School of Media and Communication

Phil Taylor's papers

BACK TO : The Balkans conflicts of the 1990s

Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle by Mark R. Jacobson


http://www.dodccrp.org/bosch08.htm


Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle

Mark R. Jacobson


Introduction

Since December 1995 over 1,000 soldiers from the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) have supported IFOR and SFOR in the former Yugoslavia. The PSYOP component to this mission represents one of the largest and most comprehensive PSYOP missions in U.S. history. For the past 2 years, PSYOP units have operated under the guidance and control of the Combined Joint Information Task Force (CJIICTF), and have been one of the few weapons systems that were used every day of the operation.

U.S. and allied PSYOP soldiers have kept the peace on a complex and potentially volatile "psychological battlefield." The internecine conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were largely the result of the ability of nationalist leaders to effectively create a demand for war by disseminating divisive and deceptive propaganda.97 In addition, by the time the CJIICTF began their own information campaign, the peoples of the former Yugoslavia had already had an additional 35 years of experience under Tito's rule within which to develop a sophisticated understanding of the nature and power of propaganda. Thus, U.S. PSYOP troops had to keep the peace in a media environment much more sophisticated than those previously encountered in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, or the Persian Gulf.

This chapter will examine the organization, use, and effectiveness of PSYOP in the former Yugoslavia.98 Specifically, the chapter will describe the support provided by the CJIICTF to Task Force Eagle, the U.S.-led, multinational element responsible for operations in MND(N). The chapter will analyze tactical PSYOP support at the brigade and battalion task force levels, that is, the levels where U.S. troops "actively" kept the peace. The chapter as a whole will address both the failures and successes of PSYOP support based largely, but not solely, on the experiences of one of the three Brigade Psychological Support Elements (BPSEs) assigned to support Task Force Eagle.

In June 1996, BPSE 210, part of the 346th PSYOP Company (346thPOC) began their deployment to Bosnia along with other elements of the 15th PSYOP BN (15th POB), 2nd PSYOP Group (2nd POG).99 In all the 15th POB deployed one Division Psychological Support Element (designated DPSE 20) and three BPSE's each with three enhanced Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT's) to Task Force Eagle as well as elements to support the British forces in MND(SW). In addition, 7th POG personnel-manned "Red Ball" was a PSYOP element headquartered at the HQ CJIICTF in Sarajevo that served as a transportation element by delivering products to the various MNDs, and could be used to fill in gaps in the theater by doing dissemination as required. The deployment also included officers mobilized from HQ 15th POB and HQ 2nd POG who served in the Corps PSYOP Support Element and the CJIICTF with the Commander, 2nd POG serving as the COMCJIICTF (See figure 8-1).



DPSE 20 and its subordinate elements replaced elements from the 9th POB, 4th Psychological Operations Group, based out of Ft. Bragg, NC. BPSE 210 supported the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division-the Ready First Combat Team (RFCT), located in the sector north of Tuzla between the Russian and NORDPOL AORs (See figure 8-2). BPSE 220 supported the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division while BPSE 230 first supported military police units in the area around HQ Task Force Eagle and would later support Nordic and Polish elements (NORDPOL) in Doboj, Bosnia.100 In November 1996, after the 1st Armored Division turned control of the Task Force Eagle (TFE) AOR over to the 1st Infantry Division, BPSE 210 supported Task Force 1-18INF.

Figure 8-2



The significance of this particular case study lies in the both the strategic significance of the AOR and the nature of operations that took place in that area during the time in question. The AOR (hereafter the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR), included the city of Brcko, the most volatile area within MND(N) and one of the two most significant potential flashpoints in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To this day Brcko has remained a sticking point in the drive toward a lasting peace largely, due to its strategic significance to both the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Muslim-Croat Federation. Specifically, the Serbs consider Brcko the linchpin to the Posavina Corridor, the small strip of land connecting the two halves of the RS granted to them under the GFAP in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The RS has made it clear that the loss of Brcko will mean war while the Muslims have been equally obstinate, declaring that a Serbian Brcko may entail a return to hostilities. Thus, as Major General Montgomery Meigs has cogently stated, Brcko is the "the strategic and geographic Gordian Knot." that will determine the fate of Bosnia.101

The nature of the AOR required BPSE 210 to perform a variety of PSYOP missions, including disseminating, collecting intelligence, assisting Civil Affairs, preparing the population for the Brcko Arbitration decision, and planning for and actively preventing civil disturbances from growing out of control. During the IFOR mission Brcko was the role model for successful crisis management both in terms of IFOR/SFOR actions as well as for methods of NATO interaction with NGOs, IGOs, and more importantly the FWF military and civilian populations. Indeed Brcko was one of the only places in Bosnia where all three factions were regularly talking to each other at the same table.102 Thus, an examination of this unit's particular operations provides a good gauge from which to look at other BPSE operations both in other sectors and during other rotations during Operation Joint Endeavor/Operation Joint Guard.103

Although the documentary evidence indicates that the experiences of other BPSEs (during both IFOR rotations) resembled those of the BPSEs in MND(N), the reader should exercise caution with the analysis and conclusions of this particular study. This is indeed a study of one particular unit, at one particular time, and at one particular place. More importantly, just as previous U.S. operations did not prove to be perfect models for operations in the former Yugoslavia, future PSYOP operations will not simply need to mimic those of Operation Joint Endeavor in order to succeed. The "information battlefield" of which the PSYOP battlefield is a part is dynamic and thus the psychological environment may be unfamiliar even if the next mission involves a return to the Balkans.

The PSYOP Mission
The primary implied task of the tactical PSYOP teams in the TFE AOR was to disseminate IIC products per doctrinal convention and campaign guidance provided from higher headquarters. The CJIICTF and CPSE would coordinate the operational PSYOP campaign and execute PSYOP dissemination within the various MNDs through DPSEs, BPSEs, and TPTs, tactical elements designed for this task. Unfortunately, the nature of the mission combined with the particular task organization chosen by the PSYOP planners meant that tactical elements were often challenged to deal with operational issues as well as tactical ones. This placed the CJIICTF HQ in the precarious position of trying to support the MNDs while at the same time protecting the integrity of the PSYOP operational plan as espoused by the JTF CDR and the theater CINC. Likewise, the DPSE at MND(N) would have to try and support both the operational PSYOP plan and the particular needs of the Commander, Task Force Eagle (COMEAGLE), to whom the DPSE provided tactical PSYOP support.

The IFOR/SFOR information campaign has been massive both in terms of the quantity of materials disseminated and the variety of themes stressed during the operation.104 Since December 1995, the CJIICTF has produced and disseminated close to 12 million products within the Federation and the RS. This includes handbills, pamphlets, posters, the Herald of Peace, (a weekly IFOR newspaper focusing on news and features of national interest) the Mirko teen-oriented magazine, as well as various radio, television, and miscellaneous products such as soccer balls, coloring books, and IFOR/SFOR logo pens.105 These products have been developed to support the missions of the military and civilian components of the IFOR/SFOR campaign, to include NATO forces, the United Nations, Red Cross, OSCE, European Union, World Bank, and other miscellaneous IOs and NGOs. The CJIICTF sought to influence the attitudes and behaviors of targeted groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to encourage cooperation with IFOR, deter resistance to peacekeeping activities, and encourage the return to normalcy within both the Federation and the RS. The guidance for the CJIICTF campaign at the theater level was expressed in the Information Campaign Operations (PSYOP) annex H to OPLAN- 10405 (SACEUR Plan) and annex H to 40105 (IFOR/AFSOUTH Plan). In each of the division areas, the information campaign was guided by PSYOP annexes to the divisional Operations Orders (OPORDS).

Even before DPSE 20 took over responsibility for PSYOP operations in the TFE AOR, the ability of PSYOP to operate within the theater had been problematic. The entry of a new COMCJIICTF, COMCPSE, and DPSE within a few weeks of each other exacerbated the situation, primarily due to the failure of the incoming organization to conduct an adequate leader's reconnaissance. The conduct of a leader's recon is not only a basic tactical principle but also a prerequisite to effective operations. The absence of a leader's recon for key leaders and operators prior to the deployment of the PSYOP force-package in June 1996 resulted in unnecessary difficulties for the PSYOP elements in Task Force Eagle and thus their supported units.

The decision of the CDR 2D POG (who was the incoming CDR CJIICTF) to not support a leader's recon by key DPSE and/or BPSE leaders meant that prior to the force package as a whole entering the theater, there had been no one capable of assessing the current AOR situation and providing on-the-ground feedback to the rest of the deploying unit. Although the 346th POC made good use of open source material in order to provide PSYOP-relevant background information to the deploying troops, they received very little up-to-date intelligence or information on the type of operations taking place in the AOR. Reports sent by the CJIICTF through USASOC and USACAPOC to the 2nd POG had to be sent by regular mail (because of inadequate communications systems at the 2nd POG), and were weeks old by the time they reached the units preparing to deploy. Furthermore, the 2nd POG did not take advantage of those means available to contact the units they would replace. Elements down through the BPSE level could have contacted their counterparts via DSN, commercial telephone, electronic mail, and even video conference calls.106 This would have enabled the deploying elements to obtain an up-to-date intelligence picture of the area, gain a greater understanding of the operational limitations and restrictions in the various AORs, and find out about living/working conditions and supply shortages.

No formal or informal mission statements were disseminated by the CDR 2nd POG or CDR 15th POB (later the COMCJIICTF and COMCPSE, respectively) prior to, during, or immediately after the troop deployment. The absence of a clear mission statement from the incoming COMCJIICTF to the fresh PSYOP soldiers in Bosnia equally hampered the ability of the PSYOP elements to integrate properly and effectively into the Task Force Eagle mission. A debilitating command climate fostered by the COMCJIICTF and communications difficulties made the development of a coordinated effort between the BPSEs, DPSEs, and CPSE even more problematic. Thus, despite periodic mission updates, annexes, and FRAGOs (fragmentary orders) developed by the CJIICTF staff, the PSYOP elements in MND(N) remained unclear about their own role in the CJIICTF mission.107

Thus, the BPSE never knew the commander's intent behind the PSYOP campaign. This limited the ability of the BPSE to accomplish its mission in several ways. First, the BPSE did not know what the priorities of effort were at a given time and this prevented effective prior planning and the ability to anticipate potential operational difficulties. Without a specified mission BPSE could not explain adequately to the local maneuver commanders the purpose of the various information campaigns Sarajevo ran in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR. Lacking clear guidance the BPSE found themselves pushed in conflicting directions by the supported unit, the DPSE, and the CJIICTF. Not until the final 60 days of the deployment did the PSYOP elements in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR even see a PSYOP annex to the ARRC, IFOR, or LANDCENT OPORDs or FRAGOs.108

Intelligence Operations
Operational requirements dictate that PSYOP is both a consumer and a producer of intelligence. As such, PSYOP elements must have a well established collection management architecture of its own and be firmly integrated into the various intelligence structures within the supported unit's organization. Effective PSYOP depends upon current and accurate intelligence provided through the intelligence cycle. Tactical PSYOP Teams and BPSEs will often collect the information needed to fill the "intelligence requirements" generated by both the PSYOP task force and the various supported units.

The experience of BPSE 210 during its 7 months in MND(N) demonstrated that PSYOP could contribute to the intelligence cycle as a key HUMINT source. Unfortunately, the integration of the PSYOP elements into the collection management architecture of the supported unit proved a hindrance to the processing of PSYOP relevant information and the dissemination of finished intelligence products to the PSYOP elements.

While Force Protection Teams (FPTs) made up of counterintelligence agents (MOS 97B) and interrogators (MOS 97E) were the primary HUMINT sources in the TFE AOR, the close contact PSYOP and Civil Affairs soldiers had with the local community meant that they too became key HUMINT collection assets.109 Civil Affairs Tactical Support Teams were often the best sources of political intelligence at the local level. Likewise, Tactical PSYOP Teams became a valuable HUMINT asset due to the large number of contacts they maintained in the local civilian population, including key members of local political parties. About 95 percent of all PSYOP missions in the TFE AOR involved some sort of HUMINT collection. Most importantly, TPTs were the points of contact between the local IFOR commanders and the indigenous print and broadcast media personalities in the AOR.

Coordination between PSYOP elements and the Force Protection elements was inconsistent and depended mainly on the personalities in the FPT and PSYOP cells. A high level of coordination in RFCT Tactical Operations Center (TOC) helped to alleviate some problems at both the division and battalion levels. Specifically, daily coordination between the brigade PSYOP and the brigade HUMINT cell ensured the detection of "false confirmations" and conflicting reports. This did not, however, prevent the entire stove-piping problem. A great deal of PSYOP information seems to have moved up the PSYOP channels without ever reaching the supported unit's intelligence shops. The lack of synchronization between the DPSE and the 1st I.D. S-2 particularly affected the ability of PSYOP information to be turned into useful intelligence. Additionally, because the CJIICTF needed to collect as much information as possible for the purposes of product assessment and development, PSYOP SITREPs were often too long to be included in their entirety in the BN and BDE INTSUMs and daily commander's SITREPs. Thus, sometimes only a small amount of information would make its way directly to the supported unit's S-2 shops. In essence the tactical PSYOP elements would prepare two SITREPs each day, one for the supported unit and one for the PSYOP chain.110

One area in which CA, PSYOP, and Force Protection teams had a particular need for collaboration was in the development of area assessments that helped the BN and BDEs develop an understanding of the environment in which they operated. Area assessments included basic information about the geography, social dynamics, political environment, cultural, and economic factors in various communities in an AOR. Area assessments were basic tasks required of both PSYOP and CA teams as well as a mission for the newly created FPTs. Rather than developing separate CA, PSYOP, and FPT assessments, the teams at the BN and BDE sought to produce a single document, using all teams as agents for collection and thereby increasing the efficiency of the collection and production effort. Although reporting formats differed slightly, and each group sought to emphasize different considerations in their initial reports (e.g., Civil Affairs emphasizing economic factors and indicators), most of the information collected was easily assembled into a single report. Area assessments, however, are not static documents and must be updated continuously. Unfortunately, there was no standard operating procedure (SOP) common to all elements involved (S-2, PSYOP, CA, FPT) for the collection of assessment information, much less the management and updating of this information. Though the ad hoc system for updating the assessments did not destroy the value of these intelligence products, it did make their use and upkeep somewhat cumbersome.

In order to make some sense of the big picture, a commander will need intelligence from out of his AO. While in a conventional operation political intelligence might seem the province for echelons above Corps, in a peacekeeping operation political and other so-called "strategic intelligence" were essential to operations at the brigade and battalion level. Thus, in order for the commanders to maintain "total mission awareness," intelligence within the Task Force Eagle elements was generally pushed down to much lower echelons than would normally be expected. While the maneuver units were supplied with a great deal of the type of intelligence products needed to discern the big picture, the CJIICTF could not always provide its subordinate elements with the type of information they required. The CJIICTF was hamstrung in many ways by the nature of the stove-piped intelligence inputs into IFOR/SFOR.111 Thus, retrieving information from the CJIICTF proved difficult. In particular, the CJIICTF was unable to provide the PSYOP elements at Task Force Eagle with Basic PSYOP Studies, Special PSYOP Assessments, and other intelligence products such as USIA and BBC audience analysis surveys of media preferences in the former Yugoslavia.112

Dissemination Operations
Several operational problems with regards to the dissemination of PSYOP products existed during BPSE 210's tenure in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR. These problems included the appropriateness of PSYOP products to the target audiences and the timeliness with which these products were delivered to the TPTs for dissemination to the population. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that these problems with product dissemination occurred throughout the CJIICTF AOR. Additionally, the comments of the supported unit and previous PSYOP rotations indicate that these problems existed during the initial 6 months of the IFOR mission as well.

The nature of the product development, approval, and delivery process greatly hindered the timely delivery of PSYOP products. Centralized product development and printing locations in Sarajevo meant that it would usually take more than a week to conceive, obtain approval, and deliver products from the CJIICTF to the TPTs. A "Red Ball" delivery element comprised of trained 37F personnel was supposed to transport the products to the DPSE at Tuzla Main approximately once a week.113 Because the pace of missions in MND(N) as well as personnel and vehicle shortages at the brigade and BN PSYOP elements, the products would often sit in Tuzla for several days until the BPSE could arrange the support necessary to convoy to Tuzla and pick up the products. Once products arrived at the BPSE it might be an additional 2 days before the products would make it out on LOG/LNO runs or the teams themselves could arrange to come back to the BPSE and pick them up. The result was that time-sensitive information did not get to the population until the news was stale or the information had been taken over by events. In several crisis situations the products did not arrive until well after the situations had been resolved.114 The CJIICTF attempted to use alternative delivery methods such as heliborne transport but the Bosnia weather, especially after October, made this sort of transportation a luxury. It is not clear whether or not the CJIICTF considered direct delivery by the Red Ball (a purpose designed delivery element) to the BDE and BN PSYOP elements that were not located in between Tuzla and Sarajevo. In any case, the number of missions devoted to the procurement of products took away from the TPT's ability to concentrate on their dissemination and intelligence collection missions.

Even if the CJIICTF had alleviated some delivery problems, the product development and Byzantine approval process alone would have challenged the ability of the CJIICTF to disseminate all its products in a timely manner. This process frustrated not only those in the tactical PSYOP elements but more importantly the supported unit whom the products served. As a result of the approval and delivery process, PSYOP products were simply not available at all times to support operations, despite several weeks lead-time for the preparation of such materials.115 In the case of operations in the former Yugoslavia, the fact that products required approval at a multinational headquarters complicated the entire process (figure 8-3).116 The key issue in regards to BPSE operations was that the process was deemed too slow to adequately respond to the needs of the Task Force Eagle peacekeeping mission.



From December 1995 until February 1997, the two BPSEs assigned Task Force Eagle frequently expressed their own, as well as their supported units' dissatisfaction, with the timeliness of products.117 The RFCT and TF 1-18 commanders both quickly discovered that PSYOP products could not be developed quickly enough to keep pace with the changing operational and tactical landscape. Thus the supported units throughout the TFE AOR tended to rely upon the Mobile Public Affairs Detachments (MPAD) at the Combined Press Information Center (CPIC) at HQ Task Force Eagle to produce information products in contingency situations rather than on those developed by the PSYOP task force. What is particularly interesting is that in order to maintain message consistency, both the MPAD and PSYOP missions were directed and guided by the same "Information Campaign Guidelines" at all levels. The Public Affairs components, at least within the U.S. sector, took advantage of decentralized execution giving authority to the JIB (Joint Information Bureau, later the CPIC (Combined Press Information Center)) chief at the division level to approve statements that would go out to the public. Meanwhile the PSYOP message, based on the same information campaign guidelines, would be going through a redundant approval process before being released, perhaps days later, to the PSYOP BPSEs. 118

By the end of the BPSE's deployment, the situation had proven so untenable within the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR that products that would normally be developed and approved by PSYOP, such as radio spots, announcements, and commanders' speeches to the population, were produced, developed, and disseminated through the MPAD's. Turnaround on most products would be a few days with approval authority coming within hours. The same product would have taken much longer to develop, approve, and disseminate through the PSYOP channels.119

In a PSYOP campaign, the information campaign guidelines must be viewed the same way that the combat arms view limiting stakes and ROE-they are parameters within which soldiers may operate without constantly seeking advice from above. There is a strong argument to be made that the MPAD method of having the division elements approve the products so long as they fall within the guidelines may be a better approach for some products. The problem was and is, however, that any product approved from one AOR such as MND(N) inevitably has a spillover effect in other AORs. Information by its very nature spreads quickly and permeates everywhere. Thus, it is important that an overall IO campaign continue to be centrally planned at the Task Force level. Robust communication systems and perhaps LNOs might have helped improve coordination as well as flexible and responsive product development and delivery.

Although tight centralized control might have been appropriate in the beginning of the operation or where the operational environment did not differ significantly from AOR to AOR, this was not the case during this time period in the former Yugoslavia. The CJIICTF would have done better to tailor its campaign by trying to more finitely divide its target audience selection rather than finding the common denominator.120 The following analogy illustrates the problem with the PSYOP campaign approval process. When a BN is given a portion of the battlefield to defend, the commander divides it among his companies. Eventually, aiming stakes are set and each soldier is given limits of fire in either direction. When the battle begins the soldiers are trained to keep their fire within these parameters-they do not call up the corps headquarters when the enemy arrives and say, "I have three soldiers in my sights, one with a machine gun, one with a grenade, and one with a rifle. Who do I shoot first and where do I shoot them?"

What the soldier would use would be rules of engagement (ROE) designed to help the soldier determine when to shoot-his training would tell him where to place the round. In a PSYOP campaign, the information campaign guidelines are the limiting stakes and the guidance from the CJIICTF are the ROE used to help determine the parameters of operation for tactical PSYOP. There is indeed a strong argument to be made that the MPAD/CPIC methods of product approval and dissemination authority might be more appropriate to a Bosnia-type mission than those used by the PSYOP component of the CJIICTF. The problem is that PSYOP objectives and themes are approved at the NAC/SACEUR level. They cannot be changed by the COMCJIICTF, much less by division commanders and PSYOP DPSEs. Nor should they be, as it is essential that the IO campaign maintain consistency throughout the theater. What the PSYOP elements and the supported units can do, however, is adjust the disseminated product by "tweaking" the messages that come out as long as they are in consonance with the approved PSYOP themes.

The actual products used were, in the opinion of the DPSE and BPSEs in MND(N), not sufficiently targeted to change attitudes and shape the behaviors within the BPSE AOR. Too many printed products, especially the posters, reflected an orientation toward American pop culture rather than the more familiar European traditions. While the development of these products adequately represented the results of comprehensive pre-testing done in the Sarajevo area, many of the products contained themes and symbols (figure 8-4) that were not familiar to the more provincial target audiences in the areas outside of Sarajevo. Those products that had a sophisticated, European feel, such as the teenage magazine MIRKO, proved as successful in areas outside of Sarajevo in terms of audience receptivity and understanding. The proper use, however, of familiar American icons such as Superman helped to reach the children and adults targeted throughout the country in the IFOR mine awareness campaign.

Figure 8-4



The CJIICTF weekly paper, The Herald of Peace (HoP), and the IFOR Radio campaign in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR raise doubts about the way in which CJIICTF conducted these campaigns outside of Sarajevo. The early HoP was a valuable tool in educating the masses about the details of the Dayton Peace Accords. After the first 5 months, however, the HoP began to fall victim to the relative success of the peacekeeping mission. As some degree of normality returned to the region, the large Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian daily papers, as well as a host of regional and European papers, soon became available to the general public. Despite its objectivity, the relatively (but unavoidably) bland Herald of Peace eventually lost its appeal to that of the other papers.121 The population quickly hungered for more sophisticated approaches to national (often controversial) issues as well as information on local events. Once post-testing indicated that the HoP was losing its appeal, the CJIICTF took steps to alleviate this situation, including the development of a sophisticated and catchy monthly to replace the weekly version of the newspaper.122

Similarly, the IFOR radio campaigns in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR lacked the ability to acquire, maintain, and thus persuade a target audience. The CJIICTF ran two radio stations in MND(N) for most of the first year of the campaign. Radio IFOR-Brcko's capabilities (the CJIICTF station in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR) as a PSYOP weapon suffered due both to technical and programming difficulties. The station had an extremely small broadcast footprint due largely to the location of the station (a function of force-protection considerations) and the terrain in the broadcast area. Additionally, while the majority of the listening audience tuned in to FM radio stations, Radio IFOR broadcast on the AM band.123 The CJIICTF viewed the radio assets in traditional terms-as operational and not as tactical assets. The local PSYOP elements and their supported units, however, found several occasions where radio could and did serve as an effective tactical weapon.124 As part of an operational campaign, the entertainment format of the radio station focused on children, teenagers, and young adults while the vast majority of messages (mostly in English and not Serbo-Croatian) were targeted at an older population. In short, even if the American rock and roll and pop music could have acquired a target audience, it would not have been the one that many of the messages were designed for.125

Part of the reason for the disconnect between the PSYOP products and their intended audiences was an inadequate regimen of pre- and post-testing. Products used in the RFCT/TF1-18 AOR were not pre-tested in that particular sector until November of 1996-almost a full year into the operation. The inability to send products down to the BPSEs as digital files meant that pre-test packages had to be sent down via the Red Ball. The associated transportation problems between Sarajevo and the TPTs in MND(N) meant that there was, at times, almost a 3-week delay between the initial submission of a product for pre-testing in MND(N) and the receipt of responses by the PDC from the TPTs conducting the pre-tests. In addition, some negative criticism of products at the BPSE level did not make it to the PDC at the CJIICTF.126 The number of requests received by the DPSE in MND(N) for "roll-up" reports requiring the location where products were disseminated rather than the audience receptivity of those products indicates that the COMCJIICTF may have mistakenly believed that the physical proximity of a population to areas of dissemination was directly proportional to the degree of reception and understanding.127

For the PSYOP operators in the field, both pre- and post-testing alike were hampered by the fact that there was little guidance as to the particular target audiences, specific objectives, or desired behaviors that should be observed in the population as a result of the PSYOP materials. Many product action worksheets reflected the common denominator approach to targeting by referring to the audience as "population of Bosnia-Herzegovina," which flew in the face of the understanding that when you "target all you target none."

Although the sophisticated information environment made the tried and true methods of PSYOP more difficult to implement, one of the most effective PSYOP weapons in the TFE AOR was one of the oldest: face-to-face communication.128 The ability of the TPTs to sit down, relax, and just talk with or "hang out" with locals-be it at a coffee shop, restaurant, or in private homes-allowed the soldiers to cut through the red tape and speak to the people in real terms. The ability to immediately assess the impact of statements on the target audience allowed for a great deal more to be accomplished in a shorter amount of time. Armed with talking points provided initially by the DPSE and later directly from local MPAD elements, the TPTs were able to provide the "party line" to the locals on even sensitive issues such as the Brcko Arbitration or War Crimes issues.129 One particular TPTs discussions with local political parties in the Brcko area also resulted in the first and perhaps only series of "multi-party" meetings in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At these meetings, the local chapters of national Serb, Croat, and Muslim parties sat down and in a civilized manner discussed their differences and even possible solutions to the local problems that faced all of them. In addition, PSYOP TPTs proved themselves capable and reliable key communicators in crisis situations, such as those at Zvornik, Mahala, and Celic. The success of the TPTs was not only due to their skills, but the ability of the teams to respond clearly and quickly to the needs of the supported unit.

Without a doubt, the BDE and BN commanders were the most potent PSYOP weapons in the TFE AOR. The success of the IFOR mission as a whole rested largely on their individual abilities to persuade the FWF that peace was the only alternative. Within each of their AORs, the FWF military and political leadership viewed the brigade and battalion as the voice of IFOR itself it because these particular U.S. commanders actively encouraged compliance with the GFAP whether through persuasion or coercion. For these reasons alone it was important that the BDE and BN commanders be highly visible in the AOR. Thus, the maneuver commanders enlisted PSYOP support in order to get their messages out through the indigenous media outlets.

In the RFCT sector, the most powerful face-to-face communicator was undoubtedly Colonel Gregory Fontenot. Fontenot, a brilliant soldier and scholar as well as an exceptional orator, was not given the Brcko sector because of his timidity. Fontenot was exactly the type of personality to keep the peace in the Posavina Corridor and truly understood the psychological battlefield, often using it to his advantage in order to prevent situations from getting out of hand.130 Fontenot's subordinates similarly used face-to-face communication and personal preventive diplomacy to alleviate problems and encourage compliance with the GFAP. Through the use of radio interviews and "fireside chats," Colonel Fontenot's successor in the region, LTC Stephen Layfield strove to attain the same position among the population that his predecessor had in the AOR.131 Unfortunately, by the time TF 1-18 INF took over the AOR, the PSYOP elements had been told by higher headquarters not to get involved with any activities involving local radio stations.132 This technically included working with the maneuver commanders in order to help them get their messages out on the airwaves. Hence, the MPADs took over responsibility for this job as well.

Operational Constraints
Force protection requirements and limited C3I capabilities within the PSYOP organization in theater affected operations in MND(N). While PSYOP soldiers may have been more vocal about concerns over force protection, it appears as though the measures resulted in very few tangible difficulties. C3I problems, however, had a somewhat greater influence on the ability of the PSYOP tactical elements to conduct operations.

Strict force protection measures in MND(N) required that soldiers carry their personal weapons at all times and wear Kevlar helmets, flack vests, and LBEs both on and off base. The regulations also required that U.S. military vehicles would have to travel in convoys of four or more. The purpose of these measures was to decrease the possibility of small unit tactical defeats.133 For the PSYOP soldiers in RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR, most of the force protection issues do not appear to have had a significant effect on the ability of the soldiers to complete their missions.

The four-vehicle convoy rule had the greatest effect on operations. Within MND(N), TPTs had one or two vehicles at most. Even if the TPTs had four vehicles, there was no way the three- and four-man teams could have provided drivers and assistant drivers for each of these vehicles. In order to alleviate personnel and vehicle shortcomings, PSYOP teams paired up with their Force Protection Team (CI and HUMINT personnel) counterparts who had to operate under similar restrictions. This required a great deal of coordination due to the OPTEMPO of FPT, PSYOP, and CA elements. In addition, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance problems left the PSYOP teams without vehicles from time to time. Maintenance problems increased during the winter months. The greatest effect the four-vehicle convoy rule had on operations came in terms of the inability to conduct missions as a result of vehicle maintenance problems late into the deployment.134 The second greatest problem was that the four-vehicle convoy rule made the delivery of PSYOP products from the CJIICTF to the DPSEs, BPSEs, and TPTs more problematic.

The authority to allow PSYOP forces to travel in two-vehicle convoys in MND(N) lay with COMEAGLE. Although several requests were made to COMEAGLE via the ARRC for an exception to policy for SOF troops such as CA and PSYOP, the requests were not granted during the IFOR mission. Exceptions were made for JCOs and Special Forces personnel due to mission requirements. Although there were legitimate concerns about the force protection posture and the ability of CA/PSYOP soldiers to operate efficiently, the fact remains that COMEAGLE had authority over U.S. troops in his MND, which meant that he had the responsibility to ensure that these troops were safe. Furthermore, the U.S. NCA and DoD made clear their intentions that keeping U.S. troops safe was to be the priority throughout the operation. For an excellent assessment of how the four-vehicle convoy rule and other force protection measures affected Force Protection Team missions, see Perkins, "CI and HUMINT in Bosnia." Despite several requests from the BPSEs, the four-vehicle convoy rule was not lifted until February 1997.

In the absence of organic transportation assets, the TPTs would attempt to "hitch a ride" with Civil Affairs teams or regularly scheduled MP and mounted infantry patrols operating in the AOR. This limited the ability to make PSYOP missions the priority assignments as TPTs could not always "drive" the focus of these other missions. Additionally, the ability of the PSYOP teams to work within and around these constraints rested largely on the ability of the TPT chiefs to coordinate and interact with their counterparts at the battalion level. The greater the involvement of the TPT in the BN operations, the better the level of coordination and support and thus the more likely that PSYOP missions would obtain adequate outside support. In the end, the results were better in some BN AORs than others.

Frustration with the four-vehicle convoy rule was paralleled by a disappointment with the individual protection requirements in the U.S. sector. The need to look like, as British soldiers put it, "Ninja Turtles" or "prisoners of peace" certainly frustrated a great number of U.S. soldiers. At least in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR, however, this frustration was by no means universal and seemed more evident among "rookies" and lower-enlisted soldiers rather than among the NCOs or veterans of Haiti, Somalia, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, where many had learned, firsthand of the potential benefits of protective clothing. Some soldiers, especially Civil Affairs, FPT, and PSYOP soldiers who dealt face-to-face with the local community, felt that the enhanced force protection requirements may have had a negative psychological impact on the local population.

PSYOP TPTs did get consistent, albeit infrequent, feedback indicating that the population questioned the need for the U.S. soldiers to wear that type of equipment. Although local civilian and FWF military personnel had openly questioned the need for U.S. forces to maintain such a posture, at no time did any of the teams indicate that this affected friendly attitudes toward U.S. soldiers. Teams learned to work within and around these constraints in order to successfully accomplish their missions.135 Not all American peacekeepers, however, felt that the force protection measures hampered the mission. As one American commander put it, "you can discuss reconstruction and resettlement just fine in a helmet and flak jacket." Also, the posture may have even helped to encourage FWF compliance with the GFAP. Both the local communities and the FWF military forces in the AOR felt that they should respect U.S. troops, as they were well armed and well protected.136 Additionally, a legitimate concern existed at least within BPSE 210 that the PSYOP soldiers may not have had all the supplementary tactical training and experience required to handle hostile tactical situations with as few as three soldiers.

A greater understanding of the psychological and operational impact of force protection measures in peacekeeping operations is certainly needed, especially in light of the great variety of beliefs about the issue within the NATO community. What is important is not necessarily whether or not troops deploy subject to enhanced force protection measures, for that may rest on political decisions at the NCA level, but that the military and political leadership understand the effects of such measures on the perceptions of the local population. Indeed the bottom line is that the beliefs on force protection measures represent greater differences of opinion on tactics for the application of force and particular techniques of conflict termination that will always be present in combined (or even joint) operations. Finally, despite the complaints about the force protection posture taken by U.S. troops, the fact remains that at the present time U.S. casualties as a result of hostile action have been near zero and that sharp responses to FWF "tests" or "resolve checks" have proven effective within MND(N).

Physical communications problems, an uninvolved command organization, and lackluster command climate also constrained PSYOP mission performance. These problems not only affected dissemination operations but the ability of the BPSEs and TPTs to collect information and secure PSYOP specific intelligence products.

By relying almost solely on the supported unit for communications support, the PSYOP BPSE was frequently left without adequate means of communicating with higher headquarters. The PSYOP annex to the OPORDS at the division level stated that "FM communications" would be the methods of communication for the BPSE and TPTs. Due to METT-T constraints, particularly the geographic and environmental conditions in Bosnia, FM communication was at best extraordinarily inconvenient and at worst impossible. The supported units utilized other communications systems such as VSAT, INMARSAT, LAN, and MSE for routine communications. The BPSE had to "borrow" phones and computers, which often proved problematic due to the heavy usage of this equipment by all elements.137 At times it could take several hours for the BPSE to reach the TPT's or the DPSE and vice versa. The most reliable means of communication, courier, often took days. This proved unacceptable to the DPSE, CPSE, and CJIICTF, though they could not provide the BPSE with any support to solve problems.

These difficulties were paralleled by communications problems within the TPTs. The urban environment required that the teams split up and conduct liaison with various individuals. These missions were dismounted and often indoor. At times the personnel were far enough away from the vehicles that they could not communicate without radios. In markets, the crowds often impaired visual or verbal communication at distances less than 100 meters. PSYOP was the only element in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR that did not have its own organic intersquad communications such as Motorola hand-talkies or PRC 127s. This became a significant force-protection issue and was noted many times by the BPSE in its SITREPS.138

The particular command relationships between the CJIICTF and its subordinate PSYOP elements at the division and brigade levels exacerbated the C3I problems resulting from communications difficulties. The dual chain of command for PSYOP has been and continues to be confusing both for PSYOP elements and supported units alike. In practice, supported units will either have Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) of the PSYOP elements. In some commander's minds, there is no dual chain of command-the TPTs report to the BPSE, the BPSEs report to the DPSE, the DPSE to the CPSE, and the CPSE to the POTF (in this case the CJIICTF). PSYOP elements, however, must rely on their supported units for "beans and bullets," and other essentials required to accomplish the mission.139

One of the greatest tensions between the PSYOP task force and the supported units in MND(N) arose because PSYOP did not plug into the operations cells in MND(N), ARRC, and HQ IFOR as well as they could have. The problem at MND(N) was due primarily to the lack of a theater PSYOP asset at MND(N); the DPSE was a tactical asset designed to control tactical PSYOP elements. In the absence of a CJIICTF representative or liaison to MND(N), the COMDPSE also became the individual responsible for operational PSYOP planning in the MND. Thus, the DPSE commander had to try and please two masters who often had conflicting intentions and goals.140

The relationship between the DPSEs and the BPSEs demonstrates what could happen as a result of the failure of PSYOP to "plug in" to the operations of a supported unit. PSYOP missions and operations appear as annexes to BN, BDE, and divisional OPORDs. PSYOP BPSEs are given Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) through the division OPORDs. The two units that BPSE 210 supported looked to its own division OPORDs, annexes, and FRAGOs in order to determine the priority of effort and support. Without written orders the BDE and BN viewed PSYOP missions as routine, and thus no command emphasis was placed on completing or, more importantly, supporting these missions. Verbal communication of intent between the DPSE and the BPSE did not translate into the same clear statement of purpose for the TF battle staff-only a written OPORD could do that. Without these written orders, mission limiters hampered BPSE missions and prevented the ability of PSYOP to successfully integrate into the STABOPS in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR.

The ability to conduct successful military operations rests on how well that organization can master the OODA loop, that is, the ability to observe, orient, decide and act quickly, deliberately, and decisively in the operational environment. While intelligence-gathering facilities, communications nodes, and effective weapons systems will give a military organization many of the tools it needs to work through this loop, the abilities of key leaders and personnel will play a disproportionate role in the ability of a military organization to make decisions and take action in a timely and effective manner. Within the PSYOP organization, the quality of personnel in the C2 process and OODA loop proved one of the weaker links.141

The lack of quality personnel in some positions inhibited the ability of PSYOP to integrate and thus perform successfully in the theater as a whole. Even those in some senior positions seem to have been weak links in the organization as well. Perhaps most importantly, the lack of command visits to PSYOP elements in the Task Force Eagle prevented those in Sarajevo from understanding the difference between the "ground truth" and the impression of Brcko as seen from a distance. Those CJIICTF and CPSE personnel that visited the MND on visits of a few days or more often left in disbelief as to the degree with which PSYOP was integrated into COMEAGLE's overall vision of keeping the peace in the AOR. Command visits could have helped to bridge the real and perceived gap between the theater PSYOP support effort and the needs of COMEAGLE. Additionally, command visits would have also done a great deal to promote the teamwork and build the trust throughout the PSYOP organization that was visibly lacking throughout the deployment. The resulting disconnects between the tactical elements in support of Task Force Eagle and the CJIICTF had a deleterious effect on morale and operations alike.

The C3I system described above affected the ability of the PSYOP elements to successfully complete their dissemination and intelligence collection functions in the TFE AOR. The specific problems encountered indicate that despite technological advances in information management and communications systems, military C3I networks will remain "friction sensitive" due to the necessary presence of human operators in those systems. Additionally, the unintended consequences of technological advance will often result in the system breaking down or not performing as originally intended, thus highlighting the importance of competent operators and managers in such a system.

Operational vs. Tactical PSYOP Support to MND(N)
Several U.S. commanders, including General Crouch (COMSFOR), MG Nash (COMEAGLE, 1st A.D.), and MG Meigs (COMEAGLE, 1st I.D.), clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the degree and nature of PSYOP support in their AORs.142 Their comments were largely directed at what they deemed to be a PSYOP campaign that was not responsive enough to their IO needs in MND(N). The reasons for this disconnect seem to lie in the larger differences between the priorities of effort in the U.S.-run MND versus those of the combined-joint headquarters in Sarajevo. These differences in turn reflect differences in opinion between the NATO members involved in the IFOR mission.

The CJIICTF operational campaign strove to bill IFOR as a credible and trustworthy source of information and then to use this credibility in order to encourage compliance with the GFAP, thereby enhancing the safety and security of IFOR/SFOR soldiers and local civilians alike. The campaign would also contribute to FWF compliance with the GFAP by reinforcing the notion that IFOR was resolved to use force if required. Finally, a great deal of emphasis was placed on support to the NGOs, IGOs, and PVOs that were the civilian contribution to the overall peacekeeping effort in Bosnia. The success of the civilian programs and long-term reconstruction required the CJIICTF to focus on a campaign that supported medium- and long-term goals in the region. This was accomplished by focusing on younger generations (the 18-26 year old age group) in order to help instill in them a greater understanding of the benefits of democracy and peace. These programs, however, had little to do with the immediate short-term (6 to 12 month) needs of the U.S. military peacekeeping forces in MND(N), where the primary concern (as relayed officially and unofficially through the U.S.-only chain of command) was force protection. Thus, some of the theater operations, such as those that supported a quick return to complete freedom of movement, were not exactly the type of PSYOP support these units desired.143

The emphasis placed on supporting the NGOs, IGOs, and PVOs naturally diluted the amount of time and energy that could have been devoted to direct support for the Task Force Eagle mission within IFOR. Theater-wide products for IFOR that supported similar long-term and countrywide programs also received the highest priority. Long-term campaigns (such as those programs targeting the teenagers in the former Yugoslavia) may have been of strategic and operational value, but certainly had much less value for the BDEs and BNs than would have tactical PSYOP support to deal with immediate and often localized problems. While the British division in MND(SW) had its own organic PSYOP support to produce regionally oriented products for operational and tactical support, the U.S. structure did not. Essentially, the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force that would normally have supported the highest level of unified command (in this case Task Force Eagle) had as its primary mission that of a Combined Joint PSYOP Task Force, or the CJIICTF. Without a CJIICTF LNO to MND(N) or an American LNO to the CJIICTF, there were no conduits for advocating the needs of MND(N) to theater campaign planners. Thus, the demands of a combined operation sometimes subordinated the need for tailored PSYOP support at the Task Force Eagle level.

U.S. joint PSYOP doctrine stresses that one of the major purposes of the PSYOP community is to ensure PSYOP support to U.S. conventional and Special Operations forces and specifically to "maintain the capability to accomplish U.S. only objectives when PSYOP forces and capabilities are provided to allied or coalition commands." Furthermore, in order for PSYOP to support maneuver units as envisioned in joint operations doctrine and enshrined in the notion of combined arms warfare, a PSYOP task force must be able to integrate and support maneuver divisions and subordinate units on the "battlefield" regardless of the operational environment. What is ironic is that unlike in the past, complications were not just the result of the inability of the supported units to understand the nature of the PSYOP weapons system. Rather the Task Force Eagle commanders were keenly aware of the psychological impact that military operations could have as well as the potential power of PSYOP campaigns to assist them in achieving their military objectives.

Because Task Force Eagle could not always obtain the type of PSYOP support it desired, COMEAGLE turned to other organizations to convey information to the local population, most notably the JIB and the MPADs.144 This type of independent, U.S.-only information campaign did not sit well with some in the CJIICTF who were concerned about the consistency of the IFOR message. Indeed, some might argue that the CJIICTF correctly emphasized tight control over the development, approval, and dissemination of products because the mission itself was so political that any mistake at the tactical level would have enormous implications at the strategic level. Though this argument correctly explains the effect that some tactical mistakes can make, it may exaggerate the influence that every tactical action will have on the operational and strategic environment. Ironically, more so than with most weapons systems, PSYOP can both adjust fire and correct mistakes that have been made. Furthermore, the degree of coordination at Task Force Eagle between the various IO weapons systems, ensured that potentially damaging deviations from the overall Information Campaign guidelines did not take place. Indeed, the level of coordination at Task Force Eagle may have surpassed that in Sarajevo due to the complexity involved in running a multinational HQ such as that of the ARRC or HQ IFOR.

In order to synchronize the Task Force Eagle information campaign with that of the overall IFOR campaign, COMEAGLE put together the Commanders Information Coordination Group (CICG). The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) offered the idea of the CICG to MG Nash based on a formula that had worked for General Schwartzkopf during the Persian Gulf War and was working for the ARRC in Sarajevo. Each morning, COMEAGLE would meet with his principal IO personnel and operations staff, to include PSYOP, JIB, PAO, G-5, POLAD, JAG, G-3, and CoS. In addition, the LNOs from the two U.S. as well as the Russian, Turkish, and NORDPOL brigades were present at the meeting. During this meeting, discussion and coordination would take place on the types of information "floating around" in the AOR as well as ongoing campaigns directed from Sarajevo and local activities (such as JMCs, radio interviews, international media events) that were taking place under the auspices of MND(N). More importantly, through the advent of these meetings COMEAGLE check his information campaign strategy against the guidelines of the CJIICTF, and could have his staff deconflict against those directives from the CPIC in Sarajevo and U.S.-only sources of public information guidance.145

In order to wage an effective PSYOP campaign in a STABOPS environment, PSYOP commanders must understand that war, conflict, and peace may all exist at once in the theater. In addition, although we tend to envision these states as appearing in a continuum, it would be better to view them as a kaleidoscope. While it is an old PSYOP maxim that operations should be centrally controlled with decentralized execution, perhaps the operational kaleidoscope suggests that a more flexible concept of operations would be better set to cope with changes in the environment. In order to adequately support U.S. forces in such a conflict, perhaps a combined PSYOP campaign requires more than a tactical control element, such as a DPSE, at the highest level of unified command. This would translate, in combined operations, into the need for some sort of "mini" POTF, or Mission Information Support Team (MIST) with limited approval and production capability at Task Force Eagle level.146

Observations and Conclusions
An evaluation of tactical PSYOP support to Task Force Eagle does reveal some real strengths, correctable weaknesses, and important implications about psychological operations and information campaigns that the PSYOP community and their supported units need to consider as they prepare for future operations. To recap some of the observations of this study-

U.S. PSYOP soldiers operated on a complex and potentially volatile battlefield and in a highly sophisticated media environment.
Due to the proportion of PSYOP soldiers in the Reserves, there are certain difficulties involved in mobilizing these soldiers. Thus, modern communications systems must be available at the Reserve units in order to expedite the ability of these units to begin the handover process while still in CONUS.
The current practice of putting together ad hoc PSYOP forces rather than entire companies (to include active Guard-Reserve personnel in key positions) should be re-evaluated. Although this may help with some personnel issues, the subsequent breakdown in unit integrity may be detrimental to the mission as a whole.
A leader's reconnaissance for the tactical PSYOP elements would have alleviated many of the difficulties posed by the short time available to transition at the Task Force Eagle and BDE levels.
Information regarding the nature of the PSYOP mission did not flow uninhibited from either the 2nd POG to the deploying units or from the incoming CJIICTF to the troops once they were deployed. This was due to physical and interpersonal communications problems at all levels of the PSYOP task force.
The nature of Operation Joint Endeavor meant that tactical elements had to perform operational as well as tactical PSYOP planning and dissemination. This forced the DPSE commander into a position where he had to support theater and MND operations that were often in conflict with one another.
PSYOP was a valuable HUMINT source to the supported unit commanders. Coordination of PSYOP-relevant intelligence collection matrices with those of other collection sources will have a synergistic effect on the ability of commanders to acquire information about the AOR.
The stove-piping of information detracted from the value that raw data from PSYOP had for the intelligence production cycle.
The production of area assessments for the supported unit needs to be a coordinated venture between PSYOP, CA, HUMINT, and other intelligence collection assets. Additionally, a strong relationship between HUMINT/CI personnel and PSYOP personnel helps to better assess the effect of the information campaigns on the attitudes and beliefs of the target audiences.
PSYOP-related intelligence products must be made readily available to PSYOP elements at the lowest levels during STABOPS.
A tedious product approval process presented a great challenge to the ability of PSYOP to support operations. The lack of digital data transfer capability, the multitude of staff agencies in the approval process, and the difficulty with disseminating completed products meant that by the time they arrived at the TPTs, some products had lost their ability to make an impact on the target audience.
The four-vehicle convoy rule presented a great challenge to mission accomplishment, particularly when combined with other factors such as personnel shortages and vehicle maintenance problems.
Individual force protection remains a contentious issue. Because these decisions are often driven by political decisions by the NCA, PSYOP may have to learn to work within these mission parameters. Though the community must be cognizant of the message a warfighting posture can send to target audiences, there is a strong argument to be made that these measures did not detract from the ability to accomplish the PSYOP mission.
The lack of intersquad communications posed a serious force-protection threat to the tactical PSYOP teams.
Face-to-face communication proved one of the most effective platforms for PSYOP in MND(N). The importance of the supported unit commander to the successful conduct of a face-to-face PSYOP campaign should not be understated.
Because IFOR troops in MND(N) provided the local population with the basic security needs they craved, the U.S. troops in particular became key communicators. The ability of the soldiers in the supported units to establish a rapport with the local population helped to establish the credibility of IFOR. Additionally, the use of line troops as adjunct disseminators of PSYOP products allowed them not only to "break the ice" with locals but to add to the overall dissemination capability of the CJIICTF.
The sophisticated media environments of the Information Age demand an increased use of the "our message, their medium" approach to PSYOP, particularly in STABOPS.
Communications difficulties exacerbated real and perceived problems between the various PSYOP elements and constrained mission capability and performance. PSYOP units must have state-of-the-art communication for voice and data transmission to include satellite communications, LAN, and telephone connections.
A CJIICTF LNO, such as that provided by a TPSE or an American PSYOP LNO in Sarajevo, could have helped to better balance and coordinate the needs of MND(N) for PSYOP support with the demands of a theater PSYOP campaign.
The command climate is one of the intangibles that can determine whether or not a mission will succeed. Thus, leaders must make timely decisions and take deli

© Copyright Leeds 2014