Phil Taylor's papers
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BACK TO : PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS) - General. Rebranded 2010 as MISO
CA/PSYOPS in Afghanistan by Richard Davis 
Infantry Online 04/15/03 Timely News for the Infantry Community CA/Psyops in Afghanistan CA/PSYOPS in Afghanistan By CPT Richard Davis Despite my initial feelings, as an Infantryman, toward units traditionally attached to an Infantry command, I was surprised to discover the unique qualities and specialties that attached units bring to an operation or mission. While in Afghanistan, I was assigned as a Battle Captain in support of a company at one of our Battalion's Forward Operation Bases (FOB). While there, I was responsible for coordinating the movements and operations of all of the different organizations using the FOB. One of these organizations was a Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations (CA/PSYOPS) group. The CA/PSYOPS group, when compared to a traditional Infantry unit, was much different. The CA/PSYOPS soldiers wore a more relaxed uniform and practiced a lesser standard of grooming. They also maintained some facial hair as was the Afghani cultural norm. In addition, they would mix the standard U.S. military uniform with civilian clothes to appear less threatening. By doing this, they were more readily accepted by the Afghanis as equals. This bridged the culture gap. By making themselves more equal to the Afghanis, they were accepted and given a certain level of trust, which provided great benefits in Force Protection and Intelligence Operations and enhanced combat operations conducted from the FOB. The CA/PSYOPS group's greatest contribution was to Force Protection. The CA/PYSOPS group daily visited and coordinated with the local Afghan villages. On their visits, the CA/PSYOPS group persuaded Afghanis to not take an active part in inflicting harm on U.S. forces or aiding Al Qaida and the Taliban in doing so. One of the most profound tools the CA/PSYOPS group shared with the Afghanis was a video that they played for villagers on a laptop or portable digital video camera. The video was a compilation of scenes from the events of September 11, 2001, and the days following, with a Pashtun narrative explaining what happened. This proved to be the one thing the Afghans were interested in the most. None of them knew what had happened, and upon seeing the video, they understood and further supported our presence in Afghanistan. The video helped further their dislike of the Taliban and Al Qaida, and support for U.S. forces in Afghanistan grew. Through these meetings, the CA/PSYOPS group was able to aid the local villages in improving their quality of life in many ways as a means of assisting in force protection. The group helped the Afghanis plan and build an irrigation system, and throughout our tour in Afghanistan, the CA/PSYOPS group continually met with and monitored the Afghans' progress on their irrigation system. With the help and direction of the CA/PSYOPS, the village was empowered to build their own well and supporting pipe system. By helping but not doing the work, the CA/PSYOPS group developed not only a functioning irrigation system, but also an independent group of villagers who can be proud of their advancement. The CA/PSYOPS group further benefited the local Afghan villages by handing out many needed items. At schools, they would hand out pens, paper, crayons, benches which they had purchased, and other school supplies. At local hospitals or clinics, they would handout medications, blankets etc. While the CA/PSYOPS members were visiting with villages, especially schools, they would attempt to prevent injury to children from unexploded ordinance (UXO) or land mines. They would pass out and explain UXO warning posters. These were introduced in an attempt to keep the children from collecting ammunition or mines that they found. Through all of these actions, the CA/PSYOPS group elicited the support and friendship of the local Afghan villages, and through this bond prevented the injury or death of many U.S. soldiers. In addition to Force Protection, the CA/PSYOPS group also contributed to Intelligence Operations, in a very simple yet effective way. U.S. forces moved into an area and occupied a safe house or established a FOB. From the outset, U.S forces had no knowledge of who the local officials were, how they worked together, and who was potentially connected with Al Qaida and or the Taliban. Concurrent with combat operations, the CA/PSYOPS group ventured out into the surrounding villages and held meetings with the locals. During these meetings, the CA/PYSOPS group would build rapport with the Afghanis. By demonstrating genuine concern and giving the villagers humanitarian aid, they quickly developed a feeling of trust with the Afghanis. Through this relationship, the CA/PSYOPS group became people with whom the Afghanis felt comfortable giving information to regarding the locations and plans of Al Qaida and Taliban sympathizers. On numerous occasions, individuals or groups of Afghanis would approach the CA/PSYOPS group with information as to where Taliban and Al Qaida members or sympathizers were. In addition, Afghan sources would approach the CA/PSYOPS group and tell them of expected attacks on the FOB or U.S. patrols. This only occurred with the CA/PSYOPS group because the locals felt comfortable approaching them. Never did the locals approach an infantryman to divulge information. The CA/PSYOPS group would then share the information with Infantry forces which would use it to plan and execute counter attack or spoiling attack operations. With their special relationship with the Afghanis, the CA/PSYOPS group was able to contribute greatly to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process. The CA/PSYOPS took advantage of the Afghans' enthusiasm for getting their picture taken, and with a digital camera, the CA/PSYOPS group would photograph the leaders of each village and return to the FOB. At the FOB, they would build a relationship tree. By cataloging each official and what village or villages they were associated with, U.S. forces were able to determine who the most important individuals were and what information they would most likely be able to provide. In addition, U.S. forces could also determine which Afghanis should not be provided certain types of information. Whether it is Force Protection or Intelligence Operations, the CA/PSYOPS group proved to be a valuable asset. Their contributions to both of these areas not only facilitated successful combat operations but also kept U.S. soldiers alive while conducting them. Editor's Note For additional information regarding the doctrinal employment of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations elements refer to FM 41-10 (Civil Affairs Operations, Feb 00), FM 3-05.30 (Psychological Operations, Jun 00), and Joint Pub 3-05 (Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, Apr 98). |