

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A STRATEGY FOR REFORM

A Report of an Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy

Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations

July 30, 2002

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A consensus is emerging, made far more urgent by the war on terrorism, that U.S. public diplomacy requires new thinking and decision-making structures that do not now exist. We must make clear why we are fighting this war and why supporting it is in the interest of other nations as well as our own. Because terrorism is considered the transcendent threat to our national security, it is overwhelmingly in the national interest that the United States formulate and manage its foreign policies in such a way that the war on terrorism receives the indispensable cooperation of foreign nations.

The purpose here is not to increase U.S. popularity abroad for its own sake, but because it is in the U.S. national interest. Doing so requires a deeper understanding of foreign attitudes and more effective communication of our policies. It also means fully integrating public diplomacy needs into the very foundation of our foreign policies in the first place. Particularly now that we are fighting a war on terrorism, we must come to understand and accept that “image problems” and “foreign policy” are not things apart: they are both part of an integrated whole.

In sum, we must make clear the U.S. government’s commitment to public diplomacy as a central element in U.S. foreign policy. Significant reform is urgently needed to bring strategic planning, focus, resources, and badly needed coordination to this effort.

Specifically, this report recommends five urgent areas of reform:

- I. Develop immediately a coherent strategic and coordinating framework, including a presidential directive on public diplomacy and a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led by the president’s personal designee.
- II. Increase customized, “two-way” dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way, “push-down” mass communication, including an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialogue, and debate that increases the amount and the effectiveness of public opinion research, and that fosters increasingly meaningful relationships between U.S. and foreign journalists.
- III. Significantly increase private sector involvement, including greater use of credible and independent messengers, and the creation of an independent, not-for-profit “Corporation for Public Diplomacy.”
- IV. Raise the effectiveness of public diplomacy resources, including State Department reforms that make public diplomacy central to the work of all diplomats and ambassadors, a Quadrennial Diplomacy Review, an Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute, and a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps.
- V. Increase public diplomacy resources, including the building of a congressional committee structure, support for public diplomacy, and enhanced resources in key areas of modern communication.

The findings of a widely publicized Gallup poll on attitudes in nine Islamic countries, a Zogby International ten-nation poll on impressions of America, State Department foreign attitude and media opinion surveys and views of many informed observers in and out of government are broadly consistent:¹ America does indeed have a serious image problem. Gallup’s poll of nearly 10,000 people in nine Muslim countries—including Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—found that 53 percent of respondents viewed the United States unfavorably. When asked whether they believed that Arabs carried out the

¹ See Gallup/USA Today, *Poll Results*, February 27, 2002, and Andrea Stone, “Many in Islamic World Doubt Arabs Behind 9/11,” *USA Today*, February 27, 2002, <http://usatoday.com>; Zogby International, “The Ten Nations Impressions of America Poll,” April 11, 2002; Pew Research Center, “America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as a Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders: Little Support for Expanding War on Terrorism,” December 19, 2001, <http://people-press.org>; and Richard Morin, “Islam and Democracy,” *The Washington Post*, April 28, 2002.

September 11 attacks, well over 70 percent of those polled in Indonesia, Kuwait and Pakistan said, “No, not true.” In Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan, 44 percent to 53 percent said they believe the Western value system has a negative influence on the Islamic value system. Many in the Muslim world do not believe the U.S. military action in Afghanistan is morally justifiable—well over half of Turks, two-thirds of Kuwaitis, and 80 percent or more in Pakistan and Indonesia. And finally, few of those polled by Gallup in the Muslim world believe that western nations respect Arab/Islamic values—only six percent of Iranians, six percent of Indonesians and 13 percent of Saudis believe this. In a Zogby International poll conducted in the spring of 2002, Arab countries gave the United States low favorable ratings across the board in its dealings with Arab nations.

Certainly, negative attitudes toward the United States and its policies are more intense in the Middle East, where many people do not trust what we say because they feel our words are contradicted by our policies, particularly our tolerance for the autocratic regimes that are our friends in the region. Nevertheless, to the extent that negative attitudes toward the United States have escalated among Muslims,² it is well to remember that the majority of the world’s highly diverse Muslim population is scattered globally and does not live only in Arab nations. Some of these feelings are also prevalent among certain groups in Western Europe, Latin America, Asia and elsewhere for a variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, trade policy, agricultural subsidies, environmental policy, American “unilateralism,” and so forth.

The case of Europe is especially worrisome because the Europeans are our vital allies, not only in the war on terrorism but in so many aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Though a recent Council on Foreign Relations/Pew Research Center/International Herald Tribune poll shows Europeans have a better opinion of President Bush than they did before September 11, they remain highly critical of most of his policies and what they see as a unilateral approach to international affairs. Fully 85 percent of Germans, 80 percent of French, 73 percent of British and 68 percent of Italian respondents say the United States is acting in its own interests in the fight against terrorism, while very few feel the United States is taking into account the interests of its allies.³

In sum, America’s image problem is not only regional. It is global.

Of course, foreign perceptions of the United States are far from monolithic. But there is little doubt that stereotypes of the United States as arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive, and unwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue are pervasive and deeply rooted.⁴ In the eyes of some people, Americans largely ignored terrorism as a problem—

² See Thomas L. Friedman, "Listening to the Future?" *The New York Times*, May 5, 2002. Friedman attributes the Muslim world's entrenched negative perceptions toward the United States to many factors: "A reaction to America's war on terrorism and Ariel Sharon's war on Yasir Arafat, the failure of Muslim states to master modernity, Muslim resentment at being blamed for 9/11, un-questioning Congressional support for Israel and outright incitement against Israel and Jews in Arab and European media and Web sites."

³ The survey of 4,042 people in four countries (along with 1,362 Americans), conducted by the Pew Research Center in association with the International Herald Tribune and the Council on Foreign Relations, finds major transatlantic differences over possible military action to end Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq. In the United States, 69 percent favor military actions, compared with 46 percent in Great Britain and France and even fewer (34 percent) in Germany and Italy. However, the survey does show European publics potentially responsive to the idea of using force against Iraq if it is established that Baghdad is developing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Evidence of Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attacks also would be very important to a majority in Great Britain, but fewer in France, Germany or Italy.

The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan enjoys strong approval among the publics of the four countries, and most believe that the United States is not overreacting to the threat of terrorism. Even so, large majorities in each country think that the U.S. is not taking allied interests into account in conducting the war, and Bush’s “axis of evil” rhetoric elicited a strongly negative reaction in France, Germany Italy and Great Britain.

⁴ The State Department’s Office of Research found that Gallup’s polling results are “generally consistent” with its own polls. The Office of Research also concluded that “Gallup, Zogby, and other surveys taken in the U.S. and a number of Muslim countries show that both American and Muslim publics believe that foreign policy issues, rather than U.S. culture, underlie Muslim disapproval of the U.S.” See Office of Research Opinion Analysis, “American’s Images of Key Muslim Countries Tumbled After 9/11; Images of U.S. in Muslim Countries Cover Wide Range,” April 23, 2002.

remember how quickly we forgot the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center—until the enormity of September 11 hit us.

Also at the root of these negative attitudes is our perceived lack of empathy for other people's pain and hardship and the tragic plight throughout the developing world. The pervasive sense of despair and hopelessness in developing countries—in the face of America's unprecedented affluence—leads, to be sure, to envy and a sense of victimhood, but also to the anger and mistrust that accompany such feelings. Among the most startling manifestations of these deep resentments from abroad were the expressions of joy from some groups immediately following the terrorist attacks. Thus, our public diplomacy must show direct evidence of U.S. government efforts to alleviate such pain through aid packages and other American-sponsored activities, including those on behalf of Muslims in places such as Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia, and the Palestinian territories. It also means articulating to lesser-privileged nations a positive vision of their future that shows that we understand and support their desire for increased prosperity, an improved quality of life, and peace.⁵

We must remember, however, that expressing empathy alone, particularly if it seems contradictory to our policies and values, will not be nearly enough. For the foreseeable future, the war on terrorism will and should overshadow other policy issues, but this war also underscores the urgent need for more effective public diplomacy in general. In this effort, the credibility of an American message will be enhanced significantly when the U.S. position does not appear unilateral, and when we appeal to international legitimacy and consensus about the principles we are defending. It is also important to make clear that regardless of the foreign criticism of our policies, they have been arrived at democratically; in the case of policy toward Israel, for example, it is essential to demonstrate that the American people are solidly behind the preservation of the state of Israel and its security, as the polls show. In the current period, we must show that this nation is overwhelmingly united behind the war against terrorism.

Improving our image through public diplomacy is directly linked to our most fundamental national security needs. But public diplomacy does more than address a "serious image problem." Defending our homeland, seeking out and destroying terrorists, and using public diplomacy to make it easier for our allies to support us and to reduce the "attractiveness" of terrorism are all part of the same battle.

We are aware, too, that many highly competent public diplomacy professionals in and out of government serve their country's public diplomacy needs with skill—albeit with inadequate tools and insufficient resources. In a state of war, and indeed, this is a multi-front war, the president and secretary of state understand that changes are required in the public diplomacy assets they inherited. They have made a good start in taking important steps such as creating the Afghan Women's Initiative, the Coalition Information Centers, and the State Department's student exchange idea. Thus far, however, the administration's initiatives have not made significant headway in meeting the president's own stated objectives.

Given the attitudes toward the United States cited above, we have asked ourselves a fundamental, if obvious, question: What difference should it make to us that large numbers of foreigners hate, distrust, scorn or resent us? In answering this question, an essential starting point is to recognize that U.S. foreign policy is weakened by a failure to include public diplomacy

⁵ U.S. initiatives critical to targeted and effective public diplomacy include humanitarian relief efforts in Afghanistan; reinvigorated English language programs in indigenous schools; installation of multimedia rooms called "American Corners" in partnering institutions abroad; acquisition of television, film, and radio rights for current events productions, documentaries, docu-dramas, and dramatic features in Muslim majority states; and exchange programs carried out by nongovernmental partners for Muslim youth, teachers, and young political leaders using programs and models adapted to the Islamic world. See Statement of Undersecretary of State Charlotte Beers before the House Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Subcommittee, April 24, 2001.

systematically in the formulation and implementation of policy. Examples of misunderstood or misguided policies include the rejections of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines, the agreement to create the International Criminal Court, and the Genocide Convention. Let us be clear: public diplomacy is not a matter of seeking foreign public approval to drive U.S. policy, nor is it simply an effort to win popularity. Rather, it involves a baseline recognition that foreign attitudes and understanding affect the success or failure of U.S. policies.

Thus, we argue that the effects of U.S. policy decisions and implementation, as well as the reaction to them, should be primary considerations in both the shaping and the communicating of U.S. policy. Having said that, some of the animosity against America is related to serious policy issues. We cannot always make others happy with our policy choices, nor should we. Part of our challenge is to better explain why we do what we do, and then to accept that many will choose to differ. We may be able to offset some of the hostility, but not eradicate it. This is part of being a great power. We should not leave the impression that all differences are resolvable or could be if we would just be nicer or more empathetic.

In the past, foreign policy was often the sole prerogative of nation-states, and it was formed through interaction between heads of state and governmental ministers. Today, people have far more access to information and more “soft power”⁶ to influence global affairs directly, indirectly, and through their governments. Globalization, the increased speed and greatly diminished cost of processing and transmitting information, the reach of 24/7 television programming, global news media (AM, FM, and shortwave radio, satellite TV), growing Internet penetration, and “smart” mobile phones, are central characteristics of the twenty-first-century foreign policy environment; so are populist movements fueled by religious and sectarian beliefs and wider public participation in international affairs. The information age has democratized communication by providing freedom of access to information, the ability to voice opinions, and the opportunity to enter debate. Therefore, no foreign policy can succeed without a sustained, coordinated capability to understand, inform, and influence people and private organizations, as well as governments.

This report goes beyond a plea to devote more resources to public diplomacy. It calls for a new public diplomacy paradigm. The challenge is not simply to adjust U.S. public diplomacy, but to revolutionize it. This means redefining the role of public diplomacy: from the way we tie it to foreign policy objectives to the way we formulate a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy; from the way we recruit and train public officials to the way we define the missions of U.S. embassies and diplomats.

I. Develop immediately a coherent strategic and coordinating framework

Issue a presidential directive on public diplomacy. Early in 2001, the George W. Bush administration undertook a review of previous efforts to integrate public diplomacy into the policy process that was intended to provide guidance before the new administration would implement its own interagency coordinating structure. In July 2002, 17 months later and ten months after September 11, this review is still not complete.

Many in the administration may feel they have made public diplomacy a genuine priority. Certainly some new and useful steps have been taken, and a recent meeting between members of our Task Force and senior White House officials gave evidence of the government’s commitment to do far more. However, to people who follow these

⁶ See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

matters—here and abroad—public diplomacy does not yet look like a genuine priority at all. It is essential that President Bush himself make clear the U.S. government's commitment to reforming public diplomacy and making it a central element of U.S. foreign policy.

Core elements of the presidential directive should include (1) a clear policy and strategy to strengthen the U.S. government's ability to communicate with foreign publics; (2) an efficient and effective coordinating structure for the U.S. government's civilian and military public diplomacy assets; (3) a requirement that all regional and functional National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committees assess the potential implications for foreign public opinion of policy options under consideration and develop communications strategies—which are indispensable—in concert with policy implementation; (4) guidance on public diplomacy resources, training, programs, budgets, and technology; (5) special attention to relations with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, commercial media outlets, and coalition allies; and (6) a schedule of tasks and benchmarks to evaluate progress in achieving reforms.

Create a public diplomacy coordinating structure (PDCS) led by the president's personal designee. The PDCS would help define communications strategies, streamline public diplomacy structures, and horizontally transfer ownership of these efforts to U.S. government agencies, allies, and private sector partners. In many ways, the PDCS would be similar to the National Security Council, in its role as adviser, synthesizer, coordinator, and priority-setter. It would also somewhat resemble the recent White House-led Coalition Information Centers (CIC), which should be studied and adapted for broader purposes.

The coordinating structure should include members at the assistant-secretary level or above designated by the following: the assistant to the president for national security affairs; the director of the White House Office of Global Communications; the director or secretary of homeland security; the secretaries of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce, and the attorney general; the directors of central intelligence, and the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the chairs of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The chair of the PDCS should serve as the president's principal adviser on public diplomacy working out of the White House. This job will require leadership of unusually high quality and a person with regular access to the president. The public diplomacy adviser must have the confidence and trust of the president and a deep strategic and practical understanding of the power of communications in today's global information environment. This official's responsibilities should include overseeing the development of strategic public diplomacy priorities, advising the president and senior policymakers on foreign public opinion and communications strategies, and long-range planning of public diplomacy. This individual should also review carefully all presidential statements to consider their impact abroad given what is known about foreign attitudes and sensitivities. This review is obviously far less needed in domestic communication, where senior elected officers have traversed the entire country, know the people, and understand the regional attitudes and sensitivities.

The PDCS chair should oversee and coordinate public diplomacy but should not engage in operations or program implementation. (Appendix I illustrates the many players in the public diplomacy universe of the U.S. government.)


A dedicated secretariat is essential to carrying out the work of the PDCS. The secretariat should consist of a small, full-time staff drawing on expertise in civilian and military agencies that carry out public diplomacy, for-profit communications organizations, and NGOs interested in communicating U.S. interests and values abroad. The secretariat should report directly to the PDCS and should not be viewed as the satellite staff of any one department. Members of the secretariat should be detailed by their agencies on a non-reimbursable basis. U.S. agencies not included in the secretariat should provide advisory and operational support as issues and circumstances warrant. The secretariat should be led by an officer selected from the Senior Foreign Service, the Senior Executive Service, a military officer of flag rank, or a professional of comparable level recruited from the private sector. It is important that the secretariat's director and staff be sensitive to different civilian and military organizational cultures and to department perceptions—and misperceptions—of the PDCS and its mandate.

The public PDCS and its secretariat must have adequate budget and authority to coordinate timely communications strategies and information dissemination by civilian and military agencies. The PDCS must be able to command, among other things, (1) expanded analyses of foreign public opinion and structures of influence through government departments and contracts with independent research organizations; (2) development of credible themes and messages for crisis response and long-term communications strategies tailored to different audiences in different cultures; (3) identification of appropriate media outlets and other information-dissemination channels; (4) production and commercial acquisition of information products; (5) recruitment and “best practices” training; (6) deployment of qualified individuals to countries and regions with critical needs; and (7) surge broadcasting for crisis communications.

Move public diplomacy from the margins to the center of foreign policy making. Too often public diplomacy is seen as reactive, not proactive, and as a response (often defensive) to a crisis. Edward R. Murrow, the legendary newsman whom President John F. Kennedy appointed director of the U.S. Information Agency, is said to have observed after the Bay of Pigs fiasco that USIA should be in on the “takeoffs” and not only the “crash landings.” Murrow urged that public diplomacy officials be included when and as foreign policies are made for several reasons: (1) to ensure that policymakers are aware of the likely reaction of foreign publics to a forthcoming policy; (2) to advise how best to convincingly communicate policies to foreign audiences; and (3) to ensure that U.S. diplomats are prepared to articulate policies before they are announced.

We strongly endorse this approach, which inculcates public diplomacy into the ongoing policymaking process and thus makes it “present at the creation.” Public diplomacy must be an integral part of foreign policy, not something that comes afterward to sell the foreign policy. It should not decide foreign policy issues, but it must be taken into consideration at the same time as foreign policy is being made. In this way it would help define optimum foreign policies as well as explain how our policies fit the values and interests of other nations, and not just those of Americans. Otherwise, the United States runs into the same problem we did for many years on human rights policy: the president would launch a foreign policy that did not include human rights, and then, when attacked, Washington would roll out the human rights rhetoric, but the people abroad would not take it seriously.

- II. Increase customized, “two-way” dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way “push-down” mass communication



Adopt an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialogue, debate and relationship-building and increases the amount and effectiveness of public-opinion research. Historically, U.S. public policy has been communicated largely in a push-down method, which lacks both a broad reach and an adequate explanation to foreign media. Policy is created, speeches given, press releases written, and press conferences held—all with a primary focus on addressing the U.S. media. Many of our messages are delivered by a limited number of official messengers, with a primary foreign audience of foreign governments and international organizations, not foreign publics. In this “push-down” approach, the government too often does not engage in much open discussion of how it arrived at its policy decisions. Communications geared toward a domestic U.S. audience assume a keen understanding of our system of government—knowledge that foreign publics often lack. We frequently fail to link our policies to the values of others, or even to our values, and thus miss the opportunity to show how they are a reflection of our freedom and democracy.

Persuasion begins with listening. The U.S. government spends only \$5 million annually on foreign public-opinion polling.⁷ This does not cover the research costs of many U.S. senatorial, gubernatorial, or other campaigns, and it is only a tiny fraction of the \$6 billion the U.S. private sector spends in these areas. We must now allocate additional research moneys—both to shape programs and efforts from their inception and to continually monitor, evaluate, and test their effectiveness.

New attitudinal research and target marketing can define potential target audiences along a continuum of support for U.S. foreign policies. New research techniques have shown that it is six times more expensive and difficult to move “undecided” consumers to

⁷ Estimate provided by U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, April 2002.

the category of “soft support” than it is to move “soft support” to “hard support.” Therefore, we must “move the moveable” before we can effectively address the skeptical.

Support voices of moderation, with particular attention over the longer term to the young to empower them to engage in effective debate through means available or created in their societies. We need to remind ourselves that the young make up an unprecedented and increasing portion of the huge population bulge in the Middle East and other areas of high frustration with the United States. Despair at high unemployment and a lack of future prospects, combined with fundamentalist, anti-Western education, makes the young likely recruits for a terror campaign.

Radical Islam’s assault on America and the West is also an assault on moderate and secular Islam in the vast majority of the Muslim world. Moderate voices are often not heard above the din of the fanatics. We must therefore encourage debate within Islam about the radicals’ attempts to hijack Islam’s spiritual soul. The United States should therefore support participatory communications, dialogue, and debate among these groups, through, for example, the use of radio and television talk shows and new interactive media forums—such as Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 90-minute MTV dialogue with young people in 146 countries in February 2002.

We must more fully employ credible messengers, who complement official government sources. To encourage genuine dialogue and avoid an “us vs. them” approach, it is essential that we identify and develop indigenous talent, (i.e., mullahs, talk show personalities, etc.), as well as other independent messengers who can criticize certain aspects of Islam with more credibility than spokespersons from Washington. In thus fostering the free flow of ideas, we should be fully aware that they will sometimes be critical of the United States. By the same token, however, these dialogues should not in any way shrink from countering vigorously the various conspiracy theories and lies that are disseminated about the United States and, of course, about themselves.

Unfortunately, many foreign sources are often more readily believed than U.S. sources, and we should therefore make ample use of such commentaries. Indeed, we should cooperate and coordinate with our allies in a variety of areas in our public diplomacy effort. Allies such as the United Kingdom have recently announced their renewed commitment to external communications, and these efforts should be coordinated at the highest possible levels in both multilateral and bilateral talks whenever possible.

Conversely, we often confront “friendly” government-supported media, such as in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that although they are major recipients of U.S. assistance, tolerate and even encourage media bashing of the United States. Should we challenge such bashing with the governments in question? And if so, how? This is not a call for censorship, only for efforts to encourage professional journalism that would separate truth from falsehood.

Foster increasingly meaningful relationships between the U.S. Government and foreign journalists. Too often, foreign reporters feel they are treated as second-class citizens relegated to the fringe of U.S. outreach efforts. To the extent that the U.S. government marginalizes foreign journalists, it alienates a group of highly effective, highly credible messengers. We must therefore increase foreign press access to high-level American officials, insisting that senior policymakers take time to brief foreign journalists at U.S. foreign press centers and make themselves available for one-on-one interviews. This

coordinated and consistent effort to engage foreign journalists more effectively must take place at all times—not just in crises.

The Bush administration has already taken some steps in this direction, including increasing foreign press access at the president’s recent meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in Crawford, Texas.⁸ It can go even further by establishing a summit that brings together members of the foreign press and high-level government officials to discuss foreign policy. This meeting could be held in an informal setting and bring in foreign journalists located in Washington and New York as well as journalists from abroad. It would provide these reporters with rare access to high-level officials, including even the president, and show that the U.S. government is committed to fostering a dialogue with both foreign and domestic journalists on important issues. These meetings would illustrate the basic point that the “listen and engage” approach would apply to senior officials, not simply to our public diplomacy professionals.

Craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps between American values and those of the rest of the world. In the short term, public diplomacy seeks to influence opinions and mobilize publics in ways that support specific U.S. interests and policies. The short-term focus is primarily, but not exclusively, on issues. By contrast, in the long term, public diplomacy promotes dialogue in ways that are politically, culturally, and socially relevant. Ideally, the two should be linked in a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy. Creating this involves finding sufficient common ground to permit dialogue.

If we are to attract and strengthen the hands of people who are in a potential frame of mind to help us, we need to make them part of what we do in ways that reflect their interests and values. If recent polls are correct, the Muslim world responds much more favorably to our values and freedoms than they do to our policies. We must leverage the common goods of freedom and democracy to build consensus and ownership. (See Appendix II for examples of messages dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conspiracy theories and lies, and democracy and human rights.)

By repeating lies about America’s economic, social, and cultural values, our enemies in the war on terrorism have been able to rally a tremendous amount of support. As former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke once asked, “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society?” Osama bin Laden has been able to find common ground, consensus, and buy-in with his constituencies. We need to match this with a “best-in-class” communications strategy.

Achieving Buy-In



Recent opinion studies report that while many U.S. policies are deplored, there is a mystique surrounding American culture, values, and our economy. Thus, to foster a better understanding of our policies, we should find ways to tie them more closely to our

⁸ As Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Charlotte Beers reported, “This marked the first such summit where the foreign press had filing facilities in Crawford—this time *in* the White House Filing Center, another first.” See “A Report for Secretary Powell from Charlotte Beers,” May 9, 2002.

cultural values, including the nation’s democratic traditions and extraordinary capacity for self-criticism and self-correction. Values that should be highlighted include strength of family, religious faith, expansive social safety nets, volunteerism, freedom of expression, the universal reach of education and its practical consequences in economic prosperity, and America’s achievements in science and medicine.

Our messages should include sympathetic news coverage and advice on important local and regional problems that might be of practical help in the areas of health care, agriculture, and daily life, as a means of building interest and confidence in American news sources. We should imbue these messages with both empathy and understanding. And, where possible, we should present U.S. foreign policies as a reflection of American cultural values—for example, in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo or U.S. humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. We must also create bridges between our society and others using common cultural pursuits in every genre of art, music, theater, religion and academia.

III. Significantly Increase Private Sector Involvement

This Task Force believes that public diplomacy will deliver far more bang for the government buck if there is a much expanded role for the private sector. We have several reasons for this firm conviction.

First, the U.S. government has traditionally targeted foreign officials as its audience abroad and must inevitably observe diplomatic protocols in communicating with these counterparts. U.S. diplomats often feel quite constrained when it comes to making public statements explaining U.S. policy—diplomats are often expected to clear their speeches, for example, with Washington. Independent messengers can be more fluid in their ability to target and engage varied audiences.

Second, private sector participation in public diplomacy adds, to some extent, a “heat shield” that can be useful when tackling controversial issues that might have negative political or diplomatic repercussions.

Third, it is important to communicate America’s belief in democratic and open debate—the give and take of a culture that thrives on legitimate critiques and, at its best, admits weaknesses and uses truth as the most powerful form of public diplomacy. Private messengers can engage in controversial critiques and debates that the U.S. government might often shrink from for fear of political backlash. We must, however, carefully select private messengers, lest we present a confusing or misleading picture to foreign audiences.⁹

Fourth, the U.S. government is unlikely to attract a sufficient number of truly creative professionals who can utilize the most cutting-edge media or communications technology. Furthermore, media or entertainment spokespeople may be more likely to cooperate with private sources, such as NGOs, than with an effort directly funded by the U.S. government.

Credible and Independent Messengers. We support a much broadened use of credible and independent messengers from diverse sectors of American life, including:

⁹ For example, for decades, USIA sent Americans abroad to speak on various topics. There was no prior clearance of their scripts, and speakers were free to say what they wished. Critics of U.S. foreign policy were included, but there was a system and guidelines for the process.

- Arab-American firefighters and police officers who rushed to the site of the World Trade Center collapse;
- Victims, particularly women and children and including Arab and Muslim Americans, who can tell their stories or those of lost loved ones;
- Arab or Muslim Americans who are thriving in the United States and who can attest to the respect their religion receives;
- Arab and other Muslim students who have studied at American universities and colleges and returned to their home countries after graduation, who were recruited as part of the existing State Department program for foreign students of all nationalities;
- Well-known Muslim- and Arab-American sports figures and celebrities (i.e., Mohammed Ali);
- Business leaders;
- Scientists;
- Healthcare leaders.

We also envision attracting credible television properties and personalities such as MTV and *Sesame Street* to play a substantial role. Likewise, the printed press remains highly influential in these foreign countries.

Bridge the gap between public and private sector initiatives by creating an independent, not-for-profit “Corporation for Public Diplomacy” (CPD). We believe the experience of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) is highly relevant, and propose a somewhat similar entity as a focal point for private sector involvement in public diplomacy.

The CPB is not part of a cabinet-level department, and is therefore somewhat independent of direct political influence. This structure permits the CPB, as a corporation with tax-exempt status under Section 501C3 of the U.S. tax code, to receive private sector grants, which have been substantial. (Walter Annenberg gave the CPB hundreds of millions of dollars, for example, to administer a school-based initiative.) The CPB has a seven-member board of directors appointed by the president; four directors come from the president’s party, and the other three must be of the opposing party

The CPB has been deeply involved in the establishment or support of such programs as *Sesame Street*, *The News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, Bill Moyers’ documentaries, and American Playhouse. Many of the most widely acclaimed public television programs would likely not have arisen or flourished had they been the sole prerogative of the U.S. government.

The CPB makes grants to a variety of individual producers and stations that in a sense have to defend what they are doing. The CPB, and inferentially the government, which provides about \$350 million of public moneys, are not seen as directly responsible for the programming on CPB-supported stations.

In an analogous structure, an organization such as the Corporation for Public Diplomacy would likewise seek to leverage private sector creativity and flexibility. It could receive private sector grants and would attract media and personalities who might be less willing to work directly with U.S. government agencies. Its proposed structure also takes advantage of the fact that private media often communicate American family values, religious commitments, and the merits of democracy more effectively than do government officials. Groups such as the Advertising Council and the ad hoc group of Hollywood executives, producers, engineers, and creative talents who joined together after September 11, which have done enormous work for other public causes, should be enlisted to help the CPD.

In projecting America's messages, we must be especially mindful of something that every good salesman understands—if you do not trust the messenger, you do not trust the message. We strongly believe that we can avoid this problem by using private sector partnerships and new approaches such as a new Corporation for Public Diplomacy. The public-private messengers will be especially effective among Muslim and Arab Americans who seek to build bridges and improve cross-cultural relations but who might sometimes be reluctant to work for the U.S. government, or who may be dismissed by foreign audiences if they are seen to do so.

Finally, we believe the CPD would be well-positioned to support independent, indigenous new media channels (i.e., satellite, radio and TV networks or private satellite TV stations with joint venture programming with existing Arab stations) or joint think tanks on domestic issues with countries in the region.

IV. Raise the effectiveness of public diplomacy resources

*Initiate State Department Reforms.*¹⁰ This means reaffirming that public diplomacy is central to the work of all U.S. ambassadors and diplomats, that bold initiatives are rewarded, risks expected, occasional mistakes accepted, and the absence of requisite skills penalized.

The budget and operational authority of the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs must be increased substantially. We also believe public diplomacy should be made the full-time job or at least a primary responsibility of the deputy assistant secretary in each of the State Department's regional bureaus.

*U.S. Ambassadors.*¹¹ In an age when heads of state converse directly—and when instructions from headquarters and field reporting occur in real time—the role of the ambassador as public diplomat has become increasingly important. Public advocacy and local language skills are essential for today's ambassadors. They must be comfortable with outreach and seek out opportunities to meet with editorial boards, make public statements, and appear on television and other indigenous media. Ambassadors need the authority to speak for the United States without excessive clearance requirements, and policymakers must understand the need to provide timely content.

Currently, the State Department offers a two-week training seminar for new ambassadors, and only a small amount of that time is devoted to public diplomacy. The State Department usually provides a one- to two-page printed summary on public diplomacy in the country to which the ambassador is assigned. Two days are devoted to media skills training—but this training is not mandatory, and not all ambassadors participate.

Similarly, the State Department provides only minimal public diplomacy training for officers entering the Foreign Service. All new officers participate in a seven-week entry-level course, but only one hour of the seven weeks is devoted to public diplomacy. For those officers entering the public diplomacy career path, a three-week public diplomacy tradecraft course is strongly encouraged, but not required. Public diplomacy officers then serve a consular tour, as opposed to a public diplomacy training tour. This much-reduced State Department public diplomacy training contrasts with previous

¹⁰ See Appendix III for further details of suggested State Department reforms.

¹¹ See Appendix IV for a detailed Mission Program Plan for public diplomacy that will require, among other things, each ambassador to establish a mission Public Diplomacy Task Force

practice in the U.S. Information Agency—where new public diplomacy officers participated in a three-month intensive seminar and were then assigned to a follow-on training tour. (Appendices III and IV contain suggested State Department organizational reforms and a “Draft Mission Program Plan on Public Diplomacy.”)

Initiate a structured evaluation of diplomatic readiness and prioritized spending through a “Quadrennial Diplomacy Review.” This evaluation, similar to the existing Quadrennial Defense Review, should be conducted by the secretary of state in consultation with the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. It should replace budget-driven reviews of the status quo with strategy-based assessments of themes, diplomatic readiness, requirements and capabilities and thereby provide a much needed long-term national information strategy.

Establish a quasi-public/private “Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute” (IPDI). The long-term need to attract and train modern Foreign Service professionals is analogous to the need for those who understand the ever-increasing role of economics in foreign policy—“geo-economics”—in contrast to the earlier dominance of strategic Cold War thinking. This new independent entity could help in recruiting and preparing a new breed of foreign professionals who understand the critical role of public diplomacy. The IPDI would also attract the best talent and techniques from U.S. corporations and universities for research, marketing, campaign management, and other relevant fields and then apply private sector “best practices” in communications and public diplomacy and become an important training ground for the next generation of public diplomacy and governmental officials.

The IPDI would offer training and services in public opinion research, cultural and attitudinal analysis, segmentation, database management, strategic formulation, political campaign management, marketing and branding, technology and tactics, communications and organizational planning, program evaluations, and studies on media trends. In coordination with, and as a supplement to, the State Department’s National Foreign Affairs Training Center, such an Institute would enhance the quality of public diplomacy programs and the skills of the next generation of foreign affairs professionals.

Establish a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps. This agency, patterned on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s disaster-relief model, would augment U.S. and overseas operations; mandate an action plan, a skills database, periodic training, updated security clearances, simplified re-entry regulations, and modification of temporary appointment requirements; and recruit prestigious private sector experts from relevant professions for short-term assignments.

Recognize Internet Age realities. Current trends in information technology are transforming how the world communicates. Diplomats need to understand that the Internet revolution will, over time, fundamentally change the relationship between information content and communications channels, though at the present time, it is far from broadly integrated in most developing countries. Therefore, the Internet is currently of somewhat limited value in reaching most of our targeted audiences. At the same time, however, the audience it currently reaches is an influential one and should certainly not be ignored. As the simple one-to-many broadcasting model of the past gives way to a more complex array of push-and-pull interactions between content providers and audiences, public diplomacy must utilize all the available communications resources.

Since American public diplomacy has limited resources and is unable to reach 100 percent of any given population, it must utilize modern technologies to identify, prioritize and target those who must be reached. High-priority communications targets might include attitudinal segments that are supportive or potentially supportive of the West and need further information and encouragement, or they might include the large population of younger people in many Arab and Muslim countries. Products in one medium, such as a satellite TV interview, can be used in other media formats such as print, Web sites, radio, and videocassettes.¹²

The international broadcasting arm of the U.S. government includes the entities of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG): Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Free Asia, and Worldnet Television. Together they reach about 100 million people weekly in 65 languages. (Appendix V discusses some of the history, and specific opportunities in International Broadcasting.)

A few key developments deserve emphasis, particularly those that illustrate the interactive, “two-way” dialogue approach emphasized in this report. Prominent among these is the new Middle East Radio Network (MERN) created in the spring of 2002. Known in Arabic as “Radio Sawa,” this station aims to attract young Arab adults. Delivered via local FM and AM radio and digital satellite, the station is still in the audience-building phase, so most of its programming is Middle Eastern and American music, with newscasts twice an hour. Its plans include gradually adding components, however, and eventually there will be audience voting for favorite songs, recorded questions from listeners about America and U.S. foreign policy, call-in discussions, and pieces on young people, women’s issues, and health. In other words, MERN will interact with its audience and the underlying messages will be respect for each other and each other’s opinions. MERN is also building an Arabic-language Web site that announcers will constantly promote on the air. On that Web site will be key U.S. documents, including the only Arabic-language text in cyberspace of the US constitution. This approach may become a model for all the languages of U.S. international broadcasting.

V. Increase Public Diplomacy Resources

Build Congressional support for public diplomacy. This must be done through sustained oversight and the formation of a new congressional committee structure, probably within the relevant committees, such as the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Congress’ role in authorizing and appropriating resources for public diplomacy is crucial, and increased resources are far more likely if Congress has a sense of ownership and oversight of public diplomacy and its linkages to foreign policy. In that connection, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has expressed sustained interest in the work of this Task Force.

¹² The State Department’s International Information Programs web site <http://usinfo.state.gov> continues to leverage the power of the Internet in addressing important international issues. It was recently listed as a top site by *U.S. News and World Report*. State’s *Iraq Update* web site is listed on the front page of Google, and its extensive multimedia site on Kosovo was named “Best Political Web Site” by *Politics On-Line*. “Liquid State,” a promising new three-part initiative, is a “content management system for web and print publications; a digital asset management system to provide access to photography, video, and sound; and the global graphics initiative to provide standards and technology for image manipulation, layout, web design, and electronic distribution.” See Barry Fulton, *Leveraging Technology in the Service of Diplomacy: Innovation in the Department of State*, PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, E-Government Series, March 2002, pp. 24-25. <http://www.pwcglobal.com>.

Bring public diplomacy funding in line with its role as a vital component of foreign policy and national security. The marginalization of public diplomacy has created a legacy of underfunded and uncoordinated efforts. For example, the approximately \$1 billion spent annually on the Department of State’s public diplomacy programs and U.S. international broadcasting is 1/25 of the nation’s international affairs budget.

From 1993 to 2001, overall funding for the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs fell more than 33 percent from \$349 million to \$232 million (adjusted for inflation). Over the past decade, exchanges in societies with significant Muslim populations declined—even as populations in these countries were increasing. State Department exchanges with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand decreased 28 percent; and in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen exchanges fell 21 percent. Moreover, in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India the decline was 34 percent. Thus, as the population in countries with significant Muslim populations increased by an estimated 16 percent per capita, State Department per capita spending decreased by more than one-third. Similar decreases in funding can be seen in the budget for international broadcasting, and Voice of America listening rates in the Middle East have in the recent past averaged only about two percent of the population. Finally, there have been drastic cutbacks in many U.S. information libraries and “America Houses.”

To make public diplomacy the kind of priority the administration has talked about would involve a budget far in excess of the approximately \$1 billion currently spent by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors in their public diplomacy programming. As a point of reference, just one percent of the Defense Department’s proposed budget of \$379 billion would be \$3 to \$4 billion. This pales in comparison to the \$222 billion American companies invest annually on overseas advertising. The marginal increases in funding now being considered on the Hill will have insufficient impact and will not be commensurate with the problems this report describes nor the reforms for which it calls.

The bottom line: U.S. public diplomacy must be funded at significantly higher levels—with moneys phased in over several years, tied to specific objectives, and monitored closely for effectiveness, including the possible use of test campaigns.

Build a stronger public diplomacy through enhancements in key areas. These include foreign public-opinion research, recruiting, training, media studies, program evaluation, significantly expanded field staffing and exchanges, increases in U.S. international broadcasting via the Middle East Radio Network and American Embassy Television Network, and enhancements of content, marketing, and branding of multi-language Web sites.

The U.S. government today has few higher spending priorities than public diplomacy.

* * * * *

In sum, the promise of America’s public diplomacy has not been realized due to a lack of political will, the absence of an overall strategy, a deficit of trained professionals, cultural constraints, structural shortcomings and a scarcity of resources. Money alone will not solve the problem. Strong leadership and imaginative thinking, planning and coordination are critical. Public diplomacy is a strategic instrument of foreign policy. And U.S. leaders must provide the sustained, coordinated, robust and effective public diplomacy that America requires. Indeed, the war on terrorism demands it.

Appendix I

U.S. Public Diplomacy—A Multi-Player Universe That Requires Effective Coordination

<p>White House</p> <p>President Vice President National Security Advisor Communications Advisor White House Spokesman Coalition Information Center Homeland Defense Director U.S. Trade Representative</p> <p>U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy</p>	<p>U.S. Embassies</p> <p>Ambassador DCM Public Affairs Officers Political Officers Economic Officers Commercial Officers USAID Director Military Attaché Others</p> <p>USUN Delegation Other IO Delegations</p>	<p>National Security Agencies</p> <p>State Department Secretary & Deputy Secretary Under Secretaries for PD & PA Other Under Secretaries Assistant Secretaries Office of Information Programs Bureau of Educational/Cultural Affairs Bureau of Public Affairs Spokesman Foreign Press Centers Am. Embassy TV Network Regional Bureaus Functional Bureaus Foreign Opinion Research Fulbright Scholarship Board</p> <p>USAID</p> <p>Defense Department Secretary & Deputy Secretary OSD Public Affairs CJCS Public Affairs Information Ops Task Force Psyop Regional CINCS IMET</p>
<p>International Broadcasting</p> <p>Broadcasting Board of Governors International Broadcasting Bureau Voice of America VOA TV Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Radio Free Asia Radio/TV Marti</p>	<p>Other USG Departments</p> <p>Treasury Justice Commerce</p>	<p>NGOs</p> <p>National Endowment for Democracy National Council for International Visitors Exchange program agencies</p>
<p>Other</p> <p>Members of Congress Coalition leaders</p>	<p>Other</p> <p>Former Presidents Mayor of New York Governor of California</p>	<p>Other</p>

Appendix II

Example Messages

As discussed earlier in this report, negative images of the United States in the Muslim world are often shaped more by U.S. foreign policies than by our culture. News reports and polls in the Middle East, including the recent Gallup Poll and initial findings from the recent Zogby Poll, show that while many U.S. policies are deplored, there is a mystique surrounding American culture, values, and even our economy. To be effective in communicating our policies, therefore, we must find ways to tie them more closely to our cultural values. To foster a better understanding of our policies, we must present them as a reflection of our cultural values and show that U.S. foreign policies reflect a freedom and democracy that provide for opportunity.

This does not mean that the United States should change policies in order to make them easier to sell. But it does mean that the effect of U.S. policy abroad should be fully considered in shaping and communicating it. A number of examples of this point are listed below.

Israel. This is the prime example of an unpopular policy that the U.S. should not change merely to curry favor with Middle East or world audiences. Washington, however, must do better in explaining the motivations behind its policies. Without casting itself as Israel's special champion, messages should point out that the United States is a democratic country, and that U.S. policy toward Israel and on other issues is heavily influenced by the views of Congress, powerful interest groups, the press, and public opinion generally. Specifically, we should:

- Stress that there is strong, widespread sympathy for the preservation of the state of Israel and its security, a sentiment that cuts across political and religious groups;
- Remind audiences that the state of Israel has been long recognized by the United Nations and the international community, yet is still not accepted convincingly in many quarters;
- Highlight Arab decisions to recognize the state of Israel, especially the decisions by Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian leadership to establish relations with Israel and to resolve disputes by peaceful means, a course the United States has advocated from the beginning;
- Emphasize that the United States is committed to the survival of Israel, while also trying to curb the widespread impression that the United States unconditionally supports Israeli policies;
- Cite examples of differences when they occur and recall American criticism of Israeli actions, such as the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza;
- Reiterate that, while the United States can influence Israeli policy, it cannot control it, and that the United States has in fact gone to extraordinary lengths to broker a just peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors;
- Craft messages that make clear that accountability and transparency are of vital importance, even from U.S. allies.

Palestine. This issue is clearly central in the minds of a majority of Arabs and Muslims. It is important to highlight American support for a viable Palestinian state negotiated on the basis of U.N. resolutions and a desire to see an end to Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank soon, as the U.S. government has frequently stated. We should make clear the belief that Palestinian rights and security will be assured only when Israeli security within recognized and defensible borders is achieved. And we should express concern about the suffering and grievances of the Palestinian people, at the same time reiterating that the United States absolutely opposes terrorism in all its forms.

Conspiracy Theories and Lies. Fighting fictions is an uphill battle. But it must be done, because leaving them unanswered allows them to continue to circulate, and silence sometimes implies confirmation. Presenting evidence to disprove conspiracy theories and to counter lies is therefore crucial. A case in point is that Osama bin Laden's involvement in September 11 is still doubted in many Arab and Muslim countries and elsewhere. The United States has not offered much evidence, presumably seeking to protect intelligence sources; however, a greater effort could have been made to provide sanitized proof. Additionally, many non-U.S. sources are more readily believed in many parts of the world, and the United States should make ample use of such commentaries and reporting when they are helpful to its case. But there are times when conspiracy theories or other misinformation need to be addressed directly, and that includes openly challenging some of the extremist Middle Eastern media. Using messengers from within the region that can provide credible explanations can do this.

Democracy and Human Rights. It is not enough to describe or praise American democracy; we must also speak about democracy or its lack thereof elsewhere. The United States must feel free to criticize undemocratic or corrupt regimes, especially on human rights abuses. For instance, State Department human rights reviews should be publicized much more forcefully. This is admittedly delicate because blunt criticism of regimes—especially those we directly or indirectly support—are likely to be resented as “interference in domestic affairs” and may alienate the United States from others. Quiet diplomacy is essential in pointing out to foreign leaders that abuses of human rights and other undemocratic actions will undermine bilateral relations. Public diplomacy should support such efforts, in some cases directly on behalf of the U.S. government, in other cases by quoting press, congressional, and other opinion and foreign comments. To this end, existing organizations devoted to the promotion of democracy abroad should be used.

Appendix III

State Department Organizational Reforms:

When the U.S. Information Agency was merged into the Department of State in 1999, the president's intent was to put public diplomacy at "the heart of American foreign policy." The personal leadership of the secretary of state, a few savvy diplomats, and the war on terrorism are together generating a new enthusiasm for public diplomacy. But three years later, there has been little real change in the State Department's culture or its public diplomacy priorities. Organizational changes alone are not the answer, but the right organizational changes over time can make a positive difference, as the Goldwater-Nichols Act demonstrated in bringing about military reforms. Furthermore, steps should be taken to strengthen the State Department's information and educational exchange programs and to continually upgrade the rank and status of those responsible for public diplomacy across the board. Specifically, the Task Force recommends the following steps:

- Reaffirm that public diplomacy is central to the work of all ambassadors and diplomats, that bold initiatives will be rewarded, risks expected, occasional mistakes accepted and the absence of requisite skills penalized;
- Provide increased budget and operational authority to the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs;
- Make public diplomacy the full-time responsibility of deputy assistant secretaries in the State Department's regional bureaus;
- Initiate and make routine collaborative personnel exchanges between the State Department, other U.S. government departments, and NGOs;
- Require at least one public diplomacy assignment or formal public diplomacy training program for advancement to the senior foreign service;
- Recruit, train, and assign public diplomacy professionals to specialize in countries and regions; recruit private sector experts with public diplomacy skills for non-career appointments abroad;
- Maintain legislated public diplomacy budget protection within the Department of State's diplomatic and consular programs budget or 150 account;
- Clarify and strengthen the secretary of state's role and responsibilities as an ex-officio member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

State Department Program Reforms:

- Significantly expand the use of State Department's multi-language Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased satellite TV and FM radio broadcasting channels; enhance the State Department's Web sites with increased marketing and branding;
- Strengthen the Office of International Information Programs through integration of all information operations—to include the American Embassy TV Network and Foreign Press Centers. Moreover, substantially increase funding, bureau status, and leadership, raising the status of the director to the level of assistant secretary;
- Give the American Embassy TV Network greater capability to acquire and produce audio and video feeds and Internet streaming to foreign news organizations.

Embassy Operations and Exchanges:

- Significantly expand public diplomacy field staffing and exchanges based on public diplomacy readiness standards and assessments. Readiness criteria should include professional credentials, language skills, area expertise, flexibility, foreign national staffs, and NGO partnerships.
- Build and improve embassy databases of influentials and stakeholders. Train embassy officers in developing attitudinal segmented categories and targeting strategies and priorities, along a continuum of support for U.S. foreign policies, including “hard support,” “soft support,” and “undecided.” In fact, new attitudinal research and target marketing techniques shows it is six times more expensive and difficult to move “undecided” consumers to the category of “soft support” than it is to move “soft support” to “hard support.” This suggests that attitudinal research, conducted properly, is an important tool to prioritize future public diplomacy efforts and increase their effectiveness and efficiency.
- Mandate comprehensive exchange alumni databases and use of the Internet to network and advance communities of interest among exchange alumni.

Building Cross Cultural Initiatives:

Develop cross-cultural initiatives for countries with large Muslim populations with new funding of up to \$1 billion annually—targeted at students, scholars, and media. This will permit expansion of traditional programs such as Fulbright exchanges and allow the reopening of public libraries where Internet penetration is low. In addition, selectively offer cable or satellite television programming and initiate new activities such as a U.S.-based Islamic Press Institute that trains Islamic journalists and publishes objective critiques of the Islamic press.

Appendix IV

Draft Mission Program Plan on Public Diplomacy

This generic draft Mission Program Plan (MPP) statement on public diplomacy should flow from the proposal for a presidential directive and a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure—and is intended to fulfill a foreign post's commitment to carrying out the secretary of state's mandate to significantly increase public diplomacy initiatives.

Chief of Mission Duties:

The secretary of state directs the chief of mission (COM) to take whatever steps are necessary and appropriate, consistent with directives from the Department of State, to redeploy mission assets (personnel, budget, etc.) to prepare a new public diplomacy initiative. The COM shall now be responsible for directly supervising and directing all elements of a foreign post's public diplomacy programs including:

1. Press attaché activities;
2. Public appearances by all foreign post personnel;
3. Representation expenditures by the COM, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), and the political, economic and press sections;
4. Visits by military personnel and assets, including all humanitarian programs;
5. Cultural programs;
6. Fulbright Scholarship, International Visitor, and other exchange programs;
7. Assistance programs administered by other agencies (the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, USAID, etc.) that may directly or indirectly have favorable impact on the U.S. image in the host country.

Public Diplomacy Objectives:

In the wake of September 11 and the escalation of violence in the Middle East, the United States faces daunting challenges to improve receptivity to its foreign policy objectives and to open channels of communications with opinion leaders who are adverse to U.S. policies. Within the current budget constraints, the COM plans to redirect foreign post resources to achieving the following objectives:

1. Complete an assessment of the key policy and message elements that need to be promoted to local constituencies;
2. Determine ways to measure impact and capacity to recalibrate methods and targets as needed;
3. Identify and prioritize key public opinion targets;
4. Assess how best to mobilize foreign post resources to accomplish key objectives;
5. Determine how to provide regular feedback to the Department of State to help determine the effectiveness of each foreign post's programs against other MPP public diplomacy programs in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

The Department of State believes that one of the highest priorities a foreign post faces is to develop creatively new public diplomacy opportunities and programs within its current budgetary authority.

Mission Plans:

1. The COM plans to coordinate and organize an initiative in all foreign posts to identify potential speaking opportunities before the following organizations:
 - Boards of editors of local newspapers
 - Reporters
 - Civil society organizations
 - University student organizations and faculty organizations
 - Television and radio stations
 - Theological seminaries
 - Political party organizations
 - Scientific and technical organizations
 - Military and diplomatic educational institutions
2. Each foreign post will establish a Public Diplomacy Task Force, chaired by the DCM that shall meet no less than weekly to coordinate all Public Diplomacy activities. The Public Diplomacy Task Force will include the attaches (no substitutes) of each mission element assigned to the foreign post. The foreign post will establish a coordinating committee of NGOs represented in the country, which will meet monthly with mission elements. The foreign post will maintain listservs and other Web-based links to the NGO community.
3. The foreign post will assess the language abilities of key personnel. All attaches will be required to undertake a State Department–organized instruction course on public diplomacy and media presentation.
4. The foreign post will plan to negotiate media placements for weekly op-ed pieces of the COM with key media elements in country.
5. The COM will host a bi-weekly “reporter’s roundtable,” inviting reporters to the residence to have both on-the-record and off-the-record conversations with the ambassador.
6. The foreign post will identify key American public figures (including internationally recognized cultural and media icons) who may be invited to the foreign post to participate in policy debates. The foreign post will assess the local private sector’s ability to sponsor such visits in view of budgetary limitations.
7. The foreign post will take an inventory of information available to the media in local languages and advise the Department of State of any gaps that the foreign post

- believes needs to be filled in order to open consistent blast fax capabilities with local media outlets.
8. Working with the local American Chamber of Commerce and representatives of the private sector, the COM will develop plans for no fewer than two delegations of key opinion leaders to visit the United States during the coming calendar year.
 9. The DCM will assume responsibility, as chair of the Public Diplomacy Task Force, to shift resources as needed to fulfill these objectives.
 10. The foreign post plans to work with U.S. technology companies to develop in-country “e-government” initiatives to help plan for Internet information exchanges between local educational institutions and sources of information on the United States. The foreign post will also translate the official embassy Web site into the local language and saturate local media and Internet Service Providers with the foreign post’s Web site address to attract “hits” to information about America available online.
 11. All surplus foreign post funds shall be transferred to a multi-year public diplomacy account, to be directly administered by the COM. These funds shall be used to supplement ongoing public diplomacy initiatives that otherwise cannot be achieved due to other budgetary constraints.
 12. The foreign post reporting will reflect increased outreach to key contacts by all mission elements and will provide sustained in-depth analysis of influence structures and the information environment.
 13. The COM will provide the Department of State with a public diplomacy roadmap in the Mission Program Plan, updated as circumstances warrant, analyzing publics, communications channels, and U.S. policy objectives in the country. Key questions to be answered include: Who is influential? What media do they use? How important is it to U.S. interests that the mission communicates with them? In addition, the COM will identify clear priorities and tradeoffs among the major instruments of public diplomacy, including exchanges, international broadcasting, partnership projects with NGOs, and mission information and cultural programs. The COM’s analysis will be a central element in the Quadrennial Diplomacy Review.

Appendix V

U.S International Broadcasting

The United States established the Voice of America (VOA) in 1942. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), U.S.-funded stations separate from VOA, originated in the early 1950s. They acted as “surrogate” national radios for listeners in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who were denied free media in their own countries. Surrogate broadcasting services to Cuba, Asia, Iraq, and Iran were established in the 1980s and 1990s, RFE/RL initiated Radio Free Afghanistan in 2002. Moreover, the International Broadcasting Act of 1994 consolidated all nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting under a part-time bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints eight BBG members, and the secretary of state serves on the board *ex officio* “to provide information and guidance on foreign policy issues.” The BBG is authorized “to direct and supervise” all the civilian broadcasting activities of the U.S. government.

These broadcasting services comprise about half of the government’s nonmilitary public diplomacy budget. The president’s fiscal year 2003 request for the U.S. international broadcasting budget totals \$518 million. (The combined fiscal year 2003 request for the State Department’s information and educational exchange programs is \$540 million.) These broadcasting services have brand identities and are staffed with dedicated journalism professionals. Moreover, the BBG and many of its supporters in Congress believe the BBG has a responsibility to serve as a “firewall” that separates U.S. international broadcasters and the foreign policy community, ensuring journalistic objectivity and credibility.¹³

Today, the United States broadcasts in more than 60 languages. In some countries, U.S. broadcasters have sizeable market shares; in others, particularly in the Middle East, audiences are small. Listening rates can be high in a crisis and in regions where credible alternative news sources are limited. In competitive media environments, however, audiences for U.S. broadcasting are much smaller and program and research costs rise dramatically.

The BBG has recently undertaken several promising initiatives to deal with greater competition. For example, it has increased its audience research through studies conducted by a private contractor, and it is seeking to enhance its marketing and to update program formats. Moreover, VOA has launched a new Middle East Radio Network (MERN); budgeted at \$30 million, MERN is intended to bring targeted radio programming to a “new young mainstream” of educated Arabs under 30 and an “emerging Arab leadership.” MERN’s 24/7 operation carries music, features, news, roundtables, call-in shows, and talk programming. And the priorities and audience segmentation reflected in the MERN initiative represent a significant change in U.S. international broadcasting.¹⁴

In this regard, MERN is imaginative and deserves to be supported. If audience research and analysis shows it to be successful, the Task Force supports additional efforts to: (1) replicate MERN in customized ways around the world; (2) recruit, train, and involve young, capable, and

¹³ U.S. international broadcasting serves America's interests by providing audiences "comprehensive, accurate and objective news information," by "representing American society and culture" and by "presenting the policies of the United States." See Voice of America Charter, Public Law 94-350 and Broadcasting Board of Governors, 1999-2000 Annual Report, p. 2, <http://www.ibb.gov/bbg/report.html>. "A separate governing board to supervise the broadcasting entities—the Broadcasting Board of Governors—is essential to providing what I call an ‘asbestos firewall,’ that is, an arms-length distance between the broadcasters and the foreign policy bureaucracy that assures journalistic integrity and independence." Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., March 6, 1997.

¹⁴ MERN is a radio network broadcasting on FM transmitters and by satellite. Plans call for an Internet site and streaming audio. On April 25, 2002, the House International Relations Committee unanimously reported H.R. 3969, The Freedom Support Act of 2002. The bill would authorize \$135 million for a 24 hour U.S government Arabic language satellite television service.

creative journalists and commentators; (3) explore ways to adapt and apply this approach to television; (4) enhance continually the marketing and operating of these projects; and (5) receive additional resources and funding.

In the future, U.S. international broadcasting faces four major challenges.

Emerging technologies As discussed in the report, the Internet, digital radio, direct satellite broadcasting, and other technologies are changing the global media environment. Successfully managing the transition from shortwave to alternative technologies is one key issue. Another is whether U.S. broadcasters will move successfully into the world of interactive and highly personalized technologies that allow programming on demand, that separate communications channels and media content, and that emphasize narrowcasting rather than broadcasting.

Television The medium of choice in many countries, including those in the Middle East, is television. The vast majority of U.S. international broadcasting resources is devoted to shortwave and AM/FM radio. Sunken costs, insufficient funding, and institutional traditions tied to radio and shortwave have prevented U.S. broadcasters from using TV to reach new audiences in key markets. Certainly, radio is still important in many countries. But how, whether, and when to use television through the U.S. international broadcasting services, the Department of State, and commercial media are key questions for policymakers and Congress.

Language service and program priorities The International Broadcasting Act requires the BBG to conduct annual reviews to determine “the addition and deletion” of language services. Issues to be addressed include: How much should the United States invest in languages where audiences are small, as a hedge against future needs? How should surge capacities be developed and maintained? How should programs be improved so they have relevance and immediacy in countries important to U.S. interests? To what extent should the United States broadcast in Albanian and Serbian in Kosovo? Does the U.S. need an RFE/RL service to Afghanistan in addition to its Voice of America services? Should RFE/RL broadcast in the Avar, Chechen, and Circasian languages in the North Caucasus? Is TV Marti cost-effective?

These are important questions not just for broadcasters, but for policymakers and the development of a sound public diplomacy strategy. To be sure, decisions on broadcast languages ultimately are political decisions. Too often policymakers and legislators leave the hard questions on broadcasting priorities to the BBG and become engaged usually only as a consequence of ad hoc diplomatic or political pressures. But the national interest will be served by considered and sustained involvement in strategic broadcasting issues by the National Security Council, the State Department, and America’s elected political leaders.

Broadcasting’s role in national security Credibility, journalistic integrity, program quality, and accurate news are important. Important, too, are decisions on funding priorities, language priorities, and how to define relations between the BBG, the Department of State, and the National Security Council. Moreover, the president, the Department of State, and Congress must all give higher priority to dealing with these long-standing issues as part of any successful public diplomacy strategy. And, again, while preserving the independence intended in the International Broadcasting Act of 1994, all U.S. international broadcasting activities should be strategically coordinated and overseen by the proposed Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure.

U.S. international broadcasting has long stood at the crossroads of journalism and foreign policy. Everyone agrees that broadcasts should be truthful, and that high program quality is

increasingly necessary to attract listeners and viewers in information-rich media environments. But the management of international broadcasting and decisions on language priorities raise more difficult questions.

Over the next decade, for example, should a part-time BBG continue to direct and supervise U.S. broadcasting services? What does it mean operationally for the secretary of state to provide “information and guidance on foreign policy issues,” as required by the International Broadcasting Act of 1994? What is the appropriate role of the National Security Council in international broadcasting decisions? Are decisions on language services so vitally linked to “national security” that they should be made by the executive branch and Congress? Or do they have more to do with “broadcasting” and should the BBG, as required by the Act, continue to make these decisions using “such criteria as audience size and awareness of the broadcasts in target areas, media environment, political and economic freedom, programming quality, transmission effectiveness, cost, broadcast hours, and language overlap between broadcasters.”¹⁵

The Task Force believes these are important long-term questions that deserve increased attention from the Department of State, the National Security Council, Congress, and the BBG. Many, of course, fall within the purview of the new Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure recommended in the report. Moreover, as a priority, a General Accounting Office study of the effectiveness of the management structure created by the International Broadcasting Act of 1994 will be of assistance in addressing these issues. And the proposed IPDI should, too, add experience and creativity to America’s international broadcasting efforts.

Finally, the Task Force supports an independent and well-qualified broadcasting board with a full-time, top-caliber Chief Executive Officer who would report to the current BBG and be empowered to direct and supervise all U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting activities. Furthermore, the Department of State and the BBG should strengthen the secretary of state’s role in providing information and guidance on foreign policy to the BBG by clarifying and specifying the Secretary’s role in making decisions on broadcast languages and other foreign policy matters.

¹⁵ United States International Broadcasting Act, Public Law 103-236.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

On private sector involvement

I agree with many of the report's recommendations but would give highest priority to an expanded role for the private sector, namely the establishment of a Corporation for Public Diplomacy.

Bette Bao Lord

On Voice of America

While I support the endorsement of innovative programming such as MERN, a note of caution is in order. It is my understanding that the initiation of MERN was accompanied by the elimination of VOA Arabic broadcasts. I believe this is a mistake. The Task Force endorsement of MERN as a prospective model for other areas should not be interpreted to support the elimination of core VOA language broadcasts. The Voice of America and its hard-earned record of credibility represent 60 years of investment by the United States and is an asset that should not be discarded readily. This is not the first time that music has been used to reach a younger audience. *Music USA* served that purpose with distinction for more than forty years—but it was done within the context of VOA programming. If particular current VOA programs are weak, improve them. If facilities are inadequate, strengthen them. But do not lose the established VOA broadcasts in favor of more tactical operations designed for particular situations

Barry Zorthian

While the introduction of a special network aimed at reaching the youth in the Arab world is commendable, the elimination of VOA in Arabic makes no sense since the result is that the only segment of Arab society now being reached by U.S. broadcasts is the young generation. American broadcasts during the Cold War that proved very effective were directed at the intellectuals of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. VOA in Arabic should be reinstated and should include programs devoted to establishing a meaningful dialogue with Arab intellectuals.

Walter Roberts

DISSENTING VIEWS

On the root causes of America's image problems

I disassociate myself from the analysis of the root causes of America's problems which the report predicated on polls in countries without freedom of the press or speech. Equating America's standing with popularity, however obliquely, makes me flinch.

Bette Bao Lord

On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The report places considerable emphasis on the principle that "public diplomacy must be an integral part of foreign policy, not something that comes afterward to sell the foreign policy." It recommends an "engagement approach" that involves listening, dialogue, and relationship-building. However, in its "example message" (Appendix II), relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the report proffers unqualified support for the Israeli position—without any allowance for the fact that specific policies of the Israeli government may indeed undermine the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the "example message" fails to acknowledge that the continued, humiliating conditions of occupation and the various grievances associated with it constitute, for Palestinians as well as for vast majorities in Arab and the Muslim countries, no less important an obstacle to peace and stability than the senseless and horrid acts of terrorism, which must of course be condemned in all its forms. In my view, this lack of emphasis on the need for a genuine engagement and dialogue with *both* sides of this conflict—as an essential part of an effective "public diplomacy" initiative on the part of the United States—detracts from the report's otherwise balanced, enlightening, and well-reasoned analyses and policy recommendations.

Ali Banuazizi

On Arab views of U.S. Middle East policy

I endorse the policy thrust of this report. However, I do so with several reservations relating to its failure to mention some issues that are central to public diplomacy and a successful war on terrorism. For example, the report correctly highlights "our tolerance for autocratic regimes who are our friends in the region" as a source for Arab frustration as well as "high unemployment and a lack of future prospects." But it fails to highlight equally the anger with U.S. policies towards Israel and the pains of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. In that, the report dismisses a major source of frustration and anger and misses the point—the need to understand the causes in order to contemplate remedies.

Raghida Dergham

On the war on terrorism

The United States is still fighting a war in Afghanistan and may soon be fighting one in Iraq. President Bush has stated the necessity of support for the United States in this war and referred to an “axis of evil.” Both of these statements fundamentally changed U.S. diplomatic policy. I believe that the main goal of public diplomacy is the explication and support of that war and those statements, specifically why we are fighting terrorism and why we oppose weapons of mass destruction in the control of countries that are likely to use them. These are issues that will be with us for a long time.

I am a strong believer in the necessity of public diplomacy and spent ten years on a commission advocating strengthening it. I dissent from the report only because of its focus on the “U.S. image problem” as a major diversion from and possibly counterproductive to the main goal stated above.

First, I don't believe pleading not guilty to the innumerable and contradictory charges brought against the United States will be effective. Moreover, the rich hegemon will usually be unpopular, deservedly or not. I do believe that explaining the reasons for our actions and the benefits such actions could bring to poor countries' economies and their ability to democratize will be far more effective.

How important is popularity? Americans want to be loved, but isn't it more important that we tell the world where we stand and follow up with appropriate action, trusting that support will emerge as it did after the Gulf War and after the overthrow of the Taliban?

Finally, one case in point: In 1998, Saddam Hussein's successful public diplomacy focused on dying babies. Sadly, ours was nonexistent. Surely it should have been on his use of funds not to heal babies, but to produce weapons to kill multitudes as he did in Muslim Iran and Muslim Kuwait, rather than focusing on our image.

Lewis Manilow

On U.S. media

When addressing U.S.-bashing in some Arab media suggesting a call for truth-telling to “encourage professional journalism and separate truth from falsehood,” the report ignores Arab and Muslim-bashing in some American media, which are equally irresponsible. In that, the report appears righteous when it comes to “us” and condescending when it is “them;” a notion which perpetuates resisting self criticism at a time this is required of all of us, not only of the others.

Raghida Dergham

On the Corporation for Public Diplomacy and other private sector involvement

The report states that “the U.S. government is unlikely to attract a sufficient number of truly creative professionals within the government who utilize the newest, most cutting-edge forms of media, communications or technology.” It therefore calls for the creation of “an independent, not-for-profit ‘Corporation for Public Diplomacy’ (CPD)...as a focal point for private sector involvement in public diplomacy.” However, what is “cutting edge” in the United States may be ineffective with foreign audiences for cultural, economic, or other reasons. Most “creative professionals” in America do not understand the cultures, languages, and communication habits of foreign audiences, so these professionals alone will not be very helpful in a public diplomacy effort. Moreover, the report assumes that a new CPD would avoid a U.S. government stigma

with foreign audiences, but foreign audiences will probably not be fooled just because government funding is indirect.

By the same token, the report's recommendation to establish an Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute is also misleading. The report claims this institute "would also attract the best private sector talent, techniques and people from U.S. corporations and universities on the research, marketing, campaign management and other relevant fields and then apply private sector 'best practices' in communications and public diplomacy." American "private sector talent" knows the United States, but it does not necessarily understand the foreign environment at all. Even if they are experienced in selling Pepsi abroad, that does not mean they can conduct public diplomacy effectively.

William Rugh

On State Department reforms

The recommendation that "public diplomacy should be made the full-time or at least a primary responsibility of the deputy assistant secretary in the Department's regional bureaus" is misleading. In actual practice, such a "change" will have no impact on the effectiveness of our public diplomacy. Instead, the authority of the undersecretary for public diplomacy should be considerably enhanced.

William Rugh

On the Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure

Let me first take this opportunity to congratulate the Council on Foreign Relations for sponsoring a creative review of U.S. public diplomacy and the challenges it faces in all parts of the world. As a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, I also want to thank the Task Force for singling out the Middle East Radio Network (MERN, or "Radio Sawa") as a key broadcast development that will emphasize dialogue with the people of the Middle East. MERN is an example of what can be done in public diplomacy if we can break old molds and bring private sector broadcast techniques to bear on U.S. international broadcasting. It is also evidence that the BBG, as an independent agency, is uniquely able to respond to foreign policy priorities with private sector solutions.

It is exactly the success of MERN that compels me to disagree with a number of task force recommendations, including the creation of a "Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure." In my role as chairman of BBG's Middle East Committee, I have made numerous visits to the region. On every trip I have been asked by high-ranking local government officials, "what are you trying to accomplish?" In each case, I have responded that the mission of U.S. international broadcasting is to promote freedom and democracy through the free flow of accurate, reliable, and credible news and information about America and the world to audiences overseas, and to be an example of a free press in the American tradition. When the inevitable question of U.S. sponsorship and propaganda comes up, I point to the fact that, in creating the BBG, Congress constructed a "firewall" between the broadcasters and the State Department in order to protect the BBG's journalistic integrity. The BBG, a nine-member board of eight presidentially appointed private citizens, plus the secretary of state, ensures the independence and credibility of our journalists. After learning how the organization of the BBG provides these protections, questions about U.S. propaganda rarely come up again.

We are now broadcasting, or have agreements to broadcast, in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Djibouti, and Cyprus, as well as on NileSat, ArabSat, and EutelSat. This will enable us to cover the entire region with our exciting new Radio Sawa format. None of this would have been possible if the BBG were viewed as a government-controlled propaganda organization. Having the BBG sit as a member of a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure which would include the director of central intelligence, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of state, as recommended by the task force, would have a chilling effect on the notion of the independence and journalistic integrity of U.S. international broadcasting.

Broadcasting is already moving in innovative directions to address the war on terrorism, and it needs the independence and flexibility of its current structure to continue this progress. The BBG's implementation of both MERN and Radio Free Afghanistan has resulted in unprecedented cooperation between VOA and our surrogate broadcasters. The integration of VOA and RFE/RL broadcasts on a single frequency in Afghanistan makes the most of the VOA and surrogate missions: providing local news and information about the countries to which we broadcast, and providing U.S. and international news and presenting the policies of the United States. If the BBG were placed under the purview of a new coordinating structure, suggesting that our message was centrally controlled, it is likely that our surrogate corporate broadcasters would resist such cooperative ventures.

If the U.S. government sees fit to create such an oversight structure, the BBG might benefit from its insights, research, and guidance. But the BBG should not be a member. Congress set the journalistic standards for the BBG and gave it a structure at arms-length from the foreign policy establishment to protect those standards. But it also provided that the secretary of state's membership and participation on the board would provide the mechanism necessary to give the BBG the widest range of foreign policy guidance. The current structure of the board—acting as a firewall to protect broadcast journalism from political and other pressures, and providing deniability to the Secretary of State about our broadcasts—is appropriate and beneficial. Preserving this firewall and deniability—not as a fiction, but a reality—could be undermined by BBG membership in this new body.

Norman Pattiz

On the Broadcasting Board of Governors

I must also take issue with the Task Force recommendation for a full-time Chief Executive Officer of the BBG. In addition to its chairman, the board already has a presidentially appointed IBB director, who also serves as the BBG chief of staff. But more importantly, the Broadcasting Board of Governors serves as a collective CEO, having since its inception made decisions by consensus in a bipartisan manner.

Each governor serves on numerous committees—on VOA, RFE/RL, RFA, OCB, Middle East, China, and Russia. In this way, presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed BBG governors, four Democrats and four Republicans of high caliber, become experts in the various regions where we broadcast to over 100 million people in over 60 languages. Governors serve as committee chairs with real authority to present initiatives to the full board, thus multiplying and maximizing the effectiveness of the BBG. The introduction of a full-time CEO is unnecessary and would not have a positive effect.

The BBG's record of achievement since its independence three years ago shows that the current structure is not broken. In fact, it is working very well. The seeds of MERN preceded the intense national debate on countering terrorism by nearly a year. In early 2001, the Broadcasting Board issued a white paper on creating an Arab-language network that would speak to the large

populations of young Arabs on the transmission networks that they listen to, and that we control. Our research in the area made it clear that there was a media war going on in the region, and the United States didn't have a horse in that race. Now we do. And we agree with the Task Force that we need to build similar networks that both appeal to foreign audiences and accomplish our foreign policy mission.

A new initiative to marry our broadcast mission to the market by using the most sophisticated and modern broadcasting techniques to present our programming to substantially larger audiences has also been initiated by this board. The foundation of MERN was built on research and, to use the Task Force's own words, we are using research "both to shape programs and efforts from their inception and to continually monitor, evaluate, and test their effectiveness." We face a complex political and media environment in which to deliver our message, and we must take our markets into account when developing our programming in order to gain the largest listenership. The task force notes that our challenge is "not just to adjust public diplomacy, but to revolutionize it." At the BBG, we have already begun this process.

The BBG's mission is unique, as is our organizational structure. That structure facilitates the mission. Our programs are not easily classified with the public diplomacy programs of other federal agencies. While we have a foreign policy mandate, we pursue it through journalism. This both serves our national security interests and buys us credibility with our audience. As the Task Force report itself states, "If you do not trust the messenger, you do not trust the message."

Norman Pattiz

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

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Lynn Forester de Rothschild is an entrepreneur in the technology and telecommunications field, currently CEO of ELR Holdings. A former member of the National Information Infrastructure Advisory Council, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Council and U.S. representative on various international trade and technology missions, she also serves on several charitable and corporate boards.

Joseph Duffey served as Director of the United States Information Agency from 1993 to 1999. He was Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs under President Carter.

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John W. (Jack) Leslie is Chairman of Weber Shandwick, the largest public relations firm in the world. Formerly a senior aide to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Leslie testified before the House International Relations Committee in November 2001 at hearings on U.S. public diplomacy.

Bette Bao Lord is Chairman Emeritus of Freedom House, a nonpartisan organization dedicated to the promotion of democracy for over sixty years. From 1994 to 2000, she was a Governor of the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Liberty, and Radio Free Asia. Ms. Lord is a best-selling author of fiction and nonfiction books on China.

Lewis Manilow served in the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for ten years, seven years as chair. He also served as Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

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Harold Pachios is the Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Mr. Pachios was assistant to Bill Moyers at the Peace Corps in the agency's earliest days, and later served in the Johnson administration as Associate White House Press Secretary.

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Peter G. Peterson is Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and Chairman and co-founder of The Blackstone Group. Prior to founding Blackstone in 1985, Mr. Peterson served as Chairman and CEO of Lehman Brothers for ten years. He was Secretary of Commerce in the Nixon Administration and also served as Assistant to President Nixon on international economic affairs.

Richard Plepler is the Executive Vice President, Corporate Communications, for Home Box Office. Plepler directed the communications strategies for such award-winning projects as “Stalin,” “Barbarians at the Gate,” “And The Band Played On,” “From the Earth to the Moon” and the award-winning HBO series “The Sopranos.”

Moeen Qureshi is the Chairman of Emerging Markets Partnership (EMP), a Washington-based asset management company which he co-founded in 1992. He served as Prime Minister of Pakistan for an interim period in 1993, and as Senior Vice President of Operations at the World Bank.

Walter R. Roberts started his government career with the Voice of America and retired as Associate Director of the U.S. Information Agency, then USIA’s top career position. Dr. Roberts was appointed by President Bush and reappointed by President Clinton to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and serves on the board of the Public Diplomacy Institute of George Washington University.

William A. Rugh was a career United States Foreign Service Officer from 1964 to 1995. He served as ambassador to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates and USIA Area Director for the Near East, North Africa and South Asia. Since 1995, Ambassador Rugh has been President and CEO of AMIDEAST.

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James J. Zogby is founder and President of the Arab American Institute. He is also the host of a weekly call-in program, "Viewpoint," on Abu Dhabi Television and Worldlink, and he is a syndicated columnist appearing in fourteen Arab countries.

Barry Zorthian is a partner in the Washington firm of Alcalde & Fay. From 1996 to 2001, he was president of the Public Diplomacy Council, an organization that promotes the importance of communication with foreign publics in the conduct of United States foreign affairs. He is a retired Vice President of Time, Inc., and a retired foreign service officer with thirteen years with the Voice of America and seven years in India and Vietnam, where he was the chief U.S. spokesman during the war.