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BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GWOT Year 3 - 2004 (mainly Iraq)
The US and the Arab media: a reversal of fortunes by Badran A Badran  #
The US and the Arab media: a reversal of fortunes By Badran A. Badran Jun 8, 2004, 12:19 Ever since pan-Arab stations such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya, Abu Dhabi TV, Al-Manar, Al-Hayat-LBC and others have surfaced on the Arab media scene as credible alternatives to CNN, BBC and other Western media outlets, there has been an increased public response in the Middle East to news. Most of the stations have provided comprehensive spot newsgathering and background analysis on developments in Iraq, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in other international hot spots. Coverage of the recent abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison was no exception. Even before the CBS program "60 Minutes II" broadcast the first images of American abuse at Abu Ghraib, and before Seymour Hersh's article on actions at the prison appeared in The New Yorker magazine, correspondents of Arab stations had reported allegations of such practices by citing former prisoners and international human rights groups. Viewers in the Arab world saw photos and footage of American and British soldiers mistreating and abusing Iraqis at various stages of the war. Scenes of handcuffed, blindfolded and battered "suspects" were printed and broadcast almost daily. Night vision images of US soldiers storming houses and scaring families with a massive show of force were often aired, to the dismay of Arab viewers. Such images were viewed through Arab eyes as emanating from a socio-political context of "occupation," "subjugation" and "humiliation" of the Arabs, not "liberation" and "freedom" as the Bush administration had argued. In the minds of many viewers, the Iraqi scene became intermixed with the Palestinian scene. The argument that Iraq had been liberated was substituted by a popular, grassroots Arab perception that another Western power had illegally occupied Arab land and taken control of its people and resources. Arab public opinion, shaped in large part by Arab television media, saw too many holes in the Bush administration's justification for war in Iraq, especially after the US failed to produce any weapons of mass destruction and failed to swiftly rehabilitate post-Saddam Iraq. Arabs who had given Washington the benefit of the doubt and hoped for a new beginning in Iraq instead saw a tragedy of errors being committed by the US and its representatives. It is not difficult to imagine, then, how those in the Arab world who were initially hostile to US actions saw the debacle unfold. In the meantime, Arab satellite stations provided ample room for the Bush administration to present its views directly to Arab viewers. However, from an American perspective the efficacy of such efforts was questionable. Despite airing daily military briefings by American commanders, spokespersons and top officials, the messages did not strike a chord with Arab viewers. With this as a background, the pictures from Abu Ghraib did not surprise Arab public opinion, though the specific practices employed at the prison stunned everyone. Arab viewers were "shocked and awed" by the pictures of sadistic abuse appearing on TV stations. In live call-in programs, viewers with no apparent political affiliations wondered how the world's superpower could allow such inhumane practices to take place. Commentators and their guests discussed the story while reminding their audiences: "We told you so." In order to inform its viewers, Arab television stations relied on a large number of news sources that showed how far they had come in just a few years. The stations used their Iraq correspondents, local experts, agency reports, Iraqi citizens, Iraqi Governing Council members, Iraqi opposition figures, US spokespersons and footage from US congressional hearings to build their stories. Add to that reports from Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Breaking news flashes alerted viewers of developments and reactions from countries and politicians. This was remarkable when one considers how limited was the access of Arab viewers to opposing viewpoints just over a decade ago. In the framework of such a news circus, the Bush administration had an opportunity to tell its side of the story and limit the damage from Abu Ghraib. Again, it failed. There were no convincing arguments that the abuse was, as Washington claimed, the work of a few individuals as opposed to a reflection of official policy. In particular, the top stations' anchorpersons reminded US officials of such statements as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's a year ago, when American soldiers had been captured by the Iraqis, that "the Geneva Convention indicates that it's not permitted to photograph and embarrass or humiliate prisoners of war;" or President George W. Bush's warning to Iraqis in March 2003 that they would be treated as war criminals if the US prisoners were mistreated. All of the major Arab networks showed the congressional testimony of Major General Antonio Taguba, who investigated the abuse at Abu Ghraib and who initially reported that members of the 800th Military Police Brigade had committed "sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses" against Iraqi detainees. In fact, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya broadcast live the testimonies of a number of top Pentagon officials before US Senate and House committees investigating Abu Ghraib, including the questioning of Rumsfeld. Another news item that received wide play on Arab television stations was the February report by the ICRC on the mistreatment by coalition forces of prisoners of war and other protected persons in Iraq during their arrest, internment and interrogation. The US missed an opportunity to improve its image when Bush addressed Arab viewers in two interviews with Al-Arabiyya and the US-financed Al-Hurra stations, but failed to apologize for the Abu Ghraib abuses. That omission cost him the potential sympathy of columnists and editorial writers who commented on the interviews and who shaped the public's reaction to them. The fact that Bush said "sorry" later during a news conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan was seen as both late and "out of context." US officials interviewed by Arab media could have arguably presented a stronger defense had they described some prison internment problems that never made it into the headlines. Among those reported by the US media were the overcrowding of facilities, the fact that there were too few military policemen and interrogators, the lack of high-level supervision and outside scrutiny of prison facilities and the lack of a system for keeping track of Iraqi prisoners. It is doubtful, however, whether those details would have made a big difference in the final determination of guilt and accountability. Coverage of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse story by Arab satellite television stations showed how far the regional media have come in terms of their professionalism. It also revealed the weakness of the US public information effort during the scandal. If nothing else, this situation reflected an amazing reversal of fortunes. Badran A. Badran is professor of communication and media sciences at Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR |