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BACK TO : PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS) - General. Rebranded 2010 as MISO
Psychological Warfare for the Malayan Emergency by Herb Friedman 
Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.) Forty years ago when we were studying what was then called 'Guerrilla Warfare,' the Army taught us that there were just three successful cases where a legitimate government in power had beaten back a Communist insurgency. They were the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya. I can still remember a Colonel explaining that in the Philippines the victory against the HUKs was won by land reform, in Greece by tightening the borders and not allowing the guerrillas to slip into Albania for refuge and resupply, and in Malaya by separating the insurgents from the general population and letting them starve in the jungle. Since that time, there have been dozens of insurgencies, some successful, some not. I study American Psychological Operations and do not claim to be an authority on British PSYOP in Malaya. However, PsyWar specialist Lee Richards obtained copies of a number of propaganda leaflets dropped on the Malayan guerrillas and asked me to put something together in the way of a narration. The following is my attempt to tell the story of PSYOP during the Malayan campaign. If any reader cares to add to this story with personal narrations, additional leaflets or translations, they are more than welcome to do so. Although I have used a number of different sources for this brief report, The Malayan Emergency: an Example of a Successful Counter-Insurgency Campaign, by Major Zolkopli bin Hashim of the Malaysian Army is my main reference source. Because of the perceived success of the British Malayan counterinsurgency campaign, the United States Department of Defense asked the Rand Corporation to prepare a study of the British methods. America was deep in the Vietnam quagmire at the moment. That project became the 1964 Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People: Malaya, 1948-1980 by Riley Sunderland. It was issued as the 57-page Memorandum RM-4174-ISA. In fact, Rand published five such research memorandums on the Malayan Emergency, but this fifth study concerns the campaign of public information, civic action, and other persuasive measures. The study used classified British and American documents and interviews with participants of the campaign as reference material. Much of what Sunderland says is mentioned in other segments of this article and will be quoted. In regard to the Civil Service he points out that the British were careful to get the best possible people that were flexible and would be able to adapt to the Communist insurgency: The few hundred British subjects who served in the Malayan Civil Service were an elite group, so carefully chosen as to be known locally as "the heaven-born." It was clear that Britain had discarded the eighteenth-century notion that colonies and protectorates were meant to provide jobs for citizens of the mother country. As a fairly successful colony, Malaya was wooed by both the Chinese Communists and Nationalists for many years before World War II. In general, the Malayan Chinese did their trading with little regard for politics. The British were strongly anti-Communist and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had little to offer the average Malayan. There was a Malayan Communist Party (MCP), but it was small with a negligible membership. This changed in 1937 when the Empire of Japan invaded the Chinese mainland. The Communists could now claim that they needed membership and funds to protect the homeland, and using theses such as 'the National Salvation Movement' and 'Save China' organizations, the MCP increased its membership from 1,000 to about 5,000. Japan then invaded Malaya in December 1941. The communists took to the jungle where they fought a guerrilla action against the Japanese as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) until 1945. This army became a well organized underground resistance force with regiments established in the various Malayan states. It was these troops that later formed the nucleus of the guerrilla movement during the insurgency. And, like the Vietnamese who would also fight for their freedom, the jungle warfare taught the communists how to survive in a hostile environment, and enabled them to establish contact with the population along the jungle fringes. Just as the American OSS helped to train the Viet Minh, British Commando Force 136 helped to train and supply the communist guerrillas in Malaya. Like Mao in China, they plotted and planned to take power once the victorious Allies had beaten the Japanese. Upon the end of the war in August 1945, the guerrillas took retributive action against Japanese collaborators while enlisting the aid of Japanese soldiers who were expert in the making and designing of mines and booby-traps. The British returned to Malaya in September 1945 expecting business as usual. They would be surprised. C. C. Too talks about this period between the defeat of the Japanese and the return of the British in an article entitled 'Defeating Communism in Malaya', Military Review, August 1967. He says in part: During the period of the Japanese surrender, the Communists carried out 'mass trials' before the return of the Allied forces to the Malay Peninsula. Many alleged collaborators were executed during the mass trials which the local population was forced to attend. During a period of three to six months, the Communists were in complete control of the smaller towns and remote villages before the Allied forces completed the process of taking over. One of the most attractive propaganda lines of the Communists was land reform which had already proved popular and extremely effective to the landless peasants in China, and the MCP was not slow in exploiting this line. With the return of the British, the MPAJA was disbanded and their weapons were confiscated. However, the Communists had hidden caches of weapons for future use. There immediate plan was to undermine British rule and economic stability by fomenting labor strife. Under the Japanese motto of 'Asia for the Asians' and 'the Co-Prosperity Sphere,' western colonial authority had been weakened. The MCP capitalized on the grievances and the discontent of the population. There was unemployment, low wages, inflation, poor working conditions and food shortages. The Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, formed in 1946, was dominated by communists and served as the front organization for the MCP to foment labor unrest and instigate strikes. This was accompanied by intimidation, selective murders, arson and other attempts at sabotaging the Malayan economy. The Malayan Emergency took place from 1948 to 1960 as the MCP switched from an urban proletariat struggle to a rural armed revolution. During the 12-year confrontation, the Malayan Communist Party employed guerilla warfare tactics as part of its overall strategy to oust the British from Malaya. There were no true battle lines so conventional military tactics based on large-scale maneuver were not likely to succeed. The British decided from the onset that the Emergency was essentially 'a war of political ideologies.' The MCP misread British intentions and did not expect immediate emergency regulations and a strong military policy. They were just in the process of going underground and launching their 'Armed Struggle' when the British took them be surprise and launched a series of raids in June 1948. The concept of the armed struggle is a major tenet of Mao Tse-Tung's philosophy: Without armed struggle neither the proletariat, nor the people, nor the Communist Party would have any standing at all in China and it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph. In these years the development, consolidation and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of revolutionary wars; without armed struggle the Communist Party would assuredly not be what it is today. Comrades throughout the Party must never forget this experience for which we have paid in blood. We learn more about the Communist plans for conquest in The War of the Running Dogs: the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Noel Barber, Weybright and Talley, N.Y., 1971: In Phase One guerrillas would attack lonely estates and mines, police and government officials in small towns and villages, forcing the British to evacuate - This was classic Mao Tse-tung approach. In Phase two areas evacuated by the British would be re-named "Liberated Areas." In them guerrilla bases would be set up and the army expanded. In Phase Three the army would attack towns, villages, railways - Then the guerrilla army would take the field against the British, backed by the might of China if necessary, and the moral weight of Soviet Russia. Due to the quick British response, the Communists were forced to quickly relocate their movement to the jungle. Worse, for them, the economic subversion and sabotage had not been successful and the people had not rallied to their cause. On the positive side, they saw the victories of the Communist Chinese against the government of China and had reason to believe that they could also successfully fight a guerrilla war against a powerful organized enemy. When the communists took to the jungles they had every reason to be confident in their ability to survive. They had fought the Japanese for four years and the 53,240 square miles of Malaya is made up of more than four-fifths evergreen equatorial forests and undergrowth. The remainder is rubber plantations, mines, rice fields and population centers. The thick vegetation provides good concealment and protection against detection. The deployment of a large body of troops for operations is difficult and ineffective. Engagements mostly occur as a result of chance encounters unless prior intelligence has been acquired about the enemies' movements or base camps. Ambushes and fighting patrols are the normal mode of military activities in jungle warfare. Jungle bases require food and water so most bases are located at the jungle fringes. The British Colonial government declared a State of Emergency after the murder of three European planters on 16 June 1948. It is notable that PSYOP was being used already as the British now called their enemy Communist Terrorists (CTs) instead of Malayan Communists. It is always good strategy to call the enemy 'terrorists' and depersonalize them. Another frequently used term for the insurgents was 'bandit.' The term invokes negative reactions and denies the legitimacy of the opponent. The British were also careful not to call the insurrection a 'war'. It was always to be identified as 'the emergency.' Secretary of State for the Colonies James Griffiths noted that: Before I left for Malaya I had been advised not to refer to the operations as 'war,' but as 'the emergency,' and to the Malayan Liberation Army as 'bandits.' It did not take me long to find out that the so-called bandits were a well-trained, highly disciplined and skillfully led force. Noel Barber tells us more about the British use of words as PSYOP: Communist Guerrilla fighters are referred to as CTs, short for Communist Terrorists. At first they were officially labeled "bandits," until the British discovered that this word had unfortunate connotations. "Bandits" had been the identical term used by the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek to describe Communists; since neither of these powers had been successful, the use of "bandits" by the British put them on a similar level in the eyes of the Malayan Chinese. It is believed that by 1948 the guerrilla movement or Min Yuen (People's Movement) cadres had about 12,000 members. Meanwhile, the British deployed about 5,000 troops and a police force of 10,000. Within two years the British had reinforced their armed forces with an infantry brigade from Hong Kong and another from Great Britain. British soldiers on jungle patrol in Malaya Like all guerrilla forces, the MCP deliberately avoided battle wherever they were weak and likely to suffer losses. They 'hit and ran' and set up ambushes for the government troops hot on their trail. They attacked isolated police stations, rubber plantations and tin mines. They set up small ambushes, did the occasional political murder and committed sabotage as the opportunity allowed. To sustain its military activities, the MCP depended on the sympathy and support of the people. While the military arm of the MCP was conducting terrorist activities designed to dislocate the political and economic foundation of British rule, the Min Yuen was responsible for recruiting and acquiring supplies for the execution of a guerilla war. The Communists were fairly successful in their campaign of terror, killing a total of 400 civilians and torturing many others during the first year of the uprising. Their activities did not extend into the urban centers, but they ran wild in the rural rubber plantations, tin mines, smaller villages and railway stations. The MCP embarked on a protracted war, but the cost was high both in military and political terms. In the first three years of its operations, the MCP lost 2,842 men while the government security forces lost 971 killed and 954 wounded. Official statistics indicate that by the end of the 12-year Emergency, 6,710 insurgents were killed, 1,287 were captured, and 2,702 surrendered. The Communists needed the support of the people. Mao Tse-Tung said that 'The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.' The MCP needed to be able to move along the jungle fringe-dwellers to forage and trade for food and supplies. However, as they threatened the population to fuel the revolution, they alienated many of the people that they badly needed for support. Unlike the Viet Minh, the MCP was unable to rally the country to their cause by appealing to nationalism and unity. This was due partly to the ethnic composition of Malaya, with 49% Malay, 39% Chinese, 10% Indians and Ceylonese, and 2% others. Meanwhile, support for the MCP was mostly from about 500,000 of the 3.12 million ethnic Chinese. We should also note that Malaya had no great nationalist leader like Mao Tse-Tung or Ho Chi Minh to rally the people. The MCP prepared written propaganda and continued to use terror in an attempt to intimidate and control the people. In Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958, Kumar Ramakrishna talks about the use of terror by the MCP: In Bahau in October 1951 the MCP used both propaganda of word and deed to cripple the rubber tapping industry. They dragged two Chinese tappers from an estate lorry and in front of their horrified fellow workers, shot them dead. Three gang foremen also suffered the same fate. For three nights in row, pamphlets were distributed amongst the terrified tappers, warning them that if they did not stop work they would be punished as well. Fifteen terrorists dominated 6,000-7,000 tappers and brought to a complete standstill the tapping of rubber trees over 50,000 acres. Communist propaganda is mentioned in an article entitled 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders in Malaya by Donald William Martin. He says in part: My company was stationed in a small village, Kuala Krau, in Pahang. During our stay there, we were subjected to terrorist attacks although none of these were serious. They, the terrorists, would come in the night, shooting off weapons, shouting Communist slogans and scattering leaflets with Communist propaganda inside the barbed wire perimeter defenses. The gist of the message on the leaflets usually was, "Go home British soldier, this is not your fight." Rui Xiong Kee wrote about Communist publications in autumn 2003. He pointed out that the Communists published several bi-weekly newsletters and newspapers during the emergency. Examples are Battlefront, War Information, Student News, People, News Brevities, Humanity News, the Beacon, True News, Battle News and Freedom News. He explains that they were written in the vernacular of the people in a matter-of-fact tone implying that the Communists were closely connected to the people. They all attacked and demonized the British and highlighted the 'Gestapo' actions of their police force. Examples of such stories are 'British bandits raped a 50 year old Malay woman,' and 'regular troops of the British imperialists raped a 12 year old Chinese girl.' The master Communist propagandist who wrote most of the articles for these newspapers and arranged for their publication was named Osman China. Later in the war, after a year of food deprivation and living on bananas, tapioca, snake and elephant meat, China quietly surrendered to the British, bringing out many of his band and eventually talking another 40 terrorists to surrender. He was paid $80,000 for his services. The British made significant headway against the MCP in 1950. Under the direction of the retired Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, who had considerable jungle experience while fighting in Burma during World War II, the shortcomings of the government were identified. These included the lack of population control measures, inadequate intelligence, and uncoordinated military, police and civilian measures against the guerrillas. From these considerations, the 'Briggs Plan' was formulated. The guerrillas would first be separated from the civilian population that sustained them, and then defeated through coordinated civil, military and police action. The first part of the Briggs plan called for the large-scale resettlement of about 500,000 squatters in the jungle fringes to new villages. These subsistence farmers were the main source of food for the rebel army. Started in June 1950, this program resettled 423,000 Chinese squatters in 410 new villages by 1952. These new villages had a defense perimeter to ensure controlled entry and exit. The government gave every family five months worth of provisions and all the materials needed to build a house. This gave the squatters an immediate sense of ownership. The communists were now forced to come out of the jungle and into the open to search for food. It made them vulnerable to attack and ambush. In 1951 the British introduced the 'food denial' program called Operation Starvation. This program was designed to stop the smuggling of excess food to the Communists. The measures included ration reduction, punching canned food at time of purchase, strict checks by the guards on all personnel moving in and out of the villages, and forbidding meals from being brought to work areas. Communal cooking of rice was encouraged to prevent any private ownership of uncooked rice that might be smuggled to the Communists. The guerrillas were now forced to come further out of the jungle to meet their suppliers, who could be identified, 'turned,' and used as a source to set up additional ambushes. As part of the British overall strategy of 'food denial' to control provisions and interdict supplies to the insurgents, this ration card was distributed and used from 1953 to 1954. Notice the columns for rice, flour, sugar, salt and miscellaneous. While resettlement and food denial programs were the main control measures, other steps were also taken. For instance, there was a national registration. Every adult above the age of 12 was ordered to carry an identity card with his photograph, his fingerprints, and his personal particulars to include his permanent residence. Not only did this separate the Communists who dared not register from the lawful citizens, it also gave the British a database for the movement of people into the 'new villages,' a name selected to imply that there would be a new and better life for the squatters after relocation. A year later a law was passed allowing the authorities to relocate the squatters and to clean up the squatter areas. The squatters now received adequate protection from the Communist terrorists, land to build their homes, free material and assistance in building their homes, a government subsidy, free medical care; free schooling for their children, water, and good roads to the nearest township. Each new village was surrounded by a double barbed wire fence over seven feet high. Gates were manned around the clock and everyone was searched both entering and leaving. There was a 24-hour curfew outside the village and a nighttime curfew inside the village. There was always the possibility of mass arrests and individuals could be searched without warrant. The various civil, military and police services were better integrated and coordinated. Briggs reinforced the police, especially in the populated areas. Eventually, the size of the police force grew from 10,000 to 75,000. In all, the British had gone to war. Of course, the Communists attacked the registration program. They printed leaflets and posters stating that the registration was a prelude to conscription, or to make it easier for the government to raise outrageous taxes on individuals. Thousands of small printed slips of paper in Chinese, Malay and Tamil threatened death to the "Running Dogs" that registered. Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations in January 1952. Templer was briefly head of the German Directorate of Special Operations Executive in WWII so he understood unconventional warfare. His leadership provided the moving force that ensured the smooth and effective implementation of the plans formulated by Briggs. Templer reorganized the Special Branch (SB) to make it a more effective intelligence agency. The SB did not confine itself to police intelligence but was responsible for the overall collation and evaluation of intelligence derived from captured terrorists and documents, surrendered enemy personnel, double-agents, and informers. Templer built up the Malayan Home Guard, armed them with shotguns, and increased their ranks to 200,000 by 1954. The most significant aspect of Templer's handling of the Emergency was his desire to win the hearts and minds of the people. Thus, the Information Services Department and the Psychological Warfare Department kept the civilian population informed of government policies, communist atrocities and disruption activities. Templer was apparently the moving force behind what might be the most successful counterinsurgency operation in history. He had the ability to operate on a number of different levels, military, political, intellectual and social, and was at ease in all of them. John A. Nagl gives an example of his vigor, energetic personal leadership, willingness to try new methods and take-charge attitude in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, the University of Chicago Press, 2002. The author points out that Templer arrived in Malaya on 7 February 1952. About six weeks later on 25 March, 12 members of a party sent to repair a water tower were killed in a terrorist ambush. Templer immediately punished the nearest town. He imposed a 22-hour curfew, cut the rice ration in half and closed the schools. He declared: This is going to stop. It does not amuse me to punish innocent people, but many of you are not innocent. You have information which you are too cowardly to give. Every villager was required to fill out a form naming known Communists and their supporters. The resulting information led to the arrest of 40 Communists and sympathizers. The curfew was then lifted. Templer was a hands-on manager and was famous for flying to trouble spots. Sometimes his chastising of the villagers had humorous consequences. Noel Barber mentions such a case after a guerrilla ambush caused Templer to immediately fly to the nearest village where he harangued the collected inhabitants: "You're a bunch of bastards," shouted Templer; and Rice, who spoke Chinese, listened carefully as the translator announced without emotion: "His Excellency informs you that he knows that none of your mothers and fathers were married when you were born." Templer waited, then, pointing a finger at the astonished villagers to show them who was the "Tuan," added "You may be bastards, but you'll find out that I can be a bigger one." Missing the point of the threat completely, the translator said politely, "His Excellency does admit, however, that his father was also not married to his mother." Templer is praised by Dr. Klev I. Sepp in 'Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,' Military Review, May-June 2005. During the 1950s Malaya Emergency, British High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer a declared antiracist strived for political and social equality of all Malays. He granted Malay citizenship en masse to over a million Indians and Chinese; required Britons to register as Malay citizens, elevated the public role of women; constructed schools, clinics, and police stations; electrified rural villages; continued a 700% increase in the number of police and military troops; and gave arms to militia guards to protect their own community. In this environment, insurgent terrorism only drove people further from the rebels and closer to the government. Sunderland points out how Templer brought everyone into the fold: Templer took office in February 1952. On midnight, 14 September, 1,100,000 Chinese and 2,630,000 Malayans became what were called "federal citizens." The Psychological Warfare Department made use of leaflets written by ex-Communist terrorists in convincing the guerrillas to surrender. Loudspeaker aircraft were also used to convey to the guerrillas the futility of continuing the war. The British changed their military tactics. The army became a decentralized fighting force operating on a territorial basis. This was essential because in a guerilla operation there are no fixed battle lines. In this new type of warfare, patrols, ambushes, and 'hunting-squads' were the main type of military organization for fighting the Communist terrorists. With better intelligence, their encounters with the CTs were no longer by chance but now by deliberate action and systematic planning. The jungle war was essentially an infantry war. Armored vehicles were used primarily for transportation of troops. The Air Force only played a supporting role and never conducted large-scale air bombardments. In regard to village entertainment as a media for disseminating propaganda, the British brought film vans and acting troupes to the villages. Sunderland adds: In any given audience, many of the spectators, most of who were children, had never seen a film before the mobile-van unit came to their village. A special attraction was provided by troupes of surrendered enemy personnel. For a guerilla to leave the Communist Party was a profound emotional experience, akin to a religious conversion. These men, and in some cases women, were filled with revulsion against their former life and often with missionary zeal. It was only natural, therefore, to have them tour the countryside to lecture on their experience and to satirize guerrilla life. A typical party would be made up of ten ex-Communists traveling in a convoy. The Communists were also busy. Their attempts at spreading propaganda about the 'concentration camps' in the new villages had little impact. In October 1951 the MCP realized its tactical blunders in the use of terror, intimidation and murder and issued a Directive which said that instead of fighting and destroying the British, the primary objective and duty of all MCP members was to expand and consolidate the organization of the masses. It was too little, too late. The terrorists did have a brief moment of glory in 1951 when they were able to assassinate the acting British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. By 1954 the Communists were defeated and the government was in the mopping up and consolidation phase. Malaya had instituted a more liberal citizenship regulation that enabled over one million Chinese to become citizens. As a result of the compromises worked out by the various ethnic groups, independence was achieved in August 1957. The MCP could no longer claim that it was fighting for the independence of Malaya. By 1960, the Emergency was officially declared over and the Communists were totally defeated and had to retreat to their sanctuary in the Thai-Malayan border. The victory was a tribute to the British who saw that the answer to the communist challenge was found not in military escalation, but in winning the hearts and minds of the people. Psychological Warfare Malaya was a hotbed of psychological operations during WWII. Both the Allies and the Japanese produced leaflets, posters and newspapers in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the populace. To give an idea of the Allied campaign, leaflets were prepared that were coded CMA, SJM (Southeast Asia Command leaflets to Japanese troops in Malaya), SMA (SEAC appeals to citizens of Malaya to rescue pilots, etc.), and SMN (SEAC newspaper Victory Herald to citizens of Malaya). There were many other general codes for the Japanese troops in all the countries of Southeast Asia, but those we mention were specific for Malaya. At the same time the Japanese were printing anti-British leaflets and posters in an attempt to attack and humiliate the white colonialists. My favorite is an image of the surrender of Singapore that was produced both as a color postcard and as an aerial leaflet. The illustration was from a painting by Miyamoto Saburo. The Fall of Singapore The Japanese postcard description from the illustrated brochure that it came in says: The fall of Singapore - The East Asian fortress under the intrusion of the British for more than a century - fell on Showa 15th year, the 2nd month, on the 17th day at 6:40 p.m. In a single file, bearing white flags, the British officers of the Malayan Command approached our mighty army to surrender. From the right: Commanding Officer Malaya, Lieutenant General Percival; Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier General Torrance; Staff officer, Colonel Sugita; Interpreter, Ling-zhuan; Chief Administrator of the British High Command, Malaya, Major General Newbiggen, who is holding the Union Jack; and Captain Wylde who serves as interpreter. It is worth noting that the Japanese made use of PSYOP in their Singapore victory. Japanese General Yamashita was outnumbered three-to one and was nearly out of ammunition by the time he reached Singapore. Instead of acting cautiously, he cut off Singapore's water supply and dropped leaflets demanding immediate surrender. His bluff worked. When General Percival met with him hoping to negotiate, Yamashita blustered, demanded unconditional surrender and yelled, "Yes or no? Surrender of fight?" Percival had no idea that he had the stronger hand, and simply said "Yes." When the Communist guerrillas took to the jungle in what was to become known as the Malayan Emergency, the British were ready to use psychological warfare once again. F. H. Lakin wrote the classified Army Operational Research Group Report, Number 5/56 - Psychological Warfare Research: its role in the Cold War.* This 9-page report was an epilogue of some of the British actions in Malaya with conclusions about successful campaigns mounted from 1952 to 1954 that might be of value in future counterinsurgency operations. The report was prepared after extensive interviews with terrorists who had surrendered. The prisoners were interrogated in Kuala Lumpur immediately after capture. One of the more interesting facts discovered by the researchers was that psychological operations played an important part in the surrender of about half of 431 prisoners interviewed. One of the prime reasons was the continual assurance of good treatment after surrender and the use of photographs and statements of well-known terrorist leaders who had defected. It was also found that news stories about Communist military defeats tended to destroy the confidence of the insurgents. A Mark 4 RAF Auster disseminating propaganda leaflets. The use of tactical leaflets combined with attacks by government forces were very successful. In Operations Hawk and Apollo in Pahang in 1954, the combination of aggression and leafleting was credited with 60% of all the surrenders including many 'hard core' Communist cadre. The author discusses the 'To the Jungle' campaign where the insurgents are invited to return to the government: Suitable leaflets were dropped on a wide scale throughout the Federation and voice aircraft broadcasts were made to the maximum degree possible. Of 31 terrorists who surrendered shortly after this campaign, 17 had received the message by one or both of the means used. Of those, nine were positively affected in the direction of surrender... In regard to types of PSYOP media, the author says: Air broadcasting and lorry-borne equipment were the subject of a long series of trials ...the fitting of voice aircraft operations into the general campaign raised many staff problems, but such operations have been going on now quite smoothly for two years. Loudspeakers operating from the ground against active terrorists were abandoned as their range and mobility were never really satisfactory; they are, however, used by the police and by the Information Service. The evidence from Malaya indicates that psychological warfare played an important part in inducing disaffection and surrender The report ends with four recommendations: Psychological operations should begin immediately when a military conflict is inevitable. Information about possible future enemies should be collected and saved to be used as part of psychological operations when needed. PSYOP officers should be trained in every phase of research to include areas where the military has no active role. The equipment for psychological operations such as printing presses, loudspeakers, leaflet dropping apparatus, etc., should be developed immediately. One of the most prophetic statements from the 1950s report is: In any such war that the United States of America is engaged, psychological warfare methods will be employed on a large scale. They were certainly correct in that statement. Current U.S. policy calls for the use of PSYOP prior to, during, and after the end of hostilities. Flight Lieutenant A. F. Derby, M.B.E. wrote an article entitled Psychological Warfare in Malaya that discussed operations during the Emergency. He stated that the aim of the campaign in Malaya was to destroy Communist morale, to induce the terrorist to surrender, and in surrendering, to spread defection amongst his fellows. The British had complete domination of the air, and intelligence good enough to make the propaganda message very personal, sometimes on an almost man-to-man basis. The psychological warfare staff was made up of a committee headed by the Director of Operations, a staff officer, a civilian member of the Malayan Civil Service, a staff officer of the Information Service, a Royal Air Force Squadron leader and an Asian editorial staff. In regard to the machinery of psychological warfare he says that the British used the Mark 4 Auster aircraft fitted with loudspeakers on each wing to broadcast to targets on the jungle fringes, isolated villages, and small targets near roads. The Auster is a single-seat aircraft, so the pilot must not only fly and navigate, but he is responsible for changing the audio tapes while in flight controlling the aircraft with the stick held tightly between his knees. The larger American C-47 Dakota aircraft has also been used for some of the loudspeaker, or as the British call them, 'voice' missions. The Dakota has a generator capable of powering four Tannoy loudspeakers affixed to the bottom of the aircraft which can broadcast over the jungle and to remote places where a large area must be covered. The DC3 Aviation Museum website features an article entitled 'They Talked to the Trees' by Joe Neville. In it, the author tells us more about the voice aircraft. He says that Faith, Hope and Charity were the names of the three Voice-Dakotas of 267 Squadron based at Royal Air Force Kuala Lumpur, Malaya during the Malayan Jungle Campaign of the 1950's. They operated continuously for six years. He adds: The three aircraft had been specially modified for this work. Slung under the mainframe of each were four loudspeakers delivering 500 watts of audio power. In the main fuselage a large diesel engine was anchored to the floor with huge bolts and metal tie bars. This supplied the required 240v AC to the four five hundred watt amplifiers situated in each corner of the main cabin. Their size took up a major part of the main cabin. A voice operator's station facing aft was positioned on the port side just forward of the main door. From my logbook, at a glance a voice operation appears to average out at about 4 hours. Most flights were over uncharted territory. The first voice aircraft trials took place in March 1953, in a DC3 loaned by the USAF. The trials proved successful. As a result of this two Valetta aircraft of the Far East Transport Wing were converted as voice aircraft. The Valetta aircraft turned out to be totally unsuitable for the task, due to loud engine noise and high stalling speed. The DC3 had a low stalling speed and a much greater mobility and audibility. On Christmas eve 1955 we took off from the Kuala Lumpur airbase to circle the city and broadcast Christmas Carols to all the folks below. We spent 2 hours 45 minutes circling playing all the favorites. A 2,000 watt loudspeaker Dakota of the Voice Flight Detachment of 52 Squadron, RAF The Dakota is also mentioned in an article entitled Stop Press of the Jungle, by Flight Lieutenant H. G. Haines, Voice Flight Detachment of 52 Squadron, Malaya. Haines points out the loudness of the four loudspeakers, tested at 2000 watts. A Dakota was then borrowed from the Royal Australian Air Force in 1954, tested and found to be superior to the Valetta aircraft. A recommendation was made to replace the Valetta aircraft with Dakotas available in the United Kingdom. By January 1954 the British had three Dakotas and two Auster aircraft based in Kuala Lampur assigned to C Flight, of the 267th Squadron. As the war waged throughout the Malayan peninsula, the squadron became the 209th and later the 52nd. The propaganda messages were always the same: All statements must be true. This principle has been rigidly adhered to in Malaya, and it is noticeable in statements by surrendered terrorists that they never doubted information heard from voice aircraft. Threats must not be used, unless the authorities intend to, and can carry out the threatened action. The messages must be brief and clear. Words or phrases must be carefully chosen. The recordings are usually made in radio Malaya studios under ideal conditions. The recordings were made in Hakka, Mandarin, Malay, Cantonese, and other local dialects. The aircraft flies at about 70 knots with the wings level so that the message can be beamed at a specific location. The plane makes squares, always turning to the left, working toward the center at 2,000 yard intervals. Roy Follows was a Police Lieutenant with the Royal Malaya Police for about nine years during the emergency. For more than five years he was engaged on jungle operations as a platoon commander with the 10th Police Jungle Company and the 4th Police Field Force, both of which were based in Johor. He took part in some small psychological operations concentrated on a few villages outside Kuantan Pahang. He says: I was based in one of the villages, and the other two or three were in my area. The operation was called 'Jack In The Box,' and run by a British chap from the PsyWar Department. He gave me piles of leaflets which were to be to be distributed around the villages, all at the same time. I placed them at first light. According to him, this sudden impact of all the villagers waking up and finding the leaflets would be a shock to them. I sometimes came across leaflets in the Hutan [forest] while on patrol. He also mentions the loudspeaker aircraft: I also heard the 'voice aircraft' asking the Communist terrorists to throw in the towel. When you could not see the plane, it was weird to hear this booming voice coming from somewhere above the trees. I did not like the idea of terrorist traitors receiving these huge amounts of blood money. The more of their so-called comrades they could set up to be killed, the richer they became. They were nothing more than ruthless killers whose slate had been cleaned and now had changed sides motivated by money. Many of them had been responsible for the most appalling deeds. There was a sliding scale paid rate almost like union rules; in other words, the higher you were in the communist chain of command, the more cash you received. Then there was a similar scale for arms. A Bren gun was worth more then a rifle and a grenade more than a round of ammo. I understand that some of them are now rich business men through their ill gotten gains, enjoying life under false identities in Spore [Singapore], Malaysia and Australia. He concludes with a mention of small unit actions behind the lines. We formed a "Special Operation Volunteer Force" (SOVF). It was made up of surrendered terrorists. The SOVF was a shadowy, little known unit. By 1957 there were eight or nine platoons of SOVF throughout Malaya, each under the command of a Police Lieutenant. With years of jungle warfare under their belts, these hard-core former terrorists would use all kinds of tricks, including PSYOP and "black" tactics to eliminate their former comrades. They not only spread confusion amongst the CTs, they also dispatched a good number of them. In fact, the SOVF was formed in 1953 and consisted of about 180 ex-Communists grouped into twelve platoons of fifteen men each. The men and women signed up for 18 months, lived in police compounds and were paid about the same as junior policemen. Once their tour was over they were released into Malayan society with a clean slate. The British used the same tactic against the Mau Mau, using surrendered terrorists to enter the Bush and interact with their own comrades before ambushing them. The Americans did something similar in Vietnam, the Phoenix Operation, where through the use of former Viet Cong and informants they identified the infrastructure of the Communist movement in a local village or area and then took military action. Broadcasting from inside a Dakota Voice aircraft. The radio messages are short and meant for tactical rather than strategic purposes. A message might start, 'Come out and start a new life.' It will tell of guerrillas who have been killed or who have surrendered. It might bear a message from a defector to his comrades back in the jungle telling them of the good treatment he has received at the hands of the British. The Valetta cargo aircraft was used for dropping leaflets from about 400 feet over the Malayan jungle. At first the side door of the aircraft was opened and the crew dumped the leaflets out into the slip-stream. As the war against the insurgents continued, the technique was refined and they dispatched bundles of 5,000 leaflets each by means of a static line. The latter method is more accurate and gives a very even distribution of leaflets over 1000 square yards. When a very accurate pinpoint airdrop is required the Mark 4 Auster was sometimes used as was the North American AT-6 Harvard used by the Malayan Auxiliary Air Force. A Royal Air Force Valetta drops leaflets from 400 feet over the Malayan jungle. The Far East Air Force / Monthly Intelligence Summary, Sep 1954, Pt II, adds: Leaflets were usually dispatched from supply-dropping aircraft of the medium range transport force, and occasionally, bombers of the offensive support force at the conclusion of an air strike. As on supply drops, the No. 55 Air Despatch Company of the RASC provided the dispatching personnel on leaflet dropping sorties, with loads of up to 800,000 leaflets in Dakota or Valetta aircraft. It was found that a good distribution was achieved over an area 1,000 yards square by dispatching 5,000 leaflets at a time at the end of a static line. Malcolm Postgate says in Operation Firedog. Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, London, HMSO, 1992: During the entire Malayan campaign, nearly 500 million leaflets were dropped on more than 2,500 sorties and nearly 4,000 hours of aerial broadcasting were completed on a further 4,500 sorties by aircraft of the air transport support forces. There have been estimates that over 5,000 different leaflets were dropped between July 1948 and July 1960, based on the coding of these leaflets over the 12 years. The later leaflets incorporated an alphabetical code indicating the Malayan state targeted. The leaflets might contain information gathered from captured documents or gleaned from local contacts. The main theme of the leaflets is always that Communists who surrender will be treated well, receive medical treatment, food and their safety is guaranteed. Some of the main concepts of the tactical leaflets are: The group photograph which shows the surrendered terrorists in obvious good health and in company with other surrendered comrades. A personal letter written in the recognizable handwriting of a former comrade. Appeals from relatives for an individual not to waste his life. When these appeals come from wife to husband, father to son, or from other close relatives, the appeal can be great. Declarations be leading personalities which point out the futility of further resistance and promise fair treatment to those who surrender. Appeals to groups who are known to be suffering from jungle illnesses or starvation, promising them medical treatment and good food. On a monthly basis strategic leaflets are dropped on targets known to be hiding places of terrorists, courier routes or contact points. These leaflets are often of the 'divide and conquer' type and point out the difference in treatment between the terrorist leader and fighter, or ask 'Why fight against the masses?' Others offer medicines for the sick, rewards for information, and attempt to exploit any perceived weakness of the guerrilla. The reward program was very successful. In the first six months of 1951, the Government paid out $500,000 for information, defection, and weapons surrender. Barber discusses the rewards. The Communist leader Chin Peng was worth $250,000 alive, and $125,000 dead. Live terrorists were always worth twice as much as dead terrorists because they could be questioned and intelligence could be gained. Informers leading the police to dumps were lavishly rewarded at the rate of $50 for a machine-gun, $10 for a rifle and $1 for every bullet. When an informer offered to lead officers to a dump hidden half way up a hill beneath a stand of trees they found a dozen pits, each one lined with timber and containing the circular metal drums in which the arms had been parachuted to Force 136 (during WWII): Police headquarters was delighted, but also dismayed at the amount of the reward, for at the ruling prices the informer was eligible to collect more than $100,000. Some leaflets were dropped on civilians, exploiting their distaste at being forced to plant food or work as a laborer for the guerrillas. The farmer is warned that his crops will be destroyed before he can hand them over to the terrorists and advising him to immediately leave the area and walk toward the government lines. One such leaflet stated: You can hide your farm for a time, but sooner or later we will find it and destroy it. Citizens are reminded that it is their duty to inform the government of rebel movements. Since some of the Malayans are illiterate, a few of the leaflets consist of just cartoons and pictures. They are always checked by a group of ex-terrorists before being accepted for dissemination. It wasn't only leaflets that were disseminated amongst the Malayans. The British also published an anti-Communist newspaper called New Path News (Sin Lu Pao). Some terrorists have stated that the leaflets are persuasive. One said: After the attack on our cultivation area we fled to another area where we saw many government propaganda leaflets and safe conduct passes. I picked up some of the leaflets, intending to use them when coming out to surrender. A few days later we heard voices coming from an airplane calling on us to surrender and offering good treatment. We all agreed to this suggestion. Another defector said: My mind was full of thoughts of my girl friend, starvation, liquidation, the contents of government leaflets, and voice aircraft. Finally the government propaganda won and early in the morning I got up and ran away. By the early 1950s, most leaflets dropped in the jungle had a safe conduct pass on the reverse for those terrorists who wished to defect. Many were signed by the High Commissioner and promised good treatment, food, cigarettes and medical attention. In addition, other leaflets like "Hints and Advice on How to Surrender" were produced. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Leaflets There are a great number of leaflets known to have been dropped on Malaya. We will show some of them here although many are without translations. This is a living article and will be updated as we receive new images and translations. We ask any reader with information or comments to write to the author at the address at the end of this article. Although the war was officially declared over in 1954, it appears that leaflets were still being dropped on some holdouts as late as 1958. The Sunday Times of 13 July 1958 said in part: Royal Air Force aircraft today began scattering seven million leaflets over the Malayan jungle, telling the Malayan Communist Party of one of the most closely kept secrets of the emergency - the surrender of 118 terrorists in Perak State. Half a million leaflets have already been dropped over the jungle forty miles north of here (Kula Lampur) in an attempt to reach fourteen terrorists, who are all that remain of the once strong Communist force there. Between them, the 118 have about 30,000 pounds in reward money, which they earned for bringing out arms and ammunition, and for persuading others to surrender. Air Despatcher L/C Ken Thomas of 55 coy AD, RASC, throws out propaganda leaflets over the Malayan jungle in 1958. (Photos courtesy of Norman Doctor) In regard to the preparation of British leaflets, The Falling Leaf, publication of the Psywar Society, Issue 4, 1958, features a letter from a Malayan PSYOP specialist to a member: You will not find much change from the specimens sent last year, unless perhaps a slightly greater use of cartoons. We still concentrate mainly on personal approaches to individual terrorists whose circumstances are known to be unfavorable, making use of letters from their relatives whenever possible. Numbers 4907 and 5000 are examples of this. Three sets of leaflets in English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil, numbers 4580, 4786 and 4900 are a special 'Merdeka' ('Freedom') offer of very attractive surrender terms valid from September to the end of 1957. The results were so good that the offer was extended to April 1958, and then to 31 July 1958. We dropped 115 million leaflets during 1957. We have dropped 60 million in the first half of 1958. Merdeka Leaflet Translation ATTENTION ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT MESSAGE Since the federation of Malaya achieved independence on 31 August 1957, in the first seven months 215 MCP PERSONNEL HAVE COME OUT TO ACCEPT THE MERDEKA OFFER This number includes high ranking personnel who hold posts like Border Committee Secretary, Regional Committee member, etc. Even these high ranking personnel have realized that the Merdeka Offer is a good offer to accept. THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE FEDERATION, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN, IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON 27 MARCH HAD THE FOLLOWING WORDS TO SAY TO ALL MCP PERSONNEL: 215 of your comrades have already accepted the Merdeka Offer which is the largest number for any similar period since the emergency began. This merdeka offer is still open, and is being extended until 31 July. I know there are many more of you who want to come out. If any of you were thinking of holding out in the mistaken idea that operations against you will be relaxed after my target date of 31 August 1958 I give you this warning. THERE WILL BE NO RELAXATION WHATEVER AFTER THAT DATE. 4786/HPWS/181, THIS MERDEKA OFFER IS NOW EXTENDED TO THE 30TH APRIL 1958. (Illustration courtesy of Norman Doctor) Leaflet 4786/HPWS/181 is a two-sided Merdeka amnesty leaflet. On the front it depicts the letter to the insurgents at left signed by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the English language text along the right side and bottom reads: THIS MERDEKA OFFER IS NOW EXTENDED TO THE 30TH APRIL 1958. ATTENTION THE GUARANTEE THAT GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PROSECUTE THOSE COMMUNIST HELPERS WHO ASSIST IN INDUCING M.C.P PERSONNEL TO ACCEPT THIS OFFER IS ALSO EXTENDED UNTIL 30TH APRIL 1958. The back of the leaflet features a safe conduct message in English and the three main Malay languages. It is: SAFE CONDUCT PASS TO MCP PERSONNEL 1. This safe conduct pass will help you come out of the jungle safely. 2. Wave this safe conduct pass when you meet anyone. TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 1. The bearer of this SAFE CONDUCT PASS wishes to leave the jungle and come out to the authorities. 2. Please help the bearer to do so - there will be a reward for you. Notice that the leaflets no longer use the word 'Surrender,' but instead say 'come out.' It was believed that this would make it easier for the Chinese guerrilla to defect while saving face. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- John C.W. Field mentions the Malayan Emergency leaflets in his book, Aerial Propaganda Leaflets, Francis J. Field Ltd., Sutton Coldfield, England. He says in part: Leaflets in Malaya seem to have been of two main types; those explaining to the terrorists the futility of their ill-spent campaigns, and those inviting them to surrender and hand over information concerning the whereabouts of Communist Party members. Three languages were in use; Chinese, Malayan and Tamil. One of these (452) in Chinese, was from the bandit Lam Swee who had surrendered, and was writing to his 'former comrades in the jungle.' The leaflets are found on blue, orange and yellow paper, according to the language. Another typical leaflet is 459, which can be found in all three languages. This sets out the rewards to be paid for anyone giving information which would lead the security forces to the capture or extermination of a bandit. The rewards, varying from 30,000 dollars in respect to the Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee, to 1,000 dollars in respect of ordinary party members, were tabulated on special moisture-resisting paper. Most examples of this type date from December 1950. A press report of 6 May 1953 stated that the British High Commissioner in Malaya (General Sir Gerald Templer) had allowed his signature to be applied for the first time to safe conduct passes, since previous unsigned appeals had been a failure. The new surrender leaflet is in the three native languages and English: The bearer of this pass wishes to surrender. He is to be given good treatment, food, cigarettes and medical attention if required. He is to be taken as soon as possible to the nearest senior police officer. Later, on 8 May 1953, the associated Press reported that 4 million surrender passes were dropped by the R.A.F. during the month of April. Ramakrishna identifies other leaflets such as 'Attacks on worker's homes' (348), 'Extortion from farmers' (349), 'The killing of worker's children' (351), and 'Damages to worker's transport' (362). He translates leaflet 367: If you want to save yourselves, the only thing to do is leave the jungle. If you do not do so, the Government will use more troops and bombs against you. Your doom will be certain. COME OUT QUICKLY AND SAVE YOUR LIVES. He says that leaflet 341, produced in March 1950, depicts the photographs of two dead terrorists, Chee Kiong and Ah Fong alias Eng Seng. The text in part is: Why suffer the horrible fate of these two foolish men? Why not take the opportunity to surrender given to you by the Government before it is too late? Why endure unnecessary hardships and starvation and face death in the jungle, when food and medical attention await you when you surrender? Those who voluntarily surrender have all been well treated. None of them have been sentenced to death for carrying arms. He points out that during 'Anti-Bandit month,' March 1950, the government produced 170,000 posters, 4,100,000 leaflets, 40,000 booklets and other materials. Other leaflets found in a search through the archives are 'Interrogation of Chai Soo of 36 Platoon, 8th Independent Company, Perak' (260) and 'Islam or Communism?' (258). The government produced propaganda leaflets by the millions. It printed and disseminated 50 million in 1948 and 51 million in 1949. In 1950 35 million leaflets were distributed. In addition, there were twelve mobile unit teams that brought the government story to the people through Chinese speakers. T. N. Harper tells us more in The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge University Press. When an amnesty was announced in September 1955, 1,318,000 leaflets announcing this rained down on the State of Perak alone, and in 1957, 116,000,000 were dropped over Malaya. We know that shortly after the Malayan elections of 31 July 1955, 12,000,000 copies of the following amnesty leaflets were dropped: The holder of this pass wishes to accept the general amnesty arrangement declared by the Federation Government. Instructions have been given to all security forces, police, military and government officers, to look after the holder of this pass carefully and treat him fairly. They will be held responsible for carrying out these instructions. 1955 seems to have been the high point for leaflet production. Gay Jordan Simpson says in Lessons from Malaya: Not by Bombs Alone, JFQ, summer, 1999: During the peak year of 1955, 141 million leaflets were dropped, including safe conduct passes, parodies of the enemy leadership, reports of the deaths of key Communists, and even enticements to pregnant female terrorists to surrender so their babies could be born in a Government hospital. During an earlier amnesty in 1949 a Government leaflet said in part: The Government recognizes that some terrorists have been forced to join the Communists and have still managed to avoid becoming assassins or committing other more dastardly crimes against defenseless persons planned by Communist leaders. The law has been altered to allow such persons to surrender without being executed for carrying arms. Come in as quickly as you can because this offer will not be open indefinitely. Do not be afraid of harsh treatment when you come in. Your circumstances will be fully understood by the Government. Richard J Aldrich, Gary Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley mention another amnesty leaflet in The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda, and Special Operations, Routledge. In preparation for a September 1955 amnesty a leaflet was prepared that said in part: To all who have taken up arms against the Federation of Malaya and those who have consorted with them Those of you who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offense connected with the Emergency which you have committee under Communist direction, either before this date, or in ignorance of this declaration. The Government will conduct investigations on those who surrender. Those who show that they genuinely intend to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and to give up their communist activities, will be helped to regain their normal position in society and be reunited with their families. As regards the remainder, restrictions will have to be placed on their liberty but if any of them wish to go to China their request will be given due consideration. In mid-March 1956 another amnesty was announced and another leaflet was prepared that was almost identical to the one just mentioned. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No. 256, Now is the time to save yourself! (Illustration courtesy of Benjamin Seet) Leaflet 256 is a very early all-text amnesty pass from September 1949 on white paper with a red border. It has been reported that of 207 terrorists who surrendered between September and December 1949, 48 were as a direct result of reading leaflet 256. The text below the British Seal is: NOTICE To team members of the so called "Malayan Races Liberation Army" and the staff of "Min Yuen." Government Officials are aware that many people were coerced and deceived into joining the Communist Party's illegal actions. Now, those Government Officials are giving these same people a chance to save themselves. The law has been amended so that whoever surrenders to the officials right now and brings in their weapons will be spared from prosecution. This amendment has been announced by the Government authority. Whoever was deceived into joining the Communist Party after the emergency, and has not been forced by the Communist Party leaders to murder, or those that have not done any brutal acts to harm the people, will enjoy this pardon. To these people, now is a chance to rescue their life. NOW IS THE TIME TO SAVE YOURSELF! Muster up your courage. Plan immediately to escape from the Devil's clutches. If possible, bring out your weapons. Immediately surrender to the authorities. You can go to any Government department, institution, or representative to surrender. If you feel that it's easier to meet with your most trusted friend to surrender, then do it that way! If you do not believe this notice, you can ask your friends and relatives. Or if you have the chance, you can enquire from the people situated in the free areas. Most of your friends have already surrendered. Don't be afraid that the government will treat you harshly. The government fully understands your situation. If you still have any doubt, you can enquire about the treatment received after surrender from the people that have already taken the opportunity to save themselves. Please make up your mind immediately! This opportunity will not be offered indefinitely. Federation of Malaya High Commissioner [Signature of Henry Gurney] September 1949 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comrade Yuen Saik Leong Leaflet One leaflet dropped over the Malayan Communists depicts a Communist commissar standing behind a blinded soldier about to kill him with a dagger. Notice that the soldier is identified as well as his best friend. It is clear that the British have excellent intelligence and have prepared a leaflet for a specific individual. That must be very scary when you think you are anonymous and hiding in the bush. The text is: Comrade Yuen Saik Leong You can save your sight you can save your life The accident which damaged your eyes has put you in |