AMERICA'S TEAM

THE ODD COUPLE

A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military

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America's Team; The Odd Couple—
A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military

By Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence

1207 18th Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37212
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Foreword

When Bill Lawrence and Frank Aukofer came together at The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, I feared that I had asked the lion to sleep with another lion.

I wondered which of these lions would be the first to roar.

I had asked the two of them—one a professional militarist and the other a professional journalist—to work together on envisioning a plan that might end the long-standing hostility and ease the never-ending tensions between the news media and the military in the United States.

At least since Vietnam, and as late as Desert Storm, the relationship has been sometimes stormy, again strained and often surly. There have been charges of bad faith on both sides. At its worst, the rhetoric included charges on one side that the military lies, manipulates and misleads and on the other that the press is biased, unfair and unpatriotic.

Certainly soldiers, sailors and Marines have a First Amendment right to condemn the work of journalists. Certainly journalists have a First Amendment right to criticize the military's censorship.

Verbal shots fired on both sides in what amounted to psychological warfare were not in the best interest of either the military or the media. They were not in the public interest, nor in the interest of those of us concerned about First Amendment values.

The question was whether the admiral and the journalist could put down peer pressures, put aside preconceived ideas and put together their best efforts in order to serve all the interests caught up in that cultural conflict.

As it turned out, during a long and trying year of academic research and writing, neither of them roared. They worked as a team, each with mutual respect and regard for the other's judgment. They brought together a cross-section of colleagues from each side of the cultural conflict. Their leadership turned those sessions into productive and positive exchanges. Honest concerns and suspicions on both sides were brought into the open.

With insight and intelligence they worked with Dr. Robert Wyatt to create a survey of professionals from both the military and the media to reinforce and supplement their findings and conclusions.

It is fair to say that each was required to compromise on points of controversy. It is inaccurate to suggest that either of them ever compromised on a salient principle.

Some of what they propose is common sense. Some is visionary. Some will be controversial. All of it should provoke discussion, dialogue, thought and consideration.

Probably the most difficult of their recommendations to address is the one proposing a method for selecting and preparing journalists to cover future combat.

Their conclusion that our nation never has gone through a war like the next one—with both the military and the media equipped with phenomenal advances in technology—is something most involved can agree on.

Their recommendation that in such a war there should be no effort at censorship by the military will upset many in the military.

Their suggestion that there may be some rare occasion when national security requires an exception to their "no censorship" rule will upset many in the media.

The value of their work is that their findings can create discussion and dialogue among representatives of both the military and the media.

From such exchanges, mutual respect and common trust will develop—if nobody roars.

John Seigenthaler

Introduction

This study starts with two fundamental premises: One is that the First Amendment guarantee of a free and unfettered press is absolutely essential to American democracy, and applies to the nation's military operations as it does to the actions of every other government institution. The other is that America's military, with its unparalleled dedication to civilian authority, is absolutely essential to the preservation of freedom, security and the Constitution, including the First Amendment.

Throughout history, the two institutions often have been at odds, but the tension escalated markedly in a brief eight-year period—from the invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 to the Desert Storm victory in 1991. Each of those led to bitter complaints by the news media that the military had completely shut out news coverage (Grenada), needlessly delayed a press pool it had helped set up (Panama), or stifled journalists through censorship, delays and denial of access (Desert Storm).

Leaders of both institutions recognized that the relationship was broken and needed to be fixed. Military and news representatives, as well as independent individuals and organizations, convened panels and round-table discussions, organized meetings and study groups, produced reports and books, and developed the Pentagon pool system—all with an eye toward bringing the relationship to an even keel. All those efforts have made substantial contributions, and should be recognized and applauded. Progress continues. But much remains to be done.

The news media, collectively, are often unpopular and, if illustrated, would look like one of the late Rube Goldberg's cartoon contraptions. They function independently, without rules or regulations, except for some that are self-imposed. The media's disparate elements—from small newsletters and special-interest magazines to national newspapers and TV networks—have a variety of interests and goals. They have their share of rogues, incompetence and avarice. Yet, at their best, the media provide the nation with a service it can get nowhere else. The Founding Fathers intended America's free press to function as the Fourth Estate of government. It does that.

The military is perennially popular and, at its best in battle, functions like a conditioned athlete. It, too, has its share of incompetence, selfishness and vindictiveness. When it makes mistakes, they can be monumental. Lives can be lost. Appropriately, the armed forces are surrounded by rules and regulations. They are disciplined, hierarchical and live within a homogenous, closed culture that can be hostile to outsiders.

When the two institutions meet during a conflict, clashes are inevitable. The press wants to tell the story, and the military wants to win the war and keep casualties to a minimum. The press wants freedom, and the military wants control. Those are fundamental differences that will never change. Yet the military and the media also have worked together in harmony, particularly in situations where individuals in both institutions had the time to get to know and respect one another.

Despite the disputes of the past, leaders in each institution understand the importance of the other. Top military officials acknowledge their responsibility to the First Amendment guarantee of the people's right to know, and

The press wants freedom, and the military wants control. Those are fundamental differences that will never change.

the vast majority of military officers (83%) believe the news media are just as necessary to maintaining American freedom as the military, according to a poll taken for this study. This attitude exists even though members of the armed forces, who swear to protect the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, give up many personal liberties that news people and other citizens take for granted.

Similarly, leaders of the nation's news media appreciate that, without the protection of America's military forces, precious constitutional freedoms would not have been preserved for more than 200 years. The poll shows that 93% of the news media disagree with the proposition that members of the military are more interested in their own image than in the good of the country. News leaders understand the need for mutual support and cooperation, especially given the fact that there is no legal way to force the military to cooperate in news coverage.

... There are wise men and women in both institutions who recognize that their ultimate goal—the preservation of American freedoms—is the same.

Yet animosity has tarnished the relationship, particularly during the last dozen years. Some military officers, including some who never served there, still blame the news media for the loss of the Vietnam War. Although top defense and military officials interviewed for this study do not subscribe to that belief, 64% of the military officers surveyed in the opinion poll believe strongly, or at least somewhat, that news media coverage of events in Vietnam harmed the war effort. On the media side, 70% disagreed with that characterization.

One positive development in the relationship is that stereotypes seem to have broken down. Only 23% of the military officers surveyed strongly agreed or agreed somewhat with the statement that "the news media are mainly left-wing doves," and just 5% of the media representatives in the survey agreed or strongly agreed that military personnel are "mainly right-wing hawks."

Although a perfect cooperative union of the media and the military is likely impossible, given the differences in missions and personalities, there are wise men and women in both institutions who recognize that their ultimate goal—the preservation of American freedoms—is the same. They also have learned that cooperation serves the interests of each, as well as serving the American people.

This study focuses on the military-media relationship in conflict situations, based on the conviction that if the two institutions can work together during the tension and fog of war, they likely can get along in peacetime. We do, however, recognize that there are disputes and issues related to news media coverage of the defense establishment in peacetime. Similarly, the study recognizes, but does not address, the coverage by the foreign news media of American forces in military operations. Those relationships are not covered by the First Amendment and are best left to the military's judgment.

We have organized the materials gathered in our nine months of research into three distinct sections. The "Overview" begins with an executive summary and includes a look at the most recent large-scale U.S. conflict, the Persian Gulf War; the results from the First Amendment Center study of the military and the media; an examination of wartime security issues from the military's point of view; and the history of the media/military relationship on the battlefield and in the courts. Part II, "For the Future," comprises a detailed list of recommendations for both the media and the military; an explanation of the Independent Coverage Tier System, our proposed system for media deployment in wars of the future; a discussion of trust; and an examination of educational issues affecting both military and media personnel. The final section, "Other Views," includes key excerpts from a number of interviews conducted over the course of our tenure at The First Amendment Center.

This study truly has been a joint effort. Although a small number of the more than 60 interviews were conducted individually, the vast majority involved both authors. Similarly, for the first time in these joint scholarly efforts at The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, both members of the team fully participated in writing the report, which is why careful readers will note some variations in style in different sections.

William P. Lawrence
Frank A. Aukofer
May 1995

PART I
OVERVIEW

Executive Summary 1

As always, the overriding issues between the news media and the military involve access, censorship and the timely reporting of news from the battlefield. News people, not surprisingly, want total access, no censorship, and the capability to get their stories out to their audiences quickly. Military people, not surprisingly, want the option to exercise some control for operational security purposes.

The greatest fear of a military commander in a pre-invasion scenario is that something might leak that would tip off an enemy.

News executives understand that concern and have agreed in specific circumstances to delay or modify coverage in the interests of security. Their biggest fear is that military leaders—or their civilian superiors—might stifle news coverage by stretching the security blanket for political purposes or to enhance their public image, cover up mistakes or influence public attitudes about a war.

... Censorship will be neither practical nor desirable in the future.

The Findings

After carefully studying the areas of contention between the news media and the military, we have found that:

1 **Censorship—or security review, as it is called in military language—is a phenomenon of the past.**

In every modern conflict, security breaches by news people have been rare. The best insurance against harmful disclosures is to send reporters to live with troops in the field, where they soon develop understanding and even friendships. American reporters exhibit as much patriotism as members of the armed forces.

Moreover, with communications networks now blanketing the globe and news organizations developing the capability to report from almost anywhere with new technology such as satellite telephones, there is a conviction—even among military and civilian-defense leaders—that censorship will be neither practical nor desirable in the future. Censorship was not employed in the Haiti and Somalia operations.

2 **Many news executives and reporters see no difficulty with a limited degree of censorship in extraordinary circumstances, even in the field, as long as the guidelines are developed in advance and are understood and strictly obeyed by both sides.**

Some practitioners of the journalistic craft—Walter Cronkite is a prominent example—advocate censorship of the sort that was practiced in World War II, aimed strictly at the security of

troops on the battlefield and handled by professionals who are receptive to appeals by correspondents. However, as this report shows, the military no longer is equipped to engage in that sort of security review.

Access to the battlefield and to military units has been the paramount concern in the news community, a concern that takes on even more importance because it is the military's only means of control if censorship can no longer be practiced. The denial of access means that the story can never be told or, if it is told, the authors will be the participants themselves, who might be inclined to forsake objectivity to make themselves look good.

... The best of plans can be shredded in the field by rogues or incompetents on either side.

3 **The military leadership is willing to take news organizations into their confidence in some pre-operational situations, as they did prior to the aborted Haiti invasion.**

This is true except for the most secret of operations.

There also is a willingness among news media leaders in such circumstances to abide by temporary restrictions on coverage, as long as the restrictions are mutually agreed upon.

4 **There is a fundamental commitment in the nation's military leadership to provide America's news media with as much access as possible to future military operations, as long as this can be made compatible with security concerns.**

The aborted invasion of Haiti and the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Somalia, two situations in which the news media participated fully and without interference, demonstrated the new attitude toward news coverage of military operations. However, because neither situation involved combat, the commitment has not—as of this writing—been fully tested.

5 **Many military leaders have become aware that news media coverage of their operations can be a force multiplier.**

Impressed by Gen. Walt Boomer's example of encouraging favorable news media coverage of the U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf War—to the point where most observers agree that the Marines received more credit than they deserved, mostly at the expense of the U.S. Army—many military leaders have come to the conclusion that media coverage not only develops public awareness and support of military units, it has the side benefit of enhancing morale by informing families and friends of the activities of their troops.

However, the new message of openness has not yet percolated through the ranks. Many military officers still see no reason to cooperate with the media. Some are openly hostile.

6 **Top leaders of both the military and the news media understand that detailed planning must be done well in advance of any operation, so that neither group is faced with uncertainties and ad hoc solutions that lead to disputes.**

Plans must have the weight of authority so that they cannot be abrogated after the operation begins or the battle starts. However, both military and news leaders are aware that the best of plans can be shredded in the field by rogues or incompetents on either side.

7 **The competitive and independent nature of the news media is such that, with rare exceptions, they cannot organize and plan in a way that represents all of their constituent parts.**

While public affairs specialists in the military have continually worked on issues related to news media coverage of combat, there has been no similar organized effort on the news media side beyond meetings and other requirements of the Pentagon pool system.

8 **The Pentagon pool system, which represents the only ongoing area of cooperation between the news media and the military, lacks institutional memory, particularly on the media side.**

Because of regular turnover in personnel among both the news organizations and the military, time is wasted bringing both sides up to speed in a pre-invasion situation.

9 There is a declining interest in military-affairs coverage among American news organizations.

That, in addition to the end of the draft in 1972, means that reporters with an understanding of military culture and operations are an endangered species.

The increased media attention to so-called social issues, including gays in the military, sexual harassment and women in combat, has come at the expense of stories analyzing the wisdom of expenditures of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. Although defense spending is on the decline, the 1995 budget authority of $263.5 billion still represented about 18% of the federal budget.

10 The vast majority of problems experienced by the news media at the hands of the military in conflicts over the last dozen years have happened primarily because of poor planning, a lack of effective top-down communication, overreaction in the field to perceived press hostility in the leadership, and plain old incompetence.

There is no evidence that military leaders engage in organized efforts to thwart news coverage.

11 Although the nation's armed forces collectively have the best public affairs apparatus in the U.S. government, the specialty still has not achieved the status it deserves among members of the military.

12 Future military leaders do not receive adequate news media education and training as they move up through the ranks.

America's armed forces are the best in the history of the world. Military men and women are professionals with a proud heritage and, with rare exceptions, nothing to hide. Having their stories told by knowledgeable practitioners of the news craft, especially in wartime, can only enhance the already popular public view of the military. Yet there still are many military officers who see nothing but career setbacks if they have contact with news media representatives.

Some of the concern is justified. There will be times when reporters screw up, and others when military organizations have difficulties or scandals that they would prefer to keep quiet. But experience has shown that the best approach is to face the situations squarely and get the story out quickly. Headlines are always bigger if the press believes there has been an attempt to stonewall or cover up.

The American news community is a many-faceted entity, and some of the facets are crazed—as we are seeing in the rise of so-called tabloid journalism. Because of the First Amendment and the tendency of some news organizations to appeal to the lowest common denominator in their audiences, that situation is unlikely to change. Some in the news media, however, are justifiably concerned that journalistic abuses could lead to popular demands for restrictions. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future the news media will continue to have sensation-mongers as well as disinterested professionals.

Despite that, the military has an overriding self-interest in getting its overwhelmingly positive story out. To do so, it must communicate the leadership's views from the top down, and improve public affairs education at all levels, but especially among the young officers who will become the next generation of leaders. Fortunately, the military command structure makes such improvements possible.

Unfortunately, such is not the case with the unstructured news media. It has no overall way to enforce responsibility or enhance education and knowledge among its practitioners. Unlike the military, which constantly analyzes its operations to learn lessons, the tendency of individual news organizations is to move on to the next story. With some exceptions, little planning is done until the next military operation is imminent.

... The military has an overriding self-interest in getting its overwhelmingly positive story out.

The Recommendations

With all of that in mind, we recommend that:

1 **The Department of Defense should consider adopting an overall policy, which already is informally in effect in many ways, of "security at the source."**

That would mean an end to field censorship, which today's military is ill-equipped to do in any case. It also would mean that escort officers would be used only to facilitate access for reporters and photographers.

Guidelines for invoking ... limited censorship should be developed in advance.

2 **News media representatives should recognize that there may be extraordinary circumstances in the future when civilian or military defense leaders might want to exercise some temporary censorship in the interest of operational security or saving lives.**

Guidelines for invoking that limited censorship should be developed in advance.

3 **Because of rapid advances in communications technology, news media and military leaders should jointly engage in a study of the security issues posed by real-time reporting from the battlefield.**

4 **Building on the concept of the Department of Defense National Media Pool, which should be continued and improved upon for temporary use in secret operations, the news media and the military should jointly establish the Independent Coverage Tier System described in this report.**

The tier system's chief advantage is that it would allow military commanders to determine how many members of the news media they could accommodate with units on the battlefield. For the news media, it would provide guaranteed access, with proper support and protection, and without censorship.

Nothing in the tier concept would prevent independent coverage by news organizations, domestic or foreign, outside the tier system. However, the military would have no obligation to accommodate outsiders.

5 **In major conflicts, such as Desert Storm, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider assigning an officer of flag or general rank in the combat theater to coordinate the news media aspects of the operation under the commander of U.S. military forces.**

In the field, an officer of sufficient rank is needed as the liaison between the news media, the Pentagon and the commander in the theater. In Desert Storm, the top media relations officer was a colonel, despite repeated admonitions over the years by news media representatives that an officer of at least one-star rank needed to be assigned.

6 **Foundations, including but not limited to such news-oriented organizations as The Freedom Forum, the McCormick Tribune Foundation and the Knight Foundation, should jointly establish an Office of Military-Media Relations.**

The office would function in a variety of ways described in this report, including maintaining the institutional memory for the combat pool and tier systems, facilitating discussions of real-time battlefield reporting, and developing education and training programs for journalists and military men and women.

As an early project, the office should produce a military source book for news organizations, as described in this report. It should be distributed to all newsrooms in the United States and be periodically updated.

7 News organizations must make a better effort to cover military affairs, beginning at the local level with coverage of National Guard, Reserve and ROTC units.

At the national level, more attention needs to be paid to coverage of the Defense Department and the military services.

8 Where journalism schools and ROTC programs share campuses or geographic locations, they should seek each other out for class visits or joint programs aimed at increasing their knowledge and understanding of each other.

9 News media education provided by the Professional Military Education System needs to be improved through an integrated, building-block approach throughout the five levels of the system.

The precommissioning and primary levels should focus on shaping realistic and healthy attitudes toward the news media. Instruction at the intermediate, senior and capstone levels should provide more detailed information concerning interaction with the media.

10 The Secretary of Defense should consider expanding to other service colleges the program which allows news media personnel to attend courses at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

11 The Armed Forces should continue efforts to expand news media training as part of field-training exercises and war games, affording the press the maximum opportunity to participate.

The foundation-supported Office of Military-Media Affairs could be used to facilitate such efforts.

12 The military services should continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness, prestige and career attractiveness of public affairs officers.

The PAOs should always be included in operational planning.

13 The Department of Defense should abandon efforts to establish regulations defining the qualifications of news media representatives.

Relations between the military and the news media should be based on informal, common-sense and mutually agreed-upon guidelines, with the possibility of quick changes if circumstances dictate.

... The relationship between the military and the news media has progressively improved.

Despite well-publicized difficulties, the relationship between the military and the news media has progressively improved. As Haiti and Somalia demonstrated, the military can accommodate the news media, and journalists can fit into military operations without jeopardizing the success of these operations.

Mostly what it takes is good will and common sense on both sides. Though that is a truism, it is the only way to approach a relationship with so many unpredictable variables. It is unlikely that the working relationship between the military and the news media will ever totally satisfy either side. However, it can be improved to the point where aggravations are few and short-lived. As the process continues—as it must—the beneficiaries will be the military, the news media and the American people.

Coverage of the Persian Gulf War 2

There's a natural conflict between the military and the media because the military is populated by Type-A personalities who want control. That's why they like the media pool, and that's why in their mindset it's the first thing. They say, "Okay, the pool, because we know we can control it."

—Col. Frederick C. Peck, USMC

America's military often is accused of always planning to fight the last war. The same might be said of the nation's news media, except for one fact: Institutionally, the media only rarely, if ever, plan anything together. Although individual news organizations work out their own coverage, it is usually done under the gun, at the last minute.

That is largely the nature of the business. News organizations are independent entities beholden to no one in the way they cover the news, though ultimately they must satisfy their readers, viewers and listeners. Moreover, news events are not predictable. That forces the media to react to events, which is the antithesis of planning.

In the Persian Gulf War, the most notable recent conflict, the military turned the old planning axiom on its head. The U.S. victory in that war—with a minimum of casualties surprising even to the leadership—happened because, since Vietnam, the military had steadily improved the performance capabilities of both personnel and weapons systems. Unfortunately, those improvements did not extend to the military's planning for the news media or sensitivity to First Amendment principles.

At the same time, the news media went into the war with no plan for coverage other than a vague notion that they would be able to roam the battlefields as a small number of reporters had done in Vietnam—an assumption, given the nature of the operation, that was unrealistic.

Desert Storm was a distinctly different kind of conflict. Many reporters expected to be transported into the field by the military, as occurred in Vietnam. In that war, they could shoot their footage or gather information for stories on what were essentially daytime, small-unit actions, then return to Saigon to file their stories and wait for the next opportunity to go back to the action.

In the Gulf War, U.S. and coalition forces were spread along a 300-mile front, preparing to launch a lightning-surprise attack that would begin at night. Among the military leaders, there was a strong imperative for secrecy—and a palpable fear of leaks. So the only way reporters could effectively cover the action was to be located within and travel with military units, probably for the duration.

As the build-up continued during Desert Shield, individual news organizations knew what they wanted to do for themselves, but their motives were selfish and derived more from protecting their own interests than from any principled belief in informing the American public. There was little understanding of the fundamental distinction between the small-unit actions of Vietnam, where operational secrecy was not a primary consideration, and the massive, night-time flanking movement of the Desert Storm ground attack, which relied on secrecy and surprise.

News organizations are independent entities beholden to no one in the way they cover the news ....

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For the coverage of Desert Storm, the military developed an ad hoc system of combat pools, a plan to which news organizations acquiesced ....

The deficiencies in both institutions produced an unusual result. For the coverage of Desert Storm, the military developed an ad hoc system of combat pools, a plan to which news organizations acquiesced and which they helped to set up. With the pools in place and CNN offering nearly around-the-clock, live television coverage, there was a period of apparent comity. Eighty percent of the American public, many members of Congress and the military—as well as people with military backgrounds—found themselves fundamentally agreeing with a post-war statement by Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams that: "The press gave the American people the best war coverage they ever had."[1]

The post-war debate

Later, in reviewing the war and what had happened to reporters trying to cover it, a group of Washington bureau chiefs, representing the major American news organizations, concluded that "the combination of security review and the use of the pool system as a form of censorship made the Gulf War the most undercovered major conflict in modern American history."[2]

In a letter to Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, the 15 bureau chiefs, representing newspapers, news magazines and television, wrote: "Our sense is that virtually all major news organizations agree that the flow of information to the public was blocked, impeded or diminished by the policies and practices of the Department of Defense. Pools did not work. Stories and pictures were late or lost. Access to the men and women in the field was interfered with by a needless system of military escorts and copy review. These conditions meant we could not tell the public the full story of those who fought the nation's battle."[3]

That assessment apparently was not shared by the majority of journalists in the combat pools, who were surveyed after the war by Pete Williams, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.

Pool members were asked to assess access to combat operations, ground rules, security review (censorship) of stories and pictures, the flow of material from pools to the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, and the cooperation extended by military units. Williams said 56 journalists responded and, of those, only seven opposed the security review process. Another 15, he said, supported security review and made suggestions for improving, streamlining or strengthening the process.[4]

"It upsets my friends in the press corps when I say it was the best-covered war in history," Cheney said. "They don't like this at all. They fundamentally disagree because they felt managed and controlled .... I understand their concerns, to the extent that they didn't get to cover the war the way they wanted to cover it. I also think it's fair to say it's a legitimate criticism for them to make. Access was very uneven. There were some people in the field who were able to file their stories, and others who weren't."[5]

"My impression, looking from outside, was that the Pentagon was pleased, relatively, with the way things worked out with the press during Desert Storm," said former Defense Secretary Les Aspin in an interview before his death on May 21, 1995. "The press was less pleased. The bitching that I heard was that they were spoon-fed. And it was the only thing they could go with, because they were stuck in some hotel.

"My sense is that the media feels very uncomfortable when the only thing they are going with is handouts. Guys like [Frank] Aukofer never liked to write totally off our press releases. And the problem with the way Desert Storm was set up was, first of all, it didn't last long. The ground part didn't last long, and I don't know how else you do the air war. We had six weeks of bombing, but how can you get a reporter out there?

"The problem, the grumbling that I heard from reporters—the whole press relations on Desert Storm—was that they were forced to use handouts, or the equivalent of handouts. Official photographs of bombs, those perfect things, shooting right down the chimney, and blowing the building up. Or going right in the window and all that kind of stuff. That makes them all feel used, and when they feel used, they get unhappy.

"They'll always run with some of that as long as they feel they have an opportunity to go out and write on their own, cover on their own, or get a story that isn't just being handed to them. Now what the Pentagon wants to do, naturally, is keep them all in the building and feed them information. The Pentagon guys are stunned that people aren't happy with that. They're doing the best job they can, to give honest information. But, of course, the press guys are suspicious of it."[6]

There is no question that the American people received an unprecedented amount of real-time information on Desert Storm. Though some of the information was incomplete or inaccurate at the time because of the reality of "the fog of war" and the commanders' desire to maintain secrecy to avoid casualties, the amount of news disseminated supports the view that Desert Storm was the most completely covered—perhaps the best-covered—war in history.



The journalistic output, despite the limitations of the pool system, was enormous. During the air and ground war, pool print reporters filed 1,352 pool reports—many of dubious quality and many delayed to the point where news organizations complained that they were useless because they were no longer timely—and on some days photographers shipped back as many as 180 rolls of film. That worked out to 6,000 images, of which only about 20 could be transmitted back to news organizations in the States on any given day. Similarly, the networks had more reportage than they could handle. The television pool could only transmit about four hours of videotape a day. Often, crews with combat units shipped twice that much.[7]

Yet that was of little satisfaction to the news organizations, which rightly concluded that many stories went untold. And even members of the military, who were in a position to know, concede that there were prominent military units and battles that went uncovered.

"Secrecy and surprise were paramount in the division commanders' minds," said Army Col. William L. Mulvey, who commanded the U.S. forces' Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, during the war. "If Gen. [John] Tilelli of the 1st Cav[alry] did not want a pool reporter, then his word was supreme. He didn't get a pool reporter. He was a two-star general, and I know how to salute."[8]

Col. Larry Icenogle, who was Mulvey's assistant then and now is the public affairs special assistant to Gen. John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave the following account of a story that went unreported because a ship captain did not want any press coverage:

"Mike Doubleday, now the EUCOM PAO [European Command public affairs officer] was Gen. Schwarzkopf's deputy PA. He was working the night shift in Riyadh. I had the night shift in Dhahran, on the east coast.

"I'll never forget the night that Doubleday calls me, and he says, 'Hey, are you aware that we've got the *Missouri* firing naval gunfire support for the first time since World War II?'[9]

"And as he is saying that — I kid you not— I had this vision of a split screen. You remember the great night-time Tomahawk shots we got off the *Wisconsin* [early in the war]? Well, I had this vision of a split screen with "2 September '45" and Tokyo Bay with General MacArthur on one side. And on the other side, here is the "Mighty Mo" blasting away. I could visualize this.

"And, of course, the skipper wouldn't take any press aboard. It was unreal."[10]

Harassment and delays

There also is no question that there were many instances—as detailed in John Fialka's book, *Hotel Warriors,* and by bureau chiefs after the war—where reporters were harassed and interfered with, and their stories were censored and delayed to the point of uselessness because they had been overtaken by events. Fialka, a correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal*, helped set up the combat pool system and served as a pool coordinator in Dhahran.

There is no question that the American people received an unprecedented amount of real-time information on Desert Storm.

"The military basically lied to us in saying they could support us out on the field," Fialka said in an interview. "I don't know to this day whether they did it on purpose or whether they didn't know what they were doing. When I think back on it, I'm pretty sure the Army didn't know what they were doing, at least at the lower level. At the upper level, you had Schwarzkopf manipulating. He might have seen that they didn't know what they were doing and encouraged it. I don't know how to read that."[11]

In Army units, particularly, there was an aversion to press coverage because of a perception—real or imagined—that it could get commanders in trouble with the boss—Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief of the coalition forces.

Gen. J. H. Binford Peay III, who succeeded Schwarzkopf as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, recalled:

... The Army suffered a self-inflicted wound because so many of its commanders were hostile to press coverage.



"I must admit that all of us were still coming out of the Vietnam period, had been through the press relationships of that period, and we all had this enormous pride in our own outfits. There was an atmosphere of concern. How do you control all that, so that your outfit appears, externally, to be a professional outfit? And secondly, so that you didn't run into the ire of Norman Schwarzkopf, who was very, very concerned about how he controlled the media through that period, for a lot of reasons that I'm sure we don't understand."

Although wary of the news media himself, Peay disclosed that he took pool reporters into his confidence, fully briefing them on the Desert Storm surprise attack two days before it started. " I wanted them to have confidence that I had confidence in them, and I wanted a kind of professional rapport built between us," he said.[12]

"There were a lot of us out in the field who had been walked through the invasion plan, and we never leaked," Fialka said. "That also happened in Vietnam. It happened in World War I and II. When it comes down to it, we're as patriotic as anybody else, especially when it comes to not impairing our own military. But you don't hear that side of it."[13]

Public-relations-savvy Marines

In retrospect, the Army suffered a self-inflicted wound because so many of its commanders were hostile to press coverage. On the other hand, the Marine Corps received more than its share of the credit and glory because the Marine commander, Gen. Walt Boomer, had been the Corps' public affairs chief and knew how to deal with the news media.

"The Marines were especially good at it," Former Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said. "But the Marines always are. All of our senior commanders were Vietnam vets. I think a lot of them had attitudes toward the press that were shaped by those events .... And the Army did not do as aggressive a job as, for example, somebody like Walt Boomer in the Marines. Boomer took Molly Moore [of *The Washington*] *Post* and got a great story out of it. ... He had her eating out of his hand."[14]

There is a fundamental disagreement among the principals over who wanted to control the news media, and for what reasons. Cheney said he viewed the media as a problem to be managed, and kept his assistant secretary for public affairs, Pete Williams, intimately involved in battle plans from the start. Williams said he was sometimes frustrated in his efforts to get the story told. The military commanders controlled the battlefield, including relations with the news media, he said, and vetoed some of his news-coverage plans. Williams said it was Schwarzkopf who refused to allow reporters to stay with military units during the build-up to Desert Storm, fearing they might violate security and let the enemy know his plans. Schwarzkopf, on the other hand, said all the media orders came from the Pentagon.

Steve Katz, who compiled the most extensive record of military-media relations during the war as counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, said President Bush, Cheney and Williams surrendered civil-

ian control of the Pentagon's public affairs operations to Schwarzkopf.

"Gen. Schwarzkopf pursued and—many would argue—succeeded in his primary agenda to win the public from the media," Katz said. "His attitude appeared to be born of the military's own mythology about the role of the media in the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam. This agenda supplanted even the Pentagon's own professional endeavors to develop a balanced and effective public affairs annex as recommended by independent observers after the operations in Grenada and Panama. Public affairs annexes developed by the Joint Chiefs were ignored ....

"The Schwarzkopf agenda of winning the public from the media adopted severe restrictions on coverage of the media so as to prevent independent coverage and repeat the pool-coverage policy criticized in the after-action reports on Grenada and Panama. This extended to the failure, hopefully not intentional, to train or prepare military public affairs officers who were instructed through a *secret* order by General Schwarzkopf to 'accompany news media representatives at all times.'"[15]

Cheney's priority

Cheney said his priority was to be truthful, to avoid the public cynicism that followed the Vietnam War. "The view I had when I arrived at the Pentagon [was] that the department lacked credibility," he said. "Over the years, for one reason or another—Vietnam, contract scandals, cost overruns and so forth—there was the general perception around town, and I think out around the country in a lot of circles, that the department couldn't be trusted, that we lacked credibility. I felt very strongly about my own obligations and responsibilities as secretary never to get into that position, that credibility counted for everything.

"That was just the way I'd always done business in my political career. I had strong feelings about the importance of being honest and accurate, not just with the press, but also with the Congress. I served in the Congress for 10 years and felt sometimes we got the runaround from the Department of Defense. I didn't want to do that."[16]

At the same time, Cheney said, he was sensitive to the fact that the press had posed problems in the past. "Frankly," he said, "I looked on it as a problem to be managed. I did not look on the press as an asset, in doing what I had to do. Maybe that's just sort of the natural order of things between government and the press. But it was so important, especially in connection with the Gulf conflict, where the possibility existed of a long-term, sustained kind of operation where the stakes were enormous, I felt that it was important to try to manage that relationship in a way so the press didn't screw us—if I can put it in those terms."

Cheney said he believed it was essential to provide a lot of information, as accurately as possible, to the public, but not necessarily to the press. So he established regular briefings at the Pentagon and in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, most of which were televised live.

"I felt it was important to manage the information flow—not to distort it, but to make certain that we got a lot of information out there so that people knew what we were doing," he said. "I also gave speeches during that period of time, testified before the Congress, and went on Sunday television talk shows. It was all getting information out, telling them what we were going to do, why we were doing it, explaining the policy, why we had to send half a million people there, call up a quarter of a million reservists, and all the other things we were doing. The information function was extraordinarily important. I did not have a lot of confidence that I could leave that to the press."

Cheney said he believed it was essential to provide a lot of information ... to the public, but not necessarily to the press.

Hush orders

In an interview, Schwarzkopf said an order arrived from Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that said all media policy would be dictated by Williams and the public affairs office in the Pentagon. He said he and the other field commanders had objected, but were overruled. At one point, he said, "We all got told that we couldn't deal with press any more. This started, I think, about the end of November. From then until the war started, we were just told, 'You cannot talk to the press anymore. None of your generals can talk to the press any more.'


Schwarzkopf

"Obviously, when the press is trying to get an interview with me, I'm not going to go back and say, 'Well, I can't talk to you, because Washington says I can't.' That's not the way we do business. We salute, follow orders, and that's it. But it got a little nasty after awhile, because people were trying to get interviews. Up until that time, we had tried very hard to be open, within the realm of reason, to do in-

WAR STORIES

Good press or bad, the animosity exists

By all accounts, the U.S. Marine Corps received more than its share of the credit for winning the Persian Gulf War. That was because the Marine commander, Gen. Walt Boomer, had learned to understand the news media as the Corps' public affairs chief, and he invited reporters to accompany his Marines. One of them was Molly Moore of *The Washington Post.*

After the war, Col. Frederick C. Peck, the Marines' deputy public affairs director, invited Moore to a "Media Day" at Quantico, to speak to captains and majors.

"I thought because she had written nothing but great things about the Marine Corps, she really would be well-received by the audience," Peck recalled. "And they tore her apart.

"She was, like, 'God, I don't believe that. What have I done?'

"But they were taking their animosity for the media out on her, for one. And, I think, there was a lot of jealousy in the room because they'd been sitting in the classroom while Molly was over there going through the war with Gen. Boomer.

"But the animosity exists. I don't think we do anything to cultivate it. I think it arrives in the mindset of the person who joins the Marine Corps that the press is, somehow or other, the enemy. Fortunately for the Marine Corps, I think our senior commanders, all the way down to the lieutenant-colonel level, are pretty well attuned to the fact that the media's not your enemy. The media is part of the battlefield."

terviews. And now, all of the sudden, we had to clamp a lid on it. The reason why was, plain and simply, because we had been told by Washington we couldn't."

Schwarzkopf told the following story to illustrate his attitude toward press coverage of the war:

"After ... the first pool [to Desert Shield in August 1990] Prince Bandar [the Saudi ambassador to the United States] came down to my house for lunch. This would have been right about the 20th of August. We were talking about a lot of things, and he said something to the effect that the pools had run their course. 'We of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have shown that we are open to the press. And, now, effective 30 August, we're going to kick all the reporters out of country. We will form our own pool of Saudi Arabian reporters, and we will report the news.'

"I said, 'Bandar, I'm sorry. You can't get there from here. You can't walk that cat back. Now that the door is open and the first media pool is in, the American public— and I'm sure the American government—will never sit still for you doing this.'

"He said, 'Oh, but we have to do that. We cannot tolerate reporters running all over the place.'

"I said, 'Bandar, you don't understand. You are going to have to keep the pool there. And as a matter of fact, I would venture to say that there will be even more reporters coming over. Now that you've opened the door, you just have to deal with it. We will help you, in every way we can, to manage this thing. But that's the way it's going to be.'

"So not only was I open to the media being there, but I feel that I was very largely responsible for preventing the Saudis from going ahead and putting a lid on the pool. There were many times when the Saudis wanted to kick somebody out of the country because some story would come out that they viewed as unfavorable. But we never kicked a single guy out of the country. Tempted, but we never kicked one out. I'd say, 'No. It will cause you far more trouble than it's worth. We have to be open to the press.'"

Reporters on the scene had different views of who was controlling what.

Battlefield concerns

Williams said, "We came up with a plan in the fall during Desert Shield to put reporters out with units and kind of rotate them through, and let reporters stay out with the unit as long as they wanted to. It was shot down by Schwarzkopf. ... His fear was, if you let reporters stay with the units when the flanking maneuver began, then they'd be filing with datelines, and you could just kind of watch them move further west and further north, and he was afraid that would telegraph the left hook."

Schwarzkopf said there was never any intention to manipulate or manage the press. But he did say he was concerned about instant reporting from the battlefield.

"I would say to the field commanders, 'Be very careful what you say to the press. Be very careful what your troops say to the press.' There were breaches of security that occurred because of somebody standing up and saying, 'I'm standing here with the 82nd Airborne at some place,' and, bingo, that's placing a unit and a location on the battlefield with a capability, and that's a security violation. The good news was the Iraqi intelligence wasn't that good."

From a different perspective, Mulvey recalled: "If you go back to the Desert Shield time frame, through December, when a negative story would come out in the press, Gen. Schwarzkopf would call the commander on the carpet and chew him out. I was told that the command climate was such that the commanders in the field knew that if there was a negative story in the press or on television, they would be called to Riyadh. So the way to prevent that from happening was not to take any press."

'Not true'

But Schwarzkopf said that was simply not true. He said the reports probably stemmed from his investigation of a *New York Times* story about a hapless platoon that seemed ill-prepared for duty.

"That one story led to a perception that every time a negative story comes out in the press, I call the generals," Schwarzkopf said. "Let me remind you that Walt Boomer worked for me, too. Very definitely worked for me. I can assure you that if I was bringing that kind of pressure on my Army commanders, I would have been bringing exactly the same kind of pressure on Walt Boomer. He was not exempt, nor was my Navy commander, Stan Arthur. It just didn't happen."

Reporters on the scene had different views of who was controlling what. Charles J. Lewis, Washington bureau chief for Hearst News Service, said: "The fact is that Schwarzkopf was extremely tender toward the public perception of Operation Desert Storm. So it's not a case of where he just kissed off the public affairs function. He embraced it totally, but he embraced it so he could control it."

Patrick J. Sloyan, who covered the war for *Newsday* and later won a Pulitzer Prize for his war coverage, rated Schwarzkopf better on press coverage than Cheney. He said Cheney was masterful in manipulating the information that was released during the war.

"These films, this footage they would spoon-feed ... would dominate perceptions of what was going on," Sloyan said in an interview. "If you look at what came over television for that period of time, it had no bearing on what was going on.

"But it was not Schwarzkopf or the military. Schwarzkopf had tremendous concern about his credibility, his image. I covered Vietnam from beginning to end, but if you didn't know about Vietnam, you didn't understand the things Schwarzkopf was saying. As generals do, they fight the last war. He was fighting Vietnam over again, and the one thing he wasn't going to permit was something where you come in and find out that there was a pack of lies—well, not a pack of lies, but they certainly covered up a lot of stuff. Had Schwarzkopf's guidance and orders held firm, we would have known a lot more, I think, although not at the time it happened."

Despite its early reluctance, the Saudi Arabian government soon was granting visas to hordes of journalists who wanted to cover the war. With hundreds of them flocking to Dhahran and Riyadh, the military leaders had to find a way to handle them, and the combat pool system was born. Essentially, it meant that the only way any journalist could cover the war and remain officially sanctioned by the U.S. military and the Saudi government was to be a member of a pool. Many reporters, some of whose news organizations had pool slots, worked outside the pool system. They risked having their credentials revoked and deportation, though neither the military nor the Saudi government ever took such actions.

Lewis

A tight leash

Eventually, 186 journalists participated in the pools. (When the United States and its allies invaded Normandy in World War II, 27 reporters accompanied the troops). In addition to reporters, the pools included photographers, video and audio operators, producers and technicians. The pools were kept on a tight leash, based on the wishes of commanders, to the point where Lewis, the Hearst Washington bureau chief, wrote after the war that the military had so controlled the press that Mulvey, in effect, had functioned as the city editor for war coverage:

"In most newsrooms, a reporter with a story idea usually tries the idea out on an editor or asks the approval of the boss to pursue it, especially if it's going to take a lot of time or money or if it's of questionable news value. In Dhahran, Mulvey was that boss. He was the city editor of the Persian Gulf war, who decided what got done and what didn't."

Lewis wrote from experience; he covered the war as a reporter and was there for the duration.

Mulvey said he later wrote a response to the Lewis article, but never sent it. "My answer was that the city editor wasn't a colonel," he recalled. "The city editors were the captains of the Navy ships, were the Air Force base commanders, were the division commanders out there, because it was their battlefield and they decided—as they rightfully should—who came out onto their battlefield and went with their soldiers to war. It wasn't me.

Many reporters, some of whose news organizations had pool slots, worked outside the pool system.

"Chuck gave me way too much power and authority. I didn't make the decisions as to how many pool reporters went to the 1st Cav Division or the 1st Armored Division or the 101st or whatever. Those division commanders, those ships' captains—the captain of the *Missouri* decided how many reporters went out on the *Missouri.* His answer was, 'None,' and who knows the *Missouri* was ever even there? But that was because he had the power, as he should have the power. He's 'God' out there."

The combat pools were set up with the cooperation of the major news organizations, which apparently cared little that the system cut off independent, open coverage and, with it, many of their colleagues from smaller news organizations. As long as the big guys were among the favored few on the inside, they ignored the fact that the rest of the press corps was frozen out and without much clout to force any change in the system. The original pool members even rigged the system to make certain that they maintained their membership, while other journalists who managed to get one of the coveted pool slots risked being shut out entirely if they dropped out of a pool for any reason. In fairness, the television and radio networks had their hands too full to stick it to their colleagues. Most of the familial mugging was done by the print media.

... There were regional stories ... that should have been told but were snuffed out by the combat pool system.

Pool members' dilemma

It was only later that the bureau chiefs got together and decided they'd been suckered because of the way the pools had been deployed. The members of the pools, however, were not prominent among the complainers, likely because they understood the nature of the military situation better than their bosses.

"They were in a dilemma," Mulvey recalled, "and many of them told me—I won't link any names here—'Look, I'm going tell you that I agree with this, but don't ever use my name or my boss will fire me.' They would say to me very honestly, 'I'm speaking out of both sides of my mouth. I'll agree to your ground rules, your pool concepts, your whatever here, but I'm going to say something different to my bureau chief back in New York, Washington, or Atlanta.'"

Mulvey concedes that there were regional stories—a feature about a Louisiana National Guard unit celebrating Mardi Gras in the desert, a story about a Milwaukee-based Coast Guard Reserve unit responsible for port security in Dhahran—that should have been told but were snuffed out by the combat pool system.

"Yes, it should have been possible to accommodate those local reporters seeking a hometown unit," he said. "That's very reasonable. ... But realize the problems I had with numbers. If I had given ... the one exception to go down to the Coast Guard unit at Dhahran or the New Orleans *Times-Picayune* guy to go to the Louisiana Guard unit, then that could have broken down the integrity of dealing with a thousand journalists."

With the coalition forces spread along the 300-mile front, preparing for the surprise attack at night, the biggest fear of all the commanders—from Schwarzkopf on down—was that the Iraqis might somehow learn about the massive "left hook." Given the circumstances, the combat pools offered the military a way to satisfy both security requirements and get reporters out to cover some of the story. Not all of the journalists agreed, however.

"There were some reporters running around," Cheney said, "who had notions of wanting to cover the war in the Gulf the way they covered Vietnam 25 years ago. Get on a helicopter, and fly up to some unit. They didn't have any concept of how the nature of warfare had changed, or that we were going to do our operations at night or that we were going to move very fast or that if we didn't provide the transportation for them, there wasn't any way they were going to be able to keep up."





The 'four-wheel-drive' school

"The field is full of feckless romantics," Fialka said. You saw it out in the field in the four-wheel-drive school of journalism, where they said, 'We're just going to drive around on the battlefield and cover this war, and nobody is going to hurt us, and all the units will welcome us.' Those people were fools.

"If you asked the ones who did it what they got, they'll say 'Almost nothing.' They saw a lot of booms and bangs and they got shot at, some of [them]. But did they know what it meant? Could they put it together? They couldn't even begin. Did they risk their lives? You bet. ... [Did they] endanger units? Yeah, if you're driving around with your headlights on, and you happen to find the First Marine Brigade out there, they're going to shoot you. If they shoot you, they've probably exposed their position.

"The four-wheel-drive school of journalism was largely fueled by people who really had no clue what they were getting into. If you go into a chemical-warfare situation in a Jeep four-wheel-drive, you think you're going to survive? Just begin to think of the things you don't have: You don't have a monitor that tells you when the chemicals arrive. Maybe you do have your designer suit. But if you don't put it on, if you don't know when to put it on, you're dead. If it's nerve gas, you're dead in a few minutes. Maybe in a minute. If you don't know when the chemicals have stopped, you don't know when to take your mask off. Canisters have a definite duration. If you don't know what mines are — most people don't — you're going to blow up. Do you want all those things to happen? Is this romance? Going into the face of that and thinking you're going to get a story? Yeah. Who does it benefit? I don't think anybody."

The complaint expressed by many journalists about the combat pool system was that the denial of access was worse than censorship because it meant that there were stories that could never be told, whereas if a reporter is given access—even if his or her work is subjected to censorship at the time—the story can eventually be told. But Mulvey argues that complete access doesn't exist anywhere.

"I've heard Pete Williams say many times that reporters don't have access to the deliberations of the Supreme Court," Mulvey said. "Is that censorship of reporting on the Supreme Court? You don't go into the caucuses of the Congress. You don't go on the football field at the 50-yard line to report on the football game. You've got to stay off the football field to report on it. There are police barriers around an accident, around a crime scene all the time. Reporters are always denied access, to a degree. And I think the courts would support the military's right to restrict access in wartime.

"But I agree that there's access and there's access, and if you have a command climate that says, 'I don't want to give reporters access because they might tell bad-news stories or they might give away the security and, therefore, I'm not going to accept any,' then the story can't be told. That is what I was fighting against. That was my job. But we also had some commanders who had seen the light. Gen. Boomer kept saying, 'Send me more, send me more.' We were getting calls all the time from the Marines asking for more pool reporters."

The complaint expressed by many journalists about the combat pool system was that the denial of access was worse than censorship ....

Origins of the pool

The combat pool system in Saudi Arabia had its roots in an earlier debacle. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan ordered an invasion of Grenada to rescue American medical students who were believed to be in danger in a Marxist takeover of the government there. The White House, concerned that any leaks could cost the lives of troops or bring harm to the students, ordered the military commanders to exclude journalists during the critical first two days of the conflict.

News organizations complained loudly, and their protests led to the formation of a special commission by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It came to be called the

Sidle Commission, for its chairman, Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle (USA, Ret.).

The Sidle Commission recommended—and the Pentagon established, with the help of professional news organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors—the Department of Defense National Media Pool. It consisted of the wire services, the television networks, news magazines, radio networks and 26 major newspapers. The idea was to have a cadre of journalists ready to go at a moment's notice to cover the early stages of a conflict. These journalists would agree to abide by security restrictions and share their reports with all other news organizations.

The operational assumption was that the first announcement of any military operation would be made in Washington, at the White House or the Pentagon. But the pool would be on the ground to provide independent witnesses to the early stages of conflict, even as announcement of the conflict was being made. From the beginning, it was intended that the pool would function only briefly, until open coverage by the news media could begin.

Despite the glitches, however, there was a reservoir of good will, and cooperation continued on both sides.



In the ensuing years, the concept seemed to have merit. The Pentagon called out the pool for exercises, and in most cases it functioned as intended. Then came the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, and once again the press was prevented from covering the conflict. In an analysis of what happened, consultant Fred S. Hoffman, who had spent many years covering the Pentagon for the Associated Press, found that an excessive concern for secrecy on the part of Defense Secretary Richard Cheney was responsible for a fatal delay in calling out the pool. He also concluded that "there was no effort to manipulate the pool in Panama. Rather, it was a matter of maladroitness, sometimes good intentions gone awry, and unanticipated obstacles."

Increasing skepticism

That was of small consolation to news media leaders, who were becoming increasingly skeptical because the pool always seemed to work as planned in exercises, but seemed to fall apart when the real thing happened. Sloyan, who opposes all pools, likened the situation to the recurring gag in the *Peanuts* comic strip.

"There's all the good will in the world, and we agree, and they pull the football back just as we're running up to kick it, like Lucy does to Charlie Brown in *Peanuts*," he said. "That's bad faith on their part, on the part of the political leadership. They don't want us reporting about American soldiers getting killed. They don't want that story out, they don't want those pictures out. And it doesn't matter what administration we're talking about."

Despite the glitches, however, there was a reservoir of good will, and cooperation continued on both sides. The pool did a credible job covering the little-noticed story of the reflagging of Kuwait's tankers. Then came Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and President George Bush's warning: "This will not stand."

The Desert Shield build-up came immediately after that, but without any press coverage because the Saudi Arabian government at first refused to grant visas to American journalists. Cheney recalled that it was a report of Saddam Hussein watching CNN that persuaded the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd, to allow reporters into his country, which theretofore had been closed to non-Muslim reporters.

"I had reporter friends of mine accuse me of finding the only place to run a war where they didn't allow the press," Cheney recalled. "At the outset, the only way reporters got in there was on my airplane. I guess it was on my second trip in. First, I went over the first weekend of the crisis and I arranged for the deployment of forces. I didn't take any press.

"And the pool went in after that. The pool was a useful way to work, from our perspective. It was there. It let us set up a system to get some access, but a lot of that we had to negotiate with the Saudis. ... According to a story I heard—and I have no reason to challenge it—King Fahd was watching CNN one night

and saw broadcasts coming live out of Baghdad in the early stages of the build-up and concluded that he wanted press in Saudi Arabia because Saddam had press in Iraq. I don't know if it's true."

Finally activated

The Iraqis rolled into Kuwait on August 2. President Bush sent Cheney to meet with King Fahd on August 5, and two days later American forces began arriving in the region—but without press coverage. It was not until Friday, August 10, with news organizations loudly complaining in the background, that the Pentagon notified members of the DOD National Media Pool that they would be activated for duty. Pool members reported to the Pentagon Saturday morning, August 11, to drop off their passports. The passports were transported to the Saudi Embassy near the Kennedy Center in Washington for visas. Members of the 17-member pool on standby also were asked to provide their suit sizes so the military could equip them with chemical-warfare suits.



Although it turned out to be one of the best pools ever, in terms of performance, the Desert Shield pool was itself a perversion of the pool concept. For one thing, it was activated in full public view, instead of secretly as originally intended. When the pool arrived at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa on Sunday, August 12, for a tour of the Central Command and a briefing by Gen. Schwarzkopf, local television-news teams were waiting to cover the arrival. It was the media covering the media.

Except for the fact that the pool lasted for almost three weeks, instead of the brief period originally envisioned for pools, the Desert Shield pool functioned as if it were the prototype for all the pool planning that had gone before. The military escort officers did everything within their power to provide as much access to operations as possible, and their security reviews of reporters' copy and film were limited to genuine concerns, as specified in the guidelines for coverage. In fact, several of the escort officers turned out to be decent editors, helping some of the reporters to tighten up their copy.

For their part, the media members of the pool took their responsibilities seriously. They honored the military guidelines. Four members of the pool even went along on a 16-hour AWACS mission and, although they learned classified information during the mission, they did not disclose any of it. Members of the 552nd Airborne Warning and Control Wing were delighted with the newspaper story, photographs and TV tape that came out of the mission.

The pool members shared all of their stories and photographs, and audio and video tapes, among themselves and with news organizations back in the States. The coverage was so complete that it was months after the pool was finally disbanded before independent news organizations began to come up with stories that had not been covered by the pool. The only major violation of the pool concept came on the news media side when the AP and other wire services failed to move the written pool reports on the wires, as they had committed to do. If the 75 stories done by the writing pool members—the so-called "pencils"—had moved on the wires, news organizations all over the country would have had a potpourri of story choices. Instead, the wires merely used information from the pool reports in daily roundups.

Still, the fact that the pool lasted nearly three weeks was at odds with the original pool concept, which specified that the pool was only to be used until coverage could be opened up.

... The fact that the pool lasted nearly three weeks was at odds with the original pool concept ....

A model, but flawed

That first pool provided a model for the combat pool system set up later to cover the Gulf War. But the combat pools also corrupted the original concept, because they were under the control of the military and its civilian leadership and were used as a complete substitute for independent coverage by news organizations.

WAR STORIES

Riding with the press pool in Riyadh

August 1990. The 17-member Pentagon Pool—the first journalists allowed into Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield—are finishing a long, hot day in Riyadh. They are in an air-conditioned bus on the airport tarmac, heading for a plane and a return to a shower, dinner and clean sheets in the Dhahran International Hotel.

One of the military escort officers points to one of the hangars, where a crowd of uniformed men and women stand waiting in the late afternoon heat. They are members of the 552nd Airborne Warning and Control Wing, and they have turned out to meet the press.

For the pool members, covering the big picture, there's not much of a story there. But it takes only a minute or so for them to realize that it's a matter of morale. So they wearily clamber off the bus, lugging cameras, notebooks and sound equipment, and spend nearly an hour interviewing the troops, who are delighted to answer questions and pose for pictures and TV cameras.

Later, as they board a Saudi C-130 for the trip back to Dhahran, a wing public affairs officer hands each of them a press kit.

Leafing through the kit on the flight back, Michael Ross of the *Los Angeles Times,* who had served previously as the newspaper's Cairo bureau chief, shouts, "Look at this!"

The press kit contains a locator sheet, detailing all the motels and other buildings in Riyadh where members of the 552nd have been assigned living quarters. It is complete with maps, bus routes, telephone numbers and lists of individuals and their billets.

"Wouldn't a terrorist love to get one of these?" Ross asks rhetorically.

The pool members remove all of the locator sheets from the press kits and give them to an astonished escort officer. ■

Yet there is no question that there was no way the U.S. military could have accommodated large numbers of journalists—domestic and foreign—who showed up in Saudi Arabia. Eventually, the situation would have forced the invention of something like the combat pool system.

Despite the media complaints, the vast majority of the American people were convinced that they had fully witnessed the war, through CNN, network television, network radio, and their national and local newspapers. A Times-Mirror poll taken Jan. 25-27, 1991, found that 8 in 10 Americans gave the press a positive rating for its war coverage. In a subsequent Times-Mirror poll on March 25, 1991, 46 percent of those polled rated the news coverage as excellent, compared with a similar rating of 36 percent in January. Virtually everyone believed they had seen the best war coverage in history.

"In my personal view," Cheney said, "one of the reasons there was such an overwhelming level of support in the end for the operation was, obviously, it was successful. That helped a hell of a lot. But it was also because the American people saw up close with their own eyes, through the magic of television, what the U.S. military was capable of doing.

"It was especially CNN. But it also was different from the impression they had after the last 25 years of press coverage of the military. It is the nature of the press to deliver bad news. It's not news if it's good. Over the years, I think the American people had the impression that our military was fat and sloppy, and we had generals too stupid to lead, and equipment that wouldn't work, and troops who didn't know how to use the equipment. For an awful lot of Americans, especially in the aftermath of Vietnam, the perception was that the Pentagon's a place that doesn't work very well, costs too damn much, and we're not at all sure they can perform their mission.

"And then, all of a sudden, bang. There the guys were, and they were doing it. Those cruise missiles were going down the streets of Baghdad, and the precision-guided munitions were going down air shafts and into buildings, and the troops were magnificent. The damn thing worked, and that surprised the hell out of an awful lot of people. I think the reason it was so surprising was, in fact, because of the impression that had been created over the years, of 25 years of normal, routine coverage of the Pentagon and the Department of Defense and the military by the press."[17]

After the war, top executives of the nation's major news organizations, acting on their bureau chiefs' recommendations, took the media complaints directly to Cheney. The initiative led to another round of negotiations between the Pentagon and media representatives. That led to the adoption in April 1992 of a new *Statement of Principles—News Coverage of Combat*, which were to be followed in future combat situations involving American troops.

There were nine principles in all, which mostly restated earlier common-sense agreements. From the media's standpoint, the most important was the first principle, which stated: "Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations." The principles also stated that pools would not be used again as the standard means of coverage.

But the principles also bound journalists to abide by a clear set of military-security ground rules. Violations of the rules could be punished by a suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone. Similar rules had applied during the Gulf War, but despite the fact that some reporters violated those guidelines by operating outside the pool system, no action was taken against any of them.

Originally, the news organizations proposed a tenth principle, which said: "News ma-

terial—words and pictures—will not be subject to security review." Pentagon negotiators instead proposed one that said: "Military operational security may require review of news material for conformance to reporting ground rules."

The two sides could not agree, so the tenth principle was dropped. In accompanying statements, the news organizations said they believed earlier military operations had proved that journalists could be trusted to abide by security rules. They said they would oppose any prior security reviews the Pentagon might try to impose in future operations.

The Pentagon, on the other hand, said the military believed it needed to retain the option to review news material to avoid inadvertent disclosures of information that could endanger the safety of troops or compromise the success of a mission.

Though that tenth principle resulted in a stalemate, it likely will become moot in future conflicts. Given advances in technology, including such equipment as satellite telephones, most military leaders now agree that security review, or censorship, is a thing of the past. The new operational imperative is "security at the source." However, it still seems likely that extraordinary situations could arise when military leaders would want to check a story before it was filed. It also seems likely that, if the request were reasonable, the journalist would go along with it.

Since Desert Storm, the Pentagon public affairs leadership, along with the military public affairs apparatus, have engaged in a great deal of analysis and planning to avoid media-coverage problems in the future, with positive results in the aborted invasion of Haiti and the withdrawal of troops from Somalia. Unfortunately, the news media has paid little attention to lessons learned and future planning.

One of the nine principles stated, "News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations."

As of this writing, there is no evidence that news organizations have followed through on the latter part of that promise.

Endnotes

1 W. Dale Nelson, "Bureau Chiefs Want More Open Coverage of Future Wars" (Washington, D.C.: Associated Press, May 2, 1991).

2 Washington Bureau Chiefs to Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, "Covering the Persian Gulf War" (unpublished report), May 30, 1991.

3 Washington Bureau Chiefs, letter to Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, Apr. 29, 1991.

4 Asst. Sec. of Defense (Public Affairs) Pete Williams, letter to Clark Hoyt, Nov. 22, 1991.

5 Richard Cheney, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1995.

6 Les Aspin, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Jan. 26, 1995.

7 John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991), pp. 5, 37.

8 Col. William L. Mulvey, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1994.

9 The battleships *Missouri* and *Wisconsin* were World War II ships which also served in Desert Storm. The Japanese surrender ceremonies were conducted on the *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on Sept. 2, 1945.

10 Col. Larry Icenogle, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1994.

11 John J. Fialka, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1994.

12 Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III, interview by authors, Tampa, Fla., Jan. 23, 1995.

13 Fialka, interview.

14 Cheney, interview.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

Information Security and Military Culture 3

The major area in which there is a clash between the cultures of the military and the news media is over the issue of information security. Maintaining secrets—denying vital knowledge to the enemies of the United States—is an essential part of the military's responsibilities. On the other hand, the press strives to be as informed as possible on as many topics as possible; concealing information is anathema to a reporter.

This divergence of attitudes reaches its greatest intensity during time of crisis/conflict. For this reason, it is particularly important to examine ways in which the news media may properly inform the public on the conduct of wars without assisting foes and jeopardizing the lives of American soldiers. The impact of emerging communication technologies on reporting from the battlefield makes such examination especially imperative.

To begin, some background on military attitudes may be helpful. First, by national standards, the U.S. military today is highly educated. More than 95% of enlisted personnel are high-school graduates, and many have attended college. Virtually all career officers are college graduates, with more the 50% of officers above the rank of O-3 having masters and doctoral degrees. Among the nearly 1,000 officers ranging in rank from O-4 to O-10 who responded to The First Amendment Center questionnaire, 83% held masters and doctoral degrees. [See Appendix II, p. 183, for key to military rank.]

No one should doubt that the members of the armed forces intellectually understand the important role of the news media in our democratic society. For example, in response to the survey question, "The news media are just as necessary to maintaining the freedom of the United States as the military," 83% of the military expressed agreement, and only 10% disagreed. The often-expressed allegation that the military has intense animosity towards the press was not borne out by the survey results or in interviews. Actually, the attitude of the armed forces toward the media is very similar to that of the public at large.

Next, it is important to understand that military personnel, from the time they enter the service, are required to abide by the rules of the National Security Classification System, established by presidential executive order.[1] This system establishes a requirement for classifying information whose unauthorized disclosure would be damaging to national security because of its value to the nation's enemies. There are three categories of classification, based on the degree of potential damage from disclosure:

Top Secret	Exceptionally grave damage to the nation.
Secret	Serious damage to the nation.
Confidential	Prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation.

Department of Defense (DOD) directives designate those officials who have the authority to place information in these classification categories and to decide which individuals in the military need to know this information. These latter must then be granted security clearances for access to a given category, following a background investigation to verify their trustworthiness. There are detailed rules specifying the type of secure storage which must be provided

Maintaining secrets—denying vital knowledge to the enemies of the United States—is an essential part of the military's responsibilities.



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for information, depending on its degree of classification. Loss or compromise of classified information can result in criminal penalties for culpable persons.

Military personnel live and work in an environment in which they must be constantly aware of the security classification of the information they are using. Not only must they be careful not to reveal classified material to persons outside the military, they must also know who in their unit is and is not authorized to have access to the material. The key point is that service members are trained to be very careful in their treatment of information and, as a regular practice, to withhold material from those not authorized to receive it.

A commander's major concern is that an enemy will know of his attack plan in advance. A soldier's greatest fear is that his unit will be ambushed.

The military's concern about information security is greatly magnified during time of war. It is axiomatic that the commander who knows more about his enemy than his enemy knows about him has a definite advantage. Secrecy and surprise are absolutely vital to the success of military operations. A commander's major concern is that an enemy will know of his attack plan in advance. A soldier's greatest fear is that his unit will be ambushed.

Military commanders know that even unclassified information poses risks during wartime. They are trained in an area referred to as "operational security" or "OpSec." OpSec is based on the premise that, during wartime, a clever enemy can analyze a mass of unclassified, seemingly innocuous information, both from press and military sources, and make an accurate assessment of U.S. capabilities and intentions, including attack plans. The armed forces have trained intelligence specialists who monitor unclassified transmissions and advise commanders about corrective actions in order to avoid helping the enemy, but the military, of course, is unable to counter press reports in the same way.

A commander's responsibility

Prior to battle, a commander's foremost concern is the morale or "fighting spirit" of his troops. As Napoleon said, "The moral is to the physical as two is to one." By appealing to such emotions as patriotism, unit pride, and peer loyalty/bonding, a commander mentally prepares his troops to fight bravely and effectively, even though they know they may lose their lives. So, it is understandable that a commander would worry about any external influence which might adversely affect his troops' mental preparation, such as an inexperienced reporter asking one of his soldiers, "Do you think this is a just war?" An analogy: There is not a football coach in the country who would feel comfortable about allowing reporters to interview his players in the locker room just prior to a game.

When the United States goes to war, its most urgent national interests are involved and the lives of American are at stake. A military commander deeply feels his responsibility to win the conflict while incurring minimum casualties to his troops. Everything else is clearly secondary to those objectives—including press coverage of the operation.

The American public would never condone battlefield failure because a commander was overly accommodating to the press. Historically, however, the public has supported wartime restrictions on the media when the armed forces felt they were necessary. Modern military commanders fully understand this.

The following statement aptly conveys the pressures military commanders feel during combat. It was given to reporters by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, Commander of U.S. Forces in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, just before initiation of the ground attack against Iraqi forces:

"The most difficult decisions are the ones that involve human life. I agonize over it. I wake up several times a night, and my brain is just in turmoil over these difficult decisions I have to make. Every waking and sleeping moment, my nightmare is the fact that I will give an order that will cause countless numbers of human beings to lose their lives. I don't want my troops to die. I don't want my troops to be

maimed. It's an intensely personal, emotional thing for me."[2]

Members of the press, therefore, should realize on entering a combat area—particularly prior to a secret, surprise attack of the type U.S. forces conducted in Desert Storm—that their presence will naturally cause some concern on the part of military commanders, even though these officers understand the importance of keeping the American public informed. It is not really a matter of the military's questioning reporters' honesty; the news media have proven throughout history that they can be trusted to keep secrets in wartime. Commanders know, as well, that most journalists are competent and dedicated professionals. Their main concern is that reporters will inadvertently disclose facts of value to the enemy, as well as increase the operational security risk and, possibly, impact troop morale.

Commanders also know that few journalists today are knowledgeable about the very complex military profession. Reporting from the battlefield is extremely difficult at best, and because conflict/crises occur with relative infrequency, reporters have little opportunity to gain proficiency in this skill. Furthermore, news organizations have shown little interest recently in covering peacetime military exercises where reporters could gain valuable experience.

There is no evidence that news organizations have made any effort to conduct war-correspondent training in compliance with a key tenet of the *DOD Principles for News Coverage of DOD Operations.* These ground rules, agreed upon between DOD and the news organizations after their disputes during Desert Storm, specify that: "News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations."

The censorship issue

This, then, is the background for contemporary combat-zone security challenges posed by hand-held cellular phones; lap-top computers; instantaneous, global satellite communications, and commercial photographic satellites. These technological innovations have called into question the whole concept of field press censorship or "security review," as it is currently referred to. Traditionally, security review has referred to the military practice of reviewing reporters' news copy prior to their filing to ensure that no information of value to the enemy is released. This system was used effectively in World War II, and there are still proponents of the approach, including the esteemed Walter Cronkite.

A review of conflicts since World War II indicates that the Pentagon has not felt that security review should be universally employed in battlefield coverage. It was not employed in the Vietnam War, because the nature of that conflict did not require it. That war consisted mainly of widespread, small-unit actions, planned and conducted on relatively short notice. There was not a need for the kind of secrecy that existed, for example, in World War II. In Vietnam, reporters were merely given ground rules and asked to withhold their stories until the battles they were covering had commenced. In the eight years of that war, there were reportedly only six violations of ground rules by reporters.

In Desert Storm, the Pentagon decided to employ security review because of the military scenario, which was more like World War II than Vietnam. In fact, the situation which existed prior to the ground attack against Iraq on February 24, 1991, was quite similar to that before the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. In Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf had deployed his troops along a 300-mile front, prepared to execute a lightning-surprise attack using an innovative left-flanking movement. Just prior to the attack, he had covertly moved two Army corps, totaling 250,000 troops, over 200 miles to the west, carrying with them thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, several hundred heavy guns, and enough fuel, ammunition, and other supplies to fight for 60 days. The imperative for secrecy was great, because if Iraqi commanders had had even an inkling of the U.S. attack plan, they could have repositioned their forces, jeopardizing the success of the operation and inflicting significantly higher casualties on American forces.

Although it could not be proven that use of security review seriously affected the quality of the news coverage of Desert Storm, there were clearly problems related to its use. First of all, because of a lack of qualified military personnel, security reviews were performed unevenly and inconsistently, in some cases causing delays in the release of news copy.

After the Vietnam War, the Pentagon had abolished the reserve field-press-censorship units designed to train in peacetime in preparation for recall to active duty in time of war. Because of overall personnel and financial

Commanders also know that few journalists today are knowledgeable about the very complex military profession.

WAR STORIES

Where the 'public's right to know' ends

Bill Smullen, executive assistant to Gen. Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that in Powell's four years as chairman, he made 665 public appearances in uniform, giving speeches, answering questions at press conferences and in interviews, and testifying before Congress.

"That's about once every other day," he said. "So, clearly, Colin Powell had an appreciation for the public's right to know in his role as the senior officer in uniform. But if it was going to have an adverse effect on the safety and welfare of the men and women in uniform that he had a responsibility for, if it could have jeopardized their lives, then he was not going to let any reporter—I don't care what news organization the reporter represented—do something to put their safety at risk."

... The Pentagon is presently disposed to allow battlefield news coverage without the requirement for security review.

constraints, the Pentagon could not justify retention of these units whose services they did not expect to need often. Planning documents were modified to make the security-review responsibility an additional duty of military intelligence personnel. In Desert Storm, the military quickly realized that intelligence personnel were so actively involved in the vital affairs of the war, they could not perform security-review functions. As a result, inexperienced personnel—some recalled reservists and National Guardsmen—were assigned these functions, with unfortunate results.

In 1991-92, based on the experience of reporters in Desert Storm, the leaders of a number of news organizations initiated a cooperative effort with the Pentagon to develop the *DOD Principles for News Coverage of DOD Operations*. [See Appendix IV, p. 197.] The Pentagon and the news leaders could not agree on the use of security review as a principle for wartime news coverage.

So, in a statement accompanying the release of the nine agreed-upon principles on March 11, 1992, the Pentagon added that: "The military believes that it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop safety or the success of a mission." Additionally, the statement affirmed that security reviews would be conducted on a limited basis and as fairly as possible, with the final decision on release remaining with news organizations.

The accompanying statement of the news organizations read:

> The news organizations are convinced that journalists covering U.S. forces in combat must be mindful at all times of operational security and the safety of American lives. News organizations strongly believe that journalists will abide by clear operational security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary.
>
> We believe that the record in Operation Desert Storm, Vietnam and other wars supports the conclusion that journalists in the battlefield can be trusted to act responsibly.
>
> We will challenge prior security review in the event the Pentagon attempts to impose it in some future military operation.

A better way

Research conducted for this report indicates that the Pentagon is presently disposed to allow battlefield news coverage without the requirement for security review. This was confirmed in the coverage of the recent operations in Somalia and Haiti, where reporters were only asked to abide by ground rules. Though it does not appear that the Pentagon is ready to concede that there will never be a requirement for security review, the prevailing thinking among military public affairs officers and other personnel is that there is a better way. As expressed by Colonel Frederick C. Peck, USMC, Deputy Director, Marine Corps Public Affairs: "If I were in the media business—and I tell my colleagues this—I'd never settle for security review or pooling beyond a few hours, maybe a day in duration. I would never get co-opted into that system again, because you give up too much."[3]

This attitude is also confirmed by the military's response to the First Amendment Center survey question:

"During wartime, the degree to which the news media are allowed to report on military





operations is always controversial. We want to know which of the following best reflects your views. Do you believe that the news media should be able to report *anything they decide without clearing their reports* with military officials? Or should the news media be allowed to report in accordance *with published guidelines without any prior review* by military officials? Or should the military retain the prerogative to *conduct a security review of news reports prior to release* if the combat situation dictates?"

Almost 55 percent of the military officers responding felt that reporters should be allowed to report in accordance with guidelines, while 44 percent felt that security review should be employed. If the responses from professional public affairs officers alone had been analyzed separately, the percentage supporting "report in accordance with guidelines" would have been higher. [See pp. 29, 188]

Based on discussions with Rear Adm. Kendell M. Pease, Jr., USN, chief of naval information, and other officers who have planned and conducted the public affairs aspects of recent military operations, the Pentagon's preferred approach is to use what is called "security at the source."[4] Under this arrangement, the Pentagon strives to develop a plan as far in advance of the operation as possible in order to allow the news media to have broad access to the total action. Where feasible, the Pentagon will position with the combat forces not only the reporters in the DOD National Media Pool, but an independent-coverage component of journalists as well. This approach proved effective during both the Haiti operation in September 1994 and the extraction of U.N. forces from Somalia in March 1995. Each reporter was first accredited and then was given the ground rules with which he/she was expected to comply. Because they were located shoulder-to-shoulder with the troops, reporters who had questions about the security aspects of the operation could find someone to respond readily without actually turning in their news copy for review.

If the security-at-the-source approach is to work, it seems reasonable to expect certain things of the news media. First, they must accept that the military can only effectively accommodate a finite number of journalists in combat operations and must work with the Pentagon in peacetime to develop a mechanism for establishing optimal numbers of reporters to cover specific conflict scenarios. The independent coverage tier concept proposed in this report's recommendations section [see pp.] provides a practical means of accomplishing this.

Second, news organizations need to more diligently train their reporters in the area of military operations—as they agreed to do when they helped to develop principles for coverage of DOD operations. The best way to do this is to send personnel to peacetime military exercises.

Many in the military have expressed concern about the emerging capability of journalists to report instantaneously from the battlefield using hand-held equipment. The security-at-the-source approach can readily deal with this issue. If reporters are positioned with combat units prior to the start of an action and are briefed on the battle plan and the security imperatives, they can control their reporting so as not to endanger U.S. troops. Before a surprise attack, they may have to refrain from transmission, but once the action has commenced, probably a delay of an hour or so is all that is required to prevent giving aid to the enemy. The issue of real-time reporting from the battlefield is one that the military and the media should address in peacetime exercises and service-college seminars.

Soon commercial, high-resolution photographic satellites will be available to news organizations. Clearly, the capability of the news media to photograph a battle area during time of war and thereby reveal the location of U.S. ground units, ships, and air bases could be very detrimental to national security. The Pentagon should engage in deliberations with the news organizations and the Commerce Department—which will control the satellites—

The more the nations of the world ... know about each other on a real-time basis, the less likely that miscalculations ... will occur.

to develop wartime utilization procedures for this capability.

Finally, the Pentagon should view as a plus rather than as a potential problem the advances in communications technologies available to the media. Such advances can serve as stabilizing factors in international relations and as deterrents to conflict. The more the nations of the world are able to know about each other on a real-time basis, the less likely that miscalculations and covert attacks will occur. Hopefully, the very availability of the technology will reduce the chances that the news media will have occasion to employ it in covering a war.

Endnotes

1 The National Security Classification System was originally established by Presidential Executive Order 10290, signed by President Truman on September 24, 1951. E.O. 10290 has been subsequently amended by E.O 10816 (5/7/59), E.O. 10901 (1/9/61), E.O. 10964 (9/20/61), E.O. 10985 (1/12/62), E.O. 11097 (2/28/63), E.O. 11652 (3/8/72), E.O. 11714 (4/24/73), E.O. 11862 (6/11/75)

2 Richard Pyle, "General Sought to Avoid Past U.S. Mistakes With Media," *The Dallas Morning News* (April 22, 1991).

3 Col. Frederick C. Peck, interview by authors, tape recording, Arlington, Va., January 12, 1995.

4 Rear Adm. Kendell Pease, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1994.

The Military and the News Media: A Survey 4

The majority of America's military officers believe that reporters for U.S. news organizations should be allowed to report whatever they want from the battlefield, without censorship, as long as they honor guidelines developed jointly by the military and the news media.

Moreover, the vast majority of military officers who responded to a public opinion poll conducted for this study showed an appreciation of the role of a free press in America. To a statement that said, "The news media are just as necessary to maintaining the freedom of the United States as the military," fully 82% of the military officers strongly agreed or agreed somewhat. Among members of the news media surveyed, the figure was 98%.

The news media are just as necessary to maintaining U.S. freedom as the military.



More surprising, however, was the 55% of the officers in the survey who agreed that reporters should be able to report without censorship. That compared with 44% who said the media should be subjected to censorship or security review—that is, allowed to report only what the military permits.

Among members of the news media, 76% favored the principle of censorship-free reporting within guidelines, and only 6% agreed with security review. Eighteen percent of the media respondents, but only 2% of the military, said they believed journalists should be able to report without any restrictions whatever.

Reporting should be free of censorship, but in accordance with published guidelines.



News media should report anything they decide, with no restrictions whatsoever.



However, despite their acceptance of the importance of the news media and press freedom on the battlefield, six out of 10 military officers said they believed their leaders should be allowed to provide false information to the news media to deceive an enemy, even if it means deceiving the American public as well. That attitude could reflect the military's traditional preoccupation with using all available tools to win an engagement.

Not surprisingly, more than nine out of 10 members of news organizations said such deception should not be allowed.

Military leaders should be allowed to use the news media to deceive the enemy (thereby deceiving the American public).



The vast majority of military officers who responded to a public opinion poll conducted for this study showed an appreciation of the role of a free press in America.

Survey Responses

Numbers of military responses

By service †

Army	350
Navy	280
Marines	72
Air Force	205
Coast Guard	20

By rank †

O-4 and under (Lt. Cmdr. to Ensign/Major to 2nd Lieutenant)	144
O-5 (Commander/Lt. Colonel)	258
O-6 (Captain/Colonel)	88
O-7 (Rear Admiral (lower half)/Brig. General)	205
O-8 (Rear Admiral/Maj. General)	163
O-9 (Vice Admiral/Lt. General)	45
O-10 (Admiral/General)	11

Numbers of media responses

By medium

Newspapers	96
Television	24
Magazines	10
Radio	9
Other	5

By job category

Editorial executives	84
Reporters or correspondents	53
Operations/financial executives	4

†Totals do not agree because not all respondents answered all questions. See Appendix II, p. 183, for key to military rank.

Level of response

Those were among the findings in the public opinion poll conducted for this report by The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center. [For full details, see Appendix I, p. 177.] The poll, which produced the highest level of responses of any mail survey thus far conducted by the Center, focused on the relationship between America's military and its news media in pre-invasion and combat situations. The survey went to more than 2,000 military officers, about half of whom were generals and admirals, and 351 carefully selected news media members, including those likely to cover a future war or military operation. Among them were editors, reporters, news directors, photographers, producers and executives of newspapers, news magazines and broadcasters, as well as directors and officers of professional journalism organizations.

Nearly half of those surveyed, a total of 47%, responded to the poll. The vast majority of the respondents were highly educated, with a higher percentage of advanced degrees among the military officers than among the news media. Among the military, 83% had master's or doctoral degrees. Among the media members, the figure was 30%.

A high percentage (60%) of the media respondents identified themselves as editorial executives. On the military side, more than 46% of those who responded were generals and admirals. They included 11 of four-star rank and 45 of three-star rank. [See Appendix II, pp.191.]

Critical comments

Many of those who responded to the poll appended individual comments, some of them sharply critical of the other institution.

"Journalists are self-serving by nature, compensated based upon copy-inch published, and focused solely upon their self-aggrandizing ego and the increase in circulation their sensationalism spawned," wrote Air Force Maj. Duane K. Little. "The visual medium (TV) is the worst of the bunch."

From the journalism side, Patrick Pexton, a reporter for *Navy Times,* wrote:

"The armed services have some of the most dedicated, bravest, hardest working men and women in the world, yet their leaders are often duplicitous, devious, dishonorable and dumb. ... The military is also immature. Any other community of half a million souls understands that its citizens sometimes make mistakes. The military refuses to acknowledge it and insists they're perfect. Grow up."

Yet there also were many service members who demonstrated an understanding of the press and its role in a free society, as well as professional reporters who expressed empathy toward the military point of view.

Army Brig. Gen. Scott Magers wrote just two sentences: "A free press is fundamental to our democracy. Any limit on that freedom is dangerous."

"The general lack of knowledge about military affairs makes most reporters and editors ill-suited to judge what information presents a risk to U.S. troops," said Otto Kreisher, military affairs correspondent for Copley News Service.

Sharp differences

The question about the use of the news media to deceive the enemy bore directly on a period during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, when many journalists were convinced that the military leaders deliberately misled the press into believing that U.S. Marines would launch an amphibious attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the Persian Gulf.

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the coalition forces, denied the accusation. In an interview, he said, "When the reporters' focus was on the Marines going out on amphibious operations, I never stood up and said, 'Wait a minute, we don't plan to do any amphibious operations.' I was delighted that the press was doing that. But I will swear on a stack of Bibles that we never, ever deliberately manipulated the press, and we never, ever deliberately planted a false story."[1]

The poll showed sharp differences between military officers and news people as well. For example, the belief that news media coverage of the Vietnam War harmed the war effort there is still widely held among military officers, with 64% agreeing somewhat or strongly agreeing that was the case. On the other hand, only 17% of the news staffers agreed or strongly agreed.

"I think there is a giant generation gap in the military's view of the media," wrote John King, a reporter who covered Desert Storm for the Associated Press. "The Vietnam generation, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, remains highly suspicious. But the younger officers are more open. So using a blanket 'military personnel' [in the poll] ... is too generalized."

That same division came in response to a question about the motives of news organiza-

News media more interested in negative stories of wrongdoing/scandals than positive stories of victories/efficient operation.



The military often wastes taxpayer money on unnecessary weapons.



News media more interested in increasing readership/viewership than in telling public what it needs to know.



News media more interested in personal power than in what is good for the country.



News media coverage of events in Vietnam harmed the war effort.



tions, with 65% of the military officers saying they agreed or strongly agreed that the news media were more interested in their own personal power than in what is good for the country. Only 17% of the news staffers strongly agreed or somewhat agreed.

Conversely, a total of 76% of those who responded from the news media said they believed the military often wasted taxpayer money on unnecessary weapons, while only 27% of the military agreed with that statement.

More than eight of 10, or 82%, of the military officers strongly agreed or agreed somewhat with the statement that "The news media are more interested in negative stories of wrongdoing or scandals than in telling positive stories about victories or efficient operations. Among the news people, 47% also agreed with that assessment.

A recurring theme in the comments on the news media by military officers was the belief that news organizations are motivated more by economics than by public service. There were complaints about "slanting" of the news to sell papers or make big profits, as well as criticisms that the news media subscribed to no ethical standards whatever.

In response to a statement that "the top managers of the news media are more interested in selling newspapers or increasing viewership than in telling the public what it needs to know," 91% of the military officers said they strongly agreed or agreed somewhat. The comparable number for news staffers surveyed was 30%.

"The media would gladly operate to the detriment of national security and the safety of military personnel if, in the long run, they would succeed in capturing a larger audience," wrote Navy Cmdr. Elaine F. Rafferty. "After all, ratings and numbers of copies sold is what it's all about."

Accuracy of coverage

Surprisingly, when asked about the accuracy of news media reporting of military operations in the Persian Gulf War, a higher percentage of military officers (88%) than news staffers (86%) said the news media coverage was often or almost always accurate.

However, there was some disagreement over whether the military reported accurately, with 99% of the officers on the "often" or "al-

In the Persian Gulf War ...

how often did *civilian government officials* report military operations accurately?



how often did *military officials* report military operations accurately?



how often did the *news media* report military operations accurately?



... The news media personnel appear to be more conscious than military officers of their shortcomings in covering military affairs.

most always accurate" side, compared to 73% of the news people. Similarly, 94% of the military officers and 75% of the news people said civilian government officials were often or almost always accurate in reporting on military operations during the war.

In another surprise, the news media personnel appear to be more conscious than military officers of their shortcomings in covering military affairs. A total of 74% of the news people agreed somewhat or strongly agreed that few members of the news media were knowledgeable about national defense matters, such as military personnel, equipment capabilities and the specifics of foreign military threats. Among the military officers, the figure was 70%.

Responding to a question about whether military personnel were honest when dealing with the news media, just 43% of the news people agreed or strongly agreed. But fully 84% of the military officers agreed or strongly agreed.

... The poll showed understanding on both sides of the importance of both a strong military and a free press to American democracy.



Understanding on both sides

Nevertheless, the poll showed understanding on both sides of the importance of both a strong military and a free press to American democracy. In response to a statement that asserted that members of the military "are more interested in their own image than in the good of the country," 57% of the news people said they disagreed somewhat or strongly disagreed. On the military side, the number was 93%.

Only 35% of the military officers surveyed said they believed the news media needed to be accompanied by military escorts to military-approved areas in war zones. The majority (55%) said the news media should be allowed to go on their own to approved places, and a surprising 10% said journalists should be allowed to go anywhere they chose. Among the news media members surveyed, 73% said reporters should be able to go anywhere, 23% said they should be able to go on their own to approved places, and just 4% said reporters should have military escorts.



Stereotypes breaking down

The poll showed that some stereotypes are breaking down. Though many military officers described themselves as conservatives, nearly half of them (49%) disagreed strongly or disagreed somewhat with the statement that "the news media are mainly left-wing doves who never want the nation to enter combat."



At the same time, 85% of the news media respondents disagreed somewhat or strongly with the statement that "military personnel are mainly right-wing hawks itching to get into combat."

On several examples of whether stories should be reported, the news media respondents showed themselves more compassionate than their military counterparts. Fifty-two percent of the military officers, but just 10% of the media, said they would report a story based on evidence in a community that a local military base commander was having an



affair with the well-known operator of a restaurant.

Similarly, just 6% of the media, but 25% of the military, said they would report that the cadet commander of the ROTC unit at a local university was a homosexual, but kept it private. Conversely, 81% of the media said they would not report that story, compared to 61% of the military.

A sharp division came over the question of showing pictures of troop casualties, including fatalities. Less than half (49%) of the military officers said they would show the photographs, compared to 82% of the news media.

A relatively easy question for the military provoked indecision among the news media staffers. The question asked whether photographs should be shown of airplanes taking off, possibly indicating that a secret invasion of a neighboring country by U.S. forces was underway. Fully 41% of the news people said they were undecided. Just 35% said they would go with story, while 24% said they would not. On the military side, 74% of the officers said they would not report the story, while just 13% said they would and 14% were undecided.

An easy question for both sides had 97% of the military and 99% of the news media saying they would report a story that enlisted personnel at a military installation were forced to obtain food stamps because their pay was too low to support their families, despite the plea of a public affairs officer that the story would damage morale.

Disagreement over motives

Motives for maintaining secrecy also produced a sharp divergence of opinion between the military and the media. When asked how often the military kept things secret because they didn't want to look bad, 99% of the media said they believed that happened often or sometimes. Just 38% of the military agreed.

Similarly, 89% of the media, compared to 40% of the military, said that the military often or sometimes maintained secrecy because of possible embarrassment over waste and inefficiency.

On the other hand, there was basic agreement that the military maintained secrecy often or sometimes because they did not trust



the news media to report fairly. On the military side, the figure was 78%; on the media side, it was 98%.

Both sides also fundamentally agreed that military secrecy was often enforced because of a fear that potential enemies might learn information that could damage the security of the United States. Ninety-seven percent of the military officers said that was sometimes or often the case, compared to 92% of the news media.

Confidence ratings

In rating various American institutions, the poll showed that both the news media and the military think highly of the military. But the military doesn't think much of the media.

In ranking its confidence in various institutions, the military ranked themselves first in confidence, followed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the medical profession and major educational institutions. Newspapers were in 9th place, with the U.S. Congress and television news at the bottom of the ratings.

On the media side, the respondents ranked the U.S. Supreme Court first in confidence, followed by newspapers and major educational institutions. The military was in fourth place, with television news fourth from the bottom, Congress third from the bottom and the CIA last.

Both the military and the news media rate national newspapers as the best in overall coverage and coverage of military and national security issues. After that, the rankings get jumbled, with local television getting the least respect from both the military and the news media.

Both the military and the news media rate national newspapers as the best in overall coverage and coverage of military and national security issues.

The need to know each other

Despite the differences between the two institutions, many of the respondents who chose to comment stressed the need for both the military and the news media to get to know each other better. Some samples:

"I believe if you let the media/press observe military training and operations, see the marvelous young people we have serving and let them observe the way we do business, our record speaks for itself. We are accountable and responsible. The military debate in Washington is only a small portion of the military that gets more coverage than it deserves."—Vice Adm. Archie Clemens, U.S. Navy, Commander, 7th Fleet.

"Soldiers and scribes have different purposes, and this inevitably results in animosities, especially in time of war. Press access and military security are inherently at odds with each other. Nonetheless, the Gulf War showed we can peacefully co-exist without giving comfort to the enemy and endangering American lives."—Bill Ketter, *The Patriot Ledger,* Quincy, Mass.

"We need to continue the trend towards increased understanding and mutual respect for our diverse missions which, in a democracy, cannot be separated. Honorable men and women in both professions will develop the framework of a workable solution. It is happening."—Maj. Gen. J. L. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, Camp Le Jeune, N.C.



Endnotes

[1]Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, interview by authors, Tampa, Fla., Jan. 23, 1995.

The First Two Centuries 5

Conflicts between the news media and the military are older than the nation itself. During the Revolutionary War, colonial printers found that they could wield the power of the press—when they weren't dodging censorship, harassment, bullying and, in some cases, tar and feathers.

Mostly, it depended on location. Newspapers in those days—and well into the 20th century—were organs of opinion, not much different from editorial pages today, although the writing was often more colorful than it is now. So a Patriot printer in an area where the majority population was sympathetic to the Revolution had peace and press freedom as long as long as his readers agreed with bashing the Loyalists.

Tory printers in such areas, however, led somewhat more interesting lives. James Rivington, who published a New York newspaper loyal to the Crown, suspended publication and fled to England after "a group of armed men rode into New York on Nov. 27, 1775, broke into the building, destroyed his press and carried away the type, which was later melted into bullets for use of the Patriots."[1]

Patriot newspapers cooperated with the Revolutionary military, publishing proclamations and orders, and "spreading any desirable information." They also advertised rewards for deserters. But they did not have reporters in the field. Sources for war news were other publications, official proclamations and letters from eyewitnesses.

The attitude of the military's civilian leadership toward the press was not much different than one might find today. George Washington reportedly was exasperated by dispatches in New York newspapers, which he felt undermined the war effort against England. "It is much to be wished," he wrote, "that our printers were more discreet in many of their publications. We see in almost every paper proclamations or accounts transmitted by the enemy of an injurious nature."[2]

The War of 1812

A similar climate prevailed during the War of 1812. Although the numbers of newspapers and the frequency of their publication had increased, they still gathered information in a haphazard way and suffered from problems of "insufficient resources, inadequate methods for transmitting news, and disruptions caused by military operations."[3]

Prevailing sentiments in a given location still determined whether a newspaper could circulate peacefully, or whether it would be a target. In Baltimore, a pro-war area, the *Federal Republican,* a federalist newspaper, had its presses wrecked and its building torn down by a mob angered by its anti-war stance.

After the defeat of the British in New Orleans, Gen. Andrew Jackson imprisoned an editor who had the temerity to ignore Jackson's demand that he secure the general's permission to print news dealing with the war. When a judge issued a *habeas corpus* order to free the editor, Jackson tried to court-martial the judge. Fortunately for the judge and editor, Jackson's zealous pursuit of the matter ended with the end of the war.

The War of 1812, however, did produce an eyewitness who was perhaps America's first war correspondent. Kentuckian James M. Bradford, editor of the *Orleans Gazette,* enlisted in Jackson's army in New Orleans and wrote letters home to his newspaper describing military operations. As in the Revolutionary War, there was no need for security review

George Washington reportedly was exasperated by dispatches in New York newspapers, which he felt undermined the war effort against England.

WAR STORIES

A colonial correspondent's press report

AMERICANS! forever bear in mind the BATTLE OF LEXINGTON! where British troops, unmolested and unprovoked, wantonly and in a manner most cruel fired upon and killed a number of our countrymen, then robbed them of their provisions, ransacked, plundered and burnt their houses! Nor could the tears of defenseless women, some of whom were in pains of childbirth, and cries of helpless babes, nor the prayers of old age, confined to beds of sickness, appease their thirst for blood!—or divert them from their DESIGN of MURDER and ROBBERY!

— Isaiah Thomas,
describing the Battle of Lexington in the *Massachusetts Spy*

or censorship because dispatches arrived too late to be of any use to the enemy.

The Mexican War

By 1846 and the start of the war with Mexico, news-gathering and technology had progressed to the point where civilian correspondents, some using the newly invented telegraph and the pony express, competed for scoops. Newspapers often were in "daily, sometimes bitter competition for the latest word on anything of importance."[4]

The most enterprising reporter of the day was George W. Kendall, who had founded the *Picayune* in New Orleans and had worked on Horace Greeley's *New Yorker* as well as several Washington newspapers. He worked the front lines, riding with McCullough's Rangers and hobnobbing with generals. Historians credit him with the first reports of "the great battles of Contreras and Churubusco, near [the] Mexican capital." Yet despite such efforts and the new technology, newspaper accounts of military actions still often were 10 days old.

"Camp newspapers" surfaced for the first time during the Mexican War, and could be regarded as the first military public affairs effort. Historian Frank L. Mott says the papers were published by soldier-printers and were used by civilian newspapers "as a chief source of news from the seat of the war."



The National Archives

Gen. Sherman
"The most notorious press-hater."

The Civil War

"Real-time" reporting emerged for the first time during the bloody four years of the Civil War, a time when government and military leaders in both the North and the South did their utmost to suppress publication of information deemed inimical to the war effort, which often simply meant something they didn't like. At the same time, leaders such as President Abraham Lincoln became convinced that newspapers were one of the keys to maintaining popular support.

For their part, the newspapers proved themselves mostly irrepressible, often publishing orders of battle and other military information of use to the enemy. In April 1861, the federal government seized control of all the telegraph lines leading to Washington. The following August, the War Department issued the 57th Article of War, which warned journalists that they could be court-martialed if they disclosed sensitive information. Newspapers mostly ignored the order, and it was never strictly enforced.

The Associated Press was created during the Civil War. As today, the AP pooled the resources of many subscribing papers to field an army of correspondents. The AP supplemented journalistic coverage with papers and printed correspondence received from soldiers at the front.

The federal government also used the AP as a way to communicate administrative actions to the people. "Washington," according to one historian, "recognized the potential usefulness of the AP—the first mass communication medium of national scope—as an indispensable tool to access a national constituency simultaneously."

Of about 500 journalists who covered the war for Northern newspapers, about 150 went out into the field with the soldiers. Although some argued that they should be treated as noncombatants, others took an active role as aides and messengers. A few even fought in battles. Historian James Melvin Lee has written that field correspondents were "quite as liable to attack by the enemy as enlisted men and were sometimes attached to officer's staffs, and served as aides, dispatch carriers or signal officers. Some were killed in action, some wounded and some captured."

The correspondents were not universally loved, however. Various military commanders denied them access to the action and, along with government officials, tried to limit the information presented in newspapers.

Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman was the most notorious press hater in the military ranks. He fiercely believed that there was a direct relationship between censorship and military victory and argued that the press should have no rights during war. Sherman blamed the press for the North's defeat at the first Battle of Bull Run, which the South called the First Manassas. That was because of reports in the *Washington Star* and *The New York Times* that listed the order of battle.

The *Times* story reported: "The army in Virginia took up the line of March for Richmond, via Fairfax and Manassas. The force starting today was fully fifty thousand strong ... about three thousand Regular Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, and fifty thousand Volunteers."[5]

In March 1862, the secretary of war, Edwin M. Stanton, ordered the military governor of the District of Columbia to seize *The Sunday Chronicle,* which had published information about military movements, and to destroy all copies of the newspaper. Stanton also worked the other side of the press-military relationship. In wartime communiqués, he "deliberately distorted accounts of key battles and manipulated casualty figures to present a more positive account of the Union army's performance."[6]

Newspapers of the day were still one-sided politically, and the Copperhead papers denounced the war and its civilian and military leadership. Lincoln was called a tyrant and "the widow-maker." Out west, *The Chicago Times* was closed for three days for its "violent Copperheadism," which had allegedly fomented treason and distrust of the war effort.

Lincoln was pressured to suppress such radicalism. He wrote of his dilemma in a note to Erastus Corning, a leader of the Democrats in New York: "Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert ... ?"[7]

Southern newspapers fared poorly in the war. With not much in the way of resources, they could not field many correspondents. Those who went out usually found themselves shut out of the action by Confederate commanders. As a result, Southern readers were mostly deprived of first-hand war news.

"The experience of the Civil War demonstrated an inherent tension between the aims of journalists and the aims of soldiers in wartime,"[8] Loren B. Thompson wrote in *Defense Beat.* "Soldiers wanted to avoid disclosure of sensitive information and objected to criticism of their performance. Journalists wanted unrestricted access to military information and the ability to use it in whatever manner they saw fit. Soldiers placed a premium on organization and discipline; war correspondents were so undisciplined and eccentric that one of their own characterized them as 'bohemians.'[9]

"Friction between these divergent priorities and styles was inevitable, as each new conflict after the Civil War illustrated. In the Spanish-American War, in World Wars I and II, in Korea and Vietnam, the tension continually reasserted itself, producing resentment and animosity between soldiers and representatives of the fourth estate."[10]

The Spanish-American War

By the time of the Spanish-American War, news dissemination had improved dramatically. Electric motors drove printing presses, the Linotype machine simplified typesetting, the Atlantic cable had been laid, telegraph wires spanned the country from coast to coast, and the telephone had come into use.

The war coincided with the rise of sensationalist "yellow journalism," exemplified by two bitterly competitive newspapers in New York City—Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World* and William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal.* "The war was unquestionably avoidable and occurred largely to satisfy the promotional goals of competing New York newspapers," Loren Thompson wrote. The war "marked a moral low point in the coverage of conflicts by the American press."[11]

The government retaliated by banning reporters from combat zones and closing cable offices. But there were so many leaks, the efforts were largely unsuccessful. In one incident, an Army commander, Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, turned the press coverage into a disinformation campaign by landing his troops at Guanica on the south coast of Puerto Rico instead of at Point Fajardo on the north coast. It surprised even the War Department.

"So much publicity had been given the enterprise that I decided to do what the enemy least expected, and instead of going or making a demonstration at Point Fajardo, I decided to go directly to Guanica," Miles said later.[12]

World War I

During World War I, "hysteria and public concerns about national loyalty ... led Congress to enact some of the most severe restrictions on speech and the press in the nation's history."[13] The Espionage Act, enacted June 15, 1917, prohibited the publication of any information that could even remotely be considered to offer aid to the enemy. It also banned interference with American military operations or war production and, along with the Sedition Act of 1918, was used to justify censorship.

The Sedition Act forbade any criticism of "the conduct or actions of the United States government or its military forces, including disparaging remarks about the flag, military uniforms, similar badges or symbols. ..."[14]



Library of Congress

Abraham Lincoln
Was called the "widow-maker."

In March 1862, the secretary of war, Edwin M. Stanton, ordered the military governor of the District of Columbia to seize *The Sunday* Chronicle ....

At the outset, newspapers and war correspondents were expected to voluntarily submit to censorship. President Woodrow Wilson's Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel, asked newspapers to refrain from printing "advance reports about troop strengths, troop and ship movements, anti-aircraft defenses and harbor defenses."[15] The military also asked the press to voluntarily censor descriptions of military policies, plans and movements; ports of embarkation, mines and harbor defenses, and any photographs that might show any of those things.

Eventually, Creel's committee maintained offices in every neutral and Allied country. It "issued a daily newspaper, operated a press service that fed information to the news media, produced films and foreign language publications, and enlisted a corps of 75,000 patriotic speakers reaching into every part of the nation."[16]

WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 1. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MILITARY CENSOR Sept. 17, 1918.
Washington

To All Correspondents, Editors and Publishers:

NOTICE: Memoranda of this nature are sent on cards of this size and color for the convenience of those concerned. It is suggested that they be filed for observance until the receipt of a similar card cancelling the request.

Memorandum on Tanks

Editors are requested to refrain from disclosing the strength of the personnel of the Tank Corps; from disclosing the number of its members overseas; from disclosing the number of tanks built or building in the United States; and from publishing descriptions or photographs of American tanks.

No objection is interposed to publicity designed to promote the recruiting campaign of the Corps, provided that in all such publicity the above request is observed.

The request to refrain from publication of photographs and descriptions of British and French "Whippet" tanks is withdrawn.

M. CHURCHILL,
Brig. Gen., Gen. Staff, Director of Military Intelligence, Chief Military Censor.

WORLD WAR I: Orders from the Chief Military Censor were sent to newsrooms on colored cards.

To report on the war, each correspondent had to be certified as an accredited or a visiting correspondent. The former lived permanently in military camps, while the latter were temporarily with units. All correspondents were required to swear an oath to write the truth, to put up a $10,000 bond, and to sign an agreement to submit all correspondence, except for personal letters, to the press officer or his assistant. (Personal letters were censored elsewhere with regular mail.)

"[T]he correspondent agreed to repeat no information he received at the front unless it had previously passed the censor; he was to give neither name nor location of any unit; there was to be no revelation of future plans or of any information that Military Intelligence might have thought of value to the enemy, and the correspondent agreed to accept the press officer's instruction as to further censorship rules from time to time."[17]

Reporters had their press passes revoked if they failed to clear stories with the censors—a punishment that was imposed on just five correspondents.

The postmaster general also had broad authority to censor and, at one point, revoked the second-class mailing privilege of the Socialist *Milwaukee Leader* because the newspaper opposed the war.

Frederick Palmer, the chief American censor for the U.S. Army in Europe, who had been a newsman, said he led a double life, working as "a public liar to keep up the spirit of the armies and people of our side."[18]

World War II

Despite the immediate imposition of censorship after the outbreak of World War II, the war represented the high-water mark of military-media relations. The country, including news organizations and their reporters, was of one patriotic mind. Journalists wore uniforms and traveled with military units, and editors accepted battlefield and home-front censorship as the price of national security.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of War Information and the Office of Censorship in 1942. The latter administered press codes that told journalists in great detail what matters they were not allowed to report in words or pictures, including location, movements and identity of units, ships and aircraft; war production and supplies; weather forecasts and temperatures in major cities; casualties, and even locations of archives and art treasures.

The military also had its own censors, who had "the right to curb the release of news about their combat activities that was deemed to be potentially harmful to their fighting effectiveness."[19] But unlike the civilian agencies, the military censors operated without guidelines and, therefore, were sometimes capricious. Historian Frederick S. Voss wrote that there were times "when the full extent of Allied failures and losses were kept out of public print, not because disclosure might help the enemy in playing to Allied weaknesses, but simply because it reflected negatively on the Allied performance."[20]

Gen. Douglas MacArthur was the most notorious practitioner of that form of censorship. If he didn't like a story, it was changed to suit him. His command often was reported as having low or light casualties. If a reporter

found anything to the contrary, the story simply would not pass the military censors.

The military used accreditation to control who went to the battlefield. Correspondents needed a press pass from the War Department and a passport from the State Department. Once shipped off to the front, reporters were assigned to "press camps"—facilities that were attached to regular military forces and were capable of handling administration, communication and briefings.

Each press camp was to follow a field army across Western Europe. "There were fifty correspondents in each of these camps,"[21] according to historian Lilya Wagner. "First the correspondent would be accredited ... then join a press camp and follow the army's activities as closely as was safe."[22] Accredited correspondents wore officers' uniforms without rank insignia, although visiting correspondents were allowed to wear mufti. The visitors, which included publishers of newspapers or magazines, came with special permission, were limited to a fixed itinerary, and ordinarily were accompanied by an escort officer, according to historian Robert W. Desmond.[23]

Radio correspondents set up what could be regarded as a precursor of the modern press pool. They were forced to work together because of limited radio transmission facilities. "One correspondent might serve as a 'neutral voice' to be carried by any or all networks," Desmond wrote.[24]

There were also special "combat correspondents." These were usually volunteers who had been journalists or writers before the war. They went into the service as enlisted men and went through regular Marine training. After participating in or observing military actions, the correspondents would have their stories, photographs, or motion pictures processed, censored, released, and distributed by the Navy Department. "Three reported the Guadalcanal-Tulagi landings in August 1942, and on September 1, forty-eight additional Marine combat correspondents were ready to join units in the Pacific."[25]

The Espionage Act of World War I was still in force, but censors were reluctant to enforce it, preferring to persuade news organizations to follow guidelines. The persuasion was almost universally successful, with news organizations mostly accepting censorship. Nevertheless, the nation's news organizations eventually provided the American public with comprehensive coverage of the war.



World War II: "Journalists [and cartoonists] wore uniforms and travelled with military units ...."

The Korean War

The Korean War, described in its day as a "police action," produced a curious reaction in the news media. At the outset, there was no censorship whatsoever. Members of the media voluntarily censored themselves, based on their own guidelines. "[S]o the correspondents wrote freely of 'whipped and frightened GIs,' of the panic of the poor example set by many officers, of the lack of equipment—'you can't even get a tank with a carbine'—of the general desperation, horror and lack of purpose."[26]

But the voluntary guidelines caused some security leaks, as well as confusion in the press corps, and critics argued that media criticism was negatively influencing public opinion in the United States. As a result, the Overseas Press Club petitioned the Defense Department to impose censorship, so reporters and editors would have precise guidelines for what they could report.

The military established a censorship scheme similar to what had existed in World War II, with censors reviewing every story, message, broadcast, photograph, and newsreel film. "Reporters were not allowed to print articles about food shortages, panics, inferior U.S. equipment or the rampant corruption in the South Korean government."[27]

Censorship extended well beyond security concerns. A story could be released only if it was accurate, did not disclose military information, would "not deteriorate morale" and would not "cause embarrassment to the United States or its allies."[28] MacArthur broadened the provisions to rule out any criticism of decisions made by United Nations

... The Overseas Press Club petitioned the Defense Department to impose censorship ....

UPI/Bettman

Vietnam:
"... Some members of the military blamed press coverage for the loss of the war."

commanders in the field, as well as "conduct by allied soldiers on the battlefield."[29]

The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War—the only war in history lost by the United States—produced both a high point and a low point in the relationship between the military and the media. The high, for the reporters and news organizations, was that no censorship was ever imposed. Journalists were free to cover whatever they wished, subject to the availability of military operations and transportation, and their copy, photographs and films went out unimpeded by any security review.

The low point came when some members of the military blamed press coverage for the loss of the war. Although interviews indicate that that opinion apparently is no longer held by top civilian and military leaders of the nation's defense establishment, it still is widespread among military officers. In an opinion poll conducted for this study, 64% of the military officers surveyed said they strongly agreed or agreed somewhat with the statement that "news media coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort." On the media side, only 17% of those who responded to the poll held that opinion. [See p. 31, 183.]

Melvin R. Laird, who served as secretary of defense from 1968 to 1972 and who presided over Vietnamization and the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, said he had encountered that opinion among many military officers. But he said it was wrong.

"They think that the press is the reason we did not do well in Vietnam," he said. "They think that it was the press getting after Lyndon Johnson, and driving him out of office. But it was Vietnam that did it. That was an unpopular war. I don't blame the press. I blame the way President Johnson handled it."[30]

Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he was one who came away from Vietnam with a sour taste in his mouth, convinced that something had gone badly wrong in the relationship between the military and the news media. He said he believed there was a built-in distrust of the media among military men and women.

"I think we keep shooting ourselves in the foot," he said. "We still have people, in my generation, who think if they solved the Vietnam problem, whatever the hell it was, then we're okay. But even if we solve Vietnam, today, the world is different than it was in Vietnam. Technology is different. Reporting of events is a different issue. Access to things that are ongoing is a different issue than it was in Vietnam. Yet some of my generation are still trying to solve that problem. Youngsters are probably doing it, too. I haven't given it much thought, but I would think that they're doing it as a kind of a reflection of what they hear from some of their elders. You know, real men don't talk to the press ...."[31]

Endnotes

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6 Thompson, op. cit., p. 12.

7 Harold L. Nelson, ed., *Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 229-230.

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11 Ibid. p. 19.

12 Charles Henry Brown, *The Correspondents' War: Journalists in the Spanish-American War* (New York: Scribner Publishing, 1967), p. 389.

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15 Michael W. Klein, "The Censor's Red Flair, the Bombs Bursting in Air: The Constitutionality of the Desert Storm Media Restrictions," *Hastings Constitutional Law* (Summer 1992), 19: 1044.

16 Matthews, op. cit., p. 7.

17 James Robert Mock, *Censorship 1917.* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 103.

18 Matthews, op. cit., p. 8.

19 Frederick Voss, *Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press for the National Portrait Gallery, 1994), pp. 20-21.

20 Ibid., p. 24.

21 Lilya Wagner, *Women War Correspondents of World War II* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 2.

22 Ibid.

23 Robert William Desmond, *Tides of War: World News Reporting, 1931-1945,* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1984) p. 238.

24 Ibid., p. 239.

25 Ibid.

26 Phillip Knightley. *The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 337.

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28 Karl Tage Olson, "The Constitutionality of Department of Defense Press Restrictions on Wartime Correspondents Covering the Persian Gulf War." *Drake Law Review,* 41: 518.

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30 Melvin R. Laird, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Jan. 26, 1995.

31 Gen. John Shalikashvili, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1994.

Grenada to Desert Storm: The Relationship Sours 6

To properly assess the Pentagon's current approach to news-media planning, it is necessary to review recent history—especially those mistakes and/or failures which occurred in Grenada, Panama and Desert Storm.

In the 1980s, as now, there were numerous Department of Defense (DOD) directives prescribing military responsibilities for supporting the news media. In addition to a detailed document governing the management and employment of the DOD National Media Pool (DNMP), the most important directive with regard to media planning was, and is, *Planning Guidance—Public Affairs*, issued by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[1] This publication is primarily directed to the commanders-in-chief of the major combatant commands (or "unified" commands, as they are commonly called), i.e., Atlantic Command, Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command, Space Command, Strategic Command, Special Operations Command, and Transportation Command. All of these commanders are officers of four-star rank, representing the four military services.

The introduction to the public-affairs directive sets its basic tone: "DOD policy is to make timely and accurate information available to the public, Congress, and the press and to provide the media access to cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and safety of U.S. forces."

The directive further emphasizes the need for the combatant commander and his/her staff to work closely with the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and his/her staff in planning and executing the most effective public affairs effort possible in each military operation. It gives detailed instructions on providing support to the media in such areas as transportation, communications, billeting, messing, and emergency medical treatment and offers guidance in areas such as accreditation of reporters, reporting ground rules, and security review of news reports.

Legacy of Vietnam

With such detailed guidance on the conduct of news-media planning, why did past failures occur?

Research for this report indicates that, prior to the 1990s, the prevailing view among military personnel was that relations with the news media should be handled only by assigned public affairs personnel. Other service members became involved only when the public affairs officers requested that they do so. The unique nature of the Vietnam War accentuated this attitude on the part of commanders.

Vietnam consisted of widespread small-unit actions, conducted mostly during the daytime. Reporters were transported to and from the field by military aircraft, often accompanied by public affairs personnel. They were free to observe and report on the combat operations, which normally occurred in a limited geographic space. Because there was not a strong imperative for secrecy, reporters were able to file their copy without the censorship employed in prior conflicts; they were required only to abide by published ground rules. Combat actions in Vietnam were quite repetitive in nature, and over time military/news media interactions became highly stereotyped. Military commanders and personnel in the field scarcely took notice of reporters. To

... Prior to the 1990s, the prevailing view among military personnel was that relations with the news media should be handled only by assigned public affairs personnel.

them, dealing with the news media was the purview of the public affairs personnel.

By the time of Grenada in 1983, there was an entire generation of military officers who did not think "public affairs." Most felt they had more to lose than to gain by interacting with the press. While the DOD and JCS directives required news media planning for military operations, commanders did not understand this to be an integral part of the overall planning. The attitude was that, if the media showed interest in covering an operation, the public affairs personnel could handle any arrangements required. Public affairs officers



conducted their planning independently from the operators and were rarely familiar with details of the plan for military action.

Few military personnel outside the public affairs field were aware of the progressive growth in the size and diversity of the news media in the years after Vietnam. When Grenada appeared on the horizon, the military prepared for the operation as they had for past missions. Commanders considered only the operational aspects of the deployment, excluding public affairs personnel from the planning even more than was normally the case because of pre-invasion secrecy imposed by the White House.[2]

As the operation commenced and 600 reporters arrived on Barbados seeking to cover the impending conflict on Grenada, the operational commanders were caught unprepared. They had allowed themselves to get into a situation that even their public affairs officers could not salvage. Preoccupied with the demands of the operation, they reacted by denying reporters access to Grenada during the first two days of the conflict. They said it was simply "too hard" to make plans to accommodate 600 reporters in the heat of battle. Lack of planning, rather than an attempt to prevent news coverage of the conflict, caused the military's media failure in Grenada; their sin was one of omission rather than commission.

Although the news organizations—understandably—registered loud protests over their treatment in Grenada, the military's approach to media relations did not change as it should have. Attitudinal changes do not occur readily in organizations as large as the military. Also, Grenada was a relatively small operation, and only a fraction of the military was involved or aware of what occurred there.

A flawed solution

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, did convene the Sidle Commission to review the Grenada debacle, an action which resulted in the establishment of the DOD National Media Pool [DNMP].[3] Ironically, however, this proved to be counterproductive to improved public affairs planning by military commanders. Many in the military had the impression that the DNMP would smooth future relations with the press, obviating any need for military commanders to become more involved in the public affairs process than they had been before.

This flaw was exposed in the Panama operation in 1989, when the DNMP was deployed without involvement of those local military commanders whose support was necessary for reporters to operate in-country . As in Grenada, members of the press were only able to cover the later stages of the operation, after the critical phase of the conflict was over.

Subsequently, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams requested Fred Hoffman, former Associated Press Pentagon correspondent, to analyze the news media aspects of the Panama conflict and provide recommendations for corrective actions.[4] In addition, General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a message to the major military commanders, stressing the importance of planning and support for news media coverage of military operations. It read, in part:

> Commanders are reminded that the media aspects of military operations are important ... and warrant your personal attention. ... Media coverage and pool support requirements must be planned simultaneously with operational plans and should address all aspects of operational activity, including direct combat, medical, prisoner-of-war, refugee, equipment repair, refueling and rearming, civic action, and stabilization activities. Public Affairs annexes should receive command attention when formulating and reviewing all such plans.

This directive helped greatly to change attitudes within the military and to convince commanders that public affairs planning was an important part of overall operational planning, not just the responsibility of public affairs officers. [See Appendix III, pp. 193-195.]

When Iraq unleashed its sneak attack on Kuwait in August 1990, no one in the American military or media had given prior thought to covering the type of war that was to evolve there. However, in the six-month period prior to the commencement of hostilities, the Pentagon, military and press had worked together to develop plans that would make the Persian Gulf coverage the most comprehensive wartime news coverage in history.

Nevertheless, there were lingering attitude problems within elements of the military which prevented the Gulf War coverage from being as good as it should have been. Once again, news-organization leaders voiced strong criticism of the military's treatment of the media. Subsequently, the representatives of these organizations and the Pentagon worked together to develop the *DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations,* which were published in April 1992. [See Appendix IV, p. 197.] This document simply highlighted concepts and procedures which had been in other DOD documents for many years, but in so doing it emphasized to military commanders the importance of their personal involvement in planning for news coverage of combat operations.

Lessons learned

Judging from conflict/crisis operations since Desert Storm, the military has finally learned its lesson with regard to news-media planning. The level of military/press cooperation in Somalia and Haiti was unprecedented. In planning prior to the invasion of Haiti, for instance, the Pentagon worked with news organizations to structure a component of independent-coverage reporters who were positioned for entry into the country immediately after the DNMP.

Reprinted by permission: Tribune Media Services

It is noteworthy that there were few, if any, complaints from the news media about their treatment by the military in Somalia or Haiti. Interviews for this report with senior military commanders indicate that they were personally involved in the media planning for these operations. For example, Gen. J.H.Binford Peay, U.S. Army, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, was interviewed at the time his command was planning for extraction of United Nations forces from Somalia, an event which occurred in March 1995. General Peay confirmed during his interview that he was intimately involved in the public affairs planning for this operation.[5]

... There were few, if any, complaints from the news media about their treatment by the military in Somalia or Haiti.

Interviews with both military and media representatives indicate two primary areas in which military/news media planning and cooperation can be further improved. First, Pentagon/military personnel must have reasonable advance notice of the number of reporters who will cover an operation in order to plan effectively for news media support. Second, it is crucial to establish the optimal number of reporters who will cover any given conflict or crisis. In Desert Storm, the number of news personnel in the theater was far in excess of what could be accommodated in the combat units, creating a major problem. This led to establishment of the combat pool system.

In applying lessons from past wars to the coverage of future conflicts, it is particularly important to understand the nature of modern warfare. U.S. armed forces today fight a closely coordinated sea-air-land battle employing high-speed "maneuver warfare." In

ground war, for example, troops are transported in rapidly moving tanks and armored personnel carriers and helicopters traveling at 150 mph or more. Furthermore, over the years the military has developed the capability to fight effectively at night. No foreign military possesses a similar night-fighting capability, so American forces will fully exploit this advantage in combat. Future U.S. military operations will normally commence at night and continue around the clock.

The only realistic way for the news media to cover modern warfare is for reporters to be positioned in and travel with military units, preferably as soon as the action starts. It will be impossible to achieve comprehensive, effective coverage of future combat with reporters striking out on their own, trying to cover battles such as those in Desert Storm, ranging over vast distances in rugged terrain at night and in bad weather.

Reporters moving randomly on the battlefield in locations unknown to both friendly and enemy forces are at great risk of getting lost, killed or captured. In addition, such situations jeopardize the effectiveness of U.S. forces by increasing the already high level of complexity and confusion in combat. Mistaking American reporters for the enemy—or mistaking the enemy for American reporters—obviously could have tragic consequences.

These considerations, as well as the others here noted, lead the authors of this report to propose an "independent coverage tier concept"—fully described in Chapter 9 [pp. 57-62]—which will improve the ability of the news media to plan effectively for coverage of future wars.

Endnotes

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3 Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, USA (Ret.), *Final Report of the CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel*, August 23, 1984.

4 Fred S. Hoffman, *Review of Panama Pool Deployment, December 1989*, report, March 1990.

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Legal Aspects of the Military-Media Relationship

7

The fundamental question of whether the press has a constitutionally protected right to be present during military actions and to report freely about them remains unresolved by the courts. ... To the extent that the press looks to the court for a vindication of its rights, it is almost certain to be disappointed.[1]

—Jane E. Kirtley

Few lawsuits involving wartime scenarios have been initiated by either the media or the military.

In plain language, the news media today have no legal way to force their way onto the battlefield. On the other hand, the American people would not tolerate a military establishment that tried to operate in secrecy. With these factors in mind, the Pentagon's official policy is to provide maximum access to the press, consistent with security concerns and the safety of men and women in uniform.[2]

Because of an overall lack of legal and legislative guidance, the relationship between the news media and the military establishment has evolved informally. On both sides there is a fundamental recognition of the other's importance to the care and nurturing of America's unique form of democracy, although a poll by The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center shows that members of the media have more confidence in the military than military officers have in newspapers or television news. [See pp. 34, 178.]

Military men and women take an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. As an institution, the military swears to uphold and defend the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press, although there are countless instances in which individual members of the military have tried to thwart or limit that freedom in the name of national or operational security.

Newsmen and newswomen have a basic respect for the military and its role in keeping America free and defending the freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. Yet individual members of the news media express suspicion and skepticism of military operations and often ignore rules and regulations in pursuit of stories. In the Persian Gulf War, for example, journalists who bypassed the combat pool system to cover the story independently violated agreements they had signed.

Few courtroom clashes

Fortunately, the conflicts that have arisen between the two institutions have been resolved, for the most part, without resorting to courtrooms or legislative chambers. Disputes have been thrashed out informally on a case-by-case basis. The relationship is complicated enough without legal interpretations and court decisions.

Few lawsuits involving wartime scenarios have been initiated by either the media or the military. Those that have actually ended up inside courtrooms were brought by individual journalism organizations. The first of these in recent years was *Flynt* v. *Weinberger,*[3] which challenged the exclusion of the press from the early stages of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. Starting on October 25 of that year, the military imposed an absolute news blackout. Two days later, the ban was lifted, and a small group of journalists was flown to Grenada on military aircraft.

In the lawsuit, *Hustler* magazine publisher Larry Flynt asked the federal district court in the District of Columbia to enjoin the military



from "preventing or otherwise hindering plaintiffs from sending reporters to the sovereign nation of Grenada to gather news." He also asked the court to declare that such denial of access was unconstitutional.

On June 21, 1984, the district court judge granted the government's motion to dismiss the case, saying it was moot because there no longer was a live controversy and the plaintiff lacked a "legally cognizable interest in the outcome."[4] The Court of Appeals later upheld the district court and ordered the case dismissed without prejudice or any opinion on the merits of the suit. Despite the lack of any ruling on the merits, the district judge, Oliver Gasch, wrote that he doubted whether the temporary ban on press coverage had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover, he said he believed that exclusion of the press to maintain secrecy was within the discretion of the military.

During Desert Storm, a group of publications ... challenged the combat pool system and its denial of press access to certain areas of the battlefield.

No Desert Storm ruling

During Desert Storm, a group of publications led by the *Nation* magazine, and later joined by Agence France-Press, the French wire service, challenged the combat pool system and its denial of press access to certain areas of the battlefield. The publications argued that battlefield restrictions and limits on the number of press representatives infringed on newsgathering privileges guaranteed by the First Amendment.

The Defense Department responded that the rules were narrowly tailored and necessary for compelling national security reasons. It also argued that, because the Constitution designated the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, executive branch decisions made in a military context could not be reviewed by the federal courts, even when First Amendment rights were involved.

Once again, the court refused to rule, saying the issue was moot. It said it could not adequately determine whether a limitation on a future overseas military operation might not be a reasonable restriction related to time, place and manner. "The court must have the benefit of a well-focused controversy. ... The court should not be evaluating a set of regulations that are currently being reviewed for possible revision, to determine their reasonableness in the context of a conflict that does not exist and the precise contours of which are unknown and unknowable."[5]

The only related case involved an attempted prior restraint on publication. In the case, *New York Times Co.* v. *the United States,* the U.S. Supreme Court held that the publication of the so-called "Pentagon Papers" on the Vietnam War could not be prevented by the government on national security grounds. The court concluded that the government was trying to avoid embarrassment and negative public reaction when citizens learned about the mistakes of American policymakers, strategists and military leaders in Vietnam. It said the government had failed to meet its "heavy burden" of showing that publication of the papers would threaten the immediate security of troops fighting in Vietnam.

Although a victory for the news media, the case did not shed much light on how the court might rule on the scope of press freedom during wartime, especially on the question of access to military operations. Nevertheless, "the case did at least lend some force to the notion that governmental power to censor during wartime is subject to fairly strict limits and that any permissible censorship must be supported by specific national security needs," wrote Mark C. Rahdert, a law professor at Temple University.[6]

Rahdert said that the practical result of the decision was to leave the scope of press freedom during wartime to a process of negotiation between the two parties, with the press voluntarily submitting to some censorship. He suggested that pressing the issue in the courts could work to the disadvantage of both sides:

"The press would suffer because the [Supreme] Court would probably, for the first time in history, directly sustain the constitutionality of some prior restraint on political speech; the military would suffer because the Court would be constrained to place some

limit on the discretion of military censors in order to protect First Amendment values. Thus, both sides tacitly agreed, in this area at least, that the exact limits of the First Amendment freedom of the press were best left undefined."[7]

Access and eligibility issues

With the advance of new technology, such as satellite telephones, most military as well as most news-organization leaders have become convinced that battlefield censorship is no longer practical or even desirable. That means that news organizations must voluntarily agree—as they have many times in the past—to file stories that conform to mutually agreed-upon guidelines, and at a time when battlefield commanders say filing poses no threat to operational security. It also means that if there is no agreement, denial of access to some areas and operations will be the only weapon left to the military, and the courts will likely let the military keep that option in reserve.

"Although the idea that the First Amendment might include a right of access to governmental activities is not entirely without precedent," Rahdert wrote, "the Supreme Court has never recognized such a right to information about military operations. Moreover, the Court has been very cautious about recognizing any rights of access under the First Amendment at all. Consequently, although a case can be made for a right of wartime access, establishing such a right is what in military idiom might be termed an 'uphill march.'"[8]

In 1992, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Pete Williams, circulated a proposal, published in the *Federal Register* as an administrative rule, titled "Eligibility Criteria for News Media Membership in the DOD National Media Pool." It attempted to codify what qualifications would be required of news organizations and reporters that wished to continue as members of the pool, including a requirement that all members "demonstrate a familiarity with the U.S. military and military operations by maintaining a correspondent who regularly covers military affairs, visits military operational units, attends Pentagon press conferences, and interviews senior military and civilian DOD officials."[9]

While many news organizations would agree that having such a person on the staff would be desirable, the idea of having the government dictate qualifications for reporters was both ridiculed and denounced by the press. Despite that, the Pentagon quietly put the rule into effect at the end of the Bush administration in 1993. However, the current public affairs leadership at the Defense Department has proposed revising the rule and has asked bureau chiefs in Washington for their evaluation.

A law or administrative rule dictating news-organization staffing or the qualifications of reporters is highly questionable on both constitutional and legal grounds and should be vigorously opposed. If guidelines are deemed necessary, they should be developed informally by consensus of both military and media representatives.

... Most military as well as most news-organization leaders have become convinced that battlefield censorship is no longer practical or even desirable.

Endnotes

1 *Government Information Quarterly,* Vol. 9, No. 4 (1992). Kirtley is executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

2 Annex F to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication, *Joint Operations Planning and Execution System* (Joint Pub 5-03.2).

3 588F. Supp.57 (1984).

4 Ibid.

5 *Nation Magazine* v. *US Department of Defense,* 762 F. Supp. 1575.

6 *Villanova Law Review,* Vol. 36, p. 1530 (1991).

7 Ibid. at 1533.

8 Ibid. at 1543.

9 *Federal Register*, Vol. 57, No. 184, p. 43645, Sept. 22, 1992.

PART II

FOR THE FUTURE

Recommendations 8

For the military and the news media

1 **The news media and the military, in joint consultation, should continue to improve the Department of Defense National Media Pool consistent with its original purpose of placing reporters and photographers on the ground with troops at the start of secret military operations.**

2 **The military and the news media should jointly develop an Independent Coverage Tier System [see p. 57.] to cover future conflicts.**

The system could be used following the activation of the DOD National Media Pool or—in cases where secrecy was not a consideration—the pool could be bypassed in favor of open coverage through the tier concept. The tier system would provide both military commanders and news executives with advance knowledge of the numbers of journalists who would be present and the names of news organizations that would be represented in a combat situation.

3 **As standard practice following each crisis/conflict operation, leaders from the Pentagon and from news organizations should arrange a thorough, objective "lessons learned" analysis of the news media coverage and the way in which it was accomplished.**

These case studies, which could be conducted under the auspices of a foundation-sponsored military/media office [see p. 55], should be widely distributed to the news media and would be valuable for use in the military education system.

The military and the news media should jointly develop an Independent Coverage Tier System to cover future conflicts.

For the military

1 **When major conflicts occur, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider assigning a high-ranking officer—an admiral or a general—to coordinate military/news media relationships in combat areas.**

The officer in charge should work under the commander of the U.S. military forces and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. This recommendation has been made repeatedly over the years by news media representatives, but has not been implemented.

The Defense Department should adopt, as a broad general policy, the concept of "security at the source."

2 **The Defense Department should adopt, as a broad general policy, the concept of "security at the source" which was employed in the Haiti and Somalia operations.**

Because the news media agree to abide by mutually agreed-upon guidelines, this approach provides reporters, photographers and film crews with broad access to the battlefield without general security review or censorship. (It is understood, however, that there may be exceptional circumstances in which reporters would be asked to cooperate in security aspects of an operation.) Escort officers would be used only to facilitate access to military units and operations.

3 **The Pentagon should engage in ongoing deliberations with news organizations and other appropriate institutions and agencies concerning the impact of emerging communications technologies on wartime news reporting.**

4 **The secretary of defense should insure that the Professional Military Education System (PME) adequately prepares military officers to assist the news media in their vital role of informing the American public on the activities of the U.S. armed forces, with specific emphasis on the crisis/conflict situation.**

As part of this effort, the practice of allowing members of the news media to attend service colleges, currently in effect at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, should be expanded to other colleges.

5 **The secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to stress that combatant commanders must personally involve themselves in planning for the support of the news media in military operations.**

6 **The military should continue efforts in progress to enhance the effectiveness and prestige of public affairs officers and to make the PAO career option an attractive one.**

In particular, PAOs must be included in operational planning for crisis/conflict situations.

7 **Although the press freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment apply only to the U.S. news media, the Defense Department nevertheless should plan for coverage of military operations by foreign news organizations.**

Some of the mainline news organizations in allied countries could be included in the Independent Coverage Tier System, while the Pentagon likely would want to exclude some other foreign operations entirely. These decisions should be left to the Defense Department, which is under no obligation to provide foreign news organizations access to U.S. military units or operations.

For the news media

1 **Foundations with an interest in the military-media relationship—including, but not limited to, The Freedom Forum, the McCormick Tribune Foundation and the Knight Foundation—should jointly establish an office of military-media relations in the Washington, D.C., area.**

The office would be responsible for maintaining institutional memory regarding the relationship. It would also facilitate contacts between and training of both journalists and military personnel, affording opportunities for each institution to learn about the other. Journalists would be encouraged to participate in military exercises, while military personnel would make visits to print and broadcast newsrooms, sitting in on editorial conferences and learning how news is gathered, judged, edited and disseminated. The office also would provide funding, on a case-by-case basis, for journalists to receive military training provided by the Defense Department.

2 **The military-media relations office should undertake, as an early project, the production of a military sourcebook for news organizations.**

It should be distributed to all U.S. newsrooms and should be revised and updated periodically.

3 **Consistent with the nine principles jointly adopted by the Pentagon and major news media representatives, news organizations should make every effort to give reporters, editors and news directors background training in military affairs.**

Where appropriate, news organizations should seek to cover both active and reserve military units in their circulation and broadcast areas.

4 **Where journalism schools and ROTC programs share a campus or geographic location, they should seek each other out for class visits or joint programs aimed at increasing knowledge and understanding of one another.**

Foundations with an interest in the military-media relationship ... should jointly establish an office of military-media relations in the Washington, D.C., area.

The Independent Coverage Tier Concept 9

Throughout the course of this study, research has indicated widespread agreement on at least one aspect of news media coverage of the military: In any situation where there is intense public interest, there will be a corresponding imperative among news organizations to cover the story. But there always will be limits on the numbers of journalists who can be accommodated.

This has been true throughout history and in every circumstance imaginable. While the First Amendment protects news-gatherers from prior restraint and censorship and keeps government open to coverage, it does not—and cannot—guarantee open-ended access by unlimited crowds. Only a finite number of reporters can be accommodated on Air Force One, in the House press galleries during a State of the Union speech, in the august courtroom of the United States Supreme Court, in Judge Lance Ito's courtroom at the O.J. Simpson trial, in a professional-baseball locker room, at the Olympic Games, at a corporation's annual meeting, or at a local city-council hearing.

In Desert Storm, there were disagreements between news media and military representatives over the actual numbers of reporters, photographers, technicians and others who were present at any given time. There also were disputes over how many *could* have been accommodated by the American military forces. But the key point is that, in any combat situation, there must be established limits. And it is the responsibility of the nation's defense leadership to establish those limits, but to do so consistent with America's democratic principles governing press freedom and the public's right to know.

"First of all, physically, there is just not enough room for an unlimited amount of reporters to run around on the battlefield," says *The Wall Street Journal's* John Fialka, who covered Desert Storm and helped establish the combat pool system there. "We learned that in the Gulf. Even the military didn't understand that; they overloaded their own units to the point where the reporters couldn't function. Will this happen again in the future? You can just about bet on it as our military gets smaller and smaller, so it gets involved in smaller conflicts. In the meantime, the breadth of media who want to go to that conflict gets much larger. We've become a society of voyeurs. Everybody wants to see it; not too many people want to understand it."[1]

In most "hot war" situations, factors of battlefield accessibility, security, time and distance dictate that the military provide various types of support for the news media, including transportation, shelter, food and even special equipment such as flak jackets, gas masks and chemical-warfare suits. In fact, in today's era of wide-ranging, high-speed maneuver warfare—much of which is conducted at night—it is virtually impossible for reporters to cover combat unless they are integrated into active military units.

News media and military leaders recognize this. The Defense Department's *Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations* specifically charges the military with responsibility for transporting reporters, even for open coverage.[2] Historically, the military has done this, in World War II, Korea, Vietnam and other conflicts.

Often, the resources required for media support—the vehicles, helicopters and other equipment—are drawn from assets used by military forces for essential operations in the combat zone. For this reason, it is essential to

While the First Amendment protects news-gatherers from prior restraint and censorship ..., it does not ... guarantee open–ended access by unlimited crowds.

Some ... argue that it is necessary only to send good reporters to the battlefield, not necessarily reporters who are well-versed in military affairs.

place a limit in advance on allocations of these assets so that military effectiveness is not jeopardized. That limit directly affects the numbers of journalists who can be accommodated.

When field commanders are able to determine early on the numbers of news media personnel who can be sent into the combat theater with military units, they are not placed in the difficult position of trying to decide, on the fly, who and how many in the media can be accommodated with the available assets. As happened in Desert Storm, such decisions invariably result in controversy and bad feelings, with the military accused of excessively controlling or hobbling the press, and members of the news media even brawling among themselves. The resulting ill will undermines any spirit of cooperation between reporters and the military and threatens the quality of overall news coverage.

Limiting numbers

From the news media's standpoint, any plan that can match the number of journalists to the military's ability to accommodate them has the advantage of greatly increasing the odds that reporters will get to the scene of the action in a timely fashion. From the military's standpoint, a known quantity injects an element of certainty—and self-confidence—into the unpredictability that almost always accompanies the early stages of an operation.

Ernie Pyle State Historic Site archives

Journalist Ernie Pyle (center) became America's best-loved war correspondent by recording the experiences of ordinary soldiers and sailors during World War II.

When unlimited numbers of news media representatives are allowed into a combat zone with limited resources for media—as happened in Desert Storm—the already intense competition among news organizations can escalate into bitter feuding. Moreover, news organizations tend to err on the side of sending more reporters than needed in order to avoid getting beat by the competition. This results in frustrated staffers and wasteful spending.

Another negative aspect of the wide-open situation is that it increases the chances that news organizations will send reporters unfamiliar with military operations. This, in turn, heightens the military's concern about the media's ability to follow guidelines and protect operational security. In fact, it gives the military ammunition to charge that the news media are not complying with the mutually agreed-upon *DOD Principles for News Coverage*, which state: "News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations."[3]

Inevitably in this situation, the military will be more inclined to employ escorts, security reviews and other restrictive measures, including limited access. As they have in the past, the news-gatherers will resist by striking out on their own, risking death or capture by the enemy—as happened to a CBS crew during Desert Storm. Moreover, with neophytes on the ground, the news media compromise their own credibility, opening themselves up to the kind of ridicule that appeared during Desert Storm in a *Saturday Night Live* parody of reporters at a wartime press briefing.

Some news media leaders argue that it is necessary only to send good reporters to the battlefield, not necessarily reporters who are well-versed in military affairs. They point out, correctly, that many of the most revered war correspondents—people like Ernie Pyle of Scripps Howard, Helen Kirkpatrick of the *Chicago Daily News*, Homer Bigart of *The New York Times* and Marguerite Higgins of the *New York Herald Tribune*—had little or no military reporting experience before they went to war. But these journalists went into the field and lived with the troops, which is the quickest way for any reporter to learn the culture and tactics of the armed forces.

Planning ahead

Clearly, in these times of nighttime rapid-maneuver warfare, it makes sense for the news media and the Defense Department to work together during peacetime to develop a plan for placing practical limits on the numbers of

Covering the Next Korean War: A Plan for U.S. Military/Media Cooperation

For the sake of demonstrating the Independent Coverage Tier Concept, let us hypothesize that the United States faces a major military conflict on the Korean peninsula.*

The war would probably begin with a massive air and ground attack by the North Korean military against South Korea. U.S. intelligence would be able to detect North Korean preparation for such an attack by identifying the concentration of forces at planned points of attack, noting increased logistics activity in the build-up of supplies, fuel and ammunitions stocks, and sighting other indicators of heightened readiness. This would probably occur over a period of two or more weeks. During this time, the United States would be engaged in active diplomatic activity, both in secret and in the open, to deter the North Koreans from attacking. The president and the Pentagon would encourage news media coverage as a means of keeping the world informed and bringing international pressure to bear against North Korea.

Because of concern for world opinion—i.e., wanting not to be perceived as the aggressor and to give diplomacy the maximum opportunity—the United States would probably not initiate a preemptive attack against the North Koreans. Rather, this nation would increase its preparedness to launch a massive counterattack upon the first indication of military action by North Korea. Three or more aircraft carriers would be rapidly deployed to the waters surrounding Korea, and numerous Air Force and Marine Corps aviation squadrons would be sent to the air bases in South Korea. Even though the burden of countering the ground attack would fall on the 600,000 troops in the South Korean army, the United States would probably also deploy additional ground forces into the theater if time permitted.

Given this scenario, how could the Pentagon best prepare for news coverage of this imminent, large-scale war?

First of all, this would not be a situation suitable for the DOD National Media Pool [DNMP], because there would be no requirement for secrecy. Moreover, the DNMP is not adequate in size to cover a vast sea-air-land military campaign involving about a million-and-a-half troops deployed over a large geographic area.

What if the news services independently converged on South Korea in the hope that they could unilaterally report on various aspects of the impending conflict, even though they had no advance plans about how to do so?

In that case, journalists probably could travel to air bases, but without prior military planning they would have trouble getting out to Navy ships. Furthermore, it would be difficult, given the pressures of final combat preparations, for the military to transport reporters to the ground units, not having known in advance who and how many were coming. It would be very risky for reporters in land vehicles to strike out for the front lines on their own to cover a ground war expected to be violently lethal.

The most likely situation would be that, as soon as war appeared imminent, the news services would be frantically contacting the Pentagon to request assistance in covering the conflict. The result: a hastily arranged and poorly coordinated plan that would, at best, result in ineffective coverage of the action.

Clearly, this is a scenario where the Independent Coverage Tier Concept would prove its worth. Having identified in advance who would be reporting on war, the Pentagon, at the first indication that combat was imminent, could begin working with the news services to plan how to position reporters for comprehensive coverage of anticipated battles. It could then make immediate transportation arrangements to place journalists in military units before the action commenced. Once the conflict was underway, the Pentagon could work continuously with the news services, drawing from the tiers to place additional reporters in the theater and to rotate reporters in and out of combat units as situations dictated.

Key to understanding the usefulness of independent tier coverage is understanding that the DOD National Media Pool is designed for a fairly unique situation—one in which the U.S. military initiates a surprise attack with a relatively limited number of troops (less than 20,000). This is the kind of action which occurred in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. The most difficult challenge for planning combat news coverage is during a large-scale operation which occurs with minimum advance notice—a situation such as the hypothetical Korean scenario depicted here or a Soviet ground attack into central Europe, considered the most likely threat during the Cold War. The Independent Coverage Tier Concept provides the only practical way to effectively cover such wars from their inception.

The concept can also be valuable in other situations. Had such a plan been in place during Desert Storm, for example, it would have greatly facilitated the placement of reporters in combat units prior to the start of the Feb. 24, 1991, ground attack against Iraq.

* To preclude a nervous reaction from readers, the authors emphasize that there is a very low possibility of another Korean War.

reporters covering combat operations when battlefield conditions dictate such limits. Obviously, there will be circumstances—as occurred in Panama and Haiti—when open coverage will be dictated by the circumstances, and the military public affairs officers will have to accommodate the crowd as best they can—as they have been trained to do. Yet, even in those situations, reporters will want to accompany military units into battle.

... News organizations such as television networks or wire services could have reporters simultaneously operating inside and outside the tier system.

An Independent Coverage Tier System, built upon the model of the existing Defense Department National Media Pool (DNMP), will facilitate such coverage. The national pool, which has been developed and refined over the last decade, would continue as the sole way to get small numbers of news-gatherers into military operations (Grenada is an example) where secrecy and surprise are top priorities and coverage cannot be open initially.

The DOD National Media Pool includes the wire services, the television and radio networks, the major news magazines and 26 daily newspapers from around the country. Members of the pool designate their representatives, groups of whom are placed on alert during each quarter of the year. In the event of hostilities, these pool representatives go in first. As in any pool, they are required to share their stories with all members of the news media.

The independent tier system would differ from the pool in that its members would not be required to share stories or information. They would file only to their own news organizations, subject only to mutually agreed-upon guidelines focused on saving the lives of troops and preserving operational security. The military, with the cooperation of these journalists, would practice security at the source, so that field censorship, or security review, would be unnecessary.[4] There might, however, have to be some agreement on when reporters—especially those working for television and radio—would file their stories.

The tier system

While news media and Pentagon representatives might need to consult on the details, the framework of the system might look like this:

Each tier would contain about 50 news media representatives. News organizations reaching the largest numbers of people would have priority. Because the reader or audience penetration levels of various news organizations, especially broadcasters, can be a matter of interpretation, an acceptable definition would need to be established. However, the first tier likely would include the wire services, television and radio networks, news magazines and national newspapers. Numbers for each organization would be determined in negotiations, and major news organizations would not be limited to the first tier; in fact, they could be represented in every tier.

Journalistic diversity, however, would also be a goal. Because even individual free-lances have First Amendment rights and foreign journalists push for inclusion as well, a percentage of each tier would be reserved for those groups. For example, in a 50-member tier, five positions (10%) could be allocated to the mainline foreign news organizations of allies, and another five slots could be set aside for American free-lances, newsletter reporters or reporters for minority, limited-circulation or specialized publications. The assignment of set-aside positions in each tier would be determined by lottery among those desiring to participate, although the foreign-news-organization slots could be reserved for wire services or broadcast networks, with priorities assigned according to numbers of people reached.

Major U.S. news organizations, including regional newspapers and local broadcasters, could opt to participate in the tier system—knowing that, if a conflict broke out, tier membership would provide the only possibility of sending a correspondent to accompany U.S. military forces engaged in combat operations, although there still might be situations where local reporters could accompany hometown military units.

Tiers would continue to be formed until all news organizations wishing to participate had been included. Again, except for the percentages reserved in each tier for non-traditional media and the foreign press, a news organization's position in the tier system would be based primarily upon the numbers of people it reached. If a news organization dropped out—as happened in the Pentagon pool that was sent to cover the withdrawal of forces from Somalia—others would move up one position. A new publication or broadcast organization would be inserted into the lineup based on its circulation or reach.

Independents, too

None of this would prevent any news organization from independently sending reporters or crews into an area of military operations. However, U.S. military units would not be expected or required to accommodate such independents. These would need to function on their own. As a result, news organizations such as television networks or wire services could have reporters simultaneously operating inside and outside the tier system. And, if conditions permitted, there would be no reason why news organizations could not swap personnel in and out of the tier.

In planning for an imminent military operation, the assistant to the secretary of defense for public affairs and his staff, along with the designated combatant commander and his or her public affairs staff, would determine the number of independent news-gatherers who could effectively be accommodated in units in the theater, based on the anticipated combat scenario.

In some cases, the DOD National Media Pool would be activated first and sent into the theater. With the transition to open coverage, the DOD would activate a number of tiers—or parts of tiers—to provide the agreed-upon number of independent news representatives. Depending on the scenario, this could happen within a few hours of the operation's inception. If security and information-sharing were not deemed necessary at the outset, the Pentagon could simply bypass the National Media Pool plan and begin sending members of the independent tiers.

As the combat operation progressed and the need for dedicated military assets became less, the DOD could opt to open up coverage to the members of all of the tiers, and even non-tier members, with the understanding that these journalists would be mainly on their own.

Making the tier system work

Turnover is the biggest obstacle to the establishment of an ongoing Independent Coverage Tier System. As has been demonstrated again and again in the development of the DOD National Media Pool, both military and news media personnel change so frequently that there is little or no institutional memory. The result is that poorly informed people on both sides often must start from scratch and waste time reinventing principles and procedures that should be common knowledge. For example, as recently as the aborted invasion of Haiti, some pool participants were surprised when told they must share their stories with all others in the news media.[5]

To eliminate this problem, an independent facilitator's office should be established to coordinate the activities of the DOD National Media Pool, as well as to oversee the establishment and monitoring of the Independent Coverage Tier System. Ideally, the office would consist of a facilitator, an assistant and secretarial help. The office could be located in the Washington, D.C., area and funded by foundations—such as The Freedom Forum, the McCormick Tribune Foundation and the Knight Foundation—that have a public service interest in improving relations between the news media and the military.

The facilitator would meet with representatives of the news media and the military to develop and maintain the Independent Coverage Tier System. This individual would also be charged with keeping both sides up to date on the status and requirements of the DOD National Media Pool and would be responsible for briefing new participants on both the news media and military sides as they arrived. Actual negotiations concerning the composition of each of the tiers would involve representatives of the news organizations and the Pentagon's assistant secretary for public affairs, with the facilitator available for consultation and assistance.

Braestrup

The facilitator's office also would oversee the development of a military-information guide and sourcebook for news organizations. This book, which would fill a need noted by Peter Braestrup of the Library of Congress in an interview for this report, would function as a desk reference on everything military, written in layman's language by

... Both military and news media personnel change so frequently that there is little or no institutional memory.

and for the journalism community.[6] It would contain brief histories of wars and conflicts, basic information about military tactics and equipment, descriptions of weapons systems (including ships and aircraft), and a primer on military ranks and the composition of military units. The reference book would be in a loose-leaf format so it could be easily updated, and the facilitator's office would be responsible for keeping it current.

The foundations ... would be asked to provide financial support to tier-member organizations that could not afford to send their reporters.

Both the news media and the military would assume certain responsibilities, with the facilitator's office assisting. The Pentagon would provide opportunities for education and training for members of the media pool and the independent tier system through special seminars and participation in military exercises. It also would pledge to ensure that, in any given combat situation, military commanders would accommodate the greatest number of tier members possible, consistent with military requirements, and would provide the assets, information and—in special circumstances—the communications capabilities necessary for journalists to get and file their stories. However, for the most part, journalists would provide their own means of communicating.

Military training for media

On the media side, news organizations would free their tier members or other staff members, including desk and management editors, for military training at seminars and exercises provided by the Pentagon and coordinated by the military-media facilitator's office.

Because of the great financial disparity among news organizations, the more financially stable would be asked to pay their representatives' expenses for educational activities and military exercises—as they likely would do anyway. The foundations that support the facilitator's office would be asked to provide financial support to tier-member organizations that could not afford to send their reporters. Decisions concerning financial support would be made on a case-by-case basis, with recommendations to the foundations made by the facilitator's office. Thanks to foundation funding, no news organization would face the ethical dilemma of whether to accept something of value from a news source.

The facilitator's office would work with news organizations to give military leaders and potential leaders a better understanding of how news is gathered and disseminated by placing them in newsrooms. The office also could function as a clearing house for retired military men and women seeking employment as journalists—a career move that former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has urged news organizations to support.[7]

The beauty of an Independent Coverage Tier System, overseen by a military-media facilitator's office, is that it would bring both the news media and the military together in a joint effort that would encourage ongoing rapport and understanding between the two groups. This would help to break down the barriers of distrust that have sometimes existed between these two vital American institutions. The result would be more accurate and better-quality coverage of military operations, with the American people as the ultimate beneficiaries.

Endnotes

1 John J. Fialka, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1994.

2 *Statement of Principles—News Coverage of Combat,* adopted Mar. 11, 1992, by Washington bureau chiefs and representatives of the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. [See Appendix IV, p. 197.]

3 Ibid.

4 See Chapter 3 [pp. 23-28.] on security review.

5 Charles J. Lewis, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 1994.

6 Peter Braestrup, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1994.

7 Melvin Laird, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Jan. 26, 1995.

Can the News Media be Trusted? 10

Trust, but verify.

It's an old saying which carries more than a little wisdom, and it has been characteristic of the relationship between the news media and the military. In World War II, combat correspondents were accepted by the armed forces as comrades fighting for the same cause. Yet no story, even from such luminaries as Ernie Pyle and Walter Cronkite, ever moved from the battlefield without first being reviewed by a military censor.

Even today, some members of the news media endorse censorship as a way to preserve security, as long as they have access to operations. With access, the argument goes, even if the story or parts of it are censored in the heat of battle, the full account can be published at some point—to satisfy the historical record, if nothing else. If access is denied, the story can never be told. Cronkite is the leading proponent of this view. But others, including many top military officers, have become convinced that censorship—or security review, which is the preferred military term—may no longer be possible or even desirable, due to the advent of modern technological devices such as satellite telephones.

This means that the military and the media must agree, as they have countless times in the past, on *when* a story can be filed from the battlefield or the combat zone. And that call must be made by the military commander, who can best judge the threat to soldiers' lives that premature disclosure of information could entail. The task, on both sides, will be easier if reporters and military personnel on the scene have developed a relationship of trust prior to combat.

There is no question that many such bonds have been forged in the past. With rare exceptions, reporters covering military actions have honored confidences. In the aborted invasion of Haiti, for example, the Defense Department National Media Pool, as well as about six score of independent, or unilateral, journalists were fully briefed on the invasion plans well in advance. Of course, they were positioned with the invasion forces and perhaps had little or no opportunity to disclose anything they had learned, which is the sort of comfort that military commanders like to have. Nevertheless, it likely would have been possible for some of the journalists to violate security, had they chosen to do so. None did.

"I see no reason, based on the demonstrated performance of the American press in wars, most recently in Vietnam, why reporters cannot be brought in, in advance, under a 'thou shalt not tell' policy," said Fred Hoffman, who covered the Pentagon for the Associated Press and later served as a Defense Department media consultant.[1]

When journalists live with the troops and understand the mission in a combat zone, they ordinarily defer to the military on questions of security.

Pre-invasion confidences

On the battlefield, the question of trust is easier to answer than the larger question of whether the military—and its civilian leadership—can take the news media into their confidence in a pre-invasion situation. When journalists live with the troops and understand the mission in a combat zone, they ordinarily defer to the military on questions of security.

"Reporters have to be willing to operate under a set of rules," says R.W. Apple Jr., Washington bureau chief of *The New York Times*. "Whatever the military may say now about the problems they encountered with us in Vietnam, they didn't say then. There were no reporters expelled from Vietnam for violating confidentiality of troop movements or other such

things. The problem arises when there is no understanding about rules. ...

"They can strike deals. [In Saudi Arabia,] I put John Kifner with the 101st Airborne, which I assumed, correctly, would be used in an air-mobile fashion and would therefore probably be in the thick of it. I told him, 'All I want from you is a really great story of how it looked and felt.' John cut a deal with Gen. [J.H. Binford] Peay [III]. Peay said, 'I won't let you file anything until we're committed. You can live with my troops, you can talk to them about anything you want to, talk to me about anything you want to. And I guarantee you that you will get your story out because I will give you my helicopter. But only if you play by the rules.' Well, they did and we did, and we got a brilliant prize-winning dispatch. That's the kind of confidence there has to be."[2]

But a relationship based on trust may be a long time coming. Brig. Gen. Ronald T. Sconyers, chief of public affairs for the U.S. Air Force, said he did not think the media trusted

'SECRET! SECRET! READ ALL ABOUT IT!'

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the military, and the military certainly did not trust the media.

"Frankly, I hate to say this, but I think a lot of that lack of trust comes within my own public affairs community," Sconyers said. "I think some of the senior leadership is more trusting than some of the PAs [public affairs personnel], because it's the PAs who get berated by a variety of people when something shows up in the media that was misquoted or quoted out of context. They sometimes get beat about the head and shoulders by their commanders, so they have this reticence to be open and honest."[3]

"Success with the media is very personality dependent," says Col. Frederick C. Peck, deputy director of public affairs for the U.S. Marine Corps.[4]

Personal connections

Washington Post reporter Bradley Graham had developed a personal relationship with Gen. Hugh Shelton, commander of the forces that were poised to invade Haiti in September 1994. Shelton invited Graham to sit in with him and the other commanders on the *Mount Whitney*, the command ship. In an unusual turn of events, Shelton and his other commanders watched CNN to monitor the progress of a peace delegation that consisted of former President Jimmy Carter, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Gen. Colin Powell, the retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"They [the military commanders] did have CNN turned on and were, throughout that whole afternoon, watching to see how the negotiations were going between the Carter-Nunn-Powell group and the Haitian leadership to get as current a sense as they could of what kind of operation they would be directed to take," Graham recalled. "They didn't know, the White House didn't know, nobody knew how this thing was going to unfold. So they were planning to do it two or three different ways all through the afternoon and early evening until it finally became clear that Carter-Nunn-Powell had a deal and that they would not have to go in with guns blazing, but that they'd still have to go in very quickly at first light the next day."

Graham said the only restriction placed on him was that he would not be allowed to file a story until after the DOD National Media Pool had filed its pool reports and coverage had been opened up to independent reporters. Beyond that, he said, there were no stipulated ground rules and no censorship.

"It was really a remarkable set-up, and I think it owes a lot to the understanding and relationship that I had with Gen. Shelton," Graham said. "He felt confident enough to open up the operation to me and to a photographer-reporting team from *Life* magazine that had similar access.

"All the pool and a number of the unilaterals who were deployed were privy to the war plans. In entering sort of a cocoon the day before, we were all briefed on the plans. And we had the understanding we couldn't file anything until after the thing got executed and until after the pool had filed. Then everybody else could file

whenever they wanted to. That sounded pretty reasonable."

Graham said he had to exercise his own judgment on what to file to avoid endangering the lives of American soldiers. He said he sat in on briefings and deliberations of the top planners, and at times would travel around all day with Shelton. Then, he said, he often would have to file a story quickly, dictating by telephone from his portable computer screen. He said there was no attempt to subject any of his stories to security review or censorship.

"I was extremely satisfied with the set-up," Graham said, "although it created some tensions within the press corps on the ship. The *Life* magazine journalists and I were there under different arrangements than the unilaterals and even the couple of pool reporters. We were granted more access to Shelton and others.

"But if a commander decides he'd like to have a reporter or two along, for whatever reasons, it's bound to create problems for those who don't have that access. You can make a blanket rule and say, 'Okay, nobody should do that,' but then you're denying the advantages that come to readers by at least having some journalistic witness."[5]

No 'pet' reporters

Although reporters and top military officers have entered into such arrangements on many occasions, the practice has been harshly criticized by some other members of the news media.

"Generals should not be allowed to take out their pet reporters," said John Fialka, Washington correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal*, who covered the Persian Gulf War and helped set up the combat pool system there. "How many generals were out there in the war? There were 13 or 14 hotshots out in the field who thought they were geniuses. If the ones who took reporters out got promoted because of all the ink they got, and the ones who didn't got ignored, the next war every damn one of them will have their own pet reporter out there. We'll have our own personal PR campaign. We've seen it before. MacArthur did it during World War II. He stiffed the reporters he didn't like and catered to the ones he did."[6]

There are some military operations which likely will never be opened up to press coverage. Those are the covert, commando-type raids of the Special Operations forces.

"Operational security is of paramount importance because in almost every circumstance, our major advantage will be tactical surprise," said Rear Adm. Irve C. Le Moyne, deputy commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. "While we may have immediate superiority of force at the target, it's unlikely we'll be able to maintain it very long. We can't stay there long. By definition, our operations are quick: We're in, and we're out, and we're gone.

"If we're expected, then as well-trained and as highly motivated as our troops are, we won't prevail. And if we're tied down for a long period of time, then the sheer weight of numbers will take their inevitable toll, and it won't be a special operation. It'll be a fire fight that lasted too long.

"I can't think of a circumstance when we could allow the media to come along— certain parts of it, perhaps. But often the physical demands and the operational demands of the operation are too severe. Our folks are carefully selected, and they are highly trained. They're extraordinarily conditioned.

"And they're all volunteers. They're a multiple of volunteers. They're part of the volunteer forces. And then they volunteered again for Special Operations. Sometimes they volunteer a third time for a particular unit of Special Operations. So they are a very unusual group of people. Teamwork is essential; everybody has a job. And if it's rehearsed carefully, it's—we hope—executed flawlessly.

"The analogy is certainly imperfect, but taking a reporter along would be like putting a sixth person out on the basketball court. You don't know what to do with them."[7]

However, there were instances in Haiti when pool reporters accompanied the special forces that went into Haitian communities in the countryside to work on civic action programs. "They were trying to do a job under difficult circumstances, working with the villagers," said David Lawsky of Reuters, one of the pool reporters. "I was extremely impressed with them."[8]

Planning for Haiti

In addition to placing reporters with units and briefing them on invasion plans, the Pentagon's civilian and military leadership consulted with news media leaders in advance of the Haiti operation, with mostly satisfactory results. Dennis Boxx, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for public affairs, said White House and Pentagon officials met in advance of the Haiti operation with the television network bureau chiefs.

"A couple of nights before the invasion was to start, we had all the network bureau chiefs here, including Bill Headline [of CNN], and then we also had a conference call with all the vice-presidents in New York," Boxx said. "We

There are some military operations which likely will never be opened up to press coverage.

DOD photograph by Helene C. Stikkel

Secretary of Defense William Perry takes questions from reporters in Haiti on Oct. 8, 1994.

asked them to do a number of things, some of which, frankly, I knew we weren't going to get.

"There were some easy and obvious ones: Don't broadcast the departure of aircraft from stateside bases—Pope was an obvious place that the Airborne was going to be leaving from, and the minute aircraft took off from there, if that were broadcast, [Haitian military leader Raoul] Cedras would have three-and-one-half hours to prepare his troops. They agreed to that, without much hesitation.

"The other thing we asked for was a one-hour embargo, or blackout, in the first hour of the invasion, so there would not be live coverage of Airborne troops dropping into the airport or the port, allowing Cedras to know exactly what we were doing, when and where. That, they did not agree to, and I did not expect them to, frankly. The argument we made on that was the security of the troops, obviously.

"They did agree to not broadcast pictures that would depict precise locations. It was going to be hard to do, but they agreed to try. We also asked them to basically stay off the streets during the first hour or so of the invasion, so there wouldn't be confusion and lights coming on and all kinds of problems with troops on the ground and media in the mix. That they would not agree to. And the last thing that we made them aware of—it was not a request, although they probably heard it as a request—was that they should stay off the rooftops.

"That was purely for their protection because if the troops had taken sniper fire, the gunships would have come in and just swept those rooftops to clean them off. If there happened to be media up there, they would have been hurt. They pretty much agreed that they would try to stay off the rooftops.

"By and large, it was very constructive. They did not read it in any way as us trying to censor them or manage them to an unreasonable point. We laid out everything in a way that made sense for the security of the troops, the security of media and the operational security of the mission. But there were things in there that they simply could not go along with, and frankly I wasn't surprised.

"When the media understand what they're involved in, and they're briefed on what the security considerations are and what the limitations are going to be —as long as you factor in what their needs are, and what they're there for—then the negotiation process is usually going to work out."[9]

"I was absolutely delighted with the response from the press," said Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The press agreed to, I think, almost everything we asked for. We, in turn, had to really beat down some of our own guys here, who wanted to make outrageous demands.

"I think my one regret is that we didn't go to the press a little sooner, and work on it. Now, that's the U.S. press. It's a different story when you have international press, as we did in Port-au-Prince. That's much harder to work on."[10]

... Large numbers of journalists in Haiti, domestic and foreign, posed potential dangers to the operation.

Too many media people

Defense Secretary William Perry said the large numbers of journalists in Haiti, domestic and foreign, posed potential dangers to the operation.

"There were just too many media people," he said. "By the time all the foreign media got in there, if not endangering people, they just got in the way. It made the operation more difficult to conduct. Anybody who looked carefully at what was going on that first day, and saw the swarms of reporters in Port-au-Prince, particularly at the airport, recognized that in many locations there were more reporters than there were military. There were altercations and potential altercations on the street. The endangerment issue there was that the presence of the press was actually making the news, instead of reporting the news.

"With modern technology, that filming is going out in a matter of hours, in some cases minutes, and sometimes it is real time. Being closely watched, that's providing a source of intelligence to whomever it is we are trying to deal with. Those are very big problems that are dramatically complicated by modern technology. They're further complicated by the enormous

interest people have in what we are doing. You have not just the U.S. media, where we work out agreements and arrangements with the journalists, but the foreign media is swarming in on us, too."[11]

Nevertheless, Perry said that, in the Haiti operation, taking the news media into the military's confidence had worked. He said the news representatives involved had kept their side of the bargain.

Former Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said Haiti was far different from Desert Storm, which made it easier to accommodate the news media. "I am not knocking Haiti," he said. "[But] I wouldn't see Haiti as anywhere comparable, in terms of the level of military difficulty. Haitians don't have an air force. They don't have an air defense system. There isn't a damn thing they could do about C-141s dropping troops onto the airport over in Port-au-Prince. Obviously, you do everything you can to minimize casualties, but it's a qualitatively different type of operation than what we did in the desert.

"In my sorting out of priorities, the number-one assignment from the standpoint of the civilian leadership of the Pentagon is to accomplish the mission. Number two is to do it at absolute minimal cost in terms of American casualties. After I've worried about those two things, then I'm prepared to worry about whether the press has access. But you always have to put those other two first ....

"In certain scenarios, you have to determine the element of surprise, the imperative of secrecy and security. You can't lower your standards. You've got to hang tough. But in Haiti, where the risk elements were not that high, we basically knew that we had something coming and believed we could afford to be more open and interface with the media. We also wanted the Haitians to know we were coming. The real message there was, 'Cedras, you better get out of town because our guys are coming.'"[12]

Lack of trust

Cheney's point of view is widely shared. Not many top defense leaders, civilian and military, believe that, as a general rule, the news media can be trusted in a pre-invasion situation. Former Defense Secretary Les Aspin said he would not trust the press in any situation in which secrecy was essential.

"The problem is that 99 percent will be trustworthy, and one percent isn't," Aspin said. "Then it's out, and once it's out, it's out. And it wasn't 50 percent of the press that put it out; it was maybe one percent. And it may not be deliberate. It may not be a guy trying to do something. It just may be an accident.

"The reason it has to be managed, of course, is because the interest of the reporters is not the interest of the Pentagon, or even the interest of the country. The reporter comes from a different culture. They just don't have the sensitivity. This is why I wouldn't try and take them into my confidence. I don't think they have the sensitivity about what is secret and what isn't."[13]

Marlin Fitzwater, who served in the Bush administration as White House press secretary, said he believed it was a good idea for the defense leadership to meet with the news media in advance of military actions, but only if the operational aspects allowed it. He said a big factor was whether there was a need for surprise, and therefore how tight operational security needed to be in the first few days of an action.

"If you require any operational security, in today's age, you can't do it," Fitzwater said. You simply cannot trust the press to hold a military secret the way they did in World War II. For example, when we alerted the Panama invasion pool, the *Time* correspondent told several people at the office Christmas party. So much for confidential notifications.

"The press today is, first of all, so much larger. When we say 'the press,' we're not talking about a monolithic source. There are just so many different media organs today, some of which have higher ethics than others, some of which have different standards for military operations than others, and so forth. If you're just talking about mainstream publications like *The Milwaukee Journal, The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, it might be all right. Or even the networks. But the truth is, I think

Not many top defense leaders ... believe that, as a general rule, the news media can be trusted in a pre-invasion situation.



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the media relationship with government today is such that you couldn't trust the networks. They're too big and too competitive, and there are too many.

"I always had a rule in dealing with the press that you can't ask a reporter not to be a reporter in any situation. It just can't happen. And I think that applies to military operations as well. In today's world, you just can't ask the media not to report. It just won't happen. In the Reagan/Bush years, we asked the news media for a delay in publication of certain stories. But it never worked.

"You can build relationships with individuals. But even individuals you trust will come under incredible pressures, and maybe they can withstand them and maybe they can't. I could draw you a lot of scenarios where you could take one reporter into your trust that you've worked with and known a long time and it comes down to the last minute, and you've got editors and publishers and everybody else asking this guy what's going on. And it just gets out."[14]

Laird said that talking to the media in advance also helped control premature leaks.

Adversaries and assets


Laird

One former defense secretary disagrees with that assessment and says that the press can be trusted. Melvin R. Laird served as secretary from 1969 to 1973, in the first Nixon administration. He was largely responsible for the Vietnamization program and getting U.S. troops out of the Vietnam War. When he left office—on his own volition—the Pentagon press corps presented him with a football. On it was lettered, "Laird 199, press 0." The 199 referred to the number of press conferences Laird had conducted. He also routinely invited reporters in for drinks, dinner and informal background briefings.

"I've never had a problem with taking the press into my confidence," Laird said. "I took them into my confidence on our Vietnam troop withdrawals from time to time, even before the president announced them. ... I don't think the press is a problem. They are adversaries, and they should be adversaries. That's their role. But you don't want to turn them into antagonists. You want to keep them as adversaries. That's what they should be.

"I think they're assets. I realized that, always, they were in an adversarial role, and that you had to be careful to get their confidence. You had to show you weren't misleading or lying to them. I think the media are assets because I don't know how you tell your story any other way. And I think you can basically trust them. I've never been asked by the press to break a secret."

Laird said that talking to the media in advance also helped control premature leaks. "They'll go with the story as soon as they see the planes taking off, if they're not taken there," he said. "You pick those, too, who are most apt to get some information about it and break the story, and you want to tie them up. You are playing a little bit of a game with them, too."

Surprisingly, Laird said he also believed that the so-called tabloid press also could be trusted. He recalled a time when, on a trip to Florida to deliver a speech, he worked in a day conferring with the editorial board of the *National Enquirer*.

"A lot of people around this town [Washington] thought I was nuts," Laird recalled. "The White House couldn't believe that I was down there briefing the *National Enquirer.* But you should have seen the way that meeting turned out. The *National Enquirer* became one of the greatest supporters that we had.

"And, as a matter of fact, I think you would have a better opportunity to do that today than we did. We were in a bloody damn war, and it was not easy having to report those casualties every morning. I was trying to withdraw troops from Vietnam, end the draft and establish the all-volunteer service. The *National Enquirer* got the story and supported this program with banner headlines."

Laird said there was no question, however, that some military officials hated and distrusted the press. "You go and talk to one of the chiefs, or you talk to Schwarzkopf about the Gulf War and you hear criticisms about the press coverage," he said. "In Vietnam, Schwarzkopf as a colonel didn't even like the press going on maneuvers with him. I think some of the military feel that the media are out to screw them. But they're not. They can be a help."

Laird did qualify his overall trust of the news media with one caveat. He said that from time to time defense leaders should be able to ask the press not to report on certain matters, such as intelligence material a reporter might find out about in the midst of a military operation.

"You sometimes have wiretaps and other covert operations going on, and you must be careful to protect the lives of our military men and women," he said. "You've got to be careful about that, because you don't want the enemy to know that you've broken their codes or know about their other secret operations. And we're very good at that.

"But I think that, basically, the press is patriotic, even thought the military doesn't always have that view because some think they've been burned badly. They think that the press is the reason that we did not do well in Vietnam. They think that it was the press getting after Lyndon Johnson, and driving him out of office. But it was Vietnam that did it. That was an unpopular war. I don't blame the press. I blame the way President Johnson handled it."

Surprisingly, Laird said he also believed that the so-called tabloid press also could be trusted.

Endnotes

1 Fred Hoffman, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1994.
2 R.W. Apple, Jr., interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 1994.
3 Col. Ronald T. Sconyers, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 1994.
4 Co. Frederick C. Peck, interview by authors, Arlington, Va., Jan. 12, 1995.
5 Bradley Graham, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1994.
6 John J. Fialka, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1994.
7 Rear Adm. Irve C. Le Moyne, interview by authors, Tampa, Fla., Jan. 23, 1995.
8 David Lawsky, telephone interview by Frank Aukofer, April 28, 1995.
9 Dennis Boxx, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1994.
10 Gen. John Shalikashvili, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1994.
11 William Perry, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., March 27, 1995.
12 Richard Cheney, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1995.
13 Les Aspin, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Jan. 26, 1995.
14 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by Frank Aukofer, Dec. 2, 1994.
15 Melvin R. Laird, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Jan. 26, 1995.

11 News Media Education: Smart and Smarter, or Dumb and Dumber?

We journalists make it a point to know very little about an extremely wide variety of topics; this is how we stay objective.

—Dave Barry

Experienced reporters and editors agree that journalists who cover the military should be properly backgrounded, although there are dissenters.

One of the most common complaints about the news media among military men and women is that journalists who show up to cover military operations don't know anything about the military.

"There are reporters who run around today who wouldn't know a battalion from a company, who wouldn't know one airplane type from another," says Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "They have a responsibility to become more professional and get to know their job. We have a responsibility, too, and a selfish interest, in making sure that they are knowledgeable. It isn't just knowing the piece of equipment, but to really help them understand what they're seeing, and then let them reach their own conclusions on the issues."[1]

But the critics are not confined to the ranks of the armed forces. Experienced reporters and editors agree that journalists who cover the military should be properly backgrounded, although there are dissenters.

"We journalists should try to bring something to the table," says George Wilson, a military affairs author who covered the Pentagon for *The Washington Post*. "I think reporters ought to bring to the table a willingness to go on the field and live like the troops. You should be willing to sleep in the field with the guys, and I don't think you should ask for special privileges once you're there. You should be willing to get shot at; to get killed, even."[2]

In the Persian Gulf War, says R.W. Apple Jr., Washington bureau chief of *The New York Times,* "the biggest problem was that most of the journalists knew nothing about military affairs. There were very few people there who had ever covered a war before. And surprisingly few who had even ever covered the Pentagon. That's a hopeless situation."[3]

Jonathan Wolman, the Washington bureau chief for the Associated Press, says that although many of those who became respected military reporters had little or no background in the field, news organizations nevertheless should do their best to provide skilled reporters.

"Did George Esper have a first day on the job?" he said. "Did Ernie Pyle? Indeed. We don't make any apologies for the idea that, if you have an abrupt deployment of 500,000 Americans in the Gulf desert many thousands of miles from home, that is not an everyday circumstance [for] which the AP pretends to be ready with its desert military reporter. ... Some of the best journalists in the United States went to the Gulf War, some of them with a background in military affairs, and some of them learning as best they could, as fast as they could. It is in the best tradition and practice of reporting. You do that when you need to expand your commitment to a story.

"But I also agree with the Pentagon, the military thinkers who expect that military affairs are of such significance that a journalist would make a commitment to be properly backgrounded. We work extremely hard at the AP to make sure our people are well rounded and well grounded. Do we succeed? Abso-

lutely. On the recent military mission in Somalia, the pool escort chief looked around and saw that the press group included many professionals who had seen more combat than he. The AP reporter and photographer had both been wounded in covering dangerous events in the past."[4]

Carla Anne Robbins, who covered the Gulf War for *U.S. News & World Report* and served as a pool coordinator, also said the *Mirabella* criticisms were off the mark. "I put *Mirabella* on the pool, and I would like to have my say on



News organizations take pride in reporters and photographers who can cover anything from a croquet match ... to a full-scale riot ....

Dumb questions

Critics of journalists' lack of expertise point to some of the questions asked at the daily Desert Storm briefings in Riyadh, which prompted a devastating spoof of the news media by the *Saturday Night Live* television show. But Charles J. Lewis, Washington bureau chief for Hearst News Service who covered the war, says, "The idea that there were dumb questions asked at the briefings in Riyadh is a total red herring, in my opinion. It is absolutely a reporter's right to self-educate."[5]

The combat pool system set up for the Gulf War by the Pentagon with the cooperation of major news organizations produced tensions and infighting between the "pooled" and the "unpooled"—the "haves," who had coveted pool slots, and the "have-nots," who had no access to the action unless they took their chances outside the system. It also produced the *Mirabella* legend. A writer from *Mirabella* magazine came to represent the epitome of the uninformed reporter, even among some journalists.

"She was used by the military as sort of the laughingstock to make a point," Lewis recalled. "She provided the parody of what we were trying to do, so that when we were in an argument with the JIB [Joint Information Bureau], they could say, 'And I suppose you want the *Mirabella* correspondent to go with the F-14 squadron,' or whatever. Actually, the *Mirabella* person was getting under their skin because she was writing about relationships, about sex, about lesbianism. She was writing about deprivation, things like this. People who had their helmets on too tight didn't like that. She became a problem to them because she was driving them wild with stories about relationships, and they didn't think this was something she should be writing about."[6]

Carla Anne Robbins, who covered the Gulf War for *U.S. News & World Report* and served as a pool coordinator, also said the *Mirabella* criticisms were off the mark. "I put *Mirabella* on the pool, and I would like to have my say on the subject of *Mirabella,*" Robbins said. "She came. Her organization paid to get her there. She got there before a lot of other news organizations. She didn't jeopardize anybody's security, and she wrote her story. Her story was somewhat better than a lot of other people who couldn't write as well. Her story was significantly worse than the copy that I wrote. But at the end of the day, it's a straw man—or, in this case, a straw woman. And I find the whole *Mirabella* thing intrinsically sexist, because the implication is that a woman from a women's magazine has no right to be there covering it."[7]

News organizations take pride in reporters and photographers who can cover anything from a croquet match or a political speech to a full-scale riot or a science convention. In fact, there is a widespread concern that reporters lose some of their effectiveness if they remain too long on a beat and get too close to their sources. So many editors and news directors make it a practice to rotate reporters through different beats. That has a side benefit of building a staff of reporters who can capably cover different subjects. But most journalists learn their beats on the job.

There is not much question that, given the choice, most editors would prefer covering a story with a reporter who has some knowledge of the subject and access to good sources. Nobody wants a neophyte to be snowed by a slick presentation, and simply knowing the right questions to ask can make the difference between a good story and one headed for the spike. That's why publications have beat reporters, and why editors send staffers to seminars and conferences—and even sometimes to military exercises—to sharpen their knowledge of specialized subjects. On the other

hand, as presidential press conferences have demonstrated time and again, sometimes it's the response to the so-called "dumb question" that produces the headlines.

Pete Williams, the NBC Washington correspondent who served as assistant secretary of defense for public affairs during the Gulf War, said news organizations should be at least as serious about war coverage as they are about covering the National Football League.

"You wouldn't just reach into the newsroom and grab six people and send them out to cover the Super Bowl," he said. "You'd have people that spent some time on this, and understand tactics and know who the coaches are.

"Guess what? That'll never happen. The news media carries with it some of its own chaos. And it generates some of its own chaos. The American news media arrives with as many people as it can funnel into an area, and that creates instant chaos.

"At one point, I had a guy come to me who insisted that there should be no restrictions on reporters in wheelchairs on the battlefield, and he basically wanted me to the be the bad guy. He had a very talented reporter in a wheelchair, but he didn't want to be the one to say, 'You can't go to the war.' He wanted the military to say, 'I'm sorry, we can't accept any guys in wheelchairs.' And I said, 'Well, that's the way it is.'

"It's silly."[8]

Differing viewpoints

However, it also is true—as Lewis points out—that reporters are sent to cover events for different purposes. A good color writer at the Super Bowl, for example, would not have to be a football expert. Similarly, editors sometimes send columnists or feature writers to national political conventions *because* they lack political expertise. The idea is to replicate the reactions of ordinary citizens or to provide a different viewpoint. Syndicated humor columnist Dave Barry covers political campaigns and conventions in a special way that has nothing to do with technical expertise—and everything to do with his wonderfully wacky way of looking at things, which often contains more than a dollop of truth. Charles Kuralt became a popular television correspondent doing stories on every subject imaginable. Newsrooms cherish the general-assignment reporters who have the experience to cover anything that comes up.

Yet, there is not much question that the complexities of modern warfare demand either some background knowledge or a reporter who is a very quick study. Top military leaders understand that they often must deal with journalists who know little about the subject, and must learn as they go.

"We in the Navy—and I speak as a senior public affairs person, but I know the senior leadership—if a media person wants to cover the Navy, we're going to try to open the door," says Rear Adm. Kendell Pease, the Navy's public affairs chief. "We're going to try to make the Navy available. If you don't know that the pointed end is the front, we'll teach you. ... I don't believe that in the military we say we only want the seasoned reporters. I want a reporter who's a reporter."[9]

David Lawsky, a Washington correspondent for Reuters, was a member of the Defense Department National Media Pool deployed for the aborted invasion of Haiti in September 1994. Although he had been assigned to the pool, he never had an opportunity to go on an exercise, and although he had filled in occasionally covering the Pentagon, he was far from being a military expert.

"There were two stories," Lawsky said. "The military was one kind of a story, and reporting on Haiti was a different kind of story. I had no military reporting background, nor did I have a Haiti reporting background.

"But they were both just reporting. It was a matter of learning on the spot. I think any journeyman or journeywoman reporter could do that. The military certainly helped. People were helpful in showing me what I needed to know, so the ignorance dropped very rapidly.

... The complexities of modern warfare demand either some background knowledge or a reporter who is a very quick study.





Courtesy of Bob Rich, The Connecticut Post

I was able to get along. I don't think I felt embarrassed by my ignorance, which was plentiful."[10]

Carla Anne Robbins and her husband, Guy Gugliotta of *The Washington Post,* both were sent to cover the Gulf War. Despite the fact that he was a Vietnam veteran, and both of them had covered military actions in Central America, neither thought they understood the new technology that would be used in Desert Storm.

"So we got a book called *How to Make War,* and we learned what the equipment was and what the acronyms were," Robbins said. "And then we pulled over a lot of really good public affairs guys who got us in touch with a lot of really good other people who sat us down and explained to us what they were doing, how the toys worked, what it all meant. This is a learnable skill."[11]

The lack of any knowledge of the military among reporters was less of a problem years ago, when most young men had at least some military service because of the draft.

The lack of any knowledge of the military among reporters was less of a problem years ago, when most young men had at least some military service because of the draft. That ended in 1972 with the advent of the all-volunteer forces, and even the number of volunteers is shrinking as the military downsizes following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

"The contribution of the military to American society has gone from 700,000 a year to 250,000 to 300,000 a year who probably would have been pretty good citizens anyway," said Adm. William Owens, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "But 250,000 in a population that is a hundred million larger now than it was 20 years ago is a much lower percentage. And so that bleed-and-feed process of 250,000 a year into American society has far less impact on American patriotism, on an awareness of the military ... than it had in the days of the draft."[12]

Changes in the newsroom

There are other factors that work against the ideal of developing a corps of journalists with military expertise. Most prominent are changes in the definition of news and changes in the makeup and culture of newsrooms. There also are the constant budget pressures that afflict news organizations, and newspapers particularly.

Almost any news organization today has got money problems," said Robert Sims, a former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and now a senior vice president at the National Geographic Society. "They are cutting back on travel and they're downsizing their staffs. As the cost of paper goes up, the news hole shrinks. So you can't expect the news media to train their people to get ready to cover the military in a crisis. But I think they'd gladly cooperate with some scheme that enabled them—and it would be prestigious to have a reporter go—to be selected to be a part of a study arrangement in the military."[13]

Changes in the personalities of newsrooms, as well as evolving definitions of news, are tougher questions. Peter Braestrup, the senior editor and director of communications for the Library of Congress, covered the Vietnam War as a reporter and has since studied and written scholarly studies about the media-military relationship.

"There are two cultures—military and journalistic," Braestrup said. "There also are generation gaps and gender gaps. With the end of the draft in 1972 and the influx of women into journalism, and now with Baby Boomers at the middle-management level, you have a bias not so much against the military as such, but a bias against 'institutional' or 'operations' stories in favor of 'social issues' and 'people' stories.

"There is one undercurrent that also pushes this tendency. Some senior news executives are now women who have never had any exposure to the military, who look at the military in rather subjective terms. It's partly because women who are 40, 45, coming into the news business have had to put up with a lot of grief from menfolks at one time or another, and so they're much more ideologically charged—or sensitive, or whatever the hell you want to call it—than their male colleagues. And part of what they see as the last bastion of male dominance is the military.

"So they look at the women officers in the military, ambitious college-educated career women like themselves, not in terms of real life in the military—because they don't know about that—but they look at the services as a bastion where women are still being denied their rights to do whatever men do. Since they don't know very much about what men do in the military or in combat, it is easy for them to believe that any military unit can be composed of women and men and should operate with no more difficulty than a 9-to-5 civilian institution."[14]

Braestrup says reporters, including those on television and news magazines, react to what they perceive editors regard as good stories. Because of the interest in social issues—such as gays in the military, the Tailhook sexual-harassment scandal and the issue of whether women should serve in combat—other traditional stories are frozen out. That is not a good situation for either the military or the news media. It means that good stories go uncovered, and critical issues go unexamined.

Today, even the mainline national news media rarely, if ever, do stories about such complex subjects as the armed forces' roles and missions and weapons-system-development programs, despite the fact that even in the military there are critics who contend that many of these programs do not reflect post-Cold War realities.

"The military as an institution, I would argue, has lost in news coverage to the military as a social battleground," Braestrup says. "So, at a time when the Pentagon is still spending $260 billion a year, you cannot get a lot of major media people interested in what they're spending it for, what the prospects are down the road, and so forth ....

"That's the first thing that's going to affect wartime coverage when it comes along, because you're going to find a kind of atrophying of interest in covering the military. In most coverage of U.S. forces in both Somalia and Haiti, for example, there was almost no reporting on the changing tactics, ground rules, locations, morale and performance of U.S. or allied forces, despite the fact that these peacekeeping efforts were the first such endeavors since the Cold War ended. We simply do not know how our forces did."

Endangered species?

Offley

Ed Offley, the military affairs reporter for the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, worries that military reporters may be on their way to extinction. In an informal survey of the military-affairs cadre, Offley estimates that the number of full-time military print and broadcast reporters has shrunk to around 50—half of what the number was six years ago. Offley is working with the McCormick Tribune Foundation in Chicago on a proposal he has developed to establish a Military Reporters Association of about 400 to 600 members, including part-timers and students. The association would provide education and training opportunities, along with professional and social interaction among the members.

An association such as that envisioned by Offley could come under the umbrella of the foundation-funded military-media office recommended in this report. The office also could develop and disseminate the military manual for newsrooms, likewise recommended in this report at Braestrup's suggestion. This would be a combination stylebook and primer on the military for news people, in a loose-leaf format so it could be updated periodically, that would be foundation-funded and distributed to every newsroom in the country.

Because of the interest in social issues—such as gays in the military, the Tailhook sexual-harassment scandal ... — other traditional stories are frozen out.

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"It would have to be in plain English," Braestrup says. "It would tell you what the Marine Corps is and what the weapons look like. It would identify types of ships. A book like that, illustrated, very well indexed, organized and color-coded, would be mailed with suitable wrapping and explanation and promotion through the ASNE and the TV news directors, so it wouldn't come out of the blue. I would try to have one or two of those books with every news desk and editorial page office in the country.

"The final version ought to be written by a newsman, or an ex-newsman, who knows the audience. To do it right, it would probably be a 300-page book, because it has to have lots of pertinent detail. You could also put it on a CD-ROM. It could also have a mini-history in it, with statistics like how many people we lost in Korea. These are things that come up all the time. It's the kind of thing *Time* magazine did in World War II. But when the Gulf War came along, the news organizations kind of fumbled their way through it. The analysis was all rather primitive and not quite correct a lot of the time. A smaller, pocket-size edition could be developed for reporters and updated every two or three years."

American journalists are every bit as patriotic as the uniformed men and women they cover.

Living with the troops

As most journalists and men and women of the military have learned time and again, there is no substitute for face-to-face contact. When reporters live with the troops to cover a story, mutual suspicion and hostility usually evaporate. American journalists are every bit as patriotic as the uniformed men and women they cover. More opportunities are needed to bring the two groups together, and the military is willing to provide them. However, news organizations often are unwilling to participate because of the cost and the low news value of covering training exercises. That is why this report recommends foundation financing, as part of the Independent Coverage Tier Concept, for news organizations to provide the time for reporters and editors to participate in peacetime military exercises.

The '30' in this World War II-era cartoon refers to the traditional notation (-30-) appearing on the last page of a repporter's copy to signal 'end of story.'

"I think reporters need to train," Admiral Pease says. "And when reporters get out of line, I'd like to see other reporters tap the other guy on the shoulder and say, 'Hey, give him a break.'

"I don't think you can police each other in a formal way, because you're just not set up that way. The nature of the business is too competitive. But when reporters see other reporters who are complaining when they shouldn't be, it would be good if they'd speak up. I was down in the hallway the other night, and one of the TV guys just stopped the other reporter in his tracks, and said, 'Hey, look. You're out of line.' ...

"The thing that bothers me most is not whether reporters know the military or not, it's whether they know how to live up to what we expect of reporters here. We don't care whether you know what we're doing or not. We can help you there."

Following the Persian Gulf War, a group of Washington bureau chiefs met with Pentagon officials and negotiated nine "principles that should govern future arrangements for news coverage from the battlefield of the United States military in combat." One of those principles stated unequivocally:

"News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations."[15]

Although some individual efforts have been made here and there, there has been no organized effort to comply with the last half of that promise. But that again is a matter that could be taken up by a foundation-funded office of military-media relations.

Clark Hoyt, vice president for news for Knight-Ridder, who served as the temporary chairman of the bureau-chiefs' group after the Gulf War, said he would like to see some life breathed into such an effort to bring journalists and the military together in peacetime.

"Right now it's all dormant because we're not in a shooting war anywhere," he said. "The

minute there's another—we all hope there won't be, but history says there's going to be another major military operation of some kind—all of these issues will come rushing to the fore again—the press's lack of preparedness, the military's closed and secret tendencies—and the clashes will start all over again."[16]

Endnotes

1 Gen. John Shalikashvili, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1994.

2 George Wilson, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1994.

3 R.W. Apple Jr., interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 1994.

4 Jonathan Wolman, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1994.

5 Charles J. Lewis, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 1994.

6 Ibid.

7 Carla Anne Robbins, round-table discussion, Nashville, Tenn., Mar. 10, 1995. [On this date, Robbins was a Washington correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal.*]

8 Pete Williams, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Oct. 20, 1994.

9 Rear Adm. Kendell Pease, round-table discussion, Nashville, Tenn., Mar. 10, 1995.

10 David Lawsky, telephone conversation with Frank Aukofer, April 28, 1995.

11 Robbins, round-table discussion.

12 Adm. William Owens, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 1994.

13 Robert Sims, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Feb. 28, 1995.

14 Peter Braestrup, interview by authors, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1994.

15 *Statement of Principles—News Coverage of Combat*, adopted March 11, 1992, by Washington bureau chiefs and representatives of the assistant secretary of defense for public affair. [See Appendix IV, p. 197.]

16 Clark Hoyt, telephone conversation with Frank Aukofer, March 20, 1995.

Military Education: Changes in Attitude

12

An underlying premise of the research for this report was that the military and the news media are fundamentally different in terms of organization and culture, a fact which would be difficult to alter. Moreover, this nation would not be well served if an attempt were made to change the basic natures of the two institutions.

Nevertheless, much can be done to improve the attitude and knowledge of individuals within the news media and the military, significantly enhancing the ability of the two to work together effectively. This chapter addresses actions which the military can take toward that end.

Certainly, attitude and education are interrelated; each has a strong effect on the other. But, of the two, attitude is the more important because, without the proper attitude, knowledge will not be applied effectively. The First Amendment Center survey conducted for this study indicates that members of the armed forces do not differ substantially from members of other institutions and the public at-large in their attitude toward the press. However, because of the strong imperative for the military and the media to work together during conflicts/crises in which urgent national interests and human lives are involved, a concerted effort to improve attitudes in both institutions is well worthwhile.

Clearly, it should be easier to mold attitudes among personnel in the armed forces, since the military is more homogeneous, hierarchical, and disciplined than the news media. Additionally, the military profession is unique in that there is little or no middle- or top-level entry. Personnel start at the bottom and work their way up, providing an extended period in which education and attitude development can be accomplished.

Research for this study indicates that military leaders need to better explain to personnel, particularly to those in the junior ranks, that the democratic system is vitally dependent on an informed public and that the news media is society's key institution for this function. For the good of the country, therefore, members of the military have an obligation to help the press fulfill its role. Military leaders should stress that, because war is such a significant national event, the American people deserve to know as much as possible about its conduct.

Moreover, the unique requirements of wartime news coverage impose extraordinary demands on both the military and the press. Special effort is required for the press to report on wars without jeopardizing the military's battlefield effectiveness and without revealing information valuable to the enemy. This can only be accomplished by effective planning and close cooperation with the news media, both before and during a conflict/crisis. It is vital that this be thoroughly understood by all in the military.

For the good of the country ... members of the military have an obligation to help the press fulfill its role.

Nothing to hide

The military should adopt the approach, espoused by the Marine Corps, that the press can be a "force multiplier."[1] This attitude is based on the premise that "we are good and have nothing to hide, so we can only gain by making ourselves accessible to the media." This approach recognizes that no organization is perfect and that some unfavorable news coverage will result, but that this will be far outweighed by the positive results achieved. Not only will the public be aware of the important

Military Public Affairs Programs and Personnel

In recent years, the U.S. armed forces have made major efforts in the area of public affairs. Military public affairs programs have three basic aspects:

1. Cooperation with the news media's endeavors to inform the American public about military affairs.
2. Community-relations programs that support direct communications with local, national, and international publics (examples include providing military bands, color guards and marching units for ceremonies and patriotic observances and supporting charities, sports events and voluntary tutoring programs for school children).
3. Command-information programs that apprise armed forces personnel and their dependents of current national, international, and military events, as well as providing news about key Department of Defense (DOD) policies and programs. (An important objective is to keep families of personnel on assignment away from home base informed about the activities and status of their loved ones.)

Currently, about 5,000 DOD personnel—officer, enlisted and civilian—are permanently assigned to public affairs responsibilities. Many more perform these duties on a part-time or "collateral-duty" basis. In addition, several hundred reserve and National Guard personnel work in this area during drill periods or when recalled to active duty.

Enlisted, civilian, and all reserve personnel tend to specialize in this career field, while each of the services takes a somewhat different approach regarding officers' tracks. The Navy and Air Force directly commission officers into the public affairs field or transfer them from combat arms fields into this specialty at junior rank—normally O-3—where they spend the remainder of their careers. On the other hand, the Army and Marine Corps seem to prefer that officers specialize in the public affairs field beginning at the rank of O-5, after they have previously alternated in combat arms and public affairs billets. Some officers in each of the services perform public affairs functions on a part-time basis in units where no professional public affairs personnel are assigned.

Since 1947, the DOD has provided formal training to prepare personnel for public affairs duties. This training was conducted at the Army Information School until 1964, when the school was renamed the Defense Information School. Presently located at Fort Meade, Md., the school has graduated over 35,000 students since 1964. The curriculum, which prepares personnel well for the duties they will perform, provides up to12-weeks' training in the following courses:

Defense Information School Courses
Advanced Public Affairs Supervisor
Basic Broadcaster
Basic Journalist
Broadcast Manager
Commanding Officer Public Affairs (Coast Guard)
The Editors
Electronic Journalism
Intermediate Photojournalism
Media Relations Workshop (Coast Guard)
Public Affairs Officer
Public Affairs Officer (Reserve Component)
Public Affairs Supervisor
Senior Enlisted Public Affairs Supervisor
Senior Public Affairs Officer
Shipboard Information, Training, and Entertainment[1]

Until the 1990s, many in the military tended to regard public affairs as a function separate and distinct from the rest of a unit's operations. Few commanders included public affairs officers (PAOs) in operational planning or involved themselves in press relations unless PAOs requested that they do so. After the problems in Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm, the military improved its utilization of PAOs, but more remains to be done.

It is essential that military leaders convey to PAOs that they are as vital to the unit's operation as doctors, logisticians, lawyers and other staff officers are. Commanders must emphasize this to all other personnel as well. In order to attract top-quality officers to public affairs, the entry standards and career attractiveness/promotion opportunities available to PAOs must equal that of officers in other professional fields. PAOs must be included in every aspect of a unit's activities, including operational planning. Military commanders must avoid the tendency to blame the PAO for unfavorable publicity.

As General Walter E. Boomer, USMC (Ret.), commander of Marine forces in Desert Storm and former director, USMC Public Affairs, has said: "To exclude the PAO from operational planning because the commander doesn't like the media is like excluding the medical officer because [the commander] doesn't like to deal with casualties. It costs nothing to allow the PAO to keep himself informed. Uncontrolled media and inept reporting might be the price if he is not informed."[2]

The climate and attitude established by military leaders within their services factor most prominently in the effectiveness of PAOs and other public affairs personnel. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the difference between the Army/Marines and the Navy/Air Force in the types of careers pursued by PAOs seems to correlate little with the effectiveness of the services' public affairs programs. This is confirmed by the press's response to The First Amendment Center survey item, "Some observers believe that some branches of the military in general work more effectively with the news media than others. Please tell us whether you think the following military services do an *excellent, good, fair,* or *poor* job of dealing with the news media."

Ratings of the military's dealings with the news media:

Journalists' responses as a percentage of total:

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
Air Force	9	43	41	7
Army	5	34	44	17
Marines	17	36	34	13
Navy	5	45	35	15

Here are responses to the survey question, "If you have worked with military public affairs officers, how would you generally rate their performance?"

Ratings of the performance of the military's public affairs officers

Responses as a percentage of total:

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
Military	18	54	25	3
Press	4	51	40	5

The armed forces public affairs personnel are a proud and professional corps. If the military follows the recommendations noted in this report and continues other initiatives currently underway, the quality of their public affairs programs and the effectiveness of their PAOs should steadily improve. ■

1 *Defense Information School General Catalog*, (Indianapolis: Fort Benjamin Harrison, 1995), pp. 17-22.

2 Brig. Gen. Walter E. Boomer, USMC, "Censorship and the Press," *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1988.

work military personnel are doing, but their families and loved ones will as well, enhancing their pride and satisfaction. In short, military leaders must stress to their personnel that much more is to be gained than lost by being forthcoming with the media.

Colonel Frederick C. Peck, USMC, deputy director for Marine Corps public affairs, describes this approach quite well: "... What we preach to Marines on how to deal with the media is that you get a lot farther with coop-

eration than you do with confrontation. We do a good job. We've got a good story to tell."[2]

Educating the military

The armed forces have a well-defined system of formal Professional Military Education (PME) which is separate and distinct from training in such areas as warfare skills, tactics, weapons systems operation, etc. It is through this system that the combat arms or "line" officers receive education and training concerning their relationship and responsibilities toward the news media.

There are five levels of PME, each available to officers of certain rank/experience, as follows: precommissioning (cadets, midshipmen), primary (O-3), intermediate (O-4), senior (O-5, O-6), and Capstone (O-7). Most of the programs at the intermediate and senior level are of nine- to 10-months duration and lead to the awarding of a master's degree in National Security Strategy, National Security Affairs, or similar disciplines.

The principal institutions where PME is conducted include the four federal undergraduate service academies, the Army War College, the Naval War College, Air University, Marine Corps University, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Army Command and General Staff College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. Media training is also provided in ROTC and Officer Candidate Schools (OCS), as well as through other military institutions and installations.

Some training for interaction with the news media is offered at all of the federal service academies—although only one academy provides a formal, required course in this area—but more needs to be done. This can be accomplished through simple modifications that do not increase the demands on already heavily taxed cadets and midshipmen.

First, academic courses, such as English, history and political science, should address the role of the news media in national life and culture and in the democratic process. In the required leadership courses which all the academies conduct, at least one course period should be devoted to discussing the military leader's responsibility—in war and in peace—to assist the press in informing the public about the armed forces' activities.

But the major role of the academies is to establish the attitudinal foundation on which future military officers build throughout their careers, and this is the area where the most emphasis should be given. This can be accomplished through lectures and discussions with academy leaders and guest speakers, including those from the media professions. It is absolutely vital that, at this early stage, fledgling officers adopt a healthy attitude towards the news media, for this sets the course for the remainder of their careers.

ROTC and OCS programs offer only rudimentary training concerning the news media, training which is dependent primarily on the initiative and imagination of local supervising officers. The time available to ROTC and OCS students is even more constrained than that available to service-academy students, so these programs should concentrate

... The major role of the academies is to establish the attitudinal foundation on which future military officers build throughout their careers ....

WAR STORIES

How attitudes form on the academic front

Attitudes develop early. Col. Joseph W. Purka, public affairs director at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colo., sees them developing in the cadet corps.

"The cadets here asked the reporter from downtown—the one who generally writes the negative stories— if she would come and talk to the class," Purka said. "The newspaper refused.

"This came shortly after a story about a cadet who was being expelled. Now, 99 out of a hundred cadets at the Academy knew that this one guy was a hood, who had no business being here in the first place, and who probably had some violent tendencies that would get him into trouble sooner or later.

"Well, the newspaper article portrayed this poor, innocent individual as one who was being railroaded by the Academy. So I think the cadets really were looking for the reporter, to tear into her. She probably picked up on that, and that was the reason she declined. Situations like this are where cadets develop a distrust of the news media. This, and a perceived attitude of the news media that 'I don't have to defend what I'm doing.'" ■

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on shaping attitudes. Local news media personalities are normally more than willing to visit and lecture to students in these programs. This not only increases students' knowledge but also encourages closer ties between the media and the military training programs.

The intermediate-, senior-, and capstone-level news media programs provided at the service colleges have steadily increased in number over the years and are, in general, quite good. In most cases, the formal courses are elective rather than required offerings. However, these are complemented by other activities, such as panel discussions and "media days," in which personnel from the press are invited to give lectures and interact with the students. The primary weakness of the PME system appears to be the absence of any effort to link the news media education conducted at the various levels.

Specific emphasis should be given to teaching military officers about the broad diversity of organizations comprising the news profession ....

A building-block approach

Under the 1986 Defense Reorganization (Goldwater-Nichols) Act, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged with the responsibility of overseeing PME. His office has published the *Military Education Policy Document* (MEPD), which provides general guidance and objectives for the conduct of PME in the armed forces. There is no reference in the MEPD to the importance of including news media education in the PME system.

SHALIKASHVILI

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has confirmed his support for such education, stating that: "Public affairs training should start sooner than it does and be more extensive than it is."[3] As a first priority, the MEPD should be revised to incorporate a requirement for news media education.

Recently, Gen. Shalikashvili has initiated an effort to refine PME, with an eye to greater continuity and uniform quality among the various institutions and throughout all levels of the system. An integrated building-block approach to news media education should be part of this effort. The precommissioning and intermediate levels of PME should concentrate primarily on shaping attitudes, while the higher levels should focus on more detailed knowledge, designed to prepare officers to plan and work with the press in a crisis/conflict situation.

Specific emphasis should be given to teaching military officers about the broad diversity of organizations comprising the news profession—that not only are there both print and broadcast elements, but within each of these two divisions, there are those with national, local, tabloid, and special-interest focuses. In planning for the participation of the news media in combat operations, as well as in dealing with news organizations day to day, military personnel must be able to accommodate the differing needs and approaches of these diverse elements.

Of course, news media education should not be performed at the expense of essential military subjects. In fact, the progressive approach suggested here makes such a trade-off unnecessary; this education can be easily fit into the PME continuum. There are excellent courses currently being conducted at certain service colleges which should be considered for adoption at other schools. Also, any effort by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to news media education should be closely coordinated with the assistant to the secretary of defense for public affairs.

The armed forces are already conducting several other forms of media training. For example, all military services currently provide their personnel with practical training in how to conduct effective interviews with the press both on-camera and off. The questions are asked by experienced public affairs personnel and, in some cases, by reporters who have volunteered their services. After the sessions, the interviewees' performances are critiqued in an effort to make the miltary personnel more media-savvy.

Also, the Army provides commanders and soldiers experience in dealing with the media on the battlefield at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La., and at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. In many of the training exercises or "war games" conducted at these centers, there are planned, media-related events as free-play items within the general game play. In other words, personnel in these training situations are challenged to deal with the media as an integral part of their combat function, an exercise that better prepares them to fulfill these responsibilities when an actual conflict occurs. Media role players are provided from the garrison public affairs office or from reserve public affairs detachments, called to active duty to support training at these centers.

The armed forces should expand media-play activities as a part of their training exercises and war games, both in the field and at war-gaming and simulation centers. Additionally, the military should invite the news media to provide actual reporters to participate in these exercises, even though personnel and financial constraints may limit the journalists' ability to do so. Both the military and the media could benefit immensely from this peacetime interaction.

WAR STORIES

The military inhabits a parallel universe

Melissa Healy, who covered the Pentagon for the *Los Angeles Times*, found a parallel universe when she started covering military affairs.

"I began to recognize that I was operating, for all practical purposes, as a foreign correspondent," she said. "I was dipping into a world with a language of its own, with a society of its own that, in every respect, paralleled U.S. civil society. But it paralleled it; it was not part of it. It was separate. It had its own justice system, its own retail system, its own health-care system. Everything was different. It's really important to have reporters who can be on the beat long enough to understand that ....

"The thing you see every day is a cultural thing. It's a culture of conservatives and of careerism in the military that sees no potential advantage in talking to reporters, that truly sees no benefit to one's career. I've always likened professional career military people's attitudes towards reporters as that of discovering an unexploded bomb. Their idea is: Back away. Don't touch. Call a public affairs officer immediately.

"The point is that you can find few, if any, career military people who can conceive that talking to a reporter not only is in the normal line of accountability and normal line of responsibility to taxpayers, but that it could possibly ever be of any benefit to them. They can only see the possibility that it could hurt their career. It's a deeply, deeply inbred attitude." ■

Ongoing analysis

The Pentagon and leaders of various news organizations should arrange—as standard practice— for a thorough, objective, "lessons-learned" analysis of the news media aspects of an operation following each crisis/conflict. Numerous institutions, such as The Freedom Forum and the McCormick Tribune Foundation, would be willing to assist in performing such assessments. The resulting case studies would be valuable for use in the various PME schools and could be widely distributed within news organizations.

The military and the news media should create more opportunities to get together and learn about each other. Since 1994, based on recommendations made by Congress and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces have opened their regular courses to civilians from the private sector. A journalist attended NWC during the 1994-95 school year.

The secretary of defense should consider expanding this opportunity for journalists to the other PME schools. Admittedly, few news media personnel can leave their work for full-time course attendance, but they should be afforded the opportunity to monitor courses, participate in seminars, etc., as their schedules permit.

Moreover, in communities where military installations are located, commanders should convey to the local press that the welcome mat is always out by, among other things, including media personnel on guest lists to all official base functions. Conversely, the local media leaders should invite military personnel to visit their newsrooms, sit in on news meetings and address editorial-board meetings. Face-to-face contact and regular association facilitate understanding better than anything else.

■

Endnotes

1 Col. John M. Shotwell, USMC, "The Fourth Estate as a Force Multiplier," *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1991.

2 Col. Frederick C. Peck, interview by authors, Arlington, Va., January 12, 1995.

3 Gen. John Shalikashvili, interview by authors, December 29, 1994.

Conclusion: Tweedledum and Tweedledee? 13

Despite the animosity that has existed between the news media and the military throughout history, and the differences in the culture, attitudes and outlooks of the professionals in both institutions, they also mirror each other in many respects.

"The irony, at least in the print world—I'm not as familiar with the TV world—is that military officers and military troops, and civilian editors and civilian reporters, have a lot more in common than they are willing to admit," says George Wilson, an author and military affairs reporter who spent many years covering the Pentagon for *The Washington Post.* "Both sides want a front-row seat on the action. That's why you're a reporter. You want to see the human comedy up close. It's fun.

"And the military guy wants to fly an F-14, or whatever he does, to get out there and see something, do something. Also, they have this kind of day-at-a-time attitude.

"To most reporters and editors, it is today that is important. They don't have these long, corporate cash-flow plans. So when military and press people get together in a relaxed environment, they find a lot in common. They have strong feelings. They are very opinionated. Reporters are opinionated as hell. And officers are opinionated as hell. Yet they can argue very constructively, especially outside of Washington.

"I was on an aircraft carrier for seven and a half months. The first two weeks, every time I would sit down, someone would come up and give me hell about some story, or what *Time* magazine had done, or how lousy TV was.

"But at the end of two weeks, when the novelty wore off and they knew that I wasn't going to go anywhere—that they had this real, live reporter captured—they started to get beneath the bromides. We discovered we had a hell of a lot in common. The next thing I knew, I was being invited to their parties, the bad boys' room that had the alcohol, and the whole thing.

"That's the great irony. There's this kind of popular conception that the military and the press are direct opposites. But in the field, they get to realize how much alike they are — in their philosophy, in trying to live on the edge."[1]

Professionalism and common sense

There will always be those in the media—news executives, reporters, editors and journalism students—who are suspicious and believe the military will do anything to hide its faults and problems. Similarly, there are individuals in the military—of all ranks—who have great animosity toward the news media. But there also are journalists who work with and understand the military and who feel a great kinship with military people, as well as many in the top military leadership who believe in the First Amendment and the role of the Fourth Estate in American democracy.

Given their differences in purpose, no one should ever expect journalists and military men and women to march together in close-order drill—and certainly never to look like the Tweedledum and Tweedledee characters in *Alice in Wonderland.* But in the course of this

There are journalists who feel a great kinship with military people, as well as many in the top military leadership who believe in the First Amendment ....

study, it has become apparent that the two groups come to cross-purposes only when there is something seriously wrong in either camp—whether an unscrupulous journalist who bends the facts or a military commander who tries to hide an embarrassment.

On the other hand, when both groups perform professionally, consistent with the ideals and principles of their respective institutions, when they exercise old-fashioned common sense to handle the inevitable disputes, they get along just fine.

Endnotes

[1] George Wilson, interview by Frank Aukofer, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1994.

PART III

OTHER VIEWS

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R.W. APPLE JR.

WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF
THE NEW YORK TIMES
NOV. 29, 1994

There has to be a common body of understanding. One of the problems in the Persian Gulf—the biggest problem—was that most of the journalists knew nothing about military affairs. There were very few people there who had ever covered a war before. And surprisingly few who had even ever covered the Pentagon. That's a hopeless situation. Newspapers have to be encouraged to have a mixture of people. That's what we had in Vietnam, and that's certainly what my newspaper had in the Persian Gulf.

Likewise, the military has to reverse its pattern of recent years, of having no really well-trained public affairs officers. The only people there who were any good in the public affairs field were in the Navy and the Marine Corps. It's not surprising from the Marine Corps, which has a long history of self-preservation, of seeing the press as a bulwark against being phased out of being or sharply cut back. The Navy has kept an MOS for public affairs, a career line for public affairs, and it also has actively kept former information officers in the Naval Reserve, ready to go. Several of the best people I met were Naval Reserve officers called to active duty who were journalists.

I think that reporters have to be willing to operate under a set of rules. Whatever the military may say now about the problems they encountered with us in Vietnam, they didn't say then. There were no reporters expelled from Vietnam for violating confidentiality of troop movements or other such things. The problem arises when there is no understanding about rules.

■

The military also has to understand that they will not build any kind of confidence with reporters if they go through this kind of scam that they went through in the Persian Gulf of "losing" their film. They can strike deals.

I put John Kifner with the 101st Airborne, which I assumed, correctly, would be used in an air-mobile fashion and would therefore probably be in the thick of it. I told him: "All I want from you is a really great story of how it looked and felt."

John cut a deal with Gen. Peay. Peay said, "I won't let you file anything until we're committed. You can live with my troops, you can talk to them about anything you want to, talk to me about anything you want to. And I guarantee you that you will get your story out because I will give you my helicopter. But only if you play by the rules."

Well, they did and we did, and we got a brilliant prize-winning dispatch. That's the kind of confidence there has to be.

■

You can have the media do it—[determine who gets to go]—or, ideally, I would think a joint organization of some kind would be fabulous.

■

On censorship: In World War II, my uncle was a free-lance magazine correspondent, and I heard tell of all of this from him. And I've talked to others—Seymour Topping, who was a combat correspondent, Homer Bigart, others of my elders when I was growing up in the

'I think that reporters have to be willing to operate under a set of rules.'

R.W. Apple Jr.

business. There was no problem. You had censorship. You abided by censorship; it was applied with quite reasonable equity. The censors were trained, were told that their job was not to be capricious. I would, frankly, far rather live under that kind of system than what we had in Saudi Arabia. Because what you had was capricious censorship with no agreed pattern, no court of appeal whatever, and access control.

■

But you can't do all of this, you can't put together anything that's going to be satisfactory, unless both sides come at it with good will. Now that may sound corny and useless, but it is the guts of the matter because ultimately the military cannot achieve its ends without the cooperation of the press, and the press cannot achieve its ends without the cooperation of the military.

■

'To the degree that there was an occasional problem in Vietnam, it was with the fringe.'

R.W. Apple Jr.

Concerning fringe journalists:
Ah, that's a big problem. And to the degree that there was an occasional problem in Vietnam, it was with the fringe. I can tell you what was done in Vietnam. The Charlie Mohrs, the Peter Arnetts, the Bill Tuohys, the Ward Justs kicked them into line. That's, in effect, what happened.

You can't have the whole thing queered by a bunch of hotshots. It's harder now than it was back then, both because of technology and the speed of transmission and stuff. Second, because the mainstream is much less well defined. The tabloidization of American journalism, both print and television, proceeds apace. It is much farther advanced now than it was four years ago. And one wonders in a war now what would be the role and the practice of people like Geraldo Rivera and Maury Povich and the *National Star* and people like that. They could cause us horrible problems, as indeed they've caused us problems which we have failed as a trade to address in this whole area of bedroom journalism.

■

You have to do something about the culture of the news business. You have to have, if not a common culture, a sharing of cultures. Now, it's not impossible to do. I think of Mike Stiles, a big, huge, monster Marine major, about 6'6", who ran the press center at DaNang. Stiles was a good fighting Marine, but Lou Walt, who commanded the 3rd Marines—the Marine force in Vietnam—wanted press, wanted us there, and Stiles liked to drink with the boys, was one of the boys, and he ran a terrific press operation.

His idea was exactly the opposite of what there was in the Gulf. His idea was to get more people out with the troops. He would ride reporters whom he saw three days in a row in the press camp: "Why aren't you out there with the grunts? Go out and live with them, see what it's like, write about that."

And he was tremendously respected; he was at my first wedding.

■

In Vietnam, the sources that made them so angry were overwhelmingly military. They were captains and majors, and not generals. They just told us what they saw with their eyes, not what had been filtered through eight levels of command. I got some of my best stuff from platoon leaders. They knew that the weapons didn't work. They told us.

Westmoreland went crazy: "How could you possibly say that?" I said, "Well, General, go talk to the guys who have the goddamn things jam and [who] go and steal Vietcong weapons, whenever they have a chance, off dead bodies."

LES ASPIN

FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY
JAN. 26, 1995

The military certainly has gotten more sophisticated about dealing with the press. They now approach it as an important part of any operation. At the same time, you've probably got less sophistication in the press corps about the military. There's nothing like a crisis that brings out a whole bunch of people who have never covered anything before.

These things go through cycles. We happen to be in a cycle now where foreign policy and, therefore, our defense, and any national security issue is low on the interest poll. So you've got a situation where the outlet probably does not have a full-time Pentagon correspondent. That means that they throw somebody in, if there is a crisis.

Right now, over there at the Pentagon briefings, the Secretary goes down and it's a familiar bunch of faces. You know them all, because they are there all the time. Come a crisis, and you go into that press briefing, and you don't see anybody you recognize. They're in there, but they're scattered in the crowd.

You can't plan for coverage during the pressures of combat. You've got to get it worked out before then. Absolutely.

There are several players here. The different medias and the Pentagon are not the only ones. The general public, I think, is probably sympathetic to the notion that there ought to be some limitation on the press.

■

My impression, looking from outside, was that the Pentagon was pleased, relatively, with the way things worked out with the press during Desert Storm. The press was less pleased. The bitching that I heard was that they were spoon-fed. And it was the only thing they could go with, because they were stuck in some hotel.

My sense is that the media feel very uncomfortable when the only thing they are going with is handouts. Guys like Aukofer never liked to write totally off our press releases. And the problem with the way Desert Storm was set up was, first of all, it didn't last long. The ground part didn't last long, and I don't know how else you do the air war. We had six weeks of bombing, but how can you get a reporter out there?

The problem, the grumbling that I heard from reporters—the whole press relations on Desert Storm—was that they were forced to use handouts, or the equivalent of handouts. Official photographs of bombs, those perfect things, shooting right down the chimney, and blowing the building up, or going right in the window, and all that kind of stuff. That makes them all feel used, and when they feel used, they get unhappy.

They'll always run with some of that as long as they feel they have an opportunity to go out and write on their own, cover on their own, or get a story that isn't just being handed to them.

Now what the Pentagon wants to do, naturally, is keep them all in the building and feed them information. The Pentagon guys are stunned that people aren't happy with that. They're doing the best job they can, to give honest information. But, of course, the press guys are suspicious of it.

First of all, I don't know how you cover the bombing campaign. It was six weeks of saturation bombing. I don't know how a reporter covers that. When the ground war started, you could go out and talk to troops and get out with Walt Boomer, that sort of thing. But that only lasted a couple of days.

■

I wouldn't trust the press in a pre-invasion situation where secrecy is essential. The problem is, is that 99 percent will be trustworthy, and one percent isn't. Then it's out, and once it's out, it's out. And it wasn't 50 percent of the press that put it out; it was maybe one percent. And it may not be deliberate. It may not be a guy trying to do something. It just may be an accident.

I kind of like what you guys were thinking about, in terms of tiers.

In the Pentagon, information is conveyed by briefings. You're a commander, and you come in and you say you want to know about something, they line up briefings for you, and that does it. The trouble is, the reporters don't want to hear briefings. They want to go out and feel it, and smell it, and touch it, and talk to the guys on the ground. They don't want to hear the briefing.

I would agree with Cheney that the press is more of a problem to be managed. The thing is that they've got a job to do. And the way you have to look at it is, if they do their job in a certain way, it can be useful to you. But if they do their job in another way, it can cause great harm. I'm talking about giving away stuff that you don't want them to give away—letting the enemy find out when we're going to attack, or where we're going to attack, or something else.

The reason it has to be managed, of course, is because the interest of the reporters is not the interest of the Pentagon, or even the interest of the country. The reporter comes from a different culture. They just don't have the sensitivity. This is why I wouldn't try and take them into my confidence. I don't think they have the sensitivity about what is secret and what isn't.

You're asking a lot, for a person to say, "Look, I've got this great story, but I can't run with it because it would damage national security." The rationale for every reporter to go with the story is that someone else is going with it: "The *Inquirer* is running with it." Or, "We heard that ABC was going to go with it, and so we went with it." Who knows whether ABC was going with it or not, because now that you've gone with it, it's out.

You're sitting there, and you're looking around, and you got this information. And here are six of your biggest competitors right around you, right? You're *The New York Times* reporter. Here's the guy from *The Washington Post* or one of the three networks, or the wires. You're thinking, "Now what if one of these SOBs goes with this story? I'm screwed."

Then you say, "Well, now, if I go first, I can stick it to all of you." So you go with it, and you say, "Oh, geez, I heard they were going." But

'... The media feel very uncomfortable when the only thing they are going with is handouts. '

Les Aspin

how do you know whether [the reporter] heard if they were going or not?

The fact of the matter is, reporters think that their job is to inform the public. It's not to be for the United States—especially if they think the United States is doing something illegal or immoral. Look at the way they approach any war. It's with a huge amount of skepticism. This is all an outgrowth of Vietnam. In the reporter culture, if your country is for it, you are hugely skeptical of it. You say, "This has happened in the past, where the country has lied to people." So just try and talk a reporter out of running a story on the basis of patriotism.

KENNETH H. BACON

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
NOV. 30, 1994


SCOTT DAVIS

CNN and new broadcast technology generally are changing the rules of engagement between the military and the press, and I don't think either side has figured out how to adjust to this new world.

Leaders have become very attuned to the power of CNN. Saddam Hussein is. Certainly Aidid is. I think we're finding all over the world now that leaders watch CNN and they understand that it's worth their while to invite the media in to cover things because they can influence the media. And sometimes they're more adept at influencing it than the military is. Let's face it, it's a battle of perceptions. And increasingly the military is beginning to realize that.

When we went to the Gulf in October, we went aboard a helicopter landing ship. There was an admiral on board, and I said to him, "You've been doing a great job for me, getting the press in onto the ship and onto other ships to cover the operations," and he said, "It's a media war, and we're going to win it." He said, "Our goal is to convince Saddam Hussein that we are putting in a force that he can't conquer, and TV can help. And therefore, I'm very attuned to the power of TV."

And he was exactly right. That is an officer embracing the good side of media coverage. Of course, it could come back and kick him if things begin going badly and he has them all positioned there and suddenly they're showing things that he doesn't want to get out. But by then, it's too late. He's made his decision; he has to live by it.

■

What we have to negotiate, it seems to me, are rules for getting the media and the military to understand this new world and how to make it work as smoothly as possible for each side. I don't think censorship is really an issue, or preventing access possible. It's difficult to negotiate general rules for something like that—particularly when people can move in and out on their own, particularly when we're dealing with foreign networks, and so on.

We thought we might have pretty good control over the Haiti operation, in terms of pools and control—where you can pick your people and decide how they're going to go in, when they're going to go in, when they're coming out. But it didn't work that way at all, because anybody could go down there and did. That, I think, turned out very well from this building's standpoint, in terms of coverage. We had a couple of bad days, but basically the coverage has been fabulous.

So the first point is that, with this CNN factor and the CNN imitators, it's very difficult to keep the press out. And it's frequently difficult to deal with them in the terms with which we're used to dealing with them, because it's not an easily controlled situation.

There may be a disaster waiting to happen in this new era. If the media went into Mogadishu today, I'm not sure anybody could keep them safe. And I'm not sure it's the military's job to keep them safe, although the media may demand that the military do something to protect them. But it's not written anywhere that it's the job of the military to interrupt their mission to protect the press. So far, we've literally dodged that bullet, but we may not always. And that can stir up a huge hornet's nest of re-evaluation of what's the military's role, what's the press's role, and we may go back in the soup on this thing.

You have to have some rules. I think the only way you can do it is through a combination of the media and the military.

■

About semantics and what "escort" means: I thought the point of John Fialka's book was that escorts can either be helpful or they can be dangerous, depending on the attitude of the services. He drew the distinction, I thought, very well, between the Army making it difficult for people to file, and the Marines making it easy for people to file. They both used escorts, they both had to allocate resources in different ways, and they chose to do it differently. It

'... It's not written anywhere that it's the job of the military to interrupt their mission to protect the press.'

Kenneth H. Bacon

seems to me the attitude of the service, or the military people, is very important here.

CLIFFORD H. BERNATH

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
NOV. 30, 1994


Scott Davis

We started planning for the Haiti operation as early as July. We recognized that the media pool hadn't been called up for almost three years, even in a practice. So the first thing we did back in July was activate the media pool. We went to Gitmo and looked at the Cuban refugees and the Haitian refugees and did an awful lot of learning from that.

What we found was, within the department, almost nobody knew about the media pool or its role. We had a new secretary of defense, a new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, new CINCs, and a lot of my own people had never been through a media pool. We also found that in the media, among the bureau chiefs, there had been a lot of changes. Some of the old-timers, like Bill Headline [of CNN], were fine. But some of the other guys, though they knew about it, didn't have any procedures in effect in their organizations.

We looked at that as the opportunity to almost start over building this thing. I went through the entire book there [the green book from the Feb. 20, 1991, Senate hearings], reread the Hoffman report on Panama, read the Sidle report [on Grenada], and read the three-year relook at the Sidle report. We looked at everything that went wrong, and the things that went right, and we built this plan with a foundation of what the lessons learned were. We wanted this to be in the model of the two primary tenets of what the media pool is supposed to be.

It's supposed to be as big as the operation can support, and as short as possible until free and open coverage can replace the pool. A normal pool is 13 people, but we had ships, and we had planes, and we had availability, so we ended up with 25, and we also worked in 68 unilaterals.

We knew there were 400 media representatives in Haiti already. We could have gotten away with saying, "Listen, if you're not part of the pool, get your bodies to Haiti and we won't worry about you." Instead, we offered opportunities: "There are ships moving, and maybe you want to cover the ships moving and talk to sailors and Marines on their mission. We've got Army units going over; maybe you'd like to be with them a couple of days early and get the story of how they prepare for a movement."

In the Hoffman report, he talked about the tip of the spear. We implemented the tip of the spear. We were going to have the media pool split into four sections—two going into Cap Haitien, one with the amphibious group, one with an air assault group, and two going into Port-au-Prince, again with an amphibious and an air group. What was going to happen was we would get them assembled by daylight, and they would get a briefing by the JTF commander—that would be exclusive for the media pool—and after that the media pool would file and be disbanded.

Then, if everything worked, we would have started landing the unilaterals. The pool came in with the tip of the spear, and probably 12 or so hours after that we would have moved in the unilaterals with the second wave of troops.

■

It didn't work that way because we never landed anybody there. What actually happened was that the unilaterals, in some cases, got on the ground before the pool people did because the troops who were in the second wave became the first wave when the operation turned over.

The equipment for the media was all palletized and set to come aboard—again, with these first-wave elements. But when the first wave didn't come, neither did that equipment. So we had to do some re-prioritizing of the mission, almost, to get their equipment off. Some of it was in the holds of ships.

We could have used that huge earth station that CNN had. It was a fly-away unit. One of the lessons that we learned is you have to get the right people involved in getting the right plane. The J3 wasn't really familiar with pools, so we ended up leaving CNN's earth station on the tarmac at Andrews because the plane that showed up was not big enough.

The reason we wanted unilaterals there was because the services wanted them to cover each of the services' elements of the mission—not the operation, not the actual combat assault, because that's the media pool. They were on various ships, they were accompanying certain army units—the 10th Mountain, for example. When those units hit the ground, then the unilaterals were assigned to them.

The pool had exclusive coverage of the assault phase, which is really the only reason

'What we found was, within the department, almost nobody knew about the media pool or its role.'

Clifford H. Bernath

there was a pool anyway. Had there not been an assault phase, then the media in Haiti were sufficient to cover what was going on there.

■

We were not trying to control the media. There were three groups of reporters out there. They were the free and open—the guys that got to Haiti on their own. They did not require or want any military support or DOD affiliation. Then there were the unilaterals, the media people who wanted to travel with the Department of Defense to cover the transit phase of the operation. They got free transportation; they got stories from the units they traveled with. And we gained, too—the department gained—because that was an element of the operation that could not be covered by the people who were in Haiti.

But the only control was what was mutually satisfactory. If a news organization wants to cover the transit of the 10th Mountain Division, there are some controls that go with that, but that happens whenever you travel with a division. Then there's the media pool, which operates under the nine rules of combat coverage.

We did have five bureau-chiefs' meetings on the Haiti after-action report. One of the points the media acknowledges is that they need more education. One of the things we're looking at now is, within each quarterly rotation of the pool, to take those reporters and backups designated for that quarter and get them out on a field training exercise—a weekend or a couple of days with some Army or Navy unit. The service PA chiefs have signed on to that.

■

My impression from talking to 40 or so of the bureau chiefs was that there is a general agreement that we are moving forward. We agreed on what the problems were, and we also agreed on a lot of courses of action to fix them. For instance, on filing photographs: It's a complex thing and it takes a lot of equipment, and wherever you are, it changes. We've been setting up our equipment on the Pentagon lawn, having wire services file to a bulletin board we've set up, so that we've improved distribution and filing. I think that you would have a hard time finding a bureau chief who doesn't think that the system is progressing.

I think we are well aware of the criticisms in the Hoffman report, and the Sidle report, and the other ones. Each exercise presents opportunities to learn. After Haiti, we conducted briefings on the goods, the bads and the uglies.

I think there will always be a case of a reporter being deployed out in the field someplace and some commander saying, "No, you can't do that," or "You can't shoot in this direction." There will always be a case where a guy wasn't able to file for some technical reason. Those things are not going to be eliminated. What happens on the battlefield is too fast. In general, though, the planning will try to preclude all those. The planning will be there. We keep getting smarter on how to do things. Each case has its own challenges. We may not make that mistake, but we'll make another mistake because the operation will change.

'If I were a media person, one of my goals would be to report everything as soon as I could report it.'

Adm. Michael Boorda

ADM. MICHAEL BOORDA

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
DEC. 27, 1994

There are principles that people who are smart on this issue could define or state. You would have eight, or 10, or 20 things that you wanted to achieve or not have happen. One of the good outcomes would be to keep the people of the United States as informed as they could possibly be. A bad outcome would be that people are killed or injured because information came out in an untimely way.

After you figure out the good and bad things that can happen to you, you've got to think about what is this particular thing I'm dealing with. You have to look at every operation as a unique thing. Clearly, the media will think some principles are more important than the commander will think. There will be some compromises. But it will be a clear understanding of why you're doing what you're doing.

If I were a media person, one of my goals would be to report everything as soon as I could report it. If I were the commander, one of my goals would be to not have key, vital information that could endanger lives reported until its proper time. Those two things are going to be in conflict with each other. And as long as you know they're in conflict with each other, then you can talk about them.

Fundamentally , the purpose of doing the operation is not to have something to report; it's to do the operation. So the first principle, for the military, is that you want the operation to be successful. It's going to be: Take this objective and do this thing; create this final result.

That's the success I'm talking about. And you want to do that. Whatever you do, you don't want to jeopardize that success. You won't be able to get me off that kick. Every operation is unique. So you give me an operation, I'll tell you what I think is more important.

The first principle for the media and, believe it or not, for me as a commander would be, on the other side of the ledger, that you do want accurate and timely reporting to the American people.

But from my perspective, the operation cannot include a public affairs component. We've lost sight of what we're all about if we do that. This is not to denigrate public relations or public affairs. It's real important. But the reason for doing a military operation is to achieve some objective. That has to be the number one thing. If it's not, then I think you've got the wrong commander.

The first thing he does is find out what his mission is. And his mission needs to be as clear as he can get it, and the clearer the better. It is stated in military terms. It doesn't have anything to do with providing food to the soldiers, or providing public affairs to the American people while you're doing it, or anything else. It is: Free Kuwait by such and such a date ....

At that point, he sits down and he starts thinking about a commander's intent: How do I want to do this? That's a unique thing. We define what we want to do, and now the commander is beginning to think about how he wants to do it, in military terms.

Only then do all the rest of these things play into it. Public affairs planning should come into it right away at that point. Let's assume it's a big operation, a three- or four-star operation like Haiti, or Schwarzkopf's operation.

In Schwarzkopf's case—and I'm making this up, but I think if he were sitting here, he would tell you—I want to move forces and I want to have a steady buildup. I want to have a bombing campaign, followed by a ground campaign. He's beginning to frame a commander's intent.

At that point, on Day One of the process, the public affairs guy gets in the game and begins to start figuring out how he's going to lead public affairs into this commander's intent and execution plan.

Now, we're talking about unique operations. Let's say the operation is to insert into Country X, to recover something that we want—say, a certain five people in there, and get them out. I'm making this up, but it's an example of a really unique operation.

Then the public affairs guy is going to come in and say, "I want to have a media pool to watch these guys land, and set up briefings where the media can get their thoughts before they go, and get their thoughts right after they come back." The commander will tell that public affairs guy, "Good try, but you don't understand what I'm doing here. We'll talk about it afterwards." I think most everybody would agree that the operation would fail if there were any leaks.

In the case of Schwarzkopf's operation, a big buildup taking several months, the media guy is going to say, "Hey, I want to get pools; I want to get people over here; I've got to start thinking about satellite transmission and stories, and gee, do we need to do any clearing of stories?" All of those things are going to start getting talked about.

But it's going to happen after the mission has been determined, and during the development of what is called a commander's intent. And I think public affairs is a key player in that, just like the doc's a key player, and the personnel guy is a key player, and the logistician's a key player, and the war fighters are key players. Now, as a result of this process, you end up with an annex to the operations order that says "Public Affairs."

If I'm a commander and I'm trying to achieve a mission, then I want public affairs that, one, doesn't jeopardize my mission accomplishment. That's got to be my number one concern. And two, I want it as open as it can be, because I believe in supporting and defending the Constitution of the United States. Those two are going to be in conflict sometimes, depending on the operation. So I want the public affairs guy in there early, so that we can satisfy both of those needs as closely as we can, through mechanisms like pools and other things.

But those are mechanisms. They're not the goal. The goal of the operation is not to have the press say I was a wonderful commander or anything like that. The goal of the operation is to do what I'm trying to do, and have the opportunity for the media to report that to the American people. I think you make a mistake, if you're a commander—I can't talk about being a media person, because I've never been one—if you are trying to put a spin on something. I want the media to see for themselves.

Using the example of how a media guy comes in with a corporation president: The corporation president is trying to sell a product. He's trying to sell Chevrolets, instead of Fords. So he wants to show the Chevrolet in its

'If I'm a commander and I'm trying to achieve a mission, then I want public affairs that ... doesn't jeopardize my mission accomplishment.'

Adm. Michael Boorda

best light. The commander ought not to try to do that. If the commander is trying to do that, he's going to get too cute by a bunch.

What the commander needs to do is allow the press to report his operation to the maximum extent that he can. How they report it will reflect, one, how well he does it, and, two, how good they are at reporting. So it's his job to keep them briefed, to make sure they understand what he's trying to do and don't have to go find some disgruntled person, who you can always find, who says something different. But we don't want to make the disgruntled person unavailable, either.

If the commander worries about anything except doing his mission and giving the press the maximum opportunity to report, then the commander is off in the wrong direction, I think.

■

All of this needs to be discussed in service colleges, where majors and lieutenant commanders can get exposed to it. Then it should be in every one of those senior-level courses as you go up. It's a part of what you do. Junior-level service colleges is about the right time to start doing this.

I've learned not to comment on specific reporters, because they get to comment on you later. But we're not talking about individuals. This is a complex business, I agree. And the reporter does a better job if the reporter understands the business.

In the operations part of it, it's up to the commander to create a situation where the media can be educated in a way that they will trust the education, so that you're not giving briefings that are just trying to give them your view of things.

In the day-to-day reporting on our business, I'm stuck with or happy with, depending on the case, whoever comes and sits down there to do the interview. I need to be aware of that person's background, so that I don't start to tell them things they don't understand and may report in a funny way. In some cases, the person is more sophisticated on the subject than I am. I won't go into names, but I can tell you there are people who sit down here and, when the interview is over, I have learned more than I've given.

There also are other people that come in here, and you say it three times, and you know they didn't write down the one thing that was really important. And so you say it three more times, and they still don't get it.

You have to develop a mutual trust with reporters or they will quickly assume that you're just trying to spin them off in your direction.

■

But I've learned something, as I got older. That is, when you think things are changing, it may be that you're just changing where you sat. A lot of guys will say, "Boy, the media are really mean-spirited now. And they were wonderful before." Well, they were wonderful before because you were a lieutenant and they didn't write about you. And now you're an admiral and they write about you.

In Washington, no matter how hard you work to put out the straight information, you will always find some person who has a different view. So if you want to write a controversial story on any subject that's important, there are going to be different views on it.

The speed at which they turn stories out, or the space in which they have to cram it, sometimes means that it's not in very much depth. Then there are some writers who do a great job, and sometimes great writers do once-over-lightly one day and a great job the next day. I think I'm probably like that, too, in how I do my work. I'm not trying to be kind; I'm just trying to be honest.

If everybody agrees exactly on how something ought to be done, or how it ought to turn out, then you've found the truly uninteresting issue. If you find any issue that is important, you will be able to find conflicting views on it. So if you're really interested in writing about controversy, you can almost make it up.

'If everybody agrees exactly on how something ought to be done, or how it ought to turn out, then you've found the truly uninteresting issue.'

Adm. Michael Boorda

DENNIS R. BOXX

DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (INFORMATION)
NOV. 30, 1994

R.D. Ward

I participated in that Haiti evolution with David Gergen, the other White House representatives and the network executives, and in all the subsequent phone calls that took place every day. It was helpful to us, because it allowed us to lay out for them what we thought the important, newsworthy areas were. It gave them a good understanding of what was coming, so they could plan their coverage, and then—when it happened—understand it, rather than purely react to it. There's a very fine line that you walk there. Is

it news management? Is it preferential treatment? We tried to be careful about that. I think by and large everybody was pleased.

We got a lot of very positive feedback from the pool reporters. The pool was a secondary thing, frankly, because there were so many reporters on the ground. We expanded the pool. All the pool did was it gave people additional access. There was no great advantage to being in the pool, other than you saw it from that end—coming in—as opposed to being in Haiti and watching it arrive. Then, of course, the shift in the scenario—being a non-war, a less hostile environment—changed the way the media coverage played out.

■

A couple of nights before the invasion was to start, we had all the network bureau chiefs here, including Bill Headline, and then we also had a conference call with all the vice-presidents in New York. We asked them to do a number of things, some of which, frankly, I knew we weren't going to get.

There were some easy and obvious ones: Don't broadcast the departure of aircraft from stateside bases. Pope was an obvious place that the Airborne was going to be leaving from, and the minute aircraft took off from there, if that were broadcast, Cedras would have three and one-half hours to prepare his troops. They agreed to that, without much hesitation.

The other thing we asked for was a one-hour embargo, or blackout, in the first hour of the invasion, so there would not be live coverage of Airborne troops dropping into the airport or the port, allowing Cedras to know exactly what we were doing, when and where. That they did not agree to, and I did not expect them to, frankly. The argument we made on that was the security of the troops, obviously.

They did agree to not broadcast pictures that would depict precise locations. It was going to be hard to do, but they agreed to try. We also asked them to basically stay off the streets during the first hour or so of the invasion, so there wouldn't be confusion and lights coming on and all kinds of problems with troops on the ground and media in the mix. That they would not agree to. And the last thing that we made them aware of—it was not a request, although they probably heard it as a request—was that they should stay off the rooftops.

That was purely for their protection, because if the troops had taken sniper fire, the gunships would have come in and just swept those rooftops to clean them off. If there happened to be media up there, they would have been hurt. They pretty much agreed that they would try to stay off the rooftops.

By and large, it was very constructive. They did not read it in any way as us trying to censor them or manage them to an unreasonable point. We laid out everything in a way that made sense for the security of the troops, the security of media and the operational security of the mission. But there were things in there that they simply could not go along with, and, frankly, I wasn't surprised.

■

By and large, when the media understand what they're involved in, and they're briefed on what the security considerations are and what the limitations are going to be—as long as you factor in what their needs are, and what they're there for—then the negotiation process is usually going to work out.

The problem is that in certain environments you can't control the numbers. Haiti would have been one. We were very concerned. There were at least 450 journalists on the ground in Haiti as we were building up. We had the pool and could control the number in the pool, but that was not the problem. Certain environments, like Desert Storm, allowed some control.

I don't think the numbers can be controlled in an environment where reporters have access. You don't control it unless there's an environment that allows it. And then if there is, it's going to have to be a mutual arrangement.

In deciding who goes, it's our obligation to come up with a reasonable cross-section, by region, by type of publication, by type of medium. But that's the worst case for us. The minute we have to do that, we are in a fight, and yet I don't think the media will do it for themselves. There is just too much competition for them to do it themselves.

However, I think we've moved beyond that in the way we're going to fight wars and the way they're going to cover wars.

■

Getting reporters knowledgeable is clearly an issue. Our Pentagon reporters are terrific. They know the business inside and out. But the minute one of them is sick, and they send somebody else to fill in, we're in deep trouble if a story breaks because we're starting from scratch.

The other part is that we could have done a better job of letting that lowest-level unit commander understand what it was that was expected of him or her when that pool reporter arrives. You've got certain responsibilities to live up to. That's why we're putting the

'Our Pentagon reporters are terrific. They know the business inside and out.'

Dennis Boxx

reporter with your unit, and you've got to support this person. That didn't happen in every case. That caused all kinds of fallout.

PETER BRAESTRUP

DIRECTOR, COMMUNICATIONS, AND SENIOR EDITOR
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
DEC. 1, 1994

There are two different sets of problems. One involves the peacetime coverage and the other wartime coverage. The first feeds into the second, but there's still a different set of problems. The security problem, and the access problem, in this day and age, are primarily wartime problems.

'Some senior news executives are now women who have never had any exposure to the military ....'

Peter Braestrup

There are the two cultures—military and journalistic. There also are generation gaps and gender gaps. With the end of the draft in 1972 and the influx of women into journalism, and now with Baby Boomers at the middle-management level, you have a bias not so much against the military as such, but a bias against "institutional" or "operations" stories, in favor of "social issues" and "people" stories.

There is one undercurrent that also pushes this tendency. Some senior news executives are now women who have never had any exposure to the military, who look at the military in rather subjective terms. It's partly because women who are 40, 45, coming into the news business have had to put up with a lot of grief from menfolks at one time or another, and so they're much more ideologically charged—or sensitive, or whatever the hell you want to call it—than their male colleagues. And part of what they see as the last bastion of male dominance is the military.

So they look at the women officers in the military, ambitious college-educated career women like themselves—not in terms of real life in the military, because they don't know about that—but they look at the services as a bastion where women are still being denied their rights to do whatever men do. Since they don't know very much about what men do in the military or in combat, it is easy for them to believe that any military unit can be composed of women and men, and should operate with no more difficulty than a 9-to-5 civilian institution.

You can do it by the numbers. Count the stories in *The Washington Post* or *Times* on the military, and you find a very high percentage of them are not concerned with the military as an operating institution deployed world-wide, but the military as a battleground between the sexes or an arena for social issues.

For their part, the male editors don't know or care enough to argue about this focus. Indeed, they may see it as more appealing to readers or viewers. Reporters go out and cover what they think the best stories are, but they always have in the back of their heads what the stories are that the editors will pick up. Pretty soon, the word gets down that this is the kind of story the national editor is interested in and will push at the afternoon story conference.

■

You can see the same thing going on in television and *Time* and *Newsweek*, etc. So the military as an institution, I would argue, has lost in news coverage to the military as a social battleground. This, of course, makes it very difficult for reporters who are genuinely interested in what's happening at this crucial time to the military—downsizing, peacekeeping, readjusting to the end of the Cold War, all of those obvious things—they have no internal market for these stories. I have plenty of pals in this business who will tell you that they just can't get it into the paper, The editors are not interested except in specific budget terms—weapons systems, and the B-2 bomber—and not much of that either.

■

So at a time when the Pentagon is still spending $260 billion a year, you cannot get a lot of major media people interested in what they're spending it for, what the prospects are down the road, etc.

So that's the first thing that's going to affect wartime coverage when it comes along because you're going to find a kind of atrophying of interest in covering the military. In most coverage of U.S. forces in both Somalia and Haiti, for example, there was almost no reporting on the changing tactics, ground rules, locations, morale and performance of U.S. or allied forces, despite the fact that these peacekeeping efforts were the first such endeavors since the Cold War ended. We simply do not know how our forces did.

You will recall that, during the Gulf War, the TV networks had to hire retired generals to sit in the studio and explain the battlefield 8,000 miles away.

In the days of the Cold War, it made sense for a reporter to become a specialist in the military, and stay with it as a career, as a career option. That is no longer the case. The media

are swirling people in and out of the Pentagon—that's just another duty stop. The notion of the career military reporter—of whom the archetype was Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times*, who spent 45 years doing it, with his own researcher, his own office, a kind of little mini-news bureau of his own—those days are gone. So you're finding a kind of vacuum of expertise, on the part not only of reporters who have no career incentives at this point to stay with the military beat, but also for demographic and cultural reasons—this is the '60s generation, the baby boomers—of people at the management level.

■

There are two partial remedies I see for this. The first is practical training. After the Gulf War, there was a whole group of editors who sat around and said the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the military or somebody ought to have training programs for journalists. It's a good idea. It would have to be Washington-based, maybe funded in some fashion by The Freedom Forum and/or the McCormick Tribune people, or a joint effort, because it's expensive.

It could start small and try over time to expose middle-management types and editorial writers, who tend to have longevity in their jobs, to the military language and what the military is and does. It could not be done in a series of canned briefings in the Pentagon.

The second thing which I feel is almost as important—and I've been lobbying for this for I don't know how many years. That is a stylebook—a combination glossary, stylebook and primer—on the military for news people. They could flip through and if somebody says, "The Marines are landing here, and there's a battalion," and they don't know what a battalion is, it would be in there. It would be looseleaf, so it could be occasionally updated. It would have to be in plain English, not in military gobbledygook.

It would tell you what the Marine Corps is and what the weapons look like. It would identify types of ships. A book like that, illustrated, very well indexed, organized and color-coded, would be mailed with suitable wrapping and explanation and promotion through the ASNE and the TV news directors, so it wouldn't come out of the blue. I would try to have one or two of those books with every news desk and editorial page office in the country.

The final version ought to be written by a newsman or an ex-newsman who knows the audience. To do it right, it would probably be a 300-page book, because it has to have lots of pertinent detail. You could also put it on a CD-ROM. It could also have a mini-history in it, with statistics like how many people we lost in Korea. These are things that come up all the time. It's the kind of thing *Time* magazine did in World War II. But when the Gulf War came along, the news organizations kind of fumbled their way through it. The analysis was all rather primitive and not quite correct a lot of the time. A smaller pocket-size, paperback edition could be developed for reporters and updated every two or three years.

■

Military-media relations start with the president. It starts with the civilians, and they set the tone. Lyndon Johnson essentially established what the military could say and how they could say it in Vietnam. That's where the problems come from. It was a different tone in Desert Storm. Army division commanders, who were the key guys, had no guidance at all from Schwarzkopf, except when he saw a bad story, and then the wires would burn. Well, after a couple of those, everybody got nervous about press access. What was in it for them? But the Marine Corps and Walt Boomer, with the concurrence of his superiors, said, "Come on in, guys." There was a big difference between Schwarzkopf and Gen. Boomer. Somebody up the line was not telling Schwarzkopf to say, "Come on in, guys."

'Military-media relations start with the president.'

Peter Braestrup

The result, of course, was that the Marines got far more credit than they should have. The heavy lifting was being done by the Army. But the Marine Corps got the credit, simply because they weren't all uptight because their chain of command wasn't all uptight, and Schwarzkopf essentially was very hypersensitive to the media. He was insistent that the PAOs worry more about Schwarzkopf's personal coverage than the Army's coverage. It was a little like MacArthur in World War II.

■

Now, let's consider the media-access question. I like the British approach used in the Gulf War. The Pentagon should decide in advance who can go on an operation and just let everybody know. And who goes depends on how many go. You don't call them pools, because they're not pooling their material. So let's call them deployments. And the smallest deployment would be Reuters, UPI and AP. The second group would be the three wire-service reporters and three wire-service photographers. If the military could handle 10 people, it would be the wire services and photographers, plus a four-man television-pool

crew. The principle always would be: Give priority to the news organizations serving the largest number of people.

The TV pool man would double on radio, so all broadcast comes in at the same time. The problem with television is, it's very manpower-intensive per transmission unit. You've got to have four people at minimum today, and that's why you pool them longer than you pool anybody else. When you get to a total deployment of 18 people, I would add the three newsmagazines and five newspapers. Then add in the three networks, and you've got 30 people. There are variations on this, but that's basically it.

■

The last thing would be to put three people maybe at the end of this sequence, who would be chosen by lottery. That would give you a shot at *The New Republic, Nation, Soldier of Fortune, Esquire, Mademoiselle, Mirabella.* They could rotate over time. Beyond 35 people, you would add more in each category, by lottery if necessary.

■

Ken Bacon could make a defensible case to include those news organizations which transmit the news the fastest to the most people, and move up from that. I will also defend to the death that the print media and the wire services will get far more relevant information out than TV. Newspaper sales went up during the Gulf War; people were hungry for details. I'm biased against television because I think it's a very inefficient information medium—good pictures, but it's more important to the public to know that there are 25 people dead, and who's in charge and where they landed, rather than 30 words in a sound bite out of CNN.

■

Censorship is a case-by-case thing. I never had any personal objection to the practice in the Gulf War, given the situation, which I compared to Britain before D-Day, before the ground war began. Why help the Iraqis? You had big U.S. units depending on the element of surprise. One problem was (due to most reporters' inexperience) that journalists wouldn't know whether they were reporting something that was classified, or should be classified, or not. That's what really scared me most about having these guys wandering around.

Most people over there, if you read *Hotel Warriors*, were not worried about censorship. They were worried about access and communications. That was the big issue. I don't ever expect to hear, and I hope I never will, newspapers say, "We want censorship." I don't want them to say that, I don't want them to look for it. They're supposed to be anti-censorship. But they will go along with it, in wartime, unless it becomes political censorship. That kind of censorship becomes tempting to the military and the White House, particularly when things are going badly.

Again it starts with the president. And then with the theater commander. The American people can take an awful lot of bad news, if they've been getting bad news all along when it happens. Maximum feasible candor—I mean, look at Gen. Boomer. There were some negative stories written about the Marines before the ground war, but Boomer had enough confidence in his troops, and in himself and everybody else, to shrug off negative stories.

You can train the hell out of the Army rank and file and even the people at Army command-and-general-staff school. But the military-media relationship falls apart if you get a Schwarzkopf out there, who escaped all that socialization or whatever it is. So the issue has to go back to the president and the defense secretary, who have to say, "Schwarzkopf, for your campaign to succeed, you've got to make a practical effort to make press access a priority."

'I will also defend to the death that the print media and the wire services will get far more relevant information out than TV.'

Peter Braestrup

RICHARD CHENEY

FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JAN. 12, 1995

My basic approach with respect to Pete Williams was to give him total access. He'd worked for me before we ever arrived at the Pentagon. I had great confidence in him. My own view, part of it based on my time in the White House with President Ford, was that a press secretary who didn't have total access was going to get in trouble sooner or later. He'd be caught up. He would end up misleading the press. You could never allow that to happen. It was better for him not to say anything than to go out and say the wrong thing. It would be a big mistake to use him to mislead the press, for deception purposes or whatever.

Part of my thinking was the view I had when I arrived at the Pentagon that the department lacked credibility. Over the years, for one reason or another—Vietnam, contract scan-

dals, cost overruns and so forth—there was the general perception around town, and I think out around the country in a lot of circles, that the department couldn't be trusted, that we lacked credibility. I felt very strongly about my own obligations and responsibilities as secretary never to get into that position, that credibility counted for everything.

That was just the way I'd always done business in my political career. I had strong feelings about the importance of being honest and accurate, not just with the press, but also with the Congress. I served in the Congress for 10 years, and felt sometimes we got the runaround from the Department of Defense. I didn't want to do that. When you translate that into military operations and the conduct of operations, a couple of things stand out. We always had Pete involved early on in the process. We did not keep him out at all. I always assumed I could trust him. I think it would be fair to say we were sensitive to past problems with the press. But frankly, I looked on it as a problem to be managed.

I did not look on the press as an asset, in doing what I had to do. Maybe that's just sort of the natural order of things between government and the press. But it was so important, especially in connection with the Gulf conflict, where the possibility existed of a long-term, sustained kind of operation where the stakes were enormous, I felt that it was important to try to manage that relationship in a way so the press didn't screw us—if I can put it in those terms.

■

We started with a situation where we were operating in Saudi Arabia, and we didn't have any press. Then I had reporter friends of mine accuse me of finding the only place to run a war where they didn't allow the press. At the outset, the only way reporters got in there was on my airplane. I guess it was on my second trip in.

First, I went over the first weekend of the crisis, and I arranged for the deployment of forces. I didn't take any press. And the pool went in after that. The pool was a useful way to work, from our perspective. It was there. It let us set up a system to get some access, but a lot of that we had to negotiate with the Saudis. ... According to a story I heard—and I have no reason to challenge it—King Fahd was watching CNN one night and saw broadcasts coming live out of Baghdad in the early stages of the buildup and concluded that he wanted press in Saudi Arabia because Saddam had press in Iraq. I don't know if it's true.

■

But the problems that eventually emerged in terms of how we managed the operation—I mean, there are press, and then there are press. If you're talking about just the professionals who cover the Pentagon on a regular basis, who know something about the military, who have experience, who know what we're all about, you can have one kind of relationship there. If you're talking about what came to be known as the food editors or the food critics—we ended up at one point in the Pentagon where the Pentagon regulars put a sign up, down in the press room over in one corner: "Food critics' corner."

These were all people who had never previously covered the military, who didn't know anything about the department, but who, because the Gulf was a big story, all of a sudden showed up to cover the Pentagon. Last week they were writing the food column for the local newspaper. This week, they're covering the Pentagon. It's very hard to deal with those kinds of people. I also have a strong feeling that there are bad reporters. I mean, politicians aren't perfect. There are good ones and bad ones. Reporters aren't perfect. There are good ones and bad ones. But I think there has been a change in the quality of the press. Take CBS. Walter Cronkite was an institution, a man of great experience and knowledge and enormous stature in the news business. He was considered, at one time, the most credible man in the Unites States. There is no one of that stature in the news business today.

■

Was that part of the reason behind establishing the combat pool system: that this would be a better way to manage and control the situation?

I think that was part of it. As I recall the process, Pete and Gen. Powell spent a lot of time sorting out how we were going to work, and then they came to me with a package that I finally had to sign off on.

But Pete worked fairly closely with the Joint staff, and Colin was involved as well with pulling that together. Part of it was the changing technology. There were some reporters running around who had notions of wanting to cover the war in the Gulf the way they covered Vietnam 25 years ago: Get on a helicopter and fly up to some unit. They didn't have any concept of how the nature of warfare had changed, or that we were going to do our operations at night, or that we were going to move very fast, or that if we didn't provide the transportation

'... I had reporter friends ... accuse me of finding the only place to run a war where they didn't allow the press.'

Richard Cheney

for them, there wasn't any way they were going to be able to keep up. My impression is we had an extensive debate about this afterwards, obviously. My general view is that the Gulf War was the best-covered war we ever had. There was more information provided, more real-time than ever before in history.

It upsets my friends in the press corps when I say it was the best-covered war in history. They don't like this at all. They fundamentally disagree because they felt managed and controlled. I spent a lot of time on that. I met with a panel that Kay Graham and the group put together somewhere. I understand their concerns, to the extent that they didn't get to cover the war the way they wanted to cover it. I also think it's fair to say it's a legitimate criticism for them to make that point. Access was very uneven. There were some people in the field who were able to file their stories, and others who weren't.

'It upsets my friends in the press corps when I say it was the best-covered war in history.'

Richard Cheney

There were differences, probably more than anything else at the start, at the division level. We had some division commanders who caused problems. On the other hand, the Marines were especially good at it. But the Marines always are.

All of our senior commanders were Vietnam vets. I think a lot of them had attitudes toward the press that were shaped by those events. I think Freddie Franks, for example—my personal view is that he's a great commander, did a hell of a job with the 7th Corps—had a somewhat skeptical attitude about the press. And the Army did not do as aggressive a job as, for example, somebody like Walt Boomer in the Marines. Boomer took Molly Moore with the *Post* and got a great story out of it. I mean, you know, he had her eating out of his hand.

But it was uneven in terms of the approach, and I did not, other than setting the broad policy, I didn't get into the business of trying to say to a particular division commander or unit commander: "You ought to do X with respect to this." It wasn't my job as secretary. I signed off on the broad policy, then delegated it. And some of these problems didn't come up until after it was all over with.

■

There have been a lot of accusations made in books and elsewhere that President Bush, you and Colin Powell decided at the outset that you were going to totally manage the news coverage of this thing.

I wouldn't state it in quite those terms. It was my responsibility, primarily. The president didn't give me any guidance on this. And that's not the kind of thing I would have taken to him. I felt that it was very important to provide a lot of information, as accurate as we could, to the public. But I emphasize, to the *public*, not necessarily to the press. I wanted the public to know what we were doing and why we were doing it. I felt I had major responsibilities to spend a lot of time explaining that. General Powell was an important part of that, too, and the system of briefings that we established. He and I would sit down in the situation room over there in the mornings and get briefed. But a lot of the stuff that we got at 8 o'clock in the morning—not everything, obviously—would then go out in the main briefing with Tom Kelly and Mike McConnell, out in front of the cameras.

And I felt it was important to manage the information flow—not to distort it, but to make certain that we got a lot of information out there so that people knew what we were doing. I also gave speeches during that period of time, testified before the Congress, and went on Sunday television talk shows. It was all getting information out, telling them what we were going to do, why we were doing it, explaining the policy, why we had to send half a million people there, call up a quarter of a million reservists, and all the other things we were doing. The information function was extraordinarily important. I did not have a lot of confidence that I could leave that to the press.

■

What about the blackout that was first put in, and then lifted?

At the start of the ground war? Well, it was my strong feeling that when you first kicked things off there, we needed to preserve the security of the operation. That was the moment of real crisis. That was the crunch. That was the point where our guys were most vulnerable and where the element of surprise was very important. We also were aware of things like the extent to which the Iraqis had positioned themselves, for example, to defend against an

amphibious operation over the beach into Kuwait City. We never planned to send the Marines up on the beach into Kuwait City, but it was clearly in our interest to have five or six Iraqi divisions tied down waiting for that invasion. The longer we could delay knowledge of the true nature of the operation, the real strategy that was at work, the more we enhanced our prospects for success and minimized casualties.

We lifted it because the thing moved so fast. Within a matter of hours after we launched, the Marines had done so well getting through the barriers into Kuwait that Norm came back and asked for approval to launch the 7th Corps 12 hours early, to move up the second phase of the assault, which we were able to sign off on. Things moved so rapidly that, in the end, I don't think the blackout was important from a military standpoint. But we didn't know that when we started.

■

Do you believe generally that it is a good idea to trust the press in a pre-invasion situation?

If I look at it in terms of my responsibility as secretary of defense, the press is there. The press has a role. I understand that role. It's important. This is a free society, and the free press is an important part of that. But if I rely as secretary on the press to be the filter through which all information goes—about why we're going to send 500,000 kids off to the Gulf and may take heavy casualties—then I can't be at all confident that my side of the story's going to get told or that the policy's going to be carefully explained and that people are going to understand what it's all about.

There's also this enormous variety of press, in terms of quality. I had an obligation to say to Mr. and Mrs. America, "Look, we've taken your 19-year-old son, and he's over there in the desert, and his life's on the line, and here's what we're doing about it, and here's how we're trying to manage the operation." In my personal view, one of the reasons there was such an overwhelming level of support in the end for the operation was, obviously, it was successful. That helped a hell of a lot. But it was also because the American people saw up close with their own eyes through the magic of television what the U.S. military was capable of doing.

It was especially CNN. But it also was different from the impression they had after the last 25 years of press coverage of the military. It is the nature of the press to deliver bad news. It's not news if it's good. Over the years, I think the American people had the impression that our military was fat and sloppy, and we had generals too stupid to lead, and equipment that wouldn't work, and troops who didn't know how to use the equipment. For an awful lot of Americans, especially in the aftermath of Vietnam, the perception was that the Pentagon's a place that doesn't work very well, costs too damn much, and we're not at all sure they can perform their mission.

And then, all of a sudden, bang. There the guys were, and they were doing it. Those cruise missiles were going down the streets of Baghdad, and the precision-guided munitions were going down air shafts and into buildings, and the troops were magnificent. The damn thing worked, and that surprised the hell out of an awful lot of people. I think the reason it was so surprising was, in fact, because of the impression that had been created over the years, of 25 years of normal, routine coverage of the Pentagon and the Department of Defense and the military by the press.

■

I am not knocking Haiti. I wouldn't see Haiti as anywhere comparable, in terms of the level of military difficulty. Haitians don't have an air force. They don't have an air-defense system. There isn't a damn thing they could do about C-141s dropping troops onto the airport over in Port-au-Prince. Obviously, you do everything you can to minimize casualties, but it's a qualitatively different type of operation than what we did in the desert. In my sorting-out of priorities, the number one assignment from the standpoint of the civilian leadership of the Pentagon is to accomplish the mission. Number two is to do it at absolute minimal cost in terms of American casualties. After I've worried about those two things, then I'm prepared to worry about whether the press has access. But you always have to put those other two first.

What I've tried to articulate is: In certain scenarios, you have to determine the element of surprise, the imperative of secrecy and security. You can't lower your standards. You've got to hang tough. But in Haiti, where the risk elements were not that high, we basically knew that we had something coming and believed we could afford to be more open and interface with the media.

We also wanted the Haitians to know we were coming. The real message there was, "Cedras, you better get out of town because our guys are coming." The press plays an interesting role here. One of the things that I will always remember was sitting in my office in

'It is the nature of the press to deliver bad news.'

Richard Cheney

the Pentagon the night we began the air war against Iraq, and General Powell was up there. We were sitting there at a little round table.

You've planned the operation for months, you've deployed the force, you've signed off on the strategy, signed out the execute order. There's not a damn thing you can do. It's out of your hands. The commanders and the lieutenants and the sergeants and the captains are taking over. And it's either going to work, or it's not.

As I recall, the hour was about 7 o'clock Washington time, and at 6:30, Bernie Shaw's on CNN interviewing Walter Cronkite. Walter's back in New York on the telephone, reminiscing about covering the London Blitz in 1940. And Shaw's saying that he had come over to interview Saddam Hussein, but he wasn't going to get the interview. So he had the first flight out tomorrow morning. And Colin and I were sitting there saying, "No, you don't, Bernie. Nothing's flying out of Baghdad tomorrow." Then, within a matter of 30 minutes, he's under the table in his hotel room in Baghdad, broadcasting live, real-time, from the battlefield, about 10,000 miles away. So the guys who planned the operation can sit there and watch real-time cruise missiles go down in Baghdad. That had never happened before.

'It would be helpful if the press had some way to police themselves.'

Richard Cheney

CNN had a big impact. We didn't try to manipulate it, certainly. But it made sense for us, given the fact that we wanted the Iraqis to stay tied down worrying about an amphibious operation, for us to mount practice operations in the region and make sure CNN was there to film them as the Iraqis sat in Baghdad and watched us practice amphibious operations in the Gulf. And boom, there's those six divisions right down on the waterfront in Kuwait City.

■

And, as I say, you've got to find a way to deal with the press. It would be helpful if the press had some way to police themselves. There isn't anybody, though, in the press that can say, "You get to go, and you don't. We're going to take the regular Pentagon correspondent from *The Milwaukee Journal* who knows what he's talking about, and he gets to go. But this person over here from the Syracuse, N.Y., *Evening News* who last week was a food critic and now wants to be credentialed as a Pentagon correspondent. You don't know enough about it. You can't go."

[The independent-coverage tier] is an interesting concept.

We spent a lot of time after the Gulf War looking at trying to establish that new set of guidelines that we finally promulgated in policy. Pete did a lot. I spent some time on it. Pete did most of it. Our view of what made sense is embodied in that set of regulations. But I'd also add that the next time one of these things happens, probably the crew—whoever's in charge at that point—will sit down and look at it and rewrite the rules book. That generally happens.

Each operation is different. You wouldn't do in Panama, 1989, what you did in Grenada in 1983. We learned some lessons. And the press's role in all of that and how you relate to the press is the same. If there were a way to do it in advance, it would be fine, but the security problem is severe within the Pentagon itself. There is absolutely a need for your civilian and military officials to be able to do some things in secret, and it is very hard.

LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER

FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS DURING THE 1983 INVASION OF GRENADA
MAY 22, 1995

I'm kind of putting it together without any notes or memory, but my recollection is that I was dealing with Adm. Poindexter in the National Security Office at the White House.

I can't remember how we finally decided we were going keep the press out. What I recall is that, from the beginning of the discussions, it was clear from the White House that we were not going to let the press know about the operation. The reasons given were the possibility of leaks, which could lead to greater losses when we went in and—just as importantly, if it leaked ahead of time—the danger of those medical students being killed. There was nothing particularly devious about it, just a sense that there was the danger of leaks and those consequences that could ensue therefrom.

My sense of the thinking was: "This really is not the press's business at this stage. We'll let them know when it starts." I don't recall any argument in the administration. I thought it was the right way to proceed.

I will say, in retrospect, that if we had the right kind of press pool, we should have done that. But as far as I can recall, there was no great desire to find a way to do so. Afterward, we caught a lot of hell from you guys. I don't

know how we could have done it, but maybe we could have.

Don't blame Grenada on the Pentagon. It was a political decision. As far as I can recall, it came out of the White House, although maybe the joint chiefs were saying, "Okay, it's not something we object to." The arguments were military: the losses to people going in. But really the biggest concern was that they would do something to those kids in the medical school—perhaps take them hostage.

The question is how you go to the press, in advance of the move, in a way that puts a pool together without telling people what's going on.

JOHN FIALKA

WASHINGTON REPORTER
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
NOV. 28, 1994

[*Fialka served as pool coordinator during Desert Storm.*]

What we want in the news business and what the military wants to do is basically incompatible. We've grown much different over the last 20 years as professions. So we don't really think alike on much at all these days.

I was struck by the level of intensity on the military side of this during the Gulf War. I knew there were people who despised us in the military, just like there are cops who despise us, and politicians who despise us. But the depth of this in the military was something that I had no idea about, until we actually ran into it. They were so intense during the Gulf War that they stepped on their own history, and I think some of them now realize that. But at the same time, what I saw of the press during the Gulf War was a whole lot of people who really didn't have a good view of what the military was all about.

We've now had, from when the draft ended, however many years that people haven't really had to think about a citizen army or what the military is supposed to do or how they're supposed to act, because most people coming out of college nowadays simply treat this as though it's not their problem. A tiny handful go into the military, and they become an officer corps. The enlisted men, by and large, are drawn out of the ranks of the inner city and rural America, and so there aren't very many people in the Army who are like us, the reporters, most of whom are college graduates.

We are really cats and dogs nowadays. And it's created this kind of gulf, and I don't think any amount of seminars or training will ever bridge this. There's nothing really out there that I see that closes it. In fact, it gets worse as the Army pares down to a residue of people who really love the military and on the outside are people who think less and less of military intervention, of intervention anywhere.

■

Now, where does that turn around and bite you? It bites when you have a little war, like in the Gulf. That's a relative term; maybe that's a big war when you compare it to the future. And everybody and his dog and his cat wants to go cover that war.

But first of all, physically, there is just not enough room for an unlimited amount of reporters to run around on the battlefield. We learned that in the Gulf. Even the military didn't understand that; they overloaded their own units to the point where the reporters couldn't function. Will this happen again in the future? You can just about bet on it as our military gets smaller and smaller, so it gets involved in smaller conflicts. In the meantime, the breadth of media that want to go to that conflict gets much larger. We've become a society of voyeurs. Everybody wants to see it; not too many people want to understand it.

The fact that we get into a situation where we have to choose—or someone has to choose—who goes out in the field and covers the war is not something that ABC-TV or the other networks are going to worry about, because they're always going to be the chosen. So they're going to tell you there's no problem. It's the *Milwaukee Journal*s of the country that have that problem in spades.

■

The first thing is to get the media to realize that there is a problem, that the noise coming from the big guys that says there is not a problem is simply self-serving, and the public interest has to be addressed in the mechanism we choose for deciding who goes out and covers that war.

Whatever mechanism you choose, the press ought to decide who goes out and covers the military. The military should never, never decide who goes out and covers the military. You had people in the Gulf War—from the big-media side of the fence—who would say, "Well, we can't solve this. Let's leave it up to the military."

'Don't blame Grenada on the Pentagon. It was a political decision.'
Lawrence Eagleburger

It shouldn't be left up to the military because it will be to the detriment of honest coverage. There are reporters that develop sources on every beat, I grant you. There are also brown-nose, suck-up reporters on every beat who will write down whatever flatters themselves to their sources, forgetting just who they are responsible to. If you want to cater to them, then leave it up to the military. But if the press wants to be responsible, it has to decide on the mechanism and control it. And if they don't do it, they're irresponsible.

Generals should not be allowed to take out their pet reporters. How many generals were out there in the war? There were 13 or 14 hotshots out in the field who thought they were geniuses. If the ones who took reporters out got promoted because of all the ink they got, and the ones who didn't got ignored, the next war every damn one of them will have their own pet reporter out there. We'll have our own personal PR campaign. We've seen it before. MacArthur did it during World War II. He stiffed the reporters he didn't like and catered to the ones he did. Now, if you want to go back to that decision, that's where you go if you say "Let the military handle it." They're good at it. They've done it before and they'll do it again.

■

'... If the press wants to be responsible, it has to decide on the mechanism and control it.'

John Fialka

We had a mechanism in the Gulf War. I helped design it, so I guess this is special pleading here. The organizing point was that we desperately wanted the military not to have a choice, for the very reason I just described. The problem was we had 1,200 reporters wanting to go out in the field, where there was honestly room for about 50 to operate. And because we got greedy and the Pentagon caved in, we got 150 out there, and it probably screwed maybe 100 reporters who couldn't get their story back, or who got lost and didn't have escorts who had global-positioning systems, or whatever. Neither side was very realistic about it.

And then afterwards you get this—this really galled me—you get the media, most of the media who weren't there and never had a thought about going there, starting yelling about the pools. And if you ask four or five people in the media what they were talking about, they hadn't a clue. I mean, there are pools and there are pools. Most of them were talking about a Pentagon-dominated press pool that existed for maybe a week or two at the outset of the Gulf crisis and then was disbanded forever.

Most people thought that continued and somehow the Pentagon manipulated us all the way through. What you had in the end, in October, was the real pool—the folks who were in Dhahran waiting for the war to start, which at that point tended to be mostly the big news organizations because smaller ones with smaller budgets couldn't really afford to baby-sit that war zone. We were sitting there, seeing the problem coming, knowing that there would be a lot more people out there, trying to figure out how we could keep that decision among ourselves.

With the exception of the print pool, everybody else sort of set up a pope and let him decide. We tried to do it democratically, and that's what got us tangled up with the *Mirabella* Rule, because the only way we could do it was to take people as they came. That got you folks that were on the list—like *Mirabella*—who were blocking out the *Milwaukee Journals* of the world and the second *New York Times* guy, all of whom would have been much more competent than *Mirabella*.

I don't know how to get around that, but we did have a mechanism there for getting around the much more serious problem, which was keeping that decision away from the military. If we cede them that ground, there's a great danger that the coverage is biased. And if that happens, then we haven't done anything; we might as well not be there.

■

There were two parts to the crunch. One was, the military basically lied to us in saying they could support us out on the field. I don't know to this day whether they did it on purpose or whether they didn't know what they were doing. When I think back on it, I'm pretty sure the Army didn't know what they were doing, at least at the lower level. At the upper level, you had Schwarzkopf manipulating. He might have seen that they didn't know what they were doing and encouraged it. I don't know how to read that.

On the Marine side, you had a vastly different philosophy operating in the same military structure, where they practically invited media and in the end inflated their own role, just because they were good at the art. And that produced another distortion. I think we can all agree that what the media wants is undistorted coverage, unbiased coverage. If we don't get that, then we might as well not even take up this discussion. And to get that, we really have a lot of work to do.

It was amazing to me, when I went back to analyze it for the book, how quickly the TV people and photo people settled their own hash internally. They each elected a pope. The

television people often do this. They regularly get into a situation where there are eight networks that want to get into a courthouse and only one can go in, so they pool it, and have done it for years.

In the case of the TV pool, they took a guy out of—I believe it was—the ABC hierarchy, and he was the pope. Whatever he said went. And they made sure they filled every slot in the field. The military had no say. There weren't any patsy reporters out there for the TV networks chosen by generals.

We in print have rarely gotten into situations where we can't all fit into the door, and we're not used to thinking about pools or setting up impartial referees.

It boggles my mind on the print side, however, to think of us electing a pope. I can just hear the bureau chiefs going into the 43rd day of that debate. But maybe that's a solution we ought to consider.

People think less of the press than they used to and I think we play into their hands when we have situations like you had in Riyadh, when you had reporters literally clamoring for secret information that would have hurt our own troops, had it come out. And then for us all to get lampooned on *Saturday Night Live*. It just really made me feel sad, because they didn't reflect us. They reflected part of us.

But there were a lot of us out in the field who had been walked through the plan, invasion plan, and we never leaked. That also happened in Vietnam. It happened in World Wars I and II. When it comes down to it, we're as patriotic as anybody else, especially when it comes to not impairing our own military. But you don't hear that side of it.

In the Gulf, you had a big access problem because nobody wanted to be the first general to get a reporter killed or a TV person killed or a photographer killed. To the print people, it wasn't as big a problem as it was to the photo and the TV people, because they really have to see, get up right in front to get the bang-bang.

I think the military is probably more attuned to exposing reporters, exposing news people to dangers than they were before. When it comes right down to it, it's a really hard decision for a general, a brigadier, or a colonel. And I empathize with them, because in their own way, they're trying to protect me. And I need to be protected out there to some extent. On the other hand, if I'm a photographer and I can't get out to where the tank battle is and the war is about tank battles, then I haven't delivered.

There are simply going to be times in this kind of war, which emphasizes stealth, rapid maneuver, lots of stuff at night and surprise, where there won't be any pictures. I think we have to treat that as a given. Even with nighttime photography and everything. The doctrine is going to drive the war, and the doctrine is just what I described, and it means there will be fewer opportunities no matter what we do.

I think we have to sensitize the military to the fact that they need a documentation of the war other than their own. Some photo people will have to take the risk. We're willing to take the risk—except the military doesn't believe it, because they see how stupid we are. We had people running around in designer chemical outfits.

Other than the access problem, the military, especially the Army, decided to set up another censorship point. And that's what gummed up the works. That slowed down all the copy coming out of the Army side of that effort and that, of course, was the main story of the war. This was just the military screwing up. Again, they lied to us about that. So we had people sending copy from the front lines, assuming it would get back the next day, as they promised. Some of this stuff didn't get back for weeks.

■

I like the idea [of training]. I think you have to do it in large enough numbers, that it will offset the fact that, when the balloon goes up, everybody sends their guy to the Pentagon. You have to have more people than that. And you have to do it systematically every year. It ought to get people to the point where they understand what the military has to do in a situation— what it's capable of doing—and then what it did.

■

My feeling is, the military won't buy elimination of field censorship because that cell-phone leaves a signature. If anybody with satellite capability can see that cell-phone beam up, and if we're operating under stealth and surprise—as we probably will be in future wars—that takes the surprise away. The military will never stand for that, because that gets them targeted and killed. So I think we're going to have to try to see, at least try to understand, their side of that question.

The fact is, a lot of nations are about to get satellite capability. If there's somebody looking for an infrared signature where there's not supposed to be one—and there *will* be in a future serious war—the guy who turns on his phone to call in some feature story about

'People think less of the press than they used to ....'

John Fialka

what's in the first-aid kit at Battalion One might get Battalion One destroyed.

Do we want to do that? No. Do we understand that? No. Is the military probably right on that one? I think so. I think there probably has to be some mechanism, some censorship mechanism in place, so we don't inadvertently kill troops or cause a military disaster. If we caused the loss of a major war, the future of this whole problem of what we're talking about—access and press coverage in general—will be gone. In time of war, look at the polls. Does the public side with us on these issues? Not at all.

■

The field is full of feckless romantics. You saw it out in the field in the four-wheel-drive school of journalism, where they said, "We're just going to drive around on the battlefield and cover this war, and nobody is going to hurt us, and all the units will welcome us." Those people were fools.

'The field is full of feckless romantics.'

John Fialka

If you asked the ones who did it what they got, they'll say, "Almost nothing." They saw a lot of booms and bangs and they got shot at, some of us. But did they know what it meant? Could they put it together? They couldn't even begin. Did they risk their lives? You bet. Is there a liability question attached to that? There ought to be. Do you endanger units? Yeah. If you're driving around with your headlights on and you happen to find the First Marine Brigade out there, they're going to shoot you. If they shoot you, they've probably exposed their position.

The four-wheel-drive school of journalism was largely fueled by people who really had no clue what they were getting into. If you go into a chemical-warfare situation in a Jeep four-wheel-drive, you think you're going to survive? Just begin to think of the things you don't have. You don't have a monitor that tells you when the chemicals arrive. Maybe you do have your designer suit. But if you don't put it on—if you don't know when to put it on—you're dead. If it's nerve gas, you're dead in a few minutes. Maybe in a minute. If you don't know when the chemicals have stopped, you don't know when to take your mask off. Canisters have a definite duration. If you don't know what mines are—most people don't—you're going to blow up. Do you want all those things to happen? Is this romance? Going into the face of that and thinking you're going to get a story? Yeah. Who does it benefit? I don't think anybody.

■

That's why you've got to get the editors out to Fort Irwin and make them put on a chem suit. And get them in a real exercise, where they're dead if they don't do something right. They really ought to endure some of that, so they can see what the threat is that they're sending their reporters out to cover. The first rule ought to be, it's not in your interest if you're sending your reporter out to get killed. Not to mention the lawyer who may come back and sue you because you're a fool.

The reporter who writes a good story is the one who survives. That should be blazoned into the editors' minds, that you've got to put somebody out there who's going survive and get the story and get near the story. You begin with some kind of training that shows you what it is you're going to cover, what the lethalities are, where you should be, what the opposition is going to be, what the military thinks, how the military thinks, what it wants to do. You should at least be able to anticipate all those questions.

Everybody sent fire-people out to Haiti. Fortunately, there was no war or we would have had a bit of a repeat of the Gulf, because we had a lot of instant experts running around.

All of that said, I do believe that their doctrine has changed. The Army is much more receptive now to the press than I can ever remember. I just came back from Haiti. When I was with Special Forces, there wasn't anything I couldn't do.

MARLIN FITZWATER

FORMER WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
DEC. 2, 1994

The idea that President Bush tried to control press coverage of the Persian Gulf War is baloney, if only because it never came to him. I doubt if the president was ever even asked to address an information question—at least not by me and I don't think by Cheney.

I talked to Pete Williams on the phone about it, but we didn't go into any details. He generally outlined the plan, so I was sure that they had one.

I asked him what were the pool arrangements, and he just orally went through it with me. He also may have sent some piece of pa-

per over. But that oral briefing was all I really needed. It sounded to me like Pete had a good plan, and that was pretty much it.

■

I think it's good to meet with the media in advance of military actions if the operational aspects allow it. A big part of it depends upon whether or not you need surprise, and how tight your operational security has to be in the first few days. However, if you require any operational security, in today's age, you can't do it. You simply cannot trust the press to hold a military secret the way they did in World War II. For example, when we alerted the Panama invasion pool, the *Time* correspondent told several people at the office Christmas party. So much for confidential notifications.

The press today is, first of all, so much larger. When we say "the press," we're not talking about a monolithic source. There are just so many different media organs today, some of which have higher ethics than others, some of which have different standards for military operations than others, and so forth. If you're just talking about mainstream publications like *The Milwaukee Journal, The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, it might be all right. Or even the networks.

But the truth is, I think the media relationship with government today is such that you couldn't trust the networks. They're too big and too competitive, and there are too many.

I trace it back to satellites and computer technology. Basically, when satellites and computers became prevalent in the '80s, it spawned an enormous growth in journalism. The daily White House press corps went from 30 reporters to 100 reporters. But more important are the outlets. Tabloid journalism and satellite television—500 cable channels—have forced a personal kind of reporting by print media, and have forced a more intense competition. More cable channels meant more time to fill. Talk and magazine shows proliferate. Print journalism becomes more personal, in order to compete with television. All of this results in a more intense competition for information than ever before.

■

I always had a rule in dealing with the press that you can't ask a reporter not to be a reporter in any situation. It just can't happen. And I think that applies to military operations as well. In today's world, you just can't ask the media not to report. It just won't happen. In the Reagan/Bush years, we asked the news media for a delay in publication of certain stories. But it never worked.

You can build relationships with individuals. But even individuals you trust will come under incredible pressures, and maybe they can withstand them and maybe they can't. I could draw you a lot of scenarios where you could take one reporter into your trust that you've worked with and known a long time, and it comes down to the last minute, and you've got editors and publishers and everybody else asking this guy what's going on. And it just gets out.

The real question is: Is it worth it for government officials to worry about military information if it violates national security concerns? If you're in the government and if you operate on the principle of the public's right to know, is it worth it to maybe compromise the mission against, let's say, 24 hours in the public's right to know? It always comes down to a time question. It's not a question of hiding information forever. That almost never happens. All you're really talking about is: Does the media know now or do they know tomorrow? And when you focus on it that way, it's a much easier decision for government to make, in the sense of not worrying about the public's right to know as being some horrible moral question, because you know they're going to know very soon.

Leaks are always a problem, and it is largely a myth that secrets can be kept. On the other hand, secrecy was maintained in the first bombing in Desert Storm and the air drops in Panama. In Panama, the aftermath studies showed that Noriega or others knew about it a couple hours in advance, something like that. But that's not enough to react. If you're within hours, that's the definition of military surprise. Similarly in Desert Storm, they knew within a day or two. But it held pretty well.

■

My preference is for open press during military operations, to just let people go with the cooperation of the military. But the real question always comes down, not to cooperation, but to protection. The military doesn't resent cooperating, they resent protecting. What they have trouble with is, when you tell the press they can go anywhere and then the press goes and starts asking for protection. In cases like Bob Simon going into Iraq, government has a real dilemma. If it weren't for the idea that he'd be captured and we'd have to live with CBS News on our back every minute of the day, you wouldn't really care if the whole press corps took out across the desert. If they want to risk their own lives and their organization wants them to do it, I think that's fine.

'When we say "the press," we're not talking about a monolithic source.'

Marlin Fitswater

But what the military resents is when they have to take care of them or have to worry about them afterwards if they become hostages and a part of the game.

That's why the pools are useful. If you get agreement on a pool situation, then you get some kind of assurance from the military that they will provide protection as well as access.

This is the crux of any pool situation. And it's the biggest problem anybody faces in government in dealing with the press—trying to structure pools. In fact, in my 10 years in the White House, it's the single most frustrating problem that I ever had.

In pools, the question is who gets in and who doesn't, which is why every press secretary would like to have every White House event in the Rose Garden or the South Lawn. Then you can just say, "Everybody goes." Nobody wants to have pools. They're just a total pain in the butt in government. And it all goes to the central question of: How do you decide who goes?

'I think you have to insure some kind of media diversity in pools.'

Marlin Fitzwater

It's been my experience that the press can never decide for themselves. You can't leave it to them. They're not only not monolithic, they cannot make a decision for each other, under any circumstance. It doesn't matter how big or how small the decision is.

So it has to be an outside source. Then the question is, are you better off, in a military situation, with the White House or the military? I don't think the White House has time to fool with it. I think it has to be the military. First of all, the White House doesn't have enough people. The press staff and the communications staff is still only going to be a dozen people, probably. And they've got enough things to do and worry about in a war situation of any kind. They just can't do it.

The way I always looked at it was: The military pool situation is a negotiating process. You never try to make rules that last. You make rules and then you negotiate for the rest of the war, because everybody complains and you just have to get a few patient people who are willing to adjust and change, live with it, whatever, throughout the process. The military has enough people to do that, but if you tied up even two or three of the top White House staff arguing about pool assignments on even a weekly or monthly basis—let alone a daily basis—you wouldn't get anything done.

Any time you have to limit in any way—whether it's numbers of people or where they can go, or how they go, any limitation at all—you get into what I call a continuous negotiation.

■

I think you have to insure some kind of media diversity in pools. My reasoning goes to the principle of why you're doing this in the first place. In the ultimate selection process, if you say the government has the right to say who goes in the pools, and you set up some kind of criterion that says the biggest go, or the most important go, or the richest go, or whatever—then you have failed. The principle that says you have to take the press in, or you want to take the press in, has to be evenly applied to the point of trying to represent the universe of the media in some kind of diversified way.

From a government standpoint, it's the principle of democracy that leads you to accommodate the press in the first place. Government people don't spend too much time worrying about the quality of reporters or news organizations. What they're motivated by is the idea that the Constitution says that there's freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, and the public has the right to know what's going on in their government.

Therefore, it doesn't really matter much to us whether it's *The New York Times* or *The Bond Buyer* that's in there, as long as there's somebody who's representing the public. The more democratic it is, the more you in government feel like you're responding to that basic constitutional mandate.

■

A lack of military expertise may be a problem, but government has to learn to live with it because it's always going to be that way. I don't think in modern journalism there's ever going to be a reporter who lives his whole life reporting the military. If he does, he becomes suspect by his own organization.

The news-media mentality is, if somebody's with the organization too long, they're corrupt. That's 100 degrees at odds from the military, who say they want a reporter that's been covering for 30 years and understands them. What that means to the newspaperman is the military wants somebody who's corruptible.

So it seems to me that the ethics of journalism, as well as just the management mentality of journalism today, is leading away from ever going back towards the specialist who stays forever in one field. In fairness, that's not necessarily bad. Journalists can cover the military without having great experience and having been there for years. In fact, most of the people in the White House who are directing the military haven't had long years of military experience, either.

Most of the military who make those complaints are really saying the journalists don't see it their way. But their way is not always the best way. That's why we have civilian control of the military. So I tend to discount those complaints by the military.

The reason the press hasn't started legal challenges is because it doesn't pay for them to sue to ask you to do something that they refuse to do themselves in the first place. That's why I say the best you can ever do is work up a reasonable and sensible negotiating process.

I would have welcomed [the involvement of foundations] as press secretary. In the White House, in the 10 years I was there, the only person I had to negotiate with was the president of the White House Correspondents Association. And they are notoriously weak. In my experience, Johanna Neuman was the only one in 10 years who had the balls to ever make a decision or speak for the correspondents. But personalities aside, there isn't anybody to really negotiate with because no one will ever say they speak for the press corps. So you can never make a deal with anybody that will hold. And even if you make a deal with the president of the correspondents' association, and one of the networks says, "To hell with that, I'm not going to do it," that's it. It's dead.

So the trick is, not only to devise some kind of negotiating organization, but to give it the power to make a decision that will last. Basically, you have to assume that they can't, that you can never devise a media organization that can actually make decisions for the media. But I think it's probably worthwhile to consider some kind of organization that can at least state their views and negotiate with the government.

The problem is, because the media can never negotiate for itself, or represent itself, they don't have any real power. So when a press secretary goes into a meeting with journalists who are complaining about pools, or whatever, he knows up front that he has all the power—mainly because, no matter what rule is made, all the press won't agree with it.

If they were like a union, it would be one thing. But they want the press secretary to make the decision. They don't want to make it themselves. So if you accept that—and I think you probably have to—then the question is, how can you build a quality negotiating apparatus that has real meaning?

EDWARD M. FOUHY

DIRECTOR
PEW CENTER FOR CIVIC JOURNALISM
DEC. 27, 1994


Focused Images

I don't want to reinvent the wheel. But I was a first lieutenant in the Marine Corps in Lebanon, and the news media had total access to us. We had no restrictions. As far as I know, the news media had total, free access to everything we did. I ran a patrol up at Damascus Highway every day, and I had newsmen with me almost every day.

I had no policy guidance. And I'm just a first lieutenant, commanding an infantry platoon. But nobody said, "Say this or don't say that," you know. Everything seemed to go okay.

Fast forward: I'm the bureau chief for CBS in Saigon in the late '60's. Barry Zorthian is the key guy. We had our problems but, for the most part, we could go wherever we wanted, within the range of our own courage. Every once in awhile, you got in a little more action than you anticipated, but that was part of the game.

That's where I got to know General Sidle. He came in from the field, and he was, in effect, the Army's public relations officer, although Zorthian was his boss, as the civilian.

You've got to remember that the press corps was international—not all Americans, by any means. In fact, many of them were Vietnamese. Many of the people working in the CBS bureau were Vietnamese. Was there a Viet Cong operative in there? I don't think so, but I don't really know. It was not important. We never knew any operational secrets.

The Army could not have been more cooperative. They would send around a guy, who would say, "There's going to be an operation tomorrow morning. You ought to have a guy and a crew out at the helicopter pad at Ton Son Nhut about 5:30 in the morning. You'll probably get a pretty decent story." Okay. It was that easy.

We also had a press card, and we had signed a statement that we would comply with certain conditions in order to maintain that card. You couldn't go anyplace without the card. You couldn't go to the PX. You couldn't go to the briefings. You couldn't go get a drink in an officers' club. So that card was very important

'... A press secretary ... knows up front that he has all the power—mainly because, no matter what rule is made, all the press won't agree with it.'

Marlin Fitzwater

to you. Only a small number of those cards were ever lifted.

■

I think Walt Boomer comes out as a big hero in the Gulf War in what was essentially an operation that was secondary to the left hook. He was a sophisticated guy, had been here in Washington and had seen how the press worked. And he said, "Anybody that wants to come with me, come on."

General officers, flag officers who think in sophisticated terms—as McCaffrey does, as I know Boomer does—are guys who are well educated, who have thought a lot about not just tactics on the battlefield, but how the military fits into a democratic society. They know it's different from an authoritarian society, and what the values are that they are fighting for. These guys are very forward-thinking people.

'... Military people think newsmen are all out to undermine the values of democracy.'

Ed Fouhy

Unfortunately, because of stereotypes, the press thinks all military guys have been swinging on trees and have room-temperature IQs. And the military people think newsmen are all out to undermine the values of democracy. Unfortunately, in some cases, they're right. And sometimes the newsmen are right.

It is true that Walt Boomer said, "You will cooperate with the press." And they all said, "Aye aye, sir," and saluted, and did as he said. But I'm not at all sure that they've been imbued with that attitude. When I go to the Marine Corps University, as I do every spring, I barely get out of there alive, because the junior officers share deeply the belief that all journalists are anti-democratic and anti-military.

What bothers me so much about the Pentagon attitude is that it's transient. Ken Pease, who is the best public affairs man I've met in Washington, is going to retire. I don't know who is going to replace Ken Pease, but I hope he's as sophisticated as Ken is. Maybe he will be; maybe he won't be.

■

One thing you might recommend is getting the journalism schools to do more than they do on this subject. I don't know if you'd have any luck with that, because the academic environment is quite hostile to both the press and the military. But that's worth an attempt. Another thing that's very important is to find a way to persuade the people who run the key journalism fellowship programs—like the Nieman—to give the military guys a crack at talking to the fellows, because those are all key journalism leaders of the future.

There are other ways to reach key journalists. But I think you have to start with the young people. Teaching kids who are going into journalism, who are never going to wear a uniform, a little bit about how the military works would go a long way toward at least opening their minds to the fact that that all military officers aren't authoritarian jerks.

What I'm concerned about is the military using the media to send misleading messages to whoever the dictator *du jour* is that we're fighting with as part of the military's propaganda war. There's such an overwhelming temptation to give the enemy disinformation in wartime that it will affect their decision-making. We already see the police doing it in hostage situations now. And I can't believe that somebody in the military won't do it and set back all our efforts.

JERRY W. FRIEDHEIM

FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DEC. 1, 1994

Neither the military nor the media side ever gets the relationship fully solved. So they both need to relax and not worry about getting to the final solution, because if either side insists on the final solution, you have a reason not to do it. It's a constitutional balancing of responsibilities. So if they don't get there, it shouldn't surprise us.

Either side can reason to make this too hard. And if it's too hard, you just don't do it. You can say, "Oh, my God, there are 625 correspondents in Barbados. How can I possibly handle 625? We're going tomorrow without anybody," which is basically what they said.

One of the smartest people I ever met in my life wrote a long newspaper column after Desert Storm was all over, and just tore apart everything that had been done. Of all the people who should know, he should have known we did the best we could do. At least he should give us the benefit of the doubt. But he didn't. So he said, "It's too damn hard. We're not going to do it anymore."

The military guys could have insisted that Grenada be done right, but the White House didn't give a hoot at that point.

On the military side, planning and lessons learned are built into the institution. They have a complete capability to plan, if the system doesn't short-circuit their planning. On the other hand, they can't expect the same

thing from the media's side, which does not have, anywhere, a built-in system of planning. The media cannot speak with one voice. There are certain things that the press cannot bring to the party.

Yet, imperfect vehicle that it is, the national media pool still was developed between the Washington bureau chiefs and the government. At least that's there, and those bureau chiefs can do some things. But the government guys need to realize that the press can never guarantee total unanimity. So it's the government's responsibility to make it work.

The planning of the Haiti thing was very promising. But everybody has to remember that it was not an opposed landing. It was probably not going to be a big problem. It was not the same as Desert Storm or something else. But they did think about it in advance.

The only way that I found to really articulate it to a military audience, that seemed to work most of the time, was to say: "It's a part of your job to figure out how to make this work, just the same as any other piece of your operation. The commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan did not have this problem. All he had to do was fight the battle. What you're going to have, as a commander at any level, is dealing with the press, which means you're dealing with the public, which means that's the difference between us and every other society in the world. So, okay, that's a part of the job. And if you think of it as a part of the job, then within that system which teaches itself to solve problems, you can figure out a way to address this."

■

In an institution without a single voice, the Washington bureau chiefs seem to be best positioned to work back and forth, day to day, on all these details. Maybe there is a way to begin to institutionalize that contact, so someone convenes or lets the hall be used for these two institutions to meet in some semi-regular sort of way.

There are only a few places where the stakes for this society are as high as this. I mean, if this one goes wrong, then there is dire damage to the institutions of this society. If it gets screwed up by the State Department or screwed up by Defense, the commander in chief is in trouble, and this society has got a problem.

So there is a reason to argue that this does require attention. If it's allowed to go wrong—if both sides would just ignore this for 10 years, and all of the present institutional memory were lost—you'd be riding for a secret war.

The chairman and the secretary of defense are important. They have to believe that doing this right serves the commander in chief, and they have to believe it enough that they will go to the commander in chief and say, "We have a plan that includes this, this, this, and this, and, oh, by the way, it includes handling the press. And we have a long history of knowing how to do this. It's in your best interest."

If they don't have that, and they go to the White House staff and say, "What do you want us to do about the press?" it won't work. And who is not served by that? Everybody is not. But for the White House's purposes, they have just hung their commander in chief out on a limb for nothing but trouble.

I would do it with the Washington bureau chiefs. I'd include both print and broadcast. And I would do it regularly. We'd know each other real well. And when another assistant secretary or chairman comes in, they would get to do it all over again.

You'd discuss all these things with the bureau chiefs in excruciating minor detail—frequency of radios, all that kind of stuff. Then the people with the responsibility inside the government would make the plan, and the press would ask to have it fine-tuned. The government would have an after-action report to show things that could have been done better.

■

And then access occurs. It's all about access. It's not about instant coverage. What the press wants is access, so that in the long pull the public has confidence in what the military services did and didn't do. If that means some of it waits until someone writes a book, that will never satisfy a bureau chief, who will not ever be able to say that that satisfies him because it does not satisfy his corporate imperatives.

But it is better for the public that, eventually, that book gets written, or the reporter comes back and eventually gets to write about what his division was doing, even though he might not have been happy on the first three days when his dispatches didn't get back.

It is unwise for either institution to take their marbles and go home. This is not a solution. In the end, it doesn't solve anything. If three bureau chiefs say it didn't work and they're never going to talk to the military again, how long is that going to last when the action occurs? Something has to tell both sides that, over a long history, it is a continual set of contentions and accommodations, and solutions, and that neither side can push the other one off the field, and neither can you withdraw from the field.

'What the press wants is access, so that in the long pull the public has confidence in what the military services did and didn't do.'

Jerry Friedheim

It would be good if somebody could convene them, as a part of an ongoing program—The Freedom Forum, Knight Foundation, whatever. It could be a place where that permanent connection between the institutions could be institutionalized. It should be small. It should include current people, it should include some people who have a history of it, and they should meet regularly.

The Joint Staff and the chairman, as well as the secretary, should insist on a public affairs plan. With Laird, we always had the public affairs plan or paragraph, even if that paragraph said it was a highly classified intelligence mission. Even if all it said was to say "no comment," it had to have a public affairs planning. And I have told every succeeding secretary of defense that lesson. Some of them have understood, and some of them haven't understood.

Laird thought—and I see a lot of this in Perry—that it could be a plus, that it was not necessarily total evil, or always a negative. He thought to use it to the advantage of himself and his commander in chief, and most times he did.

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'The last thing the military wants, as an institution, is a secret war.'

Jerry Friedheim

Nobody has an excuse for not doing something, because the stakes are so high. You must cope with this. You have to think about it. You've got to figure out what's the best thing to do. And if it's only sending an AP reporter and an AP photographer, that's better than not sending anybody.

If you don't do it ... And they came real close in the buildup to Desert Storm, when the Saudis said, "Nobody can come into our country, and we won't issue any visas for any reporters." The State Department wishy-washed around, and they came close to a secret war.

The last thing the military wants, as an institution, is a secret war. You want the public to know, most importantly, what you're not doing in those circumstances, particularly if you've got a volunteer force.

I don't like the national pool. It's imperfect. But it does establish that there can be a pool. And it does establish that access should occur on both sides. And that it needs to get reinforced. That makes it possible to do. The chore here is to make this thing possible for reasonable professionals turning over, over the years, to make it happen to the benefit of everyone.

On the question of who should determine who goes, the practical answer is that the government has to do that. But it also has to understand that a certain diversity is in everybody's best interests.

People shouldn't reject out of hand some semblance of accreditation of some kind. Everybody harks back to Vietnam accreditation, which said, "Bring us a letter that says you work for somebody, and we'll accredit you."

There could be agreement that there needs to be a trained cadre of people. But you have to find some vehicle by which you control this numbers question, without sounding too arbitrary and saying that, really, "We're going to give everybody a test. And if you can pass the test, then you can come."

The odds are that the press side is never going to agree to that, in advance. But Boccardi will know who he wants to send. And Walt Mears will know which of his people are the best ones to send. And he probably wouldn't be adverse to sending some person for training, from time to time. You can't do it for the whole world, though.

BRADLEY GRAHAM

REPORTER
THE WASHINGTON POST
NOV. 28, 1994

I had a very unusual experience in covering the Haiti intervention in the first week. I had come to know General Hugh Shelton, who was the commander of the operation, and he invited me down with him.

So I was on the *Mount Whitney*, the command ship, that weekend when the operation unfolded. I was sitting with him and Gen. Mead, who was the head of the 10th Mountain, Adm. Jay Johnson, who was a deputy task force commander, and a bunch of other senior people who were that Sunday trying to figure out whether they were going to invade or go in some other way.

They did have CNN turned on and were, throughout that whole afternoon, watching to see how the negotiations were going between the Carter-Nunn-Powell group and the Haitian leadership to get as current a sense as they could of what kind of operation they would be directed to take. They didn't know, the White House didn't know, nobody knew how this thing was going to unfold. So they were planning to do it two or three different ways all through the afternoon and early evening until it finally became clear that Carter-Nunn-Powell had a deal and that they would not have to go in with guns blazing, but that they'd still

have to go in very quickly at first light the next day.

The general ground rules for all of us who were deployed early was that we were part of the pool. We had to wait until the pool filed and was disbanded before we could file. All the unilaterals, as they're called by the Pentagon, had to agree to that. But beyond that, there weren't any stipulated ground rules.

It was really a remarkable set-up, and I think it owes a lot to the understanding and relationship that I had with Gen. Shelton. He felt confident enough to open up the operation to me and to a photographer/reporting team from *Life* magazine that had similar access.

All the pool and a number of the unilaterals who were deployed were privy to the war plans. In entering sort of a cocoon the day before, we were all briefed on the plans. And we had the understanding we couldn't file anything until after the thing got executed and until after the pool had filed. Then everybody else could file whenever they wanted to. That sounded pretty reasonable.

Where the discretion came in was afterwards, in the initial days of the operation—Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday—after the intervention started. I continued to witness some of the briefings and deliberations of the top planners and commanders. Things were still kind of dicey, so I felt I had to exercise some judgment about what to print and what not to print to avoid endangering the lives of U.S. soldiers. It was a very fluid situation.

Sometimes I would be out all day traveling around with Shelton. I'd come back, write my story and then have to file it quickly. I dictated by phone from the computer screen. I'm not quite sure how you would set up a system where you'd have somebody reading over copy to make sure that there wasn't anything being sent that would compromise security.

I was extremely satisfied with the set-up, although it created some tensions within the press corps on the ship. The *Life* magazine journalists and I were there under different arrangements than the unilaterals and even the couple of pool reporters. We were granted more access to Shelton and others. But if a commander decides he'd like to have a reporter or two along, for whatever reasons, it's bound to create problems for those who don't have that access. You either can make a blanket rule and say, "Okay, nobody should do that," but then you're denying the advantages that come to readers by at least having some journalistic witness.

Different public affairs officers were having trouble squaring our arrangement with the general rules for the pool. The argument was that, if a pool reporter was anywhere around, he or she should have the ultimate access, even over some unilateral who might have a relationship with the commanding officer involved.

I have trouble with that notion, because I think if a reporter or a group of reporters has a certain understanding with a military officer where they all feel comfortable working together, you have to be able to capitalize on that because it's so difficult to get to that point in this business. Just because a pool reporter comes in and says, "I'm a pool reporter," doesn't mean that he's going to have that rapport or whatever—that level of trust with the commander.

Yet we have a pool system that all the organizations have signed onto, because you can't have everybody there in tight quarters in the command post.

Shelton was definitely taking a chance, and he knew he was experimenting to a degree. I think there were more press per soldier out and among the troops at various points, poised to go in with various units, than was true in the Gulf.

There weren't any systems for reviewing our files. So Shelton knew they were going farther this time and really trying to advance the media/military relations. He told his commanders, "Look, we're doing this, so go along with us here." Of course, not everybody was as comfortable doing it. But there were a number of reasons, I think, that the military felt this was worth a try. In part it was because they learned some things from the Gulf experience and wanted to do it better. Also, they knew this operation was militarily not going to be as risky as something like the Gulf War. So they could take more of a chance with the media. By all accounts, it paid off for them.

■

What would have been different with intervention? Actually, the initial logistics were more complicated because there wasn't an intervention. They had a plan for moving all the press ashore the morning after the invasion, for holding a press conference and setting up a JIB. When the plan changed and they had to get other kinds of troops ashore in a hurry, it messed up some of the flow they had planned for the press. So some of the press ended up stranded on ships, or even in a staging area on one of the Bahamian islands and at Fort Bragg.

'All the pool and a number of the unilaterals who were deployed were privy to the war plans.'

Bradley Graham

That took several days for the military to straighten out. It became a headache for senior commanders who were getting phone calls from angry media-organization representatives saying, "Hey, you've had my correspondents stranded for two days!"

So, to some extent, the planning by people managing the media wasn't as thorough as it might have been, because they hadn't thought through what would happen if the plug were pulled on an invasion at the last minute, as it was. Nobody had completely foreseen this particular scenario in quite the way it developed. It took a little while to figure out what to do with all the media.

Overall, the set-up was very much to the liking of a lot of news organizations. There were some technical problems about filing facilities and also filing by the pool, because there wasn't an intervention. The idea was the pool would all get together on shore the morning of the operation and file their pool reports from some filing center. But that didn't happen, so you had these pool reporters spread out, and the embargo was dropped about 10:30 or 11 Sunday night. Some of them didn't know who to file to. The Pentagon is working on a system to enable reporters in a pool to file directly onto a computer network in the future, allowing all subscribing news organizations to tap in.

'... As a reporter riding around with a unit, you feel a lot of the same things that the soldiers you're with are feeling ....'

Bradley Graham

■

Obviously we won't get anything exactly like the Gulf War ever again. But there might be something similar, where it's a fairly big operation with an element of surprise. Do you think that the kind of thing that you experienced in Haiti would work there as well?

Yes, because in every case I've heard of where a commander has invited reporters along, the reporters have appreciated security concerns, with first regard for the lives of the troops they're with. What's more, they have tended to be even more conservative in their reporting because of these security concerns. It's a very interesting phenomenon. When you're placed in a situation like that, you err on the side of caution.

Certainly as a reporter riding around with a unit, you feel a lot of the same things that the soldiers you're with are feeling—from elation to fear—and that's bound to affect your coverage. But that's what you want. That's why you go to the effort of sending a reporter there, so that coverage can have some of that charge and emotion, as well as detail.

■

Should news organizations or the military determine where reporters go?

That's a very real issue. What happened to the pool in this case was they all got down to Fort Bragg on Saturday and then they got divided up. It was the military who assigned members of the pool to their respective ships and planes and units. Had the press done it themselves, they might have ended up with a somewhat more sensible division, where certain kinds of journalists would be in assignments more suited to their skills.

But the military just did the assigning randomly. On the other hand, you could argue that if you had left it up to the journalists to try decide, nothing would have gotten decided and you would have had a lot of little fights and bruised feelings. So the question is: Could we come up with a workable system? I don't know. I have some real questions about that.

BILL HEADLINE

WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF
CNN
OCT. 14, 1994


GEORGE BENNETT

My reaction to the independent coverage tier concept was lukewarm, and I guess I remain that way.

First, let me say that I have been a fan of the pool concept from its inception. It's not that I like pools— in fact, I hate them. But from doing them for close to 30 years, I know that many times they are necessary and that if they are well run they can serve the journalists, the institutions that cause them, and the public reasonably well.

In the case of Pentagon Pools (DOD National Pools and less formal ones, as well) the media/military relationship has been so fragile at times that I have felt that the pool gave us a way to cover important stories and a way to keep the dialog alive through the planning and postmortem phases. That is important.

My first concern over the tier concept is that the pool doesn't work all that well yet, and I don't want to see efforts to improve the pool sidetracked by planning for the next step.

The next problem that occurs to me is that, in general, the tier concept seems basically rigid when the variety of hostile-action situations calls for flexibility in planning and execu-

tion. We have had Pentagon pools that ranged from covering the reflagging of Kuwait tankers (open coverage not an option) to Panama, to Somalia, to the Gulf, to Gitmo, to Haiti.

In all but the Gulf, open coverage either existed in some form before the action or was not an option. It seems to me that in the Gulf, the military screwed up by either succumbing to pressure and allowing too many journalists to come into the area or by not beefing up the public affairs and logistical support operations to the point of being able to handle the crowd. Beyond that, I wonder what the likelihood of a repeat of the Gulf situation is. I suspect it is slim, but I fear that the tier concept is designed primarily to handle another Gulf.

On the question of logistical support, I am a cynic. Even on the little pools that have been deployed, one of the realities, I think in *every* case, has been that the logistical support counted on by the public affairs officers has not been provided by some of the operators. Until the field commands are convinced that the media support, pool or tier, is an important mission, I fear that the tiers may be left high and dry, or their tapes won't get back to the feed point, or they will experience all of the problems that the pools have experienced, multiplied by the larger numbers in the tiers.

I am not sure that the tier concept recognized the fact that the major news operations will want to be as self-sufficient as possible after a war gets started. We are willing to use military transportation if we have to, but we would rather operate our own fleet of boats, trucks, airplanes, etc. Obviously, there are limits. Our folks in Bosnia ride in our company-owned, armored Mercedes a lot more than they ride in UN vehicles.

If a tier plan is adopted, it has to have a great deal of inherent flexibility. Factors to consider: How big is the military operation? On whose soil is the base of operations and how friendly are they? How long do we think this operation is going to take? How "newsy" is it to the American public? How "newsy" is it to the rest of the world? How much of the rest of the world's press will be there? Is public opinion at home for or against the operation? How much coverage exists before the operation gets under way? What kind of an operation is it (ranging from a Delta Force-type of strike to knocking a couple of Libyan fighters out of the air to a repeat of the Gulf to another—God help us—Vietnam)?

On the question of trained journalists: I think the foundations may be able to provide a mechanism for some limited training, although just deciding what subject matter should be taught is daunting. But I think the variety of sentiments expressed on that question reflects the actual situation. Some organizations will *want* to send their food reporters, and in a free country with a free press, God love 'em.

As I mentioned, there are some pools in which the poolers are not required to share their stories [video, pool reports, etc.] with all members of the media. To share is a rule of the DOD National Media Pool. However, many pools operate on the basis that only those organizations present and denied access should be recipients of the pool material. In other situations, ad hoc rules are made up. For example, in Somalia the general rule has been that pool materials were shared with those who were on the ground in Mogadishu or Nairobi.

If you are going to set up a structure that gives priority to organizations that reach the largest number of people, there should be an accepted measure of circulation/audience reach. At least in broadcast, you can argue over these numbers 'til the cows come home and still not find agreement.

Please recognize that there has to be flexibility within a tier for replacement/maintenance/support people. Reporter X may have a death in his/her family, climatic conditions may require that a maintenance engineer has to come in to modify all of the cameras belonging to an organization, etc.

If a decision is made to bypass the National Media Pool and just send in tiers, then there is no pooling and only the tier members get first coverage. One of the purposes of the pool is to make sure that the whole world gets the benefit of the first coverage.

Finally, I don't think you want a foundation operating as an honest broker between the media and the military with respect to the tier operation. The military will have to devote extra time and assets in order to keep the foundation up to date; the foundation people may or may not understand the needs of the military and/or the media; foundation folks with a print bias are going to screw broadcast and vice versa; and, most important, none of the media folks is going to want to deal with the foundation at all. We are all going to take our cases directly to the military, whether or not there is a foundation in the mix.

I do not like to rain on other people's parades. I have served in and loved the military, and I have spent a lot of good years in broadcast journalism. I testified before the Sidle

'If a tier plan is adopted, it has to have a great deal of inherent flexibility.'

Bill Headline

Commission and have deployed more DOD pools than any other television bureau chief.

My gut tells me that the tier system has a number of potential gremlins. For the concept to work it needs to be closer to gremlin-free before it is introduced. But, again, for my money, the most important chore now is to keep improving the pool concept.

MELISSA HEALY

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT;
FORMER PENTAGON REPORTER
LOS ANGELES TIMES
DEC. 28, 1994

There are two things wrong. One of them you see every day in defense coverage, and the other you tend to see, in a really exaggerated form, in wartime. The thing you see every day is a cultural thing. It's a culture of conservatives and of careerism in the military that sees no potential advantage in talking to reporters, that truly sees no benefit to one's career.

'When there was a war, we really saw the faults of the system, structurally.'

Melissa Healy

I've always likened professional career military people's attitudes towards reporters as that of discovering an unexploded bomb. Their idea is: Back away, don't touch; call a public affairs officer immediately.

The point is, that you can find few, if any, career military people who can conceive that talking to a reporter not only is in the normal line of accountability and normal line of responsibility to taxpayers, but that it could possibly ever be of any benefit to them. They can only see the possibility that it could hurt their career. It's a deeply, deeply inbred attitude.

It seems ironic to me, that in an institution where people will fight and die alongside each other and with each other, nobody ever considers the possibility that maybe the institution will be improved by the coverage.

In wartime, you definitely see an exaggeration of that. You see young, career-minded professionals who have made the military a career. They are in combat situations, and they realize what's on the line from a career point of view. The Persian Gulf was a perfect example. You clearly saw a lot of people looking at the prospect of their war service and how it would affect their careers. And they sure as hell didn't want to screw it up.

From people not allowing enlisted people to talk to you, to folks being unwilling to talk to you themselves, to being unwilling to host a combat pool person, or being uncooperative, or not terribly inviting to that reporter, there again, I would say, part of this is a cultural thing.

■

The second part is a much more deeply structural thing. And that is what we really saw when the rubber hit the road. When there was a war, we really saw the faults of the system, structurally. And that is when the public affairs apparatus goes up through a normal chain of command, instead of a separate chain of command with the defense secretary. It's a real problem.

Every time you saw a group of reporters stranded for lack of transportation, every time you saw a colonel able to say, "Screw you, I can't talk to you," you saw the effects of people who only had to report to their commander.

Dick Cheney, at the top of the command, had made very clear that the press should be accommodated. But Cheney was way too far up the chain of command for these people. They had to answer to their senior officer tomorrow morning. They had to answer to the colonel at the end of the week. And nobody was going to take the risk of assigning a vehicle to a group of reporters, of accommodating a group of reporters with scarce resources, including information, when everybody understood that, within their chain of command, what came first were the military requirements, the battle requirements.

Let's say that, as a public affairs officer, you truly wanted to carry out the letter of Dick Cheney's command, and you truly wanted to accommodate the coverage of this war. Well that's very nice. But as a public affairs officer, you still had to report to the division commander—and well beneath that, as well. And that division commander sometimes had priorities different or, frequently, in conflict, with those of Dick Cheney.

We needed a military public affairs chief with not just horsepower, but some command over resources as well. I'm talking about helicopters and Jeeps and the like. That's really key. Remember, at the time that the war started there were several people who were just grounded for lack of helicopters. They were left behind.

■

I think reporters understand that they're pretty low down on the priority list. On the other hand, you've got to ask, "Who benefits by that?" I think the cultural predisposition against reporters needs to be worked on. But

so long as it exists, you need to have a structure that minimizes the impact of that cultural problem. And I believe the structure should have a public affairs general officer at the top who reports directly to the commander of the operation, and a chain of command within the civilian bureaucracy.

I would argue that the cultural problem that I talked about, the careerism, the conservatism, with regard to reporters, is only going to get far, far worse as the military continues to shrink, as competition becomes ever more fierce for promotions. You're going to see a zero tolerance for any mistakes, and people simply won't pass from captain to major if they were quoted in a newspaper as having said something that was not perceived as reflecting well on their unit. So, on that front, you are going to be fighting an uphill battle.

■

I think you see a lot of people with very little exposure to the military dip into military reporting—frequently with the notion of making their mark, winning their Pulitzer, whatever. News organizations need to make a commitment to military coverage. I know we are accustomed to moving people around very quickly, but there are a few organizations—the *L.A. Times* happens to be one of them—that really do tolerate reporters staying on a beat for an extended period. I know that benefited me.

We have FAA reporters who swing into action when there is an airline crash. And we know that wars are going to happen, and the U.S. military is going to be called into action at regular intervals. We need to have reporters who understand how the military works and who can be available.

As I recall the last version of the combat pool rules that I saw, there was a suggestion that news organizations who had committed a full-time person to the beat would have some priority. I really strongly support that. I don't think that the military can or should, as a matter of principle, bar people with little or no exposure to covering combat. But I think everybody has to recognize that there are limits to resources, and that there are only so many people who can go out. And let's face it: We have news services. People can pick up the L.A. Times News Service story.

But sometimes the non-defense reporters are important, too. During the Pentagon's Gulf War briefings, I sat next to a fellow by the name of Hamil Harris, who had come from, I think, a small paper in Baltimore called *The African-American*, and he was doing some stringing for lots and lots of organizations. He now works for *The Washington Post*.

Hamil had no exposure whatsoever to the Pentagon. And yet I was constantly surprised by the just plain good sense of many of his questions. They were questions that many of us who had covered the Pentagon for years forgot to ask. They were questions that maybe people out there were asking.

I think that's important. While it's very important to have a core of people who understand the assumptions of the military and the framework within which they think, it's also important to talk to the people out there—the people who pay their salaries. And it's important for them to recognize that fewer and fewer of those people have exposure to the military, and that—just like some of the reporters that cover them—they, too, ask questions that may be perceived as stupid.

Remember, the military is an extraordinary and a unique institution. But it should not assume, given the almost isolated lives its people live, that people understand the basic tenets of military logic. It's a different world, which has to be explained to regular people with little exposure to the military.

■

As a military correspondent, and especially as I've been on the beat longer and longer, I began to recognize that I was operating, for all practical purposes, as a foreign correspondent. I was dipping into a world with a language of its own, with a society of its own that, in every respect, paralleled U.S. civil society. But it paralleled it; it was not part of it. It was separate. It had its own justice system, its own retail system, its own health-care system. Everything was different. It's really important to have reporters who can be on the beat long enough to understand that, but who are of the world that doesn't have much exposure to the military.

It is important for people to understand that this is a different society. And sometimes the people who are best capable of understanding that, and of communicating that to people with little or no exposure to the military, are people who, themselves, have little or no exposure to the military, but who come in with care, sensitivity, thoughtfulness, and a real commitment, and learn the institution.

I feel a little bit of two minds on the stories on social problems. I spent many years on the defense beat covering hardware, covering wars, policy, arms control—the full range of what I considered to be the heart of defense policy. Then the last two years, I spent virtually the whole time on the shrinkage of the

'As a military correspondent ... I began to recognize that I was operating, for all practical purposes, as a foreign correspondent.'

Melissa Healy

military, its social problems—gays in the military, women in combat, sexual harassment, minorities, etc. And I came to believe that those were truly important stories. They truly enriched my understanding of the military.

FRED HOFFMAN

PENTAGON PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISER; FORMER AP DEFENSE CORRESPONDENT
DEC. 1, 1994

What I have found, consistently, is a mistrust of the press in the officer corps. It's not that they're going to intentionally betray the country or anything, but the feeling is pervasive, and has been throughout my career, that you can't trust news people to hold a confidence. You can't, for example, give them advance word on an operation. The military I've dealt with, all the way from four-star on down, stops short of being willing to do that.

'What I have found, consistently, is a mistrust of the press in the officer corps.'
Fred Hoffman

In earlier times it was different. My predecessor at the Pentagon was covering this place in World War II. He and a small group of reporters were brought in way in advance of the Doolittle raid. The whole thing was laid out for them. But they were told it was under a very strict hold. It was delayed several times by weather. Nothing ever leaked. Given the time in which this happened, this was an extraordinarily important event.

I had no difficulty, personally, because I had established a basis of trust covering this place for so many years. But the average reporter almost invariably would run into suspicion.

■

I have one idea that I tried to promote in the building, with no success whatsoever. I don't believe that an occasional media day at the War College does any good. In many cases, it probably does more harm than good because it ends up in this we-against-them sort of syndrome. I would like to see the services introduce into the curricula at the various professional development schools—as far down as you can—a block of instruction on what the press is all about, the press's tradition and its role in society. Even less lofty than that, it should include hands-on, face-to-face contact with newsmen on a fairly frequent basis, to learn how they work, why they do what they do, and what motivates them. This could be very important, right down to the base level, dealing with local reporters.

It has to be introduced on a sustained basis—not a lecture occasionally, and not a piece of paper that says, "You shall do thus and so." Every service resisted that idea, because they felt it took time away from other types of training.

■

Another observation I've had, over a few years, varies by service. But the Army, which often has needed the most help in the public affairs area, always has considered the public affairs officers to be second-rate officers. The queen of battle is the infantry, and the artillery and the armor. Culturally, institutionally, public affairs officers have been considered throwaways. They're not killers.

I know of one very good officer, a colonel, who had an excellent combat record in Vietnam. But after the war, he got into a public affairs billet. He worked for the assistant secretary of defense here, then was assigned to command a combat unit in Germany. He shows up. He does his introductory meeting with the brigade commander, who looks at him and says, "I've just been looking at your file. If I had known that you were a public affairs officer, I wouldn't have accepted you." This is the kind of atmosphere and attitude you have.

On the other hand, the Marine Corps had a great public affairs result because of Walt Boomer, the senior Marine commander in the Gulf, who had been a public affairs officer. He knew, regardless of what strictures were coming down from Washington or from Gen. Schwarzkopf, how to reach out, as he did, and hand-carry some reporters he knew, like Molly Moore. So the Marines got great coverage. All of the Army unit commanders I knew of afterward, from corps on down, were grumbling that they got terrible or nonexistent coverage. In my view, the Army leadership in Washington was at fault.

■

The jury is out until the next hot event. But Colin Powell's message was fine. It was exactly what should have been done. However, when we got to the Gulf, all those good intentions went out the window. Sometimes what's agreed to, painfully, in between hot situations seems to go into limbo when you get an actual situation.

The best information chief I've ever known, was Si Sidle, in Vietnam, at the most difficult time—during Tet. Sidle, uniquely, had a sense of what reporters needed. He also trusted re-

porters. And they trusted him. Si also had status with the killers, because he had been a World War II combat soldier. He was an artilleryman by trade. He was accepted on the general staff and by Westmoreland as a soldier—not just as a dressed-up public relations guy.

■

The degree to which you expect casualties is the underlying concern of the White House and the secretary of the defense. Apart from the human considerations are the political considerations. To the extent that you are going up against someplace where you might lose a lot of people, then, I think, that's when the pucker factor sets in. Haiti wasn't that way.

In the early stages of Desert Storm, it was badly handled. The purpose of the pool was not as a substitute for general coverage. It was to make sure that there was an American news presence at the beginning of an operation. When we went in with the first paratroopers, there was no Western news presence on the ground. A week later, they sent a pool in from here. It was pointless. By then the pool was no longer needed.

I see no reason, based on the demonstrated performance of the American press in wars—most recently in Vietnam—why reporters cannot be brought in, in advance, under a "thou shalt not tell" policy.

There are times, even after an operation is under way, where, for practical reasons, you might have to resort to pools or some form of them. But it's wrong to lay down a rule saying that's the only way we're going to cover this thing.

While the Navy was escorting Kuwaiti tankers, we had pool coverage because of the fact that just so many people could be accommodated on the ships. If you have time, as we did with our standing pool arrangements, you put the responsibility on the news organizations to determine who got to go. The TV people would decide their rotation for themselves. It was the same with the print, the wires, the radio. But if you have to do it under the pressure of events about to happen, you could probably justify the decision being made by the assistant secretary of defense or the commander.

The emphasis always needs to be that it is a pool, and they must share. What was difficult for me to get across to the pools was that they were a pool. They weren't acting for their own organizations. They weren't supposed to file and hold back from others.

You have to have an assistant secretary who has the balls to go to his secretary and say, "This is not the way to do it." In my opinion, Pete Williams just wasn't that strong and forceful a guy. I've known strong ASDs. Mike Burch was one. Jerry Friedheim was the best of the breed, without question.

■

The people who are now in the news business have never served in uniform. Otto Kreisher, I think, was a Navy pilot. That's about it. That was a problem in the Gulf. They had five months of the buildup before we got to the action, so there was an opportunity for the reporters to get an education, at least in the basics of what the military does.

It would help if a foundation could finance sabbaticals for reporters who are covering the military to spend extensive amounts of time living with the troops—a month, three months. But you're going to have to convince the military to do it, and you also would have a selling job to persuade the news organizations.

The Pentagon press corps now is disinterested. It's a poor press corps. The major newspapers ignore basic military news—important stuff that we used to write. They're only interested in things like Tailhook—what I call the ankle-biting stories.

■

To enforce voluntary ground rules, the penalty would be expulsion from the theater. And demonstrate that you'll do it. If somebody does violate basic ground rules—when I say basic, it means protection of the operation, protection of lives, not any of this stuff around the edges of it—you kick them out now, and not only do you kick them out but—because they can be replaced—you kick their organization out. But you've got to be hard-nosed. And the ground rules need to be kept simple and essential.

Field censorship won't work. It's getting to the point now where you can file by satellite with no intervening buffer. I can see the enormous problem there, and I don't see anything approaching an answer. Another colossal problem for the civilian and the military leadership is: How do you manage the numbers?

One thing I've found, time and time again, is that military officers would cite the safety of reporters as a reason to restrain them or deny access. But that is not the military's or the civilian leadership's responsibility. Reporters go in harm's way at their own risk, and that should not be either an excuse or a reason for restraining or denying access.

'The major newspapers ignore basic military news—important stuff that we used to write.'

Fred Hoffman

CLARK HOYT

VICE PRESIDENT FOR NEWS
KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWS SERVICE
MAR. 20, 1995

[*Hoyt served as ad hoc chairman of the bureau chiefs' group following Desert Storm.*]

The military learned that the service that was the most cooperative with the press got the best coverage and other services didn't. I think in the aftermath of the war, the Army in particular—which was very restrictive and didn't open its units sufficiently to coverage—didn't get a lot of coverage. In the postwar aftermath, legitimate exploits of the Army had essentially gone unrecorded. Trees fell in the forest and nobody heard, and I think it really bothered the services in retrospect.

■

'Trees fell in the forest and nobody heard....'

Clark Hoyt

On the news media's commitment to do some sort of training of reporters:

I'm sort of appalled when I realize that we haven't done anything.

■

Foundation support for training materials, maintaining institutional memory:

I think it has a lot of merit. I was under the impression that the McCormick Tribune Foundation was contemplating something to have a continuing dialogue. It hosted a two-day meeting at the McCormick estate outside Chicago. I'm unclear on whether there was any sustained follow-up. I'd be interested in knowing what happened.

Cooperative projects with foundations would be great. My sense is that one of the problems was, there was a fear of any single organization taking it over. People were uncomfortable getting a consortium of groups together. I don't know if the Knight Foundation would be interested in participating. Perhaps it is something ASNE should take on. I would like to see some folks breathe some life into this.

Right now it's all dormant, because we're not in a shooting war anywhere. The minute there's another—we all hope there won't be, but history says there's going to be another major military operation of some kind—all of these issues will come rushing to the fore again: the press's lack of preparedness, the military's closed and secret tendencies. And the clashes will start all over again.

COLONEL LARRY ICENOGLE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS TO THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
NOV. 30, 1994

We had a great run on the first Desert Shield pool. We checked every block.The pool did exactly what Si Sidle and his commission intended, in that we put journalists into an environment where there were no other journalists. They were the first ones there on the scene. We took them to every type unit we could, and they reported it, they shared it, and everyone all over the world got those stories. That's what the thing was designed to do.

■

Logistically and doctrinally and asset-wise, the Desert Shield pool was a real pain in the butt, because you're trying to be fair not just to the small core of people that make up the pool, but you're trying to be fair to everyone. The long and the short of it was, we learned a hard lesson. And that is that, whenever you have a pool, the shorter the duration of it, the better, unless it's for a specifically designed, narrowly defined mission, or unless it's for something where you really have to restrict the numbers.

But here we were, about to embark on this terrific offensive undertaking, and there was no way to get there. You couldn't get around, except under military escort. You couldn't get around to know where you were and not run the risk of compromising some sort of an operation.

Bob Prucha, a Navy captain who's now the public affairs chief down at CENTCOM in Tampa, worked with Pete Williams. Bob and his guys went over and they talked to the commanders, and they talked with the public affairs guys, and they talked with the JIB skippers. They are the ones who came up with this idea of the combat-media pool system, whereby you could put "X" number of pools with the various forces and types of units.

One of the reasons we got into the combat pool system was because of security. We were concerned about having just hundreds of reporters. There simply was no way—because of

the lack of transportation, concern over physical as well as operations security—to accommodate hundreds of journalists without covering the operation in some sort of a pooling concept. That was, at least in part, some of the thinking going in.

■

The real major problems came down to this: lack of access and a failure, on the part of the military establishment, to get the products back to Dhahran as expeditiously as possible. We tried. But we should have tried harder, in my view.

Access was a problem, because some commanders didn't want reporters. But you had some commanders, like Gen. [Barry R.] McCaffrey, who commanded the 24th, who not only had one of my pools, he also had Joe Galloway writing and filing independent stuff. That was because the 24th was Gen. Schwarzkopf's old outfit, and he sent Galloway, who was writing a book, I believe.

But Gen. McCaffrey did it the way it *can* and *should* be done. And that is, he put Galloway in his track and never let him out of his sight. He shared everything with Galloway. And he would say, "Okay, now, this is sensitive and this isn't." And Galloway is no dummy; he's an accomplished combat reporter. I mean, he filed tremendous stuff.

So America—for two weeks running, it was the cover of *U.S. News*—America thought that the 24th Mech. did it all. Meanwhile, in the First Cavalry Division, because their division commander, Gen. [John H.] Tilelli [Jr.], would not take reporters, there was no access to the First Cav. Ergo, all the family members back in Fort Hood, Texas, never heard a thing about the First Cav, because there was nobody covering the First Cav.

■

You'll hate this story: Mike Doubleday, now the EUCOM PAO, was Gen. Schwarzkopf's deputy PA. He was working the night shift in Riyadh. I had the night shift in Dhahran, on the east coast.

I'll never forget the night that Doubleday calls me, and he says, "Hey, are you aware that we've got the *Missouri* firing naval gunfire support for the first time since World War II?" And as he is saying that—I kid you not—I had this vision of a split screen. You remember the great nighttime Tomahawk shots we got off the *Wisconsin*?

Well, I had this vision of a split screen with "2 September '45" and Tokyo Bay with General McArthur on one side. And on the other side, here is the "Mighty Mo" blasting away. I could visualize this. And, of course, the skipper wouldn't take any press aboard. It was unreal.

■

The key to this whole thing all gets back to access, rapport, and relationship. It's not so much a matter of numbers; it's the numbers that are supportable.

One of the most positive things for us, on the public affairs side, that happened in Haiti was in the after-action review. We had the chairman saying things like, "Yes, it's really important that the public affairs planners and the operators are in bed together as early as possible." I don't know the last time a chairman would say something like that.

What we tried to do in the pool concept was fair, it was democratic, and it was a disaster. It was the embodiment of one man and one vote. That's what this country was built upon. The problem is, *The Milwaukee Journal* and *The New York Times* and the *L.A. Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*, and USA TODAY all have the same one vote. So if *The Milwaukee Journal* and the *Wichita Beacon* want to dump on the *L.A. Times*, by God, they can do it.

'What we tried to do in the pool concept was fair, it was democratic, and it was a disaster.'

Col. Larry Icenogle

So the long and the short of it is, you leave it to the JIB guys, leave it to the military establishment. Because if you come to me, I know you. I know what your capabilities are. You're number 47, but it doesn't make any difference. Forty-seven becomes number one, because I know what you can do for me. And I'm just going to do it. Hey, life ain't fair. What can I tell you? But I guarantee you this: The unit that I send that person to is going to be well covered, because I don't have to train him.

You can imagine how many requests I get every day and every week to interview the chairman. Well, you and I both know that if the *Punxatawny Daily* wants 30 minutes with the chairman, and USA TODAY wants 30 minutes interviewing the chairman, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that one man, one vote is not going to work. I know that USA TODAY is the largest-circulation paper there is. And, by the way, this reporter is talking color cover.

I don't want to sound so doctrinaire, but I'm not so sure there's all that much the press guys can do without us. I still think the burden of proof comes back to us, because the road to hell is paved with good intentions. You've heard me say this before. There wasn't a single bad story in Saudi Arabia. I was so proud to have been a part of that, because there were a zillion great stories.

You get a reporter out there in that environment, you've got to love it. You go to sea with these guys and you see what's going on out there, you get caught up in it. It was amazing how many charges of being "co-opted" were leveled amongst the journalists.

Most importantly, from our perspective, is how to interface and get the press and the media involved with our soldiers, to tell our story. The Army, as we draw down, is really going to have a tougher time than all of the other services to tell our story. I don't know why I feel that way, but I do.

STEVEN L. KATZ

FORMER COUNSEL TO THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
DECEMBER 1, 1994

'General Schwarzkopf pursued and ... succeeded in his primary agenda to win the public from the media.'

Steven Katz

[*Katz directed the Senate hearing, Feb. 20, 1991, concerning Pentagon rules on media coverage of the Persian Gulf War and authored 'Ground Zero: The Information War in the Persian Gulf,' which appeared in* Government Information Quarterly, *Vol. 9, No. 4, 1992.*]

Concerning the impact of the Pentagon's management structure in the public affairs area, on media coverage of combat:

There are two fundamental principles which need to be recognized and adhered to in this area. The most paramount is that the Pentagon's public affairs policy and programs must be civilian led, consistent with the United States government's tradition of civilian-led military. Next, as a related principle, the most senior manager and spokesperson for the military in the public affairs area should be an assistant secretary, and that individual should ensure that he or she—or another superior civilian official—has the title and the functional authority to be in charge. This is a cultural necessity at the Pentagon, where rank is a prerequisite to respect for priority status, the exercise of authority, and access to important officials and to information.

During the Persian Gulf War, President George Bush, together with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Pete Williams, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, surrendered civilian control of the Pentagon's public affairs to CENTCOM Army General Norman Schwarzkopf.

In addition, it appears that the position of assistant secretary for public affairs was eliminated by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and while restored by Secretary William Perry, the Senate had not confirmed President Clinton's nominee for the individual as of April 1995.

■

Regarding problems which arose concerning the military and the media, from the standpoint of both military preparedness and media preparedness:

Abandoning civilian control of the Pentagon's public affairs policy and programs fostered the pursuit of a military public affairs agenda. General Schwarzkopf pursued and, many would argue, succeeded in his primary agenda to win the public from the media. His attitude appeared to be born of the military's own mythology about the role of the media in the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam. This agenda supplanted even the Pentagon's own professional endeavors to develop a balanced and effective public affairs annex, as recommended by independent observers after the operations in Grenada and Panama. Public affairs annexes developed by the Joint Chiefs were ignored.

In addition, the Schwarzkopf agenda of winning the public from the media adopted severe restrictions on coverage of the media so as to prevent independent coverage and repeat the pool-coverage policy criticized in the after-action reports on Grenada and Panama. This extended to the failure—hopefully not intentional—to train or prepare military public affairs officers who were instructed through a *secret* order by General Schwarzkopf to "accompany news media representatives at all times."

The list of problems associated with the lack of appropriate civilian control of public affairs in the Gulf War included: a lack of an independent record of the events of the Persian Gulf War and failure to keep the Congress, as lawmakers, and the American people, as citizens and taxpayers, informed in a complete and timely manner. In addition, the restrictions on the media created a bottleneck of journalists at the "box office to the war," and heightened the tension between the military and the media. That led to the type of climate which the public is accustomed to seeing in countries governed by a military dictatorship and dealt a severe setback to the necessary levels of trust, respect, communication, and co-

operation necessary in military-media relations in the United States.

■

You cannot suspend democracy in the name of protecting and preserving it. Information and government accountability are fundamental to protecting and preserving our democracy.

MELVIN R. LAIRD

FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JAN. 26, 1995


RAY PAULSEN

The all-volunteer military service is getting along better with the press than they ever have. You can't ask for better understanding of the military than the press gives them now. They're getting great coverage. They got great coverage in Rwanda. They were in there with their purification plants faster than anybody. It was beautiful. Who else in the world could have done it? And they got great coverage, not only in this country, but in Europe and all over.

The United Nations passed a special resolution. In Haiti, also, I think the coverage the military got was terrific.

They got bad press during the Vietnam War. That was tough. But there was an unpopular draft from 1963 to 1969, and the war lasted too long. The public's patience wore very thin.

They got beautiful coverage in the Persian Gulf. If anybody didn't think the military came out of the Persian Gulf well, they don't understand what the press is all about.

The military likes to bitch about press coverage most of the time. But I'll tell you, they've gotten tremendous coverage. And if they keep bitching all the time, all they do is hurt themselves up in the Congress.

The Pentagon needs to get out and sell its stories. But they're not doing that. Look at the M-1 tank or the Abrams tank. Hell, the Army wanted 120 this year. They only got 80 in the 1996 budget. Now, some guys in the Army are ticked off because the Defense Department won't buy 120. But the Army did not do a good job of selling 120. If the Army wants to go out and sell 120, they have to sell the Defense Department, the Congress and the public about the need.

I've never had a problem with taking the press into my confidence. I took them into my confidence on our Vietnam troop withdrawals from time to time, even before the president announced them. I never had any problem with it. I had a whole chart laid out, which was confidential, that I showed to the press and I used to explain the withdrawals.

The military people all have their own agendas. They get tied up on this program or that system. But you've got to decide what you're going to promote and what you want your stories on, in advance. It's just like when you have a press conference down there in the Pentagon, you want to first set up what you want the stories to read like when you leave the room. Seriously, you've got to get your point of view across. That's why you go down to the pressroom. Sometimes you get your story across, and sometimes you fail.

I don't think the press is a problem. They are adversaries, and they should be adversaries. That's their role. But you don't want to turn them into antagonists. You want to keep them as adversaries. That's what they should be.

■

I think they're assets. I realized that, always, they were in an adversarial role, and that you had to be careful to get their confidence. You had to show you weren't misleading or lying to them. I think the media are assets, because I don't know how you tell your story any other way. And I think you can basically trust them. I've never been asked by the press to break a secret.

The tabloid press is no different. I was the only secretary of defense who has ever gone down to the *National Enquirer*. I spent a whole day with them. They are published down in Florida. They asked me to come down and meet with their editorial board. A lot of people around this town thought I was nuts. The White House couldn't believe that I was down there briefing the *National Enquirer.*

But you should have seen the way that meeting turned out. The *National Enquirer* became one of the greatest supporters that we had. And, as a matter of fact, I think you would have a better opportunity to do that today than we did. We were in a bloody damn war, and it was not easy having to report those casualties every morning. I was trying to withdraw trooops from Vietnam, end the draft and establish the all-volunteer service. The *National Enquirer* got the story and supported this program with banner headlines.

I had the press up for cocktails and dinner. I didn't overlook anybody. But I'd divide it into kind of different groups. The oldtimers, like [Fred] Hoffman, could come in anytime.

'The military likes to bitch about press coverage most of the time.'

Melvin Laird

I made one memorable mistake in my relations with the press. I was sent a piece of pipe that I was told was taken in one of those raids across the border in Laos. I used it to show that we had broken up this pipeline. But that particular piece of pipe was not taken on that day, and it was not taken out of Laos. It was taken by a special mission that we had going across the border every once in awhile over a period of several years. I had unknowingly misled the press. When I found out about it, I called a press conference the next day to apologize to them. I said, "I just got this information, and that piece of pipe I showed you yesterday was not true."

You're better off talking to the media in advance, for one reason: They'll go with the story as soon as they see the planes taking off if they're not taken there. You pick those, too, who are most apt to get some information about it and break the story, and you want to tie them up. You are playing a little bit of a game with them, too.

■

'... Basically, the press is patriotic, even though the military doesn't always have that view ....'

Melvin Laird

But some of the military hates the press. They just distrust the press 100 percent. You go and talk to one of the chiefs, or you talk to Schwarzkopf about the Gulf War and you hear criticisms about the press coverage. In Vietnam, Schwarzkopf as a colonel didn't even like the press going on maneuvers with him.

I think some of the military feel that the media are out to screw them. But they're not. They can be a help. When I dedicated the correspondents' corridor in the Pentagon, I made a speech about it. And we called all our public information officers from all the commands, had a meeting with them, and tried to impress upon them how important it was to do everything they could to tell what the Vietnamization program was all about. If we didn't sell Vietnamization, we wouldn't have a defense budget, because people were so fed up with the Vietnam War.

■

If you could do that tier system, it would be wonderful. But that has to be done in advance through the press. You can't do that when you're over there. I couldn't turn down anybody going over to Vietnam. The military always bitched at me about it. Westmoreland was the chief of staff of the Army, and he said, "You've got too many of them over there." But if you start turning them down, they accuse you of playing favorites. But you've got to have it ready to go. You can't do it when you've got an emergency.

The military should provide the communications, transportation and other assets for the press.

I think that there may be a few things, from time to time, that you should be able to ask the press not to report on. I am particularly concerned about some intelligence material that the press could run into, if you're in the midst of an operation. You sometimes have wiretaps and other covert operations going on, and you must be careful to protect the lives of our military men and women.

You've got to be careful about that, because you don't want the enemy to know that you've broken their codes or know about their other secret operations. And we're very good at that.

But I think that, basically, the press is patriotic, even though the military doesn't always have that view because some think they've been burned badly. They think that the press is the reason that we did not do well in Vietnam. They think that it was the press getting after Lyndon Johnson and driving him out of office. But it was Vietnam that did it. That was an unpopular war. I don't blame the press. I blame the way President Johnson handled it.

■

Les Aspin has a different view. He doesn't think you can ever trust the press because you can have 99 guys that you trust, but that one guy is going to screw you.

Well, I don't think that.

DAVID LAWSKY

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
REUTERS
APR. 28, 1995

[*Lawsky was a member of the DOD National Media Pool covering the military operation in Haiti.*]

You can't get somebody more skeptical than me. I came from an anti-war background. I marched against the Vietnam War because of the policy goals that were being pursued. That turned me against the instrument of those policies, which is the military.

What happened was, I watched people who do their jobs well. Even when it was obvious that they had policy differences with the administration, they were professional and did not let that get in their way. Working on Capi-

tol Hill, I had been used to watching politics interfere with a lot of things.

■

[Lawsky and other members of the DOD National Media Pool were called out in the early morning of Sept. 17. He reported to Andrews Air Force Base, outfitted and ready to go, unlike some other pool members. He had all his shots, and Reuters had provided all the clothing and equipment he needed.

At the "mother of all briefings" at Andrews Air Force Base, Lawsky recalled, a military officer who was to be identified as "a senior defense official," said: "I don't enjoy what I'm doing right now. I've got a big operation. This is something new. It's an experiment between us. It's a partnership we have formed."]

The pool was sanitized. We couldn't make phone calls. But the briefing allowed us to understand what was happening. He was forthcoming and cooperative. It was impressive. For the most part, it was that way all the way down the line.

■

[Lawsky and two other pool members eventually arrived on the USS *Nashville*, which carried U.S. Marines. They met the skipper, Capt. Thomas G. Otterbein.]

He was surprised. He didn't know we were coming, and he was surprised there was no PAO with us. But he went out of his way to accommodate us. When we got stuck, he was there for us, and he made sure his guys were there for us.

■

[An officer took Lawsky and the other pool members to the wardroom, where he was introduced to Marine Corps 1st Lt. Shane Tomko.]

He sort of stands there and glares at us. The officer says, "Hey, they're on the same side we are." Ultimately, Tomko and I got to know each other well. From that initial suspicion, we went to the point where he trusted me. We talked about his wife, his music. He loaned me his battle dress to wear when I landed with the Marines. It was his best set, too.

When I got back to the States, I called his wife on the phone. I sent her pictures, and I talked to his parents. I told him if he and his wife ever came to Washington, I'd take them to lunch in the Capitol. The same with the other guys I met. I'd love to show these guys around where I work. I've seen where they work.

I was just impressed with everyone I ran across. I also learned something about the degree of sacrifice of these people, to be out there cut off from their families. There's no communication. They'd been out there chugging around for months.

I live in a world where people do things for you. There, if something needs to be lifted, it has to be done by the people on the spot. You can't pass the buck to somebody else.

I was impressed with the dedication and sacrifice. When people on this end, in the U.S., send the military to do something, there is a sense that the order is given and things are done. But you actually see that nothing is automatic, that there are people who have to plan, who have to sit out there for months. The readiness of all this involves real human efforts.

People absolutely set aside any question of policy and give the most to their task, even though there was danger associated with it. I really felt an urge to communicate that aspect of what I was seeing.

■

[Later, after Lawsky landed with the Marines, he accompanied Special Forces working on civic action programs in villages in the Haitian countryside.]

I had worked with the Navy and traveled with the Marines. I had respect for both of them. Then I went with the Special Forces, who had a difficult task and worked in a different way. People were going to villages, trying to do a job under difficult circumstances. They tried to work with the villagers.

Again, I was extremely impressed with the Special Forces. They were very cooperative with me and the other reporters out there. They did have a good story to tell, and a number of us did write positive and accurate stories about what they were doing.

There were two stories. The military was one kind of a story, and reporting on Haiti was a different kind of story. I had no military reporting background, nor did I have a Haiti reporting background.

But they were both just reporting. It was a matter of learning on the spot. I think any journeyman or journeywoman reporter could do that. The military certainly helped. People were helpful in showing me what I needed to know, so the ignorance dropped very rapidly. I was able to get along. I don't think I felt embarrassed by my ignorance, which was plentiful.

'I ... learned something about the degree of sacrifice of these people, to be out there cut off from their families.'

David Lawsky

REAR ADM. IRVE C. LE MOYNE

DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND, MACDILL AIR FORCE
BASE, FLA.
JAN. 23, 1995

In military operations, commanders certainly have a responsibility to have a media plan in hand. But unless we're talking about the maintenance of operational security in an operation, then there needs to be wide access by the media—the press, TV, radio—to the troops, to the soldiers, the sailors, the airmen.

'I can't think of a circumstance when we could allow the media to come along ....'
Rear Adm. Irve Moyne

The message that we have to convey to our troops is, as well as we can—and we have mechanisms to do that—is that this is not a free-play exercise. What you say can have an impact—an enormous impact. A casual comment could go a very long way. Then you can spin this out, logically, to an infinite variety or number of developments. We could inadvertently send the wrong signal.

We watched the CNN reporters in Baghdad. I'm sure if an enemy commander has access to media reports about our forces and so forth, they're going to watch it. And inescapably, they're going to draw inferences from that. If they draw the wrong inference, they misinterpret it, it could go either way. It's impossible to predict.

So I think we could probably drive ourselves nuts thinking about all the possible implications and all the possible outcomes of what we say, what we don't say, how we say it, and where we say it.

■

From the Special Operations perspective, operational security is of paramount importance because in almost every circumstance, our major advantage will be tactical surprise. While we may have immediate superiority of force at the target, it's unlikely we'll be able to maintain it very long. We can't stay there long. By definition, our operations are quick: We're in, and we're out, and we're gone.

If we're expected, then as well-trained and as highly motivated as our troops are, we won't prevail. And if we're tied down for a long period of time, then the sheer weight of numbers will take their inevitable toll, and it won't be a special operation. It'll be a fire fight that lasted too long.

I can't think of a circumstance when we could allow the media to come along— certain parts of it, perhaps. But often the physical demands and the operational demands of the operation are too severe. Our folks are carefully selected, and they are highly trained. They're extraordinarily conditioned.

And they're all volunteers. They're a multiple of volunteers. They're part of the volunteer forces. And then they volunteered again for Special Operations. Sometimes they volunteer a third time for a particular unit of Special Operations. So they are a very unusual group of people. Teamwork is essential; everybody has a job. And if it's rehearsed carefully, it's—we hope—executed flawlessly

The analogy is certainly imperfect, but taking a reporter along would be like putting a sixth person out on the basketball court. You don't know what to do with them.

■

Training and those sorts of things certainly can be observed and covered. And there are some ways to cover operations. When I was a Seal platoon commander in Vietnam, there was a reporter from—I think it was—*Time* magazine who came down and stayed with us. He never went on an operation. But he watched the preparation for the operation, the rehearsal, the briefing. He saw them launched. He saw them come back. And he listened. He sat in on the debriefing. Then he wrote the article.

Well, you had to be a careful student of English, and the various tenses, to realize when he lapsed from the first person into the third person. Because if you just read it over, you'd wonder, "How did he get out there?" He wasn't allowed out there. Then I read it again, and determined that he wasn't there. But it was very artfully written, and it was true. So it worked out all right

■

I think the media are like any other group. There are those who are trustworthy and those who aren't. Within the press corps, and within the public affairs officer ranks, you know who is trustworthy. I react accordingly. There are some folks who you simply wouldn't talk to, or you certainly wouldn't tell them things of value and importance. Others you do trust.

I'm sure we're like anyone else. If things are going well, and we think they're going well, then we're very comfortable having the media there. If they're not going so well, then we're not comfortable. That's human nature.

It's part of our society. I think we need to encourage a professional working relationship

between the military and the media. We ought to train more on the military side for dealing with the media. And it is trainable.

On the media side, I think they have to do conscientious research. They need to know the subject matter as thoroughly as they can. And they need to understand the implications of what they may say. I know that they don't write everything they see, and the editors don't print everything they write. So you don't know how it's going to come out.

I think uncertainty and unfamiliarity are part of the hostility toward the media. It's a feeling of having no control, no prediction of what the outcome will be. If you talk to a reporter of any sort, probably the unarticulated supposition is that this is kind of like the Woody Hayes theory of the forward pass: Any number of things can happen, and only one of them is good.

So it's better to be anonymous, better not to talk, better not to be featured or highlighted, than to run the risk. Because the risk is there. Say I'm the transportation officer, and we've got four blowouts on four different vehicles, and I'm having a bad day. I've had 64 good days, but the reporter is here today, and it's a bad day. Oh.

You know the reporter won't be here tomorrow. He wasn't here for the last 64, and he won't be here for the next 64, but he's here today. If he weren't here, I wouldn't have to worry about it, except that I've got to get these vehicles fixed and get them on the road.

Journalists who are going to cover military operations ought to—as well as they can—know the military from top to bottom. They ought to spend time in it, with it, at all levels, so they see and they understand, particularly if they've never served. And most of them, almost without fail, will not have served.

A soldier, a sailor, an airman is not your assembly-line worker in a GM auto plant. The things that we demand of our folks, that our nation demands of them, are very difficult. Unless you experience it and think about it, it's easy to overlook, because when I take this uniform off and stand in the shower, I don't look any different than anyone. But I react differently to certain things. I carry an ID card. I take orders. And I volunteered to do all that. And that's a little different.

I think in our daily business, we have nothing to hide. We have a lot to talk about. And we ought to enjoy the opportunity to have that story told. I would draw the line, again, at tactical operations, operational security. But beyond that, things that don't have to be kept secret, legitimately operationally secret, then there's no reason not to talk to the media.

And it ought to be easy for reporters to talk to people in uniform, and people in uniform ought to know how to talk to reporters. That's helpful. Over the long term, it will be increasingly helpful as the military continues to grow smaller. As we remain an all-volunteer force, we are a very small segment of our total population. It's important that the population—the voters in this country—know who and what the military is, and what to expect of them and what not to expect. There are a lot of myths, and those need to be examined and looked at carefully.

CHARLES J. LEWIS

WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF
HEARST NEWS SERVICE
OCT. 21, 1995

It's clear that we suffer from a lack of institutional memory. We were over there Wednesday reinventing the wheel, and it was just astonishing.

Of the people there, I was the only person there at the convocation of the pool—who was still a bureau chief—who was there 10 years ago. My God, the public affairs shop at the Pentagon is in its 10th generation since that time in 1984. And so it was clear that, no matter how much good will exists on both sides of the table, we spend too much time reinventing the wheel.

■

The most devastating thing for all of us is the realization that we have still not mastered the ability, the technology, to file our products. We still haven't got very far. This fight has been going on, and it is a fight all the way from the reflagging in the Persian Gulf, to all the exercises in the '80s, to Desert Storm, and now to Restore Democracy. We're still fighting fundamental problems of communications.

This is why an institutional memory that would survive the press and survive the public affairs shop at the Pentagon would be extremely helpful, if you were to recommend this and tell Freedom Forum to get behind it.

What I'm saying is an institutional memory would be something like The Freedom Forum. It would have to have a staff or staffer who was sort of the institutional memory, and when there was a new person at the Pentagon with a

'I think uncertainty and unfamiliarity are part of the hostility toward the media.'

Rear Adm. Irve Moyne

public affairs mission, they would be brought in for a briefing on where things are, what the past has been, what the present problems are. Maybe it would be some kind of round table with the media on one side and the new people on the other side.

■

The Marines have got a public presence that the Army doesn't have, and the Marines know it, and they're proud of it, and they exploit it. The Marines look at us as somebody to exploit, and they do a good job at it, and we're willing accomplices. The Army couldn't give a damn.

Schwarzkopf, in particular, is a good case to study because he was extremely sensitive about public affairs, extremely sensitive about the public perception about the operation he was the commander-in-chief of.

The fact is that Schwarzkopf was extremely tender toward the public perception of Operation Desert Storm. So it's not a case of where he just kissed off the public affairs function. He embraced it totally, but he embraced it so he could control it.

'The idea that there were dumb questions asked at the briefings in Riyadh is a total red herring, in my opinion.'

Charles Lewis

■

An editor called me and wanted to know what kind of a person should come back to Saudi Arabia. I said, "You could do no better than sending one of two types of people: One, a police reporter, somebody who can handle fast-moving situations and who can relate well to people who are under a lot of pressure. The second choice would be a colorist who would come in here and do color." I didn't say that could be your food editor, but it could be your food editor.

The idea that there were dumb questions asked at the briefings in Riyadh is a total red herring, in my opinion. It is absolutely a reporter's right to self-educate. That's what we do.

■

In Desert Storm, *Mirabella* had a correspondent in Dhahran, and she was used by the military as sort of the laughingstock to make a point. She provided the parody of what we were trying to do, so that when we were in an argument with the JIB, they could say, "And I suppose you want the *Mirabella* correspondent to go with the F-14 squadron, or whatever." Actually, the *Mirabella* person was getting under their skin because she was writing about relationships, about sex, about lesbianism. She was writing about deprivation, things like this. People who had their helmets on too tight didn't like that.

She became a problem to them because she was driving them wild with questions about relationships, and they didn't think this was something she should be writing about.

■

[From a letter May 25, 1995, commenting on recommendations in the military-media report:]

I take a cautious view of your Independent Coverage Tier proposal. For one thing, I disagree with ... the claim that the news media swamped Desert Storm. I defy anyone to name a unit that was overwhelmed.

Caution is in order because:

1. Any organized effort to limit the media has the potential for abuse by the military and/or news organizations that control the organized effort.

2. The news media are unconvinced that there is the need for an outside force to limit the media population. As I said at our meeting at the Freedom Forum, news organizations will self-select out of any war coverage that is (a) long, (b) expensive and/or (c) dangerous.

The proposal for an independent facilitator has merit because it would address the problem of turnover in the military. There is far more institutional memory on the media side of the table.

MAJ.GEN. CHARLES W. MCCLAIN, JR.

U.S. ARMY CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OCT. 21, 1994

Desert Storm was the real turning point, in that even on the political side of the house, as well as the military side, the distinction between the tactical and the strategic is almost nonexistent now because of the immediacy primarily of television.

A vignette: When we sent the first observers into Macedonia, a team from our headquarters in Germany went up and gave what we call media training to the young company commander, the battalion commander and some of the key noncommissioned officers because we knew that, rightfully or wrongfully, we have to deal with the world as it is and reality as it is. I can't make CNN go away. Those of you in the print media can't make it go away, either.

In my mind, I thought that if it were a slow enough news day, the way that captain reacted to the press when he walked off of the back ramp of the C-130 at the Skopje airport would

start to define the success or failure of American policy there.

Now that is frightening to me, when you put on the shoulders of a young captain—26 or 27 years old—that he or she, by the way they react to the media, will define whether American policy is succeeding or failing. And he's only been on the ground 30 seconds.

■

Journalism schools are important, but when I look at the curriculum in some of the journalism schools, all they want to do is teach journalism. They don't want to teach anything else. And they cram it all full of all those courses, so you don't have an opportunity to do anything else.

■

In Desert Storm, I'll tell you what the problem was. When they came up with the plan on how they were going to get the products back, at the last minute—I'm talking about DOD and Gen. Schwarzkopf's staff—the thing was never exercised, there were no dedicated assets to do it, I said—to be quite blunt about it—I said, "This isn't going to work." And it didn't.

Gen. Ron Griffith, who commanded the 1st Armored Division in the war, heard about reporters having trouble getting their stuff back. He said, "I'd love to help you, but the only thing I got that can get your stuff back there is my command and control helicopter. That's the only one I've got that's got extended-fuel-range tanks on it." We were a victim of time, distance and weather. We've got to work with the press and do better.

■

There's a lot of mythology about Vietnam on both sides of the fence. I was a public affairs officer in Vietnam. We think the press was so bad, but if you go back and review it, the studies will tell you it wasn't. It was individual experiences that people had. And then the second point is, the press thought that they had the free run of the place, and I'll guarantee you they didn't. It's a mythology that's grown up on both sides of the house which has polarized those who were there. And unfortunately some of that mythology has been passed on to the next generation. We're beginning, hopefully, to get over some of that.

■

Something else on the press side, and this is from me dealing with the folks when they come in here and they're new on the beat. The problem isn't the reporters. The problem is economics and their bosses. I've had reporters come in here—they and their publications or their outlets shall remain nameless—they've come in here and I say, "Why don't you go to Fort Benning for two or three days. Take your notebook. There you can see the training base, specialty training, and the Airborne and you can visit with the Ranger regiment. And you can visit the brigade of the 24th Mech. You can really get a good taste for all of the essence of the Army in two or three days." And they'll be wild-eyed and run out, but then the bosses veto the idea.

COL. WILLIAM L. MULVEY

CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
DEC. 1, 1994

[*Mulvey was director of Central Command's Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.*]

In Desert Storm, we got out all the network crews; we got out all the radio broadcasters; we got out all the U.S. still photographers, and certainly the vast majority of the pencil reporters. Then it's, how low do you go? *Mirabella* magazine was out there, and Johnny Apple wanted four or five *New York Times* reporters out there. But we were into seconds. There was a second *New York Times* reporter out there; there was a second *Washington Post* reporter out, so how deep do you go? How big does the pool have to be? Twenty-seven for Normandy or 191 for Desert Storm?

Secrecy and surprise were paramount in the division commanders' minds. If Gen. Tilelli of the 1st Cav did not want a pool reporter, then his word was supreme. He didn't get a pool reporter. He was a two-star general, and I know how to salute. Now, I can sure go back through Pete Williams and Capt. Ron Wildermuth and say, "You need to convince these division commanders to take pool reporters."

I did that, and Gen. Vuono called Gen. Luck and Gen. Franks saying, "Hey, you guys need to get with the program and tell the Army story and accept some pool reporters." And that's why we had that flood just before the ground war started, really too late to get them out there, but it was that pressure from the Pentagon saying: "I know you've been saying 'no' all along, but you've got to do it."

Gen. Schwarzkopf didn't pose a problem, but then he wasn't saying to Gen. Franks:

'There's a lot of mythology about Vietnam on both sides of the fence.'

Maj. Gen. Charles McClain

"Take those people down there, give them some assets, fly their stories back, dedicate some helicopters." Lt. Gen. Franks' guidance to his 7th Corps PAO was: "Command information is primary. Get information to the troops, get news out to the troops, emphasize command information—if you've got any assets left, take care of the media." That's 7th Corps' guidance, which he now realizes was wrong. But his corps PAO was doing what his corps commander told him to do. The pool reporters had a low priority generally in 7th Corps.

■

If you go back to the Desert Shield time frame, through December, when a negative story would come out in the press, Gen. Schwarzkopf would call the commander on the carpet and chew him out. I was told that the command climate was such that the commanders in the field knew that if there was a negative story in the press or on television, they would be called to Riyadh. So the way to prevent that from happening was not to take any press.

'The combat pool system was the way to do it. And the security review was all part of a package ....'

Col. William Mulvey

In December, the word from Riyadh was: No overnights. You can take reporters out, let them talk to a couple of soldiers or pilots and bring them back to Dhahran. But no reporters will stay overnight out in the field. And commanders were supporting that, because they didn't want any bad-news stories. The less they had to do with the press, the better. Central Command and the Pentagon began developing the actual plan of how we were going to get pools out there to the front line units if a shooting war began. Two versions already had been tried and failed; I believe Gen. Schwarzkopf had disapproved both, but that was before I arrived.

I brought a revised plan over with me the 1st of December, worked on it with the reporters in the hotel there—the 285 hard-core who remained through December. And together we hammered it out with them, with Riyadh, with Pete Williams and his people back in the Pentagon, and we got Gen. Schwarzkopf's blessing.

The combat pool system was the way to do it. And the security review was all part of a package because we had to, number one, limit the number of reporters going out in the troop units, because the commanders didn't have the assets to take care of all of them. I don't care if the number was 200, 400, 600 or 1,000, when Gen. Peay says: "I can take two," that's all that he had room for.

The PAO of the 101st Airborne Division, Maj. Griggson, had his sergeant and his two military journalists and himself and their equipment, in one humvee. When the 101st took off in the helicopters, they had four seats in the helicopters. So when Gen. Peay says two people, that's one person sitting on Griggson's lap and one person sitting on his sergeant's lap. That's all they had room for. That's all the helicopter space the Army had given them. So we couldn't let a thousand or 200 just go out and take up rifle soldiers' space within the units.

The second thing we had to do was convince the commanders that there wasn't going to be a security-violation problem. So, as part of the plan, we promised the security review—that a military person, officer or PAO would look at that copy, see that videotape, listen to that audio tape, look at that picture before it went out, and that satisfied the commanders. They said, "Someone writes a story, he sends it off, and maybe very innocently he gives away the plan, and I have dead soldiers." Once they heard that there was going to be someone else looking at that story one time, they accepted it. The commanders still didn't particularly like it. But they were told to like it. They were told the CINC had approved it. "Okay," they said. "We will take a limited number, with security review."

■

The example that I use over and over involves one of the best reporters over there, Larry Jolidon of USA TODAY. He had been there throughout Desert Shield, he knew the military and had been out with the units. He was out in one of the pools with an engineer unit, and sent back a little feature story about a small town in Saudi Arabia where there was an interesting mix of cultures.

There were French and there were American paratroopers, there were American helicopter pilots, and he named the town where this mix of people happened to be. It was just a neat feature story about a group of people in a small town. It hadn't been reviewed out in the field because there was no PAO with him. When it came to me, I took a quick look at it, looked at my map and said, "Geez, Christmas. This town is just about in Jordan." It was so far west on the map that this was absolutely our left flank. It was the French, it was the 82nd, it was the 101st, all in this little town. So if you named that town and you looked on the map, you knew how far west we were.

So I called in Nick Horrock, the press-pool coordinator from *The Chicago Tribune*. I said, "Nick, look at this innocent little feature story from Larry Jolidon, and look at the map." He looked at it and said, "You guys are way out

there? Gee, I didn't know that. That'll give away the plan." I said, "Nick, you got my point." He got the USA TODAY bureau chief. She came in. Same thing. She read the story, looked at the map and said, "That can't go out like that. Give it to me. She changed it to "a little town in Saudi Arabia." Larry didn't even know that happened until months later. But here's a good reporter who understands security, who was down at the battalion level and didn't have any concept of where he was. He probably didn't have a big map of Saudi Arabia.

If there'd been no security review, that could have been in USA TODAY. It would have been everywhere. It was a pool report. Everybody would have had it, including Saddam, and he'd have known that the 82nd, the 101st, and the French were near that town in western Saudi Arabia. The generals would have killed me and the pool system.

■

There are too many who have said that there was censorship by access. I've heard Pete Williams say many times that reporters don't have access to the deliberations of the Supreme Court. Is that censorship of reporting on the Supreme Court? You don't go into the caucuses of the Congress. You don't go on the football field at the 50-yard line to report on the football game. You've got to stay off the football field to report on it. There are police barriers around an accident, around a crime scene all the time. Reporters are always denied access to a degree. And I think the courts would support the military's right to restrict access in wartime.

But I agree that there's access and there's access, and if you have a command climate that says, "I don't want to give reporters access because they might tell bad-news stories or they might violate security and, therefore, I'm not going to accept any, then the story can't be told. That is what we were fighting against. That was my job. But we also had some commanders who had seen the light. Gen. Boomer kept saying, "Send me more, send me more." We were getting calls all the time.

In fact, every commander I visited—Horner, Arthur and Boomer—after I sat down with them, they all said, "Give me more." This was back in mid-December when we had a very conservative 18 to the Marines, 18 to the Army. A couple of pools out to the ships and the air bases. But these commanders said they'd take more, and they'd specify, "I can take five on a battleship. Why don't you send some over to this base?" Boomer said, "I know a number of journalists. Would you have any problem if I invited additional ones I know and have a high level of confidence in?" I said, "Great. As long as they're pool reporters and they share their stories. As long as Molly Moore's stories get given out to everybody, that is fine." Only one additional reporter went out to the Marines that way. I looked at it as another pool slot.

Although there were problems getting stories back from the front lines, there were fewer with Gen. Boomer because he would commit his personal helicopter, his e-mail, his fax machines. He committed his tactical assets to get the stories back. None of the Army, Navy, or Air Force commanders would do that to the extent the Marines did. Gen. Boomer was a shining star.

■

There are individual examples of regional stories that should have been covered outside the pool system. But realize the problems I had with numbers. If I had given you the one exception to go down to the Coast Guard unit at Dhahran or the New Orleans *Times-Picayune* guy to go to the Louisiana Guard unit, then that could have broken down the integrity of dealing with a thousand journalists. But yes, it should have been possible to accommodate those local reporters seeking a hometown unit. That's very reasonable.

'... There's access and there's access ....'

Col. William Mulvey

TV didn't have enough satellite time to get all the cassettes that were coming back on the air and back to the states. They had to judge. Some never got fed back there because they were inundated by videocassettes, by stories, sometimes by not-very-good stories. The system was also overwhelmed by photo images. They couldn't take any more, and they didn't have any more TV camera crews or any more U.S. still photographers.

■

Basically all those principles for coverage that the Pentagon and the bureau chiefs agreed to after the war were the same ones that we went in with. And they were the same ones in Vietnam and the same ones in Korea and the same ones in World War II. Historically, they were basically the same ground rules and guidelines.

I think the bureau chiefs became angry because it was a whole new environment for them. They were used to their reporters being able to go to the scene of the crime, to go to the halls of Congress or whatever and have free, roaming access to get their stories. Any reporter on any beat had reasonable, if not total, access.

But as reporters got onto a battlefield—for the first time for many of these bureau chiefs—it didn't work that way. Moreover, bureau chiefs weren't there, so they were looking at it from the big First Amendment perspective, the censorship perspective, the restriction perspective, and they were saying, "We want our people to freely roam around like they would roam around Washington, D.C., to go to the hot story." And the military was saying, "No, you won't." We were placing new restrictions on them in an environment that they weren't familiar with. The bureau chiefs, I think, looked at it from a philosophical perspective. But if you talk to enough of the actual pool reporters who were out there in December and January, and were with the units for a long period—the Doug Jehls, the Larry Jolidons, who were out there from beginning to end with the pools—they were practical about how we worked it out.

There are exceptions like the Chuck Lewises, the Bob Frankels and the Bob Simons. But the majority of them were very practical. They had to get a story out. They knew what my constraints were. I was very open and honest with them, and we did the best we could with the situation. They were not screaming. Their bosses were.

'I hate pools. That should be our last resort.'

Col. William Mulvey

One other quick thing: They were in a dilemma, and many of them told me—I won't link any names here—"Look, I'm going to tell you that I agree with this, but don't ever use my name or my boss will fire me." They would say to me very honestly, "I'm speaking out of both sides of my mouth. I'll agree to your ground rules, your pool concepts, your whatever here, but I'm going to say something different to my bureau chief back in New York, Washington, or Atlanta."

The bureau chiefs did call me all the time, pleading their cases. I was taking the heat, and I said that was fine. I stuck up for these guys. We had that relationship. But I think the people who weren't on the battlefield and had never driven 16 hours to the 82nd Airborne Division from Dhahran, had never driven out to the western flank, but said, "We want the copy back an hour back after it's written," didn't have any perspective. They hadn't ever been on Tap Line Road.

■

In the future, we need to determine the numbers in advance. Once we do that, I am absolutely convinced that it's got to be the news media who decide who those individuals are.

I hate pools. That should be our last resort. What I would love to see is, if the numbers have been limited, then *The Milwaukee Journal* guy reports for *The Milwaukee Journal*. Everybody reports for their own news organization.

If you let the press freely decide among themselves who goes when there is a limited number, then you have not violated the First Amendment. As soon as I pick *The New York Times* or *The Milwaukee Journal* over *The Army Times* and *The Kansas City Star*, then I am making a rule. The military is restricting free access of the press. So don't make us do it; we're the government. The media need to restrict their own numbers themselves.

The number's got to be determined by the operation. Once that's determined, then you let the news media decide who goes to do it. If they say, "We can't determine them ourselves," I'm sorry. That's not my job. The First Amendment tells the government not to impose restrictions on you. So I'm going put everybody who wants to go in a room—all 100 of you—and the first 20 that come out the door —they are the ones I'm going to take on that combat operation. I don't care how you determined it—whatever it takes—that is not the government's problem. But the numbers of reporters on a battlefield has to be limited.

I fought that 24 hours a day for five months in the Gulf. I am absolutely convinced that I cannot be the negotiator. *Army Times* would come up to me and say, "We're special. Nobody will let us in on the print pool because we're a weekly military newspaper." So they were getting left out. And then Johnny Apple would come up to me from *The New York Times* and say, "Hey, I'm being screwed by these guys." Then CNN would come up and say, "The other three networks are ganging up against us. Colonel, you decide." I was the Solomon for the pool system. I had to split the baby in half. My answer is: I'm not going to make those decisions. That is your problem. I'll get you as much access as possible. I'll promise you as many slots as possible. I'll call generals. I'll visit generals. I'll call Gen. Schwarzkopf—whatever it takes to get more access for you But then, once I get you those slots, you decide who goes, because I am not going to make those decisions. I am not going to pick the favorite or the most special.

■

What scares me is that we all agree that something has to be done on both sides. But from Grenada on, the military was the one doing it. It convened the Sidle panel. It didn't work in Panama, as Fred Hoffman has pointed

out. We had a system that wasn't perfect in Saudi. We learned a lot of lessons; we wrote our reports. We've tried to fix the problems, and we continue to try to fix them. But the media I don't think is doing anything except laying off defense correspondents.

As the draw-down continues, there's less coverage, so there are fewer and fewer reporters who are dedicated full-time or even part-time to covering the military. So that shrinking pool of educated defense correspondents is not growing as we would want. The lesson learned was, you want more people who have been exposed to training situations. But we're finding fewer and fewer people. So the media's got a lot of work to do to educate individual reporters about the military. We're willing to help you all we can.

I've seen no willingness whatsoever by the news media to restrict their own numbers, to say, "Fine, we'll get organized; we'll figure out a way to determine who gets to go." I realize that there is no monolithic news media. But again, that's not the military's problem to solve. The fact that they can't agree doesn't mean that the privilege should be given to the government.

Back on the other side, I think the military needs to do more at a couple of levels. First of all, we still don't have the joint doctrine. I'm told it was on Cliff Bernath's desk at DOD Public Affairs a couple of months ago, but it hasn't moved. We need the top-down, joint public affairs doctrine that gives the requirements down to the services. It will allow the Navy to have so many beds for reporters on a ship, to have a PAO assigned, to have space on that COD (carrier on-board delivery) to bring videotape and stories, not just mail.

I can't tell you how many times I've been told: "Nope, I'm sorry; there's no priority for this media stuff. We've got passengers and mail with a higher priority. We can't take anybody to that ship." The Army divisions, too, are not authorizing any equipment, whatsoever, for media. There are no helicopters. There are no humvees, no Bradley fighting vehicles assigned to a division to take care of any reporters. But that's because there's no requirement from the top that says: "You, the CINCs, the commanders, will plan for and you will buy the assets required to support the news media on the battlefield." You've got to have it from the top. Then the Army can say, "Because the Joint Chiefs, the Joint staff, have told me that I've got to do this, I want two more helicopters and two more Bradley fighting vehicles and two more humvees per division to take care of media. And I need some more training money to train PAOs, be it in the Reserves, or be it active duty. But if you don't have that top requirement, it isn't ever going to happen. So we've got more to do.

■

I'm disturbed about the quality of some of the PAOs, because until that command climate is established where the PAO is important on the general's staff or the admiral's staff, until that's the job to have, you're not going to get the best and the brightest into public affairs. Sometimes, you're going to get the guy who was relieved as a company commander: "We've got to find something for him to do; well, anybody can do public affairs. That's just common-sense stuff." But until the commander and the structure make the public affairs officer as important as any other staff officer, you're going to have some second-class people.

Commanders and CINCs need to be told from the top with joint doctrine that this is a part of going to war, just like logistics. You've got to have bullets and you've got to have a logistics system. You've got to have a public affairs system and you've got to have assets. You've got to have transportation. You have got to have equipment. You have got to have officers dedicated to do that. Lt. Gen. Boomer had to rob Peter to pay public affairs. He was taking the humvee from other duties and taking an officer from supply and making them escorts and giving them to the public affairs people to build up the staff necessary to take care of reporters. He was putting it together on the battlefield, saying, "Here's my helicopter. Take Molly's story back." But that was the commander fixing a system that doesn't now tell the commanders: "You *will* have the right people, the right assets."

The PAO in an Army division is at least one grade below the rest of the staff. I was a major, a new major with a lot of lieutenant colonels on a division staff. When I was a Corps PAO, I was a lieutenant colonel with a staff full of colonels. You're always the junior officer around. Adm. Kendell Pease has just gotten his second star, but the Air Force has a colonel sitting in there. Could we have done better with a one-star in Dhahran and with a two-star on Gen. Schwarzkopf's staff? You betcha.

You mentioned the article by Chuck Lewis, "The City Editor was a Colonel." I wrote a response to that, and then I never sent it. But my answer was that the city editor wasn't a colonel. The city editors were the captains of the Navy ships, were the Air Force base command-

'... Until ... the PAO is important on the general's staff ... you're not going to get the best and the brightest into public affairs.'

Col. William Mulvey

ers, were the Army division commanders out there, because it was their battlefield and they decided—as they rightfully should—who came out onto their battlefield and went with their soldiers to war. It wasn't me. Chuck gave me way too much power and authority. I didn't make the decisions as to how many pool reporters went to the 1st Cav Division or the 1st Armored Division or the 101st or whatever. Those division commanders, those commanders, those ships' captains—the captain of the *Missouri* decided how many reporters went out on the *Missouri.* His answer was, "None," and who knows the *Missouri* was ever even there? But that was because he had the power, as he should have the power. He's 'God' out there.

That commander hadn't been taught at Annapolis, or Newport, that one of his responsibilities was to accommodate the press. We only wanted to send five reporters out on his ship. He said no, even though Adm. Arthur supported the pools. That's fine, but his answer should have been "yes."

■

There were others who said "yes." You saw the first Tomahawk ever fired in combat. You can turn on your TV today and see it. The media were there. They were on the JFK as those flights took off. We fulfilled our promise. We said, "When we go to war, you'll be there." Pool reporters were at the air bases. Reporters were on the ships. Reporters—the press—were with the tactical units as they went into Kuwait and Iraq.

Khafji was a Saudi battle and there were pool reporters standing right there with the closest American troops. There is videotape of those Marine-fired rounds going into Khafji. The American involvement in Khafji was totally covered by a pool. And my responsibility was not to send pool reporters with the Saudis, or the Egyptians or the Qataris or the French or the Brits or anybody else. It's a red herring to say that no pool reporters covered non-U.S. actions.

It is true that one TV guy outside the pool was the first into Kuwait City—by a matter of an hour or two. And it came at great risk to himself and at great risk to the troops. There are stories that every time he'd start talking, to beam up stories, artillery fire would come to his area.

We had to get those pool reporters out there with the troops as early as possible. The ones that did the best, that got the best coverage, were the ones that went out on the 12th of January and stayed out there with the units throughout and had been there for more than a month when that ground war started. The ones we sent three or four days before the ground war started, that had barely gotten to or hadn't even gotten up to their units, had no rapport with the commanders, didn't know what was going on, and when you talked to them, their experience was that the pool system didn't work. Well, that's right, because those commanders would not take pool reporters until the last minute.

■

You can't have it both ways. Philosophically, I would say if you're going to have a pool system, then you got to maintain the integrity of the pool and let only those people go. On the other hand, as I said earlier, I wanted to get anybody I could out to cover the war. If Gen. Shelton said in Haiti, "Yeah, I'll take Bradley Graham," great, Bradley, go. If Gen. Schwarzkopf says, "Send Joe Galloway to the 24th Infantry Division," he goes. That's my mission, to get the story told.

I say, go for it. If the press wants more access, then they shouldn't complain about Bradley Graham and *Life.* That was the pool *plus* two. If you say, "Then I really don't want more access; all I want is the pool," then you can make your argument. But if your argument is more access and you had this access plus some more, then say, "Thank you for more access," and don't complain about it. The only reason they're complaining is because their name's not Bradley Graham, and they weren't there. They complained about Joe Galloway and Molly Moore because their names are not Joe Galloway and Molly Moore.

I think the news media would be better off if they limit their numbers themselves. Two hundred, fine. Four hundred, we I could have taken care of. Even six hundred, I felt I could have taken care of. One thousand, I couldn't take care of. But they kept coming and kept coming and kept coming. If all we had for the war was the 285 in December, everybody would have been out with the unit of their choice. We could have done a lot. They probably could have been without escort, flowed from unit to unit. But it became so many more. The numbers have to be limited.

We are putting our head in the sand about foreign journalists. I was fortunate because—talk about our press not being organized—the foreign journalists really weren't organized, and that's the way I put them off. But right as the ground war began, they were ready to hold major demonstrations—and I mean with 400 placard-carrying and camera-toting foreign

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journalists—against the Joint Information Bureau.That would have made world news about what the nasty Americans were doing, barring them from covering the war.

GEN. CARL E. MUNDY JR.

COMMANDANT
U.S. MARINE CORPS
JAN. 12, 1995

My overall impression is that, with regard to the most recent operations we have run, including Desert Shield and Storm and on up, the press reporting has been pretty good, pretty fair.

I'm a veteran of Vietnam, and I came back deeply despising much of the liberal press. Remember, those of us with short haircuts were very proud that we had been there. Then we had people burning their draft cards and everything. We saw the world as a very black-and-white situation. They were bad, and we were good. And anybody that advocated their cause or participated in their activities was bad to us.

But I think it's pretty good right now. That, very likely, is the nature of the conflicts that we were involved in. Even though you might take political issue with whether we should have gone to Haiti, the fact is that it is a rather humane thing to do. So on that, the press coverage might hound the policy-makers, or the president, but they have not hounded the soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines that are involved down there.

■

How the Marines play in the press: Here, I guess, I will engage in chest beating, and forgive me for that. But you know that we Marines are very proud of what we are. That may be more in the training that we give individual Marines or, indeed, young Marine officers, but Marines are generally proud of and confident in what they do. It's macho. Whatever it is, we're proud of the Marine Corps.

It's the old saying, "It's hard to be humble when you're the finest." Well, Marines are not necessarily humble, so they're always glad to talk to you and tell you about what we're doing. I think any Marine leader would tell you that we have learned over time that the most effective way we can cause the press to be on our side is not to assign an officer to cover you, not to put any unnecessary constraints on you, but to say, "Look, here's a squad. Go live with them."

The other side of that is what a PFC may say. Well, that's a young guy and if he says, "Hey, I don't like being here," you can say, "Well, he really doesn't understand the big picture."

Then you get some interviews with people that say, "I signed on to get an education here. I didn't know I was going to have to do this." You don't get that from Marines. Why, I don't know. And if we knew why, we'd probably fiddle around with it and mess it up somehow.

In three-and-a-half years as commandant, I have never been asked about pay. The sergeant major of the Marine Corps doesn't get questions about, "When are we going to get a pay raise?," that sort of thing.

What the young Marines—and I'm talking lieutenant colonels and on down—what they really want to know when you go down there is, "Are we going to get to kick some butt?" You have this ethos, or this spirit, or this pride, or this feeling of unit identity that enables us just to say, "Go mess around with the Marines. They'll tell you what's going on. Get a sergeant. He'll take care of it." That's worked very successfully for us, and still does. Any Marine officer feels very confident in letting you loose into any collection of Marines anywhere.

But we are deployers. It is the ethos of what we do. Others would go if World War III were declared. But short of that, they really don't expect to leave.

■

The more we can include the press in our activities, the better informed they are. They come to appreciate the effort that we make to try and do our jobs well, rather than standing on the outside and being critical because they don't understand the friction and the confusion of even a peaceful conflict—how utterly confusing and, most of the time, out of control it gets when you inject military forces into different scenarios.

On press training, one of the Pentagon CNN reporters is a case at hand. He's humorous about it. The first time I had him up here, he said, "When I came into this job, I wouldn't have known a tank if one drove by. I don't know what a B-2 is. A C-17 could fly right by, and I would think it was National Airlines going in. I don't know anything."

But gradually, he said, he stumbled along and learned it. I think that the news agencies do a disservice to their people in that. It would be wonderful if we had some sort of training or an orientation course—not to keep you

'The more we can include the press in our activities, the better informed they are.'

Gen. Carl Mundy

from your right of free speech and assessment of what we're doing, but to at least educate you on what we do.

That's the real value of being able to take as many press as we can down to Camp Le Jeune and show them the equipment and let them talk to the Marines. It pays off. The reporter I mentioned went down there and he came back wowed, and he has done very well by the Marine Corps since then.

■

I hate to keep using an isolated reporter here, but he just popped up on my screen. He's good at reporting or reading a script that had been prepared. However, he's not of the analytic capacity to evaluate whether certain planes or weapons systems would fit into the Marine Corps. My own feeling—purely from serving the defense interest—is that we would do better to get back to the Drew Middletons or the Ernie Pyles, who understood not only the programs but the culture as well.

'It would be wonderful if we had some sort of training or orientation course ... to at least educate you on what we do.'

Gen. Carl Mundy

On the gay and homosexual issue, for example, if you understood the culture of the military, which is different than the culture of Times Square, you probably would put a different twist on reporting it, rather than just accusing us of being Neanderthals. Whatever your personal views on it, it's a different problem for us than it might be in the rest of society.

In the television business, you have a profit or a viewer-percentage incentive. You want people to watch your program, so you do a *20/20*, or a *Prime Time Live*, or you do a *60 Minutes*. But why do you turn on *60 Minutes*? Because you want to see the sensation. If I was going to watch the news, I wouldn't go to *60 Minutes*.

Lesley Stahl sat here, and the interview went on for two-and-a-half hours. I was trying to educate Lesley, who was not resistant to that. I was really trying to work my way through it. When she left, she said, "Listen, we are not here to do a number on the Marine Corps." Then Lesley leaves and goes back to the makeup artist. But they take the two-and-a-half hours, and it ends up on the cutting-room floor.

That was the first exposure I'd had to that. I've done interviews before, but most of them have been with the *Navy Times* or *Sea Power*. You ramble on, and they put it all in, and they put your picture in there, and you feel pretty good about yourself.

But with *60 Minutes* I came to realize, all of a sudden, that the most senior of the military leadership is viewed in the same context as the guy running for Congress in the 4th District of Oklahoma or something. It is the sensational: "Let's see if we can tear his feet of clay."

All I ever wanted to be was a Marine. I never tried to be commandant, but just to do the best I could under whatever circumstance I was facing. Then, to be attacked as a political appointee is rather stunning for someone in the uniformed military. So your tendency is to question what is the agenda of the press in looking at why we do what we do. Unfortunately, there probably are some in our ranks who also, maybe, have an agenda. I don't know how to cure that. My agenda is to keep the Marine Corps afloat and not screw it up too badly so that in X number of years, I can hand off the baton to the next guy.

60 Minutes has faded off my screen, and I'm really not hung up on that. I, the man, am really less important in this. If it is sport to take one of us apart, okay. But the thing that was most bothersome—and something we might do something about if we had a training program for the press—would be for them to think about how they are impacting a lot of proud Marines who are minorities—and even those who are not minorities—by, in effect, putting them down.

The clips that were used from me—not in context and not even in response to the questions—made a dramatic impact on thousands of Americans out there who are proud to be what they are. It would be nice to have some consideration of how that is going to affect not just the excited liberal New York people watching on Sunday night, but how is this going to affect the Marine Corps?

Being open, all those things, have worked for us. I would tell those under me to continue to be open, but to probably say less than I have been inclined to say, particularly if it's a taped TV interview.

When there is so much to tell and so much to explain, I would value sitting here with you and rambling for three hours through why the nation needs a balance in minorities, under the presumption that you would take all of this in and would then do a fair and balanced piece. But I also realize that you have a deadline and your job is to produce something that people will read. So you're going to clip four things I said and write that.

ADM. WILLIAM A. OWENS

VICE CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OCT. 21, 1994

I find it across the country as I give speeches, and talk to people: There aren't many who understand what the U.S. military is about.

We are now at the end of about 20 years of an all-volunteer force and, for the first time in the history of the world, there is a military which is all volunteer. We are now in this social-cultural environment. It's been here for a generation, and few people have thought about what it used to be like and what it is today.

What it used to be like was the kids off the streets of Detroit, or Philadelphia, or New York City, or Bismarck, N.D.—my home town—who had some difficulty, couldn't quite come to grips with life, were going to maybe be in trouble—maybe not, but they were at least on the fence—they had a place to go, to the U.S. military.

They came back after a couple of years, knowing how to pledge allegiance to the flag. They knew a little bit about patriotism, they had a sense of country, and this feed into American society of trained citizens, trained patriots, was about 700,000 a year.

Today, if you are a kid in the streets of Detroit, or Philadelphia, or New York, you can't get in the military. We won't accept you. We're too good. We want better people than you are. We want a high school graduate, and you better have stood pretty high in your class. Lower half doesn't hack it, in general.

So the contribution of the military to American society has gone from 700,000 a year to 250,000 to 300,000 a year, who probably would have been pretty good citizens anyway. But 250,000, in a population that is a hundred million larger now than it was 20 years ago, is a much lower percentage. And so that bleed-and-feed process of 250,000 a year into American society has far less impact on American patriotism, on an awareness of the military and American awareness of the country, than it had in the days of the draft.

I think it's one of the principal reasons why America is in worse shape as a moral, ethical, patriotic country today than it was 20 years ago, and not many people realize it.

■

Another thing that's happened is in the press. The Ernie Pyles of today don't exist. I was out in Gonaiv, 120 miles northwest of Port-au-Prince, and the story was out there. A squad of soldiers in a city of 100,000 had established a relationship in five days with the bishop, and with the mayor, and with the businessmen of the city, and had dealt with the local police, and this squad of Americans had faced unbelievable difficulties in this place. And I thought to myself, where was Ernie Pyle?

REAR ADM. KENDELL PEASE

U.S. NAVY PUBLIC AFFAIRS CHIEF
NOV. 29, 1994

The key to the whole thing is security at the source. You need to teach people in the military that there has to be a trust, and if it's something you don't want covered, you either don't show it or—if they can't avoid seeing it—you just tell the media they can't report on it because it's going to cost lives or hurt security.

Every media person I've ever met is willing to go by those rules. The media police themselves very well. It's a matter of educating the military about who the media are, and what you can and can't do.

You can't put the lobster dinner in front of the media and say, "Just sniff it a lot." But you can certainly put a lot of stuff out and say, "You can have everything else on the table, but you can't touch this over here."

I have found that the media accept that. During the Haiti operation, the military leaders were giving away sensitive information, and the media kept it confidential. There's not a media organization that didn't know that those airplanes took off from Pope Air Force Base.

I think it's necessary to have security review as an option. There might be some circumstance where you really get concerned, and you have to do a double-check. It has to be in your back pocket.

The option of security review is great for me as a public affairs officer. I can say to my boss, "Hey, if there's a problem, we always have security review."

And you can let the media go. But all of a sudden, if we see it's going the wrong way, we

'The Ernie Pyles of today don't exist.'

Adm. William Owens

can stop and say, "Hey, folks, you've agreed to the security review. We just haven't asked for it yet. We're getting into that sticky situation now, where we're going to have to just glance at your stories because lives are going to be at risk."

We have reporters with cell phones in the field all the time. I don't think that's a problem because you tell them when they can file. You also can just collect all the cellular phones, although we haven't done that. We've just said, "Can you give us a break?"

■

Sometimes the fringe folks cause problems, but not because they're bad people. It's because they don't understand the system. Media relations is not a game. But you have to have a relationship. If you have someone from a non-mainstream publication, or a non-defense writer who comes into this relationship, he or she has to learn the rules first.

'Sometimes the fringe folks cause problems ... because they don't understand the system.'

Rear Adm. Kendell Pease

Reporters who regularly cover the Pentagon know that when we say, "I really don't have anything for you on that," that we are telling the reporter, "Great question, you've got something, but I'm not going to be able to give you a 'no comment' or anything." But if you say that to reporters who don't cover the building, they don't know when to back off. They don't know what security means.

For the unilateral group in Haiti, we picked those people who cover the Pentagon. We made some calls. We knew how many seats we had, what the DOD pool had, how many more bunks we had, and how many seats on airplanes.

We went to people who had come to us and expressed interest in going if there were something else other than the pool. Since there were more who wanted to go than seats available, we picked people. We were selective. We picked people who covered the Pentagon. I didn't pick a *Sports Illustrated.* I picked an *Inside the Navy*, *Defense News*, *Defense Week*, *The New York Times*, *Washington Post.* You go with who you trust, and we trust quite a few of them. They all verified that trust.

If the news media had a committee set up to decide who goes, I wouldn't have any problem with that. I'd rather have somebody else making the decisions. But I believe in the *Animal Farm* theory, too. You know: All pigs are equal, but some pigs are more equal. Sometimes you've got to have the people who cover you.

We've gotten praise, and I haven't gotten any complaints. So if how we picked them was wrong, no one's come forward.

There might be someone sitting out in Peoria who didn't get sent. On the other hand, a reporter from Virginia Beach got chosen because the ships were from Norfolk. Every TV station in Norfolk also was given the opportunity.

This was for the local folks. They always get shut out, and they are some of our best customers. They're the people we continually call on, in the home ports, to write about us, or around the base, to talk about the good things we do, even though they write enough bad things. Here was an opportunity to pay them off, to show them we appreciate their good journalism and the effort they make to understand the Navy. We showed them that just because we're going to the Super Bowl doesn't mean we're only going to talk to the national reporters.

In the Haiti operation, we didn't touch one particular reporter from *The Washington Post*. He had made a personal deal with the Army, with the commanding general. I'm not going to tell the general he did it wrong, but I think he did. I didn't think that was fair. I wouldn't do that, although I understood what he was trying to do, and I salute him for that.

He was trying to ensure that whatever he did was in *The Washington Post*. He was going to an invasion. I thought it was a great move on his part. But I thought it was a bad public affairs move. It was something I wouldn't want to do. When it's a major news story, you can go pool, but if you don't go pool, you can't bring your pet rock, either.

We had a pool there, too, covering the general. Did they get the same access? I don't think so. And that's not fair. We're talking relationships, and I've got to live with these people every day.

■

I see a tremendous change in the culture of the Navy. I can't talk about the other services.

In the Navy, if you're a surface warrior, you go through the Prospective Commanding Officer Course at Newport. I go up and brief every class on public affairs. I have a chart that talks about fairness. I tell them if they expect the story to be fair, to consider what's on the other side. I think it's accessibility. The media must have access. If they don't, how are they ever going to be fair?

I advise them all never to go off the record. We should never have to go off the record. Be on the record.

One of the most important things is where you do the interview, the location. You do it in your office, and it's going to be an office setting. You do it on the bridge, and it's going to be a different interview.

I tell them they need to think about what the message is, because it's a commercial. It's an opportunity to sell the United States Navy, or whatever they're selling. So make sure you sell it.

Airplanes fly at them, and they learn how to shoot them down. So we put a television camera in front of them, and they find out how to talk to the television camera or the print media.

One of the lessons I teach is that the interview is never over. Even though the reporter folds that notebook and starts to walk out the door, you're still being interviewed. They have to understand that, because we have many people who just let their guard down and say something silly. Then they wonder, when did I say that?

We go over those things, so that when they meet the media, it's not a hostile environment. But we don't have to do interviews. We have to provide information, but we don't have to do interviews. If you're continually getting a stick in the eye from a reporter and being misquoted, you don't have to do it.

So why do we do interviews? It may be because the troops did something really good, and you want to give them credit. Or there's a new piece of technology that's changing the world, and we want to make sure we talk about it. But we also want to know why we're talking about it.

We give them the four C's, the commandments: Cosmetics—how you look, where you're standing; Control—don't lose control; Communications—Make sure you know what you want to say, what the commercial is, and the final one is the Commandment—"Thou Shalt Not Lie."

We tell them if it's something they can't talk about, "no comment" is not an answer. It's "I'd love to tell you, but the Privacy Act precludes me from telling you what's in that person's record. It's a medical problem, or whatever, and I can't get into that." Reporters accept that.

■

When I first came in the Navy, I dealt with a really a tough reporter. He would write every rotten story there was in the Navy, and it would light hair on fire. He was a local reporter, but it would always get in the Early Bird. It was the Navy did this, or drunken sailors did that, or whatever.

I had to solve that. So I found out where the sources were. His sources were sailors. He would go down on the strip and sit in bars, buying beer for the guys. And that's what he got.

Nobody would let him on base because he was the guy writing all that trash. And nobody would talk to him. So I said, "It's easy. We'll bring him on base. Any time he wants to talk to me, come on. Let him talk to the admirals."

All of a sudden, his stories changed because he had something else to write about. He didn't want to write the barroom stories, but that's all he had access to. He was a reporter, and he was going to report on the Navy. So we changed it. That's how you can change anything, through access. If I show the media what's going on, some will write about the warts, there's no doubt about it. And we have warts; we're human. But the more access you give them, the less time they have to sit there and look for warts.

It's true that there are some reporters—and they upset the hell out of me—who just have to write about the warts. It's something the senior leadership has never understood, and it's the toughest thing in the media and military relationship. We can get a person on a ship who just has to sneak away from the escort, and find out that the guys really do read girlie books, or whatever.

■

I think reporters need to train. And when reporters get out of line, I'd like to see other reporters tap the other guy on the shoulder and say, "Hey, give him a break."

I don't think you can police each other in a formal way, because you're just not set up that way. The nature of the business is too competitive. But when reporters see other reporters who are complaining when they shouldn't be, it would be good if they'd speak up. I was down in the hallway the other night, and one of the TV guys just stopped the other reporter in his tracks, and said, "Hey, look. You're out of line."

The thing that bothers me most is not whether reporters know the military or not, it's whether they know how to live up to what we expect of reporters here. We don't care whether you know what we're doing or not. We can help you there.

The first day of the Somalia landings, one of the networks had a reporter on his first day in the Pentagon. He didn't even know what a ship looked like. We put a person in his booth, watching the raw footage that he was supposed to be reporting on, and told him, "That's the ship." We don't mind doing that. But he's an honest guy. What I do mind is the reporter who comes in and feels that he shouldn't talk to us because we're just "spin doctors."

'... When reporters see other reporters who are complaining when they shouldn't be, it would be good if they'd speak up.'

Rear Adm. Kendell Pease

If they choose not to use us, I don't care. If they want to go to their sources, fine. But don't go to the source and get information, and then come back and expect me to explain it. I get reporters who are working on things, and they're telling us 99 percent. Then all of a sudden, their story comes out, and they've got a bombshell in there just that is wrong, or was easily explained, or came out of a draft, or was just garbage.

They all want us to trust them, but they have to trust us, too. If they're going to write a bomb on us, we expect them to at least give us a fair shot to respond.

GEN. J.H. BINFORD PEAY III

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
JAN. 23, 1995

'... When we kicked off the pool, I could not have been happier with the reporters.'

Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III

In the Gulf, I went with the early forces and came out at the very end. So I saw Schwarzkopf two or three times during that nine-month period. But I never was close enough to truly understand the pressures that he was working under.

I must admit that all of us were still coming out of the Vietnam period, had been through the press relationships of that period, and we all had this enormous pride in our own outfits. There was an atmosphere of concern. How do you control all that, so that your outfit appears, externally, to be a professional outfit? And secondly, so that you didn't run into the ire of Norman Schwarzkopf, who was very, very concerned about how he controlled the media through that period, for a lot of reasons that I'm sure we don't understand.

About three or four months into this thing, it became very clear to me that there was a real mixture of professionalism associated with the media correspondents that were covering it, from youngsters to very, very seasoned people.

There was really a misunderstanding of the fact that you're going to hear a certain amount of bitching from soldiers and, I suspect, sailors and airmen who, in my case, were arriving at 127-degree heat in the desert, going through the acclimatization period, and going through a little bit of a period of not being quite clear what the mission is going to be. So you would get the kind of soldierly bitching that you get with that kind of situation. And the media write-up of that did not reflect that this was what you would expect any normal guy to say.

You'd see that written up instead of the bigger story of how well the equipment was working, how well the acclimatization process was going on, the logistical buildup. The more substantive military kinds of things were not in proportion.

That's important because that then affected the way, at least in our division—and I think with all my division-commander brothers—that you started controlling the media. Instead of, perhaps, being fully open, bringing them down in hordes, you started controlling that a little bit more.

Furthermore, you had to control it because of the distances. You just couldn't afford to put a number of Blackhawks hauling them around because, literally, you could fly from Dhahran out to the fort area of the 101st, and a couple of trips like that and you put a Blackhawk in the maintenance phase, where whole engines had to be pulled.

So the combination of the geography and the stories, in my case, started to put some control techniques into how we handled them. I did that, I guess, for about the last three or four months, until we went to the pool concept before the kickoff of the war.

I don't mean to leave you the impression that I clamped it down totally. But I will tell you that in my evening briefings every night, I found out which media were coming, who was escorting them, what was the story we were trying to tell, so that instead of just allowing the media to have the upper hand in questioning, we would try to present a story with more military substance. We hoped that would produce writings back home with a greater depth of understanding

I am negative because I don't think a large percentage of the media people who came to our division early on were integrated in the military way of doing business to understand what they were really hearing and what they were not hearing.

Now, when we kicked off the pool, I could not have been happier with the reporters. And I did some things that I'm sure I'd be criticized for today, and certainly was criticized heavily in my own staff at the division headquarters. I brought them all in. They came to me about 10 days before kickoff, and I gave them a general, overall briefing of the situation. Then I kicked them out to the various brigade commanders so that some relationships could start being formed.

I told them that several days before the kickoff, I would call them in and give them the entire plan. And I did that, much to the consternation of a lot of the people in the headquarters today. I did that because, one, I wanted them to have confidence that I had confidence in them, and I wanted a kind of professional rapport built between us. And, two, I wanted them to know that I was not going to leave them behind. I had them manifested early.

I wanted them to understand that I wanted them to know the whole plan so that they wouldn't do anything to hurt their own personal security. Also, if they violated my trust, it was very clear how far I had gone, so that their careers would be terminated if they did anything that would violate that kind of trust and access that I gave them.

So two days before, I brought them in. I laid out the entire plan, every single piece of it. Now it's interesting that, since the war, I have received a number of correspondences from these, say, five teams of people. I have been in press conferences—one just recently in the desert on this last October Iraq thing, and also back when, as the vice in the Army, I was involved in the controversial agreement on the drawdown of reserves—when I was being attacked somewhat aggressively by a number of media. But a couple of these who were on that pool happened to be in the audience and, I thought, put enormous balance into the press conference.

■

That's a long background. But it seems to me that it's important in terms of where we go. I wonder if there could be some initiatives that, on a day-to-day basis, would have the major news media start putting some youngsters across all of the services, into the headquarters, or down in the troop units, so that we can grow together. You're not going to change culture, but there could be a growing together, an understanding of what is the real substance of this very, very professional business, versus a tendency toward just the veneer pieces that come when you don't understand each other.

What we're doing with the Somalia withdrawal is to recognize that we are not going to control it. Although we are going to activate or approve of a piece of it—a very small crew of 13 to 15 people—we're going to have all these others out there. So we're going to do some early work with a broad news conference in the theater. But I think that's what's going to happen in the future. They're going to come in there with their satellite dishes and everything. I don't know if we can stop it. And if we can't, then the question is: How do you get at the front end of this? It's bigger than a culture problem.

In Desert Storm, you saw the professionalism grow in the reporting. I think it's a function of their own growth and experience as they spent more time out there and found out that these kids, and even some of the leaders, were really not such bad guys. You started to see the reflection change.

■

Now look at the possible danger. Early on, because of this out-of-proportion reporting, there were major discussions of the rotating of large forces. There was this idea that you couldn't keep these kids out there for 90 or 120 days. The stories said they would get bored, and we would have to rotate those units.

Well, two things would have happened. If we had gone to a rotation policy, you would have had this enormous drop-off of proficiency. When our kids got there, they couldn't even spell desert. When they left, they were Ph.D.-level experts in it, with all the confidence that goes with it.

Interestingly enough, none of the kids wanted to come home. If you had brought the 101st out of that desert, after 95 days in there, versus letting them continue in the role they played in the final peace, I would have had a revolt on my hands. There is a great example of just how serious improper reporting can be.

A basic point is, how do we build trust early, so that professional reporting starts early? Secondly, I personally think the media can be a combat component, and it can do the things that make our country very special. So I'm not for eliminating media reporting on the battlefield. I like to look at it in the positive side. It's how you bring the team together. And I think, today, it's more important than ever.

Of course, the Vietnam attitudes will go out, over time. But also, when you bring the media into the military, even though they are civilians, there are an abnormal number of these youngsters with horribly long, shaggy hair, horrible-looking clothing. And then you put them into this different culture.

I think of some very small approaches that could be taken to dampen these frictions—such as providing correspondents the right clothing so they don't freeze to death out there, and we don't have to turn to one of our soldiers and ask him for his parka. And the modicum of shaving and a haircut. Those are things, I think, that help ensure access on their part.

'... How do we build trust early, so that professional reporting starts early?'

Gen J.H. Binford Peay III

COL. FREDERICK C. PECK

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
U.S. MARINE CORPS
JAN. 12, 1995

The first thing in the question about trusting the press in a pre-invasion scenario is that you have to understand the nature of the news media. In just about every scenario I can imagine, the press is international. I've been to symposiums where Dan Rather gets up there, thumps his chest and says, "I'm an American. I'm as patriotic as the next man. I wouldn't do anything to compromise our troops or their safety." Well, that's great, Dan. I believe you. I accept that as gospel from you.

But, unfortunately, the press is international. I know from my experiences in Japan, Kenya, Somalia and in Los Angeles, where there's a lot of foreign press based, that everybody shows up. In Somalia, I had the People's Republic of China. I had Korean, Japanese, Eastern and Western Europe, African, and I even had Polish TV show up there.

I did, and I can, treat them differently. When it came time to decide who got to go with us, when it was only American forces involved in the operation at the beginning, I didn't see where I needed to push Americans aside to make room when there was only enough room for 28. I did take Reuters, and Visnews, which are European-based. The rest of them, the Italians and the Germans and the French who were there and wanted to go with me, I said, "Sorry, no room."

There's also the problem of foreign nationals working for American news organizations as regular employees or stringers. For example, we all live and die by CNN, and the folks I was dealing with there were great people. But I'm not sure what some of them claim for a national loyalty.

Now, in a pre-invasion scenario, we have the nine principles that Pete Williams negotiated with the American press, the bureau chiefs here in Washington. There are restrictions in there. But you have to realize that once stuff gets out into the popular media, it spreads internationally, and people on the receiving end of that information may use it against you. Their motivations and their sympathies may be with the other side, and you just have to accept that.

People tend to get ethnocentric when thinking about the media and only think about ABC and *The Washington Post*. They don't realize that what I may say to CBS today is now used by NHK in Japan tomorrow morning. And NHK and all the other Japanese media belong to the same union, they belong to the same press club, and they all belong to the Social Democratic Party, and they all slant their news that way. That's just the way the world works.

This idea of an unbiased, fair press without an agenda is an American phenomenon. The closest match would be the Brits, and their press is very political.

That doesn't mean you can't work with the bureau chiefs and say, "Look, we've got something coming up, can't say when, can't say where." Or, in an instance like Somalia, I did my own talking with members of the media. They asked me about how I thought Somalia would go down from a media coverage standpoint. And I told my counterparts in DOD, "Talk to these guys. Instead of trying to guess what CNN and ABC are going to do, and divine what's going to show up out there, call them and ask them what their thoughts are about Somalia."

Of course, the news guys are going to ask, "What's going down?" And we can tell them enough so that we can plan together without divulging secret information. Now if it had been Grenada, that's a pop-up target, and it becomes much more difficult. But we've refined this national media pool enough to make even that work.

■

I probably disagree with the folks in the Pentagon. I think they're too quick to leap to the national media pool as the answer to their problems, when I think unilateral coverage is probably a better answer in many instances. Any time you pool, I think you dilute the product, and you come up with vanilla news. And it then gets reported as cleared by DOD censors even though we don't have any kind of censorship or security review, and the reporters get robbed of their primary motivation, which is their byline, or standup, or whatever.

The reporting, therefore, suffers. You don't get as good reporting. But there is a purpose for the pool. In Haiti, it worked very well, and the American media cooperated very well. They did not broadcast the planes taking off from Seymour Johnson or Pope Air Force bases.

'Any time you pool, I think you dilute the product, and you come up with vanilla news.'

Col. Frederick Peck

But what if, instead of Haiti—which wasn't a big surprise—it had been something where we were going to countries that have news media operating out of Washington, and they were opposed to whatever action we were taking. They could have been camped outside the air base and filming the takeoff of those C-141s, and there wouldn't be a damn thing you could do to stop them. They could be broadcasting it back to Korea or Japan or China, or wherever. What do you do in a situation like that?

There are even issues when everything's hunky-dorey as it was for Haiti. We got the pool, and then Rear Adm. Kendell Pease and I and others of us went in and argued with DOD that the pool wasn't enough. We could accommodate unilateral coverage. We pushed, we leaned on USACOM from here in Washington to finally get them to open the door. It was a great story for the Army, but they missed some great opportunities.

There's a natural conflict between the military and the media because the military is populated by Type-A personalities who want control. That's why they like the media pool, and that's why in their mindset it's the first thing. They say, "Okay, the pool, because we know we can control it."

■

The problem that comes up with your independent coverage tier concept is the 800 who don't get to go in those first two tiers, and then they fly to the Dominican Republic, drive across the border and are waiting there when you arrive.

If the Gulf War had gone on for weeks instead of only a matter of 100 hours, you could have gone to doing press coverage the way we did in Vietnam.

The invasion of Normandy is a very good analogy to the start of the ground war in the Gulf. But you could have set out the same ground rules in Desert Storm with the same number of people—1,300 roughly—and not had them pooled.

It may be that we have to make some choices in your independent coverage concept, but my brethren in the public affairs business and the services are very reluctant to make those kinds of choices, establishing those tiers and saying, "Okay, *The Baltimore Sun* can go, and *The Denver Post* can't." But somebody has to do it. Somebody has to bite the bullet.

■

In Somalia, I had 78 U.S.-based news organizations and 42 non-U.S.-based.

I'll give you a real-world example of how you have to make choices, and you can decide whether it was done rightly or wrongly. I was sitting in Mombasa, Kenya, and the media were starting to show up there. We also were getting messages that more were on the way.

They all wanted to join the Marines afloat to come ashore with the landing force. The list began to grow, and I began to negotiate, via radio, with the ship, asking how many they could host. And how many women, because we had billeting requirements to consider as well, and they're going to have to spend a couple of days aboard ship.

They came in with a number that I thought was ridiculously low, and I went back and said, "Come on, give me a break. I know you can fit more people in than that. These people are not asking for staterooms. They'd sleep in the passageway on a blanket roll if that's what it takes. So don't think creature comforts are the riveting factor."

We had, realistically, three rifle companies that were going ashore in three different ways. I asked them how many journalists they could take along. I knew they had helicopter spaces and landing-craft spaces, and that should have been the driving number. They came back with 29 slots—me as the escort officer and 28 news media.

I had a list of over 45 people who wanted to go, and I just worked my way down. it. I had all the networks represented—ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN and Visnews—so I had those five teams to accommodate. I had AP, UPI, and a had a couple of wire photographers. So I just started filling the slots. Then I had a bunch of magazines, and major dailies. I looked down the list and eliminated duplications.

I told *The Washington Post*, "You can take one person, not two. *New York Times*, you can't take two photographers." Eventually, we narrowed it down to 28.

I called Pete Williams in Washington, and I said, "Sir, it's down to a decision point here. Without pooling, I can accommodate all the American media organizations that have shown up here, plus Reuters and Visnews. But I have another 20 people who want to go. Who makes that decision?" And he said, "Well, Fred, I guess you do." And I said, "Good, it's made."

■

It was the same thing when I arrived in Somalia. We had over 600 news media folks there—seven or eight crews from CBS and five from CNN. And everybody wanted to go with a patrol. Everybody wanted to go with a con-

'There's a natural conflict between the military and the media because the military is populated by Type-A personalities who want control.'

Col. Frederick Peck

voy. Everybody wanted to go for a ride in a helicopter.

We just said, "Well, the show's only so big here. You're all just going to have to wait your turn." I started with the major players and just basically told them, "You'll have to work your way through. I'm not here to make you happy. I'm here to do my best to see that your interests are served, as well as ours. But I've got to establish some cutoffs, and not everybody can get to go."

Then I would argue with the operators who did convoys and things, to try to get the maximum number in there, realizing that the ones who got shut out would probably be trailing along behind us or driving out in front of us anyway, and would have to be dealt with in some manner. But at least we had a manageable number that we were hosting.

The public affairs person should be the honest broker. But the news organizations shouldn't forget who my boss is. I'm there to please my commander and my chain of command. But realizing that I am a buffer and a translator and a negotiator, I established a rapport with the media because they knew I was an honest broker and would give them a fair chance.

'Success with the media is very personality-dependent'

Col. Frederick Peck

I tried a couple of times early on to get all the TV guys together and all the print guys together. But they can't do it amongst themselves, certainly not very efficiently. It turns into a big food fight. So I said, "Well, then, I'll make the decisions from now on."

Unless we go to Saudi Arabia again, you'll never have a situation where the king tells you when a reporter can come into the country. They were able to evolve into that combat pool system because the reporters came in a manageable trickle instead of being there all at once.

■

Success with the media is very personality-dependent. What went wrong in Panama was they picked the wrong guy to run the pool. Fred Francis [of NBC], who went as a TV guy, said he saw the Air Force colonel show up wearing basically his uniform and his Corfam shoes while they're going off to war. Francis said, "We've got a problem here."

They got to Panama, and they were told they couldn't go up to Quarry Heights because there was shooting up there. "Well, yeah, that's kind of why we came down here, to cover a war. We kind of expected there would be shooting."

"Well," they were told, "we'll give you some briefings and, when the situation calms down, we'll take you up there."

I disagree a little bit with the media folks I talked to about Desert Storm. It wasn't that they didn't have access. A lot of them had ringside seats to what went down. But they had no capability to file because we limited the equipment that went with them and, fighting across the desert, it wasn't like you could stop at the 7-11 and pick up the pay phone.

When they told Molly Moore (*Washington Post*) and Peter Copeland (Scripps Howard) that they couldn't take their SAT phones with them, they were basically incommunicado until they got to a place where they could file. In Peter's case, he was right out there on the point with an armored cavalry regiment watching them blow up the Republican Guard's tanks and writing wonderful stories. Unfortunately, it's four days later before he finally gets to a place where he can file them. By that time, as far as the bureau chiefs in America are concerned, the war is over, and those stories were dead.

If I were in the media business—and I tell my colleagues this—I'd never settle for security review or pooling beyond a few hours, maybe a day in duration. I would never get coopted into that system again, because you give up too much.

■

Despite the emphasis on working with the media, I could take you down to a media day at Quantico with the captains and majors, and you'd see a real animosity coming from the audience. I remember I took Molly Moore down there after Desert Storm. I thought because she had written nothing but great things about the Marine Corps, she really would be well received by the audience. And they tore her apart.

She was, like, "God, I don't believe that. What have I done?"

But they were taking their animosity for the media out on her, for one. And, I think, there was a lot of jealousy in the room because they'd been sitting in the classroom while Molly was over there going through the war with Gen. Boomer.

But the animosity exists. I don't think we do anything to cultivate it. I think it arrives in the mindset of the person that joins the Marine Corps that the press is, somehow or other, the enemy. Fortunately for the Marine Corps, I think our senior commanders, all the way down to the lieutenant colonel level, are pretty well attuned to the fact that the media's not your enemy. The media is part of the battlefield.

The way we deal with that is, we take them from the large auditorium and break them down into groups of 15 or 20, and put them in with a real, live reporter. They begin to see this person doesn't have horns or a tail, they're a person. They talk about what they do in their jobs.

We work at it constantly. We start with them when they're second lieutenants. We introduce media play and reporters into their war games at Quantico, and we bring them back at the captain level, at the major level. We have commanders' media symposiums at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels.

All the general officers go through an intensive media-training program. All the war games, all of the exercises that we do have media play in them. All of our work-ups for our deploying units have media play in them. We wear them down, but it's a constant process. You can't just say, "Well, we published the order. Everybody now will love and cooperate with the media." You have to consistently keep banging on that theme, and make them realize that the media are a part of the modern battlefield. If you don't plan for them beforehand, you're not going to have any hope for control or success.

■

And we preach that security begins at the source. There's a right of the press to publish anything they want, but they don't have a right to come inside your perimeter.

There's nothing in the Constitution that says you have to bring them in and host them at your position. In fact, you have every right to exclude them. And if you bring them in, you have every right to enforce certain ground rules as a condition for when they come in, because you have a legitimate need for security.

But what we preach to Marines on how to deal with the media is that you get a lot farther with cooperation than you do with confrontation. We do a good job. We've got a good story to tell.

■

One final point: Part of the reason for the friction or animosity is fear. And fear comes out of ignorance. Once we teach them how to deal with the news media, once we give them something so they now have a paradigm with which to deal with the news media, they feel a lot better about it. We sit them down in front of a camera, and we interview them after we've taught them about interview techniques—how to come up with your own bullets and your factoids that you want to fire, and how to work some control measures for an interview, of hooking and flagging and moving over to talk about the points you want to make.

We can even give them a little card with a cheat sheet on it, telling them what to do. We tell them to do the same thing with the troops. Give them media training before deployment, and tell them, "It's going to happen, so here's what you need to know. And, oh, by the way—it's part of your mission."

WILLIAM J. PERRY

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MARCH 27, 1995

This communication access is a critical part of my job. I do not consider this something off to the side. In my first year as secretary, I gave 30 press conferences. I had 65 media interviews, about once a week. And on top of that, I had 55 on-air interviews.

So it was about once a week of going on radio and television, and subjecting myself to Sunday morning talk shows. That's on top of testifying to Congress 18 times, which seems small by comparison, although that 18 doesn't capture the many times I'd go over there for informal meetings.

The second point is, I have strongly emphasized the outreach to other countries—to my counterparts and other officials. In my first year in office, I traveled 120 days and visited 37 foreign countries. On nearly every one of those trips, I had a small press team with me, ranging from two or three—up to eight or nine, depending on how interested they were in the trip.

The access they had during those trips was considerable. And besides the interviews I gave in foreign countries, I would meet with them on the airplanes. We had media on board almost every leg of the trip. So I truly believe that the access and getting this information out is a critical part of my job.

The third comment has to do specifically with the military operations we conduct. I looked very carefully over the plans that we put together for the last three. Haiti, in particular, was sort of a model of how we could conduct this.

You will see us moving in several directions. First of all, we recognize that access is important. Secondly, we try to balance that with the

'There's a right of the press to publish anything they want, but they don't have a right to come inside your perimeter.'

Col. Frederick Peck

need for pre-invasion secrecy by setting up media pools and putting a blackout on the media pools.

In Haiti, as it turned out, we did not have the invasion in the sense that we were planning, but that worked from our point of view, and I think it worked from the media's point of view.

The two big problems we had in Haiti, as I saw it, was a certain endangerment to people's lives by just the milling around of the media in real military operations. Secondly, there were just too many media people. By the time all the foreign media got in there, if not endangering people, they just got in the way. It made the operation more difficult to conduct.

Anybody who looked carefully at what was going on that first day, and saw the swarms of reporters in Port-au-Prince, particularly at the airport, recognized that in many locations there were more reporters than there were military. There were altercations and potential altercations on the street. The endangerment issue there was that the presence of the press was actually making the news, instead of reporting the news.

'It is possible to take the news media into our confidence.'

William Perry

With modern technology, that filming is going out in a matter of hours—in some cases, minutes—and sometimes it is real time. Being closely watched, that's providing a source of intelligence to whomever it is we are trying to deal with. Those are very big problems that are dramatically complicated by modern technology. They're further complicated by the enormous interest people have in what we are doing. You have not just the U.S. media, where we work out agreements and arrangements with the journalists, but the foreign media is swarming in on us, too.

It is possible to take the news media into our confidence. We did that in Haiti, and it worked. Our side of that deal has to be very forthcoming. The arrangers bring in a lot of people, and then really feed them and give them real information. What I can't tell you is how satisfied that [Haiti] media pool was with the extent to which we were giving them information. I can tell you they respected the confidence.

■

Can we institutionalize the peacetime planning of an open coverage tier concept?

Sure. You know we did the same with Somalia. We started with the pool and then broadened it.

■

Do you think the civilian leadership of the military should be presenting everything, constantly, to the news media, or is there an attempt to put the best face forward?

I think our best tactic is to present it, warts and all, because you do have that attitude. You do have people who believe you are trying to cover up. No matter what you do, there are going to be people reporting that. If we give them any real basis for believing that, then you have just absolutely shattered your credibility. If you're trying to get a straight story across, you're not getting credibility on the straight story.

You can argue this from an ethics point of view, you can argue it from the First Amendment point of view, or you can just simply argue it from a practical point of view. But with modern technology, and with as many reporters as there are out there, you are not going to be able to cover up the warts anyway. So by far, your best tactic is just a straightforward and honest getting it out. I simply argue that as the best practical approach and the one that—while it will give you a lump here and a lump there—integrated over time, you are going to come across a hell of a lot better.

■

Do you see hostility among the military toward the press?

I watched pretty carefully for signs of that during the Haiti operation, and I didn't sense much of that. What I did sense was some feeling that the press was interfering with their operations. This was a sort of unique crowd-control element that they were playing down there, where they saw the press there in such great numbers and, with inflammatory reporting, it was making their jobs harder. I was quite sympathetic with the military, although I didn't know what to do about it at the time. It was an annoyance, in making their jobs harder. But I didn't really sense any paranoia.

On the credibility question, I look back at the really bad news stories about the military over the last couple of years. Almost always what made the story bad was not the event that was being covered, but either the fact or the perception of a cover-up. The story became the cover-up, rather than the wart. What happened, in trying to cover up a little wart, you've created a much bigger one.

When a bad story comes out, we try—as quickly as we can—to find out what the facts

are and get them out. That's about the only way of defending yourself. But our limited ability to succeed in doing that keeps us from always succeeding. To the extent that we are playing square and giving them as much information as we can, we have a better environment where people are more apt to accept what we say.

I haven't been terribly successful with [field censorship or security review]. But I am not prepared to give it up. The one thing that always bothers field commanders is the instant reporting of casualties, when we cannot run it through our system to make sure that we are getting accurate information. That is very troublesome to field commanders, although I don't know whether you consider that censorship or not.

COL. ROBERT E. PILNACEK

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
JAN. 23, 1995

I'm not a big advocate of the media pools, because it's easy for DOD to set them up, and then they forget about them.

If they're going to set them up and they're going to send them, then they should support them, and they should provide the vehicles and all of that stuff that's necessary because I don't have the resources to do it, and Sconyers doesn't have the resources. He's trying to keep his head above water with a gazillion other reporters that are down there.

CAPT. ROBERT PRUCHA
COL. JOHN A. SMITH

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, USN
DEP. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, USA
CENTRAL COMMAND
MAR. 30, 1995

[*Interview focused on press coverage of the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia, protected by American troops.*]

Prucha: The pool consisted of 20 individuals. We originally went to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and said we'd like to do about 13. Then we negotiated over that and ended up, ultimately, with the 20, all of whom had started out as members of the quarterly DOD media pool.

For example, the *St. Petersburg Times* was in the pool for the quarter, along with the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and *The Christian Science Monitor*. All three of those publications bowed out, and said they did not want to go. OSD then replaced them with the *L.A. Times*, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. So we had some fairly influential print media journalists.

In each of those cases, the journalists had covered Somalia before, which was great, from our standpoint, because we didn't have to start at ground zero. They knew the history. They knew what it was like. They knew the situation, and we didn't have to start at the very beginning. So that worked well.

■

Smith: A point of explanation on that: This was the first time that, I think, as far as the pool goes, that we had one that was DOD-sponsored and regionally constituted. This one was constituted out of Nairobi. We went after that partly to get some experienced journalists that we could start at a little higher plane, with the luxury of having the DOD distribution system, which a regional pool wouldn't normally have.

The reason the three newspapers dropped out was because they didn't have anybody in Nairobi, and they thought it would be a little bit too expensive to send them there. The DOD media pool, originating out of Andrews Air Force Base, is great when you have a specific D-Day or H-hour and you can plan back from that. But we didn't have that.

United Shield was very situation-dependent, and we needed to be able to react fast. We felt that pulling folks either from the region or from organizations that were willing to get their people over there a little bit ahead of time gave us more time to respond. That was the main reason we went after that.

This was the first time we'd done a regional pool with a DOD sanction. If we had done this purely regionally—and we've done that before—all the stories would have been filed back to a regional point, and then further filed from there. It would have just been kind of distributed regionally.

On the electronic side—and this deviates a little bit from the pool concept—each of the four major networks had a reporter. CNN, NBC, CBS and ABC all had their own reporters. We also negotiated for another CBS-TV crew, so we had two camera crews and four reporters to cover the TV portion of it. They shared the video that was shot.

■

Prucha: Plus, two producers, one an assignment-editor type of guy who can see the broad

'The one thing that always bothers field commanders is the instant reporting of casualties ....'
William Perry

picture and get people out to where they need to go. Then they had another up-link producer, who was the one who kind of wrestled all of the material that was being shot through the up-link.

■

Smith: The decision for this pool was made in DOD, and the message was put out to notify the commands and each one of the bureaus. We formed up the evening of the 20th of February at the Hilton in Nairobi. This operation was not a surprise, and there wasn't a lot of operational security involved.

We went over the ground rules. They signed off on them. Then we gave them the broad view, the background information that we knew at the time, gave them their media packets, and set up for a 5:30 a.m. start time the following morning.

'... The closer we got to Somalia, the clearer it became to us that the press pool was not going to sit back and just stay aboard ships ....'

Col. John Smith

Everybody was responsible to start from the Hilton. We were on the bus, on the way to Nairobi Airport by 5:45 a.m. We got out there and took a C-130, provided by the Marines, to Mombasa. There we did a quick press conference with Admiral Redd and Ambassador Simpson on the tarmac, and then allowed some filing to take place for the print journalists and the radio journalists. The TV journalists did some standups, which we then sent back to Nairobi to be uplinked. Those were the first products out.

As soon as that happened—this all was within about a two-hour period of time—we shuttled the pool from Mombasa, via helicopter, to the USS *Kiska*, which was an ammunition ship that was heading towards the task force. We got aboard that by around noon on the 21st, and sailed with the *Kiska* for about 24 hours.

That night we had an off-the-record dinner between the members of the press pool and Vice Adm. John S. Redd [commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command], and he pretty much laid out the entire operation, to let them know what they were going to be seeing and what was going to happen. It was pretty much a no-holds-barred outline. Then the following noon, we flew from the *Kiska* to the *Belleau Wood*, which was the flagship of the task force.

When we got to the *Belleau Wood*, we had now entered General Zinnie's territory. We started right out with a briefing for the press pool, attended by all the senior staff of the command task force. They went through the whole bit. It really was a no-holds-barred, lay-it-all-out, here's-what's-happening. We were relying on our ground rules as the protection for the information that was being put out, because some of it was operationally sensitive. The ground rules were essentially the ground rules from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, minus the security review. There was no security review at all.

It was security at the source. Everybody understands that whatever they say can be used by the media. So you just have to be careful, right from the get-go, as to what you say, because anything you say is considered to be on the record. The reporters had to agree to abide by whatever embargo might be imposed, to keep something from being released inappropriately. We operated on that basis throughout, and there was not, during the whole operation, a violation of that trust. Gen. Zinnie made it very clear, up front, that they were part of the team, and they were going to know as much as we knew.

I can't say it would always happen this way, but due to the nature of this operation, there really wasn't much that they could not ask for and get an answer to. That set an extremely positive tone for the whole shooting match.

■

One lesson that we learned was: We had not planned on taking the media ashore for coverage. We knew that there were a lot of independent journalists ashore, and we figured that that's how the American people would find out what's going on ashore, prior to the U.S. moving ashore. However, the closer we got to Somalia, the clearer it became to us that the press pool was not going to sit back and just stay aboard ships until the time came for the main body of U.S. troops to move ashore.

They wanted to get on the ground. Since there were a few Americans already on the ground—the planning cell, and the coalition support teams—the pool members wanted to get ashore, to get the aspect of what the Marines would face when they came ashore. A security perimeter already was established. This was not going to be an opposed landing. It was to be an administrative landing, a means of getting soldiers ashore only. It was not an amphibious assault.

The combined task force earlier reached an agreement with Unisom to allow a USA planning cell, which had been there since the 18th of January, and coalition support teams, which had been there for a couple of weeks already, to be ashore within that Unisom perimeter. So when we came ashore, it wasn't a security problem. It was a matter that we were imposing 20 media folks on very little U.S. infrastructure (about 50 U.S. military members).

■

What we set up in advance—and it worked out pretty well—was a system for filing that went from the most sophisticated, down to the most rudimentary. We had the ability to file military messages through the message center. I think we only filed one story that way, because the other systems were working okay. So we filed data from both the ship and, once we got ashore, from there, because we carried with us a portable Inmarsat and a couple of laptops. That was the primary means of filing for print.

From a broadcast standpoint, we were fortunate, situationally, in that we had arranged with World Television Network, which had an uplink in Somalia prior to our arrival, to service the pool and ultimately serve the independent broadcast media there for the time they would be within the security perimeter. So all broadcast video was done from the shores at Mogadishu. Radio was filed both from the ship and from ashore. Photos we filed predominantly over AP Leaf fax type of equipment via Inmarsat.

The only thing that really produced a complaint on the part of the pool was, on the night that we left from the beach, a part of the pool got stranded on a LCAC (Landing Craft-Air Cushioned) for six-and-a-half hours, and could not file, obviously. As it turned out, everyone got to file. But for the time period that we were cutting circles in the Indian Ocean on an LCAC, they were not happy campers. I think that's really the only filing glitch we had during the whole time.

Several things caused it. Gen. Zinnie was in an inoperable AAV (Armored Amphibious Vehicle), bobbing around in the ocean, and they were keeping the well decks of the ships cleared until they got him back aboard. We were safely aboard a ship, so we weren't in any peril. And there was one other AAV that was inoperable, so they kept the well decks opened for the rescue of those vehicles, and all other traffic was put in a holding pattern.

One of the lessons that I had to teach the press pool, however, was that we did not have all of our eggs in one basket. I had eight to 10 of the press pool on the LCAC. The rest we had dispersed to other parts of the operation. They were aboard ships, being able to file during that six-and-a-half hours. The thing that seemed to be forgotten—and I can understand it, from a competitive standpoint—is that you can't always put 20 people at the same point of action at the same time. That was hard to explain sometimes, when their bureau chiefs were leaning on them about why the hell they hadn't submitted something. But they have to remember they are pooled for a reason.

We put the notion to rest right up front that additional people could not join the pool. The independent media were very accessible to where we were throughout the whole operation, from the time we first came ashore. Of course, the independents did not have the advantage of the briefings and access to the pool members did. We, CTF, were also very particular to make sure that the pool always had the best vantage points, always really having the jump on the independents to retain a value for the pool.

We absorbed, the last two days into the pool, three French and three Italian journalists that had come from their nations' ships. And we, kind of on an ad hoc basis, wrapped them into our pool. Quite honestly, that's something that needs some serious planning consideration in the future. We did not do that on prior planning on this. We were able to go ahead and accommodate them for a couple of days, but I have a feeling, in the future, we're going to have to address it much further in advance.

■

Prucha: The reason we didn't do that is that the purpose of the pool is to give the American public a view of what's going on and we should, therefore, cater to the American news media. We shouldn't have to deal with foreigners. So that's kind of the way we approached it, initially. But then once they were on the scene, the Italians had brought a lot of media with them. The French had some. So it was a decision just to include these folks. At the time, it seemed the right thing to do, you know. So they just did it. And it worked out.

Moving print products, of course, is easy. Moving the video products is always something that presents a little bit more of a challenge. And we felt that we were responsible for moving those products. And then you have to look at how we can do that.

The options were: We fly the video products out every day to Mombasa, for further transfer to Nairobi, or we go through the whole process of having one of the networks come up with what they consider to be a portable ground station.

Now, in this case, the portable ground station was going to weigh about 2,800 pounds, and it was going to be 38 crates. Then we'd have to move all that stuff from Nairobi and, ultimately, ashore. What we did was make a deal with the World Television Network that when they came in, they got permission from

'... The purpose of the pool is to give the American public a view of what's going on and we should, therefore, cater to the American news media.'

Capt. Robert Prucha

Unisom to come in and set up. They got permission from General Zinnie. Part of that package was that we told them, when it was time to leave, we would get them out of there. So we didn't have to worry about the logistics of getting them into the country. All we then had to do was just pack them up, when it was time to leave, put them on the *Belleau Wood*, and bring them out.

So it really made the situation a lot easier to move those products. They were already set up and ready to go when the pool arrived. And they knew that they were going to be leaving with us, when the time came.

The independent media didn't know that we had made plans to extract them when the troops came out. And the reason we didn't advertise this was, we were really trying to keep the numbers down. We felt that we would provide adequate coverage to the pool and through the independent media. We also knew that we were going to be responsible for getting all these folks off the beach. If you tell everybody that, up front and ahead of time, you're inviting the people to come. That could then present another logistics problem.

'... The media represented on this pool did as much to help the situation by being professional, by being trustworthy.'

Col. John Smith

So about the second day on the ground, General Zinnie said, "Here are your choices: Tomorrow, I'm going to close the perimeter. If you're outside the fence, you stay outside the fence. If you're inside the fence, you stay inside. If you choose to stay inside, we're going to take care of you. We're going to feed you. We're going to give you a place to stay. And we're going to get you out, when the time comes."

Since they were independent media, the price they paid for that was that they left earlier than the pool. So the pool really got the best shots, got the final shots of everybody leaving the beach. But the bottom line was, I think we had 70-some independent media that we hauled out, in addition to the pool.

■

Smith: The last point I'd like to make is really the crux of the matter. This pool went extremely well. I think there were a few things, situationally, that helped us along. But the bottom line of this whole business is the environment that was established by the command—and this is from General Peay on down—that this pool was a part of the operation. It had the priority of being a part of the operation. And we were going to support it—no ifs, ands, or buts about it. There was no lip service paid.

The pool sat through General Zinnie's operational brief every day—most of the time on the record. And vehicles were put ashore a day before the rest of the troops arrived. Now that was a luxury of this situation. They were dedicated exclusively to the pool—two highback humvees and one five-ton that were totally for the pool's use. All of the things that come with that happened because the commander stood up at the very first and said, "This is going to work. No ifs, ands, or buts. No excuses."

When the troops landed, we had six of the press in the command center, watching. These were the print guys, because there wasn't much to see from a photo standpoint. They sat there with the command group, while the stuff was coming ashore, seeing it from that aspect. And from the top down, I never saw a case where someone was reluctant to be accessible or provide support as needed. That was because the tone had been set up front.

The last part was that the media represented on this pool did as much to help the situation by being professional, by being trustworthy. There are a lot of future leaders who were exposed to these reporters. And what they saw were professionals who could be told something and didn't run outside and report it, except when it was appropriate to do so. Most even had more knowledge about Somalia than the people they were talking to. For example, I had two in the press pool who had been wounded in Somalia while covering Somalia earlier.

So the bottom line is that the positive reinforcement goes both ways. And the press that represented the pool did the media profession proud in the way they conducted themselves.

COL. JOSEPH W. PURKA

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY
FEB. 1, 1995

The Vietnam experience may have been the symptom, rather than the cause of military-media antagonism. The most hostile group to the news media, I have found, were the Marine captains down in Quantico. My guess is most of those guys were preschoolers during Vietnam. So it's not that baggage they're carrying with them. It's something else. If I can speculate, it may be the growth of investigative journalism, the suspicion of everything, the looking for deception and cover-up, the distrust of the government,

that flies in the face of the trust, loyalty and unity of a military organization.

Generally, it's not the training. To the best of my knowledge, there is no training in the military where you would necessarily be critical of the media or the profession. I think the officers pick it up, based on their personal observations and in conversations with their peers.

Here at the Air Force Academy, for example, they wonder how come the *Gazette Telegraph* always writes negative things about the Academy. That's not totally true. There are positive stories. But which are the stories that make Page One and not the inside pages? It's the negative stories, the stories that are critical, or cause embarrassment, or something of that sort. The positive stories are less visible because they wind up on the inside pages.

Having done this for 24 years now, I don't think our relationship with the press is all that negative. But there's not much understanding among cadets of what makes news and what is going to make the front page.

The other thing, to some degree, is a tendency that is found in business, the clergy and other institutions, as well as the military, and probably in the news media itself, for that matter. It is the tendency to protect the institution, and to be somewhat soft-skinned in that regard.

You'll sit there and watch *60 Minutes* as they blast the clergy. You may believe some of it, disbelieve other parts, and be amused by most of it. Then, something comes on about the military, and immediately, the hackles go up. Or if you're in business, and something comes on about your company or industry, you get the same reaction. And even if it's true, you say, "Why do they have to use that?" It's a tendency to protect the institution more than anything else, I think, which causes that type of reaction.

The news organizations are protective of their institution, too. The cadets here asked the reporter from downtown—the one who generally writes the negative stories—if she would come and talk to the class. The newspaper refused.

This came shortly after a story about a cadet who was being expelled. Now, 99 out of a hundred cadets at the Academy knew that this one guy was a hood who had no business being here in the first place and who probably had some violent tendencies that would get him into trouble sooner or later.

Well, the newspaper article portrayed this poor, innocent individual as one who was being railroaded by the Academy. So I think the cadets really were looking for the reporter, to tear into her. She probably picked up on that, and that was the reason she declined. Situations like this are where cadets develop a distrust of the news media. This, and a perceived attitude of the news media that "I don't have to defend what I'm doing."

So that contributes, to some degree, to the hostility. And a lot of it is lack of understanding for each other.

■

You say, "Gosh, the Washington press corps is tough." But, in many cases, dealing with these guys, who at least understand the military, makes a big difference.

Now, wartime is a different situation. That's when you get people who carry a reporter's notebook in their inside pocket and they automatically get in to become war correspondents. And they may not know the first thing about it.

On a daily basis, there is an ingrained institutionalism. It's part of the military socialization process. It's not anything that's written down. It's not part of any curriculum. But the socialization in the military develops an ethic which protects the institution, and your superiors. Like any bureaucracy, or even in business, bad news doesn't go uphill very well. This converts into the tendency to be distrustful of outsiders who are critical.

'... The socialization in the military develops an ethic which protects the institution, and your superiors.'

Col. Joseph Purka

I've known people who have been in extremely positive relationships with reporters, able to sit down with them and really explain things, and generally keeping a friendly relationship. Then, all of a sudden, because of the nature of an issue that is potentially negative, potentially critical, they immediately go into a defensive crouch. That's really probably more a reaction of human nature than anything else.

From my observation of the military, there is a recognition when you get into the general officer rank that press interviews are something you have to do, whether you like it or not. If played right, it could be to your advantage, and if played wrong, it could be to your disadvantage, but it's something you have to do regardless. If you're a commander of a major command, the ability never to do an interview is almost nonexistent, because sooner or later you're going to have to do something.

My personal opinion is that the news media is an asset—not necessarily to be managed, however. It can be used to the advantage of the military. Getting the word out about some of the good things the people are doing, the need

for new weapons systems or modernization, assisting in the recruiting effort: these are the positives.

There are also perceived negatives, which, in some respects, are good. I tend to believe that if it weren't for a free press, the level of government abuse—and I'm not necessarily talking about mismanagement of funds; I'm talking more along the lines of an abuse of power, for example—would be much greater. Again, that's just the nature of the bureaucracy and the way things work. Because you have someone watching over your shoulder, you are forced into doing the right thing. But in the absence of that, if what you want to do becomes more difficult, then it becomes so much easier to do the expedient thing, rather than the right thing.

'The problem is, in the world of CNN, the Saddam Husseins of the future are going to have their television sets turned on ....'

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf

GEN. H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF
U.S. ARMY (RET.);
SUPREME COMMANDER, GULF WAR
JAN. 23, 1995

One of the big problems with Desert Shield, originally, and Desert Storm was the fact that, once again, we had not dealt with the problem since the days of Grenada. Therefore, you do one of two things: You fall back on what you came up with after Grenada, or you have to invent a system right there on the spot.

And inventing a system right there on the spot is absolutely the wrong way to go about doing business because there are so many other things that are so much more important, that have to be done at that time. None of the people who should be involved in the decision-making process, at that point, get involved, because of the pressures of Saddam invading and the question of "Is he going to come into Saudi Arabia?" You're getting your defense up. You just don't have the time to devote to it.

The Department of Defense, the Executive Branch, or whomever, needs to deal with the problem now, and work out the guidelines and the rules for the next conflict that's going to come up two years, five years, eight years from now.

I don't feel there is a fundamental conflict between the military and the media. I feel we have a management problem on our hands. The world is forever shrinking, as a result of the tremendous transportation capability we have in the world.

So whereas at the height of the Tet offensive there were 80 reporters in Vietnam, at the height of the war in the Gulf we had 2,060 reporters. In Vietnam, it was predominantly U.S. reporters and a few Australian reporters. In the Gulf War, you had reporters streaming in from every nation in the world, just flowing in.

I think that that's going to continue to happen in future wars. Because the world is getting smaller, because of mass communication, you are going to have a giant influx of reporters, not solely American. That was problem number one, just the sheer numbers we had to deal with.

Number two is, of course, technology. In Vietnam, when a battle was recorded on television, it was generally about 72 hours before that videotape made it back to national television. With the way technology is today, people can get something, bing, up to the satellite, bing, onto the television set instantaneously, practically. And that technology is only going to get better.

All you have to do is look at these 18-inch satellite dishes that are coming out now, that are going to replace cable. I had satellite communication anywhere I went. A fellow sat down, put up his antenna, took out a compass, found out where the satellite was, shot the azimuth and, boom, we could talk to the world. So it's not beyond the realm of reason that five years from now, or 10 years from now, every reporter is going to have the same capability.

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The problem is, in the world of CNN, the Saddam Husseins of the future are going to have their television sets turned on in their headquarters.

So we have to come to a reasonable set of guidelines, or agreement, or something. How do you handle 2,000 reporters, all of whom have an ability to instantaneously report what they see on the battlefield? When what they report may end up in your enemy's headquarters?

The reporters don't have the sieve, if you will, to screen what it is they're seeing. They don't have the big picture to say, "Well, if I report this, does this become a breach of security; will this endanger the troops or not?" They just don't have that sieve.

Of course, I'm saying this very black and white. But the reporters' priority, I think, is speed first, accuracy second and, third, operational security. They want to get the scoop. I understand that. That's the nature of their

business. They want to get the byline, whatever. So, bingo, they're interested in speed, and accuracy suffers a little bit.

My priority, as a commander in the field, is exactly the opposite. Number one, operational security. Number two, say what you want, but make sure it's accurate. I could care less who gets the byline, so speed is not important to me.

Before the Gulf War, there was a very controversial decision made under Colin Powell. Most of the CINCs objected to it, me included. It said that the principal, number one person who would control everything having to do with the media was Pete Williams, and that Washington would call all the shots, in theater, on how the media was dealt with.

The CINCs said, "Wait a minute. Washington doesn't always know what's going on. As a matter of fact, most of the time they probably don't know, or are out of touch." Anyhow, the decision was made that Pete was really the principal shot-caller. So a lot of times, things that were blamed on the people in theater had been directed straight from Washington for—let's face it—principally political reasons, probably. The people in theater didn't like it any more than anybody else.

I'll give you a very good example. At one point, we all got told that we couldn't deal with press anymore. This started, I think, about the end of November. From then until the war started, we were just told: "You cannot talk to the press any more. None of your generals can talk to the press any more."

Obviously, when the press is trying to get an interview with me, I'm not going to go back and say, "Well, I can't talk to you, because Washington says I can't." That's not the way we do business. We salute, follow orders, and that's it. But it got a little nasty after awhile, because people were trying to get interviews. Up until that time, we had tried very hard to be open, within the realm of reason, to do interviews. And now, all of a sudden, we had to clamp a lid on it. The reason why was plainly and simply because we had been told by Washington we couldn't.

Another very good example was cruise missiles. We fired a lot of cruise missiles at the beginning of the overall strategic air campaign, and we were showing selective footage of cruise missiles firing.

Colin Powell called me and said, "These cruise missiles cost—I forget how much money—every time you fire one. Let's put a lid on firing cruise missiles. Let's stop." I'm sure it wasn't Colin's decision alone. It came from the Department of Defense. I said, "Fine, we can work around it." So we restructured the strategic bombing campaign, and we finally stopped using the cruise missiles. But we had a lot of footage on cruise missiles.

Suddenly, unbeknownst to me, a whole bunch of cruise-missile footage starts being broadcast to the United States. I said, "Wait a minute. We're trying to de-emphasize cruise missiles. We're trying to stop firing the cruise missiles, and here the drum is being beat on cruise missiles. Where is this coming from?"

Well, I came to find out that that footage was down in one of our media centers someplace. And Pete Williams had called up, found out it was there, and demanded it be sent directly to him. It was sent directly to him, and it was shown in the Pentagon. And the theater commander and Colin Powell are sitting here, and it just goes, shoo, right around them and out the other door.

Then Colin calls me up and says, "Damn it, what is this cruise missile stuff doing on the air?" I said, "It beats the hell out of me. I will find out." But that sort of thing happened.

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When we were trying to hammer out the rules, at the very beginning of Desert Shield, they were not our rules. A lot of that stuff was OSD-imposed. They were sent to us, and we would try and put the theater spin on the thing and send it back to them. They were the ones that were approving it. But we were the ones that were getting, quote, the blame, end quote, for lack of a better word. But it really was an OSD-forged policy, and a Pete Williams-forged policy, and one that was dictated by Washington, D.C.

I think you'll see that it's very clear that the policy—all policies, with regard to dealing with the press—comes straight from OSD Public Affairs.

Not only was I open to reporters and pools but let me tell you a story that not a lot of people know. After you went over in the first pool, Prince Bandar [Saudi ambassador to the United States] came down to my house for lunch. This would have been right about the 20th of August. We were talking about a lot of things, and he said something to the effect that the pools had run their course. "We of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia have shown that we are open to the press. And, now, effective 30 August, we're going to kick all the reporters out of country. We will form our own pool of Saudi Arabian reporters, and we will report the news."

'At one point, we all got told that we couldn't deal with press anymore. '

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf

I said, "Bandar, I'm sorry. You can't get there from here. You can't walk that cat back. Now that the door is open and the first media pool is in, the American public— and I'm sure the American government—will never sit still for you doing this."

He said, "Oh, but we have to do that. We cannot tolerate reporters running all over the place."

I said, "Bandar, you don't understand. You are going to have to keep the pool there. And as a matter of fact, I would venture to say that there will be even more reporters coming over. Now that you've opened the door, you just have to deal with it. We will help you in every way we can to manage this thing. But that's the way it's going to be."

So not only was I open to the media being there, but I feel that I was very largely responsible for preventing the Saudis from going ahead and putting a lid on the pool. There were many times when the Saudis wanted to kick somebody out of the country because some story would come out that they viewed as unfavorable. But we never kicked a single guy out of the country. Tempted, but we never kicked one out. I'd say, "No, It will cause you far more trouble than it's worth. We have to be open to the press."

'... I feel that I was very largely responsible for preventing the Saudis from going ahead and putting a lid on the pool.'

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf

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In the very early days of the war, the deception planners came down with their deception plan. One of the principal proposals was that we would plant false stories in the newspapers. Then the enemy, reading these newspapers, would be led to believe them. But a decision made in Washington, which I supported, was that's not the way we do things in the United States of America. We don't lie to the press. We do not put false stories in the newspaper to manipulate the enemy. We're not going to do that.

Now I will tell you, quite candidly, when the reporters' focus was on the Marines going out on amphibious operations, I never stood up and said, "Wait a minute. We don't plan to do any amphibious operations." I was delighted that the press was doing that.

But I will swear on a stack of Bibles that we never, ever deliberately manipulated the press, and we never, ever deliberately planted a false story. We just didn't do it. First of all, we didn't need to do it because there was so much stuff going on out there that I would have been confused, myself, reading the papers, if I didn't know what was going on.

But it's just not the way you do things in a democracy. That decision was made in Washington in early August, and it was the one we continued to use throughout the war. There was never an intent to manipulate or manage the press.

The only thing we had trouble with, that perhaps caused field commanders to deal with the press the way they did, was the fact that you do have this instant reporting that can cause you trouble. Therefore, I would say to the field commanders: "Be very careful what you say to the press. Be very careful what your troops say to the press."

There were breaches of security that occurred because of somebody standing up and saying, "I'm standing here with the 82nd Airborne at some place" and, bingo, that's placing a unit and a location on the battlefield with a capability, and that's a security violation.

The good news was the Iraqi intelligence wasn't that good. But had they been that good, it could have caused us a lot of problems by just saying, "Hey, it is now 11 o'clock at night. There was a major gun battle." They call down and find out where a major gun battle happened on the front, and it happened right here. And they said, "Well, wait a minute. The last report we had, that unit was over there. What's it doing over here?" That's a specific example of something that happened.

■

One of the things I remember as a CINC that I objected to—and this was about '88 or '89, when they came out with these new OSD guidelines—not only were we responsible for other things, but we were responsible for all the transportation for the reporters that were on the battlefield. We were responsible for the feeding of all the reporters. We were responsible for the housing of the reporters. We were responsible for communications. We were responsible to make sure that they could get their stories back.

Now, that's manageable if you have 18 pools of 10 or 15 people. But if you've got 2,060 people, all of whom feel that they can go anywhere on the battlefield they want to go, and you are responsible for their housing, their feeding, their transportation, and their communication, it is just totally unmanageable.

I can't have 2,000 reporters out there, running around at random. It's not the press. It is the fact that just overwhelming numbers of people are out there and, literally, that's what they wanted. They wanted free and unrestricted access to go anywhere they wanted to and do anything they wanted.

Reality is, you know, hey, if somebody would have said to me, "50, that's it," I would

have said "Wonderful. Okay." But one of the problems we ran into is *The New York Times* had five people there. Okay. And you've just sent a *New York Times* reporter out on the pool. But there's 2,000 people clamoring to get out there, and so you're rotating people into the pool. And the next pool goes out, and the *New York Times* number two guy comes up and says, "Why aren't I in the pool?" Well ...

Even 300 is reasonable. But all of a sudden, a helicopter comes winging in from Dubai, there's *Der Stern*. This helicopter lands, and it disgorges a television crew and three, four, or five Reuters reporters, and they're there. Whether you like or not, you got to deal with them. Sure, at bayonet point, you can put them back on the helicopter. That makes a great story. So what do you do?

■

I could tell you a lot about this one-story business and how it can ruin your life. There was this *New York Times* reporter. He goes down early in Desert Shield to the 24th Division. The only reason why he's in the 24th Division is because his brother happens to be the chief of staff. He comes from a long line of military guys. His other brother is an admiral down here at Special Operations Command.

His story comes out and says everybody talks about how prepared they are. But he says he went out with this outfit. They got lost in the desert. They ran out of fuel. He talked to the commander, and the commander is worried about body bags.

But, most of all, he talked to this bunch of troops. It was a headquarters maintenance platoon or something, not anybody that's in the front line. He said, "These guys don't know what's going on. Nobody's keeping them informed."

I read this thing and I said, "I can't believe that we have a platoon out there that doesn't know what's going on." So I called Gary Luck, the corps commander, and I said, "Gary, if this story is true, there's a leadership problem out there. We need to go out and find out if these troops do, in fact, know what's going on. If they don't, somebody needs to be telling them. And this story about body bags is crazy, because there's no truth to it. You need to see what's going on in your troop information program."

If a story came out saying the troops didn't have any boots, same thing. I would call up the commander and say, "Wait a minute. A story here says the troops don't have boots. How about checking on this?" If the press comes out and says there's some deficiency out there, as a commander, I'm going to find out what's going on. If somebody's wife writes me and says, "My husband's in the field, and he doesn't have a weapon," then I'm going to find out why.

So I went down to Gary, and it went downhill to Barry. And Barry went to the commander. Unfortunately, timing-wise, I was scheduled to visit the 24th. About a week later, I went out there and never got out of the headquarters. We got a big briefing and left.

The next thing I know, I had been accused of going down to the 24th Division, grabbing this poor battalion commander, and threatening him with relief. It never happened. Not once.

But that one story led to a perception that every time a negative story comes out in the press, I call the generals. Let me remind you that Walt Boomer worked for me, too. Very definitely worked for me. I can assure you that if I was bringing that kind of pressure on my Army commanders, I would have been bringing exactly the same kind of pressure on Walt Boomer. He was not exempt, nor was my Navy commander, Stan Arthur. It just didn't happen.

But because of the *Times* guy beating that drum ... As a matter of fact, if you go back and look at the tape, Dan Rather asked me that specific question on the Thanksgiving interview. He said, "Well, we've heard that there's a battalion commander out there, and that you went down and personally threatened him with relief."

And I said, "I've never met the man. If he walked through the door right now, I wouldn't even know who the battalion commander was. It didn't happen. All I did was call the corps commander and say, 'If this story is true, there's a leadership problem down there, and you guys need to look into the problem.'"

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Censorship laws didn't go out until 1947. So every story Ernie Pyle sent in went through a military censor.

The two things you have to do is, number one, limit the numbers. And, number two, somehow, some way, control what it is that's going out instantaneously over the lines. Now against Iraq, it probably didn't make much difference. But if we end up fighting Russia, or China, or something like that, that's going to make a huge difference because of the intelligence capability of the countries.

That's where the confrontation occurs. I think it's fair to say—and I'm not saying this critically—that most media people funda-

'... Every story Ernie Pyle sent in went through a military censor. '

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf

mentally do not want to see the slightest dent in anything having to do with their First Amendment rights. It's sort of like the NRA and gun control. The NRA says, "Well, you put one gun rule out there, and that's the beginning of the end; you're on the slippery slope to the bottom of the hill." The attitude is: "Yes, we want to be there We want to have free access. You give us a bunch of guidelines, and then just trust us, because we'll abide by your guidelines." Come on.

And if you say, "Wait a minute, we'd like to see your stories," the reply is, "No, sorry, I can't do that. That's the slippery slope down to losing our First Amendment rights."

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As a citizen in the United States of America, I think it's very important that we come to some agreement before the next major confrontation. If we don't, it is inevitable that the next confrontation is going to happen and the problem is going to be compounded just because of the advances we have in technology.

'... I think it's very important that we come to some agreement before the next major confrontation.'

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf

I don't know what the answer is. As a commander in the field, my answer is very simple: Number one, limit the number of people to a manageable number. I want the press there. I think it's important for the American people, for their right to know. But you have to limit it to a number that's manageable by the commander.

Number two, there has to be some screen that's put up before people are allowed unlimited access to satellites to broadcast their stories worldwide, because if you allow that to happen, you are going to end up killing people. It's going to cost the lives of the troops. That's just not right.

You have to limit the numbers and control what is going out instantaneously over the lines. If you don't—well, as I very facetiously say, I never saw one television program that was being broadcast by an Iraqi television crew walking through the Iraqi troop positions.

The American people made it very clear in the Gulf War that they have their right to know. But if their right to know means that someone is going to be put in harm's way, then they don't want to know. I think the American people have sent that signal very sternly.

I don't worry about that 90 percent of reporters who go over there. It's that 10 percent that are—I don't want to say a bunch of ninnies, but you've got a certain callous few who say they could care less about national security. They just want to get their stories in. Then you've got others who are just plain dumb. They're just stupid, and they don't know the difference.

BRIG. GEN. RONALD T. SCONYERS

DIRECTOR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
U.S. AIR FORCE
OCT. 21, 1994

In the relationship between the media and the military, one of the things I talk about is principles of war. Clausewitz defined basically nine principles of war. In my opinion, there is a 10th principle that overarches all the other nine, and that is public opinion. Harry Summers talked about it in his book *On Strategy* in Vietnam. In today's environment, without favorable public opinion you are not even going to get to the war, let alone being able to wage that war. And it's more than just war—it's peacekeeping, it's humanitarian, it's contingency, it's all those operations where decisions are made in Washington, decisions based on needed public support. So we have to bite the bullet. We've got to make those helicopters, those trucks available, whatever, to get the media out there because that's the only way we're going to get the story told.

Total cooperation between the military and the news media is not going to happen just yet because I don't know that we have that level of mutual trust. I don't think the media trusts the military, and I don't think the military trusts the media. And frankly, I hate to say this, but I think a lot of that lack of trust comes within my own public affairs community. I think some of the senior leadership is more trusting than some of the PAs, because it's the PAs who get berated by a variety of people when something shows up in the media that was misquoted or quoted out of context. They sometimes get beat about the head and shoulders by their commanders, so they have this reticence to be open and honest.

To develop the understanding of the media, you need to start working with them at the captain's level. By the time they get to the War College, and the media walk in for a full-day seminar, all these O-5s and O-6s sit there and they start booing. They've already got this mindset that these guys are the bad guys. We can all sit here and tell stories about when the media screws up, but we, too, need to be understanding.

I have a problem all the time getting senior leadership to understand that the guy who writes the story is not the guy that writes the headline in the newspaper. Usually the guy that writes the headline reads the first graf and the last graf, if it's a big newspaper, and slaps some kind of headline on there that may not reflect very well what's in the story.

■

We want to get reporters out there and let them participate and get dirty. That's where the stories get told. But nobody seems to want to act on taking them out to different exercises. The problem is, the commanders don't want to be messing with the reporters when we're doing an exercise. To my way of thinking, that's exactly when we ought to be doing it. That's when we can train them, we can learn their requirements, and they can learn our requirements.

■

There's another dynamic that operates both in peace and war, and that is the friendly and sometimes not-so-friendly competition among the services. The Navy, in my way of thinking, right now is the benchmark for getting the service story out. They are the master marketeers, but they are perceived as doing it at the expense of other services. If I had a chance to get an F-16 story out as opposed to an FA-18 story, I'm going to go for the F-16 story, even if I'm sitting in the JIB in Saudi Arabia. This is the suit I wear, this is who pays my salary, and it's hard to get that joint perspective into your system.

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Following are additional previously published comments offered by Gen. Sconyers:

Dealing with the media has always been important, but it's time to think about communications differently. Antagonism toward the press must be set aside. There are new realities, realities that point to learning to accept and work with the press, or perish. Communications voids do not last, they are filled by other voices if we fail to respond quickly and professionally.

Continual contact and education on both sides will enhance all of our efforts. The Air Force must become more sophisticated when working with the media, developing a relationship of mutual respect that decreases the "cultural antagonism" that can harm communications between the Air Force and the press.

GEN. JOHN SHALIKASHVILI

CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DEC. 29, 1994

I think I was shaped, as much as anything, by Vietnam, and as far as the press/military relationship is concerned, I walked away with a very sour taste in my mouth, that something had gone badly wrong in that relationship.

I reached a conclusion that the foundation of any healthy relationship is one that needs to be based upon, as much as security will permit, a hands-off policy by the government and by the military.

That is, you ought to allow the press to do its job. Only when there are legitimate security and safety issues ought the government interject itself. And then, get out of that interjection as rapidly as possible.

My next experience was my involvement at the end of Desert Storm, with the Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, where I said that I wanted to be as forthcoming as I could, to allow the press to do its job, to give them access to what they felt they needed in order to get their job done.

But there's another component, and that is the responsibility to ensure that you help them understand what is going on. Let me give you an example. There are reporters who run around today who wouldn't know a battalion from a company, who wouldn't know one airplane type from another. They have a responsibility to become more professional and get to know their job.

We have a responsibility, too, and a selfish interest, in making sure that they are knowledgeable. It isn't just knowing the piece of equipment, but to really help them understand what they're seeing and then let them reach their own conclusions on the issues.

Those were my driving motives, and I think we achieved that. The press we had was, by and large, very supportive—partly because of what we were doing. It's kind of hard to get yourself all upset about saving lives. But also, we gave them plenty of opportunities to help them understand it better, to assist them in getting to places so they could tell their story better. And I think the country was better served as a result of it.

'... The foundation of any healthy relationship is one that needs to be based upon, as much as security will permit, a hands-off policy by the government and by the military. '

Gen. John Shalikashvili

Although we were never directly involved in Bosnia, we were in operations such as the no-fly regime. I tried to press those guys—again, within the limits of security concerns—to be open and forthcoming and do as much teaching as we could.

The next event was Somalia. I came to this job right after the early October casualties and the backlash of the whole operation. What we were facing was how to extricate ourselves from Somalia and come home. Therefore, the relationship with the press was a very big part of it.

The fact that we were able to get out of Somalia by the beginning of March this year, with hardly anyone even noticing that we had done so, was not an accident but was by design. I thought that we could serve the country best by being very low key in this thing, very professional. But in getting out of there, the last thing we really needed was to make headlines every day. I think that was still within the principle of being very open, but not trying to dramatize the thing and just being matter of fact, and professional. On a couple of trips, I took the press with me, to make sure that they would feel that they had access to all of that.

■

'The press ... is so well connected that it is virtually impossible for me to do close-held planning ... without it getting to someone in the media.'

Gen. John Shalikashvili

Public affairs training should start sooner than it does and be more extensive than it is. I think we keep shooting ourselves in the foot. We still have people, in my generation, who think if they solved the Vietnam problem, whatever the hell it was, then we're okay. But even if we solve Vietnam, today the world is different than it was in Vietnam. Technology is different. Reporting of events is a different issue. Access to things that are ongoing is a different issue than it was in Vietnam. Yet some of my generation are still trying to solve that problem. Youngsters are probably doing it, too. I haven't given it much thought, but I would think that they're doing it as a kind of a reflection of what they hear from some of their elders. You know, real men don't talk to the press ....

There's this reaction that, if you keep the press at arm's length, you'll be better off than if you don't. Where that comes from, I'm not sure. I think there's a built-in distrust.

There is another aspect, maybe just peculiar to this town. The press, by and large, is so well connected that it is virtually impossible for me to do close-held planning, close-held discussions of issues, without it getting to someone in the media. It's not that we're not as patriotic as we used to be; it has become part of the culture. A colonel tells his buddy over a beer, others talk to the buddy, and eventually it ends up in somebody's column. It is so porous that it has an effect on how one does business. Because of the concern about whether something will leak, sometimes you don't do the necessary staff work or homework because you're afraid that, if you do, it will get out and everything will be destroyed.

We have to understand that it is a myth that it's better to hold the media at arm's length than it is to allow them to do their job. The media, on the other hand, need to understand—not that we expect them to change—that they have a fundamental impact on how we, nowadays, can and cannot do business.

■

On the military side, sometimes when you can finally say, "I want you to keep the media informed," the younger they are, the more they have the tendency not to stay in their lane. I encourage a lieutenant, when he encounters a member of the press, to talk about the things that he, as a lieutenant, is responsible for. I really encourage it. But I don't want him to talk about what the president ought to be doing or what I ought to be doing. Just watch what your responsibilities are.

In the relations with the media, we need to do better for people—particularly young people as they go up through the ranks—to understand that they're encouraged to talk about the things that they are responsible for and that they can be expected to be knowledgeable about. But it is not all right to postulate how Schwarzkopf ought to be hooking to the left or hooking to the right. Let Schwarzkopf talk about it.

■

Let me talk about Haiti. We went on the assumption that we would have to invade Haiti, that there would be a forced entry. When we started, we wanted to keep that quiet. So we had to do the planning in a very small compartment. Then we reached a point where we needed to have units rehearse certain pieces of it without the units knowing what they were rehearsing. We took down that airfield in Port-au-Prince three times without the soldiers knowing that they were taking down the airfield three times.

Then came a point where we felt that it was in our interests for the Haitian government to understand that we were serious. We wanted the press to report that we were serious, so we could become much more open about it.

The stories were helpful, although people were reporting how bad our security was and that it was all leaking. But there was no decep-

tion at all. We were encouraged by the fact that those stories would appear because that made it more credible, that, in fact, we were serious and something was going on.

But then came the issue of saying to yourself, in this environment—clearly—you cannot maintain strategic surprise. We wanted them to know we were coming, because that would make the diplomatic effort more credible. This was before we knew that President Carter would get involved. But there was always a supposition that someone would get involved. As it turned out, the Carter mission developed, and so we didn't have to send someone from the administration to do it.

But we knew, then, that the strategic surprise was not achievable, not desired. But you had to maintain, somehow, the tactical surprise; you had to settle on how many days, either way this thing went, you had to allow yourself. And that's not easy to do when you consider that you've got the ROROs (roll-on, roll-off) that have to start flowing, so they can marry up with the troops that land.

But that's doable, if you're clever about it and if you work your timelines right. What is not doable ... when the time comes that you expect to jump in—particularly since this was going to be a night operation—how could you keep what by that time was about a three-, four-hundred man media party in Port-au-Prince from turning on white lights, from getting in the way?

My dilemma was this: You're trying to make a night jump, to take down the airfield, as an example, and you have white lights illuminating. You're really endangering soldiers.

When you have a patrol that has just landed, and it's going down the street, trying to clear the street, and on the right-hand side, there is a television crew filming, first of all, those soldiers feel like asses, crouching from door to door and trying to clear it. So they will be less attentive, because they will feel absurd doing it. And so they will no longer watch all the roof lines. They will no longer search every doorstep, because they feel foolish. They know it's being shown in Detroit on the evening news.

So they will just nonchalantly walk along, and some sniper is going to get them. There are real, honest-to-goodness security concerns, and we had to deal with those.

We then went to the highest levels of the media and laid that out and asked for their consideration. We knew that Cedras watched CNN. So it was important that CNN understood what kind of a real-life problem that could pose because, watching the airdrop, he could redirect whatever little reinforcements he had for that situation. It was important, for at least a certain amount of time, to have an embargo. I was absolutely delighted with the response from the press.

The press agreed to, I think, almost everything we asked for. We, in turn, had to really beat down some of our own guys here who wanted to make outrageous demands. I think my one regret is that we didn't go to the press a little sooner, and work on it.

Now, that's the U.S. press. It's a different story when you have international press, as we did in Port-au-Prince. That's much harder to work on, although there we didn't have the problem of German television showing something, being fully aware that Cedras wasn't monitoring German television. Someplace else, it might be different. An operation might be unfolding where it might be very relevant if Algerian TV shows something. But that's a different story.

■

Our appetite is larger than what we will get. But if we limit our appetite and work with the senior leadership, we can make progress. I don't know why, but I was very pleasantly surprised. I think the great step forward is that it was possible to talk about it and do it.

We were just talking about Desert Storm, and I submit to you, at the beginning of Desert Storm, it would have been impossible to discuss some of the things which we did here without any great debates.

ROBERT SIMS

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY
FEB. 28, 1995

[*Sims is former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.*]

I couldn't have dealt with the numbers of journalists who showed up for Desert Storm. I don't know how they did it, frankly. I never had anything, in all my experience, where there were so many reporters going to such a limited area—under foot, if you will, having to be handled, having to be briefed and escorted.

I don't know where we go from here, unless you get some kind of an arrangement that would limit the numbers.

'I couldn't have dealt with the numbers of journalists who showed up for Desert Storm.'
Robert Sims

I think you can set guidelines and ask reporters and news organizations to live within security guidelines, not identifying whatever is specified in the guidelines. But I think the enforcement almost has to be moral, because you can't really control the tabloids and the others. You can, and should, kick violators out of a theater, if you've got that kind of control. But you don't always have that, and that's the trouble.

Reporters will be on every pool or tier that you organize. But the news organizations also will send people, unilaterally, to get whatever they want. How do you keep them from being everywhere else?

■

On the question of whether you can enforce some kind of security field censorship, I don't think so. I think you can ask, and if it's made clear what the national interest is, most reporters and most news organizations will want to cooperate. Even in this day and age, I think they really will want to cooperate, if they understand why they should.

'The filing of copy has always been a problem, from World War II on.'

Robert Sims

There's always the problem of getting news organizations to work together and agree on anything. They've got their own interests, or they may be competing within their radio, television, print, news magazine, photo categories for space and for treatment. I found it really hard to get them to come together.

First of all, a lot of the news organizations seriously questioned whether they wanted to be a part of a cooperative effort, especially cooperating with the Defense Department. So if you could come up with a holding company of some kind that would be independent and would be trusted by news organizations, which could be funded and carry on training and be an institutional memory, it would be a real step forward.

The military are always going to remember. They've got this carryover. They may remember the wrong things. But there will be more of an institutional memory there.

■

I liked to exercise the pool, probably more than the news organizations liked. They didn't want to send a reporter to Fort Campbell, or someplace, because they wanted to go somewhere for real.

But what we found was if we sent them to Fort Campbell, the reporters would show up wearing Gucci loafers. Until they got trained, and had been through some exercises, they weren't very good. But the escort officers also didn't know what was required of them until they had done some training, too. So there's more training required on both sides.

I have always been on the First Amendment side, believing that the military had an obligation to let the people, through news organizations, know what they were doing. The people paid for the national defense effort, and our government, generally. We ought to tell them what they're paying for.

But in a military operation, lives are at stake. So if you've got the right attitude among military leaders—that is, they understand they've got an obligation to the press—the military leaders should have the last word.

I always told the pool representatives, "When we call out the pool, and it's for real, the pool may be one person, if that's all we can get in. Or it may be the first 10, or the first 20." And I promised them that they wouldn't have to decide who would go, because I knew they couldn't.

They could never agree. If we said it's five guys, there would be 10 news organizations powerful enough to get through to the president to make sure they were one of those five. So I said we would decide. I really think that somewhere, the government has got to have control.

The filing of copy has always been a problem, from World War II on. I've been to a lot of places, especially with the Navy, where reporters are on board ship, and you've got a story, and you can't get it out. You can't use Navy communications. They are too slow, or you couldn't get his copy or film off the carrier. It was a handicap. But that seems to be breaking down with the new technological advances.

Reporters don't think about covering stories in commercial terms but in competitive terms—being first with the news. That's what news has always been about. General Motors has the same kind of problems with them that the Defense Department has.

My contention—and it's not exactly a popular one—is that there's more cooperation between the military and the media than there is an adversarial relationship. There's a pose, and reporters will say, "We've got an adversarial relationship. My job is to get the news, and yours is to protect security," as if they were constantly fighting. But I haven't found that to be the case. I find that there is much more cooperation.

■

In the military, your operational reports can be wrong. They can be misleading. They can be late. They can be partial. We had a

media pool when the Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged. One of the tankers hit a mine and exploded. I don't know what time it was there, but it was the middle of the night here.

I get the call to the Pentagon Command Center. And Bill Crowe is there. He's the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And we're looking at all the operational reports that were coming in. And fog it was. The most put-together, the most comprehensive piece of information we had was from the wire-service reporter who was on board, who wrote a narrative of what happened. And we understood.

I called [Defense Secretary Caspar] Weinberger and I said, "We committed to release the pool reports as they come in. And we've got one here that says what happened." Admiral Crowe had already let it go. Weinberger said fine. But it was a better piece of reporting than our own operational reporting system.

I think you need to have some contact with the press in a pre-invasion situation. I haven't seen many of these where the press didn't know something was about to happen, and sometimes what was going to happen. I remember, distinctly, when we had the attack on Libya, they knew something was happening. We had flights, and some of the planes had to go around France. So it was building up. Obviously, we didn't want to tell the Libyans we were coming.

But Fred Francis of NBC had it. And he came and talked to me. I think I told him enough so that he wouldn't go with it, but I wouldn't confirm it and say, "Fred, you are right, but please don't use it." I just think that's too much temptation for a newsman.

I just don't think you can take reporters into your confidence and say that we're about to go. You can do as we do with the pool, say that you're going somewhere. Something's happening. And, usually, they'll know. But to call them in and lay out your battle plan, World War II-style, and expect them to be good citizens and wait, I just don't think that will work.

■

I've always been an advocate for more training and trying to get the service academies to include it. But the whole relationship of the military, as an institution, with the greater society would benefit if its people knew more about how to deal with the press, whether it's in the Pentagon or a local community where you know the media and can talk about what the Army is doing and what your unit is doing. You gain local support.

If you're in a major command in the Pentagon, you've got to understand how this interaction works. But a lot of our officers don't. Some want to. They're interested, so they find out for themselves. But there's not enough effort made as an institution.

It's important for journalists to know more about the military. I'm intrigued by your idea of having someone with the resources sponsor some kind of an education exchange, so that reporters who have an interest in covering the military can be sponsored to go with the military on a training exercise, or whatever, without ethical problems and without the financial concerns.

Almost any news organization today has got money problems. They are cutting back on travel and they're downsizing their staffs. As the cost of paper goes up, the news hole shrinks. So you can't expect the news media to train their people to get ready to cover the military in a crisis. But I think they'd gladly cooperate with some scheme that enabled them—and it would be prestigious to have a reporter go—to be selected to be a part of a study arrangement in the military.

When I got to the top job in the Pentagon, I found that the Pentagon Press Corps didn't have the Fred Hoffmans and the Charlie Corddrys who had served in the military and covered it for a long time. It had the guy who was doing real well on the White House beat, or some other beat. Maybe he hadn't gotten to the White House beat yet, but he showed some promise, so they sent him to cover the Pentagon, to kind of punch his ticket. Never served in the military. Didn't know the pointy end of the ship from the stern. Just generally, they didn't know what they were doing.

We tried to get them around—and I got the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps—to cooperate. We organized some trips on our own for the Pentagon Press Corps. They were happy to go and take a real quick hit to see each one of the services and interact with them in the field.

'... The whole relationship of the military, as an institution, with the greater society would benefit if its people knew more about how to deal with the press ....'

Robert Sims

PATRICK J. SLOYAN

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
NEWSDAY
DEC. 28, 1994

[*Sloyan won the Pulitzer Prize for his stories on the Gulf War.*]

My viewpoint on press control begins with the bombing of the Marines in Beirut, which was widely photographed and reported. It was a real disaster for the Reagan Administration, and it came in the aftermath of the Falklands war, where Weinberger, a great fan of the British—he's a real Anglophile—delighted in the way Thatcher controlled the press covering the Falklands.

'The pool performed nothing like it was promised.'

Patrick Sloyan

So in the mix of the disaster of Beirut, they staged this victory in Grenada. They just propagandized that, what happened in Grenada. The total account was government film, government spokesmen, and that's what led to the pool.

Now, I objected to the pool originally, even though I was in London. I told Mr. Friedheim, no, no, no, no. And he said, "Well, this is very positive. This will get us in the door." Us. So I laid off. The *Newsday* editors supported it. But had he talked to me, I would have said no.

And then we had the pool in Panama, which was a total bad faith on the part of the Bush Administration. It was Cheney, not the military. I don't blame the military on this at all. They'll follow orders. And, you know, there's divided opinion on it, in my experience in the military. The older people don't think Vietnam was decided by bad press. Some younger nitwits might think that.

The pool was a fiasco in Panama. They went in after most of the fighting was over. And then it was constrained from even seeing them mopping up. Jacqueline Sharkey—she's a professor at the University of Arizona—has the best solid information on the pool operation that I know of. She really had a good look at what happened in Panama, because there was an effort to organize a pool down there. And Cheney's guys stopped it. The idea was to not have a working relationship with the press; it was to prevent press coverage, period. And the reason is the politics of it. They don't like the pictures of the dead soldiers, either the Americans or the Panamanians. I don't think Thurman had a damn thing to do with it. He was taking his orders from Powell, Cheney and Bush.

I think that was a warning to everybody in the press that, when Iraq came along, they were determined to keep us from covering the war. That *Washington Post* piece distills what I said. It sort of writes my history, my view of what happened in those instances.

So there's been demonstrated bad faith in two major incidents of using the pool. The pool performed nothing like it was promised.

I remember you could do anything with the Marines. The Marines traditionally are very forthcoming with the press. But the Army went to really limited coverage, I thought. There is no question that the Army, and everybody else, not only controlled that combat pool system, but held it back and blocked them from covering the war.

In the aftermath of the war now, there are two exceptions that I know of. Tony Clifton with *Newsweek* had some pretty good eyewitness stuff, but, again, with the Marines. And then Joe Galloway, who worked his friendship with Schwarzkopf. And Schwarzkopf let him, for *U.S. News*, do the best coverage.

But as I went back after and found out what really happened, there were a lot of things ... the pool reporters were systematically blocked and didn't see dick. There were four or five stories in there, all of which were very solid, good stories, which were not witnessed or reported on by the pool members. So to my knowledge, with those two exceptions, there was no eyewitness account of a battle. There was no combat video by a commercial newsman. There was some good military footage.

So this was systematic bad faith by Bush, by Cheney, by Pete Williams, who said, "Don't let them see a damn thing, and/or hold them back or restrict them." And then the Army took it one step further. They arrested guys. They beat up guys.

■

Schwarzkopf was very sensitive and knowledgeable [about] an open press. Schwarzkopf is the one who dramatically improved the briefings, by sending up [Richard] Neal, his operations guy. That daily briefing became very valuable. If you had any military knowledge at all, you could really write some good stories off the Schwarzkopf briefing in Riyadh.

I found Neal and Schwarzkopf very forthcoming during that period. A question here and a question there, you could find out. I put together, in 24 hours, the mistake where they killed the civilians. It was an ill-fated attempt to get Saddam. They thought Saddam was in

that bunker. And that was just by reporting right there in Riyadh.

Periodically, I would go up to Hafr al Batin on my own out there. Andy Glass [Cox Newspapers] went up with me one time. We got a good story. We got the whole westward deployment. Andy, typically, sent it through the censor. I didn't. I'd send it right to *Newsday*, and my stuff goes out on the *Los Angeles Times-Washington Post* news service.

It was in early February or late January. I put it together in an afternoon. I just hung out at the crossroads, and the trucks would stop, and I'd interview the guys on the back of the truck, asking them what outfit they were in, where they were from. I said to Glass, "Every division is going out to the west here."

Then we went out and drove along the Tap Line Road, where you could see them deploy. So I just wrote that they had moved out, mostly westward. There was never any question about that westward deployment and hooking in. I had talked to Powell and the JCS before I left, and I had a very knowledgeable idea of what the ground attack was before I even got there, so all I was seeing was the actual deployment.

And I didn't feel that I was endangering anyone. I always felt that they would destroy the Iraqis, or the Iraqis wouldn't fight. That was the other thing I had written prior to that, that they would cut and run, and they would not put up a big fight. The major concern was the Republican Guard. They had the capability, but they didn't have the wherewithal. So I always saw it as a one-sided slaughter in the making. I never thought this was going to be real combat.

But my major concern was the Marines going into Kuwait. And, once again, Schwarzkopf, in his wisdom, sent the Saudis in first. There was a high potential of loss of life from a Marine amphibious invasion into Kuwait and destruction of Kuwait at the same time.

It didn't make any different what the Iraqis knew. I mean, it was akin to Charles Barkley playing on the Olympic team. In that specific case, if they had done live shots from west of Hafr al Batin, it wouldn't have made a bit of difference in the outcome of the war. Schwarzkopf's argument on that is, regardless of what the press said, they had no way of knowing where we were because they had no aerial reconnaissance ability.

So what if the St. Petersburg paper got a Soviet spot or a French spot satellite photograph of the deployment I saw and ran it. It still wouldn't have made any difference.

■

But in 10 years of war in Vietnam one of the fundamental agreements was, you would not report something that would jeopardize lives. And if you did, you would lose your accreditation. There was not one case, in 10 years, of people violating that. So there's the history of good faith on the part of the American press and the western press covering Vietnam. There were no violations of security. We abided on every possible aspect of that rule.

Why does the Pentagon totally ignore that? It worked for 10 years, and there were no violations, there was no reporting the day before. All the operations were reported after they had happened.

■

I've done this for many years. And I have extensive relationships within the military about when the military is in the field. I know what they're supposed to be doing. I know who to talk to. I know the questions to ask. But that's me. With the new or inexperienced reporters who have no military training, they have to apply themselves. If you're going to write about economics, you'd better learn about economics.

■

I think the military have become terribly sensitive to press coverage. And on balance, I'd rate Schwarzkopf better on press coverage than, say, Cheney. I think Cheney had a very politically shrewd sense to control what was happening, what the war was. It was very masterful, these films, this footage they would spoon-feed that would dominate perceptions of what was going on. If you look at what came over television for that period of time, it had no bearing on what was going on.

But it was not Schwarzkopf or the military. Schwarzkopf had tremendous concern about his credibility, his image. I covered Vietnam, from beginning to end, but if you didn't know about Vietnam, you didn't understand the things Schwarzkopf was saying. As generals do, they fight the last war. He was fighting Vietnam over again, and the one thing he wasn't going to permit was something where you come in and find out that there was a pack of lies. Well, not a pack of lies, but they certainly covered up a lot of stuff.

Had Schwarzkopf's guidance and orders held firm, we would have known a lot more, I think, although not at the time it happened. I don't think the eyewitness stuff was possible.

'... In Vietnam one of the fundamental agreements was, you would not report something that would jeopardize lives.'

Patrick Sloyan

After the political directives, the military became determined to hold back the press. They made it even worse. Remember, once the ground war started, Cheney announced there would be a press blackout for the first eight or 12 hours. Then they went on the air right away, when it was going so well.

Then look what happened to the pool reports. That was a four-day, five-day, six-day war, depending on how you count it, and I'd say 90 percent of the pool reports were delayed beyond use. So the news blackout was in effect. The pool reports were lost, they were misplaced, they were delayed, effectively making them more and more worthless. By the time some of these stories were getting through, Kuwait had fallen.

It was the middle-level officers, but they had the sanctions and the authority of the political leadership to restrain and control the press. And I think they took it a step further, as field troops are wont to do. They are not sophisticated, not skilled or clever people. Some of the biggest screw-ups in the military end up being the public affairs officers. Some are good, but most of them are pretty bad. And [John] Fialka saw the pretty bad ones. They mistreated a lot of reporters.

That's the unsophisticated, unskilled military going a bit too far. So I'm not saying they're without criticism. But I'm saying, at the top levels, I found the military far more forthcoming than the political.

You've got to remember that Cheney, on that last visit to Saudi, before the offensive, put out the word—and the wires and *The New York Times* reported it—that there was going to be a two or three week delay. It was total misinformation. It came right from Cheney and Pete Williams. And if you would talk to Cheney today, he would say, "Well, I had to protect our troops."

■

So the outrageous behavior during Desert Storm, the crippling of the press during Desert Storm, the outrageous behavior of Just Cause, to me is overwhelming evidence that we should no longer accept the pool arrangement.

We should do it on an informal basis, as we've always done it. The wires, the networks, *The New York Times* cover the Pentagon. You cover the Pentagon. I cover the Pentagon. If we were going to have any military action, the military takes you people who cover the Pentagon. You have military experience. We're going to get you up front.

It's personal relationships. We know the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We know the flacks. We're very well connected to the Pentagon. They need us, and we need them. It's symbiotic.

But they're not going to control us. They're not going to censor our journalism. We are going to censor our journalism. But with live coverage from the field, you can send those visions to the world. Clearly, there has to be some self-censorship, some self-control there. And that's done by common sense and goodwill. That's the relationship that works. It's worked. It's always worked, in this century.

But I think it's the media that has to have the dominant input. In other words, we'll make decisions which we can accept. If you put the military and the Pentagon and the political hierarchy in controlling these decisions, they'll make decision after decision that you could not accept, that you could not live with.

Really, I think a key part of it is accreditation. Every four years, we do this, in effect, on coverage of the national political conventions. It's handled by the congressional correspondents' committee. The White House will issue passes to people they don't like, but usually they rely on us to be the primary accrediting body.

The question of "too many" also confronted the British press in the Gulf War. The editor of *The London Guardian,* Peter Preston, took charge of who would go and who would not. He worked it out with the Ministry of Defense, and it worked perfectly. The relationship between the British government and the British press was fantastic.

I can't help the military's complaints about the inadequacies of the press. They just have to do the best they can. If we're going to put a little more effort into writing stories about the military, that's our business. We've got a commercial need for that. But what they want—and that's what the pool arrangement has given them, to a degree—is control over the press. They want to say: "Stop this interview. No, he can't say that. You can't write that, or you can't send this out."

That's where the editors fell down. I think those principles are baloney. That we would agree to them, after the treatment we received in Panama and Grenada and in Desert Storm, is foolish. It's not working, guys.

There's all the good will in the world, and we agree, and they pull the football back, just as we're running up to kick it, like Lucy does to Charlie Brown in *Peanuts.* That's bad faith on their part, on the part of the political leadership. They don't want us reporting about

'... The crippling of the press during Desert Storm, the outrageous behavior of Just Cause, to me is overwhelming evidence that we should no longer accept the pool arrangement.'

Patrick Sloyan

American soldiers getting killed. They don't want that story out, they don't want those pictures out. And it doesn't matter what administration we're talking about.

Their performance with the pool relationship in Panama and Desert Storm shows nothing but bad faith on the part of the political leadership. And as their accomplice, the military ... although I think the military is much more progressive than the political leadership, nonetheless. Schwarzkopf, his staff, the veteran skilled public affairs people in the military—there are some very competent people who understand our needs.

But I don't think the political leadership—the current one, the past one, the next one, where they're going to send our troops in to get killed or risk getting them killed—are going to permit photographs, eyewitness accounts, or television coverage of those events.

If Jerry Friedheim was in charge, forever, of the Pentagon pool system, I'd say fine, if it was his call and he could override whoever was secretary of defense. He understands my needs. He's a competent, intelligent person. He knows the military end of it. He knows the political end of it. He knows the newspaper end of it. And he's got good faith. He backed me off on this pool thing a couple of times. I refused to participate in any pools.

COL. BILL SMULLEN

U.S. ARMY (RET.);
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD
AND DESERT STORM
OCT. 20, 1994

Those of us in uniform—people in public service, politicians, fire chiefs, police officers, commanders in the military—ought to expect that they will come under scrutiny, ought to expect that someone is going to pass judgment on their decisions, that they are going to come under hard criticism, and justifiably so.

But what we fail to teach people in uniform in their earliest days is that they have a responsibility to participate in the process. I would also say that the other place where we do very poorly is the relationship of people in uniform to the Congress. We don't teach them that they have a responsibility there as well. Sometimes a person has to become a general or a flag officer before he believes he has a responsibility to answer to Congress, and that everything he does is eligible to come under their watchful eyes, and ought to. They are the people who pay the bills.

You can teach that at the military academies, but if you want to get people of all backgrounds, you need to really start teaching it at the basic officers' course for each of the branches of service. And frankly, at that level, it needs to include both the responsibilities of dealing with the mass media, and dealing with Congress.

Then it should go to the next level—command and general staff college, and at the war college—which is really where it catches on, at least in the Army that I know of. There's very much of it at command and general staff college. So really, in the case of an officer, one gets to be a lieutenant colonel or colonel before this really dawns on him or her because someone is drumming it into their heads.

And even at the Army War College, for example, it's an elective. It's not something that is mandatory, although they usually do have military-media day, where they bring public affairs officers, reporters and students together for a seminar. One day a year, it comes and goes, and if somebody's on sick call or having a bad day, or falls asleep that day because he had a late night the night before, then it's gone forever. And it's not necessarily something that affords the interaction that I think is important.

■

From a pragmatic standpoint, you just can't have people running all over the countryside when you've got months of build-up. If it's 48 hours or 72 hours, you can poise them up with the front-line troops, and we should have done that in Just Cause. But when you've got seven months leading up to the start of a war, as in Desert Shield, it's awfully hard to say, "Okay, guys. You're all here, go cover whatever you want to today." It's just not going to work, particularly when you've got long distances to go to get to units, and you have to support reporters administratively and logistically to get their stories out.

We didn't have security review when U.S. troops went to Somalia. Nobody gave a flip about it because it wasn't a problem, it wasn't a condition. And it probably won't be next time. If we had gotten reporters into Panama on time, it wouldn't have been a requirement there, either. But when an operation is protracted, and when there are fragile elements of

'But what we fail to teach people in uniform in their earliest days is that they have a responsibility to participate in the process.'

Col. Bill Smullen

security and maintaining a coalition at stake, then I think you can require it for the right reasons.

It's going to be different the next time, and the time after that, and the time after that. There is no single, seminal operation to use as a right or wrong way. You can fix the mistakes of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but the next one's going to be different. There's no overlay, and you can try to come up with a menu of rules, and I will submit to you that it will never work.

■

In his four years as chairman—and I kept a count of them—there were 665 times in which Colin Powell appeared somewhere publicly in uniform, whether it was an appearance before Congress, or a speech to an organization or group, or a press conference or a media availability, or an interview. That's about once every other day.

So clearly Colin Powell had an appreciation for the public's right to know in his role as the senior officer in uniform. But if it was going to have an adverse effect on the safety and welfare of the men and women in uniform that he has a responsibility for, if it could have jeopardized their lives, then he was not going to let any reporter—I don't care what news organization the reporter represented—do something to put their safety at risk.

■

I've never seen any overt discussion—by military in uniform in positions of responsibility—the thesis of which was to be obstructionist when it comes to reporters getting their jobs done.

I will say I've seen situations where we probably didn't prioritize that relationship and support apparatus to a degree that we should have or could have, where when the ground war began there weren't assets available, ready and waiting to get those stories back in a timely way to make it into the newspapers, or on the air, before the war was over. We didn't always do it. And someone's at fault. I don't know who you put the blame on. I suppose you've got to take it right to the top.

In this particular case, Gen. Schwarzkopf could have told each of his component commanders, you *will* do it, and I'm sure there would have been dedicated aircraft, dedicated vehicles and dedicated whatever to get the stories back, and that just didn't happen. So there's blame. But I've never seen an organized attempt to intentionally obstruct the ability of a reporter to get and/or tell his or her story.

'But in real life, aircraft availability and hostile action or any number of factors can ruin the plan.'

Peggy Soucy

PEGGY SOUCY

DEPUTY WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF
CNN
DEC. 27, 1994

I have to say, after going through Bahrain and other Pentagon pools through the years, that the Cuba and Haiti operations were really well planned. The problems in Cuba came when resources that were guaranteed to the plan were instead diverted. Then the plan started falling apart. They weren't given the planes, and they didn't have enough escorts. For instance, a large aircraft, a C-141, was planned for in this mission to accommodate the uplink. In the end, that plane was not available. In the planning stages, we worked closely with the military and determined that a specific uplink would be best for the Guantanamo operation. We said that we would rather take a large one, because it has all of the bells and whistles. They thought that they had the larger plane, but it turned out that only a small C-9 was available. The uplink was left behind. There must be an up-front commitment to resources for these operations to work well.

I'm concerned that the positive, cooperative attitude doesn't get down to the folks in the field. That is what we hear the problem is. For instance, we could talk to folks at the Pentagon throughout the Haiti deployment, and they were very good. They tried to reach out the best they could to resolve issues, but you didn't get the sense that word got from the actual command down to the troops in the field.

We were prepared for the Haiti deployment. We took Inmarsat phones and our crew was equipped with microwave gear. Because of the cooperative planning, our crews could have fed live pictures from the field to the pool.

It all works, but you need equipment and help to make it all happen. You need the aircraft. Sometimes, as with microwave equipment, the crew has a transmitter and the receiver must be pre-positioned. You need help. An uplink requires power. You need help with a generator. Vehicles may be necessary to transport and deliver videotape to the feedpoint. They need to be made available.

Technology allows the gear to get smaller, but realistically we are not at the point where one person is able to do everything required.

There is too much equipment, and it takes additional manpower to set up an uplink to send picture and sound to the satellite.

The exercises don't always help because, under real time and real conditions, you don't always have the resources that you thought you had. In an exercise, outside factors don't seem to interfere as with a true action. For instance, in an exercise, you may have a good plan in which the military picks up videotape from the television crew and delivers it to the nearest feed point. But in real life, aircraft availability and hostile action or any number of factors can ruin the plan.

ROBERT W. TAYLOR

SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS
AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE
NOV. 30, 1994


Russell Roederer

The media have been very open about the fact that coverage is all economically driven. They have so much money that they can spend, so they assign their key reporter here at the Pentagon or to cover military situations. That person becomes deeply steeped in the military, and then when a regional conflict breaks out, that's logically the person they want to send because that's their top person. They then send their next person here to the Pentagon. Now if they're very lucky, they have somebody who used to have this as a beat and can get up to speed quickly.

The thing for them to do is take two or three people and build a little depth into their own systems. But that's something we have no control over. The media have to do that and police themselves.

We've had meetings on news-media training several times and came up with the same conclusions. If you take the list of news organizations in the media pool—there are around 40 print—you're going to come up with a significant number that have one or two reporters. They are very constrained. They can't free up their only reporter—sometimes the bureau chief is the reporter—to go on a two-or-three-day exercise when maybe something else is happening that is of much more importance to them. It is really tough to do.

The alternative is to limit the pool to those robust organizations that can afford four or five reporters, so they've got two or three who are always trained up. That would mean excluding the smaller bureaus, and I don't think that's acceptable to them.

Public affairs planning here has been going on for years. It's just getting more sophisticated because the players are getting more sophisticated, and the PAs are more sophisticated. A lot of it is top-driven. Shortly after Panama, we met with the folks at the National War College and Capstone, and started putting public affairs players in all their exercises. We've got PAs there who are able to actually advise the students—our future leaders—on what they're doing and what the media implications are. It's also fantastic training for our people, who get to sit with 15 to 20 generals or generals-to-be, and go through the thought processes with them.

The relationship between the chairman and the secretary, and the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, is absolutely critical. They must really trust that person and take him or her into their confidence. Without that, it doesn't matter what you've done down in the field.

Something is classified secret because it has impact on national security. I realize that if I as a government official, or anyone else, divulges something that is classified secret to someone who shouldn't have access to that information, we can be prosecuted. So what's the incentive to walk up to a reporter, or bureau chief, even though they're all respectable individuals, and say, "By the way, the attack begins at 12 tomorrow. We need to sit down with you." The relationship's got to be really tight there, and there's got to be an understanding from the very top level that all of these negotiations and workings are taking place.

If you look at the actual attack when we went into Iraq, it was an extraordinarily tight circle among those who had all their clearances and authorizations. So to get the confidences of the secretary, the chairman, the president, to bring in another group of people is an extremely tough job.

'Public affairs planning here has been going on for years. It's just getting more sophisticated ....'
Robert Taylor

PETE WILLIAMS

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
NBC NEWS
OCT. 20, 1994

[*Williams is a former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.*]

You will not see any news organization challenge the military's —I guess "right" is the word—to control the battlefield. We looked at that. And, by the way, the reason I think no news organization will do that is because they're afraid they will lose, and they don't want the question to be answered.

'It's just never going to be a commander's highest priority to move the pool.'

Pete Williams

The ultimate fact is, whether anybody likes it or not, the military is going to control the battlefield, and that's all there is to it, and I don't think most news organizations dispute that. But I also think that it would be wrong for the military to base that view on the fact that they've got public opinion on their side, because that could turn.

What I say to military groups and commanders is that no plan is complete until it has a plan on how the operation is going to be covered. What I say is, "You wouldn't go to the battlefield and say, 'Let's not worry about the supply line; we'll just sort of ad lib that as we go. Let's not worry about the logistics tail; we'll just do that.'" It's ridiculous. You'd plan that in detail.

Yet that's been the approach in big military operations in terms of press relations. It's a very serious problem that the military still hasn't quite got its head around. It's still an afterthought. If you look at how the planning process works, it's an annex to the plan. It's Annex F. It's, "Oh yeah, after we get the plan, then we'll worry about it later." It isn't thought about from the beginning. It's brought in at the end.

■

It's just never going to be a commander's highest priority to move the pool. They're always going to be trying to win the war, and that's understandable. So it shouldn't even be a decision. The decision should already be made, and there should be assets dedicated to it.

Two points are terribly important: Plan in advance and try to get people out there. You get people out in the field and it's much different. Reporters understand. They sort of click into it. And military commanders, too. It's just a different relationship in the field.

The problem in the Gulf was, I think, we had a great plan and they just didn't go for it. We were going to have a system where we allowed people to go out in the field, stay with units, all throughout Desert Shield, individually. And then we had sort of said, "If we can't get enough people out there and the press wants it to be pooled, then we'll do that." But the hope was that people would just kind of fan out, join up with various units, get comfortable with them, stay with them. If they wanted to stay, fine, and then kind of rotate in and out.

You tell me where you think the most problems are going to occur: Take 15 reporters from the International Hotel in Dhahran, keep them cooling their heels for two weeks, get them pretty well PO'd about the situation, and then plunk them down in the middle of the 101st Puking Dogs and let them file.

Now, contrast that to taking the same 15 reporters, putting them out with that unit for three weeks, and then the action starts and they file. Now, under which scenario are you most likely to have problems? It's obvious, because if you get reporters out with that unit, they begin to understand what the unit's all about. If you write a story that says the 101st Puking Dogs are critically low on gasoline, that might tell somebody something. You begin to say, "Oh, I understand now how this works."

I don't think the problem is a reporter who will intentionally screw a unit. You hear these journalistic seminar bravados where Sam Donaldson says, "Well, yes, if I had information I knew would be damaging to a unit, and I thought it was true, of course I'd report it." Bull. You wouldn't do that in a million years. It's this breast-beating that goes on in journalism seminars. But when you actually get people out in the field and they can spend some time, then you will have fewer of those problems. That's why you were in the worst of all positions in the Gulf, to keep reporters bottled up and then send them out, but with security review.

■

I would urge you to try to get away from the theory of military-press relations that there is some bastard somewhere who is determined to screw the press. That was not my experience. My experience was: It's a matter of planning, it's a matter of comfort, of people spending time with each other.

My real fear is, in the next big military operation, the news organizations will say, "Screw the Pentagon. They were bad news.

We're just going to go out there." And there are going to be a lot of people get shot. There ought to be a lot more going on with news organizations and the Pentagon right now about "Okay, what are we going to do next time?" But nobody wants to do that.

You tell me where the discussions are going on in the news industry right now about what television networks ought to do when there's a live-coverage situation on the battlefield. It's not happening at RTNDA. You tell me where the news industry is discussing among itself issues about electromagnetic-spectrum-signature problems of filing. It only happens in a crisis. Maybe it's unrealistic to assume that it would happen any other time.

I think the wrong thing would be to say, "Screw the military; we're going to go off on our own." I think that's a disaster. A lot of people have this sort of World War II-documentary attitude about how it works. They have this thing in mind that if you could just kind of get your own Jeep and sort of buzz up and down the line, you could file your daily reports. It doesn't work that way.

The Army was shooting a lot of its own people over there. What happens if you start putting *The New York Times* in little Jeeps buzzing around? I don't know. I can't tell you what the next battle is going to look like. And none of us can. We don't know where it's going to be. We don't know if it's going to be a Bosnia, in Europe, or Korea or where. Or what the terrain is going to be like, or anything. I think, though, that it's hard to imagine a kind of scenario where the wisest thing to do would be to ignore the military and go off on your own.

■

It is unrealistic to assume that in a system like security review, it won't be abused by the military. It clearly was. There were cases where military commanders took this as a real opportunity to annihilate things by delay. It's equally unrealistic to assume that if there is no system in today's incredibly competitive environment, you will not get things that will come out that will be damaging. You also will have reporters who are not experienced in covering combat, who will innocently—not in bad faith, not because they want to screw anybody—report things that will tick the military off. And some, with good cause, will tick them off. To assume that either one will not happen is ludicrous.

Well, let's face it. The easiest system would be for you, at The First Amendment Center, to sit down and say, "We're going to solve a big problem right now. We're going to just take it on, cinch up our belts, and we're going to get real about trying to solve the next problem. We're going to agree in advance, right now, how many people will cover the next battlefield. We're going to set a limit on ourselves. We're going to say that we will not impose any more than X number—100, whatever it is. And we're also going to agree, right now, on who the battlefield reporters will be, and we're going to keep them up to speed on military stuff. In other words, we're going to be as serious about covering the war as about covering the NFL."

You know, you wouldn't just reach into the newsroom and grab six people and send them out to cover the Super Bowl. You'd have people that spent some time on this, and understand tactics and know who the coaches are.

Guess what? That'll never happen. The news media carries with it some of its own chaos. And it generates some of its own chaos. The American news media arrives with as many people as it can funnel into an area, and that creates instant chaos. At one point, I had a guy come to me who insisted that there should be no restrictions on reporters in wheelchairs on the battlefield, and he basically wanted me to be the bad guy. He had a very talented reporter in a wheelchair, but he didn't want to be the one to say, "You can't go to the war." He wanted the military to say, "I'm sorry, we can't accept any guys in wheelchairs." And I said, "Well, that's the way it is."

It's silly.

'The news media carries with it some of its own chaos. And it generates some of its own chaos.'

Pete Williams

GEORGE WILSON

AUTHOR AND DEFENSE REPORTER
NOV. 28, 1994

The primary problem in Desert Storm was that after you went through all the expense and effort to get a guy out there, you couldn't get his copy, because it was, in effect, censored. They said it was being held for review but, to me, that ends up the same. You've heard Mike Getler talk, that he had three guys there, and he'd spent all these thousands of dollars, and he never heard from one of them until the war was over.

That was one of the big frustrations of Desert Storm. Even those people who were lucky enough to get out in the field couldn't get their stuff back in time.

Basically, I agree with the premise that we journalists should try and bring something to the table. I think reporters ought to bring to the table a willingness to go on the field and live like the troops. You should be willing to sleep in the field with the guys, and I don't think you should ask for special privileges once you're there. You should be willing to get shot at, to get killed, even.

I don't see anything wrong with making the press outfit itself, when it comes to that, so that they're ready and willing to go to the field.

Also, I think it hurt the press an awful lot by having generalists who had never covered the military be the first on the scene and ask so many dumb questions. It made the press look really stupid.

■

'... Probably there's nobody who once wore a uniform in most city rooms now, so there's not much familiarity with the military.'

George Wilson

I think it would behoove both sides to have some kind of a ready-made credential system, so that foreign governments—as well as the U.S. government—could accredit military reporters quickly. Then you wouldn't have to put in whoever had a visa, no matter what his or her background was. That would sit well with the military reporters. They wouldn't find themselves being aced out by a guy or gal who just happened to be close to the scene.

You could do a lot of good by talking to the Allied governments and asking: Would you be willing to accredit a given number of American military specialists? I think it would also help in the globalization of the coverage. I think it would behoove both sides to have some kind of expedited system, beyond the pool, to get military specialists accredited and accepted by the host country.

■

To help non-military reporters, you might think about getting the military to offer up some on-the-ground exposure. They already do it for businessmen. The military is already set up for that. They military lobbies its causes with the businessmen, puts on demonstrations of their projects.

If you call up the information officers and say, "I have a new guy on the beat, and I'd like to have him oriented," they'll lay something on. But they don't have it regularly established, like they do for businessmen.

At Fort Benning, they demonstrate every weapon in the Army inventory. They have what they call the "mad minute," and they fire all their weapons.

■

Just in the last five years, there's been a real change in editors' appetites. They're very big on social issues, like gays in the military or women in combat. But you haven't read anything about weapons and cost overruns, or projects like the C-17 transport in contrast to all the stories that were front-page news in this town just 10 or 15 years ago. The C-5 had a cost overrun of two billion dollars, and it was front-page news for like two years. Now you've got a C-17 that's $500,000,000 a copy, and the press is letting it slide through virtually unchallenged. And you've got one Air Force plane, and the Navy another, to combat the very same threat. And they're absolutely opposite aircraft, the Air Force F-22 and the Navy F/A-18 E and F. Something is wrong. One of them is Stealth and one of them is not.

Those questions aren't raised. I think part of it is that probably there's nobody who once wore a uniform in most city rooms now, so there's not much familiarity with the military. And there's no war, so there's no story in most editors' view.

The military people are probably grateful nobody's covering their cost overruns any more. But, you know, it's taxpayers' money, and the budget is still $260 billion plus. And I think they should be more accountable. But it's just not in fashion.

■

I, frankly, don't think that the problem of handling everybody is as bad as the military thinks it is. And I think Haiti is a case in point. As far as I know, anybody who wanted to go to Haiti got on a ship or got on something, whereas, in Desert Storm, the Navy said, "I don't want anybody on my ship." And that's ridiculous. You've got a ship that accommodates 5,000 people, you can take three or four reporters.

I thought the Navy missed a great opportunity—and I think they agree with us— in Desert Storm, because they had 50 ships out there that could have provided a lot of education. But the skippers wouldn't let the reporters aboard.

■

To get the kind of access you need, you have to have a secretary of defense who is appreciative of what you need, and orders the military to do it. Otherwise, they don't do it. I mean, Colin Powell gets like a big friend of the press in public. But he wasn't all that supportive of opening up access to the press. They're not going to do it unless they're ordered to do it.

I don't care how nice a military guy you have, when it comes to choosing between him getting something done tomorrow morning unimpeded and thinking of bringing you along, they're going to freeze the press out if

they can. So there has to be a commitment from the top civilian leadership. The Ken Bacons and Pete Williamses in the world are only as powerful as their secretary of defense enables them to be. If they can't say, "I'm calling for the Secretary, Admiral, and he wants you to let those two reporters aboard the battleship," they ain't getting on.

They'll say, "We just don't have the boats where we can pick them up," or, "We can't get the air." They'll give you a million excuses. They don't want to do it.

So then the secretary of defense has to call in all his public information officers and say, "Look, war has become not a struggle for territory; it's become a struggle for men's minds. And like it or not, the press is out there, and we have to use them to get our side of the story told.

"We want to at least tell our story. It may not come out in print the way we want, but we want to at least give the press a chance to see what we're doing and why. And we want you information officers to let these guys see the action."

On the reporter's side, if a couple of them get killed, that's the price of doing business.

■

Well, I would have to differ with idea that it was incompetence. I think the military, more than any other form of endeavor, takes its signals from the top. And Schwarzkopf had let it be known that he wasn't all that concerned about getting the press' copy back to the home offices. His command, not the Marines, held up Molly Moore's stories about the Marines. The colonels take their cue from the generals.

So it's got to be an attitude from the top. It's not just incompetence in the middle levels.

■

The irony, at least in the print world—I'm not as familiar with the TV world—is that military officers and military troops, and civilian editors and civilian reporters, have a lot more in common than they are willing to admit. Both sides want a front-row seat on the action. That's why you're a reporter. You want to see the human comedy up close. It's fun.

And the military guy wants to fly an F-14, or whatever he does, to get out there and see something, do something. Also, they have this kind of day-at-a-time attitude. To most reporters and editors, it is today that is important. They don't have these long corporate cash flow plans. So when military and press people get together in a relaxed environment, they find a lot in common. They have strong feelings. They are very opinionated. Reporters are opinionated as hell. And officers are opinionated as hell. Yet they can argue very constructively, especially outside of Washington.

I was on an aircraft carrier for seven-and-a-half months. The first two weeks, every time I would sit down, someone would come up and give me hell about some story, or what *Time* magazine had done, or how lousy TV was.

But at the end of two weeks, when the novelty wore off, and they knew I wasn't going to go anywhere—that they had this real live reporter captured—they started to get beneath the bromides. We discovered we had a hell of a lot in common. The next thing I knew I was being invited to their parties, the bad-boys' room that had the alcohol, and the whole thing.

That's the great irony. There's this kind of popular conception that the military and the press are direct opposites. But in the field, they get to realize how much alike they are—in their philosophy, in trying to live on the edge.

■

If the military wants to get you to Point X, or were under orders to get you to Point X, as long as it doesn't hazard the combat mission, they'll get you there. If they don't want to get you there, you could have a hundred helicopters brought for the press and have *Milwaukee Journal* painted on the side, and there will be an excuse for not getting you there.

I think it's the attitude. The decision at the top must be that we've got to let them in there, warts and all.

I don't think reserving assets is a good idea. It opens us up to all kinds of criticism, taking things away from our troops that they need. I'd hate to see a chopper that was needed to rescue some kid, sitting on the press-pool pad waiting for a reporter or camera crew to use it. Bad idea. Troops in trouble should always come first. They have only one life. We've got lots of editions.

'I'd hate to see a chopper that was needed to rescue some kid, sitting on the press-pool pad waiting for a reporter ....'

George Wilson

JONATHAN WOLMAN

WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF
ASSOCIATED PRESS
NOV. 28, 1994

I'm wary of instituting too many rules and regulations. Every combat pool is designed for the unique aspects of the military operation and the conditions in the field. So it's easy to talk about our experience with the Haiti pool, but it won't necessarily relate the next time around, and it won't necessarily relate back to Desert Storm, or Panama, or any previous episode.

I thought the military's press plans for Haiti were good. It was clear that Pentagon and military officials were committed to provide for first-wave combat coverage, something we haven't seen yet in the "Sidle pool" era.

In this case, there was every evidence that first-wave coverage was going to happen. Of course, the operation was called off, and so there will have to be another time and place to test this commitment.

But I believe that the military is making a good-faith effort to reorient itself.

■

What about the use of combat pools to restrict press access?

In fact, there are press restrictions every day. On your basic air base in Europe, or in Florida, the press must have military approval to come and go. Across the world, government restricts access to its facilities and among its people. They do it at the White House. They do it at the Department of Housing and Urban Development. And they do it at the Hall of States.

I have heard the access issue raised over and over again by military officials, but it's a false issue. I don't know anyone in journalism who doesn't recognize that the military has the right to set restrictions on press and public access to its people and its facilities.

It's essential that access be provided responsibly, under the circumstances described in the nine principles. The military has embraced these principles and has circulated and implemented them.

Certainly nobody is expecting that an unlimited number of reporters could descend on the 101st ....

'I don't know anyone in journalism who doesn't recognize that the military has the right to set restrictions on press and public access to its people and its facilities.'

Jonathan Wolman

These are complicated matters, but press coverage is accommodated under First Amendment privileges and common-sense requirements. This is everyday stuff. Coverage issues come up at the Detroit Lions training camp. Everybody can't walk in—there are rules on who would have access to a football team's locker room. And the teams need to fairly apply those rules or someone is going to holler—all the way to court.

The Pentagon does this every day, controls access and credentials. It's a straightforward function of a democratic government. It isn't the press's function to make that kind of decision. No one expects the sportswriters to set the rules on covering the Lions' locker room.

Of course, we can't allow the Pentagon to abuse the nine principles, or the guidelines for combat coverage. If they start abusing the guidelines, or the application of fairness or common sense, everybody is going to be unhappy and loud about it. But I don't feel that the AP has to have a vote on who's going to cover a particular HUD event. Or say Mrs. Clinton would be going to a housing project and working with some children for the day. You just know that they can't accommodate the whole press corps, that they're going to set some sort of restrictions.

■

How should the offbeat publications and free-lances be handled?

I think the military needs to accommodate the diversity of the American press Nobody is looking for perfection, but there are principles here that ought to be respected. The United States has a diverse press, and the military needs to be open to coverage by this diverse press.

It's one thing to laugh at the TV hairdressers who might show up on a Gulf War assignment—safe and warm, well out of harm's way. It's another thing to respect that there are magazines and on-line services—and who knows what will arise in the future—that ought to be accommodated for combat coverage.

The press doesn't have the tools or the responsibility to decide restrictions on access. Is there space for three or four journalists? Sixty or 80? Do we know how many choppers are available? Jeeps in the field? Filing opportunities?

Access is the central requirement of combat coverage. The eyewitness is the essential foundation upon which reporting is based. In the

Gulf War, there was not access to many units that deserved and required coverage.

I feel that access for unilateral coverage is the ideal, and AP is committed to providing independent journalism. Where logistics or the requirements of national security don't allow for that, we respect the need for pool arrangements.

■

What sort of training should the media have to cover combat?

I think the media should be committed to providing the best coverage of military affairs that it can, giving reporters the tools that they need to do that. I also think a good reporter will pick up a lot of education very fast.

Did George Esper have a first day on the job? Did Ernie Pyle? Indeed.

We don't make any apologies for the idea that, if you have an abrupt deployment of 500,000 Americans in the Gulf desert many thousands of miles from home, that is not an everyday circumstance for which the AP pretends to be ready with its desert military reporter.

On the other hand, some of the best journalists in the United States went to the Gulf War—some of them with a background in military affairs, and some of them learning as best they could, as fast as they could. It is in the best tradition and practice of reporting. You do that when you need to expand your commitment to a story.

But I also agree with the Pentagon, the military thinkers who expect that military affairs are of such significance that a journalist would make a commitment to be properly backgrounded. We work extremely hard at the AP to make sure our people are well rounded and well grounded.

Do we succeed? Absolutely. On the recent military mission in Somalia, the pool escort chief looked around and saw that the press group included many professionals who had seen more combat than he. The AP reporter and photographer had both been wounded in covering dangerous events in the past.

I don't know of anybody in the mainstream media that isn't willing to sit down with the Pentagon and discuss the requirements that would allow for the successful operation and execution of U.S. policy ....

■

I believe we could have a system of open coverage, without any field censorship. It isn't even remotely a theoretical question. The fact is, that reporters are routinely trusted with military secrets—Haiti and Somalia and the Gulf War would be three recent examples—with understandings that the material should inform their coverage, but not be published as such. That's smart for the press and the public, and I think it's smart for the military. Over the years, I don't know of an episode where the press has failed to keep these national security materials and briefings confidential.

And whenever we have material that could be sensitive, the military has an opportunity to express any concerns it might have. We deal with our responsibilities story by story.

The military puts out a very specific set of guidelines for coverage of combat, and they accredit journalists who agree to abide by those requirements. Those requirements have generally seemed sensible to the AP, and we go along with them voluntarily.

The nine principles are the real thing, not academic or idealist tablets. The military and the media entered into agreement on the principles, and the military has made the principles a part of their doctrine. If these principles are honored under the difficult circumstances that accompany combat, then I think everybody will be well served. The military will be well served and, most importantly, I think the American people's right to follow government activities will be well served.

I think it would be smart for the military to recognize that field security review is antithetical to the values of our society, and that a responsible military command and a responsible press can work together to insure that the security of any given mission is respected and protected.

'... It would be smart for the military to recognize that field security review is antithetical to the values of our society ....'

Jonathan Wolman

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Survey Methodology and Results I

By Robert O. Wyatt

To assess how military officers and journalists responsible for covering military affairs perceive each other and to measure their orientation toward news of war, defense and military issues, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University conducted mail surveys of both groups during the fall and winter of 1994-95.

Mail questionnaires were sent to reporters and editors responsible for military coverage at various print and broadcast outlets and to combat flag and general officers in the military, plus mid-grade officers enrolled at the five military service colleges. Questionnaires were printed on prominently colored paper in booklet form and were mailed in hand-stamped envelopes, with hand-stamped reply envelopes enclosed. A thank you/reminder postcard followed the first mailing by one week, and replacement questionnaires were sent to all non-respondents one month later.

Journalists surveyed included editors, news executives and reporters from every branch of the news media, including all media who covered operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and the police action in Somalia. All defense correspondents listed by the Media and Security Project of the Fund for Peace were also surveyed, for a total of 351 journalists. Of these, 146 (42%) produced usable responses.

Usable military responses totaled 935, an overall response rate of 47%. Trackable response among flag and general was as follows: Air Force, 108 of 318 (34%), Army 124 of 351 (35%), Coast Guard, 15 of 30 (50%), Marines 38 of 82 (46%) and Navy 136 of 294 (46%). For the mid-level officers at the five service colleges, 511 of 925 (55%) questionnaires were returned. Three questionnaires could not be tracked by the return coding system.

Because all members of each journalistic and military group were included rather than smaller random samples drawn from larger bodies, the results are technically a census. Thus, assessing findings using statistical margins of error is technically inappropriate. This is the case even when response rates are less than 100%, because the researcher cannot statistically project the opinions of non-respondents from those who did respond.

Because all subgroups of journalists proved similar to each other and all subgroups of military officers proved likewise homogeneous on the vast majority of questionnaire items, results were analyzed by contrasting all military opinions with all journalistic opinions.

National Defense, the Military and the News Media

All numbers are valid row percentages for military and press; missing data is ignored; because of rounding, percentages may not equal 100. Missing data is, for most attitudinal items, minimal. Maximum response represents 935 military and 146 journalists.

We want to know what you think about some important national institutions and how you feel about relations between the military and the news media. Because your responses will be kept confidential unless you instruct us otherwise, please be as open as possible. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in your opinions.

First, we are going to consider some major institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?

How much confidence do you have in...	Group	A great deal	Only some	Hardly any
The U.S. Supreme Court	Military	78	22	1
	Press	59	40	1
Major educational institutions such as colleges and universities	Military	41	54	5
	Press	43	54	4
The Executive Branch of government	Military	16	67	17
	Press	8	78	15
Television news	Military	4	50	46
	Press	4	68	28
The military	Military	89	11	0
	Press	38	57	6
Newspapers	Military	12	71	18
	Press	44	52	3
Insurance companies	Military	10	62	28
	Press	6	56	39
Congress	Military	7	54	40
	Press	2	66	32
Major companies	Military	22	71	7
	Press	13	73	15
Medicine	Military	42	54	4
	Press	35	58	6
The CIA	Military	18	66	15
	Press	1	57	42
Wall Street	Military	14	68	18
	Press	10	60	30

How do you rate the ***overall coverage*** of different kinds of news media? We are interested in your ***general impressions***, not a detailed judgment. Think of the media—the newspapers, television channels, news magazines and radio stations—that you turn to most often for news. Tell us whether you think their coverage is excellent, good, fair or poor.

How do you rate...	Group	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
The national television news program or channel you watch most often	Military	14	50	29	7
(ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, etc.)	Press	7	55	29	9
The national newspaper you read most often	Military	20	57	20	3
(New York Times, USA TODAY, Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, etc.)	Press	47	50	2	1
The national radio news broadcast you listen to most often	Military	16	56	26	2
(NBC, CBS, CNN, Mutual, etc.)	Press	28	43	25	4
The news magazine you read most often	Military	16	58	22	4
	Press	10	54	33	4
The local television news program you watch most often	Military	5	41	45	9
	Press	2	16	45	37
The local radio station you listen to for news most often	Military	8	43	40	9
	Press	4	32	41	23
The local newspaper you read most often	Military	7	39	41	12
	Press	25	55	17	3

How do you rate the ***general coverage*** of the military and national security issues in these same news media?

How do you rate...	Group	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
The national television news program or channel you watch most often	Military	5	35	41	19
	Press	4	40	43	14
The national newspaper you read most often	Military	7	41	41	11
	Press	26	54	19	1
The national radio news broadcast you listen to most often	Military	5	36	48	12
	Press	11	31	38	20
The news magazine you read most often	Military	5	43	40	12
	Press	6	43	44	7
The local television news program you watch most often	Military	3	27	46	24
	Press	0	6	31	62
The local radio station you listen to for news most often	Military	3	27	44	26
	Press	1	9	37	53
The local newspaper you read most often	Military	5	28	43	24
	Press	10	44	30	15

Some observers believe that some branches of the military in general work more effectively with the news media than others. Please tell us whether you think the following military services do an ***excellent***, ***good***, ***fair***, or ***poor*** job of dealing with the news media.

How do you rate...	Group	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
Air Force	Military	24	51	22	3
	Press	9	43	42	7
Army	Military	7	44	42	7
	Press	5	34	44	17
Coast Guard	Military	22	51	25	2
	Press	14	40	35	11
Marines	Military	28	43	23	6
	Press	17	36	34	13
Navy	Military	8	34	38	20
	Press	5	45	35	15

When a military operation is being planned, how much access to those plans do you think the news media should be given?

Maximum Access	Military	1
	Press	30
Limited Access	Military	48
	Press	60
No access at all	Military	51
	Press	10

During wartime, the degree to which the news media are allowed to report on military operations is always controversial. We want to know which of the following best reflects your views. Do you believe that the news media should be able to report ***anything they decide without clearing their reports*** with military officials? Or should the news media be allowed to report in accordance with ***published guidelines without any prior review*** by military officials? Or should the military retain the prerogative to ***conduct a security review of news reports prior to release*** if the combat situation dictates?

Report anything they decide	Military	2
	Press	18
Report whatever they decide within guidelines	Military	55
	Press	76
Report only what the military permits	Military	44
	Press	6

The degree to which the news media are allowed access to personnel, installations, units and battlefields within a war zone also is controversial. Which of the following best reflects your views? Do you feel that the news media should be free to visit ***any place they choose*** within the war zone? Or should the news media be free to visit ***only places approved by the military***? Or should the news media be ***escorted to places approved by the military***?

Free to visit any place they choose	Military Press	10 73
Visit only places approved by the military	Military Press	55 23
Escorted to approved places	Military Press	35 4

Some people believe that the military should be able to limit the number of news media personnel covering an event by forming media pools under certain circumstances. Should the military have the right to form media pools for the following reasons?

		Yes	No
Concerns for the lives of military personnel	Military Press	96 81	4 19
Concern for the lives of members of the news media	Military Press	76 36	24 64
Impairment of combat effectiveness	Military Press	94 78	6 22
Inability to handle a large number of journalists	Military Press	79 63	21 37
Concerns about the security of an operation	Military Press	96 76	4 24

If pools are used, should they be used throughout the conflict or only as long as necessary?

Throughout conflict	Military Press	21 4
Only as long as necessary	Military Press	79 97

In wartime, do you believe military leaders should be allowed to use the news media to deceive the enemy and thereby deceive the American public as well?

Yes	Military Press	60 8
No	Military Press	41 92

During the Persian Gulf War, CNN carried reports from Baghdad, inside enemy territory, which were subject to Iraqi censorship and which some people thought were unpatriotic. In the future, do you think news organizations should ***refrain from such broadcasts***? Or should they ***report as long as they announce that their reports have been subject to enemy censorship***? Or should they ***report without restriction***?

Refrain from such broadcasts	Military Press	15 1
Report, announcing that reports are censored	Military Press	78 85
Report without restriction	Military Press	6 14

If the president decides to conduct military operations in the national interest and directs the Pentagon to develop secret battle plans, should ***all planning be kept completely secret***? Or should the White House and the Pentagon ***take key news media executives into their confidence*** and ask that they withhold reports until cleared by the government? Or should ***no plans be kept secret*** and the news media be free to report based on their judgment of what best serves the national interest?

Keep all military plans secret	Military Press	77 52
Take news media into confidence and ask them not to report until cleared	Military Press	23 39
Keep no military plans secret	Military Press	0 9

A military officer is aware of some wrongdoing but feels pressure from superiors to keep the incident quiet. Should the officer ***inform the news media*** of the problem? Or should the officer ***call the anonymous government "fraud, waste and abuse hotline"?*** Or should the officer ***remain quiet*** about the event?

Inform the news media	Military Press	2 66
Call hotline	Military Press	90 34
Remain quiet	Military Press	8 0

Generally speaking, how often do you believe that ***civilian government officials*** reported accurately about military operations in the Persian Gulf War?

Almost always	Military Press	33 7
Often	Military Press	61 68
Seldom	Military Press	6 23
Almost never	Military Press	0 2

Generally speaking, how often do you believe that ***the military*** reported accurately about operations in the Persian Gulf War?

Almost always	Military Press	49 6
Often	Military Press	50 67
Seldom	Military Press	1 26
Almost never	Military Press	0 1

Generally speaking, how often do you believe that the ***news media*** reported accurately about military operations in the Persian Gulf War?

Almost always	Military Press	15 10
Often	Military Press	73 76
Seldom	Military Press	11 14
Almost never	Military Press	1 0

Some people say that members of the military like to maintain secrecy for various reasons under different circumstances and that some of these reasons are legitimate while others are questionable. We want to know how often you think ***military officials*** maintain secrecy for the following reasons.

How often does the military maintain secrecy because...	Group	Often	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
They do not trust the news media to report fairly.	Military	31	47	20	2
	Press	70	28	2	0
They fear that potential enemies may learn information that may damage the security of the United States.	Military	73	24	3	0
	Press	51	41	8	0
They know that errors in combat have been made that could be embarrassing for the military.	Military	5	43	48	4
	Press	32	60	8	0
They know that secret new weapons systems are not as effective as they are said to be.	Military	4	30	58	9
	Press	21	54	23	3
They know that reports of waste and inefficiency may be embarrassing.	Military	4	36	54	6
	Press	35	54	10	1
They believe that the news media do not report things that are in the best interest of the United States.	Military	18	42	33	7
	Press	49	39	12	1
They fear that news reports may undermine military morale.	Military	11	43	41	5
	Press	33	49	16	1
They don't want anything reported that will make them look bad.	Military	8	30	54	9
	Press	56	43	2	0

Members of the news media who work for newspapers or the broadcast media often face choices about what they will report concerning national defense and the military. Often, the military and defense officials disagree with their choices. We want to know what **you** think should be reported in several situations. Please tell us whether, if you were in charge of a news operation, you would or would not report the following stories, or if you are undecided.

Would you ...	Group	Report	Undecided	Not report
A reporter obtains documents that show federal government officials and military leaders misled the public about a military operation. Officials say publishing the documents will harm national security.	Military	31	36	34
	Press	77	22	1
A photographer gets pictures of airplanes taking off, possibly indicating that a secret invasion of a neighboring country is underway by U.S. forces.	Military	13	14	74
	Press	35	41	24
A reporter learns that enlisted personnel at a near-by military installation are forced to obtain food stamps because their pay is too low to support their families. A public affairs officer for the unit says the story should not run because it will cause morale problems among the troops.	Military	97	2	1
	Press	99	1	1
There is evidence in a community that the married commander of a local military base is having an affair with the well-known operator of a restaurant.	Military	52	16	32
	Press	10	22	69
A reporter learns that the cadet commander of the ROTC unit at the local university is gay, but keeps his or her sexual orientation private.	Military	25	14	61
	Press	6	14	81
During battlefield coverage, a media photographer takes pictures of U.S. troop casualties, including fatalities. A public affairs officer says the pictures should not be used because of the negative effect on public and troop morale.	Military	49	20	31
	Press	82	13	5
For the third year in a row, the local Marine Corps Reserve unit announces its "Toys for Tots" charity program for the Christmas holiday season. The commander appeals for help from the local news media to obtain contributions.	Military	95	4	2
	Press	87	12	1
American troops are stationed in a foreign country, ready to go into combat. A reserve unit has been activated and is performing support functions. A reporter on the scene wants to do a human-interest story for the reserve unit's hometown newspaper, but military officials refuse, saying the area has not been cleared for access by news media.	Military	41	21	38
	Press	78	15	7

If you have worked with military public affairs officers, how would you generally rate their performance?

Excellent	Military	18
	Press	4
Good	Military	54
	Press	51
Fair	Military	25
	Press	40
Poor	Military	3
	Press	5

The news media and the military sometimes accuse each other of doing things that are not good for the country for different, and sometimes conflicting, reasons. Here are a number of things each group might think about the other. Please tell us whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly.

Do you...	Group	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
Members of the military are more interested in their own image than in the good of the country.	Military	1	4	2	16	77
	Press	2	19	23	34	23
The news media are more interested in negative stories of wrongdoing or scandals than in telling positive stories about victories or efficient operations.	Military	40	42	7	9	2
	Press	5	42	8	34	12
The military often wastes taxpayer money on unnecessary weapons.	Military	3	24	13	39	22
	Press	24	52	14	8	1
The top managers of the news media are more interested in selling newspapers or increasing viewership than in telling the public what it needs to know.	Military	46	45	5	4	1
	Press	3	27	9	40	22
The news media are just as necessary to maintaining the freedom of the United States as the military.	Military	52	30	7	7	3
	Press	85	13	1	0	1
The news media underestimate the public by assuming that the public wants stories about scandals instead of stories about major challenges confronting national defense.	Military	27	50	12	10	2
	Press	11	50	14	18	7
The news media are more interested in their own personal power than in what is good for the country.	Military	23	42	17	17	2
	Press	3	14	9	32	43
Most members of the public are so ignorant that their opinions about national defense don't mean anything anyway.	Military	1	8	8	31	51
	Press	3	5	8	28	56
News media that report about national defense issues rather than sleazy stories about sex and violence will go out of business.	Military	3	19	19	33	26
	Press	3	3	8	19	67
The news media are honest when dealing with military issues.	Military	2	32	19	39	7
	Press	27	52	14	6	1
Military personnel do not appreciate the role of the news media in a democracy.	Military	5	42	9	28	16
	Press	22	54	8	15	1
Military personnel, particularly in the senior ranks, often feel intimidated by the news media.	Military	10	46	9	26	10
	Press	16	45	14	24	1
The news media are mainly left-wing doves who never want the nation to enter combat.	Military	4	20	28	34	15
	Press	1	8	8	29	55
Military personnel prefer to avoid the news media because they are suspicious of their motives.	Military	26	61	5	6	2
	Press	23	68	6	3	0
The public does not really understand the positive role of the news media in covering military operations.	Military	3	36	30	28	3
	Press	21	59	10	8	3
Military personnel are honest when dealing with the news media.	Military	28	56	9	7	0
	Press	2	41	23	30	3
Military personnel often do not speak out and refute news coverage that is biased or inaccurate.	Military	25	57	6	10	3
	Press	6	42	24	23	6
When a military conflict occurs, the public wants only news that is positive, not negative reports about military operations.	Military	1	9	11	55	25
	Press	4	17	6	35	39
Military personnel are mainly right-wing hawks itching to get into combat.	Military	1	2	4	18	75
	Press	1	4	9	33	52
Few members of the news media are knowledgeable about national defense matters, such as military personnel, equipment capabilities and the specifics of foreign military threats.	Military	27	43	6	19	6
	Press	23	51	5	16	6
Military personnel are capable of deciding what the news media need to know about operations.	Military	13	37	16	30	5
	Press	3	4	7	21	66
There is a professional code among the news media that ensures high standards in journalism.	Military	1	12	9	37	42
	Press	10	33	17	25	15
The news media cannot be trusted with information that might compromise the security of a military operation.	Military	33	35	7	21	3
	Press	3	12	8	41	35
Strong competition among the news media improves their performance in covering defense issues.	Military	4	23	17	38	18
	Press	16	42	23	16	3
News media coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort.	Military	31	33	15	15	6
	Press	7	10	12	20	50
Lack of knowledge of the military by members of the news media threatens national security when they report about combat operations.	Military	16	53	15	14	2
	Press	4	24	20	34	18
Limiting the total number of news media members reporting on combat can improve the caliber of reporting.	Military	10	36	29	21	4
	Press	5	17	11	29	39

Comments included in military officers' responses to opinion poll

"I read about F-15s off of an aircraft carrier, or EA-6 AWACS aircraft, *basic items* that are dead wrong. Then I wonder about the rest of the article. Taking it a step further, I then read an article in the same publication and wonder if the article on some sort of breakthrough 'medical miracle' is as inaccurate as the one I read on the military. And it goes on and on ...."

—Cmdr. James J. Convery, USN
Middletown, R.I.

"Bottom line: When media half-covers and the military half-candidly answers, we have quarter truths."

—Lt. Col. Rick Weiner, USA
Carlisle, Pa.

"Poor government policies, not poor reporting, caused the decline of public support for our actions in Vietnam. Poor reporting of good policies can have the same effect. Reporting errors on the local city hall may cause embarrassment. Reporting errors, unintentional or not, may cost lives in combat."

—Lt. Col. Randy Schoel
Fort Hood, Texas

"The media would gladly operate to the detriment of national security and the safety of military personnel if, in the long run, they would succeed in capturing a larger audience. After all, ratings and numbers of copies sold are what it's all about. ...The media will seize any opportunity to make the military look bad. I cannot even speculate as to why this is, but I would venture to say that the majority of media folk are still kicking the mud off their feet from Woodstock."

—Cmdr. Elaine R. Rafferty, USN
Portsmouth, R.I.

"Trust, trust. Fire those on both sides who prove to be untrustworthy."

—Lt. Gen. Ira C. Owens, USA
Fort Myer, Va.

"If you don't trust the media, you don't trust the American people. Some of the media are scum. Most are very honest, hard-working professionals who are trying to do a hard job as best they can. Integrity is just as important to a media reporter as it is to a military person."

—Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF
Niceville, Fla.

"There is a very real trade-off between the press and military. Each has some rights and responsibilities. This is a free society and we both have to labor under that burden. We in the military cannot use secrecy to 'cover' for mistakes, but the press cannot risk lives in search of a story."

—Rear Adm. C. J. Beers Jr., USN
Falls Church, Va.

"More dialogue between the media and the military should be established so we can educate each other about our culture and our professional responsibilities. Mutual trust and respect needs to be built up .... If we commit an injustice, we should be forthright and tell the media (if not a security issue). And they should give it balanced coverage—fair and accurate."

—Cmdr. Valerie Moulé, USN
Newport, R.I.

"There is a perception that reporters try and 'make' the news, not just report it. There is also a perception that (absent a war; i.e., Desert Storm) the media's coverage of the military is an effort to say, 'Gotcha!' Where controversy does not exist, the media creates it."

—Col. Neil S. Fox, USMC
Carlisle, Pa.

"Journalists are self-serving by nature, compensated based upon copy-inch published, and focused solely upon their self-aggrandizing ego and the increase in circulation their sensationalism spawned. The visual medium (TV) is the worst of the bunch."

—Maj. Duane K. Little, USAF
Newport, R.I.

"There is ... a big difference between national and local news media expertise in knowledge of the military. ... National level reporters with experience in military operations, I have more trust in their judgment, even though I may not always agree with them."

—Lt. Col. Roy A. Cleland, USAF
Arlington, Va.

"The vast majority of American journalists have never served their country in the armed forces—most are ignorant of what that entails. The fundamental difference between the respect the two institutions enjoy can be attributed to this. The news media are motivated by *greed.* The military services are motivated by *selfless service* to this nation."

—Lt. Col. John Rosenberger, USA
Carlisle, Pa.

"I didn't think it was wise to allow the proximity of news reporting that occurred in Desert Shield/Storm. I felt that many news media personnel were too close to the action and much, if not all, of the video coverage could have been provided by the military."

—Cmdr. Walter P. Kirkland, USN
Newport, R.I.

"The military needs to put the bad feelings associated with Vietnam behind us. More should be done to foster mutual respect and understanding. There is much for representatives of each camp to learn about the other and there is much worthy of respect in the other."

—Maj. Gen. John C. Thompson, USA
Fort Belvoir, Va.

"War colleges need to educate and train officers more in relations with the media. The media need to set standards and accredit only those who meet and comply with those standards."

—Maj. Gen. Robert S. Frix, USA
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

"A free press is fundamental to our democracy. Any limit on that freedom is dangerous."

—Brig. Gen. Scott Magers, USA
Springfield, Va.

"I have met a few people in the military who would like to choke a few folks in the media; but I've never met anyone who believed we should do away with them. The media and the military both protect our Constitution! The more professional each is, the better the relationship. Honesty and trust are key."

—Maj. Gen. Peter Pace, USMC
Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan

"As a media escort officer during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti ... I was surprised at the media's lack of planning in terms of how to transmit stories back to the United States. ... The more time the media spent with Marines, the greater the mutual understanding, which allowed both the Marines and the media to better complete their missions."

—1st Lt. Michael J. Neumann, USMC
Kingstowne, Va.

"I believe if you let the media/press observe military training and operations, see the marvelous young people we have serving and let them observe the way we do business, our record speaks for itself. We are accountable and responsible. The military debate in Washington is only a small portion of the military that gets more coverage than it deserves."

—Vice Adm. Archie Clemens, USN
Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet

"They (media) are always amazed at the complexity of our operations and the age (youth) of our personnel handling, leading, etc., these operations. Once forthright relationships are established, then we (military and media) can trust each other."

—Rear Adm. David L. Brewer III, USN
Guam

"I remain deeply concerned with the media's general lack of knowledge and appreciation of military affairs. As a consequence, their interviews, reviews and observations suffer in accuracy and clarity. There is also a sense in many reporters (of all media) that the military is a simple concept and one that does not require study or preparation to cover. Thus, reporting is often shallow, inaccurate and, worst of all, half-right."

—Lt. Gen. David A. Bramlett, USA
Camp Smith, Hawaii

"Our First Amendment rights need to be protected, so we military must permit responsible reporting of our activity. During combat operations, lives depend on secrecy and timing. Reporters must honor that requirement. Success or failure also depends on the same aspects. News media's lack of personal policing to insure integrity of reporting is scandalous."

—Rear Adm. David R. Morris, USN
Deputy Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe

"Amateur journalists have contributed significantly to the mistrust between the two communities. Keep them out of the battlefield! Military commanders *own* the battlefield (not the media). If we can't trust our commanders—it's all over for democracy!

—Cmdr. C. A. Melhuish, USN
Middletown, R.I.

"We in the military tend to be a major part of continued tension and ill-will between them and us. For fear of being burned by media, many of us have adopted a 'stand clear' attitude. ... Ultimately, we need media (and vice-versa); we have a positive story to tell, and they want the story. To those who can't stand 'em, 'Get over it!'"

—Lt. Col. R. C. Leicht, USA

"Most military officers, in my opinion, are far more concerned with making a career-ending slip on the record that with national security issues vis-a-vis the media—and for very good reason. The ability of the media to degrade security is minimal—but there is a reasonably good probability that the 'talking head' will blow it."

—Lt. Col. D.C. O'Brien, USMC
Montclair, Va.

"I think our military strategy of stonewalling is counterproductive. *Nightline* or *60 Minutes* is going to run the story anyway, so it is appalling to me that DOD often does not give at least one other side of the story! It shows *immaturity* in our military PAO staffs and a lack of common sense, and hurts our image with the American public."

—Cmdr. Sarah Brown, USN
Fairfax, Va.

"Military people do not, as a rule, trust the press. That distrust often extends to the PAO. The media do not, as a rule, trust the military. That also extends to the PAO at times. Thus an important link between the two antagonistic groups is not fully trusted by either of them."

—Cmdr. John H. Woodhouse Jr., USN

"My recent experience with the press in GTMO convinces me that an attitude of mutual respect and absolute honesty produces good results. We took the press into our confidence and we were not disappointed. Military officers have no business manipulating the media. It doesn't work and it cheapens our image."

—Brig. Gen. M. J. Williams, USMC
Camp Le Jeune, N.C.

"There is still a sense in the military that 'media ethics' is an oxymoron. However, the general view is that we have to work with the print and electronic media people."

—Maj. Gen. Jerry Bates, USA

"The military must never forget that as a public institution, supported by the citizenry, the citizen has every right to know what he's getting for his money."

—Maj. Gen. P. D. Williams, USMC
Santa Ana, Calif.

"I was a brigade commander during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. My brigade attacked with the French into Iraq. I had a four-person press pool with my brigade for almost six weeks. I found them all to be highly professional, cooperative and in search of the truth.

"I believe success in dealing with the press depends on mutual trust and openness. I told the press with me I would answer all their questions truthfully—would hold no information back. In return, they agreed to check with me in what they could and could not report without violating security of our forces and war plans. It seemed to work very well. I was honest with them and they never violated my trust."

—Brig. Gen. Ronald F. Rokosz, USA
Honolulu, Hawaii

"The reason we (military) don't trust the media is this lack of standards and morals."

—Maj. Gen. R. K. Guest, USA

"'Freedom carries with it its own obligation for discipline.' (Not my words.) And it is that which is missing in our press, both written and visual. If Jefferson, the federalists and other framers of the Constitution would have ever conceived of the impact of the pounding of television on a somewhat vacuous country (U.S.), it is probable that more discipline—less freedom—would have been afforded the wording of the First Amendment."

—Rear Adm. E. Christensen, USN
Ceiba, Puerto Rico

"Having been around national media in two conflicts, I have found the print media to be professional and willing to listen and learn. The national network media are not that way at all. They too often behave as if they are the story and we are the props."

—Maj. W. Scott Aitken, USMC
Burke, Va.

"Military officers should not be afraid of contact with the media. We should know their techniques, cultivate those who are honest in their replication of facts. We cannot let our side of the story go 'untold' by us."

—Brig. Gen. David R. Gust, USA
Fort Monmouth, N.J.

"The major issue that bothers me about the media is they tend to 'hide' behind their First Amendment rights. Those of us in the military have given up parts of our First Amendment rights. I believe 'common sense' and good judgment should dictate what the media can report on the military."

—Lt. Col. Pete Gibbon, USA
Springfield, Va.

"I believe senior combat commanders (O-6s and above) need increased media awareness training to improve their interaction with reporters in peacetime as well as war. The media keep military commanders accountable to a constituency larger than that which they consider appropriate or necessary. In turn, the military must keep the media accountable to the soldier who may *perish* due to a misguided news report. We police each other ... and hope truth prevails."

—Lt. Col. Ronald P. Richardson, USAF
Springfield, Va..

"The media of the '60s and '70s generally enjoyed broad public respect; however, today media and toilet are likely to form a ward-pair association match. ... The media in a certain sense is like Congress. The public loves to hate the institution, but likes its members."

—Cmdr. David Nicholson,
U.S. Coast Guard
Woodbridge, Va.

"I applaud the efforts made by the media to keep the public informed. Being under this type of scrutiny ensures that we keep a competent organization."

—Cmdr. Drew Brugal, USN
Newport, R.I.

"If we can train with the former Soviet Union military and have worthwhile exchange programs, we should be able to 'peacefully coexist' with our media at a minimum, possibly the international media as well."

—Lt. Cmdr. Daniel P. Mack, USN
Portsmouth, R.I.

"The sheer number of individuals describing themselves as journalists is leading to further erosion of media/military relations. ... They insist all must be treated the same. ... This is not, nor will it ever be, possible. ... My experience with national journalists is that their complaints have nothing to do with restrictions. They are only concerned with access for 'me.' In other words, 'Treat me better that anybody else or I will make your life miserable.'"

—Col. John T. Kirkwood, USAF
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

"In Desert Storm many reporters were not at all familiar with military matters and had no idea of the importance of security when dealing with operational matters. There was no sense that any sensitive information would be handled with any care. ... Responsible news agencies should send reporters experienced with military matters."

—Lt. Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF

"The press sold themselves out to an 'alternate lifestyle' which is destructive to the country. They are no longer the honest brokers for freedom and justice. They've lost their impartiality and along with it the respect of majority America. ... As a member of the military, I have zero confidence or faith that the news media are concerned about the well-being of this country. I do not trust them."

—Lt. Col. John H. Herd, USAF
Springfield, Va.

"I believe that the *only time* a military member, especially a senior officer and most especially a flag officer, gets himself or herself in trouble with the media is when that person places his/her *self interests* before that of *service* or *country*."

—Vice Adm. A.E. (Gene) Henn,
U.S. Coast Guard
Washington, D.C.

"News coverage didn't hurt the war effort in Vietnam—an untenable policy with no recipe for winning destroyed that effort. Media scrutiny of flawed policy is definitely in the best interests of the country. ... I believe most media have no interest in harming national security, but they can smell cover-up if a PAO or official arbitrarily keeps them from relevant information without good cause."

—Lt. Maureen P. March,
U.S. Coast Guard
Honolulu, Hawaii.

"The officers and troops who went to Desert Storm saw an improved relationship between the media and the Marines. The Marine Corps had a great relationship with the media."

—Maj. Gen. J. R. Davis, USMC
Washington, D.C.

"We need to continue the trend towards increased understanding and mutual respect for our diverse missions which, in a democracy, cannot be separated. Honorable men and women in both professions will develop the framework of a workable solution. It is happening."

—Maj. Gen. J. L. Jones, USMC
Camp Le Jeune, N.C.

Comments included in journalists' responses to opinion poll

"Members of the press need to do a better job of understanding what they are covering—in this case, the military. The military, meanwhile, needs to get a thicker skin. A little "bad" press shouldn't force them further into their shell. The U.S. taxpayers, after all, entrust the military with close to $250 billion a year. Anything less than optimum results should not be tolerated—or ignored."

—Richard Lardner
Inside the Pentagon

"The role of the press in an open society is often misunderstood by both the public and the military. It is not unpatriotic to be critical, constructively, of the military, to report accurately, fairly and responsibly on the military.

—William Hilliard
Portland, Ore.

"Few reporters question such dubious notions as 'surgical strikes.' Few reporters have military backgrounds, and few editors. ... Considering both the military's expense to taxpayers and interest from its current and former personnel, the inattention to this subject in the media is surprising."

—Stephen Rynkiewicz
Chicago Sun-Times

"The key issue in deciding what information should be reported and when, is the potential impact on success or failure of a mission and U.S. casualties. Prior reporting of pending combat operations must be limited for those reasons. But reporting of past events seldom has those restrictions.

"The general lack of knowledge about military affairs makes most reporters and editors ill-suited to judge what information presents a risk to U.S. troops. But military officials frequently are too restrictive. In combat, more cooperation between the military and the media is needed. Few restrictions apply, however, to peacetime issues such as procurement problems and policies."

—Otto Kreisher
Copley News Service

"Rarely is there a military operation that is totally secret. Some small-unit, Special Ops operations may go unreported, but the major media almost always are aware of an operation hours, if not days, before."

—Robert Windrem
NBC Nightly News

"The military is intent on controlling information and, worse, controlling the spin, the angle, far more than any politician I've ever covered. I have had public affairs officers lie to me frequently and they seem to do so more as they rank higher in their careers.

"The military doesn't want anything bad to come out about it and puts incredible roadblocks in journalists' way—and then they ask us why we're so suspicious. I have never been pressured to keep quiet over anything of a sensitive, classified nature—only on subjects that embarrass the military.

"It is also ironic that the armed services have some of the most dedicated, bravest, hardest working men and women in the world, yet their leaders are often duplicitous, devious, dishonorable and dumb. The troops rarely get the leaders they deserve.

"The military is also immature. Any other community of half a million souls understands that its citizens sometimes make mistakes. The military refuses to acknowledge that and insists they're perfect. Grow up."

—Patrick Pexton
Reporter, Navy Times

"Soldiers and scribes have different purposes, and this inevitably results in animosities, especially in time of war. Press access and military security are inherently at odds with each other. Nonetheless, the Gulf War showed we can peacefully coexist without giving comfort to the enemy and endangering American lives."

—Bill Ketter
The Patriot Ledger, *Quincy, Mass.*

"In a major conflict of any duration, foreign journalists will be reporting alongside American journalists. There is no way to bind them to any agreement on coverage. And they are serving a different audience, one that may be opposed to U.S. participation in the conflict. What they gather and report alongside other reporters may pre-empt any rules that have been agreed to."

—Carl Rochelle
CNN

"I think there is a giant generation gap in the military's view of the media. The Vietnam generation, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, remains highly suspicious. But the younger officers are more open. So using a blanket 'military personnel' ... is too generalized."

—John King
Associated Press

Key to Military Rank II

Rank	Navy/Coast Guard	Army/Air Force/Marines
O-1	Ensign	Second Lieutenant
O-2	Lieutenant (Junior Grade)	First Lieutenant
O-3	Lieutenant	Captain
O-4	Lieutenant Commander	Major
O-5	Commander	Lieutenant Colonel
O-6	Captain	Colonel
O-7	Rear Admiral (Lower Half)	Brigadier General
O-8	Rear Admiral	Major General
O-9	Vice Admiral	Lieutenant General
O-10	Admiral	General

Directive from Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

III

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UNCLAS
SUBJECT: DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
1. THE RECENT DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL DEPLOYMENT TO PANAMA FOR OPERATION JUST CAUSE WAS ITS FIRST DEPLOYMENT TO COVER AN ACTUAL COMBAT OPERATION. A DOD ANALYSIS OF THE DEPLOYMENT, WHICH INCLUDED COMMENTS FROM THE REPORTERS IN THE PANAMA POOL, THE COMMANDS INVOLVED, AND THE MILITARY ESCORTS, REVEALED SEVERAL AREAS THAT NEED TO BE IMPROVED IN THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS AND GOVERNING POLICIES FOR THE POOL.
2. THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL WAS DEVELOPED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS IN HANDLING MEDIA ASPECTS OF THE GRENADA OPERATION. AFTER THAT OPERATION, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONVENED THE SIDLE PANEL TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO ACCOMMODATE THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF THE MEDIA TO REPORT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE PANEL CONCLUDED THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS SHOULD HAVE OPEN MEDIA COVERAGE WHENEVER POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY, IT SUGGESTED ESTABLISHING A SMALL POOL OF MEDIA TO COVER AN OPERATION UNTIL OPEN COVERAGE COULD BE ARRANGED. CONSEQUENTLY, IN 1985, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ESTABLISHED THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, CONSISTING OF A SMALL CONTINGENT OF MEDIA WHICH REMAINS ON

ALERT IN WASHINGTON, DC, AND IS AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT.

3. THE GRENADA AND PANAMA OPERATIONS CLEARLY REVEALED THE MEDIA'S NEED FOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION. DURING THE FIRST 24 HOURS OF THE GRENADA ACTION, MORE THAN 600 REPORTERS ATTEMPTED TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE OPERATION. IN PANAMA MORE THAN 800 REPORTERS EVENTUALLY ARRIVED ON-SCENE. IN BOTH CASES, THE LARGE NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS OVERWHELMED THE ASSETS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THEM. ALTERNATIVELY, THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, CONSISTING OF UP TO 16 MEDIA AND 3 ESCORT OFFICERS, IS STRUCTURED TO PROVIDE MEDIA COVERAGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE COMMAND HAS HAD TIME TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND ESTABLISH OPEN MEDIA COVERAGE. ONCE OPEN COVERAGE IS ACHIEVED, THE POOL IS TO BE DISBANDED.
4. ALTHOUGH THE MEDIA POOL WAS DEPLOYED DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE, IT WAS UNABLE TO COVER THE MILITARY ACTION UNTIL THE SECOND DAY AND, CONSEQUENTLY, DID NOT PERFORM AS PLANNED. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(PUBLIC AFFAIRS) AND THE JOINT STAFF ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO EVALUATE AND SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THE MEDIA POOL EXPERIENCED DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE. THESE SOLUTIONS WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO A NEW DOD DIRECTIVE ON THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO ALL COMMANDS AND THE SERVICES FOR STAFFING IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. UNTIL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW INSTRUCTION, THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE BASIC GUIDANCE TO BE USED IN PLANNING FOR ACCOMMODATING A DOD MEDIA POOL DURING BOTH EXERCISES AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.
5. COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED THAT MILITARY ACTIONS IN GRENADA AND PANAMA DEMONSTRATED THAT OTHERWISE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS ARE NOT TOTAL SUCCESSES UNLESS THE MEDIA ASPECTS ARE PROPERLY HANDLED. BOTH OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH SUCCESSFUL, PRODUCED SOME UNFAVORABLE AND OFTEN INCORRECT NEWS STORIES, WHICH DETRACTED FROM THE OPERATION.
6. COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED THAT THE MEDIA ASPECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE IMPORTANT, WILL GET NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION, AND WARRANT YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION. AS STATED IN THE JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE, JOPS VOLUME IV, PLANNING FOR THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL IS A REQUIREMENT FOR ALL CONTINGENCY PLANS. ADDITIONALLY, SUCH PLANNING SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO ALL PART I SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISES (EXCEPT FOR CPX, NUCLEAR ACCIDENT/INCIDENTS, AND COMBINED/JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXERCISES/FTX'S). MEDIA COVERAGE AND POOL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS MUST BE PLANNED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OPERATIONAL PLANS AND SHOULD ADDRESS ALL ASPECTS OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY, INCLUDING DIRECT COMBAT, MEDICAL, PRISONER-OF-WAR, REFUGEE, EQUIPMENT REPAIR, REFUELING AND REARMING, CIVIC ACTION, AND STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ANNEXES SHOULD RECEIVE COMMAND ATTENTION WHEN FORMULATING AND REVIEWING ALL SUCH PLANS.
7. COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED THAT HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN PLANNING TO RECEIVE THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL. COMMANDERS SHOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM TO EFFECT APPROPRIATE HOST NATION COORDINATION.
8. THE NEXT DEPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL MAY OCCUR AT ANY TIME TO EITHER AN EXERCISE OR REAL-WORLD CONTINGENCY OPERATION. AS A MINIMUM THE POOL WILL REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING THEATER SUPPORT:
   A. DAILY, COMPREHENSIVE, UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL BRIEFINGS FOR POOL PERSONNEL.

B. ACCESS TO AREAS OF ONGOING COMBAT/EXERCISE OPERATIONS. THE MEDIA REALIZE AND ACCEPT THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF RISK INVOLVED IN ACCOMPANYING MILITARY FORCES INTO COMBAT. THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY IS NOT A REASON FOR EXCLUDING THEM FROM AN AREA OF ONGOING OPERATIONS. ESSENTIALLY, THE GOAL SHOULD BE TO TREAT REPORTERS AS MEMBERS OF THE UNITS, ALLOWING THEM TO MOVE WITH THE UNITS, WITHOUT RECKLESSLY EXPOSING THEM TO HOSTILE FIRE. WHENEVER POSSIBLE, THEIR COVERAGE SHOULD BE FROM POSITIONS OF REASONABLE SAFETY.

C. REASONABLE ACCESS TO KEY COMMAND AND STAFF PERSONNEL. ALL INFORMATION GIVEN OUT BY THESE PERSONNEL WILL BE UNCLASSIFIED AND ON THE RECORD.

D. AN OFFICER FROM THE SUPPORTED COMMAND IN THE GRADE OF O-5 OR O-6 TO COORDINATE MEDIA POOL REQUIREMENTS. THIS OFFICER WOULD NORMALLY BE THE COMMAND PAO AND SHOULD BE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS, THE ONGOING OPERATION, AND PARTICIPATING COMMANDS. THIS OFFICER SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATE AND UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE COMMANDER TO RESOLVE MEDIA POOL PROBLEMS AS THEY ARISE.

E. ITINERARY PLANNING THAT WILL ENABLE MEDIA POOL MEMBERS TO DISPERSE THROUGHOUT THE COMBAT AREA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE BALANCED COVERAGE OF OPERATIONS, AND TO REGROUP PERIODICALLY TO SHARE INFORMATION AND FILE STORIES. COMMANDS SHOULD PLAN FROM THE ONSET OF THE OPERATION TO DIVIDE THE POOL INTO SMALL ELEMENTS OF FROM 1 - 3 PERSONS, TO DISPERSE THOSE ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE AREA OF OPERATION TO FACILITATE COVERAGE OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION, TO PERIODICALLY RETURN THEM TO A CENTRAL LOCATION TO POOL THEIR MATERIAL, AND THEN TO RETURN THEM TO THE OPERATIONAL AREA SO THAT THEY MAY CONTINUE COVERING THE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES. THIS CYCLE SHOULD BE REPEATED THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT, AT A MINIMUM OF ONCE A DAY.

F. COOPERATION FROM ALL FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION/EXERCISE ON A NOT-TO-INTERFERE BASIS. NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES HAVE A LEGITIMATE ROLE TO FULFILL IN A COMBAT AREA. SINCE THE EARLIEST DAYS OF OUR NATION, THEY HAVE HELPED THE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE KEEP THE AMERICAN PUBLIC INFORMED OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES.

9. SUPPORTED COMMANDERS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR POOL AND ESCORT PERSONNEL OUT OF EXISTING EXERCISE OR CONTINGENCY FUNDS. THE NATIONAL MEDIA POOL MAY CONSIST OF UP TO 16 MEDIA PERSONNEL AND 3 ESCORT OFFICERS (2 DOD & 1 JCS). REQUIRED SUPPORT MAY INCLUDE, BUT MAY NOT BE LIMITED TO:

A. EXISTING CONTINGENCY/EXERCISE AIRLIFT FROM CONUS TO AREA OF OPERATIONS OR EXERCISE AND RETURN.

B. THEATER GROUND, SEA, AND AIR TRANSPORTATION TO ALLOW FOR POOL COVERAGE OF OPERATIONS.

C. MESSING AND BILLETING ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS.

D. ISSUANCE OF ANY GEAR CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION (E.G., HELMETS, CANTEENS, FLAK VESTS, ETC.).

E. ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO FILE STORIES ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS.

F. MEDICAL SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

10. COMMANDS ARE ENCOURAGED TO RETRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND UNITS.

11. THE DOD MEDIA POOL POINT OF CONTACT IS LCDR GREGG HARTUNG, USN, AV 223-1074, COMM (202) 693-1074. MESSAGE ADDRESS: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC // OASD:PA-DPL // . BT

Statement of Principles: News Coverage of Combat IV

The following principles have been adopted by representatives of major American news media and the Pentagon to be followed in any future combat situation involving American troops.

Principles that should govern future arrangements for news coverage from the battlefield of the United States military in combat:

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard of covering U.S. military operations. But pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspensions of the credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special Operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool System.

Accompanying Statement on Security Review

Note: The news organizations originally proposed 10 principles. One dealt with security review and said: "News material—words and pictures—will not be subject to security review." The Pentagon proposed instead a principle that said: "Military operational security may require review of news material for conformance to reporting ground rules." This fundamental disagreement could not be bridged, and representatives of the press and the military issued their separate views on this matter, as follows.

News Media Statement

The news organizations are convinced that journalists covering U.S. forces in combat must be mindful at all times of operational security and the safety of American lives. News organizations strongly believe that journalists will abide by clear operational security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary.

We believe that the record in Operation Desert Storm, Vietnam and other wars supports the conclusion that journalists in the battlefield can be trusted to act responsibly.

We will challenge prior security review in the event that the Pentagon attempts to impose it in some future military operation.

Department of Defense Statement

The military believes that it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop safety or the success of a mission.

Any review system would be imposed only when operational security is a consideration—for example, the very early stages of a contingency operation or sensitive periods in combat. If security review were imposed, it would be used for one very limited purpose: to prevent disclosure of information which, if published, would jeopardize troop safety or the success of a military operation. Such a review system would not be used to seek alterations in any other aspect of content or to delay timely transmission of news material.

Security review would be performed by the military in the field, giving the commander's representative the opportunity to address potential ground rule violations. The reporter would either change the story to meet ground rule concerns and file it, or file it and flag for the editor whatever passages were in dispute. The editor would then call the Pentagon to give the military one last chance to talk about potential ground rule violations.

The Defense Department believes that the advantage of this system is that the news organization would retain control of the material throughout the review and filing process. The Pentagon would have two chances to address potential operational security violations, but the news organization would make the final decision about whether to publish the disputed information. Under Principle Four, violations of the ground rules could result in expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone.

Adopted Mar. 11, 1992

List of Persons Interviewed V

Taped Interviews

1. 10-20-94 Pete Williams, NBC Washington correspondent.
At the National Press Club. Lawrence & Aukofer.

2. 10-20-94 Bill Smullen, executive assistant to Gen. Colin Powell.
In Alexandria, Va. Lawrence & Aukofer.

3. 10-21-94 Charles J. Lewis, Washington bureau chief, Hearst News Service.
At Hearst bureau. Lawrence & Aukofer.

4. 10-21-94 Maj. Gen. Charles W. McClain Jr., U.S. Army public information chief.
Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

5. 10-21-94 Brig. Gen. Ronald T. Sconyers, U.S. Air Force public affairs chief.
Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

6. 10-21-94 Adm. William Owens, vice-chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

7. 11-28-94 Jonathan Wolman, AP Washington bureau chief.
At AP Washington bureau. Aukofer.

8. 11-28-94 George Wilson, author and defense reporter.
In Washington, D.C. Aukofer.

9. 11-28-94 Bradley Graham, *Washington Post* defense reporter.
At Washington Post *offices. Aukofer.*

10. 11-28-94 John Fialka, *Wall Street Journal* Washington reporter.
At WSJ Washington bureau. Aukofer.

11. 11-29-94 Rear Adm. Kendell Pease, U.S. Navy public affairs chief.
At Pentagon. Aukofer.

12. 11-29-94 R. W. Apple Jr., Washington bureau chief, *New York Times*.
In Washington, D.C. Aukofer.

13. 11-30-94 Dennis Boxx, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for public affairs.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

14. 11-30-94 Cliff Bernath, principal deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for public affairs.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

15. 11-30-94 Robert Taylor, superintendent of schools, Armed Forces Information Service.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

16. 11-30-94 Kenneth Bacon, assistant to the secretary of defense for public affairs.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

17. 11-30-94 Col. Larry Icenogle, public affairs special assistant to the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer

18. 12-1-94 Col. William L. Mulvey, chief of public affairs, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (director of Central Command JIB in Gulf War).
At Corps of Engineers HQ, Washington, D.C. Lawrence & Aukofer.

19. 12-1-94 Fred Hoffman, Pentagon public affairs adviser, former AP defense correspondent.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

20. 12-1-94 Jerry Friedheim, former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.
In Washington, D.C.. Lawrence & Aukofer.

21. 12-1-94 Peter Braestrup, senior editor and director of communications, Library of Congress.
At Library of Congress. Lawrence & Aukofer.

22. 12-1-94 Steve Katz, former Senate staffer for Sen. John Glenn, who directed Senate hearings on press coverage of Gulf War.
At Library of Congress. Lawrence & Aukofer.

23. 12-2-94 Marlin Fitzwater, press secretary to President George Bush.
Telephone interview. Aukofer.

24. 12-27-94 Adm. Michael Boorda, chief of naval operations.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

25. 12-27-94 Edward M. Fouhy, head of Concord Communications Group.
At CNN Washington bureau. Lawrence & Aukofer.

26. 12-27-94 Peggy Soucy, deputy Washington bureau chief, CNN.
At CNN Washington bureau. Lawrence & Aukofer.

27. 12-28-94 Melissa Healy, Washington correspondent, *Los Angeles Times* (covered defense for 11 years).
At Los Angeles Times *Washington bureau. Lawrence & Aukofer.*

28. 12-28-94 Patrick J. Sloyan, Washington correspondent, *Newsday*, Pulitzer Prize winner for stories about Gulf War.
At Sloyan home near Leesburg, Va. Aukofer.

29. 12-29-94 Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer..

30. 1-12-95 Gen. Carl E. Mundy Jr., commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
At Marine Corps HQ, Arlington, Va. Lawrence & Aukofer.

31. 1-12-95 Col. Frederick C. Peck, deputy director, division of public affairs, U.S. Marine Corps.
At Marine HQ. Lawrence & Aukofer.

32. 1-12-95 Brig. Gen. Terrence P. Murray, director of public affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps.
At Marine HQ, Lawrence & Aukofer.

33. 1-12-95 Former Defense Secretary Richard Cheney.
At Cheney's office at American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. Lawrence & Aukofer.

34. 1-23-95 Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf (USA, Ret.).
At Schwarzkopf's office, Tampa, Fla. Lawrence & Aukofer.

35. 1-23-95 Gen. J. H. Binford Peay III, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla.
In Peay's office at MacDill. Lawrence & Aukofer.

36. 1-23-95 Navy Capt. Robert Prucha, CentCom public affairs officer.
At CentCom. Lawrence & Aukofer.

37. 1-23-95 Rear Adm. Irve C. Le Moyne, deputy commander in chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB.
In Le Moyne office. Lawrence & Aukofer.

38. 1-23-95 Army Col. Robert E. Pilnacek, public affairs officer, U.S. Special Operations Command.
At Special Ops Command. Lawrence & Aukofer.

39. 1-26-95 Former Defense Secretary Les Aspin.
In Aspin's office at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Lawrence & Aukofer.

40. 1-26-95 Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird.
In Laird's Washington office. Aukofer.

41. 2-1-95 Maj. John Farley, U.S. Air Force Academy, assistant professor and course director, English 365, TV News Production (called "Blue Tube"). Also executive officer, English Department.
At USAF Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. Aukofer.

42. 2-1-95 Capt. Chris Luedtke, U.S. Air Force Academy, course director MAS 480 (military art & science), which is military-media course. Also 34th Squadron executive officer, which is not part of faculty but part of commandant of cadets.
At USAF Academy. Aukofer.

43. 2-1-95 First Lt. Ronald Watrous, public affairs officer, U.S. Air Force Academy.
At Academy. Aukofer.

44. 2-1-95 Col. Joseph W. Purka, director of public affairs, U.S. Air Force Academy.
At Academy. Aukofer.

45. 2-28-95 Robert Sims, vice president of communications, National Geographic Society; former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.
In Sims's office. Lawrence & Aukofer.

46. 3-20-95 Clark Hoyt, vice president for news, Knight-Ridder News Service.
Telephone interview. Aukofer.

47. 3-27-95 Secretary of Defense William Perry.
In Perry's office at Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

48. 3-30-95 Capt. Robert Prucha, USN, CentCom director of public affairs, and Col. John A. Smith, deputy director of public affairs, CentCom.
Taped telephone interview. Lawrence & Aukofer.

Other Meetings and Interviews (not taped)

1. 10-14-94 Larry Smith, counselor to Defense Secretary William Perry.
At Pentagon. Background interview. Lawrence & Aukofer.

2. 10-14-94 Adm. Kendell Pease, U.S. Navy public affairs chief.
At Pentagon. Lawrence & Aukofer.

3. 10-14-94 Bill Headline, Washington bureau chief, CNN, and Jamie McIntyre, CNN Pentagon correspondent.
At CNN Washington bureau. Lawrence & Aukofer.

4. 10-20-94 Col. Robert C. Hughes (USAF), dean of faculty and academic affairs, National War College.
At War College. Lawrence & Aukofer.

5. 10-20-94 Charles Stevenson, professor of national security policy, National War College.
At War College. Lawrence & Aukofer.

6. 12-6-94 Adm. Charles R. Larson, superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy.
At Annapolis, Md. Lawrence.

7. 12-15 Rear Adm. Wallace N. Guthrie Jr., USNR, director of training, Armed Forces Information Service (AFIS).
Telephone interview. Lawrence.

8. 12-9-94 Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.
At Forbes *magazine office, Washington, D.C. Lawrence.*

9. 12-29-94 Robert Taylor, superintendent of schools, Armed Forces Information Service (AFIS).
Telephone conversation. Lawrence.

10. 1-26-95 Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., USA (Ret.), military writer and former member of the Twentieth Century Fund's task force on the military and the media.
At Summers home, Bowie, Md. Lawrence.

11. 1-31-95 Former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci.
At Carlyle Group offices, Washington, D.C. Lawrence.

12. 2-2-95 Capt. R. E. Wildermuth, USN (Ret.), former public affairs officer, U.S. Central Command during Desert Storm.
Telephone conversation. Lawrence.

13. 2-8-95 Capt. Michael T. Sherman, USN (Ret.), former director, Joint Information Bureau, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, August to November 1990.
Telephone conversation. Lawrence.

14. 4-28-95 David Lawsky, Washington correspondent, Reuters.
Telephone interview. Aukofer.

15. 5-22-95 Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.
Telephone interview. Aukofer.

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About the Authors

Vice Adm. William P. Lawrence (USN, Ret.) is a career naval aviator. While commanding officer of a fighter squadron flying off an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War, he was shot down and spent six years as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam. Subsequently, his senior assignments included service as Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, Commander of the Third Fleet and Chief of Naval Personnel. His decorations include four Distinguished Service Medals, three Silver Stars, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and two Purple Hearts. Lawrence retired in 1986 after 35 years of service and resides in Annapolis, Md.

Frank A. Aukofer is Washington Bureau Chief of the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*. He joined *The Milwaukee Journal* in 1960 and moved to the newspaper's Washington bureau in 1970. Over the years, he has covered the civil rights movement, many of Washington's top news stories, national political conventions, and assignments in Mexico and Latin America. He was an original member of the Pentagon press pool and was in the first pool allowed into Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield. Later, he returned to cover Desert Storm. Aukofer resides in Annandale, Va.

Credits

John Seigenthaler is chairman of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center and a trustee of The Freedom Forum. He is chairman emeritus of *The Tennessean* in Nashville and the founding editorial director of USA TODAY.

Paul McMasters is executive director of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center and a vice president of The Freedom Forum. He is past president of The Society of Professional Journalists and former associate editor of the editorial page at USA TODAY.

Bracey Campbell is director of communications for The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University. A former managing editor of the *Nashville Banner*, Campbell also served as special assistant to former Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander.

Natilee Duning is editor/writer for The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University. She is a former reporter and music editor for *The Tennessean* and former editorial-page editor of *The* (Shreveport) *Times*.

Robert O. Wyatt is professor of journalism and director of the Office of Communication Research at Middle Tennessee State University. His 1991 nationwide survey of public attitudes toward the First Amendment, published by the American Society of Newspaper Editors, was awarded the 1992 Sigma Delta Chi Award for Research About Journalism.

Scholars' assistant: **Angie McDade**
Research assistants: **Jonathan Brasfield, Monique Carter**
Cover and publication design: **David Smith**
Cover illustration: **Bill Rechin**

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The First Amendment Center's mission is to foster a better public understanding of and appreciation for First Amendment rights and values, including freedom of religion, free speech and press, and the right to petition government and to assemble peacefully.

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Major operating programs are The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center at Columbia University in New York City, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn., and The Newseum at The Freedom Forum Headquarters in Arlington, Va.

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