Phil Taylor's papers
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BACK TO : INFORMATION WARFARE (IW) & INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) - see also PSYOPS
The Role of Public Information in the Era of Information Operations by C Nemeth 
Journal of Peace, Conflict & Military Studies Vol. 1, No. 2, November 2000, ISSN 1563-4019 The Winds of Change: The Role of Public Information in the Era of Information Operations Captain Christopher Nemeth (Retired)* U.S. Naval Reserve Democratic military public information has traditionally included programs to build relations between the military and key audiences: community leaders and citizens, one's own forces, and the press. U.S. military forces recently have consolidated public information and other military information functions into the doctrine of "information operations" (IO). This is in response to bad actors on the international stage using mass communications (including the Internet) to influence public opinion during armed conflict. This essay explores how the advent of information operations affects the perception, value, and practice of public information. The questions and implications have import for the practice of public information on the African continent as its countries seek to establish open public discourse. The Role of Information Operations Traditional military strategies such as battle space dominance are used to assert control over land, water or air space. The information environment, however, exists in a realm that is outside of any single commander's control: the global information environment (GIE). The GIE is a combination of both civilian and military information networks and technologies. This environment exists separate and apart from the boundaries of geography or statehood. It includes national global and defense infrastructures, national and foreign industry, joint systems, international organizations, political leaders, other governments, and elements of the editorial media such as Cable News Network (CNN) and the Internet. It is the GIE that "electronically links organizations and individuals around the globe".1 Live worldwide television coverage of the Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM drove a new message home to the civilian and military leadership on both sides of that conflict. Public views of success or failure were being developed during, not after, events via the GIE. In short order, the U.S. military realized that "shaping the battle environment" must also include shaping the information environment. Failure to do so could create inaccurate and negative public perceptions about the U.S.-led coalition that could lead to its demise. Information Operations and Public Information It will help to start by understanding what is meant by the terms information warfare and information operations, then to identify where public information belongs. Some authors such as Fredericks 2 have included the conduct of public information and media relations within the field that is termed information warfare. Other authors such as Kuehl 3 define information warfare more narrowly. For Kuehl, information warfare consists of "those offensive and defensive war fighting actions in or via the information environment to control or exploit it". Kuehl defines information operations as "the range of military government operations to protect and exploit the information environment". Unlike information warfare, information operations "spans the conflict spectrum from peace to war and back to peace, and it involves all elements of the national government, not solely the military". It is information operations that merges "traditionally separate capabilities and activities," including "public affairs, counter deception, physical security, communications security, deception, computer security, physical attack/destruction, counterintelligence, counter propaganda, network management, electronic warfare, operational security, computer network attack, civil affairs, and information security".4 Public information, then, is more correctly considered within information operations and not information warfare. Power in truth telling makes public information a viable and valuable resource of the commander. The IO Cell Three roles have served a command's traditional needs for information support: civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and public information (PI). Civil affairs typically involves the creation and management of social systems (e.g., elections) in order to restore a society to order. The difference between psychological operations and public information, though, is not as clear. Psychological operations are "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of PSYOPS is "to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to their originator's objectives".5 In the U.S., public information is "the maximum release of information to the American public consistent with national and operational security".6 Public information practice does not include the same methods as PSYOP. While PSYOP seeks to influence attitudes with tactics such as deception, public information relies on truth. However, that does not limit the effect of public information. In fact, its effect can be more powerful under some circumstances. The reason is that "in many cases, the ability of public affairs to inject a well-timed truth into the equation can have as significant an impact upon an adversary as a detailed deception plan".7 This power in truth telling makes public information a viable and valuable resource of the commander. It also provides the commander with tools that limit and even avoid conflict entirely. The Changing Role of Conflict Three aspects of military conflict have been affected by the contest for public opinion in the GIE: objectives, symmetry and deterrence. Objectives - Opposing sides in a conflict pursue contrary objectives. That pursuit occurs on three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactics are actions that are intended to achieve an objective. Operations are tactics that are planned and carried out over a period of time. Strategic operations are directed at attaining objectives in a specific theater (theater strategic). Alternately, strategic operations may affect the citizenry and values in one's own nation (national strategic). It can be argued that when national media are present, any tactical situation becomes strategic. For example, when the United States sent forces to Somalia, their mission was to restore order in a country that had been ravaged by famine. However, media coverage that showed the public abuse of U.S. forces there effected a sharp national reaction in the U.S. mission there. A tactical situation in Somalia elicited a strategic outcome in the U.S., via the GIE.8 Two aspects of conflict have provided the impetus for public information to evolve from a support role to an operational role: asymmetry and deterrence. Asymmetry - In conflicts such as World War II, adversaries conducted symmetric wars. Similar kinds of forces used similar types of tactics. The sides and issues were in little doubt. Since Vietnam, opponents have varied widely in scale and ability. Without a tactical or strategic edge, adversaries have sought means other than equal military strength in order to deny an opponent strength or support. Finding and exploiting an opponent's weakness has been a frequent asymmetric tactic. For example, guerrilla forces use stealth or surprise in order to counter an opponent's material or force supremacy. In Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic used U.S. citizen sensitivity to potential casualties and to human rights as an asymmetric route to try to weaken the NATO alliance's cohesion. Apple9 described Kosovo as the ultimate extension of asymmetry. It exemplified the kind of complex, confusing crisis that takes place "in a twilight zone, full of uncertainty, where rules are formulated (and broken) as the participants choose. It is hard to know who is winning, sometimes harder to know who has won". Deterrence - Deterrence is the delay of armed conflict through non-hostile means. It makes it possible to deny an adversary his objective without exposing one's own forces to jeopardy. The writings of Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu described the precedent for deterrence: Only when the enemy could not be overcome by these means was there recourse to armed force, which was applied so that the victory was gained: (a) in the shortest possible time; (b) at the least possible cost in lives and effort; (c) with the infliction on the enemy of the least possible casualties".10 For German military writer Carl von Clausewitz, deterrence provides an alternative to all-out conflict. It is a measured response, "just enough to checkmate the attempted aggression," that can be used as an alternative to mass retaliation. Such "straightforward dealing" enables the commander to disarm the enemy through the employment of an inner or moral courage. That inner courage complements the physical courage that is more often associated with hostilities.11 Deterrent effect can be used to suppress an adversary's willingness to launch aggressive action. This can delay an adversary's initiative. Such a delay can be used to accomplish a variety of actions. For example, a delay can be used to buy to enable a coalition to forge a consensus. The GIE provides a faster, more direct contact with an adversary than ever before. How a military commander uses the GIE now affects the outcome of conflicts. Public information, as part of the information operations cell, is one of the means that is available within IO to accomplish a favorable outcome. The Role of Public Information The role of the warrior storyteller extends back to ancient times. Leaders sought consent from the citizenry to undertake an action or campaign. Any soldier or sailor returning from battle had an account of his experience to tell. Eventually, storytellers observed the battle and conveyed its account to a variety of audiences. Until the Vietnam conflict, public information practitioners acted as controllers or gatekeepers of information and access. Media were relatively few. Media representatives observed a reasonably consistent set of conventions, although not always cordially. Military commanders sought to obtain well-informed media coverage of events in the field. Commanders also solicited insightful judgment about media coverage through participation in editorial board sessions. Attention was paid to the way that the media portrayed the command and issues of concern to the command. The members of media were considered to be best attuned to the interests of their subscribers, listeners, or viewers. As a result, speed and accuracy of response to media queries was the standard for public information staff performance. The contest for perceptions conducted in the GIE has changed that role. Now, public information practitioners perform as an information resource and initiator. Reactive methods such as imposing limits and control have given way to three active methods that can be employed to pre-empt those who would attempt to deny the military commander's objectives: revelation, explanation, and assessment. Revelation - Revelation brings to light information that is not known. The ability to assess actual conditions before, during, and after hostilities removes the potential for an adversary to make false claims stick. Revelation can be used to effect deterrence. For example, the demonstration of the actual capabilities of one's own forces can give pause to an adversary (as long as those capabilities can actually be brought to bear). Revelation can also be used to deflate false claims that may be used to solicit public sympathy. For example, an adversary might claim that an opponent caused the destruction of an orphanage that was actually a munitions cache. The release of accurate video or still photo coverage of the damaged area could be used to deflate the false claim by revealing it to be military asset. Explanation - Explanation provides a context for information that is known but is not understood or that has been imbued with a biased meaning. Such claims and counter-claims are the manner in which much of the contest for public opinion is conducted. Countering incorrect assumptions with fact can quell an otherwise chaotic situation that adversaries can use to their advantage. Assessment - Through assessment, public information acts as the commander's lead agent in understanding the adversary through his use of the media. What has or has not been said? How has it been said, and where? Is this consistent with or inconsistent with expectations? Is the command getting the outcome it seeks? Application to Practice The conduct of information operations has already brought about a significant change in the practice of public information. This has occurred primarily in the European Theater, particularly in the Balkan conflicts in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Serbian province of Kosovo. Two events in recent years have provided U.S. and allied forces with the opportunity to explore the use of public information within the information operations environment: Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and Operation ALLIED FORCE. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR - Captain Mark Van Dyke, USN served in 1996 at Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina as Chief of Public Information for the Implementation Force (IFOR) while assigned as Director of Public Information for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). IFOR afforded NATO with its first chance to implement the "information cell" concept as it enacted the Dayton Accords. Van Dyke recounts that, in addition to political, economic, and military elements, "public information was one of the four main elements of power used by the international community's military leaders to shape the operational environment, deter potential conflicts and resolve crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina". Through the efforts of a common information cell, civil affairs, public information, and political advisors developed and implemented an IFOR information campaign (IIC) in order to coordinate the daily IFOR message that was synchronized with operations. IFOR recognized the need for public information and psychological operations to remain separate, in order for public information to remain credible. The IFOR information cell maintained a partition between PSYOP and public information by assignment. PSYOP communicated directly with the Bosnian people. Public information communicated with the domestic (U.S.) and world publics via the mass media. Continual coordination among cell members ensured that communications were consistent and implemented according to IFOR policy. Public information has now become a prime asset for the commander on the battlefield of perceptions. IFOR efforts were hampered by a lack of manpower, by NATO staff who had no public information experience, and by a lack of NATO internal information doctrine. Väätäinen12 noted that the six-month rotations for IFOR staff made it all but impossible for them to grasp Balkan issues and to develop meaningful contacts with the media. International and local press, . . were relatively happy with the press briefings and individual spokespersons whose credibility was crucial to the mission". Those staff members who gained respect from the press do so as a result of their expertise on the region, knowledge of what was happening, or honesty and frankness . . .. Despite the rigors that the combined environment imposed, Van Dyke considered the program to have been a success. Information operations were "used to shape opinions and attitudes, deter aggressive actions, and diffuse crises when they did occur". "Research done of press conferences during JOINT ENDEAVOR indicates that interviews and press conferences with commanders were among the most credible and effective means of communicating IFOR's message to the public". 13 Operation ALLIED FORCE - U.S. participation in NATO operations in support of Kosovo was the first opportunity to exercise public information in the information operations environment during hostilities. The experience, which spanned 1998 through to 1999, shows mixed results. Slobodan Milosevic used the media extensively in his efforts to erode the cohesion of the NATO alliance before, during, and after the operation. By ejecting the foreign press and non-governmental organizations (NGO's), he created what amounted to an information vacuum that he filled at will, free from scrutiny by objective third parties. Having no ground forces or observers, the "information war" revolved around claims by Milosevic that were related to the results of air strikes. Milosevic appeared to have accepted the risks of media chiding over the mass press expulsion, as well as a certain residual skepticism about Serbian motives. The air campaign began in March, 1999. Senior staff at U.S. European Command (EUCOM) headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany was already conversant with information operations doctrine. They had already stood up an IO cell and had developed a comprehensive IO plan. The plan was provided to NATO in order to help move the new approach forward. It would serve in effect as a substrate for the NATO IO effort. In the end, ALLIED FORCE lasted only three months. The brief time was too short to deploy public information resources or to establish and operate a full PA/IO effort. The "information war" continued long after hostilities ended.14 Claims over the effectiveness of NATO bombing were still being argued well after the conflict subsided.15 To this day, public sentiment in Kosovo and Serbia regarding the outcome of the operation remains an open topic of debate. Public Information in the Information Operations Era The public information role is changing under the influence of information operations. In its new incarnation, public information has become operational in nature, synchronized with the operational situation, initiative, and inclusive of all services and agencies. Operational - Public information is now among the resources that the commander employs to achieve campaign objectives when dealing with an adversary. No longer a support role, the focus of public information is on operational campaign objectives. Practitioners who are unfamiliar with the sophistication that is necessary for intra-service, inter-service, allied, and combined collaboration will be unable to earn and sustain the trust of the operational commander. Public information now operates relative to the actions and messages of adversaries while events unfold. Public information practitioners must cultivate a razor-sharp situational awareness. Those who succeed in this role will be able to sense what adversaries are able to and likely to do, and have a variety of options ready on how to proceed as the campaign evolves. Initiative - The public information message is linked to the battle commander's objectives. Public information staff members collaborate with other information cell participants to plan and execute information campaigns. This requires a strong sense of how to employ truth telling as a deliberate command role. Public information practitioners need to apply an aggressive, incisive intellect to support the command mission. The information war begins long before any organized deployment of forces. Public information resources need the equipment, transportation resources and professional skills to act as independent advance forces. Adversary-oriented - Unlike the traditional model of friendly-only communications, the adversary is now a key audience. Public information assumes the responsibility to understand key issues, culture, decision-makers in that audience, as well as to assess outcomes with that audience. This requires those who practice public information to learn the culture, behavior and language of each area in which they operate. That includes regular, as well as irregular, parties that may have occasion to influence the position of the commander's forces. Inclusive of all services, agencies - Participation in IO activities integrates political leaders, civilian agencies, non-governmental agencies, as well as military services. Public information practitioners need to grasp the range of interests and approaches that each participant brings to the table. Conclusions Information is a means to breathe the fresh air of truth into the public discourse in a democratizing nation. Information operations are clearly blowing the winds of change through the practice of public information. Initial indications show that the collaboration among information cell roles, including public information, can have substantial value and success. The future is not certain, however. Many aspects of public information practice and its employment by senior staff and unit commanders will need to be resolved. In addition, those who practice the role of public information will need to step forward and meet the "information war" challenge. As the Balkans conflicts have recently shown, bad actors can exert more influence that one might suspect by waging asymmetric conflicts. Public information's role in injecting a "well-timed" truth can strike a telling blow in these circumstances. But revelation, explanation and assessment require news skills and abilities among those who use them. The challenge now for those who rely on this new role and who practice this new role is to shape it, learn it, and use it. Endnotes FM 100-6. Department of Defense. Washington, D.C. August, 1996. Fredericks, B. "Information Warfare at the Crossroads". Joint Force Quarterly. Summer, 1997. 97-103. Kuehl, D. Defining Information Warfare. The Officer. Reserve Officers Association. Washington, DC. November, 1997. Joint Publication 3-13 (final coordination draft) Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. Department of Defense. Washington, DC. July, 1998. I-10. Information Warfare Defense. Defense Science Board Task Force. November, 1996. DoD Directive 5122.5. Public Affairs. Department of Defense. Washington, DC. Denying the Enemy: A Concept for Information Operations. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Surface Warfare. July-August 1998. pp. 22-27. Hovatter, G. Deputy Director (ECPA) U.S. European Command. Personal interview. Stuttgart-Vaihingen, GER. July, 1999. Apple, R.W. "It's the 21st Century Arriving Early". The New York Times. April 1, 1999. A14. Griffin. S.B. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. Oxford University Press. New York.1963. 39. Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Penguin Books. New York. 1968. 58, 139, 274. Väätäinen, S. Totally Honest? The IFOR Press and Information Operation in the Balkans in the Eyes of the Press. M.A. Thesis in Journalism. Department of Communication. University of Jyväskylä, Finland. December 1997. 36-39. Van Dyke, M. NATO Military Public Information Operations: IFOR Lessons Learned. Presentation to the Ministry of Defense. Bucharest, ROM. May, 1997. Whitney, C. "NATO Chief Still Directing Battle of Words Over Kosovo". New York Times. September 17, 1999. A10. Newman, R. "The Bombs That Failed in Kosovo". U.S. News and World Report. September 20, 1999. 28-29. |