Phil Taylor's papers
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BACK TO : The Kosovo conflict 1999
Kosovo and the future of Information Operations by W Church 
Kosovo and the Future of Information Operations Article by William Church NATO's action in Kosovo has set the stage for a more in-depth discussion of information weapons or, in general terms, Information Operations (IO). Kosovo qualifies as a stage for future wars in terms of weapons targeted at the information infrastructure to effect the decision processes of both government leaders and the general civilian population. The Kosovo action allowed NATO to use a full arsenal of IO weapons. It used graphite bombs against the infrastructure to deprive the civilian population of electricity, and, therefore, it put political pressure on the Yugoslavian government. In other IO action, senior United States Air Force officials have described extensive covert system intrusions --hacking-- into the Yugoslavian air defense systems to degrade their response capabilities, and both sides conducted an extensive psychological campaign that ranged from traditional leaflets targeted at Yugoslavian civilians warning about a bogus ground attack to hacking web pages which had minimum strategic value. The Kosovo action has pushed significant international relations issues to the surface. Questions of sovereignty and the role of multi-lateral organizations are prime concerns, but it is also important to examine the broader concerns of non-lethal technology weapons and decision-cycle disruption strategies to destabilize a sovereign nation, without due process in an international arena. Ironically, Russia has been at the jagged edge of both of these issues. In November 1998, the Russian government requested the United Nations to establish a working group to table the issue of "information warfare," and the United Nations has agreed to start exploring these weapons for some form of possible IO use treaty. Working towards this process, there are technological and strategic issues that must be examined. First and foremost, the real danger of IO must be discussed and understood. IO weapons include non-nuclear Electronic Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons which "fry" any electronic or computer infrastructure within range. This category of weapon can render most military land and air craft useless and, therefore, vulnerable to attack by conventional weapons and forces. It can also be used against the civilian infrastructure for a number of reasons: First, it disrupts water and electric systems that support war production, and second, it can inflame any festering civil unrest which might deprive an opposition force additional protection or support. So-called soft bombs or graphite bombs also fall into the category of IO weapons. They are graphite strips that fall onto electric lines which cause a systemic failure in the distribution system but not the production system. In addition, an extension of this type of weapon is the electronic intrusion --hacking-- of those same systems which then allows for control of the infrastructure. For example, these methods could be used to control the water flow systems of dams or the cooling towers of nuclear power plants. Both would have a severe effect on the war production capacity of a nation. Another effort might be directed at a nation's financial system. This could be as simple as disrupting the transfer of money in and out of a country to create the maximum economic impact on industrial production, or it could take the form of an "electronic trading program" that systematically attacks a nation's currency. Another effort has more to do with isolating a nation in the global information infrastructure. A country could be "strangled" by depriving it of internet and other network connections which could effectively control the flow of information. This move would have to be coupled -- as it is was in Kosovo -- with the bombing of physical production and transmission systems. The NATO action demonstrates that the use of IO can be effective and may be expanded in the future. Non-NATO countries will build defensive and offensive capabilities and NATO will push to maintain its lead in this area. In addition, IO weapons have the capability of upsetting the traditional offense-defense balance which has been leaning in the favor of the defense for the last 20 years, thanks to nuclear weapons. All of the above reasons dovetail with another more sobering truth: conventional weapons - including air power - have failed to achieve an overwhelming victory in almost all of the conflicts of the last 40 years. It is for these reasons, and others, that IO weapons and strategies will blossom in the next decade. Although in modern terms IO weapons may be new, the current situation is very similar to the threat developed from air power in the first part of this century because IO weapons extend the battlespace, in concept, much like air power extended the traditional battlespace. The new battlespace was expanded to air space thousands of feet above the ground. H.G. Wells correctly forecasted in "The War in the Air" this battlespace transition: "With flying machines war alters its character; it ceases to be an affair of fronts and becomes an affair of areas; neither side, victor or loser remains immune from the gravest injuries and while there is a vast increase in the destructiveness of war there is also increased indecisiveness." Some 14 years after Wells made that observation the Hague Aerial Bombardment Rules were drafted on 11 December 1922 and Article 22 may be most applicable: "Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population of destroying or damaging private property not of a military character, of injuring non-combatants is prohibited." With the continuing infrastructure privatization trend and nations being highly dependent on electronic and information infrastructure, it may be reasonably argued that terrorizing the civilian population could include depriving them of vital life support services such as electric and telecommunications facilities. This might be especially true when considering the advances of medicine today and their increased dependence on information systems to deliver the most basic level of services. This principle was extended by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Protocols I and II of 1977. Protocol I, once again, restated a general principle of warfare which goes back to the Peace of God concept. Certain weapons should be prohibited "which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." It also extended that prohibition to weapons that could cause "widespread long term and serve damage to the natural environment," and specifically named dams, dikes, and nuclear power plants. The recent IO attacks in Yugoslavia are dangerously close to a violation of this protocol because of the developing nature of the world infrastructure. Today, a nation's infrastructure is significantly interlocked and dependent. A good example of this might be the December 1998 electricity black-out in the San Francisco Bay Area. A minor problem at a switching station caused millions of people to be without power for up to 12 hours because it cascaded through the entire system. With nuclear power plants, dams, water control systems, and other infrastructure components highly dependent on electronic systems, it might be argued that IO weapons should be restricted because of the fear of a significant, systemic event triggered by soft bombs or hacking targeted at electric systems. As far fetched as that might sound, there is sufficient evidence of the systemic causal relationship of modern interlocked infrastructure. For example, in 1997 in the southern portion of the United States a local utility company turned off the electricity to a town because they were late in their bills and this effected the pumping station at the sewage treatment plant which dumped thousands of gallons of raw sewage into a river which was upstream of a highly populated area. Today, with extensive 911 or emergency systems, it is possible that civilians could die as a result of system failures. Psychological warfare (PSYOP) aspects of IO should also be reviewed because of the Kosovo situation. The growing concern is that the advancing global communications infrastructure is an enabling factor. PSYOPs on the internet could be devastating to already potentially explosive situations like Indonesia and Malaysia. In terms of financial systems and the role of modern communications, there has been more than one Asian government that pointed to the 1997 financial meltdown as being a hostile effort to disrupt their political system. For the above reasons, the development of an IO treaty must be explored in an appropriate forum. The period between the world wars failed to address the issue of the uses of air power and countless civilians, from the air raid bunkers of Dresden to the napalmed civilians of Vietnam, have suffered. It must be immediately addressed in an international forum like the United Nations because of existing Human Rights provisions and its ability to represent the international infrastructure through its existing organizations. William Church is the Managing Director Centre for Infrastructural Warfare Studies |