Phil Taylor's papers
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BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GLOBAL 'WAR' ON TERROR (GWOT) Years 1 and 2, ie 9/11-2003
The other Media Network by A Sennit 
The other Media Network by Andy Sennitt, 15 January 2004 The Harris Corporation, a US technology company which builds transmitters, is going to be responsible for the Arabic language programmes on Iraqi domestic radio. At least, that's the impression you would have had if you read the 14 Jan edition of the Washington Post, which a lot of Americans - including those in high places - did. This misinterpetation of the simple word 'operate' in a press release is symptomatic of the muddle and confusion that has surrounded efforts to rebuild the Iraqi media since the Coalition took control of the country nine months ago. And unless major changes are made to the approach of the US-led Coalition, I see no prospect of an improvement. "Disgusted of Baghdad" It's significant that a number of experienced journalists hired to help run the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) have walked out in disgust. One is veteran TV producer Don North, who described the IMN in Television Week as "an irrelevant mouthpiece for Coalition Provisional Authority propaganda, managed news and mediocre programmes." This week, on the radio programme Democracy Now! North said that "The Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Bremer's organisation, doesn't seem to be able to differentiate between public diplomacy, in other words telling Iraqis and the world what we Americans are trying to do in Iraq, and giving the Iraqis a voice of independence that they need themselves." If that's what an insider thinks, imagine how the Iraqis must feel! The plan on paper looks sound enough: a public broadcasting system based on the BBC and the American PBS. However, they've got one crucial thing wrong. Having the Pentagon and the Coalition Provisional Authority directly involved is the equivalent of handing responsibility for the BBC's domestic output to, say, the French President and Prime Minister. The way it was The problem has been exacerbated by the limited technical resources available after the almost total destruction of the transmission infrastructure in the 1991 Gulf War and again in 2003. The Saddam regime inherited a broadcasting system that was remarkably well developed compared to surrounding countries at the time. A number of very high power mediumwave transmitters carried Arabic programmes to the whole country, while there was regional broadcasting for the Kurdish and Turkomen minorities. Such a structure would not be out of place today, and could have been put back in place by now, but for the insistence of those hired to run the IMN that all programming was to be organised from Baghdad. And it gets worse. Those entrusted to make the key decisions never went to find out what was actually needed by the people themselves. With breathtaking arrogance, they decided to impose their idea of what was appropriate over the heads of those who knew better. The experience of the broadcasting specialists attached to the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul demonstrates how officials at the IMN persisted in trying to drag defeat from the jaws of victory in the battle to win hearts and minds. But what do you expect when you hire a defence contractor to run the media? A new beginning? So mistakes were made. Now there's a chance to put them right. Unfortunately, from what I've read so far, it could still all end in tears. Nobody would question the ability of the Harris Corporation to rebuild the technical infrastructure: it's a job that ought to have been started nine months ago, but better late than never. What bothers me is the apparent insistence on continuing to freeze out most of the 5000 or so individuals who worked in the Iraqi media under the Saddam regime. To accuse them of all of being Baathists is ridiculous. A broadcast engineer is just that. He might hold strong political views, or he might not. It doesn't make any difference to his ability to get a transmitter up and running. Shortage of parts meant some of these guys developed wonderful skills that kept stations such as the Iraq Satellite channel on the air under the most extreme conditions. But where are they now? Judging by the poor technical standards of some of the coalition's media efforts to date, they're not where they ought to be. Strangers in town So Lebanese and Kuwaitis are being brought in to "train" Iraqis in their own country. Imagine how US broadcasters would feel if they were told they had to take lessons from Canadians and Brits about how to make good radio and TV programmes. Come to think of it, that might not be such a bad idea, but can you see it ever happening? It would be much better to bring in some native Iraqis who have been working in the media outside Iraq to do any training necessary. It will give the Iraqis some self respect, and lessen their feelings of being totally dependent on outsiders. But will the Coalition take heed? Based on their track record so far, I doubt it. My impression is that they are pursuing their own agenda, paying lip service to the concept of a proper public broadcasting system, while doing what they feel is good for the Coalition, not for the Iraqi people. Meanwhile, many Iraqis will continue to do what they did in the Saddam era: rely on media from outside the country while longing for a public broadcasting system they can really call their own. Disclaimer: Views expressed in this article are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of Radio Netherlands. |