



INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY  
EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE  
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## TALKING WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD: IS THE MESSAGE GETTING THROUGH?

*Session Two of Three Sessions*

### *How American and Foreign Media Present America*

Project Director Marjorie Ransom explained that the three-panel series will analyze the image of the United States in the Muslim world and consider how the U.S. can promote favorable opinions of the U.S. and understanding and support for U.S. policy.

The February 19 panel focused on the U.S. image in the Islamic world. Jim Zogby said the problems stem from the view that the U.S. acts unilaterally; the Pew Research Center study found that 71 percent of opinion leaders in the Middle East felt this way. People in Europe, Latin America and Asia had similar opinions. Other reasons given for disliking the U.S. were: U.S. policies that contributed to the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the growing power of the U.S. multinational organizations and U.S. support for Israel. The last view is held by 95 percent of the Middle East, 82 percent of Asia, 78 percent of Latin America and 68 percent of West Europe.

Ms. Dergham insisted that the problem is fundamental differences on policy, while Dr. Ahmed saw great pain in the Islamic world, not just from painful political situations, but also from the negative image of American Muslims in the American media and movies. He feels that the culture of the West constantly humiliates the Muslim community.

Ambassador Ross saw support for America in the Muslim world, i.e., a high regard for American values of democracy, free expression and religious tolerance. He said the U.S. should focus on these strategic strengths, as well as on education, to build

more understanding. In short, the panelists mostly agreed on the problems we face.

Ms. Ransom said that the third panel will focus on what the U.S. government can do about its image problem and cited two statistics from the recent Gallup poll of 10,000 residents from nine Muslim countries to demonstrate the dimension of the image problem.

First, a large percentage of people view the United States unfavorably. Most importantly, in six of these Islamic countries 61 percent say Arabs are not responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center. If the U.S. cannot convince 61 percent of Arabs in six countries that it was Arabs who took part in the attack on the World Trade Center, how can American officials convince Arabs of anything?

**JOHN ALTERMAN**  
**Council of Foreign Relation Fellow**  
**U.S. Department of State**

#### **The Effect of the U.S. Media Messages on the World**

The huge impact of U.S. media in news and cultural products caused three significant developments:

*1. The effects of the American style of news reporting worldwide*

Firstly, the most obvious impact is how the media define what is news. Generally, news is

things that shock, such as conflicts, battles, illness and suffering. Peace negotiations are rarely news, due to the patient work that is necessary before agreement is reached. Ordinary events aren't a story unless what's normal is abnormal for the intended audience. Thus, American news almost always has a negative cast. It seeks the unusual and broadcasts it to a wide audience. Secondly, a story must have a beginning, a middle and an end. News stories tend to have a conflict at their core, which protagonists either defeat or succumb to. A third convention of American news coverage is the appearance of objectivity. U.S. reporters stress that their news is objective, regardless of writers' and editors' tendency to get carried away. As television spreads to small towns and villages, more people follow what Americans call news and it is reported in increasingly homogenous ways. Due to training and a desire to replicate western style, news stories throughout the world are introducing a western style of news coverage to their growing audiences. Thus, the weaknesses of western style reporting, i.e., its concentration on conflict and its insistence on determining a winner and a loser, has a broader cultural effect on the world. One might argue that the ideal of objectivity represents an advance. But, because so many media in the developing world are state-run, news organizations tend to support governmental decision making, while simultaneously proclaiming objectivity.

This spread of a global news culture leads to an expansion of what Benedict Anderson called "imagined communities." This phenomenon can be a force for both solidarity and violence. The global news system can infiltrate ideas of democracy, good governance and rule of law into societies where freedoms are severely restricted. Interestingly, one of the greatest changes in news broadcasting in the Muslim world is increased reporting of international affairs; domestic coverage is closely monitored by government officials, whereas international affairs is less so.

### *2. The emergence of a global news ecosystem*

Technology created the emergence of a single global news ecosystem unrestricted by national borders. An explosion in technology and reporting talent lends new immediacy to news events around the world. Satellites and the digitization of broadcasting make global links cheaper and simpler each year.

Every domestic broadcaster has competition from international satellite broadcasting, especially when pursuing elite audiences. Competition for elite viewers means that even non-elite viewers are get-

ting information products that more closely meet international standards. National broadcasters in the Middle East face competition from CNN and other western satellite channels, as well as from major Arab satellite broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera. They cannot maintain an audience without credibility and can't maintain credibility while censoring news. Governments can no longer delay the reporting of news; as soon as news happens, viewers turn on their televisions. If the news is not being reported, they turn to another channel.

As news agencies prove increasingly reluctant to pay for foreign correspondents from the U.S., local reporters, editors and writers jump into the breach. An increased premium is placed on producing at the skill level international consumers demand. More reporters are chasing the stories the international news media want. Hence, coverage around the world is becoming more homogenous. Also, the quality and impact of images have increased dramatically, e.g., the image of twelve-year old Palestinian Mohammed Al-Dura, who was killed in October 2000, spread around the globe in less than a day. The spread had less to do with the news itself (i.e., the tragic death of a twelve-year old boy) than with the quality of the image as news. Finally, what is reported for domestic consumption becomes immediately international news. The most important driver in all of this has been the development of technology, and this is certainly the case in the Muslim-majority world.

### *3. The influence of the global news ecosystem on U.S. interests and concerns*

The U.S. has to understand the effects of the expansion and unification of news media on decisions of foreign governments. Are publics more demanding? Do governments feel the need to be more responsive? These questions hit at the core of twenty-first century diplomacy. The U.S. must understand how governments respond to the ubiquity of reporting. Governments produce press guidance to respond to domestic concerns and events. That guidance is now directly transmitted overseas to audiences who view it through a much different prism. If broadcasters use this type of local reporting in other countries, it can result in discrepancies in the story. Audiences then demand a reconciliation of the two versions. There is no easy answer to this problem. It is important to note that audiences remain distinct, even though reporting is becoming universal.

In conclusion, the most important effects of the American media on the Muslim-majority world are broad-gauged. They are not linked to American

biases, but rather to broader issues like the spread of technology leading to the spread of information. Finally, all of this is not driven by government decision but by technology. Governments can think about how they're going to respond, but, for the foreseeable future, they are going to be in reaction mode to these changes.

**DR. MASYKURI ABDILLAH**  
**Fulbright Scholar**

**Cultural and Non-Media Images  
of the United States**

The United States emerged as the world's single super power following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the eighties. This world domination raised questions throughout the world, with the most critical questions coming from the Muslim world. The major issue was U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which most Muslims consider unjust. The American economic and political systems and culture, which pervade the world, arouse mixed reactions, particularly in Muslim countries. The September 11th terrorist attacks and the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan changed both popular opinion towards the U.S. and American perception of the Muslim world.

Results from a December 2001-January 2002 Gallup poll indicate that 53 percent of the population in nine Muslim countries has an unfavorable opinion of America, while only 22 percent has a favorable opinion. The nine countries are Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Seventy-seven percent in the same countries considers the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan morally unjustifiable, while only 9 percent considers it justifiable. It is important to note, however, that 67 percent considers the September 11th attacks morally unjustifiable, while only 15 percent considers it justifiable.

In Indonesia, which is 88 percent Muslim, the same poll reflects different attitudes. Only 27 percent of Indonesians has an unfavorable opinion of America, while 30 percent has a favorable opinion; 43 percent holds a neutral opinion. Most significantly, however, 89 percent of Indonesians considers the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan morally unjustifiable. A similar percentage would condemn any U.S. bombing of Iraq, although they do not support Saddam Hussein. One can credit Indonesian reforms in 1998, which granted more freedom of political expression, and global Islamic movements that pressure Muslims to reject foreign influence, for

the Indonesian government's not supporting the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan, even though they condemned the attacks of September 11th. This criticism represents a change in Indonesian opinion, which has historically supported U.S. policy.

Indonesian attitudes are reflected in two groups, namely (1) devout Muslims and (2) nominal Muslims and non-Muslims. In the past twenty years, the number of devout Muslims has increased significantly; they are generally divided into three groups: (a) the hard-liners, who promote an Islamic state, represent a vocal, but not radical, minority; (b) the liberals, also a minority, who want Islam only as the source of ethics and morality in society and support secularism; and (c) the moderates, the majority, who argue that Islam is not only a belief system, but also a social system, and should be implemented according to democratic principles.

The hardliners are influenced by Islamic movements in the Middle East, especially the the Muslim Brotherhood, but they strongly deny any connection to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda. *Front Pembela Islam* (The Front of Islam, the Protector), *Laskar Jihad* (The Jihad Militia) and *KISDI* (The Committee for Islamic World Solidarity) can be included in this group. Although hardliners, most of their actions are within the boundaries of Indonesian law, so it is not correct to call them radicals. The liberals are also a minority, for their ideas of liberalism and secularism are not acceptable for the majority of devout Muslims. The moderates constitute the majority of Indonesian Muslims; the two biggest Islamic organizations, namely *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, fall in this group.

All three groups accept U.S. science and technology. Unlike the "Islamic fundamentalists" of the Middle East, they also accept democracy, pluralism and human rights as the system and values of the state; they favor, however, a system that is compatible with Islam. While many Indonesians appreciate U.S. promotion of democracy and human rights in Indonesia, they question U.S. inconsistencies in implementing them throughout the world. Many believe that the U.S. often supports stability over democracy, as in the Middle East. They believe the U.S. supports self-interest over human rights, especially in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where the U.S. is accused of unbalanced support for Israel, while violating the human rights of the Palestinians.

U.S. ideas, their governmental and social system, and American culture can be divided into three groups: (1) objective, such as science and technology, (2) relatively objective, such as the political and economic systems and (3) subjective and

containing values, such as habits and entertainment. Likewise, Indonesians categorize U.S. cultural traits into three groups, namely, (a) positive, which includes hard-working, disciplined and tolerant, (b) negative, which includes materialistic, secular and sexually promiscuous, and (c) neutral, which includes technology and certain foods that have been exported to Indonesia.

The enormous power of the U.S. in almost all sectors of life has come to be called hegemony, a hegemony that leads to “homogeny”. We see U.S. products in almost all countries, not only in the form of high technology, but also entertainment (especially movies and music), foods (such as Coca-Cola, Sprite, McDonalds and Kentucky Fried Chicken) as well as types of clothing.

The major problem between the U.S. and the Muslim world is U.S. policy towards the Middle East. American ignorance of world geography and Islam contributes to this problem. It is worsened by lack of understanding on the part of people in Muslim countries of the U.S. The media exacerbate this problem by reporting world events incorrectly. Bad reporting has caused bad feelings in both Muslim countries and the U.S.

Efforts must be made to overcome these problems. Dialogue, educational programs like the Fulbright program and gestures on the part of the U.S. government, such as the White House’s celebration of the Islamic holiday *Id al-Fitr*, are ways to an eventual solution. The most important event to be noted today is the Saudi peace initiative, based on the U.N. resolutions 242 and 338.

**DENIZ ARSLAN ENGINSOY**  
**Washington Bureau Chief**  
**Anatolia News Agency**

Ms. Enginsoy stressed that Turkey is quite different from other Islamic nations in its approach to the war on terrorism. A majority of Muslims around the world consider the U.S. war against terrorism morally unjustifiable. Turks, however, have a deep secular tradition. As a result, a majority of Turks support the U.S. war.

Still, a significant minority of Turks oppose U.S. actions. They deny that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the 9/11 attacks and note that, while Bush emphasizes that this is a war against terrorism and not Islam, all the targets are Islamic.

Ms. Enginsoy suggested that America work on the moderates in the Islamic countries; she asserted that the best way to change hardliners’ minds

would be for America to “show its compassionate face.” Poverty and ignorance nurture terrorism. Support for education and economic aid would pay dividends. Moreover, as Deputy Secretary of Defense Woflowitz has said, the U.S. should support political reform. She also stressed that America should not compromise in the fight against terrorism.

Finally, she said it would also be a great help if the U.S. took the lead in peace efforts in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Ms. Enginsoy noted that the presence of Turkish troops among coalition partners in Afghanistan proved that this was not a way against Islam. Since 9/11, the Turkish media have been united in condemning terrorism, especially since Turkey has itself been a victim of terrorism. But this support could falter in the next phase against Iraq. Turks and their government fear chaos. While they oppose Saddam, they do not see a link to 9/11. And a majority of Turks do not see Saddam as a threat to them.

Ms. Enginsoy concluded that, while the Turkish government might reluctantly support military action to oust Saddam, Turks would also see such action as a threat to Turkey’s economy. Rapid success in military action against Saddam, however, might change some minds.

**DR. MOHAMED SAID**  
**U.S. Bureau Chief, *Al-Ahram***

To understand Arab views of the U.S., one should look beyond recent polls and the current context after 9/11 to see a deeper Arab appreciation of America’s anti-colonialist past and a continuing strong Arab affinity for American culture. Nevertheless, Arabs no longer see the U.S. as anti-colonialist and they resent what is seen as blind American support for Israel in its destruction of the Palestinian nation. Despite current resentments, there remains a strong well of warm feelings among Arabs toward America and its culture.

Dr. Said stressed that polls showing widespread Islamic opposition to the U.S. and its war on terrorism are misleading. The widely cited Gallup poll was taken at a time of particular difficulty and reflects an “aberration in a longstanding affinity” between the Islamic world and America. Moreover, the questions are themselves politically loaded.

One should eschew surface perceptions that such polls reveal and look deeper. For instance, Dr. Said said that he himself had long admired Ameri-

can culture, but he also disagreed with U.S. policy. This is not an impossible conflict.

Moreover, there is an “unrecognized proximity” between Arab and American cultures. Indeed, America remains a cultural reference point in the Islamic world, including in how the Arab media cover the news.

Nevertheless, Dr. Said remarked that his generation had experienced a fundamental change in perceptions of the United States. In the early 20th century, America was seen as Wilsonian and anti-colonial. Now, the U.S. is seen as neither revolutionary nor anti-colonial.

Most important, Arabs resent the U.S. for its perceived blind support of Israel and what is seen as Israel’s “large-scale destruction of the entire Palestinian nation.” They hold the U.S. responsible. Similarly, they blame the U.S. for the suffering of Iraqis.

Despite these strongly held views, Dr. Said noted that most Arab states are conservative and have, therefore, supported the U.S., including in its wars in Iraq and the Horn of Africa and against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, Dr. Said said, was the product of mistaken collaboration between U.S. foreign policy and a fundamentalist approach to Islam in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Still, Dr. Said concluded that, behind the strong Arab resentment of the U.S., there remains a “very sweet and soft” appreciation of America.

## DISCUSSION

**Question** There is talk of a new FM radio station proposed for the Middle East, intended to attract young listeners and broadcast American culture and ideas. Would this be attractive to its target audience?

**Sayed** We have no scarcity of American culture in the Middle East. Young Arabs today can recite the lyrics of songs in English more perfectly than I can speak to you in English. Understand that American media is not a product of the Arab world and not part of the Arab culture. There is no lack of richness in the Arab culture itself; the streets of Washington could be filled with Arab writing. I think Mr. Ross [Ambassador Christopher Ross who was on the February 19 panel] made it clear, though, that it is not enough for America to change its public diplomacy; it must change its foreign policy. To change the image of America in the Arab world today the U.S. must address peoples’ real problems. America must do something to change the

Arab condition. There is a great suffering there—refugees are detained and prevented from returning to their own homes; they often keep their house keys as a reminder of their plight. People from Russia and South Africa came recently to the Arab world and took Arab houses; the United States and the United Nations did nothing to prevent this. We must address the issue of Arab suffering and do so by changing American foreign policy.

**Question** I’d like to address this question to Prof. Abdillah. We heard quite a bit recently about the influence of Saudi Arabia on the media in Arab countries. Does this problem exist in Indonesia? I know from my own time in Indonesia that the Saudis have financed mosques in your country and most recently those mosques have become attached to schools. How much Saudi influence do you perceive in this regard?

**Abdillah** The influence of Saudi Arabia is not terribly strong in Indonesia. Saudi support comes only in the form of mosques. Once, my colleagues and I studied Saudi and American support for Indonesia, and we found that the United States contributes far more to our country. The influence of the Saudis is not terribly strong, especially in Indonesia’s understanding of religion. It is important to remember that our political system is drastically different from that of Saudi Arabia; the Indonesian state is a republic, not a kingdom, and a democracy, not an autocracy.

**Question** A recent article about news coverage in the United States posed a paradox and a disturbing comparison. Twenty-five years ago, 25 percent of American media coverage focused on international affairs; today the percentage is closer to 11 percent. This marks a dramatic shift in what we Americans classify as “news”. This may be tempered by the fact that Americans have access to the BBC or Al Jazeera on their televisions, but do you think that Arabs are better educated about the outside world than Americans? Does state-controlled media promote an unfavorable image of the outside world?

**Enginsoy** There is not a big interest in foreign news in Turkey. We have two news stations; still, international concerns at least have an effect on the people.

**Sayed** In my own experience, Egyptian media provide a balanced look at politics. It broadcasts both the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideas of more liberal factions. The government has control over the media, but, in my experience as a

writer, I have found its influence stops at the front page of the newspaper where all headlines must contain the name of President Mubarak. Papers do very professional work in covering international affairs. We emphasize international affairs at the expense of important domestic affairs. Our readership is highly educated on international issues because such issues affect us directly. You in the United States never needed to hear much about the outside world until after September 11th; for us, it has always been a matter of life and death.

**Abdillah** Since the fall of Suharto, Indonesia has become the most democratic and open country in the Muslim world. We have no problems in reporting Indonesian affairs as we see them. There is actually a kind of euphoria in the Indonesian press because so much freedom has come so rapidly.

**Question** As you know, the U.S. State Department has a new Director of Public Diplomacy, who is working hard to change the perception of the United States in the Arab world and who is consulting many Muslim groups. If she were to come to you, what advice would you give?

**Enginsoy** In general, Turkey has no misconceptions of the United States, so this is not a substantial problem.

**Abdillah** Changing Indonesian perceptions of Americans is not as important as changing general Muslim misunderstanding of Americans. The prevailing image is that the United States and the western world are not good; when I meet people who feel this way, I tell them that this is not true. To change the misperceptions, people in the Muslim world must begin to understand the American culture. Thirteen years ago, what I perceived about the United States was not correct; I imagined that the United States was like the movies—full of violence and erotica. Mutual understanding between the American and Muslim worlds is the most important first step.

**Sayed** No amount of public relations can alter the facts—we must have a change before Muslims can embrace Americans. Specifically, the issue of the Palestinian suffering is very important. Palestinians are denied basic human rights. Americans basically said that the Palestinian problem was not their business, and left us to go out and kill each other. I would call this behavior unprofessional—it is not political science as I have learned it in the United States. There is a perception that issues are defined as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ because Americans tell us that they are good or bad.

We must bring the American and Egyptian people into close contact. American policy is arrogant, but the American individual is nice, generous, gracious, and friendly. People who come to this country like Americans. I feel very at ease in the United States, because you Americans have such tremendous sociability, art, and ingenuity. Why don’t Americans act more in accordance with your traditional thinking? Why don’t you make the world trust you and like you as a good friend? You have a lousy foreign policy, not just in relation to us. It is not just Arabs who believe this; look at India, and even Europe. All will tell you that American policy is too favorable to Israel and neglects the best interests of the rest of the world. I like Mr. Powell, but he went recently to India and Pakistan advocating a peaceful solution to their disputes. Instead of staying in the region to help the peace process, he left the two sides to work it out on their own. I have supported him publicly, but my advice is to bring international politics close to the people—because you Americans have a tremendous society, and tremendous abilities that people can appreciate. Make those skills and traits clear in your foreign policy.

**Question** The foreign policy of the United States has been unclear, as the administration set its agenda since 9/11. They claim to be cutting off anti-American propaganda, but they have been doing this for years. Your thoughts?

**Sayed** I think that America has a right to demand the elimination of all hate speech in our countries. Eliminating hatred has always been a policy of our governments; it is a regime interest, not just an American interest. We must educate our people about the fallacy of questionable religious texts, or religious teachings that are presented questionably. America is doing good things in the Muslim world. It did a terrific job of dealing with the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo, although their intervention was too late to prevent tragedies like Srebrenica. Muslims and Arabs never give credit to the United States on that issue. However, if you are not going to correct your image, why should I do it? You have sent the worst possible message to the Arab world; when they see your errors, their hatred grows. For example, if your brother breaks a chair, you criticize him for his lack of respect for your property, but you may also criticize him for being lazy, a drunkard, or any of his other vices. You do not confine your resentment to the sin that set it off. This is the situation in Muslim perceptions of Americans today.

## BIOGRAPHIES

### DR. MASYKURI ABDILLAH Fulbright Visiting Scholar Boston University

Lecturer at the Faculty of Shari'ah/Graduate Studies, State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), Jakarta

#### Education

Dr. Phil. (*magna cum laude*) in Islamic studies (and political/legal sciences as minor) at the University of Hamburg (1995).

Dr. in Islamic law (and legal science as minor) at the Faculty of Shari'ah, IAIN Jakarta (1985).

BA. in Islamic law (and legal science as minor) at the Faculty of Shari'ah, PTIQ Jakarta (1981).

#### Positions and Experiences

Vice Rector IV (for Inter-Institutional Cooperation) IAIN Jakarta. (2000-present).

Lecturer at the Faculty of Shari'ah/Graduate Studies, IAIN Jakarta (1996-present).

Lecturer at the Graduate Studies, PTIQ Jakarta and UNISMA (1999-present).

Director of the Center for Human Resources Development (PPSDM), IAIN Jakarta (1998-present).

Lecturer at the Faculty of Public Health, University of Indonesia (1996–2000).

Director of the Institute for the Study and Advancement of Civil Society (ISACS) Jakarta (1999–2000).

Head of the Department of Islamic Business Law and Islamic Banking, Faculty of Shari'ah, IAIN Jakarta (1997–1998).

Chairman of the Institute for Social and Population Studies (1986–1989).

Chairman of the Central Board of the Indonesian Muslim Students Movement (PMII, 1985–1988).

#### Publications (not all)

Book writer of *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy* (1966–1993); (Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1997), translated into Indonesian under the title, *Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna: Respons Intelektual Muslim Indonesia terhadap Konsep Demokrasi* (1966–1993), (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1999).

#### Article Contributor of Various Anthologies

Jamal D. Rahman (ed.), *Wacana Baru Fiqh Sosial*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1997); Azyumardi Azra (ed.),

*Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial-Politik*, (Jakarta: PPIM, 1998); M. Deden Ridwan (ed.), *Demokratisasi Kekuasaan*, (Jakarta: LSAF, 1999); AS. Hikam et. al., *Wacana Politik Hukum dan Demokrasi Hukum Indonesia*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1999); Hamid Basyaib (ed.), *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?* (Jakarta: Alvabet, 1999); Achmad Fathoni Rodli (ed.), *Berguru kepada Bapak Bangsa: Kumpulan Esai Menelusuri Jejak Pemikiran KH. Abdurrahman Wahid*, (Jakarta: PP GP Ansor, 1999), Franz M. Parera (ed.), *Demokratisasi dan Otonomi*, (Jakarta: Kompas, 1999), LSAF (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Transisi Menuju Demokrasi*, (Jakarta: LSAF, 1999), and Abdul Mun'im DZ, (ed.), *Islam di Tengah Arus Transisi*, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2000), Komaruddin Hidayat dan Hendro Prasetyo (ed.), *Problem & Prospek IAIN: Antologi Pendidikan Tinggi Islam*, (Jakarta: Ditbinperta, 2000).

#### Article Writer in Various Newspapers

*Kompas, The Jakarta Post, Republika, Media Indonesia, Merdeka, Pelita, Wawasan and Suara Merdeka*; journals: *ASIEN, Studia Islamika, Afjkar, Perta, Ahkam, Dialog, Madrasah, Mimbar Ulama, Mimbar Hukum, Mimbar Budaya Hikmah, Jauhar, Civility and Madania*.

#### Speaker

IAIN Jakarta, IAIN Yogyakarta, IAIN Lampung, IAIN Padang, LIPI Jakarta, University of Indonesia Jakarta/Depok, University of Muhammadiyah Jakarta, University of Hasanuddin Makassar, Catholic University Atma Jaya Jakarta, Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (LSAF) Jakarta, Institute for Social Institution Studies (ISIS) Jakarta, P3M Jakarta, Paramadina Jakarta, Lembaga Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia (Lakpesdam NU), International Forum for Islamic Studies (IFIS), Forum Indonesia Satu (FIS) Jakarta, etc.

#### International Conferences, Workshops and Symposiums (not all)

Speaker at the International Seminar on Islam and Humanism, held by the IAIN Walisongo, Semarang, November 5–8, 2000.

Speaker at the International Seminar on Islam and the West: Islamic and Modern Concepts of Governance and Democracy, held by the Yayasan 2020, Goethe Institute, the British Council, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, April 11–12, di Jakarta.

Speaker at the International Conference on Islam and the Electoral Process, held by the Interna-

tional Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Leiden University, December 1999.

Participant at the International Conference of German Oriental Society, held by the University of Bonn, September/October 1998.

Speaker at the International Symposium on Practices of Malayo-Islamic Worldview, held by the Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies (PRO-SEA), Academia Sinica, Taiwan, November 1997.

Speaker at the International Workshop on Islamic Revivalism and State Response: The Experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, held by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, December 1996 and June 1997.

Participant at the International Conference on Muslim-Christian Relations: Past, Present and Future Dialogue and Cooperation, held by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs-Temple University-Hartford Seminary, August 1997.

Speaker at the International Conference on Islam and the 21st Century, held by Leiden University, June 1996.

Participant in the International Visitors Program on "Youth Leadership in the United States" held by the U.S. State Department/USIA (1987).

**DR. JON ALTERMAN**  
**Council of Foreign Relations Fellow**  
**U.S. Department of State**

Jon B. Alterman is a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, and an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of *New Media, New Politics? From satellite television to the Internet in the Arab world* (1998), and a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of the *Middle East Journal*.

Alterman is currently on leave from his position in the Research and Studies Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Before joining the Institute, Alterman taught at Harvard University, from which he received a Ph.D. in history. He has also worked as a legislative aide to Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY). Prior to entering government service, Alterman was a frequent commentator on leading international news outlets, as well as the author of numerous journal articles, book chapters, and opinion pieces on issues related to Middle East security issues and new media in the developing world.

**DENIZ ARSLAN ENGINSOY**  
**Washington Bureau Chief**  
**Anatolia News Agency**

**Educational Information**

1996–1997: Received courses at Sociology Dept., Hacettepe University in Ankara, as special student.

1988–1992: Received BA degree from News Media Dept., Gazi University in Ankara.

1985–1988: Yukselis High School in Ankara, education in English.

**Professional Information**

April 1999–Ongoing: Washington bureau chief, Anatolia News Agency of Turkey

Feb. 1998–April 1999: Diplomatic correspondent at Ankara headquarters of Anatolia News Agency.

Mar. 1996–Feb. 1998: Reporter at Ankara bureau of the French news agency Agence France-Presse.

Sept. 1994–Mar. 1996: Environment correspondent at Ankara bureau of *Hurriyet* newspaper.

Mar. 1994–Sept. 1994: Correspondent at Kibris newspaper in Nicosia, North Cyprus.

**Sports Background**

1985–1998: Played professional basketball in Turkey and North Cyprus.

1993: Invited to Turkey's women's national basketball team.

**MARJORIE RANSOM**  
**Project Director, ISD**  
**Panel Moderator**

Marjorie Ransom's career of 30 years brought her to the rank of Career Minister, the second highest in the Foreign Service.

She served throughout her career in the U.S. Information Agency, specializing in cultural exchange, press, and education. A Middle East specialist and Arabic speaker, she served as the first female officer in Amman, Jordan in 1963 and subsequently headed Public Affairs sections in the American Embassies of Sanaa, Yemen; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Damascus, Syria, and Cairo, Egypt—the last a section so large it exceeded many embassies in size.

In 1995–1997, she served a second tour in Damascus, Syria in a key State Department job, that of Deputy Chief of Mission, the number two job in the Embassy. During that time there were seven trips by the Secretary of State in a valiant but unsuccessful quest for a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.



From 1997 to 2000, she was the Director of the Department's three foreign press centers in Washington, New York and Los Angeles. In that capacity, she led the U.S. government effort to inform foreign journalists in the U.S. and through them large foreign audiences abroad about U.S. policy, society and institutions.

With her husband, also a Foreign Service Officer, she pioneered in tandem assignments, serving with him (a State Department political officer) in the same embassies three times. The overlap and difference in their interests made for a rich family life for their three daughters, now all graduated from college and launched in careers of their own.

In November, 2000, Ms. Ransom retired from the Department of State to devote more time to her family and to her extensive personal interests: U.S. public diplomacy towards the Middle East, researching, cataloguing and documenting her considerable collection of the folk silver jewelry of the Middle East and Central Asia and volunteer activities in prison ministry and mentoring a District of Columbia public school student.

**MOHAMED EL SAYED SAID**  
**U.S. Bureau Chief, *Al-Ahram***

**Education**

1983: Ph.D. in Political Science, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

1979: M.A. in Political Science; M.A. in Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt

1973: Graduate Diploma in Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt

1972: B.A. in Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt

**Employment**

2002: U.S. Bureau Chief, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper

1994–2001: Deputy Director, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper, in Cairo; Research Advisor, Cairo's Institute for Human Rights Studies

1990–1994: Assistant Director, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper

1983–1989: Expert and Head of the Arab Affairs Unit, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper

1981–1983: Researcher, Center for International Development, The University of Maryland at College Park

1979–1981: Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

1975–1979: Journalist and Researcher, Center of Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper

1975: Liaison Officer, Egyptian National Commission of UNESCO

1972–1975: Army Conscript

**Books (Author)**

*Multinational Corporations: Their Political and Economic Impact on the Third World* (in Arabic) Cairo, Egyptian Public Book Authority, 1977.

*Immigrants' Absorption Policy in Israel* (in Arabic) Cairo, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper, 1976.

*Transnational Corporations and the Future of Nationalism* (in Arabic), Kuwait Alam El Merefa (World of Knowledge, 107) 1986.

*The Political Economy of Migration in Egypt 1974–1989* (in English). The Population Council, Cairo, 1990.

*The Future of the Arab Regional System in the Aftermath of the Gulf Crisis* (in Arabic), Alam El Merefa (The World of Knowledge), Kuwait, 1992.

*Introduction to Understanding the Human Rights System*, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, 1995.

*Technological Revolution: Implications for Egypt*, *Al-Ahram*, 1997.

*A Call for Progress: The Absorption of High Technology in Egypt* (in Arabic), *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, 1998.

*Egypt's Renaissance and Foreign Policy*. *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, 1999.

*Businessmen, Democracy and Human Rights*. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, 2001.

**Books Co-Author**

The Arab League Between Regime Security and National Liberation, in Mohammed Ayoub (Ed.), *Religion Security in the Third World*, London, Croom Helm, 1986.

Co-author and Editor of the Arab Section, *The Arab Strategic Reports 1985, 1986, 1987* (in Arabic) Center for Political And Strategic Studies, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper, Cairo, 1987.

Co-author and Executive Editor of the Arab Strategic Reports, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 1992, 1993.

*The Egyptian Wisdom*. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, 2001 (Book Fair Prize-Winning Book in Social Studies in 2001).

**Editor (In Chief), and Co-Author**

*The Arab Strategic Report, 1994* (in Arabic and English), Center For Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Ahram* Newspaper, Cairo, 1995.

*Human Rights in Egypt*, The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Cairo, 1989 (in Arabic).

*Human Rights Guarantees Under the Palestinian Self-Rule Authority*. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 1995 (in Arabic and English); Cairo, 1995.

Editor and Co-author: *The Arab World and Change in the International System*, Institute of Arab Studies, The Arab League, Cairo, 1991.

**Membership in Public Purpose Societies**

Ex-member of the Board of Trustees, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights; EOCHR.

Member of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, AOHR.

Membership in Professional Organizations: Egyptian Press Syndicate, African Press Union, Egyptian Society for Political Economy, Jurisprudence and Statistics, Arab Society for Political Science, African Studies Association.