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Managing Terrorism After 9/11: the War On Terror, the Media and the Imagined Threat by C Archetti &


Managing Terrorism After 9/11: the War On Terror
The Media, and the Imagined Threat*
Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor


The paper argues that, in the post -9/11 world, managing the imagined threat of terrorism
is as much, if not more, important than dealing with its real threat. This is not only due to
the peculiar nature of the global War On Terror, a struggle for "hearts and minds" and for
the moral high ground, but also to the relevance of perceptions within an increasingly
media-saturated international environment. Starting from the analysis of the
government/media interactions in a range of terrorist alerts in the UK, the paper identifies
a series of problem areas in successfully countering the imagined threat. They not only
apply to the UK, but to the whole Euro-Atlantic context and span from defining (framing)
the threat in "manageable" terms to approaching the media as a different kind of actor
than normally regarded by politicians. The research suggests that, if these problems are
not addressed, they could not only contribute to a heightened sense of society's
vulnerability, but also to a weakening of trust in authorities and the information they
provide the public with. This would, in turn, erode our democratic institutions and
ultimately raise the question of whether we can really win the war on terrorism.
Argument & Overview
The paper's main line of argument is that managing the imagined threat of terrorism is an
essential part of dealing with the terrorist danger and that the media, willingly or not, play
a vital role within this context. What the report argues is neither that counter-terrorist
policies are not useful or necessary, nor that the threat of terrorism is "imaginary". Of
course the threat is real and needs to be dealt with through a variety of measures. What
the research want to draw the attention on is the fact that the way we think about the
terrorist threat may not necessarily reflect its reality. In other words the way we perceive
the terrorist threat is constructed (framed) through the way social actors, especially
politicians and the media, talk about it. This framing, although occurring in the abstract
world of perceptions, has far reaching consequences in the real world, including the way
we practically deal with terrorism and our sense of vulnerability as a society. This paper
looks at how the perception of the terrorist threat is shaped through language and rhetoric
* The research for this paper was undertaken as part of the ESRC-funded project on the Domestic Management of Terrorism led by
King's College, London in 2002-03.
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by governmental actors and the media. It specifically looks at a range of case studies
represented by terrorist alerts occurred in the UK in the period 2003 to 2004.
The argument will unfold in five steps:
1. An Introduction explains why perceptions are particularly relevant in the context of
the War on Terrorism
2. The section Theoretical Debate, Method and Case Studies describes how the
framing analysis fits into the wider context of International Relations studies about
security and provides some information about the research methodology and the case
studies that have been analysed
3. Findings illustrates the observations concerning the case studies
4. Interpreting the Data is an attempt at drawing some lessons out of the material. What
do the results suggest us on how to deal with the terrorist threat?
5. The Conclusions explore the challenges ahead
1. INTRODUCTION
The WOT and Public Perceptions: the Struggle for the Information
Space
President Bush has defined the War on Terrorism (WOT) 'a new kind of war', a kind of
conflict that has never been fought before. The WOT is a struggle being waged on several
fronts, including the law enforcement, legislative and financial fronts as well as the world
of secret intelligence. There have been military confrontations with the terrorists in
Afghanistan and Iraq, but the real nature of the WOT seems to be laying elsewhere. As
illustrated by the intense rhetorical debate preceding the Iraq war, but perhaps even more
by the recent release of pictures about the torture of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib
prison, the WOT appears as a propaganda war, a "struggle for hearts and minds". The
WOT is, from this point of view, a war to win the moral high ground in the global public
domain. This really defines the peculiar nature of the WOT and is underlined by Western
politicians' acknowledgement of the need to explain the Arab world that this 'war' is not
a clash of civilizations. In Tony Blair's words, it is necessary to bridge a 'gulf of
misunderstanding'. This requires the use of perception management or, less
euphemistically, propaganda.
Information needs to be deployed to explain the reasons and objectives of the WOT to
domestic and foreign audiences, but also as an offensive weapon to counter terrorists'
moves. The terrorist global network, in fact, uses propaganda as a key weapon in its
asymmetric struggle against the West. This is illustrated by the fact that most damage to
the West seems currently to be inflicted by fear deriving from a heightened sense of
vulnerability of our society rather than by actual attacks. In this perspective the WOT is a
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struggle to shape public perceptions as well as an international conflict which, far from
being confined to a physical battleground, extends to a global 'information space'.
This is the context in which the media become crucial. On the one hand they carry the
terrifying images of successful attacks delivering worldwide audiences a message of
terror. The media are exploited by terrorists who know how to maximise their publicity.
This is exemplified by the very 9/11 attacks' spectacular choreography or, more recently,
by the decapitation of an American businessman, Nicholas Berg, in front of the cameras
(May 12th 2004). Especially the last example suggests a sophisticated use of the media by
the terrorists. In fact, beside the obvious horror of the murder, the orange suite worn by
the victim and reminding of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay was most probably meant
to deliver an additional message. The images evoked the anti-American arguments about
Bush administration's double standards, particularly its hypoc ritical rhetoric of respect
for human rights and freedom vs. illegal imprisonment. On the other hand media play a
role within governmental measures against terrorism. In fact Governments need to be
able to inform the public to make it aware of the terrorist threat. This serves both to create
support for the authorities' anti-terrorist action and to insulate the public from terrorists'
attempt to spread panic and destabilize society. This strategy has to be deployed when
communicating with the public and necessarily has to go through the media filter.
Is this an overstating the role of perceptions and rhetoric? Does what politicians or the
media say matter that much? Isn't it what social actors actually do that counts at the end
of the day when dealing with security issues and in trying to counter terrorists who,
ultimately, want to inflict physical harm?
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, METHOD AND CASE
STUDIES
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The research's understanding of the role of language reflects one of the recent
developments in International Relations theory. This is the attempt at integrating the
growing role and impact of communications technology on international politics into
traditional studies. Here I refer to the approach of the Copenhagen School, mainly
represented by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde and to their concept of
'securitization' and 'societal threat'. 1
1 Buzan, B., O. Waever, et al., Eds. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
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The theorists of the Copenhagen school regard the very issue of security as constructed
through speech-acts. Which issues belong to the 'security' box cannot be determined a
priori, but it is the result of rhetorical choices. In other words how issues are constructed
and perceived is the result of a process involving a selection of language, which is not
just seen as describing reality but as creating it. This can be applied, as an example, to the
WOT. We all talk about a WOT, politicians refer to it, media mention it. The WOT,
however, before the 9/11 attacks, did not exist. It came about because someone, the U.S.
Government, started to talk about it. This also applies to the shift in foreign policy
priorities after 9/11 and terrorism becoming the number one security issue on the global
political agenda.2
The Copenhagen School theorists also talk about the concept of "societal threat".
Differently from traditional Realist or Neo-realist approaches this is a threat to security,
interestingly an 'existential threat', that is not conceived in exclusive military terms, just
aiming at undermining the territorial integrity of the state. In this concept the very
identity of a group is undermined 'by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic
integration, or population movements'.3 The concept can again be applied to the WOT,
especially the idea that terrorism is far more than a physical threat to life. It is a threat, as
PM T. Blair or President G. Bush put it, 'to our civilization' and 'our way of life', to the
very stability and 'survival' of our societies. T. Blair actually referred to it using the very
word 'existential'.4
This is the broader theoretical framework for the analysis of a range of case studies in the
UK.
2.2. CASE STUDIES
Heathrow airport alert (February 11-13 2003): 450 troops, 1000 extra police and light
armoured vehicles are dispatched to Heathrow airport following intelligence warnings
about a possible terrorist attack on the occasion of the end of the Muslim festival of Eid
(February 15th). Heightened security measures are adopted in other airports around the
country and in the proximity of government build ings in London.
Istanbul bombing (November 20 2003): 2 bombs directed at British targets, the British
Consulate and a branch of the HSBC bank, explode in Istanbul killing 28 people, 3 of
which British.
Flight delays (December 2003 to February 2004): a series of delays involving
transatlantic flights to the U.S. over the Christmas period and the beginning of 2004. The
2 Williams, M. C. (2003). "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." International Studies Quarterly (47):
511-531.
3 'Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of "societal" security, in which the identity of a group is
presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements', Ibid. p. 513.
4 'the nature of the global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real and existential', PM Warns of Continuing Global Terror
Threat, March 5 2004, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page5461.asp
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case study includes the media coverage of, among the rest, the grounding of Air France
flight 68 from Paris to Los Angeles on Christmas Eve , BA flight 223 from Heathrow to
Washington (cancelled several times at beginning of January), BA flight 263 from
Heathrow to Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) on December 31 2003.
Madrid bombing (March 11 2004): short after 7.30 local time four bombs explode on a
train approaching Atocha station, the main train station in Madrid. Minutes later two
more bombs detonate at El Pozo and one at Eugenia stations. The attacks left 192 people
dead and more than 1,200 injured. The Spanish Government first blamed the Basque
separatist terrorist group ETA for the attacks. Another lead in the investigation about who
was behind the bombing started to develop when, a few hours after the attacks, a van
containing detonators and tapes with verses of the Koran was found in the outskir ts of
Madrid. A letter purporting to come from al-Qaida and addressed to the London-based
Arabic newspaper al-Quds also claimed responsibility for the train bombing.
The range of cases studies selected gives the opportunity of analysing how both officials
and the media dealt with events of a different nature. The case studies include simple
alerts and actual attacks, both in the run up to the war in Iraq and afterwards. The Istanbul
bombing throws light on the coverage of an attack on British interests on foreign soil,
while the Madrid bombing provides some information about the way both the British
press and authorities reacted to an attack abroad.
2.3. METHOD
The research is based on a multidisciplinary approach combining a tool of political
communication, framing, with discourse analysis within a comparative research design.
Framing essentially refers to the construction of issues through language by means of
selection and saliency. According to R. Entman 'To frame is to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation,
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described'.5
Taking Entman's definition as a starting point I have explored the frames related to the
terrorist threat through qualitative content analysis of both politicians' and media
discourses. The analysis has been carried out through the methodological tools of
discourse analysis.
I have essentially compared the political and media discourses in order to identify the
interactions between media and politicians and find out which source is effectively
5 Entman, R. M. (1993). "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." Journal of Communication 43(4), p. 52.
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shaping the perceptions of the terrorist threat and where media contents actually come
from. This procedure allows capturing the information exchanges among social actors to
identify the mechanisms that operate within the information space.
Sample
Governmental/officials' statements constitute the "political discourse": speeches given by
the Prime Minister, official briefings and press conferences, parliamentary debates,
information available on governmental websites. 6
The "media discourse" is represented by both text and video sources:
1. The Press coverage by 6 national newspapers: The Guardian/The Observer, The
Times/The Sunday Times, The Independent/The Independent on Sunday, The Daily
Mirror/Sunday Mirror, The Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday, The Sun/News of the World.7
2. TV coverage on 4 channels' evening news programmes: News at Ten (BBC1) ,
Newsnight (BBC2), ITV News (ITV), Channel 4 News (CHANNEL 4) and weekend
political programmes such as Breakfast with Frost (Saturday morning BBC1) and
Jonathan Dimbleby (Sunday morning? ITV). 8
Objectives of the Analysis
The analysis aimed at:
1. Identifying the extent to which the way political authorities framed the problem of
terrorism and the war against it (i.e. the language they used to describe these aspects) had
an impact on the media and on public perceptions of the threat
2. Defining the role of the media as a mediator between the Government and the public.
This last question particularly refers to testing the widespread claim that the media tend
to sensationalise, create hype and, possibly, encourage panic/alarmism.
6 The material has been retrieved from a variety of sources: 10 Downing Street - http://www.number-10.gov.uk , The United
Kingdom Parliament - http://www.parliament.uk/, The Home Office Website- http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/index.html ,
The MET Police Website - http://www.met.police.uk/
7 Newspapers' sources - Sample:
The sample for the content analysis is made up by articles retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis database through the search-words
""terrorist OR terrorism OR terror". This allows retrieving all articles dealing with the topic of terrorism, the "war on terrorism" (also
called "war on terror") and related issues. All articles mentioning the keywords have been considered. The time span of the analysis
covers every day from the first mention of the of the events considered in each case study (for example the dispatch of troops to
Heathrow airport on February 11th is first mentioned on February 12th's newspapers) until no more references are made to it (but no
longer than 14 days afterwards).
8 Video footage - Sample:
The TV coverage sample is made up of the daily evening news (BBC's1 News at Ten, BBC2's Newsnight, ITV's ITV News, Channel
4's Channel 4 News) and weekend political programmes such as BBC1's Breakfast with Frost and ITV's Jonathan Dimbleby. The
time span considered extends from the day the events considered by each case occurred (the Heathrow airport alert, for example, is
reported on the same day it occurred, February 11th) to the following 3 days.
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3. FINDINGS
The research has led to three main findings: the first is about politicians' framing of the
terrorist threat having an effect on media coverage's contents. The second concerns the
nature of the media, while the third challenges the myths about the role of politicians, the
media and their relationship.
3.1. POLITICIANS' FRAMING AND ITS EFFECT ON MEDIA
COVERAGE
A comparison between statements by political sources and the content of media coverage
reveals that the way politicians define the problem of terrorism and describe it has a
substantial impact on media performance. This refers, above all, to the contents of the
coverage and the amount as well as depth of criticism expressed against the
Government's messages. This will be illustrated by comparing official rhetoric's changes
over time and corresponding media coverage in three of the case studies: the Heathrow
airport alert, the Istanbul bombing and the Madrid attacks. They highlight how the
political context created by politicians' rhetoric shapes the ove rall understanding of the
media and the way they convey official messages to the wider public.
3.1.1. THE SHIFT IN THE U.K. GOVERNMENT'S RHETORIC
While the U.S. Government's portrayal of what the WOT is about has been extremely
consistent, starting from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.K.
Government's framing of the terrorist threat has evolved over time.
This is what President Bush declared the day following the WTC and Pentagon attacks.
'The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday
against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.
This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and
resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack.
The American people need to know that we're facing a different enemy
than we have ever faced. This enemy hides in shadows, and has no regard
for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and
unsuspecting people, then runs for cover. But it won't be able to run for
cover forever. This is an enemy that tries to hide. But it won't be able to
hide forever. This is an enemy that thinks its harbors are safe. But they
won't be safe forever.
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This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people
everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our
resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be
patient, we will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination.
This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we
will win.
'America is united. The freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our
side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good
will prevail.'9
The interpretation of the 9/11 events is very clear: the attacks are as an 'act of war' on
civilization (problem definition) by evil terrorists (moral evaluation) motivated by hate
for human life (causal interpretation) against which the world should unite to defeat
barbarity and defend freedom (treatment recommenda tion). This frame has not been
changed since the attacks and has helped the U.S. Government placing both domestic and
international events that have followed 9/11 (such as terrorist alerts, counter-terrorist
measures, military operations in Afghanistan or in Iraq, but also restrictions of civil
liberties) into a solid context.
The U.K. Government, by contrast, did not provide a similarly strong post-9/11 frame. If
we compare the Lord Major Speech (November 11th 2002), regarded as the
Government's blueprint for its anti-terrorist strategy to another speech held with G. Bush
in occasion of his state visit to Britain at the time of the Istanbul bombings (November
20th 2003), it is possible to notice a huge change in rhetoric. The second speech marks a
clear move towards the U.S. Government's frame. This is even more obvious in a speech
by the PM on March 5th 2004.
But let's have a closer look at how the shifting rhetoric changed the points of reference
for the media's understanding of terrorist alerts and attacks.
3.1.2. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-TERRORIST
STRATEGY
The first speech:10
'WMD is but one aspect of the new dangers we face. The Cold War has
ended. The great ideological battle between Communism and Western
liberal democracy is over. Most countries believe both in markets and in
a necessary role for Government. There will be thunderous debates inside
9 President G. W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team, September 12 2001,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html.
10 PM speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, November 11 2002, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1731.asp.
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nations about the balance, but the struggle for world hegemony by
political ideology is gone.
What preoccupies decision-makers now is a different danger. It is
extremism driven by fanaticism, personified either in terrorist groups or
rogue states.'
'So: these are new times. New threats need new measures. The simplest
act of fanaticism carried out in a state thousands of miles from us is of
significance on the streets of London or in the villages of County Durham.
The interdependence of the modern world has never been clearer; the
need for a common response never greater; the values of freedom, justice
and tolerance of our diversity never more relevant; and the need to apply
them fairly across the world never more urgent.'
The Government describes here the terrorist threat in very vague terms. Tony Blair says
that we are living in 'new times' in which 'new threats' required 'new measures'. 'These
dangers', identified in a not better-defined connection among 'WMD', 'extremism' and
'rogue states' 'can strike at any time, across any national boundary and in pursuit of a
cause with which there can be little or no rational negotiation'. No mention was made of
a "war against terrorism".
The Heathrow Alert: Government's "Mistakes" and Public Scepticism
The Heathrow airport alert is particularly interesting in highlighting the tight interlink
between the media and official sources and how the mismanagement of information by
authorities can translate into a failure of the 'informing, but not alarming the public'
strategy. The lack of background information concerning what the very threat of
terrorism, let alone a whole "war on terrorism", was about represents the main reason
behind the Government's lack of success in handling the situation. In very short terms
this was the mechanism that led to such an outcome: the information vacuum about the
very nature of the threat or Government's engagement in a WOT translated into the
absence of mentions of a WOT in the media coverage. In this context the attempt of the
Government at informing the public did not contribute to any better public knowledge of
the situation. Officials' messages appeared just empty repetition of soundbites. By then
the general perception was that the threat was not real, let alone imminent, as the
Government had encouraged the public to believe. 11 The presence of some slight
inconsistencies in Government's words and deeds amplified public and media's initial
scepticism into outright cynicism and allegations that the sending of light armoured
vehicles to Heathrow was a "PR stunt".
11 This is the statement by the Metropolitan Police announcing the despatch of troops at Heathrow airport: 'The current strengthening
of security is precautionary and is related to action being taken in other countries and the possibility that the end of the religious
festival of Eid may erroneously be used by Al Qaida and associated networks to mount attacks. The strengthened security, which is
likely to be most visible to the public at Heathrow Airport, relates to a potential threat to the capital' MET Police Website, Heightened
Levels of Security in London, February 11 2003, http://www.met.police.uk/pns/DisplayPN.cgi?pn_id=2003_0028.
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Let's have a closer look at each of the above-mentioned stages and at how the crisis
unfolded.
No War On Terrorism
Although the WOT is assumed by the Government as a "naturally understood"
framework for the antiterrorist measures adopted during the airport alert, there is no
evidence of the media perceiving its relevance. The "official WOT" did not exist in the
media's perspective. And if it did, it was not clear what it referred to. This will be
illustrated by some examples.
In the coverage of the events the expressions "War on Terrorism" and "War on Terror"
are used interchangeably and often replaced by 'fight against terror',12 'fight against
terrorism' 13 or 'battle against terrorism' 14 that, in their respective contexts, simply refer to
a generalised idea of taking measures against terrorism. This is the emerging trend in the
broadsheets.
The War on Terrorism and the War on Terror, when mentioned at all, are referred to
within an official context, usually within a quote from officials or in some way related to
state policies. An example of WOT mentioned by an official comes from The Times
covering the calling off of a military air show in a RAF airbase in Suffolk. Colonel
Donald Lustig explains in an interview: 'Some of our men and aircraft have already been
deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The unpredictability of the ongoing
war on terrorism has increased the operations tempo here and on other bases'.15
The Independent offers another case:
'&France is convinced that a US-led invasion - however short and
surgical - will compound hatred of the West in the Islamic world and
make the "war on terror", which should take precedence, harder to win'.16
When not mentioned within an official context, the WOT appears to be often completely
misunderstood. This is particularly evident in The Independent. The War on Terrorism
or the War on Terror are portrayed more as a reality belonging to President George W.
Bush's policy and U.S foreign policy, not involving Britain. In other words, it is not
Britain's War on Terrorism, but America's.
'The Israeli authorities have repeatedly sought to present their conflict
with the Palestinians as equivalent to president George Bush's "war on
terror".17
12 For example The Times, Army man to help firms fight terror, May 18, 2003 and The Guardian, We are going to France where race
relations are a lot worse than in Britain, February 16 2003.
13The fight against terrorism has increased the number of little indignities at airport security checks', The Independent, BAA could
still fly high in a war, February 15 2003.
14 The Independent, Patience will be a vital weapon in the long battle against terrorism, February 14 2003.
15 The Times, Suffolk military air show is called off, February 14 2003.
16 The Independent, Irreconcilable differences of opinion? A tale of two world views great gulf fixed between UK and France,
February 12 2003.
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Some articles very clearly reveal basic misunderstandings about the meaning of the
WOT:
'This is becoming like a dark Peter Sellers farce in which the main players
pursue a complicated red herring while the more dangerous villains make
hay. Mr Blair is fighting for his political future over a likely war with Iraq.
President Bush, addressing troops heading for the Gulf, crudely conflates
the looming conflict with the war against terrorism. The rest of the UN
agonises over Hans Blix, under pressure to contrive a unity that does not
exist. While the world looks away, the terrorists prepare to strike'. 18
The following quote reveals a lack of understanding of the WOT within U.S. foreign
policy's objectives:
'When Mr Blair expressed unqualified support for the US in the aftermath
of the Twin Towers, he had a choice. He could sign up for the campaign
against terrorism or he could sign up for the whole voyage. By choosing
the latter, he sought to maximise his influence but, in truth, irretrievably
circumscribed his freedom of action. Mr Blair's bargain with George Bush
is truly Faustian'.19
This article interprets the 'campaign against terrorism' as something different from what
is currently occurring, as if the WOT had finished with the war in Afghanistan. This last
point is confirmed by the following:
'When we fought the war against terrorism by invading Afghanistan, one
of the arguments made to justify the war was that the Taliban was a harsh
and immoral regime'. 20
Other interesting examples of misunderstanding of the WOT come from The Sun. This is
the only newspaper having a section specifically called "War On Terror". This is absent
in the rest of the press, usually placing articles related to the airport alert under the label
"The Threat of War" (The Guardian) or "Iraq Crisis" (The Times). The Sun's WOT
section, however, contains a variety of questionable contents such as articles on asylum21
(which implies an association of the terrorist threat with asylum seekers) as well as news
that has no clear connection with actual terrorism. An example of an unrelated article
appears on 17 February - 'US troop jets forced back to Shannon in engine scares'.22 This
17 The Independent, Israeli army seals borders after exceptional number of terrorist attack warnings, February 12 2003.
18 The Independent on Sunday, Tighter airport security would do more than a second UN resolution, February 16 2003.
This point is also made by the following quote:
'the Prime Minister ought to know, that the numbers on the streets today [anti-war protest] will have been swelled by two things.
One was the bellicosity of President Bush in addressing sailors on the USS Philippines Sea this week. His conflation of the war on
terror with that on Iraq was unstatesmanlike: "The terrorists brought this war to us - and now we're taking it back to them." Of course,
we know the link of logic, in that if Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons they could come into terrorist hands. But the
implication that invading Iraq is the counterpunch to 11 September is dishonest. And the gloating over the deaths of 3,000 suspected
terrorists in Afghanistan - "they're not a problem any more" - was offensive'18 The Independent, Mr. Blix has spoken. Today, vast
numbers of Britons will speak up. Mr. Blair must listen, February 15 2003.
19 The Independent on Sunday, Quick march to war. Whatever happened to Britain's third way? February 16 2003.
20 The Independent, The harsh truth about Taliban asylum rights, February 20 2003.
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is very interesting because it reports two U.S. troop-carrying jets forced to make an
emergency landing at Shannon during the weekend after one of the planes, just returned
from duty in the Gulf, started 'suffering engine trouble'. The problem with one of the
aircraft's engines is not even attributed to a possible terrorist attack or sabotage (the pilot,
according to the article, 'did not declare an emergency and did not seek assistance').
There would therefore be no reason to include this article in the section on WOT. This
proves that, at least in this tabloid, anything loosely linked to U.S., airplanes, war and
their mixture is almost automatically associated to the WOT.
The greatest misunderstanding is perhaps failing to see the connection between the Iraq
war and the WOT. The Mirror, from this point of view, does not refer to the WOT at all.
Repetition of Uninformative Messages
The government's communication during the crisis saw the almost obsessive repetition of
the same messages. They could have probably been more informative if the public had
been adequately prepared to understand them. Given the information vacuum in which
they were sent, however, they sounded as empty soundbites. As proof of the extent to
which they were repeated, almost always with the same words, is the fact that they are
referred to by the media on more than one occasion as the government's 'mantra'.23
Apart from the omnipresent recommendation for the public to be "alert but not alarmed",
the most recurrent soundbites (the majority of them already present in the Lord Major
Speech) were:
- the threat from 'international terrorism' is 'real' and 'serious'
- the government has to make 'fine judgements' 24 about taking action that is
both 'necessary and proportionate';25 'this could never be an exact
science'26
- the government is taking 'whatever action' 27 it believes necessary 'to
protect the public'28
- we should not do the terrorists' 'job for them'29
- 'people had to get used to the idea that as the threat level rose and fell at
different times and in different circumstances, so the security would rise
and fall in parallel.'30
21 Examples : The Sun, Plug leaks at borders, February 17 2003 and The Sun, Taliban No2 given asylum in Britain, February 17 2003.
22 The Sun, US troop jets forced back to Shannon in engine scares, February 17 2003.
23 Mark Mardell, News at Ten, BBC1, Feb 11 2003. Also an article on The Times reports that in occasion of the alert 'ministers
repeated their mantra that the public should be 'alert but not alarmed'. The Times, How worried should we be?, February 16 2003.
24 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp.
25 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp.
26 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp.
27 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp.
28 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp.
29 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp.
13
The following is a quote from the afternoon press briefing of Tuesday 11th February that
particularly reveals how much the PM's official spokesman attempted to stick to the
official line by presenting almost all of these themes together:
'As the Prime Minister had said in his speech to the Lord Mayor's
Banquet last November, the government had to make fine judgements. We
had to take whatever security measures we could consistent with the desire
for people to lead normal lives. Given the terrorist threat was real, people
had to get used to the idea that the response to it would rise and fall
accordingly. This could never be an exact science. There was no rulebook
to deal with such things. The guiding principles were to protect the
security of the people of this country consistent with the desire to ensure
as best [as] we could that we did not do the terrorists' job for them. That
was exactly what we were doing'.31
That was all that was going to be said. While limiting the release of new information
could have been justified on the grounds that, as explained by all officials, it was not safe
to give details about an ongoing operation, the authorities actually gave the public the
impression tha t they were annoyed by media requests for more information. In fact the
Government overestimated the public's capacity to understand the situation.
Inconsistencies
The combination of the terrorist threat's framing with the course of action actually taken
by the government in dealing with the terrorist threat generated a series of inconsistencies
that undermined the credibility of the government's strategy. A crude example of this
during the airport alert is the contrast between the statements that the threat is 'real',
'serious' and specific' and the government's decision not to close any infrastructure.
Heathrow remained open and flights continued to operate. 32 Another example is offered
by the government's commitment to informing the public clashing with its reluctance,
even irritation, to elaborate about the nature of the threat when asked for more details.33
Again, contrast the rhetoric that 'we should be "alert but not alarmed"' in the 'new
normality after 9/11' with the adoption, as acknowledged by the PM's official
spokesman, of exceptional measures. Troops and armoured vehicles were deployed in
30 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 3.45p.m. Thursday 13 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page2916.asp.
31 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 3.45p.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1803.asp.
32 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp.
33 Mr. Blunkett, as The Independent remarked twice, appeared to be 'clearly irritated' by having to make a statement to the House of
Commons (February 13 2001) on the government's course of action against the terrorist danger. The Independent, Travellers cancel
flights as Blunkett calls for calm, February 14 2003. On The Independent on Sunday, Weariness and fear that haunt ministers,
February 16 2003, it is also said that the Home Secretary 'could not hide his exhausted irritation at being summoned to the House of
Commons to make a statement on the security threat'.
14
the biggest security operation on mainland British soil since the 1991 Heathrow terrorist
alerts.34
As a last example: if, as the government maintained, the threat is everywhere and can
strike at any time, that there is no rationality behind the terrorists' aims and that their
objective is to kill and cause disruption, how was it that, on this occasion, special security
measures including the dispatch of armoured vehicles (whose usefulness in this context
would soon be questioned) were taken at specific locations such as Heathrow, other
airports and some government building in London?
An Unreal Threat
The threat, in this perspective, appeared so unconvinc ing as to lead to the interpretation
of the tanks' presence at Heathrow mainly as a 'public relations exercise',35 a PR stunt to
convince people that it was necessary to support the decision to go to war in Iraq, which
even supported the allegation by the Daily Mail that the alert could have been a 'hoax'.36
Scepticism is particularly well illustrated by CARTOONS [see report specifically about
Heathrow alert for examples. I did not copy them to keep the size of the file small]
This is an indicator of how "unreal" the threat appeared to some media. It cannot be ruled
out the fact that this may have created more confusion in the public and fostered a sense
of uncertainty on what was to be believed. The general impression, however, given the
fact that humour was a characteristic of the coverage of most newspapers, is that the
media recorded a public mood.
3.1.3 THE SECOND SPEECH AND THE ISTANBUL BOMBINGS
Here is an excerpt from the PM's second speech on the topic of terrorism. 37 It provides a
more sophisticated narrative on how to interpret international events. This includes a
description of the terrorists' identity, their motives, our identity as 'people who believe in
freedom' and what we can do to counter the global threat of terrorism.
'Here is where we have got to. We have got to see what this struggle
[against terrorism] is about, because you can see it clearer and clearer
day by day. This is a struggle between fanaticism and extremism on the
one hand, and people who believe in freedom and intolerance on the
34 There are references made by the PMOS to the dispatch of troops in 1994: 'He [PMOS] was not pretending today that the fact the
army had been deployed in this capacity for the first time since 1994 was not newsworthy. Of course it was&', 10 Downing Street
Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. [These
references are actually wrong since in 1994 politicians debated about whether to send troops in, but ultimately decided not to]
35 The Daily Mail, Panic stations, February 13 2003.
36 The Daily Mail, Terror alert 'due to an Al Quaeda hoax', February 15 2003.
37 Press Conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush, November 20 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page5004.asp.
15
other. And these attacks have been building for years, they came to their
height OK on September 11, but that actually wasn't the first attack that al
Qu'eda was perpetrating against America and other countries, and you
look round the world today and I tell you in virtually every place there is
trouble and difficulty, these terrorists are making it worse, whether it is
Kashmir, whether it is Palestine, whether it is Chechnya, wherever it is,
and they are prepared to kill anyone, they are prepared to shed any
amount of bloodshed, because they know how important this battle is. And
here is why Iraq is important in this, because in the end their case, which
is based on dividing people, the Arab world and the western world, the
Muslim world and the Ch ristian world and other religions, their case is
that we are in Iraq to suppress Muslims, steal their oil, to spoil the
country. Now we know, you know, that all those things are lies. They
know therefore that if we manage to get Iraq on its feet as a stable,
prosperous, democratic country, the blow we strike is not just one for the
Iraqi people, it is the end of that propaganda and that is why they are
fighting us. And when you say is this attack today directed at our alliance,
it is directed at anybody who stands in the way of this fanaticism. And
that is why our response has got to be to say to them as clearly as we
possibly can, you are not going to defeat us because our will to defend
what we believe in is actually in the end stronger, better, more determined
than your will to inflict damage on an innocent people. Now that is what
this whole thing is about. That is why when I hear people talking about
the alliance between our two countries, this is not an alliance that is based
on simply Britain and America and the ties that go back in history and all
the rest of it, this is a real living alliance about the struggle going on
today in the early 21st century, and if we don't win this struggle, it is not
just Britain and America that is going to suffer, people everywhere are
going to suffer, and that is why it is important. And if they think that when
they go and kill people by these terrorist attacks they are going to
somehow weaken us or make us think well let's shuffle to the back of the
queue and hide away from this, they are wrong, that is not the tradition of
my country and it is not the tradition of the British people or the American
people.'38
The occasion of a joint press conference with the U.S. President also contributes to a coordination
of the UK Government's message with its U.S. counterpart which, as the
analysis confirms, proves to be very successful in terms of media management, for the
purpose of getting official messages reproduced in the media coverage.
38 Press Conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush, November 20 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page5004.asp.
16
The Istanbul Bombings: Improved Communication
The fact that the Government elaborates on the broader context in which the threat should
be understood, does change the media coverage. The first observation emerging from the
comparison of how the media report about the Heathrow alert and the Istanbul bombing
is the media's improved understanding of the terrorist threat. The seriousness and reality
of the danger are no longer questioned. Media talk confidently about a WOT and seem to
be more "familiar" with it.
It cannot be excluded that this outcome is due to a long exposure to the issue of terrorism
and the WOT over time. In fact the Istanbul bombing takes place nine months after the
Heathrow alert, after the Iraq war, a period in which media coverage was saturated by
discussions about terrorism, WMD and ways to deal with threats to security. At the end,
this must also be considered, the Heathrow airport alert and the Istanbul bombings are
two different kinds of event and no full comparison can be established between them.
The analysis seems to suggest, however, that when messages are consistent and they
"make sense" within a wider explanatory picture they are reported by the media in the
same form as they are issued. Also the media do not feel the need to question or
challenge them as much as when they are issued in an information vacuum. It could be
argued that the lack of criticism could be explained by the increased deference of the
media due to the presence of casualties, some of which British citizens. This does not
mean, howeve r, that the media do not criticize the Government at all. Media coverage
contained many critical pieces, some of them openly challenging Government's policies.
Within the criticism, however, the media did not seem to disagree any longer on the
sources of the threat or its nature. Such interpretations actually followed the lines traced
by the Government's frame.
Let's have a look at a few examples illustrating the reproduction of the basic aspects of
the Government's frame, even within critical stands:
Frame Reproduction Within Criticism
The Daily Mail:
'This time, the attack on Britain's consulate and the HSBC bank in
Istanbul coincided with President Bush's state visit to this country, thereby
achieving the maximum possible impact worldwide.
But for what? There is no reason in any of this savagery. This is killing for
killing's sake, an insane eruption of hatred and rage not only against
America and its allies, but also the principles of Western civilisation itself.
And now there are intelligence warnings that an Al Qaeda strike in Britain
is inevitable.
Tony Blair's response is admirable: 'In the face of this terrorism, there
17
must be no holding back, no compromise, no hesitation in confronting this
menace
and defeating it utterly'.
Indeed. Such resolution clearly shared by Mr Bush is indispensable in the
face of a remorseless evil. But it isn't enough by itself. And the bleak truth
is that the mistaken policies of Prime Minister and President have made
the defeat of terrorism that much more difficult.'39
The Independent:
'The terrorists are vile, and their crimes appalling. Yet there are reasons
why they are supported and why they flourish in some parts of the world.
The war against terrorism is complex and multi-layered. It will be long,
arduous and dangerous. There will be no final, climactic victory, just the
hope of halting its progress. That hope would be increased if Bush and
Blair displayed a greater insight, and a more subtle vision, of the challenge
that faces them.' 40
The Guardian:
'Mr Bush and Mr Blair have made many mistakes since 9/11. There is an
urgent need for a radical review of policy. But in the teeth of such terror,
there must also be solidarity. Yesterday was Britain's day to mourn, to
grieve for our diplomats, our citizens and those many others so cruelly
victimised in Istanbul - and grieve we do. But tomorrow, or next week, or
next month, if this goes on unchecked, it will be somebody else's awful
turn. A candid admission of western failings does not imply submission to
barbarity. There is no case for surrender. But there is a very strong case for
a more intelligent, less confrontational, combined east-west approach to an
intensifying global crisis.'41
These are statements from an article by Jason Burke, expert on Islamic militancy:
'JACK STRAW was right to say last week that increased security can
never make us safe against terrorists of the sort we now face. This is a
battle of visions, of perceptions, for hearts and minds, as much as a battle
of guns, forensic detection and intelligence. Making progress in the latter,
which it is possible we are doing, is nothing without progress in the
former. There are now fewer terrorist leaders, but more followers.
39 The Daily Mail, Victims of a mindless hate, November 21 2003.
40 The Independent on Sunday, We need subtler vision to defeat the terrorists, November 23 2003.
41 The Guardian, Istanbul bombs: Reaping the whirlwind, November 21 2003.
18
Of course a 'war on terror' requires a military component. But we need to
eliminate our enemies without simply creating more. Last week al-Qaeda
said that 'the cars of death will not stop'. If we fail to counter their warped
world-view then their threat will not be idle.'42
The Mirror:
'JACK Straw looked understandably shocked while touring the rubble of
the Istanbul atrocities.
But that does not excuse the nonsense the Foreign Secretary talked
afterwards.
Most ridiculously, he insisted that people believed September 11 happened
six months after military action began in Iraq.
What people? What circles can Mr Straw possibly move in to think that?
The charitable explanation of the Foreign Secretary's words is that he is
desperate to support the Bush-Blair approach to the war on terrorism.
But that is not the way to win the argument. Not the way to persuade the
millions who believe that the attack on Iraq has made things worse.
Mr Straw - like President Bush and Tony Blair the previous day - insists
that the war on terrorism must be pursued with absolute vigour. We
agree.
But they also say Iraq is central to it, even though there is not a shred of
evidence that al-Qaeda had any presence in that country or contact with
Saddam Hussein.
A sensible, intelligent debate is essential. From both sides. That means not
making wild statements or relying on misinformation.
If the Foreign Secretary says the sort of things he did yesterday, those who
disagree with the Government's actions will claim it is because he knows
he has no valid case.
Mr Straw saw for himself the horrors of terrorism. Surely we should be
united and honest in finding the best way to deal with it.'43
42 The Observer, Where terror begins, November 23 2003.
43 The Mirror, Jack's case is clutching at straws, November 22 2003.
19
Most of media criticism is focused on the perceived lack of a link between 9/11's
terrorism and Iraq. This connection is particularly questioned, among the newspape rs, by
the Mirror and on TV coverage. Such disagreement is explained by the fact that,
contrarily to what happened in the US, the UK Government justified the war in Iraq by
focusing its rhetoric on the danger to security represented by Saddam Hussein's WMD.
Repetition of Official Soundbites
Another aspect that can be observed is the extensive reporting of several governmental
soundbites. The following excerpts, especially the second, were reported by virtually all
media sources. They were widely interpreted, together with President Bush's coordinated
messages, as an expression of a unity of purposes between the American and
British fronts as well as a firm determination by both Administrations to fight against
terrorism:
'First of all I would wish to express my deepest sympathy and
condolences to the families of the victims, some will be British, many will
be Turkish citizens, I would like to express my condolences also to the
government and to the people of Turkey. And once again we are reminded
of the evil these terrorists pose to innocent people everywhere, and to our
way of life, once again we must affirm that in the face of this terrorism,
there must be no holding back, no compromise, no hesitation in
confronting this menace, in attacking it wherever and whenever we can,
and in defeating it utterly.'
'And let me make it absolutely clear for our position as well. We stay until
the job gets done. And what this latest terrorist outrage shows us is that
this is a war, its main battleground is Iraq. We have got to make sure that
we defeat these terrorists - the former Saddam people - in Iraq and we
must do that because that is an essential part of defeating this fanaticism
and extremism that is killing innocent people all over our world today.
And I can assure you of one thing, that when something like this happens
today, our response is not to flinch, or give way or concede one inch. We
stand absolutely firm until this job is done, done in Iraq, done elsewhere in
the world.' 44
44 Press Conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush, November 20 2003, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page5004.asp.
20
3.1.4. THE THIRD SPEECH AND THE MADRID BOMBING 45
This speech contributes to further refine the existing narrative by developing the idea of
pre-emptive strike as the way for dealing with the current threat from terrorism. The
speech received wide TV coverage and was described by Gavin Esler on BBC2's
Newsnight as outlining 'almost a "Blair Doctrine"', as 'a statement on what to do about
the problems of the world right now and in the future'.
'September 11th was for me a revelation. What had seemed inchoate
came together. The point about September 11th was not its detailed
planning; not its devilish execution; not even, simply, that it happened in
America, on the streets of New York. All of this made it an astonishing,
terrible and wicked tragedy, a barbaric murder of innocent people. But
what galvanised me was that it was a declaration of war by religious
fanatics who were prepared to wage that war without limit. They killed
3000. But if they could have killed 30,000 or 300,000 they would have
rejoiced in it. The purpose was to cause such hatred between Moslems
and the West that a religious jihad became reality; and the world engulfed
by it.'
'Here is the irony. For all the fighting, this threat cannot be defeated by
security means alone. Taking strong action is a necessary but insufficient
condition for defeating. Its final defeat is only assured by the triumph of
the values of the human spirit.
Which brings me to the final point. It may well be that under international
law as presently constituted, a regime can systematically brutalise and
oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue,
diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of
a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass graves
already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a
catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be?
We know now, if we didn't before, that our own self interest is ultimately
bound up with the fate of other nations. The doctrine of international
community is no longer a vision of idealism. It is a practical recognition
that just as within a country, citizens who are free, well educated and
prosperous tend to be responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in
which they have a stake; so do nations that are free, democratic and
benefiting from economic progress, tend to be stable and solid partners in
45 PM Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat, March 5 2004, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page5461.asp .
21
the advance of humankind. The best defence of our security lies in the
spread of our values.
But we cannot advance these values except within a framework that
recognises their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs a global
response, based on global rules.
The essence of a community is common rights and responsibilities. We
have obligations in relation to each other. If we are threatened, we have a
right to act. And we do not accept in a community that others have a right
to oppress and brutalise their people. We value the freedom and dignity
of the human race and each individual in it.
Containment will not work in the face of the global threat that confronts
us. The terrorists have no intention of being contained. The states that
proliferate or acquire WMD illegally are doing so precisely to avoid
containment. Emphatically I am not saying that every situation leads to
military action. But we surely have a duty and a right to prevent the
threat materialising; and we surely have a responsibility to act when a
nation's people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam's. Otherwise,
we are powerless to fight the aggression and injustice which over time
puts at risk our security and way of life.'
Let's explore more in depth how these changes have practically affected the coverage.
The Madrid Bombings: Understanding the Threat
What emerges from the analysis of the Madrid case study is, again, a wide reproduction
of many elements of the Government's frame, especially the ideas that terrorists are evil,
have no sensible aim but to kill innocents and that "we are all targets now".
The Guardian
'Cities have become our battlegrounds; where once they were places of
safety to which countryfolk retreated in times of war, they are now where
the war is conducted. After 3/11 every citizen of a western European city,
of Paris, Rome, Berlin or London, nervously enters the packed tube, the
busy commuter train or the high-rise office block. Fear could empty the
city and cauterise the mass transit systems that are its lifeblood. One is
haunted by an image of shut-down tube stations, of empty streets where
weeds break up the Tarmac and everyone retreats home to their laptops,
and we look back on the conviviality of the era before mass terrorism with
nostalgic disbelief.
What's at stake is a long history of the city, that exchange point for trade
22
and ideas that has been the crux of all civilisations. The city orders how
large numbers of human beings live in close proximity. In so doing, it
civilises and turns strangers into citizens who belong to a civil society in
which they treat each other with (more or less) civility. All these words
have the same Latin root, civitas
What the demonstrations in Spain remind us is that civility - the measure
of goodwill from one stranger to another - is ultimately what makes a
city's spirit. It is the accumulation of tiny, daily interactions with bus
conduc tors, fellow commuters, newspaper sellers and coffee-shop
waitresses - the humour, the greetings, the gestures of help that smooth the
rough edges of urban living.'46
The Daily Mail:
'The sheer scale of the inhumanity which targeted so many Spanish
innocents for death demonstrated what we understood on 9/11: that we are
up against an enemy of a kind we have not seen before.
This is not the IRA-style terrorism with which we are wearily familiar. In
Al Qaeda and its associates, we are dealing with a death cult, enemies of
life and of humanity itself, who have said: 'We are not fighting for you to
offer us something, but to eliminate you.' Indeed, it is vital to grasp that -
despite the tape's claims over Iraq and Afghanistan - those who say
Madrid was targeted only because Spain supported America are
grievously mistaken.'
'Too many people, though, still don't grasp the nature of what we are all
up against.
Instead, they complain we are no safer than before - which is a bit like
blaming the Blitz on the fact that we went to war against Germany.
Despite the obvious differences, we are in a war now.
It was declared upon us and we must defend ourselves. It is not possible to
sit it out on the sidelines.
It can and must be won; but that will only happen if we all stand shoulder
to shoulder, not just with the people of Spain but those of all countries and
all faiths who are now under attack.'47
46 The Guardian, Terror in Madrid: Europeans must tell the United States where Washington is going wrong in its war on terror,
March 13 2004.
47 The Daily Mail, We are at war - and it must be won, March 15 2004.
23
The Mirror:
'The war on terrorism is just that - a war. For the terrorists have declared
war on us, on the civilised world, on everything that is decent.
They don't even have a basic sense of humanity. But that is why they will
be beaten.
They do appalling things, but we are stronger than them. Not just because
we have right on our side but because we are united agains t them.'48
The following example from the same newspaper underlines how the acceptance
of the Government's frame can coexist with harsh criticism:
'"We will not defeat it [terrorism] by hoping it will leave us alone or by
hiding away," said Mr Blair. True. But nor will we defeat it by fighting the
wrong battles, for the reasons, in the wrong place against the wrong people
with the wrong intelligence.
That is what we did in Iraq.'49
The Media and the Government's "Dilemma"
The content analysis confirms the understanding by the media not only of the terrorist
threat, but also of the problems of dealing with terrorism. The media clearly understand
the Government's "dilemma" of "informing, but not alarming the public" and seem to
produce a great amount of constructive criticism, especially in the broadsheets.
The Times:
'Of course, September 11 did not mark the end of terrorist attacks on
military targets around the world. Ask the coalition troops in Iraq. But the
twin towers attacks mark a turning point, since when terrorists of many
kinds appear to think it legitimate -and fruitful -to attack civilians.
That presents governments with new problems. They have the practical
problem of trying to protect their citizens from the kind of attack that is
almost impossible to prevent. They have legal problems of balancing
pursuit of terrorists with civil liberties. And they have a political dilemma
-which President Bush has conspicuously not solved -of whether it is in
their interests to inflame people's fears that they are living in an era of
great danger.'
[&]
48 The Mirror, These vile killers must not prevail, March 13 2004.
49 The Sunday Mirror, Time to target the real enemy, March 14 2004.
24
'So governments will, no doubt, deploy a mixture of the techniques that
have become familiar since September 11. There will be a few, scattered,
precise warnings or interventions, such as flights from London to
Washington or Riyadh suspended. Then there will be generalised
exhortations to be alert, because of a heightened but unspecified -security
risk. However, that last tactic is a dangerous political tool. If people are
not told what they can do to avoid the threat, or what the government is
doing, they may well resent being frightened. As Bush's soaring poll
ratings showed after September 11, people are willing to give political
leaders credit for rushing to defend them. But if, down the road, they fail
to feel safer, they may hold against those leaders any new cause to feel
afraid.'50
Another example from the same newspaper:
'Madrid has confirmed, yet again, that terrorism is the enemy of
democracy and all that we stand for. It is a thre


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