Phil Taylor's papers
|
BACK TO : The Bush Doctrine - Key Speeches & Analysis
Realists and Idealists: Interpreting the Bush Doctrine by Geoffrey Kemp 
Realists and Idealists: Interpreting the Bush Doctrine By Geoffrey Kemp From the August 25, 2002 edition of Al-Ittihad On June 1, 2002, President Bush announced a new preemptive military strategy that will seek out and destroy threats to the United States before they take place. Does the "Bush Doctrine" represent a realistic view of the world since September 11th, 2001, one shared by America's friends and allies or, alternatively, does it reflect a new American penchant for unilateralism and exceptionalism? The most likely target of a U.S. preemptive strike remains Iraq. As the debate about Iraq intensifies, two distinct points of view have emerged among those who believe that Saddam Hussein's regime poses a growing threat that must be confronted. The first school consists of "realists" who believe that, despicable as the Iraqi regime is, the only serious threat it poses to the outside world is its possession and possible use, directly or indirectly, of weapons of mass destruction. Thus the focus of American policy must be the removal of these weapons. This should preferably be achieved either by UN arms inspections or by covert means. If this is not possible and the overt use of force is necessary, it must be done with the clear, unequivocal support of the UN and key allies and friends in Europe and the Middle East. In this context the structure of any post-Saddam Hussein regime should be molded and managed by an international coalition, not by the U.S. alone. To achieve these objectives, President Bush has to convince his own party, the Congress, key allies, and the UN that the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction is real, that Saddam Hussein is in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and that his flagrant violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) must not be allowed to stand. The President needs to make the case in the context of U.S. international commitments and to point out to the rest of the world why countries who sign international arms treaties and violate them must be punished and this is why Iraqi behavior is so unique and so dangerous. If Iraq is not stopped then how long will it be before other countries walk away from international treaties and develop WMD? The realists worry that unilateralists in the Bush Administration who pour scorn on arms control treaties reinforce the likelihood of weapons proliferation and thereby increase the very dangers the United States is so eager to identify. The realists are particularly concerned that the precedent of unilateral, pre-emptive war will be adopted by other countries who face terrorism threats, including Russia, China, and India. The second school, dominated by neoconservative opinion both inside and outside the administration, has a much broader and more ambitious agenda. In the case of Iraq, Saddam's possession of WMD is merely the rationale for changing the regime. The ultimate purpose is to reconfigure the Muslim Middle East and to nurture new regimes that will be democratic, pro-American, and conform to international human rights standards. The rhetoric of the neoconservatives has reached such levels of intensity that some believe their vision is overly romantic; others argue it is neocolonialist and imperialist. Their eagerness to label regimes "evil" and corrupt and to talk about reconfiguring the geopolitical map of the Middle East as part of the war against terrorism and extremism is evidence of their far reaching ambitions. However one problem with this high blown rhetoric is that it runs up against the reality that the United States has to deal with the region as it is, not as the U.S. hopes it will be. The test case for the administration is Afghanistan where the situation remains very precarious. The stability of the Karzai government is dependent on a small international peacekeeping force in Kabul and the goodwill of the governments in Iran and Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Russia. The Administration finds itself caught between its own rhetoric concerning "good" and "evil" especially concerning Pakistan. General Musharraf's decision to extend his dictatorial powers can be excused as necessary to ensure stability in Pakistan and avoid the possibility that a radical regime will take over and control the nuclear weapons. Yet clearly what Musharraf is doing runs counter to the pursuit of a new democratic order throughout the greater Middle East. Likewise the war against Al Qaeda requires intelligence cooperation with countries such as Syria, whose human rights record ranks one of the worst in the world. While the United States has slapped Egypt's wrist over the jailing of the sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim by not granting Egypt an increase in its aid budget, the Administration realizes that Egyptian cooperation, in one form or another, is essential for the war on terrorism and possible action against Iraq. The President's more centrist supporters believe his arguments for military action against Saddam Hussein must be more substantial and less emotional. Iraq's determination to reconstitute its WMD is an unacceptable threat and must be confronted. But how to do it and when to do it remains highly controversial both in the U.S. and among key allies. |