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BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GWOT Year 3 - 2004 (mainly Iraq)

To Win Over Iraqis by Thomas Melia and Brian Katulis

To Win Over Iraqis
Washington Post
August 10, 2003

By Thomas Melia and Brian Katulis

L. Paul Bremer, the presidential envoy to Iraq, said last month's controversial release of photographs of Saddam Hussein's dead sons was intended to convince a skeptical Iraqi public that it no longer need fear the return of Uday and Qusay Hussein. Bremer outlined ways the coalition authorities are seeking to assure Iraqis that their country is on the mend: a television channel that reaches more than half the country, a 24-hour radio station, an Arabic newspaper published five times a week.

This information strategy represents an important start at getting the Iraqi public to join in the reconstruction. The bigger challenge will be to persuade Iraqis to believe the word of any authority figures -- whether American, British or those Iraqis in the new 25-member Governing Council. We recently conducted focus groups with a diverse, nationwide cross section of Iraqis -- men and women, young and old, Shiite, Sunni and Christian, in seven locations. Sponsored by the National Democratic Institute, this research sought to convey the hopes and aspirations of ordinary Iraqis to decision makers working on Iraq's reconstruction.

One key finding is the deep skepticism Iraqis have regarding all sources of information. Though scores of publications and broadcasters are appearing, many Iraqis told us with pride that they rely on "friends and neighbors" for their news. The rumor mill is very powerful indeed.

Iraqis tend to be unenthusiastic about political leaders -- whether newly emerging insiders or those recently returned from exile. Cynicism is especially acute regarding those who were the objects of vilification campaigns by the previous regime.

Moreover, Iraqis' frame of reference for interpreting current events is grounded in a past where facts and critical analysis were seldom available through the media. Though we found nearly universal satisfaction that Saddam Hussein is gone, a quarter-century of his propaganda lives on in the minds of Iraqis.

Anti-American and anti-Jewish vitriol is thoroughly embedded, shaping the ways Iraqis interpret events. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are doing the bidding of "Zionist" interests, some believe, and Israelis are buying houses and land in Iraq. One woman in Najaf says that a majority of the foreign soldiers are Jewish -- further evidence of a plot to keep Iraq down while the coalition, in cahoots with Israel, steals Iraq's natural resources.

Even more troubling is a broadly shared belief that the postwar chaos is actually part of the U.S. plan. What critics in the West see as poor planning for the postwar situation is interpreted by Iraqis as deliberate.

They presume a country as obviously powerful as the United States does what it wants, in precisely the way it wants. A middle-aged Shiite woman in one focus group in Karbala said, "We think that they absolutely know and understand the total situation. They know about everything. They enjoy watching this. We don't know why they do this."

Few participants in our groups believe the United States is motivated by a desire to do what is best for Iraq. Rather, they think the United States invaded "for its own interests." By this, they do not mean the United States acted for reasons of national security but to boost the American economy and steal Iraq's oil. The United States has thus made a rapid transition from enemy in war to liberator to occupier, all in the span of five short months.

The new media outlets Bremer announced constitute a step toward overcoming deep skepticism. Based on our research, which involved weeks of travel in Iraq outside the security umbrella of the U.S.-led occupation forces, we recommend three more steps for coalition authorities and the new Iraqi Governing Council:

Set up better feedback mechanisms so that average Iraqis can make their concerns and complaints known. Most coalition officials currently operate behind the high walls and barbed wire surrounding the palaces and offices they seized from Hussein's regime, and they travel only in heavily armored convoys. Average Iraqis fervently want their voices to be heard, and they have no clear idea where to turn with their problems. To underscore the intention to be responsive to legitimate public concerns, the interim authorities need to organize forums with the Iraqi public and continuing mechanisms for receiving input. This will help build trust between the public and the interim governing authorities.
Frame all initiatives as responses to Iraqi desires. This step is vital in overcoming the skepticism and conspiracy theories about the coalition's objectives in Iraq, and it requires listening carefully to the complaints being raised. Not everyone critical of the American-led administration of Iraq is a Baath Party member, and few Iraqis long for the return of Hussein. They do want a government that responds to their concerns and works for their interests.
Educate Iraqis about how to engage in democratic politics. Massive civic education campaigns could provide information about how Iraqis themselves can assume responsibility for participating in their own governance -- a new and necessary skill.
In the aftermath of Saddam Hussein, it will take some effort to clear away the fog of disinformation that obscures the way forward in liberated Iraq.

Thomas Melia is director of research at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and adjunct professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Brian Katulis is a consultant for the National Democratic Institute. Their full report on Iraqi public opinion is available online at

School of Media and Communication

Phil Taylor's papers