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Managing Terrorism After 9/11: the War On Terror, the Media and the Imagined Threat by C Archetti & Managing Terrorism After 9/11: the War On Terror The Media, and the Imagined Threat* Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor The paper argues that, in the post -9/11 world, managing the imagined threat of terrorism is as much, if not more, important than dealing with its real threat. This is not only due to the peculiar nature of the global War On Terror, a struggle for "hearts and minds" and for the moral high ground, but also to the relevance of perceptions within an increasingly media-saturated international environment. Starting from the analysis of the government/media interactions in a range of terrorist alerts in the UK, the paper identifies a series of problem areas in successfully countering the imagined threat. They not only apply to the UK, but to the whole Euro-Atlantic context and span from defining (framing) the threat in "manageable" terms to approaching the media as a different kind of actor than normally regarded by politicians. The research suggests that, if these problems are not addressed, they could not only contribute to a heightened sense of society's vulnerability, but also to a weakening of trust in authorities and the information they provide the public with. This would, in turn, erode our democratic institutions and ultimately raise the question of whether we can really win the war on terrorism. Argument & Overview The paper's main line of argument is that managing the imagined threat of terrorism is an essential part of dealing with the terrorist danger and that the media, willingly or not, play a vital role within this context. What the report argues is neither that counter-terrorist policies are not useful or necessary, nor that the threat of terrorism is "imaginary". Of course the threat is real and needs to be dealt with through a variety of measures. What the research want to draw the attention on is the fact that the way we think about the terrorist threat may not necessarily reflect its reality. In other words the way we perceive the terrorist threat is constructed (framed) through the way social actors, especially politicians and the media, talk about it. This framing, although occurring in the abstract world of perceptions, has far reaching consequences in the real world, including the way we practically deal with terrorism and our sense of vulnerability as a society. This paper looks at how the perception of the terrorist threat is shaped through language and rhetoric * The research for this paper was undertaken as part of the ESRC-funded project on the Domestic Management of Terrorism led by King's College, London in 2002-03. 2 by governmental actors and the media. It specifically looks at a range of case studies represented by terrorist alerts occurred in the UK in the period 2003 to 2004. The argument will unfold in five steps: 1. An Introduction explains why perceptions are particularly relevant in the context of the War on Terrorism 2. The section Theoretical Debate, Method and Case Studies describes how the framing analysis fits into the wider context of International Relations studies about security and provides some information about the research methodology and the case studies that have been analysed 3. Findings illustrates the observations concerning the case studies 4. Interpreting the Data is an attempt at drawing some lessons out of the material. What do the results suggest us on how to deal with the terrorist threat? 5. The Conclusions explore the challenges ahead 1. INTRODUCTION The WOT and Public Perceptions: the Struggle for the Information Space President Bush has defined the War on Terrorism (WOT) 'a new kind of war', a kind of conflict that has never been fought before. The WOT is a struggle being waged on several fronts, including the law enforcement, legislative and financial fronts as well as the world of secret intelligence. There have been military confrontations with the terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the real nature of the WOT seems to be laying elsewhere. As illustrated by the intense rhetorical debate preceding the Iraq war, but perhaps even more by the recent release of pictures about the torture of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison, the WOT appears as a propaganda war, a "struggle for hearts and minds". The WOT is, from this point of view, a war to win the moral high ground in the global public domain. This really defines the peculiar nature of the WOT and is underlined by Western politicians' acknowledgement of the need to explain the Arab world that this 'war' is not a clash of civilizations. In Tony Blair's words, it is necessary to bridge a 'gulf of misunderstanding'. This requires the use of perception management or, less euphemistically, propaganda. Information needs to be deployed to explain the reasons and objectives of the WOT to domestic and foreign audiences, but also as an offensive weapon to counter terrorists' moves. The terrorist global network, in fact, uses propaganda as a key weapon in its asymmetric struggle against the West. This is illustrated by the fact that most damage to the West seems currently to be inflicted by fear deriving from a heightened sense of vulnerability of our society rather than by actual attacks. In this perspective the WOT is a 3 struggle to shape public perceptions as well as an international conflict which, far from being confined to a physical battleground, extends to a global 'information space'. This is the context in which the media become crucial. On the one hand they carry the terrifying images of successful attacks delivering worldwide audiences a message of terror. The media are exploited by terrorists who know how to maximise their publicity. This is exemplified by the very 9/11 attacks' spectacular choreography or, more recently, by the decapitation of an American businessman, Nicholas Berg, in front of the cameras (May 12th 2004). Especially the last example suggests a sophisticated use of the media by the terrorists. In fact, beside the obvious horror of the murder, the orange suite worn by the victim and reminding of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay was most probably meant to deliver an additional message. The images evoked the anti-American arguments about Bush administration's double standards, particularly its hypoc ritical rhetoric of respect for human rights and freedom vs. illegal imprisonment. On the other hand media play a role within governmental measures against terrorism. In fact Governments need to be able to inform the public to make it aware of the terrorist threat. This serves both to create support for the authorities' anti-terrorist action and to insulate the public from terrorists' attempt to spread panic and destabilize society. This strategy has to be deployed when communicating with the public and necessarily has to go through the media filter. Is this an overstating the role of perceptions and rhetoric? Does what politicians or the media say matter that much? Isn't it what social actors actually do that counts at the end of the day when dealing with security issues and in trying to counter terrorists who, ultimately, want to inflict physical harm? 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, METHOD AND CASE STUDIES 2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The research's understanding of the role of language reflects one of the recent developments in International Relations theory. This is the attempt at integrating the growing role and impact of communications technology on international politics into traditional studies. Here I refer to the approach of the Copenhagen School, mainly represented by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde and to their concept of 'securitization' and 'societal threat'. 1 1 Buzan, B., O. Waever, et al., Eds. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 4 The theorists of the Copenhagen school regard the very issue of security as constructed through speech-acts. Which issues belong to the 'security' box cannot be determined a priori, but it is the result of rhetorical choices. In other words how issues are constructed and perceived is the result of a process involving a selection of language, which is not just seen as describing reality but as creating it. This can be applied, as an example, to the WOT. We all talk about a WOT, politicians refer to it, media mention it. The WOT, however, before the 9/11 attacks, did not exist. It came about because someone, the U.S. Government, started to talk about it. This also applies to the shift in foreign policy priorities after 9/11 and terrorism becoming the number one security issue on the global political agenda.2 The Copenhagen School theorists also talk about the concept of "societal threat". Differently from traditional Realist or Neo-realist approaches this is a threat to security, interestingly an 'existential threat', that is not conceived in exclusive military terms, just aiming at undermining the territorial integrity of the state. In this concept the very identity of a group is undermined 'by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements'.3 The concept can again be applied to the WOT, especially the idea that terrorism is far more than a physical threat to life. It is a threat, as PM T. Blair or President G. Bush put it, 'to our civilization' and 'our way of life', to the very stability and 'survival' of our societies. T. Blair actually referred to it using the very word 'existential'.4 This is the broader theoretical framework for the analysis of a range of case studies in the UK. 2.2. CASE STUDIES Heathrow airport alert (February 11-13 2003): 450 troops, 1000 extra police and light armoured vehicles are dispatched to Heathrow airport following intelligence warnings about a possible terrorist attack on the occasion of the end of the Muslim festival of Eid (February 15th). Heightened security measures are adopted in other airports around the country and in the proximity of government build ings in London. Istanbul bombing (November 20 2003): 2 bombs directed at British targets, the British Consulate and a branch of the HSBC bank, explode in Istanbul killing 28 people, 3 of which British. Flight delays (December 2003 to February 2004): a series of delays involving transatlantic flights to the U.S. over the Christmas period and the beginning of 2004. The 2 Williams, M. C. (2003). "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." International Studies Quarterly (47): 511-531. 3 'Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of "societal" security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements', Ibid. p. 513. 4 'the nature of the global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real and existential', PM Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat, March 5 2004, 
5 case study includes the media coverage of, among the rest, the grounding of Air France flight 68 from Paris to Los Angeles on Christmas Eve , BA flight 223 from Heathrow to Washington (cancelled several times at beginning of January), BA flight 263 from Heathrow to Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) on December 31 2003. Madrid bombing (March 11 2004): short after 7.30 local time four bombs explode on a train approaching Atocha station, the main train station in Madrid. Minutes later two more bombs detonate at El Pozo and one at Eugenia stations. The attacks left 192 people dead and more than 1,200 injured. The Spanish Government first blamed the Basque separatist terrorist group ETA for the attacks. Another lead in the investigation about who was behind the bombing started to develop when, a few hours after the attacks, a van containing detonators and tapes with verses of the Koran was found in the outskir ts of Madrid. A letter purporting to come from al-Qaida and addressed to the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Quds also claimed responsibility for the train bombing. The range of cases studies selected gives the opportunity of analysing how both officials and the media dealt with events of a different nature. The case studies include simple alerts and actual attacks, both in the run up to the war in Iraq and afterwards. The Istanbul bombing throws light on the coverage of an attack on British interests on foreign soil, while the Madrid bombing provides some information about the way both the British press and authorities reacted to an attack abroad. 2.3. METHOD The research is based on a multidisciplinary approach combining a tool of political communication, framing, with discourse analysis within a comparative research design. Framing essentially refers to the construction of issues through language by means of selection and saliency. According to R. Entman 'To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described'.5 Taking Entman's definition as a starting point I have explored the frames related to the terrorist threat through qualitative content analysis of both politicians' and media discourses. The analysis has been carried out through the methodological tools of discourse analysis. I have essentially compared the political and media discourses in order to identify the interactions between media and politicians and find out which source is effectively 5 Entman, R. M. (1993). "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." Journal of Communication 43(4), p. 52. 6 shaping the perceptions of the terrorist threat and where media contents actually come from. This procedure allows capturing the information exchanges among social actors to identify the mechanisms that operate within the information space. Sample Governmental/officials' statements constitute the "political discourse": speeches given by the Prime Minister, official briefings and press conferences, parliamentary debates, information available on governmental websites. 6 The "media discourse" is represented by both text and video sources: 1. The Press coverage by 6 national newspapers: The Guardian/The Observer, The Times/The Sunday Times, The Independent/The Independent on Sunday, The Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror, The Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday, The Sun/News of the World.7 2. TV coverage on 4 channels' evening news programmes: News at Ten (BBC1) , Newsnight (BBC2), ITV News (ITV), Channel 4 News (CHANNEL 4) and weekend political programmes such as Breakfast with Frost (Saturday morning BBC1) and Jonathan Dimbleby (Sunday morning? ITV). 8 Objectives of the Analysis The analysis aimed at: 1. Identifying the extent to which the way political authorities framed the problem of terrorism and the war against it (i.e. the language they used to describe these aspects) had an impact on the media and on public perceptions of the threat 2. Defining the role of the media as a mediator between the Government and the public. This last question particularly refers to testing the widespread claim that the media tend to sensationalise, create hype and, possibly, encourage panic/alarmism. 6 The material has been retrieved from a variety of sources: 10 Downing Street - , The United
Kingdom Parliament - , The Home Office Website- ,
The MET Police Website -
7 Newspapers' sources - Sample: The sample for the content analysis is made up by articles retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis database through the search-words ""terrorist OR terrorism OR terror". This allows retrieving all articles dealing with the topic of terrorism, the "war on terrorism" (also called "war on terror") and related issues. All articles mentioning the keywords have been considered. The time span of the analysis covers every day from the first mention of the of the events considered in each case study (for example the dispatch of troops to Heathrow airport on February 11th is first mentioned on February 12th's newspapers) until no more references are made to it (but no longer than 14 days afterwards). 8 Video footage - Sample: The TV coverage sample is made up of the daily evening news (BBC's1 News at Ten, BBC2's Newsnight, ITV's ITV News, Channel 4's Channel 4 News) and weekend political programmes such as BBC1's Breakfast with Frost and ITV's Jonathan Dimbleby. The time span considered extends from the day the events considered by each case occurred (the Heathrow airport alert, for example, is reported on the same day it occurred, February 11th) to the following 3 days. 7 3. FINDINGS The research has led to three main findings: the first is about politicians' framing of the terrorist threat having an effect on media coverage's contents. The second concerns the nature of the media, while the third challenges the myths about the role of politicians, the media and their relationship. 3.1. POLITICIANS' FRAMING AND ITS EFFECT ON MEDIA COVERAGE A comparison between statements by political sources and the content of media coverage reveals that the way politicians define the problem of terrorism and describe it has a substantial impact on media performance. This refers, above all, to the contents of the coverage and the amount as well as depth of criticism expressed against the Government's messages. This will be illustrated by comparing official rhetoric's changes over time and corresponding media coverage in three of the case studies: the Heathrow airport alert, the Istanbul bombing and the Madrid attacks. They highlight how the political context created by politicians' rhetoric shapes the ove rall understanding of the media and the way they convey official messages to the wider public. 3.1.1. THE SHIFT IN THE U.K. GOVERNMENT'S RHETORIC While the U.S. Government's portrayal of what the WOT is about has been extremely consistent, starting from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.K. Government's framing of the terrorist threat has evolved over time. This is what President Bush declared the day following the WTC and Pentagon attacks. 'The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. This enemy hides in shadows, and has no regard for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, then runs for cover. But it won't be able to run for cover forever. This is an enemy that tries to hide. But it won't be able to hide forever. This is an enemy that thinks its harbors are safe. But they won't be safe forever. 8 This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient, we will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination. This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we will win. 'America is united. The freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail.'9 The interpretation of the 9/11 events is very clear: the attacks are as an 'act of war' on civilization (problem definition) by evil terrorists (moral evaluation) motivated by hate for human life (causal interpretation) against which the world should unite to defeat barbarity and defend freedom (treatment recommenda tion). This frame has not been changed since the attacks and has helped the U.S. Government placing both domestic and international events that have followed 9/11 (such as terrorist alerts, counter-terrorist measures, military operations in Afghanistan or in Iraq, but also restrictions of civil liberties) into a solid context. The U.K. Government, by contrast, did not provide a similarly strong post-9/11 frame. If we compare the Lord Major Speech (November 11th 2002), regarded as the Government's blueprint for its anti-terrorist strategy to another speech held with G. Bush in occasion of his state visit to Britain at the time of the Istanbul bombings (November 20th 2003), it is possible to notice a huge change in rhetoric. The second speech marks a clear move towards the U.S. Government's frame. This is even more obvious in a speech by the PM on March 5th 2004. But let's have a closer look at how the shifting rhetoric changed the points of reference for the media's understanding of terrorist alerts and attacks. 3.1.2. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-TERRORIST STRATEGY The first speech:10 'WMD is but one aspect of the new dangers we face. The Cold War has ended. The great ideological battle between Communism and Western liberal democracy is over. Most countries believe both in markets and in a necessary role for Government. There will be thunderous debates inside 9 President G. W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team, September 12 2001, .
10 PM speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, November 11 2002, .
9 nations about the balance, but the struggle for world hegemony by political ideology is gone. What preoccupies decision-makers now is a different danger. It is extremism driven by fanaticism, personified either in terrorist groups or rogue states.' 'So: these are new times. New threats need new measures. The simplest act of fanaticism carried out in a state thousands of miles from us is of significance on the streets of London or in the villages of County Durham. The interdependence of the modern world has never been clearer; the need for a common response never greater; the values of freedom, justice and tolerance of our diversity never more relevant; and the need to apply them fairly across the world never more urgent.' The Government describes here the terrorist threat in very vague terms. Tony Blair says that we are living in 'new times' in which 'new threats' required 'new measures'. 'These dangers', identified in a not better-defined connection among 'WMD', 'extremism' and 'rogue states' 'can strike at any time, across any national boundary and in pursuit of a cause with which there can be little or no rational negotiation'. No mention was made of a "war against terrorism". The Heathrow Alert: Government's "Mistakes" and Public Scepticism The Heathrow airport alert is particularly interesting in highlighting the tight interlink between the media and official sources and how the mismanagement of information by authorities can translate into a failure of the 'informing, but not alarming the public' strategy. The lack of background information concerning what the very threat of terrorism, let alone a whole "war on terrorism", was about represents the main reason behind the Government's lack of success in handling the situation. In very short terms this was the mechanism that led to such an outcome: the information vacuum about the very nature of the threat or Government's engagement in a WOT translated into the absence of mentions of a WOT in the media coverage. In this context the attempt of the Government at informing the public did not contribute to any better public knowledge of the situation. Officials' messages appeared just empty repetition of soundbites. By then the general perception was that the threat was not real, let alone imminent, as the Government had encouraged the public to believe. 11 The presence of some slight inconsistencies in Government's words and deeds amplified public and media's initial scepticism into outright cynicism and allegations that the sending of light armoured vehicles to Heathrow was a "PR stunt". 11 This is the statement by the Metropolitan Police announcing the despatch of troops at Heathrow airport: 'The current strengthening of security is precautionary and is related to action being taken in other countries and the possibility that the end of the religious festival of Eid may erroneously be used by Al Qaida and associated networks to mount attacks. The strengthened security, which is likely to be most visible to the public at Heathrow Airport, relates to a potential threat to the capital' MET Police Website, Heightened Levels of Security in London, February 11 2003, .
10 Let's have a closer look at each of the above-mentioned stages and at how the crisis unfolded. No War On Terrorism Although the WOT is assumed by the Government as a "naturally understood" framework for the antiterrorist measures adopted during the airport alert, there is no evidence of the media perceiving its relevance. The "official WOT" did not exist in the media's perspective. And if it did, it was not clear what it referred to. This will be illustrated by some examples. In the coverage of the events the expressions "War on Terrorism" and "War on Terror" are used interchangeably and often replaced by 'fight against terror',12 'fight against terrorism' 13 or 'battle against terrorism' 14 that, in their respective contexts, simply refer to a generalised idea of taking measures against terrorism. This is the emerging trend in the broadsheets. The War on Terrorism and the War on Terror, when mentioned at all, are referred to within an official context, usually within a quote from officials or in some way related to state policies. An example of WOT mentioned by an official comes from The Times covering the calling off of a military air show in a RAF airbase in Suffolk. Colonel Donald Lustig explains in an interview: 'Some of our men and aircraft have already been deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The unpredictability of the ongoing war on terrorism has increased the operations tempo here and on other bases'.15 The Independent offers another case: '&France is convinced that a US-led invasion - however short and surgical - will compound hatred of the West in the Islamic world and make the "war on terror", which should take precedence, harder to win'.16 When not mentioned within an official context, the WOT appears to be often completely misunderstood. This is particularly evident in The Independent. The War on Terrorism or the War on Terror are portrayed more as a reality belonging to President George W. Bush's policy and U.S foreign policy, not involving Britain. In other words, it is not Britain's War on Terrorism, but America's. 'The Israeli authorities have repeatedly sought to present their conflict with the Palestinians as equivalent to president George Bush's "war on terror".17 12 For example The Times, Army man to help firms fight terror, May 18, 2003 and The Guardian, We are going to France where race relations are a lot worse than in Britain, February 16 2003. 13The fight against terrorism has increased the number of little indignities at airport security checks', The Independent, BAA could still fly high in a war, February 15 2003. 14 The Independent, Patience will be a vital weapon in the long battle against terrorism, February 14 2003. 15 The Times, Suffolk military air show is called off, February 14 2003. 16 The Independent, Irreconcilable differences of opinion? A tale of two world views great gulf fixed between UK and France, February 12 2003. 11 Some articles very clearly reveal basic misunderstandings about the meaning of the WOT: 'This is becoming like a dark Peter Sellers farce in which the main players pursue a complicated red herring while the more dangerous villains make hay. Mr Blair is fighting for his political future over a likely war with Iraq. President Bush, addressing troops heading for the Gulf, crudely conflates the looming conflict with the war against terrorism. The rest of the UN agonises over Hans Blix, under pressure to contrive a unity that does not exist. While the world looks away, the terrorists prepare to strike'. 18 The following quote reveals a lack of understanding of the WOT within U.S. foreign policy's objectives: 'When Mr Blair expressed unqualified support for the US in the aftermath of the Twin Towers, he had a choice. He could sign up for the campaign against terrorism or he could sign up for the whole voyage. By choosing the latter, he sought to maximise his influence but, in truth, irretrievably circumscribed his freedom of action. Mr Blair's bargain with George Bush is truly Faustian'.19 This article interprets the 'campaign against terrorism' as something different from what is currently occurring, as if the WOT had finished with the war in Afghanistan. This last point is confirmed by the following: 'When we fought the war against terrorism by invading Afghanistan, one of the arguments made to justify the war was that the Taliban was a harsh and immoral regime'. 20 Other interesting examples of misunderstanding of the WOT come from The Sun. This is the only newspaper having a section specifically called "War On Terror". This is absent in the rest of the press, usually placing articles related to the airport alert under the label "The Threat of War" (The Guardian) or "Iraq Crisis" (The Times). The Sun's WOT section, however, contains a variety of questionable contents such as articles on asylum21 (which implies an association of the terrorist threat with asylum seekers) as well as news that has no clear connection with actual terrorism. An example of an unrelated article appears on 17 February - 'US troop jets forced back to Shannon in engine scares'.22 This 17 The Independent, Israeli army seals borders after exceptional number of terrorist attack warnings, February 12 2003. 18 The Independent on Sunday, Tighter airport security would do more than a second UN resolution, February 16 2003. This point is also made by the following quote: 'the Prime Minister ought to know, that the numbers on the streets today [anti-war protest] will have been swelled by two things. One was the bellicosity of President Bush in addressing sailors on the USS Philippines Sea this week. His conflation of the war on terror with that on Iraq was unstatesmanlike: "The terrorists brought this war to us - and now we're taking it back to them." Of course, we know the link of logic, in that if Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons they could come into terrorist hands. But the implication that invading Iraq is the counterpunch to 11 September is dishonest. And the gloating over the deaths of 3,000 suspected terrorists in Afghanistan - "they're not a problem any more" - was offensive'18 The Independent, Mr. Blix has spoken. Today, vast numbers of Britons will speak up. Mr. Blair must listen, February 15 2003. 19 The Independent on Sunday, Quick march to war. Whatever happened to Britain's third way? February 16 2003. 20 The Independent, The harsh truth about Taliban asylum rights, February 20 2003. 12 is very interesting because it reports two U.S. troop-carrying jets forced to make an emergency landing at Shannon during the weekend after one of the planes, just returned from duty in the Gulf, started 'suffering engine trouble'. The problem with one of the aircraft's engines is not even attributed to a possible terrorist attack or sabotage (the pilot, according to the article, 'did not declare an emergency and did not seek assistance'). There would therefore be no reason to include this article in the section on WOT. This proves that, at least in this tabloid, anything loosely linked to U.S., airplanes, war and their mixture is almost automatically associated to the WOT. The greatest misunderstanding is perhaps failing to see the connection between the Iraq war and the WOT. The Mirror, from this point of view, does not refer to the WOT at all. Repetition of Uninformative Messages The government's communication during the crisis saw the almost obsessive repetition of the same messages. They could have probably been more informative if the public had been adequately prepared to understand them. Given the information vacuum in which they were sent, however, they sounded as empty soundbites. As proof of the extent to which they were repeated, almost always with the same words, is the fact that they are referred to by the media on more than one occasion as the government's 'mantra'.23 Apart from the omnipresent recommendation for the public to be "alert but not alarmed", the most recurrent soundbites (the majority of them already present in the Lord Major Speech) were: - the threat from 'international terrorism' is 'real' and 'serious' - the government has to make 'fine judgements' 24 about taking action that is both 'necessary and proportionate';25 'this could never be an exact science'26 - the government is taking 'whatever action' 27 it believes necessary 'to protect the public'28 - we should not do the terrorists' 'job for them'29 - 'people had to get used to the idea that as the threat level rose and fell at different times and in different circumstances, so the security would rise and fall in parallel.'30 21 Examples : The Sun, Plug leaks at borders, February 17 2003 and The Sun, Taliban No2 given asylum in Britain, February 17 2003. 22 The Sun, US troop jets forced back to Shannon in engine scares, February 17 2003. 23 Mark Mardell, News at Ten, BBC1, Feb 11 2003. Also an article on The Times reports that in occasion of the alert 'ministers repeated their mantra that the public should be 'alert but not alarmed'. The Times, How worried should we be?, February 16 2003. 24 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. 25 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. 26 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. 27 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. 28 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. 29 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. 13 The following is a quote from the afternoon press briefing of Tuesday 11th February that particularly reveals how much the PM's official spokesman attempted to stick to the official line by presenting almost all of these themes together: 'As the Prime Minister had said in his speech to the Lord Mayor's Banquet last November, the government had to make fine judgements. We had to take whatever security measures we could consistent with the desire for people to lead normal lives. Given the terrorist threat was real, people had to get used to the idea that the response to it would rise and fall accordingly. This could never be an exact science. There was no rulebook to deal with such things. The guiding principles were to protect the security of the people of this country consistent with the desire to ensure as best [as] we could that we did not do the terrorists' job for them. That was exactly what we were doing'.31 That was all that was going to be said. While limiting the release of new information could have been justified on the grounds that, as explained by all officials, it was not safe to give details about an ongoing operation, the authorities actually gave the public the impression tha t they were annoyed by media requests for more information. In fact the Government overestimated the public's capacity to understand the situation. Inconsistencies The combination of the terrorist threat's framing with the course of action actually taken by the government in dealing with the terrorist threat generated a series of inconsistencies that undermined the credibility of the government's strategy. A crude example of this during the airport alert is the contrast between the statements that the threat is 'real', 'serious' and specific' and the government's decision not to close any infrastructure. Heathrow remained open and flights continued to operate. 32 Another example is offered by the government's commitment to informing the public clashing with its reluctance, even irritation, to elaborate about the nature of the threat when asked for more details.33 Again, contrast the rhetoric that 'we should be "alert but not alarmed"' in the 'new normality after 9/11' with the adoption, as acknowledged by the PM's official spokesman, of exceptional measures. Troops and armoured vehicles were deployed in 30 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 3.45p.m. Thursday 13 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page2916.asp. 31 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 3.45p.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1803.asp. 32 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page1802.asp. 33 Mr. Blunkett, as The Independent remarked twice, appeared to be 'clearly irritated' by having to make a statement to the House of Commons (February 13 2001) on the government's course of action against the terrorist danger. The Independent, Travellers cancel flights as Blunkett calls for calm, February 14 2003. On The Independent on Sunday, Weariness and fear that haunt ministers, February 16 2003, it is also said that the Home Secretary 'could not hide his exhausted irritation at being summoned to the House of Commons to make a statement on the security threat'. 14 the biggest security operation on mainland British soil since the 1991 Heathrow terrorist alerts.34 As a last example: if, as the government maintained, the threat is everywhere and can strike at any time, that there is no rationality behind the terrorists' aims and that their objective is to kill and cause disruption, how was it that, on this occasion, special security measures including the dispatch of armoured vehicles (whose usefulness in this context would soon be questioned) were taken at specific locations such as Heathrow, other airports and some government building in London? An Unreal Threat The threat, in this perspective, appeared so unconvinc ing as to lead to the interpretation of the tanks' presence at Heathrow mainly as a 'public relations exercise',35 a PR stunt to convince people that it was necessary to support the decision to go to war in Iraq, which even supported the allegation by the Daily Mail that the alert could have been a 'hoax'.36 Scepticism is particularly well illustrated by CARTOONS [see report specifically about Heathrow alert for examples. I did not copy them to keep the size of the file small] This is an indicator of how "unreal" the threat appeared to some media. It cannot be ruled out the fact that this may have created more confusion in the public and fostered a sense of uncertainty on what was to be believed. The general impression, however, given the fact that humour was a characteristic of the coverage of most newspapers, is that the media recorded a public mood. 3.1.3 THE SECOND SPEECH AND THE ISTANBUL BOMBINGS Here is an excerpt from the PM's second speech on the topic of terrorism. 37 It provides a more sophisticated narrative on how to interpret international events. This includes a description of the terrorists' identity, their motives, our identity as 'people who believe in freedom' and what we can do to counter the global threat of terrorism. 'Here is where we have got to. We have got to see what this struggle [against terrorism] is about, because you can see it clearer and clearer day by day. This is a struggle between fanaticism and extremism on the one hand, and people who believe in freedom and intolerance on the 34 There are references made by the PMOS to the dispatch of troops in 1994: 'He [PMOS] was not pretending today that the fact the army had been deployed in this capacity for the first time since 1994 was not newsworthy. Of course it was&', 10 Downing Street Website - Press Briefing: 10.30a.m. Tuesday 11 February 2003, . [These
references are actually wrong since in 1994 politicians debated about whether to send troops in, but ultimately decided not to] 35 The Daily Mail, Panic stations, February 13 2003. 36 The Daily Mail, Terror alert 'due to an Al Quaeda hoax', February 15 2003. 37 Press Conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush, November 20 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page5004.asp. 15 other. And these attacks have been building for years, they came to their height OK on September 11, but that actually wasn't the first attack that al Qu'eda was perpetrating against America and other countries, and you look round the world today and I tell you in virtually every place there is trouble and difficulty, these terrorists are making it worse, whether it is Kashmir, whether it is Palestine, whether it is Chechnya, wherever it is, and they are prepared to kill anyone, they are prepared to shed any amount of bloodshed, because they know how important this battle is. And here is why Iraq is important in this, because in the end their case, which is based on dividing people, the Arab world and the western world, the Muslim world and the Ch ristian world and other religions, their case is that we are in Iraq to suppress Muslims, steal their oil, to spoil the country. Now we know, you know, that all those things are lies. They know therefore that if we manage to get Iraq on its feet as a stable, prosperous, democratic country, the blow we strike is not just one for the Iraqi people, it is the end of that propaganda and that is why they are fighting us. And when you say is this attack today directed at our alliance, it is directed at anybody who stands in the way of this fanaticism. And that is why our response has got to be to say to them as clearly as we possibly can, you are not going to defeat us because our will to defend what we believe in is actually in the end stronger, better, more determined than your will to inflict damage on an innocent people. Now that is what this whole thing is about. That is why when I hear people talking about the alliance between our two countries, this is not an alliance that is based on simply Britain and America and the ties that go back in history and all the rest of it, this is a real living alliance about the struggle going on today in the early 21st century, and if we don't win this struggle, it is not just Britain and America that is going to suffer, people everywhere are going to suffer, and that is why it is important. And if they think that when they go and kill people by these terrorist attacks they are going to somehow weaken us or make us think well let's shuffle to the back of the queue and hide away from this, they are wrong, that is not the tradition of my country and it is not the tradition of the British people or the American people.'38 The occasion of a joint press conference with the U.S. President also contributes to a coordination of the UK Government's message with its U.S. counterpart which, as the analysis confirms, proves to be very successful in terms of media management, for the purpose of getting official messages reproduced in the media coverage. 38 Press Conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush, November 20 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page5004.asp. 16 The Istanbul Bombings: Improved Communication The fact that the Government elaborates on the broader context in which the threat should be understood, does change the media coverage. The first observation emerging from the comparison of how the media report about the Heathrow alert and the Istanbul bombing is the media's improved understanding of the terrorist threat. The seriousness and reality of the danger are no longer questioned. Media talk confidently about a WOT and seem to be more "familiar" with it. It cannot be excluded that this outcome is due to a long exposure to the issue of terrorism and the WOT over time. In fact the Istanbul bombing takes place nine months after the Heathrow alert, after the Iraq war, a period in which media coverage was saturated by discussions about terrorism, WMD and ways to deal with threats to security. At the end, this must also be considered, the Heathrow airport alert and the Istanbul bombings are two different kinds of event and no full comparison can be established between them. The analysis seems to suggest, however, that when messages are consistent and they "make sense" within a wider explanatory picture they are reported by the media in the same form as they are issued. Also the media do not feel the need to question or challenge them as much as when they are issued in an information vacuum. It could be argued that the lack of criticism could be explained by the increased deference of the media due to the presence of casualties, some of which British citizens. This does not mean, howeve r, that the media do not criticize the Government at all. Media coverage contained many critical pieces, some of them openly challenging Government's policies. Within the criticism, however, the media did not seem to disagree any longer on the sources of the threat or its nature. Such interpretations actually followed the lines traced by the Government's frame. Let's have a look at a few examples illustrating the reproduction of the basic aspects of the Government's frame, even within critical stands: Frame Reproduction Within Criticism The Daily Mail: 'This time, the attack on Britain's consulate and the HSBC bank in Istanbul coincided with President Bush's state visit to this country, thereby achieving the maximum possible impact worldwide. But for what? There is no reason in any of this savagery. This is killing for killing's sake, an insane eruption of hatred and rage not only against America and its allies, but also the principles of Western civilisation itself. And now there are intelligence warnings that an Al Qaeda strike in Britain is inevitable. Tony Blair's response is admirable: 'In the face of this terrorism, there 17 must be no holding back, no compromise, no hesitation in confronting this menace and defeating it utterly'. Indeed. Such resolution clearly shared by Mr Bush is indispensable in the face of a remorseless evil. But it isn't enough by itself. And the bleak truth is that the mistaken policies of Prime Minister and President have made the defeat of terrorism that much more difficult.'39 The Independent: 'The terrorists are vile, and their crimes appalling. Yet there are reasons why they are supported and why they flourish in some parts of the world. The war against terrorism is complex and multi-layered. It will be long, arduous and dangerous. There will be no final, climactic victory, just the hope of halting its progress. That hope would be increased if Bush and Blair displayed a greater insight, and a more subtle vision, of the challenge that faces them.' 40 The Guardian: 'Mr Bush and Mr Blair have made many mistakes since 9/11. There is an urgent need for a radical review of policy. But in the teeth of such terror, there must also be solidarity. Yesterday was Britain's day to mourn, to grieve for our diplomats, our citizens and those many others so cruelly victimised in Istanbul - and grieve we do. But tomorrow, or next week, or next month, if this goes on unchecked, it will be somebody else's awful turn. A candid admission of western failings does not imply submission to barbarity. There is no case for surrender. But there is a very strong case for a more intelligent, less confrontational, combined east-west approach to an intensifying global crisis.'41 These are statements from an article by Jason Burke, expert on Islamic militancy: 'JACK STRAW was right to say last week that increased security can never make us safe against terrorists of the sort we now face. This is a battle of visions, of perceptions, for hearts and minds, as much as a battle of guns, forensic detection and intelligence. Making progress in the latter, which it is possible we are doing, is nothing without progress in the former. There are now fewer terrorist leaders, but more followers. 39 The Daily Mail, Victims of a mindless hate, November 21 2003. 40 The Independent on Sunday, We need subtler vision to defeat the terrorists, November 23 2003. 41 The Guardian, Istanbul bombs: Reaping the whirlwind, November 21 2003. 18 Of course a 'war on terror' requires a military component. But we need to eliminate our enemies without simply creating more. Last week al-Qaeda said that 'the cars of death will not stop'. If we fail to counter their warped world-view then their threat will not be idle.'42 The Mirror: 'JACK Straw looked understandably shocked while touring the rubble of the Istanbul atrocities. But that does not excuse the nonsense the Foreign Secretary talked afterwards. Most ridiculously, he insisted that people believed September 11 happened six months after military action began in Iraq. What people? What circles can Mr Straw possibly move in to think that? The charitable explanation of the Foreign Secretary's words is that he is desperate to support the Bush-Blair approach to the war on terrorism. But that is not the way to win the argument. Not the way to persuade the millions who believe that the attack on Iraq has made things worse. Mr Straw - like President Bush and Tony Blair the previous day - insists that the war on terrorism must be pursued with absolute vigour. We agree. But they also say Iraq is central to it, even though there is not a shred of evidence that al-Qaeda had any presence in that country or contact with Saddam Hussein. A sensible, intelligent debate is essential. From both sides. That means not making wild statements or relying on misinformation. If the Foreign Secretary says the sort of things he did yesterday, those who disagree with the Government's actions will claim it is because he knows he has no valid case. Mr Straw saw for himself the horrors of terrorism. Surely we should be united and honest in finding the best way to deal with it.'43 42 The Observer, Where terror begins, November 23 2003. 43 The Mirror, Jack's case is clutching at straws, November 22 2003. 19 Most of media criticism is focused on the perceived lack of a link between 9/11's terrorism and Iraq. This connection is particularly questioned, among the newspape rs, by the Mirror and on TV coverage. Such disagreement is explained by the fact that, contrarily to what happened in the US, the UK Government justified the war in Iraq by focusing its rhetoric on the danger to security represented by Saddam Hussein's WMD. Repetition of Official Soundbites Another aspect that can be observed is the extensive reporting of several governmental soundbites. The following excerpts, especially the second, were reported by virtually all media sources. They were widely interpreted, together with President Bush's coordinated messages, as an expression of a unity of purposes between the American and British fronts as well as a firm determination by both Administrations to fight against terrorism: 'First of all I would wish to express my deepest sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims, some will be British, many will be Turkish citizens, I would like to express my condolences also to the government and to the people of Turkey. And once again we are reminded of the evil these terrorists pose to innocent people everywhere, and to our way of life, once again we must affirm that in the face of this terrorism, there must be no holding back, no compromise, no hesitation in confronting this menace, in attacking it wherever and whenever we can, and in defeating it utterly.' 'And let me make it absolutely clear for our position as well. We stay until the job gets done. And what this latest terrorist outrage shows us is that this is a war, its main battleground is Iraq. We have got to make sure that we defeat these terrorists - the former Saddam people - in Iraq and we must do that because that is an essential part of defeating this fanaticism and extremism that is killing innocent people all over our world today. And I can assure you of one thing, that when something like this happens today, our response is not to flinch, or give way or concede one inch. We stand absolutely firm until this job is done, done in Iraq, done elsewhere in the world.' 44 44 Press Conference: PM Tony Blair and President George Bush, November 20 2003, -
10.gov.uk/output/Page5004.asp. 20 3.1.4. THE THIRD SPEECH AND THE MADRID BOMBING 45 This speech contributes to further refine the existing narrative by developing the idea of pre-emptive strike as the way for dealing with the current threat from terrorism. The speech received wide TV coverage and was described by Gavin Esler on BBC2's Newsnight as outlining 'almost a "Blair Doctrine"', as 'a statement on what to do about the problems of the world right now and in the future'. 'September 11th was for me a revelation. What had seemed inchoate came together. The point about September 11th was not its detailed planning; not its devilish execution; not even, simply, that it happened in America, on the streets of New York. All of this made it an astonishing, terrible and wicked tragedy, a barbaric murder of innocent people. But what galvanised me was that it was a declaration of war by religious fanatics who were prepared to wage that war without limit. They killed 3000. But if they could have killed 30,000 or 300,000 they would have rejoiced in it. The purpose was to cause such hatred between Moslems and the West that a religious jihad became reality; and the world engulfed by it.' 'Here is the irony. For all the fighting, this threat cannot be defeated by security means alone. Taking strong action is a necessary but insufficient condition for defeating. Its final defeat is only assured by the triumph of the values of the human spirit. Which brings me to the final point. It may well be that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can systematically brutalise and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass graves already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be? We know now, if we didn't before, that our own self interest is ultimately bound up with the fate of other nations. The doctrine of international community is no longer a vision of idealism. It is a practical recognition that just as within a country, citizens who are free, well educated and prosperous tend to be responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in which they have a stake; so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting from economic progress, tend to be stable and solid partners in 45 PM Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat, March 5 2004, .
21 the advance of humankind. The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values. But we cannot advance these values except within a framework that recognises their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs a global response, based on global rules. The essence of a community is common rights and responsibilities. We have obligations in relation to each other. If we are threatened, we have a right to act. And we do not accept in a community that others have a right to oppress and brutalise their people. We value the freedom and dignity of the human race and each individual in it. Containment will not work in the face of the global threat that confronts us. The terrorists have no intention of being contained. The states that proliferate or acquire WMD illegally are doing so precisely to avoid containment. Emphatically I am not saying that every situation leads to military action. But we surely have a duty and a right to prevent the threat materialising; and we surely have a responsibility to act when a nation's people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam's. Otherwise, we are powerless to fight the aggression and injustice which over time puts at risk our security and way of life.' Let's explore more in depth how these changes have practically affected the coverage. The Madrid Bombings: Understanding the Threat What emerges from the analysis of the Madrid case study is, again, a wide reproduction of many elements of the Government's frame, especially the ideas that terrorists are evil, have no sensible aim but to kill innocents and that "we are all targets now". The Guardian 'Cities have become our battlegrounds; where once they were places of safety to which countryfolk retreated in times of war, they are now where the war is conducted. After 3/11 every citizen of a western European city, of Paris, Rome, Berlin or London, nervously enters the packed tube, the busy commuter train or the high-rise office block. Fear could empty the city and cauterise the mass transit systems that are its lifeblood. One is haunted by an image of shut-down tube stations, of empty streets where weeds break up the Tarmac and everyone retreats home to their laptops, and we look back on the conviviality of the era before mass terrorism with nostalgic disbelief. What's at stake is a long history of the city, that exchange point for trade 22 and ideas that has been the crux of all civilisations. The city orders how large numbers of human beings live in close proximity. In so doing, it civilises and turns strangers into citizens who belong to a civil society in which they treat each other with (more or less) civility. All these words have the same Latin root, civitas What the demonstrations in Spain remind us is that civility - the measure of goodwill from one stranger to another - is ultimately what makes a city's spirit. It is the accumulation of tiny, daily interactions with bus conduc tors, fellow commuters, newspaper sellers and coffee-shop waitresses - the humour, the greetings, the gestures of help that smooth the rough edges of urban living.'46 The Daily Mail: 'The sheer scale of the inhumanity which targeted so many Spanish innocents for death demonstrated what we understood on 9/11: that we are up against an enemy of a kind we have not seen before. This is not the IRA-style terrorism with which we are wearily familiar. In Al Qaeda and its associates, we are dealing with a death cult, enemies of life and of humanity itself, who have said: 'We are not fighting for you to offer us something, but to eliminate you.' Indeed, it is vital to grasp that - despite the tape's claims over Iraq and Afghanistan - those who say Madrid was targeted only because Spain supported America are grievously mistaken.' 'Too many people, though, still don't grasp the nature of what we are all up against. Instead, they complain we are no safer than before - which is a bit like blaming the Blitz on the fact that we went to war against Germany. Despite the obvious differences, we are in a war now. It was declared upon us and we must defend ourselves. It is not possible to sit it out on the sidelines. It can and must be won; but that will only happen if we all stand shoulder to shoulder, not just with the people of Spain but those of all countries and all faiths who are now under attack.'47 46 The Guardian, Terror in Madrid: Europeans must tell the United States where Washington is going wrong in its war on terror, March 13 2004. 47 The Daily Mail, We are at war - and it must be won, March 15 2004. 23 The Mirror: 'The war on terrorism is just that - a war. For the terrorists have declared war on us, on the civilised world, on everything that is decent. They don't even have a basic sense of humanity. But that is why they will be beaten. They do appalling things, but we are stronger than them. Not just because we have right on our side but because we are united agains t them.'48 The following example from the same newspaper underlines how the acceptance of the Government's frame can coexist with harsh criticism: '"We will not defeat it [terrorism] by hoping it will leave us alone or by hiding away," said Mr Blair. True. But nor will we defeat it by fighting the wrong battles, for the reasons, in the wrong place against the wrong people with the wrong intelligence. That is what we did in Iraq.'49 The Media and the Government's "Dilemma" The content analysis confirms the understanding by the media not only of the terrorist threat, but also of the problems of dealing with terrorism. The media clearly understand the Government's "dilemma" of "informing, but not alarming the public" and seem to produce a great amount of constructive criticism, especially in the broadsheets. The Times: 'Of course, September 11 did not mark the end of terrorist attacks on military targets around the world. Ask the coalition troops in Iraq. But the twin towers attacks mark a turning point, since when terrorists of many kinds appear to think it legitimate -and fruitful -to attack civilians. That presents governments with new problems. They have the practical problem of trying to protect their citizens from the kind of attack that is almost impossible to prevent. They have legal problems of balancing pursuit of terrorists with civil liberties. And they have a political dilemma -which President Bush has conspicuously not solved -of whether it is in their interests to inflame people's fears that they are living in an era of great danger.' [&] 48 The Mirror, These vile killers must not prevail, March 13 2004. 49 The Sunday Mirror, Time to target the real enemy, March 14 2004. 24 'So governments will, no doubt, deploy a mixture of the techniques that have become familiar since September 11. There will be a few, scattered, precise warnings or interventions, such as flights from London to Washington or Riyadh suspended. Then there will be generalised exhortations to be alert, because of a heightened but unspecified -security risk. However, that last tactic is a dangerous political tool. If people are not told what they can do to avoid the threat, or what the government is doing, they may well resent being frightened. As Bush's soaring poll ratings showed after September 11, people are willing to give political leaders credit for rushing to defend them. But if, down the road, they fail to feel safer, they may hold against those leaders any new cause to feel afraid.'50 Another example from the same newspaper: 'Madrid has confirmed, yet again, that terrorism is the enemy of democracy and all that we stand for. It is a thre |
EXHIBITS Final%20Report.pdf  |