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BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GWOT Year 3 - 2004 (mainly Iraq)
Understanding the defensive strategy of Saddam Hussein by Ibrahim al-Marashi 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 7, No. 2 - June 2003 THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: UNDERSTANDING THE DEFENSE STRATEGY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN By Ibrahim al-Marashi This article analyzes how the Iraqi regime portrayed the war to its people and conducted it on both a military and political level. Using earlier captured Iraqi documents it analyzes the regime's strategies and techniques for both controlling and mobilizing the population. Saddam's choice of a defensive strategy to force a lengthy war of attrition was his best possible one, based on his hope that his enemies would lack the patience or courage to continue the war and also that domestic and international pressures would force his opponents to let his regime survive. "Military training is the central path that has no substitute, to make the soldier proficient in militarism and able to serve the Iraqi nation, the people and Arab nation from this location." The President Leader Saddam Hussein(1) While there has been massive coverage and analysis of the 2003 Anglo-American war with Iraq regarding the Western perspective of the fighting, relatively little attention has been paid to how the war was waged from the Iraqi side, tactically or conceptually. For example, the Anglo-American operation's official name was "Iraqi Freedom," and most Arab circles called it "al-Harb al-Khalijiyya al-Thalitha" (The Third Gulf War) but what did the Saddam regime call it? The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 was not referred to as such in the official Iraqi discourse but rather as Qadisiyat Saddam, coupling the leader's name with the first battle ever fought in history between the Persians and Arabs, in which the Arab Muslims emerged victorious. The implication was that Saddam was fighting for all the Arabs and that he would win a tremendous and total victory. That earlier battle, which took place in 637 AD, led by the Arab general Sa'd ibn Waqqas lasted for three days, resulting in the death of both the Persian general Rustum as well as the end of Persian Sassanian rule in Iraq.(2) The collapse of the Zoroastrian Iranian forces at al-Qadisiyya allowed the Arabs to spread Islam eastward, thus giving the battle a religious significance. As Ofra Bengio has written, "The myths woven around al-Qadisiyya are a most instructive example of the Ba'thi technique of using an event with a core historical truth that is deeply etched into collective memory in order to further the party's ideology of Arab nationalism and to appeal to the public by means of a challenge of great emotional power."(3) Thus, by invoking the name of al-Qadisiyya, Saddam justified his war as a continuation of the struggle between Persian and Arab. Saddam's label of the Iran-Iraq war as al-Qadisiyya revealed his vision of how the war should end: a decisive Arab victory over the Persian masses, leading to the complete surrender of the Iranian nation. The 1991 Gulf war was termed "Operation Desert Storm" by the Coalition forces, while Saddam used the term, "Umm Kul al-Ma'arik" or "the Mother of all Battles". This euphemistic title for the 1991 war reveals Saddam's emphasis on the scope and severity of the impending war with the United States. Nevertheless, the regime believed it would emerge victorious. In a military memo circulated among military units it states, "We are guaranteed victory because we are standing up to 30 nations, and that is a point of pride for us."(4) This statement infers that if the regime survives the "mother of all battles" that would mean a victory no matter what happened on the battlefield itself. And by this measure, the regime could well claim to have won the 1991 war. Saddam euphemistically referred to Iraqi Operation Freedom as Ma'rakat Al-Hawasim, "The Defining Battle," to mobilize the Iraqi masses against the impending American attack in 2003. Perhaps the rhetorical use of this title indicated that this was the final, defining battle of the regime. Like almost everything that happened in Iraq between around 1973 and 2003, that matter was highly dependent on the mindset of Saddam Hussein. Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University points out that analysis of Saddam Hussein has vacillated between characterizing him as a rational, logical actor, and a fanatic, isolated from reality. "The most dangerous fanatics, however, combine elements of both--they are shrewd operators with deranged views. Though Hitler was obsessed by the preposterous theory of a Jewish plot for world mastery, he was also remarkably astute--outwitting Western statesmen before the Second World War and driving his generals to achieve a spectacular sequence of rapid military victories."(5) Saddam, too, can be said to have combined serious misperceptions of the world, including a profound belief in conspiracies, with a shrewd sense of the political behavior and strategies required by his position. Claims of conspiracies also justified many of the regime's policies and garnered loyalty to them by the security apparatus and sometimes by the population at large. As one example of the regime's use of this method, here are two statements justifying Iraq's possession and possible use of chemical weapons in an official training manual.(6) These weapons were needed: &as a result of the American-Zionist union against our country in order to steal the natural resources of the Arab world, under an international umbrella and the decision of the Security Council and the distortion of facts by some of the traitorous Arab leaders like the [king of Saudi Arabia] and [President] Husni Mubarak [of Egypt]. And as a result of the concentration of the hostile forces&in preparations for unleashing hostilities on our dear country: [Intelligence] reports have indicated the possession of the American-Zionist union of chemical weapons, and their ill intention to use them against our country to increase our losses in persons, equipments, weapons and preparations.(7) Yet it would be a mistake to overstate Saddam's irrational side--noting that even the purveying of conspiracy theories often served as a practical political measure for the regime. Indeed, an examination of Saddam's strategy in the 2003 war shows how it parallels the strategy that he used in 1991. It is vital to make a distinction between the mistakes Saddam made in blundering into a war under unfavorable circumstances and his choice of the best possible--though limited and difficult--option once faced with fighting such a conflict. In both wars, Saddam realized that he could not achieve a military victory against vastly superior U.S. forces. His goal in both conflicts was to emerge with a political victory by ensuring the survival of his regime, just as Nasser had done in 1956 when a losing war guaranteed his place as champion of the Arab world. The manner in which Saddam organized the defense of Iraq in both wars demonstrated that his goal was to ensure a protracted conflict, inflicting as many Allied casualties as possible, in the hope that his opponents' impatience, spiritual weakness or internal conflicts forced them to give up. A document dated January 14, 1991, two days before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm reveals Saddam's strategy and bears a striking resemblance to the strategy employed during this conflict. Directives to commanders of the Iraqi army bluntly indicate that Iraq is at a technological disadvantage: "The enemy has different equipment. There is a difference between Iraqi soldiers and American soldiers in methodology, size, etc." The following directive orders, "Try to cause many casualties and have a long war. Wait underground for the end of the air attack. Utilize propaganda. Do not leave Kuwait. Have self-confidence."(8) Essentially, the document suggests that the Iraqi army, in the face of overwhelming firepower, should engage "the enemy" in a protracted war but does not command it to act in an offensive campaign. Essentially, Saddam's end game was not a victory for the Iraqi nation, but a victory for the regime itself. As one pre-war assessment put it, most Iraqi military leaders knew "that Iraq cannot resist a U.S. assault, but could only hope to make the U.S. entry as costly as possible as soon in the war as possible, and then to draw out the fighting into Baghdad to the point where the U.S. media would make continued U.S. engagement untenable."(9) Essentially, this comment echoes the goals laid out for the Iraqi military in the January 14, 1991 directive to the Iraqi army. SADDAM'S DEFENSE STRATEGY The military defense of Iraq was most likely coordinated by Saddam through the Ba'th Party Military Bureau, the body which managed Iraqi defense and security issues during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as selected high ranking military officers.(10) The Bureau was subordinated to the party chairman, Saddam Hussein, who was also its general secretary. Saddam, not the minister of defense, was thus the highest military authority in Iraq. Given the nature of the system he established, his active and direct control was absolutely necessary for the morale and functioning of the Iraqi armed forces and to provide leadership. Prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam had divided Iraq into four military command zones. Yet it appeared that Saddam set the overall strategy along a three-tiered approach. The first line of defense was the regular Iraqi military. The Republican Guard would defend the capital from outside it. The Special Republican Guard and the military units of Iraq's intelligence organizations would defend Baghdad from within. The First Tier The regular Iraqi Army was organized into five corps which were stationed in the south of Iraq, as well as the area to the north of Baghdad, bordering the Kurdish safe-haven. The Iraqi Third and Fourth Corps were based in the south of Iraq, while the First and Fifth Corps were based in the north of Iraq to guard against an attack from the Kurdish zone. The Second Corps had been deployed to the east of Baghdad, along the Iranian border.(11) Iraq's regular Army suffered neglect after the 1991 Gulf war and was the least effective element of Saddam's defense. Generally, it was deployed in the furthest reaches to the north and south of Iraq on the front lines. Thus, they served as a buffer between invading forces and the Republican Guard stationed in the second tier. Ostensibly, it seemed that such deployments were designed to stall the invading American and British forces, thus giving the Republican Guard time to prepare to defend their positions on the outskirts of Baghdad. The Second Tier The Republican Guard was stationed to defend the areas in the vicinity of the capital. It had the best-equipped and trained units among Saddam's forces and received better pay and privileges than the regular Iraqi army. The Republican Guard's six divisions included an armored division, three mechanized divisions and two infantry divisions, as well as three Special Forces brigades. These were the al-Nida Division, Baghdad, the Madina al-Munawarah, Nebuchadnezzar, Adnan, and Hammurabi divisions. Each had approximately 8,000 to 10,000 men, with total manpower estimated at about 60,000-80,000 men.(12) The Republican Guard was not under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, rather it was supervised by Qusay Hussein, head of the Special Security Organization. However, even though the Guard and regular Army were separate institutions, they fought effectively together in defensive operations. Despite Saddam's high-profile use of the Republican Guard, they were strategically deployed outside Baghdad so as not to facilitate or allow any one of the Guard units to act against the regime. The Special Republican Guard was the largest armed unit allowed inside of Baghdad. The Third Tier Saddam allowed his son, Qusay, to organize the defense of the capital using elite forces that numbered up to 40,000 men who would fight inside the city using terror and guerrilla tactics. One of the organizations tasked with defending the capital was Jihaz al-Amn al-Khas (the Special Security Organization),(13) with its brigade which served as a rapid response unit for the organization, independent of the military establishment and of the Special Republican Guard. In addition, various armed security forces were deployed inside the capital, such as Al-Amn al-'Amm (General Security), a political police force, with its paramilitary wing, known as Quwat al-Tawari' (The Emergency Forces). Another unit in Saddam's security apparatus, known as Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa (The Special Protection Apparatus) was the only unit to have armed men in the direct proximity of the President and served as his bodyguards. Finally, al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas (The Special Republican Guard), which had up to 26,000 men, was divided into four brigades, with three brigades guarding the northern, southern and western routes into Baghdad.(14) In addition to this three-tiered defense, it was predicted that Saddam would destroy the oil wells in the south and north of Iraq, destroy bridges at critical junctions such as Nasiriyya, flood the approaches to Baghdad and bring the Americans into a bloody urban battle for the capital where chemical weapons would be unleashed. However, the course of the war demonstrated that only a few elements of Saddam's defense strategy were ever implemented to halt the Coalition advance. THE WAR FOR SADDAM'S IRAQ The Battle For The South Of Iraq Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003 with an attempted decapitation air strike against the regime, subsequent to which American and British ground forces entered Iraq. As U.S. and UK forces were dispatched to the south of Iraq to seize the port of Um Qasr as well as the oil fields in the south, Iraq launched a variety of missiles toward the invading forces bases in Kuwait, perhaps the only offensive aspect of Saddam's strategy. As Coalition forces advanced through the south, most assessments failed to account for the prominent role of Saddam's Fidayin. Saddam's Fidayin (also spelled Fedayeen) can be roughly translated as "those who sacrifice themselves for Saddam." A paramilitary militia with the strength of about 30,000 to 40,000 men, it was established in 1995 by Saddam's oldest son Uday to maintain internal security in Iraq. By no means a professional fighting force, nor were its member recruited for suicide missions, members were induced to join with higher salaries than regular Iraqi soldiers.(15) It has been erroneously referred to as an "elite" fighting force, when in reality it is known for its brute force, rather than its fighting prowess.(16) Many of the fighters were youths in their teens from Saddam's hometown of Tikrit or from his al-Bu Nasir tribe, with no prior combat experience. Assessments of Iraq's strategy prior to the conflict indicated that this unit would be engaged in a battle for Baghdad, and that these forces, along with the Special Republican Guard, would most likely defend the city in earnest. Iraq's defense strategy would prove these assessments wrong as the Fidayin were dispatched to the south, where they provided stiff resistance, particularly in defending the southern cities of Basra, Um Qasr, Najaf, and Nasiriyya, and targeting Coalition supply lines. The Fidayin employed guerrilla tactics against these forces in units of 10 to 15 fighters. It seemed, though, that they fought without coordination, instead fighting a war of attrition, attempting to inflict as many casualties as possible. They proved to be the crucial element in Iraq's guerrilla war tactics, capturing several Americans as well. It is most likely that part of Iraq's strategy in this regard was to offer financial incentives to every Iraqi combatant who captured a POW. A document dated February 8, 1991 details financial rewards for the apprehension of American and British prisoners of war. It states, "Carrying out the orders of the President Leader (May God bless him) that were issued in a meeting of the leadership of the armed forces on the 8th of December 1990, regarding rewarding the fighters who are able to bring in an English or American POW with 10,000 dinars on average for every POW."(17) Again, though, these resistance efforts were uncoordinated. The reported death of Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's paternal cousin, in Basra on April 6, 2003 in an airstrike against his residence seems to have damaged Iraq's effort in the south. As commander of the southern military zone, al-Majid would have put up a more effective effort at mounting an attrition defense. His loss also undermined Iraqi morale there. The Battle For the Center While the Iraqi defense strategy involved using the Fidayin to defend the southernmost areas in Iraq, the Republican Guard was deployed in the vicinity of Baghdad to provide a second tier of resistance to the Allied forces. When the military conflict commenced, U.S. air strikes concentrated on the three Republican Guard divisions--the Madina, al-Nida, and Baghdad--defending the outskirts of Baghdad. An unanswered question still remains as to the fate of Iraq's Republican Guard. All Republican Guard troops were volunteers rather than conscripted and the majority were Sunni Arab Muslims.(18) When Shia and Kurds revolted against the regime after the 1991 Gulf War, the weakened Republican Guard rallied behind Saddam Hussein and brutally suppressed the insurrection. This uprising took on an ethnic and sectarian nature, and it appeared as if the predominantly Arab Sunni Republican Guards were defending their privileged status in the Iraqi state. Understandably, they expected that Saddam's fall would be a tremendous personal loss of status and power in Iraq. In later years, though, the Guard's loyalty appears to have been shaken. Important Guard elements attempted to overthrow Saddam on various occasions. Executions and purges of suspect officers was a common phenomenon. The Fidayin and the Iraqi security apparatuses were deployed against the Guard during times of dissension. After Operation Desert Fox in 1998, Saddam promoted a large number of officers from his hometown of Tikrit to senior positions in the Guard, upsetting many senior officers. Based on these past precedents, some analysts had predicted that the Republican Guard deployed on the outskirts of the capital would not serve as an enthusiastic fighting force, nor put up much resistance to an American attack. The Guard's poor performance in the 2003 war could be attributed to this reduced loyalty and the disabling of Saddam as military commander. Whether or not he was killed, wounded, or merely forced into hiding, Saddam was not visibly directing these forces and this fact led to a demoralizing confusion, paralysis, and a belief that defeat was inevitable. As U.S. forces approached the outskirts of Baghdad, the Pentagon asserted that Republican Guard Units had been given the authority to deploy chemical weapons when the Americans approached Baghdad. Such assessments indicate that some of the Coalition war planners did not have a full understanding of the command and control structure of Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal. In fact, the only Iraqi unit that had the authority to deploy chemical munitions was the Chemical Corps of the elite Special Security Organization, managed by Saddam's son, Qusay.(19) One reason Saddam entrusted a security/intelligence agency to deploy these weapons was out of fear that the military would disobey his orders to use them.(20) As the Republican Guard forces defending the outskirts Baghdad collapsed, American forces conducted forays into the capital. Besides Saddam's Fidayin, there were a myriad of groups charged with defending the capital. It was at this juncture that many analysts predicted that bloody street battles would begin. But chemical weapons were never deployed and, contrary to Saddam's intentions, neither the Special Republican Guard nor the Emergency Forces provided serious resistance within Baghdad. The Absence of Any "Oil Weapon" While a few oil fields in the south of Iraq were set ablaze, Iraq's oil fields in the north of Iraq remained undamaged. Given Iraq's past motives for destroying Kuwait's oil fields, it seemed likely that Saddam would have given the order to destroy the oil fields around Kirkuk and Mosul in the event of an American attack. The fact that the oil fields were not set ablaze is surprising given that Saddam used the destruction of the oil wells in 1991 as part of his defensive strategy. While Saddam destroyed the Kuwaiti oil fields in the last days of February 1991 to thwart the American abilities to conduct air raids, the ensuing smoke clouds limited visibility, documents illustrate that Saddam had ordered the oil wells to be prepared for destruction as early as August 1990, well before the Gulf War had started. For example, a document known as a "signed release for the detonation of the oil wells," states, "I guarantee that all 16 wells in the group location 21 are ready to be destroyed."(21) An Iraqi officer signed the document on August 26, 1990. Based on this pattern, Saddam most likely rigged the oil wells near Basra and Kirkuk with explosives as well. Another document suggests that the Iraqis also ordered the destruction of the wells simply so the Americans would not gain access to them. One captured document reads, "Because the oil fields are important to the enemy we need to protect the explosives that are positioned at the oil fields."(22) Since the United States coveted Kuwaiti oil, the Iraqis had to make sure the wells were destroyed, in a vengeful act of spite. Finally, the regime believed that the destruction of the wells had an important psychological effect on its forces. "The importance of the execution of the destruction of the oil wells plays a significant role in lifting morale. The terminology, delayed destruction will be used for destruction at the last moment in front of the enemy."(23) Given the importance of the destruction of the oil wells in the eyes of the regime, it was surprising that most of Iraq's oil infrastructure remained intact in 2003. Perhaps Iraqi engineers were less willing to destroy their own national resources, as opposed to those in Kuwait. This issue will require additional research. AN ASSESSMENT OF SADDAM'S DEFENSE STRATEGY Some have argued that Saddam had no concept of reality and was insulated from those around him about the nature of the American threats in 1991 and 2003. Nevertheless, in 1990, Iraqi intelligence services often delivered candid reports on Iraq's inability to defend itself. It would seem likely that Saddam's plan in 2003 was also a result of reasonable--if mistaken--assessments of Coalition capabilities and strategy. For example, a report issued from Mudiriyyat al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya, (The Directorate of Military Intelligence) on August 20, 1990, reported on the movements of the American aircraft carrier, the USS Kennedy, as well as the American fighters deployed in Saudi Arabia, along with Egyptian and Pakistani ground forces.(24) The report defines "Possible Scenarios of an American attack" involving the following steps: "The air forces will be used to strike in the rear areas of Kuwait to cut off transportation to [Iraq], as well as strikes from the Gulf. Then the land forces will attack our army in Kuwait, after the military air strikes have succeeded in paralyzing our military and produced heavy losses for the Iraqis."(25) In addition, "The enemy will use electronic warfare to affect our wire communications and paralyze our defense."(26) This document is in stark contrast to Saddam's rhetoric then about a quick and easy victory over the Coalition. Other reports from the Iraq military offered candid assessments of low troop morale. On December 30, 1990 a report states, "Soldiers are afraid that if they retreat they will be killed by their own forces. Soldiers have had little to no training. Most were pulled off the street and shipped to the front lines without training. This has had a great effect on morale. In order to increase morale the officers are trying to arrange training for the soldiers. There are complaints about not having night binoculars. They cannot see what is happening around them and cannot tell if they are about to be attacked at night."(27) One could argue that such assessments never reached Saddam himself. However, Saddam's control of the military and the way he organized the defense of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 indicated that in fact he was aware of the woeful state of his forces and that his survival depended on a political victory through a protracted conflict. In 1991, the aim of regime survival was fulfilled. In 2003, however, his enemies did not give up due to their own demoralization or to domestic or international political pressures. Of course, when Saddam heard that his soldiers were largely motivated by fear of him this was not a disappointment but an essential part of his strategy. In 1992, Saddam established al-Amn al-'Askari (Military Security), which grew out of the Special Bureau of Military Intelligence, after Saddam believed the latter had failed to detect disturbances in the military. It was designed to put agents into every branch of the military, serving as the regime's eyes and ears to ensure loyalty to Saddam.(28) Distrust of the fighting capability of the military manifested itself in reports emerging from the 1991 conflict. Officers were forced to sign statements along the following lines, "The Mission: Defending Great Iraq within the brigade and division and prevent the Americans and their coalition from taking any part from the homeland and never give up my place whatever happens. I am staying in my position until the last moment."(29) In the context of Iraqi life, such statements indicated the signers were acknowledging the fact that they would be executed if these promises were not fulfilled. Most combatants in the Iraqi military had other reasons to fight to the very end for the defense of the regime; at least as long as they believed the regime might survive. In most cases, their families were under threat of retaliation in the event of treason or desertion. The military intelligence unit of the 29th Division reported that two men had escaped to Saudi Arabia in 1990. It requested from the Corps command, "their home addresses&within 24 hours."(30) A list of directives circulated to military units on February 17, 1991, demonstrates how fear was instilled into the Iraqi military in ways that still applied in 2003. The document warns that if there is a single deserter in any unit "the entire unit will be punished. Those who escape are to be executed by the Popular Army. Those who escape to Saudi Arabia will bring shame on them and their families."(31) Every soldier understood the direct threat to his loved ones. The document concludes, "Executions should be held in public and without any mercy on every deserter. At the battle, any soldier that is out of line is to be executed. Those who escape and return should be sent to the front line. Iraq is more dear than everyone."(32) But once the security organizations and the fear that the regime would survive to exact retribution collapsed toward the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom, so did the instruments of fear within the military. And with that, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi soldiers refused to fight to save Saddam. CONCLUSION It is possible to obtain a good sense of how Saddam viewed his adversaries. He was highly influenced by his perception that America had been defeated in Vietnam by a lack of courage and will power, a limit on its patience, and an inability to sustain casualties. This view was reinforced by his reading of American behavior after Vietnam, leaving Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993, among other events. Even in Afghanistan in 2001, where the United States won a quick victory, Saddam noted that the United States preferred to use local forces rather than risking its own troops. Since U.S. forces would have to do the fighting in Iraq, his best--and perhaps only--hope was a protracted ground war in which America would tire of losing soldiers, which would occasion domestic demands to end the war. He also hoped that international public opinion in other countries, as well as Arab protests, would demand that the war be ended. In this context, using weapons of mass destruction would have been counterproductive since it would have destroyed the pretext that Iraq was a victim that needed to be saved by the world and by the American people. Saddam also knew that this basic strategy had worked in 1991 to save him. He thus, understandably, believed that this defensive strategy was his best bet for the regime's survival, and he was willing to pay the cost, Iraq's utter destruction, to serve that end. NOTES 1. KDS folder CD 8 file 064-1-013a p. 4. 2. See Qadissiyat Saddam, Al-Taba'ah Al-Ulah, (Al-Sahafah wa Taba'ah wa al-Nashir: Kuwait, 1980) 3. Ofra Bengio, Saddam's Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 173. 4. KDS Folder 90809 file 681-1-3 pp. 4-7. 5. Christopher Andrew, "We Must Know What Makes Them Tick," London Times, December 5, 2002. 6. These files form the Iraq Research and Documentation Project's Kuwait Data Set and can be accessed at 7. KDS folder CD 9 file 104-6-015 p. 6. 8. KDS Folder CD004 File 084-2-002 p. 5 and File 084-2-002a pp. 2-17. 9. Gregory R. Copley, "Preparations Indicate US Readiness for Conflict With Iraq, Initiated by Air War, Starting Late November 2002", November 4, 2002. 10. Jeremy Binnie, ed., Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (London: Jane's Information Group, 2001), p. 188. 11. Binnie, pp. 188-192. 12. Binnie, pp. 194-5. 13. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 49. 14. For more detailed information on the Iraqi intelligence agencies see Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3, September 2002. 15. Binnie, p. 217. 16. Global Security, "Saddam's Fidayin," 17. KDS folder CD 6 file 096-17-024 p. 07. 18. Global Security, "Republican Guard," 19. For more information, see Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2003. 20. Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). p. 48. 21. KDS Folder Iraq Docs File 559-034 pp. 10,11,12,15. 22. KDS Folder Iraq Docs File 532-029 pp. 4, 5, 7, 8. 23. KDS Folder CD003 File 024-3-001 pp. 16-19. 24. KDS Folder 90809 File 124-6-009 p. 84. 25. KDS Folder 90809 File 124-6-009 p. 86. 26. KDS Folder 90809 File 124-6-009 p. 86. 27. KDS Folder CD004 File 048-5-002 p. 2. 28. Hiro, p. 57. 29. KDS Folder CD004 File 021-1-031 p. 2. 30. KDS Folder 90809 File 600-2-019 p.106. 31. KDS Folder 90809 file 681-1-3 pp. 4-7. 32. KDS Folder 90809 file 681-1-3 pp. 4-7. Ibrahim al-Marashi is a research associate at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, California as well as a lecturer at the US Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently working on a project on Iraqi intelligence operations in northern Iraq and Kuwait. He is also the author of "How Iraq Conceals And Obtains Its Weapons Of Mass Destruction" which appeared in the March 2003 issue of MERIA. |