Phil Taylor's papers
|
BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GLOBAL 'WAR' ON TERROR (GWOT) Years 1 and 2, ie 9/11-2003
The Propaganda War by The Economist 
The story that prompted this web folder Fighting terrorism The propaganda war Oct 4th 2001 From The Economist print edition It is needed to sustain the immediate battle, but also to win the peace Reuters EVERY day during the build-up of American forces around Afghanistan, it has seemed that the first military action against the al-Qaeda terrorist bosses and their hosts, the country's Taliban regime, must be just "a few days away". So numerous have been the journalists clustered in and around the expected frontline and so scarce has been the news that some have even reported upon what they say have been the first skirmishes, though more in the hope of accidentally being right than because of any actual information. Frustrated, some of the journalists have even begun to return home. The first attacks may indeed be just "a few days away". But another sort of war is already under way, one in which journalists are already playing an important role as a conduit or filter, though not just the scribblers and broadcasters from the West. It is the propaganda war. That word has come to have a derogatory meaning, of the dissemination of untruths. In this case, America's task is (in truth) to disseminate truths, about its motives, about its intentions, about its current and past actions in Israel and Iraq, about its views of Islam. For all that, however, this part of the war promises to be no easier to win than the many other elements of the effort. Questions of evidence Success in the propaganda war is a vital preparation for military action; it will be vital if the coalition of allies is to be maintained during that action and amid the inevitable setbacks; and it will be most vital of all if defeats of these particular terrorists are to be followed up, as they should be, by a wider effort to make the ensuing peace more secure, within Central Asia and the Middle East as well as at home. In this war, the United States has so far been quite successful. The appalling scale and nature of the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on September 11th were enough to bring most of the coalition of supporters together, putting aside some of their old differences and resentments. The truth of the World Trade Centre was self-evident. The resolute but mostly well-measured response by President George Bush and his cabinet, combined with some nimble diplomacy, then made that coalition larger than could have been predicted on September 10th, especially among the countries surrounding Afghanistan. The task now, though, is to keep that coalition together. This is tricky, as there are pressures in several directions (see article). Public opinion in Western Europe and the United States does not seem to be impatient for military action, but as time goes on and the television cameramen search for useful ways to spend their time, so more and more images will appear of starving Afghan refugees, of innocents displaced or innocents liable to be caught in the crossfire. That argues for speed. Afghanistan's neighbours and countries in the Arab world, however, are nervous about hasty action. Governments there are concerned about their own publics' opinions, and the views of powerful factions within their countries. This argues for caution, and for careful preparation. Most of all, though, it argues for the release of some of the evidence for the guilt of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. This is a practical rather than a moral matter. The United States needs to retain the support of Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others. To be able to fend off their own critics and enemies, those countries' governments need to be able to show that they are assisting in a just cause, rather than merely doing the American hegemon's bidding. It has been useful that some of the evidence has been shown privately to governments, both in Europe and on the frontline. But, it would be best if some evidence were to be put into the public domain, probably just at the moment when military action begins. The tour of the main Arab and Muslim allies by Donald Rumsfeld, Mr Bush's defence secretary, which began on October 3rd, offers a good opportunity if it is to coincide with military strikes. The evidence does not have to amount to a full case for the prosecution of the sort that might convince a jury: that would be impractical and would risk giving away too many secrets. Yet it needs to be enough to help the frontline governments to keep their critics at bay. In the past, they have not been good at that. Some, indeed, especially in the Arab world, have collaborated in disseminating a view of America and its foreign policy that has been hostile to a fault. Iran is the most aggressive in this regard, and its conservative clerics resumed their noisy criticism of America last week. But it is not alone. One cause célèbre in Arab minds is, naturally, Israel (see article). One of America's most immediate worries is whether violence between Israelis and Palestinians could lead to desertions from the coalition - and what to do about it. That is why President Bush slipped a mention of support for an eventual Palestinian state into public comments this week. He and his officials will now need to do more, not only to persuade Israel to moderate its army's actions (see next leader) but also to persuade Arab governments to tell their people that that is what it is doing. The shadow of Saddam Armed even with the truth, America is not going to be able to win round the hearts and minds of Muslims, especially Arabs, within a matter of weeks or even months. But it can hope to gain their acquiescence, through the information disseminated by their governments. It also has a longer-term task, however: that of garnering support for whatever new regime or structure it wishes to encourage in Afghanistan, to succeed the Taliban. For that task, it needs to think back to the Gulf war. Iraq poses both an immediate propaganda challenge and a lesson about what not to do when you have won a war. The immediate challenge is that, both within the Muslim world and in the West, it is widely believed that American-led sanctions and the no-fly zones enforced by American and British fighters have led directly to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children. America, it is said, has a double standard: it supports Israel in responding to murders of Israeli citizens but cares little when Arab children die. The true cause of those deaths is Saddam. Although sanctions contribute to his country's impoverishment, it is he who has chosen to restrict the distribution of food and medicine that is permitted by them, and facilitated by an "oil-for-food" programme, both directly and by siphoning off some of the resources for himself. Nevertheless, the truth is that sanctions have failed, on two counts. They have failed to bring down the Iraqi dictator. And they have allowed him to win his own propaganda war, by associating America with dying children. As the campaign proceeds against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, America will need again to take up its argument with Saddam, in order to fend off Arab criticism. Humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees, and demonstrable care about civilian casualties there, will play an important role. But also, those Iraqi children are likely to come up again. America must have its arguments ready, but also a plan to revive reforms to the sanctions (dubbed "smart" sanctions) that Russia (among others) scuppered at the United Nations in July. The longer-term lesson, though, is even more important. In 1991, when the American-led coalition drove Iraq's tattered army out of Kuwait, it stopped short of bringing down Saddam Hussein himself. President Bush's father was nervous that Iraq might descend into chaos, or that America might be left with an enduring entanglement there, and so were his neighbouring allies. The result has been disastrous. Saddam remains in power; efforts to contain his military strength through UN inspections were only partially successful and helped to stoke Arab resentment; and sanctions have allowed him to play the victim. With an eye on what might happen if the Taliban regime is toppled, many are saying again that it might be better not to go that far. The risk of chaos is too great. The Iraqi lesson, though, points the other way. The risk of leaving a defeated regime in place is too great: a focus for resentment, it will in time turn the propaganda war against you. If you fight a war, you have to be willing to deal with the consequences of victory. Copyright © 2003 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved. |