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From victory to success: afterwar policy in Iraq by numerous authors 
From victory to success: afterwar policy in Iraq.(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Foreign Policy, July-August, 2003, by Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Minxin Pei, Anatol Lieven, Marina S. Ottaway, Edward C. Chow, Thomas Carothers, Husain Haqqani, Daniel Brumberg, George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Vincent Cannistraro, Robert Kagan The fog of war in Iraq is gone, only to be replaced, it seems, by the fog of afterwar. Questions sprout like weeds in the rubble of Saddam Hussein's palaces. Did the war stoke or help curb terrorism? What message did Saddam's fall send to other dictators? Will it help the world reach a new consensus on how to handle weapons of mass destruction? What is the best way to rebuild Iraq? How can the United States recover its legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world? The answers to such questions will help determine history's verdict on the wisdom of the war and shape the future for decades to come. In this special report, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, working with FOREIGN POLICY, seeks to address some of the afterwar's most pressing issues and to offer a framework for turning victory into success. The oldest international affairs think tank in the United States, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a nonpartisan policy research institute. Founded in 1910, the endowment develops new ideas and strategies to shape practical, forward-looking policies on the major debates of the day. From globalization and free trade to weapons of mass destruction and the war against terrorism, our goal is to shape today's policy debates and promote America's engagement in the world. In Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and throughout the world, our independent research projects work with key global players to build consensus, shape decisions, and influence policies. As part of our mission, we have published the award-winning FOREIGN POLICY magazine for more than 30 years. For more about our work, visit and sign up for Carnegie e-News, a biweekly resource with analysis, news, and events on today's headlines and issues over the horizon.
RELATED ARTICLE: NOW FOR THE HARD PART BY JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS After months of Iraq dominating the news, why should you care about the war's aftermath, now that the drama of armed conflict has ended? Because, without diminishing the brilliance of the military campaign, the easier phase is over. The part that the United States is less good at, less practiced in, and less politically ready for is still to come. This more difficult phase will determine whether Americans, and the world, will look back on the Iraq war as not just a victory but a success. Iraq clearly proves again, hard on the heels of Afghanistan, that the United States chronically underestimates the difficulties of nonmilitary aspects of foreign interventions and wildly inflates nonmilitary goals without committing the resources required to achieve them. Military planning for the Iraq war took more than a year and reached a level of detail down to the location of windows on targeted buildings. The postwar plan was altogether different. It largely ignored not just details but major aspects of Iraq's political landscape and well-established lessons of prior foreign interventions, like the overriding need to quickly establish an effective policing force. The U.S. plan assumed that Iraq's government could be removed with minimal disruption to the country's ability to function and that the United States would be welcomed with open arms. Best-case planning is bad enough; this plan was heavily weighted with wishful thinking. The difference in how seriously the United States addressed the war and the postwar can be found in the priority assigned to the exercise of force versus that given to other instruments of power and influence, from intelligence to diplomacy to patient economic assistance. It is to be found in the 16 to 1 difference between the peacetime budgets for the Pentagon and for all of foreign operations. Only on the nonmilitary side does the United States indulge in goals, means, and public commitment that bear no relation to one another. This gap has widened during the past quarter century, under both political parties, to a point where it severely strains U.S. capabilities. The afterwar in Iraq will be a decisive test of whether this trend will be reversed, or whether, like Afghanistan in the 1980s, the intervention in Iraq will be a military victory followed by a costly political defeat. The stakes are particularly high in Iraq because, if history is any guide, occupation and reconstruction will shape U.S. relations with the Arab world--and perhaps the whole Muslim world--for decades, just as prior military occupations profoundly altered relations with Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Asia. The presence of U.S. troops in Iraq may be a historical first for the region, but the United States is not writing history on a blank slate. Each side is ignorant of the other, and there is deep mutual suspicion, colored by the region's bitter, recent experience of colonial rule and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Achieving a positive outcome requires every ounce of wisdom, patience, and realism the United States can bring to bear. Following the progress of the war was easy: Troops advanced, targets were destroyed, and cities were taken. But keeping track of the aftermath--phase two of the war--is harder and, over the long term, more important. This special report, produced jointly by FOREIGN POLICY and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is an expert guide to these crucial issues that will be illuminating reading now and a valuable reference for months to come. Jessica Tuchman Mathews is president of the Carnegie Endowment. LESSONS OF THE PAST BY MINXIN PEI Nation building--the restructuring of the governing institutions in foreign societies--is probably the most complex, costly, and, ultimately, frustrating foreign policy undertaking. Even for great powers endowed with unsurpassed military strength and wealth, most attempts to rebuild other nations in their own image have historically ended in disappointment, if not outright failure. To make nation building work in Iraq, the United States must first and foremost recall its own experiences in other countries. Such a historical examination would show that a key aspect of nation-building failures has been a unilateral approach. According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States has conducted more than 200 military interventions abroad since its founding. Sixteen of these interventions, or about 8 percent, can be categorized as nation-building attempts. These missions have three characteristics. First, their practical goal was to achieve regime change or the survival of a regime that would have otherwise collapsed. (As in Iraq, creating or restoring democracy was not the original mission objective. Rather, core U.S. security and economic interests were the principal drivers of U.S. interventions.) Second, American nation-building efforts typically required that a large number of ground troops be deployed to provide security and basic services. Third, U.S. military and civilian personnel were active in post-conflict political administration. Such deep U.S. involvement in the political life of the target nations allowed Washington to select friendly leaders, influence policy, and restructure institutions. If we judge these nation-building attempts by whether they created durable democratic regimes after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the results are sobering. Of the 16 attempts (see facing page), only four (Japan, Germany, Panama in 1989, and Grenada in 1983) qualify as successes. In these four countries, democracy, as measured by the widely used Polity democracy index maintained at the University of Maryland, was sustained 10 years after U.S. troops left. In the other 11 countries (excluding Afghanistan), democracy failed to emerge or endure during the same time frame. Worse, in the countries where U.S. nation-building efforts foundered, brutal dictatorships and corrupt, autocratic regimes gained power after the U.S. exit. This record implies a success rate of 26 percent (four out of 15 attempts). The factors contributing to failed nation-building efforts are complex, and some of them, such as socioeconomic characteristics and governing capacities in target nations, are beyond U.S. control. Yet one factor is not: U.S. decisions to "go it alone." It appears that unilateral efforts are more likely to cause nation building to fail. Of the 16 cases included in this analysis, 12 were unilateral attempts. Of these, 10 failed. The key variable in failed unilateral nation-building attempts seems to be the type of interim administration deployed immediately following military intervention. Of the 16 cases, seven saw interim rule by U.S.-supported surrogate regimes-governments that were almost totally dependent on Washington. The United States picked, or deemed acceptable, the individuals who headed these regimes, and their survival usually hinged on U.S. military and economic support. Such surrogate governments might have served short-term American interests, but the regimes never developed democratic institutions. In the 10 years following U.S. troop withdrawals, none of the target countries ruled by such governments had made the transition to democracy. One possible explanation is that, in building these interim regimes, the United States facilitated the rise of the target country's military, an institution indispensable to restoring security and order. Later, strongmen seized the military to advance their personal ambitions. Another explanation is that these surrogate governments, lacking indigenous legitimacy, could survive only through repression after U.S. forces departed. Another mode of nation building, direct U.S. administration, has a mixed record. This approach failed in Cuba (1898-1902 and 1906-1909) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) but worked in Japan (1945-1952). The ideal form of political transition in nation building appears to be the quick transfer of power to legitimately elected local leaders, as happened in Grenada and Panama. But this approach assumes a functioning electoral system and the existence of credible, moderate local leaders who have genuine indigenous political support. In the case of Iraq, a fully open electoral process is very likely to elevate radical religious leaders to power because they have extensive organizational networks and broad popular support. In other Muslim societies, such as Algeria, early efforts to introduce democracy have led to the rise of extremist Islamic parties and brutal civil conflict. None of these three modes of interim administration seems suited to the complex, uncertain conditions in Iraq. To calm Arab fears of U.S. neoimperialism, Washington has promised to end direct U.S. administration as soon as possible. But a speedy transition to full democracy will likely produce political instability that will harm U.S. interests and decrease the long-term viability of democracy in Iraq. Establishing a pro-American surrogate regime, however, might serve Washington's short-term needs but will most likely hinder the emergence of democracy, as demonstrated by the historical record of similar regimes. There is another option: multilateralism. This approach has been tried in four of the 16 cases of U.S. nation building. Of these four cases, two (Haiti in 1994 and Afghanistan in 2001) were authorized by the United Nations, one (Germany after World War II) was undertaken with allies, and one (Japan after World War II) was multilateral in form although unilateral on the ground. Certainly, a multilateral approach does not always succeed, as the current political crisis in Haiti demonstrates. Afghanistan remains a work in progress. Still, multilateralism in nation building has great benefits. U.N.-sanctioned nation building garners more international legitimacy than attempts by a lone intervener. In addition, multilateralism helps distribute the costs--in money and manpower--more widely. Most important, multilateralism provides an insurance policy against the huge risks of failure for the image and interests of countries such as the United States. The poor record of past unilateral nation building leaves a U.N.-led approach as the least risky alternative. In addition to bringing legitimacy, experience in managing post-conflict societies, and economic and military contributions from its members, a U.N.-led interim administration of Iraq will help discredit popular conspiracy theories deriding Washington's intentions toward Iraq. Since the Bush administration has publicly disavowed an intent to establish long-term military bases in Iraq or to take advantage of its vast oil resources, having the United Nations as the lead partner would give the administration instant credibility. A U.N.-led effort by no means guarantees success. Multilateralism has its limitations, such as poor coordination and burdensome bureaucracy. Yet history suggests that multilateralism manages risk, while unilateralism invites it. The Bush administration has been undaunted by risk, arguing that no country has ever been as powerful as the United States is today. But in the case of nation building, will that power allow the United States to transcend the lessons of history? If At First You Don't Succeed: U.S. Nation-Building, 1898-2003 Multilateral or Target Country Population Years Unilateral Afghanistan 26.8 million 2001-present Multilateral Haiti 7 million 1994-1996 Multilateral Panama 2.3 million 1989 Unilateral Grenada 92,000 1983 Unilateral Cambodia 7 million 1970-73 Unilateral South Vietnam 19 million 1964-73 Unilateral Dominican Republic 3.8 million 1965-66 Unilateral Japan 72 million 1945-52 Both * West Germany 46 million 1945-49 Multilateral Dominican Republic 895,000 1916-24 Unilateral Cuba 2.8 million 1917-22 Unilateral Haiti 2 million 1915-34 Unilateral Nicaragua 620,000 1909-33 Unilateral Cuba 2 million 1906-09 Unilateral Panama 450,000 1903-36 Unilateral Cuba 1.6 million 1898-1902 Unilateral Interim Democracy Target Country Administration After 10 Years? Afghanistan U.N. Administration N/A Haiti Local Administration No Panama Local Administration Yes Grenada Local Administration No Cambodia Local Administration Yes South Vietnam U.S. Surrogate Regime No Dominican Republic U.S. Surrogate Regime No Japan U.S. Direct Administration Yes West Germany Multilateral Administration Yes Dominican Republic U.S. Direct Administration No Cuba U.S. Surrogate Regime No Haiti U.S. Surrogate Regime No Nicaragua U.S. Surrogate Regime No Cuba U.S. Direct Administration No Panama U.S. Surrogate Regime No Cuba U.S. Direct Administration No * The United States won the war as part of the Allied victory over Japan but assumed exclusive occupation authority in Japan after the war. KEEP YOUR EYES ON How long the United States stays in Iraq and whether it allows the United Nations and other countries to take part WHAT TO EXPECT If the United States insists on going it alone, history suggests it will fail. Minxin Pei is the author of From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Don't Forget Afghanistan Anatol Lieven Developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban was overthrown in autumn 2001 reveal the gap between Western rhetoric supporting democratization and development in Muslim societies and the actual commitment that Western countries are prepared to make. Afghanistan also puts the widespread portrayals of societies thirsting for Western democracy in sharp contrast with the reality of local political structures and traditions. Afghanistan cannot be developed by its existing weak and deeply divided government-an administration only in name- or by current Western approaches to aid, which depend on working through that' government. Yet if the country is not to sink back into the conditions that produced the Taliban and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan must see real development. Since it is out of the question for the United States and its allies, to occupy and administer Afghanistan' themselves, the West must develop a strategy based on working with, and nor against, regional forces. Eighteen months after the Taliban fell, the overwhelming majority of the population has yet to see signs of economic reconstruction. The Taliban remains active in much of southern Afghanistan and has recently intensified attacks on U.S. troops and Western aid workers. The current timetable calls for national elections in 2004, followed by the establishment of an elected government and a withdrawal of both U.S. troops, and international peacekeepers. This plan looks doubtful if not delusional. For valid reasons of speed, geography, regional politics, and safety, the Bush administration chose to conquer Afghanistan not with U.S. troops but with those of local anti-Taliban forces backed by U.S. airpower. The continuing U.S. hunt for the Taliban and al Qaeda also depends heavily on local Afghan allies, subsidized and armed by the United States. As a result, power in Afghanistan's regions has fallen into the hands of a variety of warlords and armed ethnic and tribal militias. In Kabul, a dominant political position was seized by Panjshiri Tajik forces belonging to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which retains a tight grip on the command of the so-called National Army and police. This action makes it even less likely that non-Tajik ethnic groups will agree to the deployment of central stare forces in their regions. Meanwhile, the U.N. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains restricted to Kabul. ISAF plays a critical role in preventing conflict between the different elements in the unstable interim administration of figurehead President Hamid Karzai, but without an enormous increase of force, peacekeepers cannot extend this tenuous stability to the rest of Afghanistan. In these circumstances, rapidly extending the current central government's military and administrative powers looks hopeless. In the medium term at least, Western development strategy should instead concentrate on two areas: helping the Kabul government establish health and education facilities, which do not directly threaten regional rulers, and using the U.S. military to repair infrastructure, beginning with roads. A start has been made on the latter with the establishment of three provincial reconstruction reams under U.S. military leadership, but these teams should be greatly enhanced and extended. And they won't succeed without payoffs to local warlords. But if the alternative is to wait until Afghanistan possesses a real nationwide administration, then reconstruction will be delayed indefinitely-and only the Taliban and al Qaeda will benefit. Anatol Lieven, a former correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan for the Times (London), is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. ONE COUNTRY, TWO PLANS BY MARINA S. OTTAWAY The United States cannot turn to a ready-made model of occupation and reconstruction in postwar Iraq because none fits the country's condition. Turning Iraq into a politically and economically stable nation is as complex a task as planning for war. U.S. military superiority, which made success of the war a foregone conclusion, does not ensure successful reconstruction. Making an intrinsically difficult task even more complex, the United States is currently guided by two conflicting models of political reconstruction, each subject to a different logic and different imperatives. Under the first, the United States would help Iraq create a decentralized, participatory democracy; under the second, the United States would swiftly give control to an interim Iraqi government. Iraq has all the characteristics that have impeded democratic transitions elsewhere: a large, impoverished population deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines; no previous experience with democracy; and a track record of maintaining stability only under the grip of a strongly autocratic government. The United States enjoys no clear advantage in trying to develop a new political system for Iraq. It has no historical ties to the country and little understanding of Iraqi culture and society. Many Iraqis resent the United States as an occupying power. And the factor that made the war so successful--reliance on a relatively small, mobile force whose strength lay in technological superiority rather than manpower--is a serious liability to reconstruction. Stabilizing a country requires a large, visible presence on the ground, not sophisticated weapons. Before the war, when U.S. President George W Bush was trying to win domestic and international support for intervention, his administration committed itself to the democratic reconstruction of fraq and the region. "America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq," declared Bush in February 2003. In the following weeks, administration officials outlined how they intended to achieve that goal. The plans presented during this period exuded confidence that the United States had the capacity not only to replace Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime but to alter the character of the state and the very social fabric of Iraq. Under U.S. military occupation, U.S. officials and contractors would vet the Iraqi civil service. They would exclude hard-line members of the regime and the Baath party and rehabilitate those not overly tainted by association with the former government. The United States would also create and train a Baath-free military and police force. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is charged with implementing reconstruction, outlined an extraordinarily ambitious program in its "Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq." U.S. contractors would oversee the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure and government services, restoring health services to 25 percent of the population in 60 days and to 50 percent (but to 100 percent of women and children) in six months; they would implement a new educational curriculum for the schools within a year; and they would restore the country's roads and electrical grids with equal speed. The plans for political reconstruction were even more remarkable. U SAID stated that "the national government will be limited to essential national functions, such as defense and security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, foreign affairs, and strategic interests such as oil and gas." Local government would be responsible for everything else and would be "required to operate in an open, transparent, and accountable matter." Citizens would participate in planning the future of their communities and would control the civil administration through elected local assemblies. At a sweep of the U.S. pen, Iraq would turn from a centralized, hierarchical country into a model of participatory democracy. But this vision for Iraq was completely uninformed by the situation on the ground. As soon as U.S. and British troops entered Iraqi cities, it became clear that the coalition did not have complete control and could only establish it with a much larger U.S. presence and the use of repression. Initial conditions could not be ignored. With resentment toward the occupation mounting even before the war ended, the United States could either stick to the original reconstruction plan and pacify the country by force or take a new approach. Unwilling to increase the size of the occupation force, the U.S. government opted for a new policy. Within days of the first rumblings of opposition to the U.S. presence, Bush administration officials began discussing a short, light-handed occupation and the swift transfer of power to an Iraqi interim authority (as if that was what they had envisaged all along). Forgetting the detailed plans for a decentralized, participatory system, U.S. officials declared that the United States would not impose a particular political order on Iraq. Quietly, however, the original, highly interventionist plans for political reconstruction proceeded. In mid-April, USAID awarded the Research Triangle Institute, a North Carolina contractor that often implements USAID projects, a $7.9 million contract, expected to grow to as much as $167.9 million over 12 months, to strengthen "management skills and capacity of local administrations and civic institutions to improve delivery of essential municipal services such as water, health, public sanitation and economic governance; includes training programs in communications, conflict resolution, leadership skills and political analysis." Huge by the standards of political reconstruction programs, such a contract shows that the administration has not abandoned the technocratic project of remaking Iraq into a decentralized, participatory system--despite the United States' lack of full control. Also in early April, USAID issued an invitation to contractors to bid on a 12-month, $70 million Iraq Community Action Program, which "will create community committees responsible for identifying and prioritizing community needs, mobilizing community and other resources, and monitoring project implementation." This agenda is not the program of a light-handed occupation. Thus, consciously or not, the United States is simultaneously applying two contradictory reconstruction policies in Iraq. Each has a separate logic and coherence, but combining the two renders both illogical and incoherent. Where the United States has little control, invasive projects of social and political transformation cannot succeed. U.S. contractors cannot channel political participation through the new structures they are supposed to create unless there is an occupying force large enough to curb the influence of religious and tribal leaders. Hoping that a light occupation and a quick transfer of power will result in the democracy the United States promised the world is either deeply cynical or excessively optimistic. Hiding a heavy-handed American occupation behind the facade of a quickly formed Iraqi interim authority could theoretically reconcile the two approaches. Yet Iraqis are likely to notice the strings and turn on both the puppets and the puppeteer. In the coming months, developments on the ground will reveal whether, after some initial confusion, the Bush administration is making a serious attempt to turn Iraq into a more democratic country, rather than simply one friendly to the United States. One strong indicator will be whether the military finally takes responsibility for establishing and maintaining law and order in the country, thus giving civilian administrators, U.S. contractors, and Iraqi citizens a chance to undertake the physical and political reconstruction process. If the United States insists that what is left of the Iraqi police can and must do the lob, it does not matter whether a civilian or a military administrator is in charge of Iraq, or how many contracts USAID signs. The reconstruction of Iraq will de facto be undertaken, as in many other countries, by the strong and the ruthless. A Moving Target: The Cost of Iraq's Reconstruction Source of Estimate Annual Cost The Bush Administration $3.5 billion for Iraqi relief and "Supporting Our Troops Abroad and reconstruction Increasing Safety at Home" (White House Office of the Press Secretary, March 25, 2003) Center for Strategic and $6.2 billion to $7.9 billion over International Studies two years for security and police "A Wiser Peace: An Action forces, transitional Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq" administration, national dialogue (Washington: Center for Strategic process, justice team, debt and International Studies, 2003) restructuring, and employment and education programs * Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Between $1 billion and $4 billion "An Analysis of the President's per month for occupation. The Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year CBO has provided no estimates of 2004" (Washington: Congressional reconstruction costs. Budget Office, 2003) United Nations Development At least $30 billion over the first Programme three years "U.N. Estimates Rebuilding Iraq Will Cost $30 Billion" (New York Times, January 31, 2003) Council on Foreign Relations $20 billion a year for "Iraq: The Day After" (New York: reconstruction, humanitarian Council on Foreign Relations, aid, and post-conflict peace 2003) stabilization American Academy of Arts and A "Marshall Plan" for Iraq would Sciences Committee on International cost $75 billion over six years. Security Studies War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Committee on International Security Studies, 2002) Center for Strategic and Budgetary $20.6 billion to $118.6 billion Assessments over the next five years for "Potential Cost of a War With Iraq occupation force, humanitarian and Its Post-War Occupation" aid, governance training, (Washington: Center for Strategic reconstruction and recovery, and and Budgetary Assessments, 2003) debt relief Source of Estimate Total Cost The Bush Administration N/A "Supporting Our Troops Abroad and Increasing Safety at Home" (White House Office of the Press Secretary, March 25, 2003) Center for Strategic and $6.2 billion to International Studies $7.9 billion * "A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq" (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003) Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Unknown "An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004" (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 2003) United Nations Development At least $30 billion Programme "U.N. Estimates Rebuilding Iraq Will Cost $30 Billion" (New York Times, January 31, 2003) Council on Foreign Relations Unknown "Iraq: The Day After" (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003) American Academy of Arts and $31 billion Sciences Committee on International to Security Studies $115 billion War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Committee on International Security Studies, 2002) Center for Strategic and Budgetary $103 billion Assessments to "Potential Cost of a War With Iraq $593 billion and Its Post-War Occupation" (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003) * This is a recommendation, not a projection For links to these documents, please vist .
KEEP YOUR EYES ON Whether U.S. and British forces can establish firm control across the country WHAT TO EXPECT Confusion, clashing plans and unrealistic goals behind the facade of an Iraqi interim authority Marina Ottaway is the author of Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2003) and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Why Oil Won't Be a Quick Fix By Edward C. Chow This time it's not colonialism or avaricious dictatorship. This time, Iraq's oil income will benefit the Iraqi people. So promise U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. How will the Iraqi people and outside observers know if this promise is being upheld? To avoid bribe-borne or crony-cooked deals and unfair pricing, the new oil policy in Iraq must foster transparency and maximum international competition. The initial goal is to return Iraq's production to at least 2 million barrels a day. To do so requires repair and safe restart of production, refining, distribution, and export facilities. It should take a year or so. To the extent that American taxpayers pay for this immediate work, it deserves to be performed primarily by American oil service contractors. However, 2 million barrels a day, earning around $15 billion annually, will not yield a financial surplus to Iraq. These figures are far below the uninformed and wildly inflated prewar estimates used to justify the argument that Iraqi oil would magically pay for the costs of the country's reconstruction. Much of this $15 billion must be reinvested in the oil fields to modernize and upgrade facilities damaged by two decades of war and economic sanctions. All told, reviving and sustaining a capacity of 2 million to 3 million barrels a day will require an investment of perhaps $30 billion to $40 billion. The longer term goal is more challenging--to reach and sustain production of 5 million barrels per day (or more). Iraq has the second-largest known reserves in the world--over a hundred billion barrels of oil. But to raise production Iraq must not only revitalize existing fields and associated facilities but also explore and develop new fields and construct new installations for processing and export. Such risky megaprojects can easily cost tens of billion dollars each. If these large projects have to wait to be funded by existing oil income, they will be delayed for many years. A more timely solution is to invite international oil companies to invest in exploration and production, particularly of new fields. Such a role is entirely legitimate for the international oil industry and capital markets: to take on the risk of investment for an equity rate of return so that public funds do not have to be expended for the development of natural resources. However, such investment won't be forthcoming, or at beneficial rates to Iraqis, until Iraq's political system is stable enough to give investors confidence that future tumult will not cancel their contracts or otherwise harm them. The location of Iraq's major oil fields primarily in the traditionally Kurdish north and the largely Shia south highlights both the challenge of ensuring political stability and of devising equitable distribution of oil income in Iraq's diverse society. The rush to bring new oil production on line must not prompt outsiders such as the U.S. government and contractors, or Iraqi elites, to make fundamental decisions, including on privatization, before the larger political structure is stabilized. Better to let the Iraqi political process mature and market forces work than to rush to create an inviting but unstable investment climate for oil in Iraq. World-class petroleum contracts of the scale called for in Iraq take years to conclude. Witness recent experiences in highly sensitive political environments such as Russia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. More than a decade after Kuwait reopened itself to international investment in energy sector development, it has yet to reach a single agreement with foreign businesses on major contracts. Even if the contract process in Iraq is handled in an orderly, businesslike manner, it will be more than five years before substantial increases in Iraq's oil production can start flowing from new investments. Such investments could help bring oil production capacity in Iraq to 5 million or 6 million barrels per day in 10 years. Other major producing countries, especially those in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Persian Gulf, will respond to avoid losing so much market share to Iraq. These major oil producers have under-invested in production capacity by mismanaging their oil income and by continuing to exclude oil companies from operating in their countries on equitable terms. The right Iraqi model would then spawn wider benefits, but only if it is developed through an open domestic political process and not as a result of external pressures. Edward C. Chow, a former executive at the Chevron Corporation, is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment. WHY DICTATORS AREN'T DOMINOES BY THOMAS CAROTHERS Having successfully driven Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power, President George W Bush and his top advisors appear to hope that the threat of regime change may also dislodge hostile Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean regimes that support terrorism or are otherwise inimical to U.S. security interests. The decisive U.S. military action in Iraq may well intimidate some unfriendly tyrants and induce them to modify some of their adverse policies. So much the better. However, the example of Iraq is unlikely to produce sudden regime change in the Middle East or elsewhere, even when combined with new, menacing noises from top U.S. officials. The experience of recent decades shows that while the direct application of military force can certainly oust defiant dictators, military threats and bluster almost never do. While rapid regime change seemingly offers a quick fix for knotty problems, the U. S. government will still need to pursue sustained diplomatic solutions to its security problems, as well as to pursue a broad range of nuanced, nonmilitary efforts to empower the domestic opponents of hostile dictators over the longer term. In the late 1980s, President George H.W. Bush tried all sorts of measures--military pressure, attempted coups, and harsh economic sanctions--to get rid of Panama's sordid strongman, Gen. Manuel Noriega. It took military intervention to drive Noriega out. Former President Bill Clinton labored mightily in the early 1990s to pressure Haiti's ruling generals to allow deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to take back the presidential reins. Yet the generals resisted increasingly pointed military threats and agreed to leave Haiti only when they were sure that the warplanes spearheading a U.S. military intervention were actually in the air. Afghanistan's Taliban rulers rejected efforts by third parties in September and October 2001 to persuade them to cede power despite a highly credible U.S. threat of imminent force. Saddam rebuffed similar entreaties earlier this year, even when President Bush's readiness to act militarily was crystal clear. Dictators cling to power, even in the face of a threatened outside military intervention. For them, stepping down is not just a political concession, it represents total defeat--the loss of a lifetime's accumulation of power and wealth, as well as the complete deflation of what is often a megalomaniacal sense of pride and self-importance. Giving in to anything less then complete military defeat becomes unthinkable. Closed off from reality and surrounded by sycophants, such leaders frequently engage in self-delusional fantasies--that the intervention will not really occur, that some third force will halt the standoff before it runs to its logical conclusion, or that their own military forces will somehow deter the enemy. Moreover, external military threats often strengthen dictators' hold. They inflate autocrats with a renewed sense of purpose and determination. The specter of foreign takeover allows swaggering strongmen to play the nationalist card at home and claim the mantle of heroic defender of the nation's honor and territorial integrity. In the intensifying state of siege, they can smear domestic opponents as pawns of sinister foreign aggressors and distract public attention from the failings of their own rule. Likewise, neighbors of an autocrat deposed by external military action will not necessarily face emboldened challengers at home. "Domino democratization" has sometimes occurred, such as in Eastern Europe in 1989 or in Latin America across the 1980s. But the power of example in those cases was that of citizens mobilizing to overthrow their own repressive rulers, not outside intervention. U.S. military actions against foreign strongmen are unquestionably powerful events that resonate loudly on the international stage. But none of the interventions of the past two decades--whether in Grenada, Panama, Haiti, or Afghanistan-has produced democratic waves in neighboring countries. Dictators do not last forever. They are not immune to pressure. And efforts by external powers to foster democratic change in dictatorial settings are not fruitless. But it is crucial to realize that dictators usually fall when they are pushed out by their own people. Short of outright invasion, outside attempts to advance regime change are most effective when they strengthen internal dissenters and democrats rather than stand in for them. When strongmen allow some limited political space, the United States and other countries seeking to promote democratic change can usefully support those forces within the society that oppose the regime-- usually a mix of opposition political groups, civic actors, unions, and independent media. External support to such groups has played or is playing a helpful role in many cases: in Indonesia before President Suharto's fall, in Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, and in Belarus today under Aleksandr Lukashenko. When an authoritarian leader gambles on elections to legitimate his rule, then outside aid to help make the elections as free and fair as possible can be valuable, as in the 1988 Chilean plebiscite on Augusto Pinochet's continued rule or last December's Kenyan elections, in which former President Daniel arap Moi's handpicked successor was defeated. Where dictators allow no or next-to-no political space, the ability of outside groups to encourage change is much more limited. Typical measures include beaming in television and radio news from outside the country's borders, supporting pro-democratic exile groups, and imposing economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure. But as demonstrated by the long-term survival of dictators such as Cuba's Fidel Castro, Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the Burmese generals, the impact of such measures is often regrettably limited. The United States can and should vigorously pressure noxious dictators and support their opponents. Yet Americans should be careful not to pin too much hope on the power of military threats and bluster to dislodge dictators, despite the example of Iraq. And more U.S. military interventions in the Middle East or elsewhere will come only at a very high cost economically, diplomatically, and possibly militarily. For all the United States' military might, history suggests it will also be necessary to keep engaging in the messy, slow business of constructing diplomatic, and usually multilateral, approaches to dealing with hostile dictatorships and other troublesome regimes. KEEP YOUR EYES ON U.S. approaches toward Syria, North Korea, and Iran WHAT TO EXPECT Saddam's fate wont inspire other dictators to retire. Thomas Carothers is the author of Aiding Democracy Abroad (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1999) and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. ISLAM'S WEAKENED MODERATES BY HUSAIN HAQQANI While optimists could still be proved correct and the removal of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein could strengthen moderating elements in the Islamic world, early trends indicate that the war has wounded the cause of moderation. During the war, images of destruction of the historic capital of Islam's caliphs, Baghdad, were beamed into Muslim homes by a vibrant and increasingly independent Arab media. For hours on end, viewers saw the suffering of their fellow Muslims pounded by an all-powerful United States. The looting that followed was seen as the result of the occupying army's disregard for the security of the Iraqi people. The burning down of the Iraqi religious affairs ministry that housed the oldest extant copies of the Muslim holy book, the Koran, strengthened the argument of anti-American clerics that the United States does not respect Muslim concerns. Almost nobody in the Muslim world noted that the looters were fellow Muslim Iraqis and not American or British soldiers. The war in Iraq has definitely increased the number of radical Muslims believing in the inevitability of a clash of civilizations and the need to stand up and be counted for their religious fellowship. Radical Islamists have started building the argument that the United States offers nothing by way of ethical ideas and has become arrogant as a result of its military dominance. This argument finds even greater resonance in the context of the Iraq war. What is new following the collapse of Iraq's secular Arab nationalist regime is a process of cooperation and convergence between radical Islamists and secular nationalists in the Middle East. Traditionally, secular Arab nationalism viewed radical Islam, with its emphasis on pan-Islamism, as an ideological rival. But the Iraq war has muted that rivalry and, in the process, accentuated the polarization between a Muslim "us" and a Western "them." The convergence of secular and fundamentalist Muslim radicals could provide new sanctuaries to radical Islamists while creating operational links between ideologically opposed terrorist groups. It could also pave the way for admission of secular enemies of the United States into groups that operate through their network of mosques and seminaries. More secular recruits would enable radical Islamist networks to overcome their relative lack of knowledge of Western societies, strengthening their operational capabilities. U.S. promises of building an Iraqi democracy and making a new beginning in the Middle East have not been taken seriously by an overwhelming majority in the Arab Islamic world. In polls in several Arab countries, a majority of respondents now say they are unlikely to change their view of the United States even if it helps to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Few people in the Muslim world liked Saddam. But the Muslim world saw the war largely as an effort to occupy Iraq, not one to liberate it. Muslim disappointment and anger toward the U.S. government has been growing for some time, not least due to perceptions that the United States is one-sided in its supposedly mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The problem is getting worse. Televised images of blindfolded prisoners in chains on Guantanamo and post-September 11 violations of civil liberties of ordinary Muslims in the United States have contributed to Muslim anti-Americanism. Rightly or wrongly, many Muslims feel that the United States manipulated and falsified evidence and argument to go to war against Iraq but would have deemed a Muslim state a dangerous rogue if it did the same thing. In Muslim eyes, it is as if Washington is stooping to the same level as its declared enemies. None of these negative developments may be significant in the long run if Iraqi reconstruction works out according to plan, a workable deal materializes between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and no new wars are fought to root out radical Islamic terrorists. As optimists note, anti-Americanism has spiked and fallen before in the Muslim world. Some U.S. neo-conservatives, in particular, insist that the Arab-Islamic world has never been receptive to Western idealism, but fears and respects force. If this assertion is true, the decisive military victory in Iraq will soon quash agitation in the Muslim Street. But an empire built on force and without support or admiration of its subjects remains vulnerable to the kind of threat represented by terrorist movements. The American public has traditionally shown little appetite for empire or for protracted conflict. Moreover, Israel's experience in the West Bank and Gaza, and Russia's in Chechnya, disproves the theory that overwhelming force can temper the fervor of radical Muslims. For obvious reasons the United States wants to bolster popular Muslim moderates and marginalize radicals. And there is a long tradition of Muslim leaders looking up to the West. Musrafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, told a peasant who asked him what westernization meant: "It means being a better human being." Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah cited the Englishman's sense of justice and fair play as the value that binds Muslims with Westerners and sought to emulate U.S. conduct toward Canada in his country's foreign policy. Even the religiously conservative founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdel Aziz, chose to ally himself with the United States because he found God-fearing Americans better than godless communists. But finding today's Ataturks or Jinnahs is not so easy. And moderates who appeal to the West may fail to win enough hearts and minds at home. Until now the United States has defined Muslim leaders furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives as "moderates." It should now widen that definition to include those able to win democratic support at home by focusing on their people's problems. KEEP YOUR EYES ON The recruiting of secular extremists into fundamental terror groups WHAT TO EXPECT A hard road for Muslim moderates who seek to promote democracy at home while cooperating with the United States The Ripple Effect: Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia The war in Iraq was intended, partly, to reshape the Arab world. But three non-Arab Muslim countries could be most affected by the success or failure of U.S.-led reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Turkey: An overwhelming 90 percent of Turks opposed the Iraq war. Islamic solidarity was one reason. But Turkey was particularly alarmed by the prospect that Iraq's disintegration would lead to demands by its own Kurdish population for an independent or autonomous Kurdistan. The slightest sign of Kurdish autonomy or independence could provoke Turkish military action. Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will also have to watch for a resurgence of Islamic sentiment within its own rank and file. Although the party has Islamic roots, it has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to Turkey's secular constitution and to the alliance with the United States. A perceived U.S. failure in rebuilding Iraq, or Islamist-led unrest in Baghdad, could put Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan under pressure to revert to a more Islamist position. That, in turn, could provoke the avowedly secular Turkish military to act against the AKP government. Turkey's support for the United States will also depend on U.S. economic assistance and Washington's ability to influence the European Union in hastening Turkey's pending membership. Pakistan: The alliance of Islamic parties, Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), which made significant gains in the parliamentary elections of October 2002, gathered more' support as a result of the war, which was seen as an anti-Muslim crusade. The MMA is likely to continue anti-U.S. agitation. Its government in the Northwest Frontier Province, adjoining Afghanistan, is already allowing greater Taliban activity against the government of President Hamid Karzai, undermining U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. In the short term, Islamist pressure on the brittle regime of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf could, increase if violence in the Middle East (including in Iraq) were to rise. Confronted by such pressure in the past, Musharraf would have tried to increase benefits from the United States by helping pursue elements of al Qaeda, while pacifying Islamists by allowing militant groups to organize and operate against India in Kashmir. Now, the proffered resumption of Indo-Pak dialogue limits the anti-Indian option because terrorism traced to Pakistan would badly damage Musharraf's international standing, including with Washington. The successful transformation of Iraq into a democracy could energize Pakistan's democratic opposition, which might decide to challenge Musharraf. This reaction would set in motion a destabilizing chain of events upsetting U.S. policy in the region, which now revolves around support for Musharraf. Indonesia Pan-Islamic sentiment, fueled by the war in Iraq, is at an all-time high in the world's most populous Muslim country. With an election due in 2004 this sentiment could Put more Islamists in office, though an Islamist president is unlikely. Indonesia's Muslim moderates have been at pains to distance themselves from extremist groups since the Bali bombings in October 2002. But the need to secure Muslim votes could lead even moderate Islamic leaders to resort to anti-American rhetoric during the election campaign. That kind of political environment could help recruitment for terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad, and might weaken the government's' resolve in clamping down on them. Husain Haqqani, a former diplomat and advisor to Pakistani prime ministers, is a journalist and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment. THE MIDDLE EAST'S MUFFLED SIGNALS BY DANIEL BRUMBERG Despite widespread predictions that the march of American forces into Baghdad would unleash either a wave of democratization or a plague of protest and repression throughout the Middle East, the more prosaic reality is that most Middle Eastern states are too preoccupied with their own domestic problems to be moved profoundly by events in Iraq. Indeed, the region seems likely to experience political evolutions rather than revolutions, small steps forward (or back) rather than sudden leaps into a new world of Middle Eastern democracy or brutal retreats to dictatorship. Iraq's main impact on the region will be political. The creation of a durable democracy will strengthen reformists and thus encourage more political liberalization. But if democratization provokes conflicts between Kurds, Sunnis, and the dominant Shiites (60 percent of Iraq's population), or if it produces a new Shiite theocracy, rulers from Rabat to Tehran will point to Iraq as good reason to avoid political reform. The possibility of ethno-religious conflict highlights Iraq's psychological importance in the region. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's rule showed that when ethnic, tribal, religious, or secular segments of society cannot peacefully resolve their differences, a strongman can at least repress them. And for all Saddam's exceptional brutality, autocrats throughout the Middle East have also used his model of trying to "resolve" identity conflicts by imposing order from above. If Iraq's new leaders learn to address such conflicts democratically, they will not only achieve more stable results but their example could then inspire proponents of ethno-religious accommodation everywhere. Iraq's neighbors are watching the dramatic reemergence of the country's Shiite majority to see whether it will learn to tolerate diverse views and cooperate with the Sunni and Kurdish communities, or whether it will instead be authoritarian and intolerant. Radical Shiite clerics may be a minority, but because they are organized, they might impose their views on the wider Shiite community. The radicals know that Najaf, the historically most important Shiite city, will eventually reemerge as a center of Shiite scholarship. If they dominate this dynamic, the radicals will inspire fundamentalists everywhere. But if Najaf becomes a center of religious pluralism, advocates of a more tolerant Islam, particularly among the Arab world's Shiites, will take heart. As a neighboring state where Shiites hold sway, Iran is key to the course of this transition. Well before the Iraq war began, some of Iran's radical clerics expressed happiness about an American-led campaign. They assumed that it would inadvertently bolster Iraq's radical clerics and thus create a new regional ally for Iran's own hard-liners. To fill the postwar vacuum before more moderate voices could organize, Iran sent Revolutionary Guardsmen to Iraq immediately after Saddam's fall. Iran's reformists, on the other hand, hope that Iraq's moderate clerics will survive and establish a base in national politics, minimizing the effective convergence of radicals in Iran and Iraq and thus strengthening the political leverage of Iran's own moderates. Still, given the divisions among the reformists and the entrenched power of the security establishment and conservative judiciary, the most feasible positive outcome in Iran would be a protracted and bumpy liberalization, even if Iraq's moderate Shiites prevail. In turn, all Arab states with significant Shiite populations will take cues from events in Iraq: Bahrain's Shiite majority is ruled by a Sunni monarchy. Many Shiites were disappointed with the reforms initiated by the monarch and boycotted the semicompetitive elections of October 2002. A radical clerical victory in Iraq would embolden those Bahraini Shiites who accuse the king of promoting a fake democracy Conversely, a pluralistic Iraq might promote an accommodation between the regime and the opposition that makes further liberalization possible. In Kuwait relations between Sunnis and Shiites are more cordial, in part because Kuwait's Shiites constitute an influential community (some 30 percent) that has representation in the parliament. With Iraq no longer a threat, the authority of Kuwait's parliament might increase. But if Shiite radicalism prevails or provokes internal conflict in Iraq, tensions will rise between Kuwait's Shiite community and the royal family, and between Sunni and Shiite members of parliament, thus diminishing the parliament's influence. Saudi Arabia's royal family has announced a reform program that will enhance the authority of the unelected Consultation Council. Inspired by events in Iraq, Saudi's small Shiite minority is clamoring for more rights. Saudi reformists may address these demands, but they will be careful not to antagonize the conservative Wahhabi establishment. If Shiite radicals prevail in Iraq, it is difficult to imagine any meaningful political reform in Saudi Arabia. In Lebanon, Hezbollah's authority as spokesmen for the Shiites will be enhanced regardless of whether Iraq emerges as a democracy or a theocracy. Either way, the ties between Lebanese and Iraqi Shiites will be reinvigorated. Yet how Hezbollah projects its influence at home and abroad, particularly in Israel, will depend heavily on Syria. If the Bush administration convinces Syria to stop backing Hezbollah, space might open up for a more moderate Shiite leadership in Lebanon. But the prospects for such moderation will depend heavily on a revival of the Arab-Israeli peace process, since only a comprehensive peace that includes Syria will give Damascus cause to rein in Hezbollah. Elsewhere in the Arab world, events in Iraq will be less significant, although hardly irrelevant. In Jordan, the paralysis of the peace process, rising Islamist passions, and economic crisis have prompted King Abdullah to reverse an earlier political liberalization. A resumption of trade with Iraq, and even more, the creation of a pluralistic regime in Baghdad, will set the stage for the holding of elections in Jordan, which as of this writing had been postponed twice. But if Iraq fragments or if radical Shiite clerics triumph, the king will carefully manage these and any elections to ensure that Iraq's malaise does not spread southward. Egypt's leaders knew that the creation of a pro-Western Iraq would undermine Egypt's geo-strategic position. They have pushed to accelerate economic reform and to reinvigorate the semiofficial National Democratic Parry. President Hosni Mubarak and his allies are determined to ensure the state's control over all further political reforms. Further west, Iraq becomes less relevant. Algeria is still recovering from civil war and is unlikely to move much beyond its state of fragmentation. As for Morocco, until the recent terrorist bombings in Casablanca, further political liberalization seemed in the offing. But the pace is likely to slow, especially if the government senses that the rising power of mainstream Islamists is serving as a cover for radical Islamism. Such reforms are unlikely to produce fully competitive democratic regimes. What we have in much of the Arab world are semiauthoritarian "liberalized autocracies." Such regimes allow for a measure of pluralism and political competition that they then use to prevent a wholesale democratization of the political system. Even if a Jeffersonian democracy emerges in Baghdad, Arab rulers will not forgo the benefits of such mixed regimes any time soon. For Arab states to contemplate moving beyond the old "liberalization game" would require a climate of regional stability that discredits Islamist extremism. Success in Iraq will help, but real political reform hinges on a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict that allows for an independent Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. The Bush administration has endorsed the Middle East road map for peace--a document that envisions the establishment of an independent Palestinian state by 2005. But will Bush take the kinds of domestic political risks for Palestinian-Israeli peace that he was ready to run for Iraqi freedom and democracy? If he doesn't, even the sweetest political victory in Iraq won't inspire the kinds of political changes in the wider Middle East for which the president and his advisors have hoped. KEEP YOUR EYES ON The city of Najaf and the influence of its radical Shiite clerics WHAT TO EXPECT Even if Jeffersonian democracy emerges in Iraq, Arab rulers won't forgo autocracy's benefits. Daniel Brumberg is the author of Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001) and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment. Can Iran and the United States Bridge the Gulf? By George Perkovich The future of Iran and its relations with the United States will significantly shape the character of the post-Iraq war world. With a population nearly three times that of Iraq, and a budding but still repressed democratic political culture, Iran could be the catalyst for a reformed Middle East. But with nuclear weapons and continued support for anti-Israel terrorists, Iran could also be the region's most disruptive force. Judging from the mixture of silence and recrimination coming from Tehran and Washington, neither government has either a strategy or tactics for capitalizin |