

THE STRUGGLE OVER THE INFORMATION SPACE IN NATO'S WAR FOR KOSOVO

By Kristina Riegert*

Summary

In this increasingly globalised world of instant financial transactions, where state sovereignty is increasingly undermined and where a plethora of media channels opens new communication possibilities for civic activists, lobbying groups, international organisations – as well as for terrorist groups – the Information Age brings new challenges. *Information Operations* is a concept that has only been incorporated into the military doctrines of the US and NATO in the late 1990s. While the activities gathered under the concept of Information Operations are not new, the attempt to co-ordinate and integrate them into an overall strategy that utilises the rapid advances in information and communications technology is part of what is often referred to as a “revolution” in military affairs.

The *US Joint Publication 3-13* defines Information Operations broadly as, “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems”. The type of information systems referred to here include everything from computer-based systems, electronic information systems to human deci-

sion-making processes. *JP 3-13* also stresses that there are “no fixed boundaries in the information environment. Open and interconnected systems are coalescing into a rapidly expanding global information infrastructure”. The existence of a global information infrastructure²⁴² means that there is not one battlefield, but many, and these include civilian and commercial sectors of societies. The issues that IO doctrine raises are thus not only the interdependence between military and civilian sectors of societies (and the need for increased cooperation), but the intertwining of national and international information environments (and the legal issues this entails). It is strange, then, that the ultimate target of information warfare, namely human decision-making processes, should get such short shrift in US and NATO Information Operations doctrines. Little is said, for example, about the role of public information systems, although the media can be a decisive factor for whether political objectives are obtained.²⁴³

The purpose of this report is to present and analyse the perceptual aspects of Information Operations/Information Warfare through the

* Kristina Riegert has a PhD in Political Science and is Lecturer at the Department of Media and Communication at Södertörn University in Stockholm, Sweden.

prism of its ultimate goal – human decision-making processes. Using the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 – here called the “Kosovo conflict” – as a case study, the report maps the extent to which the parties to the conflict invoked the perceptual aspects of Information Warfare in their struggle to influence one another’s attitudes and behaviour, as well as the media and public opinion in different countries. The report concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned and not learned from the Kosovo conflict.

The report operationalises the perceptual aspects of IO/IW by gathering such activities under Dearth’s (2000) conceptualisation of *Perception Management*, which includes the military disciplines of Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Psychological Operations, Deception and Covert Action. Perception management concerns using or withholding information that will influence leaders’ and “foreign” audiences’ emotions, motives and objective reasoning.²⁴⁴ The ultimate goal of IO, says Dearth, is to shape the “Information Space” to one’s own advantage. This report was written under the assumption that one of the main “shapers” of the Information Space is the international and national news media. Since one of the weapons of asymmetric warfare has been to use the news media and morally defined rules of engagement as spearheads in an attempt to drive a wedge between democratic decision-makers and public opinion, the Kosovo conflict provides an interesting case study.

Perceptual Aspects of NATO’s Information Warfare in the Kosovo Conflict

NATO’s military strikes on Yugoslav territory began 24 March 1999 and lasted for 78 days, ending officially on 10 June. Prior to the campaign, only the US had a developed IO doctrine.²⁴⁵ NATO’s Military Committee presented a framework policy (MC-422) for Information

Operations that was approved by the North Atlantic Council just three months before the strikes began in 1999.²⁴⁶ Thus, when the Kosovo conflict began, neither the member states nor NATO itself had integrated IO strategy into their military structures or operational environments. Furthermore, as the Defence Committee of the House of Commons noted:

*An effective information operations campaign by NATO would have required an integrated political-military effort. At all levels from grand strategy, through doctrine, training and resourcing to intelligence support information operations were not adequately incorporated into national or Alliance planning.*²⁴⁷

To be sure, NATO used IO weapons during the Kosovo conflict – among them, Command-and-Control Warfare (C2W), electronic warfare, psychological operations, public information and public diplomacy. These were not, however, planned and co-ordinated at the strategic level as envisioned by IO doctrine, but implemented *ad hoc*, as the situation arose. According to British government reports and parliamentary inquiries, there were a number of successful IO-related attacks on Yugoslavia’s air defence systems, communication lines, and mass media systems.²⁴⁸ The electromagnetic (graphite) bombings of power plants and transformer stations were considered by observers and military analysts to be among the more successful attacks. The periodic blackouts caused by bombing became more and more frequent and made repairs increasingly difficult. The attacks were effective from both a physical and a psychological point of view – they not only blocked computers (including military systems), but also greatly inconvenienced the civilian population, which put pressure on the Yugoslav government.²⁴⁹ Yet, as Hubbard points out, “IO and IW target

the cognitive processes of the adversary's decision-makers to shape their behavior to conform to the security interests and desires of the US and its allies".²⁵⁰ The extent to which the Yugoslav leadership was affected by these attacks has been difficult to evaluate.

The term *media management* used in this report encompasses what military doctrine calls Public Affairs/Information and Public Diplomacy. That is, the strategies, activities and routines used by the political and military leaderships to convey information internally and externally, i.e. to the media and the public, so that the preferred message is received. The focus in this study is on the civilian-dominated NATO Information Office and its media operations, not on NATO's military Public Information Officers, since the focus of media coverage during the Kosovo conflict emanated from the former rather than the latter.²⁵¹

NATO's media management during the Kosovo conflict is often considered one of the less successful aspects of this Information War. In fairness, this was largely due to the fact that this was the first war of its kind – 19 member states, 19 national media and 19 spheres for public opinion constitute a mammoth task for which NATO had no preparedness. The NATO media operation was very much *trial by error*; it became more adept as the conflict progressed. NATO's main problem was that its credibility was compromised in mid-conflict – a significant problem since the success of media managing "depends significantly on the ability to maintain absolute credibility."²⁵²

NATO's credibility was questioned after some 70 Albanians were killed in the bombing of two refugee convoys near Djakovica on 14 April 1999. Following days of accusations, evasions, and conflicting information, NATO finally admitted responsibility. A team headed by Prime Minister Blair's Press Secretary Alas-

tair Campbell and President Clinton's speechwriter Jonathan Prince, was brought in to reorganise and reinforce the Information Office. Former NATO spokesman Jamie Shea likened the new organisation to a political campaign with seasoned professionals monitoring the media around-the-clock.²⁵³ The team increased the number of personnel, improved coordination between the military and political arms of NATO, and between the NATO capitals, so that the Allies would be seen to be speaking "with one voice".²⁵⁴ Shea summarised the functions of the newly renamed Media Operations Centre as follows:

- Occupying the space: being on the air constantly with briefings, interviews, speeches;
- Planning events for the media: press conferences, interviews, trips to refugee camps;
- Coordinating external activities and deconflicting;
- Media Monitoring: in the Allied countries and in Yugoslavia;
- Rebuttals and replies;
- SHAPE liaison: information to and from the military arm of NATO; and
- Writing and placing debate articles, research, and analysis.²⁵⁵

The strategy of occupying the media space with one's own message appears to be one of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, one major element of which was "feeding the media". Occupying the space increased NATO's chance of setting the agenda with its own stories and themes since it kept journalists busy, giving them less time to dig up other stories, and played to the weaknesses of 24-hour television news by exploiting the thirst for the latest "twist" in the story.

Prior to the convoy incident, NATO had no possibility of monitoring the Serb media, no resources to monitor the media in member

countries, or to fully co-ordinate the media message among national governments. Due to the continuing problems of getting information from the military, and the international media's access to events on the ground in Serbia, Serb media monitoring became an "early warning indication" that civilians were involved in a NATO attack. Secondly, the lack of Serb media monitoring meant that it was difficult to quickly respond to Serb claims with rebuttals and disclaimers, which gave the adversary the advantage of time.

The Media Operations Centre was meant to improve information delays between the political and military arms of NATO, and between NATO headquarters and the Pentagon, but the MOC continued to have difficulty obtaining correct and timely information from the military, in particular due to US restrictions on the release of information.²⁵⁶ More successful was the co-ordination between the national governments, which consisted of a number of daily conference calls and the simultaneous release of the same material and message. One of the lessons learned by NATO was, thus, that deployment of a crisis management team, including a dramatic increase in personnel, was required at the first sign of a crisis and that the media needed to be integrated into NATO exercises.²⁵⁷

The Internet and the Battle for Public Opinion

In order to win a "media war" three types of opinion are important: domestic opinion, adversary opinion and allied opinion/world opinion. NATO considered allied opinion problematic since opinion was predominantly negative in Italy and Greece as well as in some of Yugoslavia's neighbouring countries. One of the tasks of the office was to contribute debates to the press by sending in Op-Ed. pieces and letters to the editor, but these informa-

tion efforts were focussed on the larger alliance partners such as the US, the UK, France and Germany. One of the lessons learned by the spokesman's office was, thus, that public opinion had to be mobilised differently in different countries due to historical, political and cultural factors, and that specific media campaigns had to be devised in specific national settings.²⁵⁸

Adversary opinion – that of the Yugoslav government, its soldiers and civilians – was important for a number of reasons, not least of which was the prospect of undermining support for the government, thereby shortening the conflict. In this respect, the NATO Information Office the overwhelming show of force and destruction, which aired nightly on satellite channels such as CNN, BBC World and Sky News, would convince the Yugoslav leadership that there was no hope of winning. This was under girded by messages that the Alliance would remain firm, and would see the campaign through until its demands were met. However, due to early news reports of divisions between NATO governments and to negative public opinion in some NATO countries, there is little evidence that this had any influence. President Milosevic's strategy was to enlist Russian aid, while waiting and hoping that the images of the war would turn public opinion, and the "wobbly" Alliance members, against the war.

NATO used traditional PSYOPS tactics, such as EC-130E "Commando Solo" radio and television broadcasts, and leaflets in an effort to influence civilians and soldiers throughout Yugoslavia. These had little effect on the Serb population, due to technical problems as well as content factors.²⁵⁹ According to Collins, the leaflets "betrayed an astonishingly shallow knowledge of the political and cultural dynamics of the region."²⁶⁰ For their part, the NATO Media Operations Centre considered it 'im-

possible" to influence Serb opinion since it could not gain access to the Serb media to present its case. Television and radio were considered the best media for reaching the international "masses". The Internet was never considered a viable tool for influencing Serb or international opinion, because one's message does not 'get out' there.²⁶¹ This was claimed despite the fact that NATO spent considerable time refuting rumours spread on the Internet, for example that it was planning to use bacteriological warfare against Yugoslavia.

This casual attitude toward the Internet is interesting in light of the rush to call the Kosovo conflict the first Internet war. Although the Internet was not especially widespread in Europe, and even less so in Yugoslavia, those who did use it for information-gathering, debating and criticising the war comprised an economic, educated and influential elite. Academics, radical Western critics as well as anti-Milosevic opposition voices formulated a critical discourse on aspects of the war, not found in the mainstream media. They questioned NATO's motives, its military strategy, the legality of the intervention, and the regional and environmental consequences of the conflict. Taylor says of the Internet, "this was a significant target audience for anyone battling for access to hearts and minds about the rights and wrongs or any given issue. The Serbs realized this, but not NATO".²⁶² If one of NATO's goals was to weaken President Milosevic's power position, then it was negligent not to attempt to address this audience.

The extradition of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians to neighbouring countries at the start of the Kosovo conflict was a gift dropped into the lap of NATO's Information Office. Fortunately, NATO's civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) efforts to convince Yugo-

slavia's neighbours to at least passively support Operation Allied Force succeeded, and NATO literally took over the co-ordination of aid and relief efforts, its soldiers building the roads and facilities for the refugee camps. The NATO Information Office used this to revive its image as the "good guy" – the strategy being to shift the focus from NATO's military tactics to the humanitarian crisis.²⁶³ From here the media could demonstrate NATO's humanitarian efforts, and the evil of the Serb "military machine" as well as justify the bombings in one fell swoop.

The View from Yugoslavia

NATO failed to persuade the Yugoslav population of the righteousness of its cause. From a Serb perspective, this failure was not only due to the unconvincing form and content of the messages aimed at the population, but also to a lack of co-ordination between the messages and the development of the bombing campaign. The campaign was not designed in such a way as to strengthen these messages, but instead appeared to contradict them. Secondly, there was very little attempt to create identification between NATO and the civilian population in Yugoslavia.

NATO's main messages were that every precaution was being taken to avoid civilian casualties, and that NATO had no quarrel with the Serb people. Yet, as the campaign dragged on, infrastructure targets were hit with increasing frequency, incurring major environmental damage and recurrent electrical blackouts that threatened the water supply. No attempt was made to justify the targets chosen, such as the heavy attacks on Novi Sad in Vojvodina, and the bridges in the northern part of the country.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, NATO waited until mid-April to bomb targets associated with the

Milosevic regime and its political and business allies, although the campaign was said to be directed primarily at the government.

Independent Serb journalists, academics and civil rights organisers monitored international news organisations on a regular basis, either by satellite television, radio or the Internet. One of the most trusted sources of information was *Radio Free Europe's South Slavic Programming*.²⁶⁵ The international media, such as CNN, *Sky News* and *BBC*, were considered trustworthy, but biased toward NATO for the following reasons: personal animosity towards Jamie Shea, misleading and false information, exaggerated statistics on missing and dead Kosovo Albanians, and the feeling that the media saw only the Kosovo Albanians as victims in the conflict. The Serb perspective in Western media outlets was represented solely by those repeating the government line, excluding other Yugoslav views that presented other types of arguments against the bombing.

Key to understanding the Yugoslavian information environment is the media landscape and the coverage during the conflict. In October 1998, the Yugoslav government imposed a Draconian Law on Public Information, which effectively muzzled the independent media. This preceded a crackdown on media organisations in the months leading up to the conflict. When the bombing began in March 1999, the Serbian Information Minister Aleksander Vucic introduced war censorship. This included detailed instructions on close daily contact with the Information Ministry, and on what aspects of the war were to be highlighted or played down.²⁶⁶ When NATO tried to eliminate the government-controlled Yugoslav media system, it lost propaganda points in the process. Broadcasting repeaters, transmitters and communication facilities were frequent targets, but when these were bombed the

government simply took over those belonging to the independent media. Thus government-controlled *Radio and Television Serbia (RTS)* was back on the air within hours of the NATO bombing of its main Belgrade building.

What did the Yugoslav media report? One of the narratives dominating RTS news coverage was the infrastructure targets hit, especially when these were schools, factories, hospitals and bridges. While RTS was the main media source for target reports, much of this information was supplied by spontaneously and independently organised radio amateurs and civil defence centres.²⁶⁷ A content analysis of the main evening news programme on RTS, *Dnevnik 2*, revealed that 40% of the coverage during the 78-day campaign consisted of civilian or government "resistance to NATO".²⁶⁸ These news items dealt with activities such as protest marches, the "We are all targets" slogan and accompanying bulls eye, the "defence of the bridges" campaign, rock concerts, interviews with refugees from Kosovo, activities in the bunkers and the ways in which the government was aiding the population. Incidentally, the bulls eye slogan, the rock concerts, the protest activities and "human shields" on the bridges were either organised or usurped by the government or the local authorities, and filmed for television. These may thus be called Serb psychological operations.²⁶⁹

One-quarter of the news coverage on *Dnevnik 2* dealt with negative reactions world-wide – protests against the bombing in other countries and statements against the war by international celebrities or politicians. There was little coverage of the military activities in Kosovo and, needless to say, little concerning the humanitarian situation in the province. Those fleeing from the province, when shown, were said to be fleeing from NATO's bombs.

Thus, the focus of government-controlled media was on the infrastructural targets, the resistance of Yugoslavia, and the support of “the entire world” against NATO.²⁷⁰

The Yugoslav media exploited the opportunities provided by NATO misinformation and collateral damage episodes: for example, when NATO said that Kosovo Albanians were being rounded up in a stadium in Pristina, Serb television went live to the empty stadium. When Kosovo Albanian leader Rugova was reported missing, Serb television showed footage of Rugova being interviewed by international journalists. Against the background of ten years of government-controlled news coverage depicting external involvement in the Balkans as fundamentally anti-Serb, where counter-propaganda in the form of explicit rebuttals of claims in the international media were common, this type of coverage was not exceptional in Yugoslavia.²⁷¹

The use of the Internet rose drastically, from 80,000 till 105,000 users during the bombing campaign. The Internet was considered a lifeline by the NGO sector, independent journalists and academics. Here they could access unfiltered information, share information with each other, debate among themselves, and make their voices heard abroad. Although the Yugoslav government evinced little savvy in its use of the Internet, it did encourage Serbia’s computer experts and hackers to use their talents. The “war in cyberspace” was thus the result of different spontaneous efforts – nationalistic exile groups, Serb hackers, the opposition, students organised by moneyed individuals – whose intent was to make their views known, to influence international opinion or to sabotage NATO and member countries’ computer systems. The most common methods used by these different groups were: setting up home pages, sending petitions of protest, voting in Internet opinion surveys, parti-

cipating in news groups, spamming, ping-pong, sending viruses or sabotage of official government or NATO’s home pages.²⁷²

The Yugoslav defence against NATO remained essentially within the realm of perceptions – military deception, psychological operations and media management. The Milosevic government exploited NATO’s Achilles’ heel by attempting to sway opinion through the media and thus provoke a split within the Alliance. Although this ultimately did not succeed, the Yugoslav media coverage of NATO’s targets turned attention from what was happening in Kosovo to what was happening in Serbia, and put the Alliance on the defensive against its own constituencies rather than on the offensive against Yugoslavia. Indeed, NATO’s media management methods were the subject of controversy long after the war was over. Reports questioning the claims about the damage inflicted on the Serb military and the extent of the atrocities caused a great deal of unease among British journalists as to whether they had been manipulated.²⁷³ A media war is not necessarily over, even when the actual war is won.

Kosovo Media Coverage and Opinion in Europe

What effect did the two protagonists have on international media coverage and public opinion? A number of media studies have demonstrated that the major news organisations in the member countries uncritically repeated the NATO version of the conflict. Dissent and debate about the legal and moral implications of NATO’s new role in Europe were marginalised.²⁷⁴ The media participated in the personification of the conflict, and the demonisation of President Milosevic, which was often generalised to the Serbs as a people. With the notable exception of Greece, the national media in NATO countries cast their spotlights on the

plight of the Kosovo Albanians in refugee camps on the borders of Yugoslavia. The KLA's role in the conflict received little attention and the reasons for the onset of the campaign – the collapse of the Rambouillet talks – remained obscure. The results of these media studies demonstrate that criticism of NATO was a function of the media's assessment of NATO's actions, rather than those of Yugoslavia. This means that the conflict was depicted in positive or less positive terms depending on the medium's interpretation of NATO's goals, tactics and the consequences of the war.

Media studies of previous conflicts have shown that the alignment between national media coverage and foreign policy is related to the political, economic or cultural proximity of the country to the conflict.²⁷⁵ While the press generally has a more nuanced picture of conflicts than does television, different studies on this particular conflict demonstrate that the national media reflected the mood in that specific country. Thus, the British and the US media were among the most supportive of the NATO intervention, despite reservations about the effectiveness of an air campaign without a ground offensive. The German and French elite press were more sceptical, and even the mainstream media of two countries as similar as NATO ally Norway and non-aligned Sweden evinced differences in criticism towards the war.²⁷⁶ Although the Swedish media, like the media of NATO member countries, were heavily influenced by Anglo-American sources, there was clearer critical edge in the specific Swedish focus on the possible consequences of the conflict and the sufferings of the civilian population – both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This critical coverage increased after the aforementioned 'convoy incident', which caused NATO's credibility to be questioned, and the intensification of infrastructural bombing. Nohrstedt et al concludes

that this "discourse of empathy" in the news coverage resulted from a combination of media logic (i.e., the need for a war with a human face) and NATO's media and collateral damage mistakes.²⁷⁷

The European media could, thus, hardly be accused of adopting the Yugoslav media version of events. This notwithstanding, public opinion in a number of European countries (Sweden, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Italy and Greece) was predominantly negative or split at the outset of the campaign.²⁷⁸ The ability of international journalists to observe and record the damage inflicted on the Serb infrastructure and population contributed to criticism of a campaign that appeared to drag on with little result. Polls indicated a waning of public support in a number of NATO countries, with Britain being the only exception. Opinion in Germany and the US, never strongly supportive, grew weaker as the campaign dragged on.²⁷⁹ For countries such as France, Germany, and Italy, with governing coalitions including Socialist or Green Parties, any changes in NATO strategy were particularly vulnerable to criticism.

The differences between a predominantly supportive European media and a divided public opinion are significant insofar as politicians and the military tend to assume casual relations between the mainstream media and public opinion. This cannot be taken for granted, especially in an era of increasing globalisation. As scholars have observed, declining identification, legitimisation and participation in existing political party systems is augmented by globalisation's erosion of national sovereignty. As the convergence of print, television and digital communication media continues, so does the concentration of media industry ownership and the fragmentation of audiences.²⁸⁰ The mainstream media have increasingly come to be seen by audiences, civic

groups, lobbies and government *as a power elite in their own right*. Digital communication and the Internet have provided alternative fora for networking and organising new global social movements, potentially dangerous disaffected groups and the medium of choice for critical voices for whom the political system offers no alternative.²⁸¹ I do not suggest that public opinion on the Kosovo conflict was shaped by the Internet, but that there should be an awareness of the declining credibility of mainstream media and the fragmentation of media audiences as forces shaping the Information Space.

The lessons of Kosovo as regards shaping the Information Space were, thus, the need for improved military-civilian co-operation, and to address and prepare for the key role of the media in warfaring. This means planning for a media crisis centre to facilitate the flow of information at the first sign of a crisis, to closely monitor the media of allies, adversaries and geographically important nations, to quickly react to negative or untrue allegations and to understand the importance of the Internet as a

factor in shaping the Information Space. Finally, and most importantly, it is essential to gain an understanding of the cultural and political terrain of the adversary.

In this age of global media convergence, domestic media and opinion are no longer the only target audiences. Different national media interpret events according to historical, political and cultural contingencies. The same messages will not be interpreted similarly in different cultural contexts. This means that an *understanding* of the political and cultural background of the relevant international actors is essential. Shaping the Information Space implies recognising the need for intimate civilian and military co-operation, as well as for integrating the media into *preparations* for crisis situations. It means understanding the consequences of visual images of the conflict, and preparing to deal with the backlash in a non-dogmatic way. Shaping the Information Space means monitoring the foreign media, including the Internet. Know your enemy; know your allies.

Footnotes 242–281

242) Joint Chiefs of Staff (1998) Chapter I, I-13.

243) It is mentioned as an afterthought, "Other activities that may contribute to offensive IO include, but are not limited to, PA [public affairs] and CA [civil affairs]". Author's parenthesis. Ibid. Chapter II: 1-6, 2-6.

244) Dearth (2000: 153-58). Dearth uses the US military definition of Perception Management but includes different disciplines than those found in JP 3-13.

245) Joint Publication 3-13, op.cit.

246) Gardeta (1999: 105-111).

247) House of Commons (2000) Chapter III. Conduct of the Campaign. §230.

248) Ministry of Defence (2000).

249) Church (undated); Levian (1999). The psychological impact of the graphite bombings on the Serb population was a recurring theme in-depth interviews conducted by the author with Serb respondents between 25 June-14 July 2001.

250) Hubbard (1999).

251) Shea (2001).

253) Shea (2001).

254) BBC 2 Correspondent, "How the War Was Spun", 16 October 1999.

255) Shea (1999).

256) Shea (1999). See also Pounder (2000: 68).

257) Shea (2001).

258) Shea (1999: 15).

259) Collins (2000); Friedman (1999).

- 260) Collins (2000: 197).
- 261) Shea (2001).
- 262) Taylor (2000a: 40).
- 263) The Information Office set up visits for journalists to the refugee camps and organised visits by NATO dignitaries to the camps.
- 264) Eight in-depth interviews were conducted in conjunction with the study. Respondents included Serb academics, representatives of NGOs, and independent journalists from the press and the Internet.
- 265) This was because the average Serb is not aware that the station is associated with the US, and because the journalists working there were considered respected professionals. Interview with media researcher, Jovanka Matic, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade. 25 June 2001. Matic cited the results of a study she conducted on RFE.
- 266) ANEM (1999: 312-319). This was also described in detail in the author's interviews.
- 267) Wulff (2002).
- 268) Milivojevic, et.al. (2000: 4-6).
- 269) I.e., the NATO definition is: "Planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour and achievement of political and military objectives". (MC402).
- 270) Milivojevic, et.al., op.cit.
- 271) Malešič, (ed.) (1997). See also Malešič (2000).
- 272) ANEM (1999: 332-333). See Satchell (1999). See also Denning (Undated.)
- 273) Riegert (2002).
- 274) Taylor (2000b: 293-297).
- 275) Riegert (1998). See also Carruthers (2000: 197).
- 276) Grundmann et.al. (2000: 299-320); Nohrstedt, et.al. (2000).
- 277) Nohrstedt, et.al. (2002).
- 278) Swedish public opinion was from the outset predominantly negative or uncertain as to whether the NATO bomb attacks on Yugoslavia were "right" or "wrong" (41% against, 33% for, and 26% undecided). See Olausson's (2002) focus group study corroborating these findings.
- 279) Se Wyatt (1999); Pew Research Center (1999); BBC News Online (1999).
- 280) Thompson (1995). Dahlgren & Sparks (1991).
- 281) Castells (1996).