Phil Taylor's papers
|
BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GWOT Year 5 - 2006
CENTCOM Senior Leaders Talking Points 1 February 2006 [I was sent this by email] OVERARCHING THEMES - 'The Long War' · Can't look at the AOR through the soda straws of Iraq and Afghanistan: o Many of the 27 Nations have instability and terrorism o Problems, but much promise - recent elections in many countries o We must remain vigilant throughout the AOR to help countries help themselves · The GWOT is a 'long war' which will be fought at different levels of intensity during different periods. · Iraq and Afghanistan are central fronts in the GWOT, but this enemy is a borderless, transnational threat. · The enemy must be defeated abroad so we do not have to fight them at home - this is vital to our national security. · Terrorists are trying to acquire WMD - this remains a central threat and a prime reason why we must defeat this enemy. · Terrorism challenges sovereignty at all levels - we must be agile and adaptable with our partners to meet this threat. · Our strategic posture reshapes for the long war = smaller more expeditionary forces enable others to help themselves. · Al Qaida and its associated movements are the main threat. · We will prevail, but it will take time, and will mean additional risks, sacrifices, and occasional setbacks. TOP LINE MESSAGES-GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM · This enemy knows he cannot defeat us militarily - he is not ten-feet tall. He is focused on winning the battle of perception, attacking civilians to spread fear among local populations. His goal is to win the perception battle and force us to lose our will. · We're in a period of revolutionary change in the Middle East, a struggle between moderation and extremism, where the moderates in both Iraq and Afghanistan have actively participated and sought to build governments based on democratic reform. · Expect turbulence as the region deals with change and moves toward participatory governments. · GWOT will require a generational commitment, consistent international cooperation and sustained public support. · We will continue to operate as a Coalition. We expect future attacks on coalition forces · We must create an international dialogue on the spread of extremism. We can defeat this extremist threat together. · This enemy has a desire to dominate the region and has no positive vision of the future. · Extremism is a borderless, global issue, manifested through affiliated cells networked by a common ideology. · This is not just a military fight - We must encourage the types of reform that lead to a peaceful state. · Our focus across the 27 countries in CENTCOM is to : o Help Iraqis secure Iraq o Help Afghans secure Afghanistan o Help Saudi Arabia and Pakistan help themselves o Deter Iran and Syria o Protect the flow of oil to the world's economy through the region o Help Horn of Africa nations secure their borders and deny transnational terrorist safe havens o Stem the spread of extremism throughout the region · Media often fails to provide balance to success stories. Negativity leads in the news. THE NATURE OF THE ENEMY · AQAM = overarching threat throughout the AOR - with an ideological desire to dominate the region, it must be defeated. · AQ network is under pressure throughout the AOR - more people reject their message than agree with it · AQ is driven by a hateful ideology. They are virtually connected, seek WMD and want to drive us from the region. · AQAM uses the Internet and media to foster the perception that they are more capable than they actually are. · AQAM is under pressure but they are still dangerous; they are always seeking another headline to intimidate people. · The enemy is a network guided by ideology, operated as a web of cells and fueled by militant Islamic zeal · Enemy strikes without warning and without regard for human life in the hope they can frighten and intimidate free people. · They will not stop until they have been defeated or we have been defeated. · History has proven that this type of evil must be confronted. · We do not create terrorism by fighting the terrorists. We invite terrorism by ignoring VIRTUAL CALIPHATE · In '96 UBL and Zawahiri laid out an AQ vision which called for attacks on apostate governments & establishment of a caliphate. · Not able to maintain a physical caliphate, they have established a global network in the virtual realm - a "virtual caliphate" · Terrorists of '05 are empowerment through the internet -- stronger than they really are through use of the internet and the media. · More than 4,000 active extremist web sites are part of the virtual caliphate which uses the internet as a safe haven for extremist: · Training · Recruitment · Disseminating tactics/techniques/procedures · Financing (Support for terrorist organizations through internet pay sites) · Professions of success and videos commemorating successful strikes · Garnering support · Virtual Caliphate exercises State-Like powers without the liabilities - it does not have to defend itself or provide for its citizens. · Virtual Caliphate changes the paradigm of warfare - It is the single most critical element in the radicalization of young Muslims. · Terrorists are linked, via this virtual caliphate, by an ideology that is repugnant to their own religion. · This is not a struggle between east and west it is a struggle within Islam and moderate voices must be heard. · AQAM work in franchise fashion operating on a broad commander's intent. UBL provides broad commander's intent. TOP LINE MESSAGES - IRAQ IRAQ DEPLOYED: · U.S. Service members 137,375 · Coalition: 19,954 · Reserves 6% · Guard 13% · Active duty 81% · The situation and political progress is not easy, violence will continue -- it requires our steadfast resolve. · In 2006 the intention is to turn over the bulk of counterinsurgency ops to the Iraqis. · Viewing events in Iraq through the prism of the media does not give you a true appreciation of the success on the ground · America has an ally of growing strength in the fight against terror. · The Coalition's mission is to foster an environment where Iraqis can defend themselves and maintain a stable government. · The insurgents consist of Baathist, Shia, Al Qaeda, and Sunni extremists (who make up the largest in size and threat). · Progress includes a standing government, mobilized security force, economic development and a democratic process. · It takes time to change culture and build institutions. We will continue to see violence, but we must stay the course. · We're slowly relinquishing control and added security as Iraqi security forces mature and take on more responsibility. · Defeating the insurgency will also depend on continued Iraqi political progress and political institutions gaining legitimacy. · Be patient, this won't happen overnight. American took nearly 20-years to ratify the constitution. · The very nature of democracy is having a choice, Iraqis are voicing their opinions, an option Iraqis haven't had in 40 years. Saddam Trial Resumes · It is important that the Iraqi High Tribunal's investigations and trial of Saddam Hussein continue, and we welcome steps that facilitate the continuation of this important process. · The Iraqi people deserve to see justice served to those who perpetrated crimes against humanity. · We fully support the Iraqi efforts to assemble the evidence, prepare cases against, and bring Saddam and others in his former regime to trial in accordance with the rule of law. · The Iraqi High Tribunal is an Iraqi-led and managed process. We would refer you to the Iraqi High Tribunal as the primary source for Tribunal personnel issues. · The U.S. and other international partners will also continue to provide technical assistance and support to the Tribunal to help ensure that it has the necessary resources, assistance, and training to conduct safe, fair, transparent and effective prosecutions in accordance with the rule of law. · The Department of Justice's Regime Crimes Liaison's Office has the lead for this assistance. Broad Dialogue with Iraqi Leaders · The US Embassy and Coalition Forces are reaching out to influential, community leaders across Iraq to address legitimate concerns of all groups and urge people to participate in a peaceful, political process. · Dialogue with and convincing those who in the past turned toward violence to lay down their weapons and become part of a long-term solution will save lives of all Iraqis. · Engaging in dialogue at all levels allows for the building of trust and confidence. · We maintain an active dialogue with political leaders from all parts of Iraq, and we encourage everyone we talk with to use whatever influence they have to turn people away from violence and have them join the political process. Detainee Release · Releases are conducted in accordance with normal procedures of the Iraq-U.S. Combined Review and Release Board. · This release and others like it highlight the progress toward democratic governance and the rule of law, demonstrating the involvement of Iraq's government in the effort to provide both security and justice for all Iraqis. The original board for these detainees was scheduled for Jan 3, but was rescheduled for Jan 16th. The CRRB met and made its recommendations as normal. · We will not discuss individual cases of detainees or when ongoing reviews may result in releases. · Since the process began, approximately 26,000 detainee files have been reviewed. · Since the board first convened in August 2004, approximately 5,000 detainees have been approved for release, 8,500 for release with a guarantor, and 12,000 were recommended for continued internment. Information Operations · Recent news coverage continues to highlight information operations in Iraq and generate concerns regarding military communications objectives and procedures. · Coalition Forces have a number of programs designed for providing factual information to the local population. As part of our operations, we've offered articles for publication to Iraqi newspapers, and in some cases articles have been accepted and published as a function of buying advertising and opinion/editorial space, as is customary in Iraq. · We are currently examining all aspects of this issue across MNF-I, and if our Civilian Police Assistance Training Team The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq will focus on the following in 2006: · Partner with MOI to continue to build Ministry capabilities. MNSTC-I focus will be to assist the MOI to develop policies, directives and procedures which will allow the Ministry to direct and conduct civil security operations. · Continue to build the Iraqi Civil Security Forces (Department of Border Enforcement, Ground Ports-of-Entry (POE) personnel, Iraqi police and the National Police Force). · MNSTC-I will complete manning, training and equipping of approximately 100,000 more MOI Civil Security Forces, for a total of 200,000 (MOI Civil Security Forces) by the end of 2006. · Additionally, MNSTC-I will intensify partnership and mentorship of MOI security forces by increasing Transition Teams approximately 50% across Iraq and initiate partnering of MNF-I forces with MOI forces. · Institutionalize gains by developing an education and training professional development system, as well as increasing leader capability through more officer and NCO Corps training. PROGRESS · Since April 2003, Iraq has registered more than 30,000 new businesses · Last March TIPS Hotline had 500-Tips// Sept '05 there were 4700 tips · Look at how many people were drawn into the political process who weren't there before - that's where the insurgency is losing. · The Iraqis, with the Coalition, have: established an interim government, successfully defeated terrorists and restored sovereignty. · Terrorists have failed to achieve their strategic objectives. · Progress in the Iraqi political process will do more than anything we can do militarily to draw people away from the insurgency IRAQI SECURITY FORCES · The ultimate goal is to enable the Iraqis by building the ISF, defeating the insurgents and strengthening Iraqi rule of law. · There are more than 227 K trained and equipped ISF doing everything from standard law enforcement to counterinsurgency. · The Iraqi security forces are maturing and progressing as we see continued success from the combined Iraqi and Coalition forces. · Iraqi Security Force capabilities continue to improve, but performance varies by region, the trend is clearly positive. · Two key factors in ISF success are "seasoning" the force and developing leaders responsible to the Iraqi Government and people. · Readiness capability is a function of numbers, training, equipment, leadership and experience. Seasoning results in experience. · In the months ahead, the Coalition will focus on partnering, mentoring, teaching and building the forces experience. · Approximately 275,000 ISF are planned to be trained, equipped and capable once the country transitions in 2006. · The Iraqi Partnership Program is a collaborative effort between the Iraqi Government and Multi-National Force - Iraq. · This program prepares ISF to take the lead and places Coalition Forces into a supporting role for the counterinsurgency fight. · The Ministry of Interior Forces was manned at 79,116 (as of Jan 05) and now sits at 113,000 (as of Dec 05). · The Ministry of Defense Forces was 56,949 (as of Jan 05) and doubled to 103,000 (as of Dec 05). SIGNIFICANT IRAQI ELECTION DATES · Dec. 15, 2005 - general election for a democratic government that would take control by Dec. 31, 2006. · 11 Feb 06 - IECI expected to officially ratify results · 1 May - New IZ Government seated · 30 Apr 06 - Constitutional amendments approved by TNA · 30 Jun 06 - New Referendum vote completed TROOP ROTATIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS · Position as 'Re-posturing' vice 'reduction' or 'off-ramp' of forces · Any change in force levels will be conditions based, not calendar based. · As stability is achieved we will reduce force structure, because U.S. and Coalition presence won't continue to be necessary. · Commanders in the field will continue to evaluate our force structure and recommend changes as conditions warrant. · The decision is made in close consultation with, and with the support of, the Iraqi government. · A timetable for leaving Iraq would be counterproductive, leading the terrorists to think they can wait us out. · U.S. troop numbers in country have stabilized at approximately 138,000 (15 Brigades). Coalition force in Iraq is about 158,000. PROVINCAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT) · Design Intent of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT): o Modular, w/standard core structure, tailored to each province o Reliant on in-place military assets for support where available; but has organic personnel movement security, comms, transportation, etc. o Built-in flexibility to "outlive" current MNF-I positioning · Promote gov reform at the provincial level and develop self-sufficiency · Assist with developing a capable and accountable local gov · Aid local Gov to ID and prioritize the needs & to address to IZ Gov Coalition, Donor, NGO and private resources · Develop the ability of provincial gov to devise short and long-term strategies for economic programs · Develop a phased plan for transition from a PRT presence to, to traditional USAID development activities, and to self-reliance · Coordinate with Coalition Forces to synchronize governance efforts with stability operations · Provide qualitative measurements of success against established benchmarks · Overall Civilian Program Lead. PRT Team Leader is responsible for and provides a central point of contact to all facets of the initiative in the province, to include political liaison, governance development, reconstruction & assistance, etc · The PRTs are a civil-military effort led by the U.S. Department of State with extensive support from U.S. and Coalition Forces · Depending on needs of each province, they range in size from 105 to 278 persons, w/about 30 locally employed staff · The principal objective of the PRT initiative is to: o Help local governments deliver public services o Develop democratic and economic governance institutions o Enhance stability and growth. ZARQAWI · Attacking innocent civilians is a desperate act. Killing innocent Iraqis is not victory. · We are patiently and efficiently breaking up his network and keeping him off-balance. · Zarqawi is trying to prevent Iraqis from choosing their own destiny. · Recent attacks are an attempt to draw attention, increase morale and drive a wedge between the Iraqi people and their future. · They have failed strategically, as the government of Iraq is in place and moving forward. · We've neutralized a number of his lieutenants (captured or killed them) as well as others who have worked with and for him. · Whether it's a Muslim, man, woman or child, Zarqawi and his followers have no regard for human life. · People on Zarqawi's team will never be part of the political future or part of the reconciliation process. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES/VBIEDS · Improvised Explosive Devices remain the greatest casualty producing threat facing our forces in Iraq. · Techniques continue to evolve and we adjust accordingly. We continue to improve tactics, techniques, and procedures. · We are always learning and finding ways of detecting threats. We are very alert to the threat posed by IEDs/VBIEDS. · DoD is applying significant resources to the task of predicting, preventing, detecting, neutralizing and mitigating the use of IEDs. · Our goal is to provide forces with comprehensive jammer protection against the complete range of radio controlled IED triggers. · Deployed forces have identified dozens of bomb-making cells, many of which have been successfully targeted and broken up. · Training remains the key to mission success and minimizing casualties. · Success requires a solution that outmaneuvers an adaptive enemy. · Finite technical components must meet system needs to succeed with DoD strategy and defeating the IED threat. JOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE · Joint IED Defeat Task Force, together with the services and all of DoD, is working to win the IED fight in a comprehensive way, using a balance of intelligence, training and technology. · The IED issue is a complicated one, and no single solution exists to defeat IEDs. Our strategy is three-fold: · Training is paramount. The best sensor and weapon on the battlefield is a well trained, situationally aware soldier or Marine. · Killing or capturing bombmakers and their networks is absolutely vital. · Providing troops on the battlefield with the most innovative effective technology as it is developed is key. · We face an adaptive, innovative, thinking enemy. · While there is work to be done, we have made and are making progress. Some 40 percent of IEDs are now found and rendered safe before they can be detonated. EQUIPPING TROOPS · U.S. Forces have the best body armor in the world. · The key is having the right equipment at the right time with the right troops - we are doing this. · Interceptor Body Armor which is in wide-spread use in Iraq and Afghanistan is saving lives everyday. · As new technologies emerge, we work with industry to develop, test and produce the best possible equipment for our Soldiers. · All deployed U.S. troops have IBA. The Army has fielded more the 500,000 sets. Sufficient SAPI are available in theater. WITHDRAWAL STRATEGY · A timetable for leaving Iraq would be counterproductive, leading the terrorists to think they can wait us out. · Withdrawal of forces needs to be conditions based. · As the Iraqis become more self-reliant the visibility and presence of forces will be reduced. · We continue to work in close concert with our Coalition partners and the Iraqis. · The purpose of the Joint Committee is to transfer security responsibility is to define the conditions for the transition. · In short, to have the Iraqi Security Forces stand up, and Coalition Forces stand down. Abduction of American Citizens · We strongly condemn the actions of individuals holding American citizens as hostages. · We call for immediate and unconditional release, as we call for the release of all hostages. · The United States government does not make concessions to hostage takers. · Embassy officials are working closely with Iraqi officials to secure the release of American citizens and others held hostage. Information Operations · Recent news coverage has highlighted IO in Iraq and has generated concerns regarding military communications objectives. · Coalition Forces have a number of programs designed for providing factual information to the local population: We have offered articles for publication to Iraqi newspapers. Some have been accepted and published as a function of buying advertising and opinion/editorial space. · Third parties have been employed in an effort to mitigate the risk to publishers. · We are currently examining all aspects of this issue across MNF-I. · If our review reveals any improprieties, they will be investigated. · If we find any part of our process that does not have our full confidence, we will suspend that activity. · If we find any contractor failing to perform as we have intended, we will take appropriate action. TOP LINE MESSAGES-AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYED: · U.S. Service members: 20,281 · Coalition: 3,371 · Reserves: 7% · Guard: 18% · Active duty: 75% · Our goals include: · Safety for the lives of the Afghan people · Improving security by training police and building the Afghan National Army · Supporting the government selected by the people of Afghanistan. · Our primary focus is on reconstruction and establishing long-term stability. · We are not changing our strategy as much as we are simply shifting emphasis to concentrate on reconstruction. · We are working hand-in-hand with President Karzai and in a strong partnership with the people of Afghanistan. · Again - our job in Afghanistan is to set the security conditions so that democratic processes can take root. · Cooperation on both sides of the border remains good and both countries understand the seriousness of the threat. · The Enemy: Taliban; Al Qaeda; HIG; Warlords; Criminals · Progress: Eliminated AQ/terrorism safe havens Removed Taliban from power 8.5 million Afghans voted for democratic government · Our presence effectively extends the reach of the central government of Afghanistan. · Our presence helps to establish security. · Encouraging non-governmental and international assistance organizations to continue rebuilding Afghanistan. · The Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) program is a great success and are key to stabilizing Afghanistan. · There are 23 PRTs operating; they allow the Afghan government to expand reconstruction/outreach efforts and security. o The Coalition runs 14 PRTs and ISAF (NATO) run 9 PRTs · PRTs are a catalyst for improved development and reconstruction. · The presence of a PRT brings security to the area where it operates and serves to enable reconstruction and development. · the enemy's capabilities diminish, their desperation to change the course of events in Afghanistan grows. NATO/ISAF TRANSITION · Political decisions from our NATO allies will drive force lay-down for ISAF expansion in AF. · We are extremely optimistic about the expansion of NATO operations in Afghanistan. · CFC-A will remain committed -- to ensure NATO is fully prepared and ready to assume additional responsibilities. · Transition planned for ISAF to take over responsibility for Regional Command South. · Political discussions ongoing within NATO regarding exact configuration of how the command will look. · NATO forces in partnership with Afghan security forces are successful in assuming stability operations in Afghanistan. · NATO has a proven history - IFOR, SFOR, KFOR. · NATO is currently in the region providing aid and assistance to earthquake victims. · This is a transition not a withdrawal. · The U.S. will continue to be the largest single contributor to NATO forces in Afghanistan. · The Coalition is fostering conditions for democratic reform, replacing extremist ideology with moderate voices. · The transition process will be conditions based, not time based. · Providing a timetable would be counterproductive, allowing the enemy to believe he can wait us out. · Changes in troop levels are based on commanders in the field and announced by the Sec Def after approval by the President. · We constantly review conditions and planners look at various levels of forces. · Counter-terrorism efforts remain the principal responsibility of U.S. forces. · Goal is synergistic relationship between OEF and ISAF to work for common goals. · Work to be done but hope for the future. Pakistan Earthquake: · CC/DAK will transfer Mobile Hosp equip to Pakistanis to further aid our allies as our presence draws down in Pakistan. · Background: The Oct 8 earthquake in Pakistan caused immense loss of life and human misery. · Widespread destruction in one of the most mountainous and inaccessible regions of Pakistan. · The 7.6 magnitude quake took more than 73,000 lives and left 2.8 million people homeless. · Nearly half of those who lost their lives were children · The United States continues to stand with Pakistan in its hour of need and has been on the ground since Oct 10. · The U.S. response has been consistent with our humanitarian values and our deep commitment to our friend and ally. · The U.S. responded immediately and generously to Pakistan's call for assistance following the tragedy. · The first U.S. relief helicopters were on the ground in Pakistan within days after the earthquake struck. · U.S. humanitarian relief personnel arrived in Pakistan within 48 hours to assist. · The U.S. has pledged a total of $510 million in earthquake relief and reconstruction efforts to assist the people of Pakistan. · This total includes: o $300 million in humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance o $110 million in military support for relief operations o and at least $100 million anticipated from U.S. private contributions. · The U.S. engaged other donors to support relief and reconstruction in Pakistan. · At the Nov 19 Donors Conference in Pakistan, 75 countries and international organizations pledged $6.2 billion. · This impressive demonstration of international support reflects the large-scale efforts of the international community. · At the peak of initial relief efforts, more than 1,200 personnel and 24 helicopters provided vital support. · The U.S. military will continue to support the relief effort at the invitation of the Government of Pakistan. · A USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) has been on the ground since Oct 10. · U.S. assistance to Pakistan has initially focused on immediate needs of shelter, supplies, health, water, sanitation and logistics. · To date, the U.S. has provided more than $79.8 million in humanitarian assistance and food aid to earthquake-affected areas. · This assistance has been through non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. TOP LINE MESSAGES - HORN OF AFRICA · There is a history of Al Qaeda operating in the region (Nairobi/Tanzania) seeking ungovernable spaces. · CJTF HOA is working with partner countries to help deny safe havens to AQ and other terrorist groups. · Progress: (a) significant cooperation; (b) low-level civic work projects (c) high return on investment. · There are 26 international officers assigned to JTF-HOA · Our mission is to counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa in conjunction with host nation CT programs. o Terrorists prey on the economically deprived in order to recruit susceptible youth and future leaders. o Our actions (i.e. CMO) are key to winning a "generational fight" children succeed through education. · CJTF-HOA's ability to perform its mission depends significantly on the relationships we've established with our partners: o Host nations and emerging partner nations, NATO Allies, and sister services. · Our common pursuit of security and prosperity becomes much stronger through shared planning and training. · Our part in contributing to regional stability includes working and training with host nation agencies to improve security. · Our goal is to ensure enhanced security, better stability and a better life for the people. · Capacity building via civil military operations, humanitarian assistance and training is key to defeating terrorism. · As regional stability is established, it will be more difficult for terrorists to find ungoverned space to operate. · The goal is to isolate the terrorist from his bases of support, and prevent movement to safe havens. · We are waging peace KUWAIT · Close relationship with the Kuwaiti armed forces. · Our relationship with the powers around the Gulf, especially the Arab powers is one of stability and cooperation. · Not interested in confrontation in the Gulf; we are interested in ensuring commerce -- for world benefit. · Kuwait is so strategically important; because of its position, influence internationally, and its resources. · Dedicated to stability, to protecting the flow of natural resources, to protecting our friends -its the greater part of what we do. · We have been partners in good times and we have been partners in the worst of times. · The solidity of this relationship is in and of itself a part of battling terrorism and increasing stability. IRAN · It's a dangerous development for Iran to develop nuclear weapons · It's very clear to me that a nuclear armed Iran is destabilizing for the region · Our relationship with the powers around the Gulf, especially the Arab powers is one of stability and cooperation. · We are not interested in confrontation in the Gulf; we are interested in ensuring that the commerce of the region benefits the world, which is why our military forces operate in this region. |