Phil Taylor's papers
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BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GLOBAL 'WAR' ON TERROR (GWOT) Years 1 and 2, ie 9/11-2003
Hearts and Minds? First, Just Win by Wayne Downing 
Hearts and Minds? First, Just Win By Wayne Downing Sunday, December 7, 2003; Page B07 The recent U.S. crackdown in the Sunni Triangle of Iraq is more than a change in tactics. It appears that the American commanders have devised a daring and risky campaign based on a new reality: that winning the hearts and minds of the Sunni Arab population is less important than winning a decisive victory over a growing insurgency that threatens the larger U.S. strategy in Iraq. The American intent has been clear from the start. The military must establish a degree of security that will allow the coalition to achieve the three key goals of establishing a stable, representative government, restoring basic services to a deprived population and building a free-market economy from a failed socialist state. The problem is that an anti-coalition insurgency has gotten out of hand and has created serious security problems, especially in the triangle region around Baghdad. Conventional wisdom asserts that winning the hearts and minds of the people is absolutely essential to success in an insurgency. Certainly U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine based on our experience in Vietnam and even as far back as the Philippine insurrection at the turn of the last century validates this dictum. U.S. forces clearly pursued this objective when they started their counterinsurgency campaign this past summer -- but with mixed success. Until early October, U.S. and coalition forces attempted to treat the entire civilian population (Shiites, Kurds, Sunnis, Turkomen, Assyrians) with kid gloves throughout the country. As the violence escalated -- helicopters shot down, fixed sites bombed, patrols and convoys ambushed, police and political leaders targeted -- it became clear that U.S. forces would have to be more aggressive in the insurgent strongholds in the Sunni Arab region. Reviewing progress in pacifying the Sunni Triangle, I believe that American military leaders finally concluded that their restrained tactics were not dampening the insurgency and were never going to win the hearts and minds of the Sunnis as long as the people were dominated by former regime loyalists and the insurgents. So why try? It was time to take off the gloves. That is exactly what we are seeing: large, well-coordinated cordon and search operations prompted by the best available intelligence; willingness to enter known insurgent strongholds and directly engage the enemy even though these areas might be heavily populated; destruction of insurgents' homes with smart bombs; and sweep operations that round up all likely suspects and turn them over to trained Arab interrogators for determination of their true status -- insurgent or innocent. These aggressive operations, which are very much like those employed by the Israeli Defense Forces, are daring and risky, but it appears this campaign is beginning to take insurgents off the street and, more important, is developing useful intelligence that leads to further fruitful operations. This is a virtuous cycle for the United States, but time may not be on our side. Will our aggressive tactics produce success before we inflame the entire Iraqi population as well as the Sunnis against us? Will Muslim, and perhaps world, opinion, which has thus far been relatively quiet, turn further against U.S. efforts in Iraq? We have some yardsticks we can use to measure progress. Do the insurgent attacks in the Sunni Triangle abate? Do we capture or kill Saddam Hussein and Izzat Ibrahim, one of his top aides? Does the security situation improve enough to reestablish Iraqi police and security forces in the Sunni Triangle? Does the majority of the Sunni population begin to "see the light" and start to cooperate with the coalition and participate in rebuilding the country? It will be the new year before answers to some of these critical questions are apparent and give some indication whether this new campaign is working, but for now that campaign is clearly underway. The writer, a retired Army general, commanded U.S. Special Operations forces and was deputy national security adviser in the current administration. He now serves as chairman of the new Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. |