Phil Taylor's papers
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BACK TO : INFORMATION WARFARE (IW) & INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) - see also PSYOPS
Information Technology and Peace Support Operations by D G Boltz 
Information Technology and Peace Support Operations Relationship for the New Millennium Lt. Col. Donna G. Boltz 2000-2001 Senior Fellow Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies. Introduction The United Nations came into existence on October 24, 1945, when China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and a majority of other signatories ratified its charter. Some sixteen weeks later, on February 14, 1946, scientists at the University of Pennsylvania introduced the world's first electronic, large-scale, general-purpose computer - the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC). The potential roles these two creations - the United Nations and the electronic computer - would play over the next fifty years surely must have seemed unrelated in the middle of the twentieth century. Today, although that relationship is stunningly clear, it is also surprisingly undeveloped. Of the fifty-four peace support operations (PSOs) approved by the United Nations since 1948, more than forty occurred in the past twelve years. During the same period, advances in and applications of information technology (IT) have also exploded. The twenty-first century opened with more than a dozen UN mandates for peace support operations around the globe - a globe connected by an infrastructure of telecommunications networks, ultra-fast computer processors, and consumer electronics. Whether the future strategic (security) environment will necessitate major wars remains to be seen. However, it is clear that smaller scale contingency operations will likely dominate future conflicts. The United Nations and its member states must respond if the international community is to stem the tide of conflicts raging around the world. In an era of peace support operations, people also find themselves in a high-tech world characterized by the Internet; personal, mobile communication devices; and near-real-time news broadcasts on twenty-four hours a day news channels. Few individuals and fewer organizations in the multinational, interagency field of peace operations remain untouched by information technology - from UN headquarters to military and police in the field to an extended community of interested actors ranging from policy makers to regional and international news consumers. Despite rapid developments in computer technology, remote sensors, aerial imagery, and communications since the end of the Cold War, the potential of information technology in peace support operations remains largely untapped. The defense industry, which supported important IT advancement in response to military necessity through World Wars I and II and the Cold War, has not responded in kind to peace operations. For this reason, UN member states must field and refine existing IT in peace support operations while pushing for new and effective IT programs tailored to the PSO environment. Simultaneously, the United Nations must take a leadership role in developing strategy and policy for IT applications in peace operations. Against a backdrop of increased regional instability and cries for UN intervention, technologies can help promote unity of effort, ensure mission credibility and legitimacy, and save manpower and funds by improving communication and training of potential actors in these complex operations as well as to assist in overall mission accomplishment. The UN secretary general recently assembled a group of experts - the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations - which noted that modern, well-utilized information technology is the key to improving UN peace support operations. According to the panel, the United Nations can more effectively act to prevent conflict and help societies to find their way back from war by facilitating communication and data sharing and providing UN staff the technological tools they need to do their work.1 To set the context for the development and integration of IT in peace support operations, this report begins with two brief sections addressing the historic development of IT and information operations (IOs), respectively; it then describes their role in peace operations. The report's objective is not to present IT as a panacea for all the challenges of these highly complex, politically charged operations. In fact, operating within the IT environment could very well introduce new and confounding challenges. Strong leadership and insightful development of IT solutions to PSO challenges, however, are cornerstones to meeting the challenges of peace operations in the Information Age. The Information Age What does it really mean to talk about the conduct of peace support operations in the Information Age? What defines the Information Age? How is it shaping the environment in which future operations will take place? A recent book described the Information Age as a series of three revolutions - the first beginning with the invention of the radio, telephone, and telegraph.2 The second revolution, the authors characterize as the introduction of the television, satellites, and early-generation computers, like the thirty-ton ENIAC, which were large and slow with limited applications. The third revolution - where some authors begin to consider a transition to an "information society" - extends from the 1980s to the present and addresses development and employment of myriad information/communications technologies. This three-revolution description spans 150 years, from the mid-1800s to the present. Alvin Toffler, in his book considering the multifaceted impact of information technology on the "Third Wave" of developing society, argues that the transition to the Information Age began after World War II, when progress began to depend more on mind than on muscle.3 According to Toffler, the Information Age is only some fifty-odd years old. Futurist John Naisbitt narrows the time frame further by identifying it with the period of "computer-liberation," which arrived in the 1960s and 1970s and led to the birth of the information society.4 Regardless of how one may define the start of this era, it is clear that billions of people around the world now thrive in an information-driven environment. In many developed countries, communication via e-mail is as much a part of "keeping in touch" as the telephone or postal service. The Information Age has welcomed a culture of transborder communication. People share information, ideas, attitudes, and opinions through instantaneous transmissions that connect the world. Countries are acquiring and applying technologies at differing rates. According to the World Bank's latest World Development Indicators, most have Information Age capabilities. Radio remains the most available medium for receiving information, though in some countries television prevails. Personal computers are available to varying degrees in most countries, although in most developing countries access is extremely limited beyond major cities and economic centers.5 In the end, information begets more information, linking more actors through more activities and interests across greater distances and cultural differences than ever before. Technology, and in particular information technology, is ushering in an increasingly connected world, affected more than ever by events occurring in far-off places. Regional instability that once evoked a "not in my backyard" response now threatens businesses, incenses interest groups, and unites the moral voices of a media-informed public that just last week didn't know the name of the country for which a peacekeeping intervention is being discussed. Commercial demands are driving the development of information technology at a phenomenal rate in the twenty-first century, but that was not always the case. Developing Information Technology: An Historic Look Defense technology played a major role in driving IT development through most of the twentieth century. In World War I, commanders sometimes used wireless telegraph to control the movement of forces. Field telephones were developed to facilitate communication in trench warfare. Photo-mapping and reconnaissance missions along with electronic and acoustic sensors provided solutions to challenges in observation, especially for artillery missions.6 Scientists developed the ENIAC to support the U.S. Army Ordnance Department in World War II. The ENIAC computed 1,000 times faster than any existing device. Although its purpose was to compute the paths of artillery shells, the ENIAC also solved computational problems in fields such as nuclear physics, aerodynamics, and weather prediction.7 In addition to the ENIAC, scientists in World War II developed sensors like those used in World War I to detect German U-boats that threatened Allied operations by disrupting ship movement and resupply activities. The new sonar and radar capabilities set up in Combat Information Centers (CICs) on Allied ships located these dangerous submarines. Military specialists then communicated the coordinates to Allied submarines and ships. The CICs used a combination of telephone, radar, and sonar - effectively integrating electronic communication and information processing.8 Given the pressing need to monitor the development and potential deployment of nuclear weapons, developments in information technology continued throughout the Cold War. The U.S. Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system was one such response to the Cold War threat. Designed as an air defense system in the early 1960s, SAGE sent by telephone information collected through a system of geographically dispersed radar to a central location where it was gathered and processed by a large-scale digital computer.9 Later in the same decade, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, introduced the predecessor to the Internet - -ARPANET. What started as a simple four-node network grew to span the globe, connecting a world of ideas, societies, and actors for a host of activities far surpassing its fledgling capabilities. The technologies developed during the two world wars and throughout the Cold War era introduced many advancements for conducting conventional war. Yet todays increasing demand on nations to participate in peace operations rather than conventional warfare suggests a critical need to fund and develop information technologies specifically to meet PSO challenges. The expectation seems to persist, however, that the residual technological advances made transforming national militaries for future conventional wars should also satisfy PSO needs. This is faulty logic at best, and it detracts from the efficient conduct of peace operations. Retrofitting tools of war to support contingency, or peace support, operations is a slow and imperfect process. Moreover, the commander of such operations cannot wield the same degree of control over the information environment as he does over a conventional military campaign. This is apparent on multiple fronts, from information gathering to control of the media. To maintain situational dominance in the PSO environment, one needs specialized tools. The U.S. Army maintains that information, when transformed into capabilities, is the currency of victory and that the military objective in operations other than war is to establish situational dominance.10 Information technology may be the most powerful tool in the commanders kit for achieving PSO goals while saving money, manpower, and lives and maintaining the PSO fundamentals of legitimacy, impartiality, unity of effort, use of force, and credibility. Integrating information technologies into the operational plan is a critical part of IOs. Information Operations as a Force Multiplier and Deterrent One of the greatest Information Age boons to PSOs is an increased capability to share information quickly, universally, and objectively. Conversely, obstacles to information sharing, not to mention equipment incompatibility, can threaten ITs potential contribution to a PSO success. Information operations - -a concept that originated in U.S. Army planning doctrine - -8211;have great application for actors throughout the PSO environment as a means to foster transparency, build credibility, express impartiality, and maintain legitimacy. Yet as written in PSO doctrine, information operations are relegated to support status for combat power in a peace operation. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-6 explains that "information operations integrate all aspects of information to support and enhance the elements of combat power, with the goal of dominating the battlespace at the right time, right place, and with the right weapons or resources."11 The concept should be expanded beyond wartime applications; IOs can be both a force multiplier and a guarantor of the PSO fundamentals during these complex operations. Information operations include a unique group of activities ranging from collecting and analyzing information, to interacting with the media, to direct communication with the local public - -including formerly belligerent factions. They also take into account communication and coordination with NGOs and international governmental organizations, whose presence most often precedes the introduction of soldiers, civilian police, and elections monitors. The military commander and civil affairs specialist have to work diligently toward establishing, developing, and maintaining functional relationships with these actors. Since impartiality is paramount to the credibility and effectiveness of humanitarian relief agencies, they may resist liaisons with soldiers and police in particular. Nevertheless, cooperative civilian/military operations enhance the credibility of the friendly force, promote consent and legitimacy, and encourage the parties to work toward peace.12 An effective information campaign articulates the value of working together and determines the best means to facilitate communication. The following vignette demonstrates the successful integration of information technology and civil affairs. In the Implementation Forces (IFOR) Multinational Division North (MND[N]) in 1996, Maj. Gen. William Nash, then MND(N) commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, invited the three former warring faction commanders in his sector to observe the monitor display of a real-time downlink from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a break in a Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting in the Zone of Separation. The general told the commanders he wanted to show them a piece of technology employed by his force to conduct the IFOR mission. The UAV was flying over the Zone of Separation in the area of the JMC, and the commanders could see themselves on the monitor. The UAV then covered the road en route to the site. As it moved along, the commanders clearly understood that it could see personnel, equipment, and movement with great accuracy and high resolution. General Nashs point was this: I can see what you are doing anywhere, all the time, and without deploying the soldiers in sector to do the job. It was clear to the commanders that if they violated the terms of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (i.e., the Dayton Peace Accords), IFOR would know, report them, and if necessary unleash forces to deal with issues of noncompliance.13 General Nash understood the terrific potential information technology held for success in his peace support operation. By using the UAV, he could cover a manpower-intense mission without a considerable commitment of Task Force Eagle troops. More importantly, by highlighting the technology and its capabilities, he could evoke compliance on the part of the faction leaders without using force. This anecdote illustrates how information operations support peace operations. General Nash used IT as soft, impartial power to collect information critical to the mission. By demonstrating the technology to the faction leaders, he added the strategy of showing them the level of information available to him with the purpose of affecting their decision-making. All the while, his methods upheld the fundamentals of peace support operations because his application of the technology was transparent. His use of the technology demonstrated impartial collection abilities. Finally, most important, his reliance on information to compel appropriate response by the commanders reduced the likelihood that he would have to use force. The general could have used the UAV very differently, and with much less impact, had he applied the technology clandestinely, as he would have during war. But peace support operations require innovative applications of existing technologies and well-thought-out and -developed information operations that synchronize those technological capabilities in planning from the outset. Leaders therefore must leverage the full power of IT in order to plan for and support information operations. Although information operations are not easily executed, IT can expedite and strengthen their effect. Established actors such as NGOs - and in some cases, the media - have historical information that peacekeepers need both for background and for its predictive value. Moreover, by the time peacekeepers get to the field, chances are information already will have been manipulated for censorship, propaganda, and disinformation. Then, once in the field, local detractors seeking to weaken PSO credibility often have access to and employ some of the same information technologies to speed faulty, sometimes deliberately dangerous information across the theater of operation. Cellular telephones, radios, television, and websites, when equally accessible to every force and faction within the environment, may play to the advantage of a local factional leader who is more familiar with the language and culture. Thus, PSO commanders must develop a decisive information campaign that considers the array of IT available to those who seek peace and to those who seek to disrupt the peace. Failure to use IT effectively threatens the forces ability to gain the requisite knowledge and information to conduct a successful peace support operation and simultaneously to deny adversaries information domination in the environment. Information operations in the PSO environment integrate the skills of a group of nontraditional actors as first-tier advisors to the commander. In 1996, when the U.S. 1st Armored Divisions Task Force Eagle deployed to Bosnia, the chief of the Coalition Press Information Center in Multinational Division North was surprised to find herself sitting in the front row of chairs for the battle update brief (a nightly operational update). The task force commander had relegated the traditional warfighting personnel to the second row. His reasoning: The threats to his operation were most likely to come from loosely organized groups trying to use disinformation, rumor, and propaganda through an effective, if unsophisticated, information campaign to drive wedges between the various parties and to exacerbate feelings of dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement within the population. To counter these efforts, civil affairs, public affairs, and psychological operations experts worked together with intelligence analysts and combat arms planners and operators in an effective IO working group. They synchronized information and planned contact with publics to maintain credibility, transparency, and impartiality.14 Information operations touch all the actors in the PSO environment because they include the cultural and political dimensions of the operation. The measure of success is not dominating the enemy but influencing the affected parties to create the conditions for a stable environment in which businesses flourish, children regularly attend schools, and families live free from the fear of being forced from their homes. It is clear, then, that a relationship of trust and understanding must exist between and among the military, police, and civilians supporting the operation as well as members of the threatened, failing, or failed state. For information operations to be successful, as they were in IFORs MND(N), requires the understanding and full support of the commander. The U.S. Army defines conventional psychological operations (PSYOP) as operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences with the goal of influencing behavior favorable to the originator. Psychological operations take on a different role during peace operations from those during conflict situations. Given that transparency and credibility are fundamental to peace support operations, the information communicated by all actors from the same force or coalition must be both harmonious and truthful. In an effective information campaign, planners and leaders wholly integrate PSYOP. The information operation in IFOR, Multinational Division North, is instructive in this regard. The chief of psychological operations in Multinational Division North requested permission to use press releases developed by the commanders public affairs officer about breaking news - material that fell outside the routine approval process for PSYOP - -for timely dissemination of information to the local population. He received approval, which allowed the PSYOP team to broadcast in a timely manner over its own (PSYOP) radio stations the same information that was available to the local media via public affairs releases and announcements. PSYOP specialists also used some of the same information in their native-language newspaper, Herald of Peace, which was distributed to the locals. This cooperative measure ensured sharing of accurate and timely information with the local audience regardless of delivery methods.15 In this instance, success in sharing and transmitting information from press releases hinged on clear communication both within the command and to the local audience. The idea that the public affairs specialist and the PSYOP chief intentionally limit their own interactions may seem absurd. However, a worse situation is occurring between individual nations and agencies, which deploy state-of-the-art technologies that cannot interface. Inability to communicate is one of the most common complaints among actors in the PSO environment. Information Sharing Problems arise when NATO units communicate with non-NATO units. Military units must also be able to communicate with civilian organizations, like CIVPOL. These organizations normally do not have military equipment and their means for communications are very basic. Technically it means that you have to choose the lowest common denominator or provide the organizations with equipment and operators.16 -Goran Tode, The First International Workshop, "Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century," Stockholm, Sweden, September 1997. Information sharing is essential to establishing and maintaining an atmosphere of cooperation among PSO actors in the area as they begin to coordinate their respective activities. Information sharing is at the heart of unity of effort. Clearly, communication is simplest and information sharing is optimal when actors are homogenous - sharing a common language and culture - -and better yet when they are in close proximity. However, this type of homogeneity and spatial relationship rarely exists among PSO actors. Representing many countries and organizations, actors always have different languages and cultures. Add to these differences the obstacle of communicating from and between remote mission sites - whether cities be fifty miles apart or countries on different continents - the challenges are apparent. Used as a tool to train soldiers, police, and civilians to manage language and culture gaps, information technology can help shorten time and distance and expedite relationship building. For this reason, it is critical that PSO planners in the Information Age capitalize upon IT capabilities. Planners of peace support operations must use IT to bridge gaps before the PSO environment is populated by a diverse group of actors who aspire to the same objective but cannot coordinate on the ground. The following section highlights the role of IT in information-sharing activities for military and police forces, UN headquarters, and field activities. Issues of Communication Interoperability: Talking from Day One One of the greatest obstacles to effective information sharing is the introduction of multiple communication systems without an overarching strategy toward interoperability. Equipment incompatibility creates problems ranging from failing to transmit critical information in a timely manner to developing feelings of "haves" and "have nots" among those nations contributing to peace support operations. The inability to share information across the PSO environment because of different systems confounds military personnel, UN administrators, and NGOs alike. Col. Patricia Capin, chief of the Multinational Joint Logistics Center for Headquarters, Kosovo Force (KFOR), described the early communication challenges faced by KFOR this way: "If we wanted to communicate with one another we either met somewhere or provided national equipment to our multinational counterparts (or received equipment from them). We each deployed with our own communications system, none of which could talk to the other. We need to deploy with a common system that allows us to communicate between nations and agencies from day one."17 Great advances in telecommunications capabilities in the 1990s, fed by a demand for systems able to support global commerce and education, have resulted in increased commercial information-sharing means and methods. Systems that once relied exclusively on cable connections now take advantage of microwave and satellite capabilities. Unfortunately in terms of interoperability, the rapid development of IT sparked competing markets globally, resulting in widely different systems designed without an eye toward operating across the multinational, interagency landscape of peace support operations. Absent a comprehensive equipment interoperability strategy, it is not surprising that communicating with the agency across the street or the force on the other side of the cantonment area has become at minimum an irritant and potentially a showstopper during a crisis. The former deputy chief of communications for KFOR, Lt. Col. Peter Varljen, expanded on the KFOR dilemma in a recent interview. He explained that the first force in Kosovo was the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which was not NATO equipped. The ARRC telephone system, Ptarmigan, was unable to interface with the national systems of most of the other multinational brigades (MNBs). To bridge the communication gap, the ARRC provided a Ptarmigan system to each of the MNB headquarters. This short-term solution put stress on the ARRC's physical capacity for communication. The ARRC also outfitted the UN element - initially arriving without communications - with a Ptarmigan system. The only electronic communications immediately possible were between the U.S. multiple subscriber element and Ptarmigan through a NATO interface located in Mannheim, Germany. Commercial communication, Lieutenant Colonel Varljen explained, was infeasible because the only existing systems went through Belgrade - not operationally acceptable routing early in the KFOR mission.18 Technical problems were compounded when attempts were made to communicate with NGOs, most of which possessed small, earth station communication dishes to support satellite communications, none of which could interface with any of the national systems. One work-around solution designed in response to the NGO link was Hotmail, which Colonel Capin explained became a depository for routine information regarding supply routes and meetings. Although equipment sharing and Internet mail domains worked as expedient field solutions, the multinational force and related agencies and organizations needed a readily deployable communications package based on an assessment addressing interoperability shortfalls - especially in the early days when stress and uncertainty were at their highest. Despite significant communications capabilities of any single player in the scenario described above, each suffered interoperability handicaps. Although there is no "cost-free" cure to the problem of communication mismatches like these, off-the-shelf technology solutions exist. In fact, a communications infrastructure with terrific potential exists within the UN's Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), Field Administration Logistics Division (FALD). The Communications and Electronic Services Section (CESS) of FALD established an IT infrastructure that enables communications between and among all UN peacekeeping and DPKO-administered missions, their field offices, and the DPKO offices in New York City. The system relies on four satellites with near-global coverage, more than 300 small, rapidly deployable, earth station communication dishes, and some 900 portable (briefcase) terminals supported by the system of international maritime satellites called INMARSAT. With a leased digital circuit between the communications hub in Brindisi, Italy, and New York City, one public telephone network, and secured communications circuits, this network reaches thirty-two countries on four continents. When military forces are part of a UN peace support operation, the force is included in the UN communications umbrella. When working with a regional organization, a memorandum of understanding addressing communications support and terms for reimbursement must be developed between the United Nations and the regional force. In the case of Kosovo, where the regional force preceded the UN peace support operation, the UN communications infrastructure was initially unavailable. However, the existence of the supporting DPKO CESS infrastructure suggests that a standing agreement that extends IT capabilities significantly could contribute to overcoming some of the confusion attributed to poor communications interoperability in peace support operations.19 At the heart of the DPKO CESS infrastructure is an information management system originally developed to support a system of accounting for UN equipment in peace support operations. The Field Administration Logistics Division of DPKO developed the Field Assets Control System (FACS) - described by the project coordinator as the "kernel" for the overall project - to enhance equipment accountability and assist in budget resolution and development.20 The system introduced a standardized program for tracking the life cycle of UN equipment in peace support operations. Using groupware - software that integrates work on a single project by several concurrent and separated users - the system provides data entries and updates to UN headquarters within minutes of input at workstations around the world. In 1997, FALD distributed the software to missions, most of which previously used "homegrown" tracking systems, and simultaneously developed a communications infrastructure to support FACS. Computer bulletin boards encouraged use of the new system and facilitated feedback, although the new system initially drew only weak response from the field. Within three years, FALD developed and refined the FACS module as the first module of the Field Mission Logistics System (FMLS). Recently completed or in development as part of FMLS are programs to track maintenance, expendable goods and supplies, contingent owned equipment, memoranda of understanding, and field personnel movement. The DPKO Wide Area Network (WAN), which supports FMLS, also supports a mail routing operation that enables communications among and between field missions and UN headquarters. In fact, the WAN supporting DPKO makes the UN headquarters intranet available to field missions and UN peace support operation headquarters. Developers could add instant messaging to the system to enable computer conferencing and real-time dialogue. Beyond the UN infrastructure, open source instant messaging software might be another option available to PSO actors interested in conducting online dialogue and conferencing. One example of instant messaging architecture easily accessible via the World Wide Web is "Jabber." Similar to a private chat room, this type of instant messaging allows users with access to the host server via computer or cellular telephone to participate in instant messaging among a dedicated user group. While not suitable for classified information, Jabber could facilitate real-time dialogue for routine communication.21 However, accessible instant messaging products like Jabber require operational telecommunications. How do actors in the PSO environment communicate when commercial telephone links may be compromised? How do they communicate in failed states or undeveloped countries where telephone connections typically do not exist? In the past, these obstacles prevented the PSO force from using commercial telecommunications. However, emerging satellite technology soon may offer a solution. In November 2000, StarBand Communications, a U.S.-based company, launched a commercial two-way satellite Internet venture. The company seeks to establish satellites as the leading route for high-speed Internet connections.22 This technology could unleash the "tele-bonds" of nonsecure Internet communication and enable computers to be linked to the outside world far from telephone switches, regardless of who controls the ground-based communications hub. StarBand still is working out bugs, such as ways to make the satellite system more resistant to inclement weather. Finally, the company must decrease the operational costs of consumer satellites to become a practical application in peace support operations. Still, deployed as part of a PSO communications package, satellite-based Internet technology holds promise as a means to connect PSO actors reliably from the start. Long recognized as an issue among allied forces conducting training operations, discussions of interoperability between nations participating in the XIV International Seapower Symposium raised the possibility of IT solutions to challenges in communication interoperability. In a panel discussion, "Interoperability in the Information Age," R. Adm. Kevin Wilson of the Royal New Zealand Navy proposed an Internet-based solution. Admiral Wilson explained that the advantage of using the Internet for communication interoperability is that it "allows remote, long-range, dynamic data retrieval and manipulation from any connected source."23 Acknowledging that the problem with using an Internet solution is security, Admiral Wilson predicted that given IT advances, security limitations will be temporary at most. In the same panel discussion, V. Adm. Simpson-Anderson of the South African Navy approached the problem from a more traditional point of view, that of making existing national systems interoperable. Short of purchasing a single, common system, Admiral Simpson-Anderson suggested a common interface that links existing systems. Viewing this as a more affordable solution that uses legacy systems, he acknowledged that any agreed-upon interface must link with each individual system - requiring each nation to perform input modification.24 The U.S. Navy is looking at a digital modular radio that may hold the key to enhancing communication with allied nations because it has a radio interconnection that facilitates interoperability between systems. The digital modular radio, available commercial technology, is attractive because it avoids the high costs and maintenance requirements associated with supporting legacy communications equipment. It holds costs down by being adaptable to different systems and not requiring an outright replacement or total purchase to provide the desired communications interface. The digital modular radio has an embedded security feature and can operate using satellite communications, line of sight, very high frequency, and high-frequency communications among different channel settings, all existing in the radio's computer software.25 When developing strategy and policy for IT interoperability, leaders and planners must integrate systems currently used with good results at the national and regional levels. One such system is video-teleconferencing (VTC). The United Nations and military organizations use VTC as a cost-effective (in terms of time and travel dollars) way to convene routine and ad hoc meetings. Besides bringing distantly located parties together for meetings without travel or schedule interruption, the VTC enhances voice message by allowing the incorporation of slides to illustrate briefings and concepts, which "attendees" simultaneously view and discuss. Military personnel using the VTC in peace support operations remind potential users that they need to formalize employment of the technology by establishing a protocol for recording (written) meeting minutes, recognizing speakers (especially in a time-constrained, multinational meeting), and staffing information shared following the meeting. Users who fail to develop such a protocol may find the technology frustrating and disruptive to other coordination processes. The cellular telephone is another information-sharing tool that has proven invaluable in linking individual actors to information resources for advance warning, situation updates, and changes in guidance. Accessible mobile communications like the cell phone are particularly important because the success of peace support operations can hinge on the actions of one or two relatively junior soldiers far from headquarters. These individuals must have up-to-the-minute information for decision making at the lowest level. With satellite support, the cellular telephone gives them that kind of crucial information. There is no question that today, well into the Information Age, technology exists to support global communications in any environment. It is encouraging that the United Nations already owns and operates a communications infrastructure capable of supporting a global network. Yet it falls short of its potential for three primary reasons. Organizational, administrative, and budgetary constraints limit the United Nations' full exploitation of its IT potential. First, organizationally, the United Nations operates as a system of parallel agencies and divisions - none of these units is empowered to take the lead in developing a standardized, interoperable, IT-based communication system. Consequently, the United Nations operates several communications networks without an overarching interoperability strategy to connect its own agencies, much less all the actors that truly represent the PSO environment - whose coordination is critical to the operation's success. Finally, tight budgets and varying priorities do not guarantee the availability of funds to develop or support effective communications before initiation of a peace support operation. An Exemplary Product: Global Information Systems Among the most promising information-sharing technologies for the PSO environment are geographic information systems (GIS). Comprising systems and software with deep commercial roots, the products rely on information from multiple actors across the peace support operation environment: military and police, NGOs and IGOs, local government, media, mission observers and monitors and open source information. GIS's are software applications with the ability to capture, store, check, integrate, manipulate, analyze, and display data related to physical positions on the earth's surface. With applications ranging from city planning to tourism to mining information, GIS's have an important application in peace support operations because of their ability to "layer" data from multiple sources. The layers come from the expertise and experience of PSO actors. For example, in creating a GIS multilayered map, the terrain and weather data may come through military channels. NGOs may provide up-to-date information on the location of various aid agencies, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees may add current information on resettlement progress. This example is oversimplified to illustrate the required collaboration. In actuality, several actors may be able to update information in the same area - different teams and organizations traveling between villages and towns can update road conditions, for example. GIS's integrate current information and maps to promote "information sharing, advance planning, operational cooperation and evaluation of progress toward complementary goals"26 and provide data that can be distributed around the world using new Internet software. Cooperating agencies have used GIS with positive results in the Balkans. In Bosnia, GIS systems were used to "correlate the pattern of ethnic expulsions with information about military lines of control of paramilitary units operating in the area at the time."27 In Kosovo, GIS applications combined information about refugee returns, minefields, unexploded ordnance, potable water, housing status, and lines of communication.28 This information helped UN administrators and PSO forces to manage the immense task of resettlement. This information-sharing mechanism drives agencies to collaborate in order to develop a complete picture of their common zone of activity. The Russian application of a GIS system, known as Project Sentinel, in Kosovo advanced the Russian sector objectives of preventing the renewal of battle action, creating the conditions for refugee return, and supporting demining efforts.29 Sentinel combined military-mapping data with dynamic information about troop movement, training activities, refugee movement, route conditions, and demining progress to meet mission requirements. The Canadian reconnaissance vehicle, Coyote - essentially a monitoring technology - has an onboard GIS that combines a television camera, thermal imager, laser range finder, ground surveillance radar, and modem for wireless transmission of the collected data up the chain of command.30 Nevertheless, simply collecting, integrating, and verifying layered information for GIS does not indicate a solid information-sharing regime. In April 2000, the United States Institute of Peace and the U.S. Army's 353rd Civil Affairs Command cosponsored an international conference on information sharing to support advanced planning and operational cooperation during PSOs. Among its conclusions was that an information strategy that addresses issues of data requirements, information security, and field constraints should be developed involving all major participating organizations. To elaborate, conference participants reported that relevant data needs and trained individuals to provide accurate data must be identified. They also determined that agreements should exist to inform relationships and mechanisms for identifying and disseminating data. Finally, they said that information systems that provide input for GIS must be supported within the operating environment - simple off-the-shelf technology that assumes infrastructure shortfalls.31 To ensure compliance with these measures, it is clear that responsibility for this type of information sharing must be assigned to a PSO actor with IT capability, field presence, and requisite expertise. The Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502) acknowledges the need to establish a responsibility center to devise and oversee the implementation of a common IT strategy for the peace and security departments with a counterpart responsibility center in the offices of the special representative to the secretary general in complex peace operations. To be successful, field offices should take guidance from FALD within DPKO - the office with the technical expertise, talent, and vision to make the most of GIS. A Final Note on Information Sharing Regardless of what information systems nations adopt to break down the barriers to communication interoperability, the United Nations must take a leadership role in establishing any lasting IT strategy. Although there are numerous examples of successful applications of national IT assets, until these efforts are integrated, the value of existing technologies will remain unexploited, extant only in the anecdotes of national and regional forces. This unacceptable consequence degrades unity of effort and results in organizations being unable to attract the attention of the communication and electronics industry to develop and market PSO technology. Contributing nations must develop, test, and fund viable IT solutions to overcome their current frustration and promote effective peace support operations from the earliest days of deployment. To speak with one voice from the PSO environment, actors must develop and transmit messages that others hear and understand. Unity of effort, impartiality, credibility, and legitimacy in peace support operations require actors to speak with one voice - from message development to communicating urgent changes that occur as a result of actions and reactions in the field. The dynamic PSO environment requires effective communications that bridge time and distance; simply arriving in the field with the means to communicate between forces and organizations, however, does not guarantee a common understanding among them. A common base of knowledge and information is required to develop a framework for an efficient working relationship. Using Information Technology to Bridge the Training Gap It is extremely important, especially as the demands of peace operations accelerate and become more complex worldwide, that training of professionals become more attuned to new technologies, specifically computer-based learning and distance-learning techniques.32 -Amb. George Ward, "Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, May 2000. Military training exercises for multinational and allied operations traditionally involve costly deployments to conduct training at a common location. The inherent characteristics of peace support operations - international response from multiple agencies and organizations - means that traditional training can be cost prohibitive in terms of both time and funds. Conducting training that requires large unit movement is expensive not only in travel funds but also in the associated costs of moving soldiers around in the field and fueling and maintaining equipment for use in the exercise. Figuring into those costs is the fact that crisis-driven deployments often occur on relatively short notice - severely compressing the schedule for troop movement alone - making efficient use of training time a critical factor in rapid response. This time crunch especially affects nations that conduct PSO training only after a unit is identified for participation in an operation. For short-notice deployments in particular, a combined exercise at a single training center is impractical when there is barely time to ready troops and equipment for movement. Military, police, and civilians participating in peace support operations can utilize the same information technologies and techniques that are employed to share information among them to support cost-effective, integrated predeployment training. The combination of computers, telecommunications infrastructures, and video-teleconferencing equipment creates a cost-effective interface for global distance education programs. Because IT can enable predeployment training that otherwise may not occur, its use yields intangible dividends in support of PSO fundamentals. Doctrine development for peace operations is generally newer and less established than doctrine used in training for war. Consequently leaders must develop some critical skills, including negotiation, relations with civilian organizations, relations with UN headquarters, and an understanding of mission specifics, during preparatory training. At lower levels and among small units, soldiers typically do not even meet or learn about their foreign partners until they deploy. Leaders of past operations have likened this approach to assembling the team for the first time on the field the day of the big game. It is easy to see that a teaching approach that fails to develop standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures for a multinational force in the course of operations could threaten force credibility and legitimacy. Credibility is compromised when former warring factions view disparate responses among deployed actors as evidence of poor coordination and visible cracks in the ability of the force to accomplish the PSO mission. Legitimacy is at stake because a strong, coordinated response is critical to undermining the legitimacy of the malefactors and to gaining and maintaining support of the indigenous people, allies, and national and international publics. Using IT to enable PSO training contributes to operational success by establishing relationships and standards of professionalism that enhance force credibility and legitimacy and exercise unity of effort. Distance Learning Solutions derived from the application of information technology support global training and learning in preparation for peace support operations. In modern distance learning, IT equipment bridges the gaps of time and space between the trainer and trainee, redefining distance learning. Once characterized by correspondence courses delivered through postal systems, distance learning today takes advantage of communication channels and media such as computers and associated networks, print, audio, cable, satellite, and videotape or a combination thereof. Interactive delivery systems account for the growing numbers of colleges and universities using distance learning around the world to attract students who cannot attend classes because of their locations or schedules. Audio and video conferencing (using telephone lines and satellites), and webcasting (real-time broadcasts of digital images delivered to websites) make obsolete the old "passive learning" stereotype of distance learning. Contemporary distance-learning approaches have a distinct advantage over traditional education in that they enable a dialogue between students and instructors when the two are in different places - creating a virtual classroom. Because of its ability to bridge distances between citizens, communities, states, and nations, education specialists recognize distance learning as part of the international landscape.33 Computer Simulations Another virtual approach to training for peace support operations is the use of computer simulations to create, not the classroom, but the PSO environment. Designed to train leaders in decision making for such operations, these applications allow actors to observe the impact of decisions and refine or modify practices without actually affecting a community moving toward resettlement or a local police force reorganizing in an operation's postconflict phases, for example. The introduction of analytical tools developed specifically for peace support operations came on line slowly. Despite early recognition of the role computer-assisted simulations could play in planning and executing peace support operations, trainers continued to rely on existing war analysis tools to fill this need. In addition, new modeling for simulations was slow to develop because the historical data about peace operations was not being assembled. Finally the reality of the ever-increasing frequency of peace support operations since the end of the Cold War sharpened the need for PSO training simulations, ranging from computer simulations specifically designed to support integrated leader training, bringing together policy makers, military leaders, NGO representatives, religious leaders, and legal experts to interactive sessions exercising soldier decision-making through packaged vignettes and scenarios. The U.S.-based Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) developed an experiential simulation that can be used to provide military leaders, policy makers, and NGOs - among those operating in the PSO environment - insight into the consequences of their proposed actions. The IDA computer simulation, Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates (SENSE), simultaneously addresses economic, social, political, and military issues in a virtual exercise. Using desktop computers and interactive software, participants in a SENSE exercise identify potential crises, scope options, and test crisis action plans.34 The software accepts the input of participants and allows them to experience the consequences of their decisions and actions. This step of moving beyond discussion and collaboration to experience is one of IT's unique contributions to training. Although computer simulations cannot replicate exactly what occurs in real-time operations, they provide invaluable interactive experiences for participants to observe possible outcomes of their decisions and to analyze and debate the impact with expert advice and input. For the individual soldier or police officer supporting a peace operation, a decision in a stressful environment can make the difference between provoking a riot and developing the trust and respect of the local public. However, before deployment, it is difficult for soldiers to envision a village that lies halfway around the world, divided by hate and history. Equally difficult for troops is to deal diplomatically with a throng of strangers who act and speak differently from their peers. The U.S. Institute for Creative Technologies is developing a virtual environment that transports soldiers from a studio setting with a 180-degree screen to a stressful incident played out in a Balkan village.35 Like the leaders' "games," the vignette allows soldiers to see - ideally to learn from - the consequences of their actions. In other words, it gives troops a chance to practice likely courses of actions in a virtual setting. Comments from many participants in after-action reviews indicate that conventional situation training exercises are the best training methodology to prepare soldiers for operations. The virtual environment builds on this feedback. Viking '99 In light of distance-learning capabilities and the value of computer simulations, the potential of combining the two applications is compelling. Envision a network of leaders engaging in a real-time simulation of a PSO environment without having to leave their home stations. In late November 1999, governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations worked together with police and military forces from more than twenty-seven countries to restore and maintain peace in the fictitious country of Betaland. Exercise VIKING '99, a full-scale computer-assisted exercise hosted by Sweden, supported NATO and Partnership for Peace countries through communications hubs in Denmark, Finland, Latvia, and the host nation. Combining simulation software, computer hardware, telephone, fax, and radio, the exercise supported multinational participants using a scenario similar to recent conflicts in the Balkans. The scenario manager for the exercise, Swedish Maj. Raymond Iller, credits the realism of the scenario to the input of people experienced in peace support operations.36 Working with PSO-veteran soldiers, lawyers, doctors, and aid organizations, Iller created Betaland. Players around the world experienced Betaland from their daily workspaces and local simulation centers. Commenting on the VIKING '99 exercise, U.S. Marine Corps Capt. David M. Griesmer says that building virtual training centers to support simulated training exercises is affordable - costing as little as $15,000. Additional costs include leasing lines for Internet and teleconferencing to support the system.37 These relatively low costs, and the fact that the technology is available using off-the-shelf hardware with specialized software designed by the United States and Sweden, puts within reach a realistic program that can be tailored to fit the peculiarities of any PSO environment. The next step is supporting the leaders' training with soldiers who - having discussed a common definition of the use of force in a distance-learning program - are exercising restraint in a virtual village of rioting and chaos. The powerful benefit of IT training includes its own set of challenges. Common language, technical support, time zone differences, and curriculum development to support the exercises present considerable hurdles. Nevertheless, the increased tempo of peace support operations over the past decade makes clear the importance nations must assign to development of IT-supported training. UN member states should take the lead in developing model training centers. The DPKO telecommunications infrastructure could serve as the backbone for connecting IT-enhanced training programs. Monitoring The peacekeeping operation can be vital in supporting and encouraging confidence-building measures which in turn foster an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual benefit. For instance, active and continuous monitoring of mutual compliance, such as we undertake in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), contributes significantly to confidence building.38 -Maj. Gen. Trygrove Tellefsen, "Challenges in Peace Supportinto the 21st Century," Amman, Jordan, October 1998. Although training may focus on various areas and tasks, one specific skill set that bears special mention is monitoring. Monitoring is essential to confidence building and consent maintenance in peace support operations. Of the fifteen UN-sanctioned peace support operations ongoing during the writing of this report, all included monitoring as part of the mandate.39 Monitoring tasks in peace support operations serve to detect and deter threats, verify agreements or resolutions, and supervise or assist with field activities. Monitoring is instrumental when the UN Security Council calls upon parties to settle a dispute in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter (and in peace enforcement operations carried out within the provisions of Chapter VII of the charter). Military forces supporting peace operations monitor sanctions, military activity, police activity, elections, and the physical security of regions, demilitarized zones, and PSO camps. Nontechnological monitoring is a manpower-intense task that relies mainly on human detection and observation conducted via patrols, observation posts, and checkpoints. Generally speaking, the larger the area and more complex the monitoring tasks, the greater the demand for personnel to conduct monitoring missions. Because budgetary constraints, national directives, and public support for peace support operations all affect the resources available, the United Nations and member states must consider IT monitoring to enhance human monitoring when possible. In addition to reducing manpower demands, IT monitoring supports PSO fundamentals of impartiality, consent, freedom of movement, and legitimacy. Monitoring technologies in and of themselves are objective and impartial in the collection of data. When forces share monitoring data with local populations and leaders, they demonstrate evenhanded application of the technology and reinforce consent and support for the PSO forces and the legitimacy of the operation. Even a PSO force with a good reputation for professionalism can be challenged over time by rumors (or accurate reports) of partiality and bias. The information-sharing methodology must be established from the outset of the mission, not as an afterthought when problems and doubts result in a need to submit proof of rightful actions. No amount of righteous indignation on the part of the compromised force can change perceptions of mistrust, which chip away at the efficacy of the peacekeeper. Further, information can be applied as a nonlethal "use of force" to compel or support compliance. General Nash's demonstration of the unmanned aerial vehicle is a perfect example of using information technology in this manner. Just the knowledge that a force can see and report the actions of a group or individual can act as a deterrent. To understand IT's contribution to monitoring missions, one must understand the objectives of the mission and related tasks. The Royal Netherlands Army Military Doctrine, for example, assigns "observation, monitoring and control" as a sequenced task cluster for peace operations. Each of these activities requires the PSO force to acquire, process, share, and as required, act on information regarding compliance with or violation of agreements and international laws. The level of action and force Dutch peacekeepers may apply increases as each task is required by the situation.40 The U.S. Army PSO doctrine lists six subtasks to the mission of "observing, monitoring, verifying and reporting any alleged violations of the governing agreements."41 From investigating cease-fire violations and boundary incidents to verifying disarmament and demobilization, each activity affords warring factions the opportunity to observe impartiality in relation to the responsibilities of the PSO force. Planners must apply monitoring devices not purely as intelligence collectors, but as operational tools - much like radios and vehicles - to appreciate the force multiplier value of sensing devices that enable fewer peacekeepers to cover a greater mission area while increasing the coverage time for the area. Optimal Use of Remote-Sensing Devices Interest in the role IT could play in monitoring during peace support operations has led to a comprehensive study by U.S.-based Sandia National Laboratories.42 In their report, Sandia researchers established a consent/force balance to determine the applicability of monitoring technologies to the operations. The report defines the variables of consent and force as commonly applied in peace support operations: that is, consent is the degree of agreement the parties involved in the conflict hold for the international peacekeeper's activities. Force indicates the force available and the level of use authorized for peacekeepers. Generally, peacekeeping operations are high in consent, deploying with lower force levels, while peace enforcement operations are characterized by less consent and higher force levels. However, operations can change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement or the reverse, given a dynamic operational environment. Decision makers who may summarily include or dismiss the application of monitoring technologies based on the initial conditions when deploying a PSO force should recognize the fluidity of the situation. According to the consent/force balance developed by Sandia, operations with a high level of consent and low force capabilities should employ open and relatively unprotected systems for specific monitoring tasks. Operations with low consent levels and high force capabilities need to protect, hide, or add redundancy to monitoring devices. It is important to note that hiding the collection device suggests not a less transparent application of the technology but protection from theft or destruction. Those collecting information st |