Phil Taylor's papers
BACK TO : PROPAGANDA AND THE GLOBAL 'WAR' ON TERROR (GWOT) Years 1 and 2, ie 9/11-2003
'Spin Laden' - Propaganda and Urban Myths by Prof Taylor A version of this article was published in The World Today in December 1999 'Spin Laden' and street propaganda in the Islamic World Philip M. Taylor University of Leeds In the aftermath of September 11th, there was much agonising in the United States as to why the attacks ever happened, and why the perpetrators appeared to 'hate us so much'. This realisation, in itself, was described in various quarters as a 'wake-up call' for the US and its image in the wider world. Having woken up at last to the need to conduct an information war, and on the principle that it is far better to 'know your enemy' if such a 'war' is to be won, we need to understand the main themes of anti-American propaganda prior to the attacks, not least because they are sufficiently deep-rooted to provide fertile ground today for refutations about America as 'a force for good in the world'. The principal source of anger is, of course, US support for Israeli 'state-sponsored terrorism' against the Palestinians. Although bin Laden is a comparatively recent convert to this cause, he fully understands how effectively this resentment can be translated into support for his 'jihad' against the west. One early manifestation of this occurred in the form of a rumour that it was, in fact, Mossad which was behind the attacks because '4,000 Jews failed to turn up for work at the World Trade Centre' on 11th September. Another rumour, which went round the world like wildfire on the internet, was that the TV footage of celebrating Palestinians on the west bank was in fact taken during the Gulf War. The Palestinian authorities certainly understood the potentially damaging nature of such imagery - which was in fact taken the previous day by the Reuters news agency - to their cause because similar footage elsewhere in the region was quickly rounded up. Although such incidents were isolated and largely small, the constant repetition of one such celebration on CNN, combined with the rumour about the age of the footage, confirmed suspicions about CNN being the 'voice of the US government'. Why some Palestinians would choose to celebrate if 4000 Jews had been absent has yet to be addressed, but Mr. Arafat was quick to be photographed offering blood in support of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon victims. On the Middle Eastern street, CNN is in fact seen to be part of the problem, not the solution. That is because a second main source of grievance about US foreign policy relates to issues of 'globalisation' by which is meant 'American imperialism'. This helps to explain why even Saddam Hussein is regarded as an Arab 'hero' - because he stood up to the west, and survived. It is not just the presence since the 1991 Gulf War of US troops in the Holy Land of Mecca, the growth in the number of McDonalds and accusations of 'coca-colonialism', but it is also the 'cowardly' bombing of Iraq which the western media coverage chose to ignore but which has resulted in the often repeated charge of 'One Million Iraqi children killed'. A photograph of an American cruise missile bound for Baghdad during Operation Desert Fox with the words 'Happy Ramadam' chalked on the side is still widely remembered throughout the region. The unfortunate initial use of the word 'crusade' and the naming of the 'war' as Operation 'Infinite Justice' - which western leaders have now backtracked from - is seen as further 'evidence' of US hypocrisy, duplicity and selectivity when it comes to dealing with Muslims. Every criminal attack upon Muslim citizens or mosques in the US and Europe is reported as further evidence of 'why the US hates Islam'. How rumours become propaganda would make a fascinating study. Already, patriotic T shirts, 'burn bin Laden' hot sauce, toilet paper and other commercial products are in American shops arising out the desire of individual entrepreneurs to contribute to the war effort (and make some money in the process) from the ground up. Although, often such phenomena appear to flare up like spontaneous combustion, rather than emanate directly from official propaganda sources, they are indicative of deep resentments and have the capacity to become what are often termed 'urban myths'. In the Middle East, it is no different and bin Laden understands this only too well. Every western claim is analysed for the slightest loophole and nowhere is this more apparent than in the deconstruction of so-called western 'evidence' for the involvement of bin Laden and Al Que'da. Quite simply, it is found to be unconvincing. Because many in the west share this view until the complete evidence is released, such democratically expressed doubts are seized upon as further reinforcement for the street level view. Instead, rumours are rife that the United States planned to attack Afghanistan long before September 11th which was accordingly provided with an 'excuse' or pretext to realise its objectives (and hence the logic of Mossad involvement), and that there have been long-term plans to kill bin Laden, confirmed now by the CIA brief to assassinate him if possible. Other stories point to the 'fact' that five of the nineteen named hijackers are still alive, thus discrediting American sources still further. Early on, Mohammed Ata's father was quoted repeatedly that his son was not involved, and American refusal to send any of the hijackers' bodies home is further evidence of 'contempt' for Islamic ways. It is also pointed out that none of the cell phone messages by doomed passengers to their relatives mentioned them as 'Arabs', and that the subsequent discovery of an alleged hijacker's passport in the rubble of the World Trade Centre when the black boxes failed to survive, or of Mohammed Ata's suitcase which did not make the first plane, are simply too coincidental to be true: they must be part of a CIA/Mossad 'conspiracy' to discredit bin Laden and justify US actions. Indeed, that is how reports of several 'martyrs' being spotted in Florida strip joints prior to the attacks are also dismissed. In a sense, it no longer matters whether any of these stories are true or false; it is how western versions of events and news are perceived about the current situation in many parts of the world. However, all this would seem to be contradicted by a poster that has become popular on the streets of Pakistan that transposes bin Laden's photograph over an image of the Twin Towers being struck. This suggests that some extremists are actually eager to see a connection that others doubt exists at all. In the eyes of the extremists, bin Laden and the Taliban are not as bad as the west would have them believe. It is this jumble of apparent contradictions, together with the magnifying - even distorting - lens of television images which western propagandists must now deal. Asking independent western television companies not to run bin Laden tapes (whether they contain 'coded messages' or not) will not suffice - this merely confirms the 'hypocrisy' of so-called democracies and their claims to value freedom of speech. In a sense, all this highlights one of the fundamental aspects of trying to wage an asymmetrical conflict against a non-state actor. The enemy really only has one weapon with which to fight - propaganda - although to this we should perhaps add terror, surprise and the generation of fear. Starving terrorists of the 'oxygen of publicity' - by taking out Taliban radio stations, by pressurising Muslim governments to moderate their state-controlled media and western media outlets to 'think carefully' about what they show - is only part of strategy needed to wage propaganda war in the information age. The fact that the western democracies are already on the defensive in this 'war against terror' suggests a failure of western propaganda - but on a much longer term dating back well before September 11th. Indeed, fear of US attempts to 'McDominate', the selectivity of western interventions and foreign policies vis a vis the Middle East and the ongoing war against Iraq have provided fertile ground for generating new resentments, new betrayals. It is these resentments which have been ignored by the western 'information' services perhaps because since 1999, when the United States Information Agency was absorbed into the State Department, US public diplomacy (for which read 'counter-propaganda') has been downgraded in significance. Voice of America broadcasts in Arabic were slight compared to the more trusted BBC World Service, which suggests an important role for Britain in the 'perception management' strategies of this information war. Besides, these public diplomacy programmes have hitherto been directed at elites, rather than at the masses. The hope was that Middle Eastern opinion-makers would pass on the message to their own populations that America was indeed 'a force for good in the world'. Instead all those elites have done is to allow the west to see street-level public opinion in the Muslim world really for the first time. That is the real significance of Al Jazeera. One amusing illustration of cross-cultural miscommunication in the information age derived from another poster of bin Laden which had the character 'Bert' from Sesame Street in the background. The Pakistani protesters had scoured the internet for an image of their 'hero' only to come across a site which transposed the two characters in a 'Bert is Evil' campaign. As another urban myth circulated around the world, the protesters realised their mistake and airbrushed out the offending, and counter-productive, image. But what can be done to counter this propaganda? In early November, it was announced that Alistair Campbell was establishing 'coalition information centres in Islamabad, London and Washington because of the by then often repeated assertion that the west is 'losing the propaganda war' in the campaign against terrorism. Whether this is in fact the case within Britain and the USA is doubtful, as public opinion polls continue to indicate majority support for the military effort currently focused on Afghanistan. Moderate Islamic opinion remains largely silent. There is some evidence of growing dissent, an inevitable consequence largely of an air campaign in Afghanistan which was bound to cause some 'collateral damage'. The role of the Al Jazeera television station in providing images of 'suffering innocent women and children' from the Taliban side, when western journalists are denied, or provided with only limited, access, has been much discussed. Because of the time difference, the ability of these images to frame the daily media agenda in western countries is what has been worrying Mr. Campbell and his colleagues. The democratic free media can sometimes appear to be what Winston Churchill described as an 'enemy within the gates'. But what really requires urgent attention is what might be described as the tactical information war at the street level of Islamic public opinion from the Middle East to Pakistan where western versions of events are simply not believed. Quite simply we need to deploy weapons of mass communication. We are only just beginning to see some emphasis placed on US interventions on behalf of Muslim populations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Kuwait, although once again this will only highlight the selective nature of US foreign policy. Hollywood executives have twice visited the White House to discuss relevant themes for incorporation into their movies as part of the wider strategic campaign for 'hearts and minds'. Yet, to be effective, propaganda requires image and reality to go hand in hand. The nut to crack is to how to make sure your 'reality' prevails not just in the short-term but also over the longer haul. |
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