Phil Taylor's papers
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BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GWOT Year 5 - 2006
Military Use of Propaganda in Iraq by R M Gerecht (more on above) 
Opinion: Military Use of Propaganda in Iraq Reuel Marc Gerecht Fellow, American Enterprise Institute/Fmr. CIA case officer Tuesday, January 10, 2006; 3:30 PM Reuel Marc Gerecht , a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former CIA case officer, will be online Tuesday, Jan. 10, at 3:30 p.m. ET to discuss his op-ed about the use of propaganda by the U.S. military in Iraq. Submit your questions and comments before or during today's discussion. ____________________ Studio City, Calif.: Your op-ed conflates several issues, thus obfuscating and dodging the real ethical questions raised by the Pentagon's use of propaganda in Iraq. As the LA Times initially reported on 11/30/05, the U.S. military was "secretly paying Iraqi newspapers to publish stories written by American troops" and presenting them as "unbiased news accounts written and reported by independent journalists." This is far different from helping to support a newspaper without its editors' knowledge and certainly a far cry from translating a pre-existing book and distributing it (you fail to disclose the book or the leader). Parse the specifics if you wish, but for instance, when I hear Robert Novak speak, I expect a particular political slant but I do not expect to hear that he was paid money by an outside entity to espouse a specific view, as was the case this for Armstrong Williams, several thinktank writers (for Abramoff), and apparently, those that wrote for the Pentagon. Advocacy is far different than propaganda but I'm sure you know this. You touch on this briefly when you state that in past programs the CIA had not "manipulated the final product." This cannot realistically be said of the Pentagon. While I (and other readers, I'm sure) appreciate a thoughtful, contrarian piece, as of yet you've only provided an interesting sidebar to the real issues. The use of propaganda raises profound ethical issues, especially given our stated goal of spreading democracy in Iraq. The other key issue is, is it effective? You write that one can't gauge the full effective of covert operations, but you suggest they have been highly useful in the past. Have you read -any- (independent) source in Iraq in the Middle East that has praised or defended this use of propaganda? It makes us look, very, very bad, and further undercuts our credibility. Your chief objection to the current operation is that it was botched. Do you really think an Iraqi family still without steady electricity, clean water, or income is going to be swayed by reading an upbeat newspaper article? Do you really think, even -before- the propaganda revelation, such articles were not suspect to Iraqis, who are accustomed to state-controlled news? (Read Morley's world news blog.) If we really want to win "hearts and minds," our energy would be better served focussed on performance, not PR. Reuel Marc Gerecht: You bring up several questions. I'll just answer a few. First, I don't think it is ethically or professionally wise for US officials to masquerade as journalists, if that is in fact what happened. I have no problem at all with the US government paying Iraqis, overtly or covertly, to start newspapers that promote democracy. I have no problem with the US government paying Iraqi intellectuals and scholars to write about post-Saddam Iraq and the merits of an open society. I don't see US covert sponsorship as necessarily corrupting---if so, then you have damned an amazing number of the best Western minds of the twentieth century. An examination of Cold War history I think leads one to the opposite conclusion: that covert US aid helped Europeans to establish a free and vigorous civil society. Is this work effective? This is an excellent question. When looking at the enormous range of CA projects in the Cold War, I certainly can't answer that question case by case. These things are cumulative. The evil of Soviet communism certainly by itself was the best teacher, but if we recall, the number of people, particuarly on the left, who did not see this evil, who recoiled from appending the word to the USSR and its satellites, was astonishing. Even in the 1980s, when the nature of the regimes should have been evident to the blind, deaf, and dumb. The debates that the CIA helped provoke--the platforms that it covertly funded--unquestionably, I think, helped to expose this villany and the weaknesses in the arguments on the other side---particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. Best, RMG _______________________ Washington, D.C.: I look forward to published responses to Mr. Gerecht's article. His Cold War analogies, to the extent that they point to anything other than conjecture, seem inapposite to me: in this age of internet and satellite communications nothing stays covert for long. And once the US propoganda becomes public knowledge, as it has and as it will, isn't it just one more weapon to be used against our interests? Reuel Marc Gerecht: Actually, internet and satellite communications don't change at all the basic rules of running covert operations. Some covert operations will become pubic. That was true in the 1950s, and thereafter. Most didn't however. And even when they do, their achievements are not necessarily compromised. Encounter, for example. Organizing and funding anti-communist socialist labor movements in Western Europe would be another. There are many more. Best, RMG _______________________ Wichita Falls, Tex.: I don't think you addressed the main criticism of the Lincoln Group program: that its anti-free press nature damages our efforts to create a democratic society. When we don't practice what we preach, we look like hypocrites with ulterior motives. All of the CIA programs you mention--RFE/RL, book distribution, and funding of opposition press--were rooted in the idea of and worked to spread free speech. Covert or not, they were honest. The Lincoln Group program, however, puts a false name on our own content. It tells Iraqis that we're willing to lie to them to win them over. Doesn't this run counter to our goals to establish democracy in Iraq? Reuel Marc Gerecht: The vast majority of CIA programs during the Cold War were covert and in that sense falsely labelled. The historical case for these programs aiding the growth of free speech and free inquiry in post-war Europe is pretty strong. I don't ethically or professionally see why the case should be different in Iraq. I would, however, stop using the Lincoln Group and force Langlety to again develop the expertise necessary to conduct covert operations in Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East. Best, RMG _______________________ Alexandria, Va.: Why did the CIA move away from propaganda operations? And how can it move back in to that field of work? Reuel Marc Gerecht: Within the clandestine service of the CIA, there was from birth tension between the covert-side of the house and the practicioners of espionage. To make a very long story unacceptably short, espionage won and covert action passed into desuetude after the Reagan years. Best, RMG _______________________ Washington, D.C.: Have you ever been affiliated in any way, shape, or form with the Lincoln Group, yourself, as has your colleague Michael Rubin? If so, have you ever been compensated in any way, shape, or form for any work or consultation you've done for them? Reuel Marc Gerecht: No. _______________________ Washington, D.C.: I read your article and couldn't help but think that the comparison between Iraq and Western Europe is a difficult one to sell. Western Europeans after World War II were not nearly as suspicious of American ambitions in the region as Arabs tend to be today. More to the point, it appears that the taint of American influence really does have the undesired effect of discrediting those who may, for their own reasons, agree with our policies. Reuel Marc Gerecht: I would argue that the objective of American "proganda" in the region is not to go out and find "pro-American" idealists; the objective is to create platforms and support individuals who oppose the dictatorships in the region and can advance arguments against bin Ladinism. The practical result of this will often be anti-American (as will the growth of democracy in the region--think of the experience in Latin America as it democratized, and then amplify the effect several times). Given the enormous dissatisfaction and anger in the region against the regimes in place, finding individuals who will, either knowingly or not, advance our goals properly understood shouldn't be that hard. The reverse would probably true. Best, RMG _______________________ St. Petersburg, Fla.: Re: "Nevertheless, one has to give the Pentagon credit: It seems to be the only government agency that is at least trying to develop Iraqi cadres to wage the "hearts and minds" campaign." Yes, DOD has been given the funds to wage a "hearts and minds" campaign and the State department has not. Why? What does it say about American political culture that engaging the world in a battle of ideas -- once seen as political struggle -- now is seen as a function of war? Reuel Marc Gerecht: The State Department also has funds for public diplomacy and other hearts-and-minds grass roots efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. In principle, there is nothing wrong at all with State doing this work. However, what I was talking about in the piece is covert-action support. In many areas of the Middle East, covert action can be a good vehicle--often the only vehicle--for supporting those fightinng for greater political freedom. State can't handle that (the once, back in the 1940s it tried), does not want to handle this. Neither really can the Pentagon. However, the CIA is missing in action. Best, RMG _______________________ Toronto, Canada: Care to comment on Doug Feith's misinformation efforts? Reuel Marc Gerecht: I'll allow Mr. Feith in his forthcoming book to discuss his successes and failures. Best, RMG _______________________ Bloomington, Ill.: Is it possible that some of the money paid for pro-American stories wound up in the hands of terrorists who later used the money to support insurgent activities? Reuel Marc Gerecht: Ask the Lincoln group. Mechanically, the flow of funds, which doesn't appear to be large, wouldn't seem particularly swift or guaranteed. Regrettably, I don't think the insurgency or the holy warriors are hurting for funds. Best, RMG _______________________ Washington, D.C.: Mr. Gerecht, I read your op-ed with great interest today, and I agree that covert and non-covert propaganda is an often overlooked factor in historical analysis of the end of the Cold War. We know from former Eastern European and Soviet dissidents that the messages about human rights and the sanctity of the individual carried through radio, print, scholarly and other exchanges, etc., resonated behind the Iron Curtain. Part of the success Americanization strategies in Europe is attributable to the shared Judeo-Christian heritage of Western countries (and I include the former Soviet Union in that construct). Liberal notions of limited government, natural rights, the social compact that are at the base of the American system grew from Locke, French philosophes, and others who questioned absolutism and the divine rights of kings. These ideas influenced Russian revolutionaries, such as Aleksander Herzen, in the 19th century as well. Central to Liberalism are the ideas that government exist only with consent of the government and that if government abuses its power, the people have a right/responsibility to call for change. In this philosophy democracy is the creation of popular will, that grows organically from a shared need for the state to protect human's natural rights to life, librety, and property. It's fallacious to assume that an outside third party can use military power to impose democracy (or any other system of government) on people who have not asked for it. What, if any effect, can post-war, CIA or even USIA overt propaganda have when the U.S. is seen as an invader, not a liberator? Reuel Marc Gerecht: I'm not so sure the Germans and the Japanese viewed the Americans as liberators. _______________________ North Haven, Conn.: Since covert CIA propaganda is such a force for good in promoting U.S. policy, do you advocate it for the home territory? Why or why not? Reuel Marc Gerecht: We have the New York Times at home. Best, RMG _______________________ Washington, D.C.: I'd like to ensure that the discussion clearly delineates between the typical purveyors of propaganda, i.e., psyops or special forces, which is fully expected, and the newer practice of using the news media to spread propaganda. As a former Army public affairs officer and the former director of public affairs for all U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan, I am fully against the use of the news media to spread propaganda. The U.S. government, and as an extension its military, must maintain a credible and truthful relationship with the news media. People must continue to believe that when a commander or public affairs officer speaks through the media, he/she is telling the truth. And in our global information society, using the excuse that only local media are being used for propaganda purposes is no longer valid. Anything published in the news media can find its way to U.S. media, thereby serving to "propagandize" Americans, which is clearly forbidden by U.S. law and DOD regulations. Reuel Marc Gerecht: I don't think the US military should be involved with founding newspapers or academic foundations or funding journalists. It isn't wise. Best, RMG _______________________ Pasadena, Calif.: I think an integral part of democracy is a free press. Don't you feel you interfere with democracy when you interfere with a free press? Doesn't "free" mean free from government interference? Reuel Marc Gerecht: Iraq isn't the United States. Neither was France, Germany, and Italy after WWII. The objective is to nourish those who want to advance political freedom. As the Cold War should have taught us all, these things do not happen in a vacuum. We countered the Soviet Union in Western Europe; I see no moral reason why we shouldn't counter are enemies in Iraq. Best, RMG _______________________ Denver, Colo.: Underneath Reuel Marc Gerecht's opinion piece about covert communication is the marginalization of a serious moral debate. Certainly the U.S. government has used propaganda in the past, as have other governments throughout history, but is this what we want our government to be doing today? Reuel Marc Gerecht: Do you think US support to a wide variety of anti-communist liberal and socialist organizations in Western Europe was wrong? Do you think CIA efforts to support the anti-communist socialist labor movement in Western Europe was wrong? Best, RMG _______________________ West Orange, N.J.: Who or what finances Iraq's SCIRI, AMS, and other religious parties or fronts? Do they have substantial budgets, or are they shoe string? Is there any site that translates to English the most widely-read or watched opinion leaders in the Middle East? I am aware of MEMRI, but some say it highlights extremists. Has the U.S. intervention in Iraq increased or decreased stability and the threat of terrorism? Was it a mistake to disband the Iraqi army? Can a new "national" army or police exist? Or will sectarian militia dominate? Will the U.S. presence help squelch the insurgency, or will an insurgency last as long as the U.S. occupation persists? Can the U.S. intelligence services recruit and retain competent linguists? Or are do the security clearance, limited career prospects (high danger, low pay), and pro-Israel U.S. policies make this impossible? Reuel Marc Gerecht: Quick responses: 1. Many groups in Iraq, particularly SCIRI, have had substantial outside funding (in SCIRI's case Iran) 2. MEMRI is good. Unfortunately, there is good service outside of the government. Inside the USG, there is FBIS, the overt monitoring wing of the CIA. It can be quite good; too ofen it is not. You need the languages. 3. This is an empirical question, answerable only in time. If I had to guess now, I'd say the terrorist threat has gone down, not up with the invasion of Iraq. What is most surprising post-invasion is how few holy warriors have come to Iraq. Compared to Afghanistan, the performance so far isn't impressive. The Muslim Brotherhood for the most part has sat this one out. Why? 4. The Iraqi Army was disbanded before Bremer officially disbanded the officer corps. Amb. Bremer has the stronger argument here. 5. The US presence is essential to defeating the insurgency. 6. Probably not. |