

Winning the War of Ideas

U.S. success in Afghanistan will count for little if the United States loses the global war of ideas. That war has produced a growing gap between much of the world's perception of the United States and the U.S. perception of itself. If this gap persists, U.S. influence abroad will erode, and the partners the United States needs to advance its interests will stand down. The few real enemies the United States faces will find it easier both to avoid sanction and to recruit others to their cause.

The United States remains powerfully attractive. Most people around the world hold a favorable view of the United States, considering it a land of opportunity and democratic ideals while admiring the country's technological and scientific achievements.¹ Millions of the world's citizens desire to move to, become educated in, do business with, or visit the United States. When people vote with their feet, the United States wins in a landslide.

Yet, the United States tends to disregard an increasingly potent mix of criticism and resentment that is diluting its attraction: anti-Americanism. Admittedly, anti-Americanism is a recurring refrain in U.S. history. A century ago, conservatives in Europe looked across the Atlantic and saw a society plagued by loose mores, bad manners, materialism, and egocentrism. A few decades ago, liberal critics around the world saw a country poisoned by racial strife at home and corrupted by its association with dictators abroad.

Although anti-Americanism is nothing new, its relevance to U.S. interests is emerging in starker relief. The early United States had few ambitions beyond its borders; European disdain was that of old money for new and did not prevent the United States from prospering. In the 1960s, for every person distressed by U.S. deficiencies, dozens more were alienated by Soviet

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tyranny. Now, the United States has global interests and no ideological rival whose vices remind the world of its virtues. The United States' global pervasiveness makes it a symbol of the status quo and, rightly or wrongly, a potential target for people everywhere who do not like the status quo. The war of ideologies is over. The war of ideas is just beginning.

Critics of the United States cluster in distinct, if overlapping, categories. Some focus on U.S. policies abroad, others on U.S. domestic behavior. Some decry unilateralism and the onslaught of "Americanization"; others fear exclusion from the progress and prosperity that the United States enjoys.

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As a result, on the battlefield of ideas, the United States often is on the defensive for what it does or fails to do, as well as for how others perceive it. Some of the criticisms are justified. On other fronts, however, facts have been losing ground to fiction. Many Muslims outside the United States consider the country hostile to Islamic and to Arab interests. In fact, the United States saved

tens of thousands of Muslims in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Washington brokered a peace offer from Israel that would have given Palestinians 95 percent of the occupied territories and dominion over East Jerusalem. At the request of the government of Saudi Arabia, U.S. troops were deployed there to protect that country's people and Islamic holy sites from Iraq. The United Nations (UN)—not the United States—imposed sanctions against Iraq. The Taliban killed far more Muslims intentionally than the U.S. bombing campaign killed accidentally; the demise of the Taliban will save many more Muslim lives.

Europeans complain about a growing values gap between the West and the United States. They see a country enamored of the death penalty, obsessed with guns and violence, and beholden to unchecked capitalism. In fact, U.S. citizens are questioning the death penalty, not embracing it; violent crime is at a 30-year low; large majorities favor stricter gun control; and the poverty rate is at its lowest level in 22 years. On every continent, some blame the United States for the growing gulf between rich and poor. Yet, the policies the country advocates—democracy and economic liberalism—offer more opportunity than any other nation's policies do.

Why should the United States care that some criticize its policies and others resent its power? Following U.S. military success in Afghanistan, concluding that unilateral might makes right, silencing critics and creating a bandwagon effect among friends, is tempting. As Charles Krauthammer wrote, "We made it plain that even if no one followed us, we would go it

alone. Surprise: others followed. ... Not because they love us. Not because we have embraced multilateralism. But because we have demonstrated astonishing military power and the will to defend vital American interests, unilaterally if necessary."² Military power remains the foundation of U.S. security; successfully applied, it magnifies U.S. influence.

More than ever before, however, the transnational nature of the problems the United States faces defies unilateral solutions. Globalization is erasing borders that once protected the United States, while empowering its enemies. Thus, trouble on the far side of the planet, such as economic disaster, outbreak of disease, or theft of a weapon of mass destruction, can quickly become a plague on the United States' house. Rogue states, outlaw actors, and religious fanatics use the nation's very strengths—its openness, advanced technology, and freedom of movement—against it, as demonstrated on September 11. U.S. leadership is essential to meet these threats successfully; now more than ever, however, so is followership. Whatever response the United States chooses—engagement, containment, or elimination—requires the help of others.

Consider the long-term war against terrorism. Al Qaeda has cells in dozens of countries. Success will depend as much on multilateral law enforcement and international cooperation on intelligence gathering as on the unilateral projection of force. Military might, no matter how impressive, does not guarantee followership. For example, Spain arrested eight alleged members of Al Qaeda for complicity in the September 11 attacks, but refused to turn them over to U.S. authorities because the Bush administration said that they might face secret trials before military tribunals. This setback in the war against terrorism also establishes bad precedent for the future. "On what leg does the [United States] now stand when China sentences an American to death after a military trial devoid of counsel chosen by the defendant?" asks William Safire.³

Similarly, extreme devotion to national sovereignty threatens followership. For example, the Bush administration's opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to an enforcement mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is not without reason: the former would tie the United States' hands for future nuclear testing, the latter would subject U.S. companies to intrusive inspections and possible espionage. Both agreements present significant verification shortcomings. Yet, the United States also has a profound interest in preventing other countries from testing nuclear arms and in stopping rogue regimes and terrorists from acquiring biological weapons. Despite their imperfections, the CTBT and the BWC protocol would advance these important goals. If the United States rejects the restraints these agreements impose or declines to negotiate improvements, how can it ask others to embrace them?

The result is what Joseph Nye calls the paradox of U.S. power.⁴ Never has a country been more powerful by traditional measures: military might and economic prowess. Yet, never has a major power been so dependent on the active cooperation of others to defeat its enemies and to advance its interests. Left unattended, those who criticize U.S. policies or resent U.S. power today are less likely to stand with the United States tomorrow. In the extreme, a failure to address foreign grievances risks broadening the base from which the country's enemies draw sanctuary, support, and successors. Winning the war of ideas is critical to the United States' future.

The Decline of Public Diplomacy

Many currents of anti-Americanism develop not because the United States is misguided, but because it is misunderstood. The economic sanctions against Iraq are a case in point. Around the world, people believe that the United States single-handedly imposed and maintains these sanctions. In fact, the UN decreed the imposition of sanctions following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and set specific conditions under which they would be lifted, including (1) the verifiable destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the means to produce and deliver them; (2) payment of reparations for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; and (3) a full accounting of Kuwaiti citizens who are missing in action. Instead of complying with these conditions, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein has spent a decade trying to dodge them. Around the world, people believe that the sanctions apply to food and medicine. In fact, they do not and never did. Likewise, people around the world believe that the sanctions are responsible for the suffering of Iraq's people. Yet in northern Iraq, where the UN and the local Kurdish authorities control the distribution of oil-for-food revenue, the infant mortality rate is lower than it was before the Persian Gulf War, and the average caloric intake is higher. Even luxury goods such as electronics and cars are widely available in that area. Only in the south—where oil exports are back to prewar levels but where Saddam diverts the proceeds to his own ends—are people suffering.⁵ In short, pursuing the right policies is not enough. The U.S. government must convince its critics that the United States is right. Enter public diplomacy.

In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) to be an independent and objective source of information about the United States and its policies. During the Cold War, public diplomacy—the U.S. government's ability to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics—was an effective weapon in the West's arsenal. It gave confidence to dissident groups of politicians, intellectuals, and artists throughout the Eastern bloc. Public diplomacy put a spotlight on the stark differences between capi-

talist and command economies, as well as between democracy and despotism, and helped bring about the collapse of communism from within. Having won the ideological war, policymakers began to perceive public diplomacy as an expensive anachronism. They believed that broad access to private media would suffice to carry the U.S. message to the world; they overlooked that these media tilt heavily toward materialistic expressions of U.S. success, rarely deal with foreign policy issues, and do not penetrate some critical parts of the world. As a result, resources devoted to shaping the image of the United States abroad have been in decline. Between 1989 and 1999, the budget of USIA, adjusted for inflation, decreased by \$150 million, or 10 percent. USIA was folded into the State Department in 1999, a move born out of a desire to streamline government; public diplomacy now accounts for 8 percent of the State Department's already inadequate budget.

Proponents hoped that consolidation would put public diplomacy closer to policymaking. In practice, integration has proved difficult, as the State Department's culture devalues public diplomacy. For foreign policy professionals, other "policy" priorities are always more pressing; political appointees view public diplomacy as a waste of time because foreigners do not vote. Most senior U.S. government officials rarely grant interviews to foreign media. In a department where making and executing foreign policy are considered more substantive endeavors, officers responsible for public diplomacy feel like second-class citizens and find themselves subject to burdensome bureaucratic rules and procedures.⁶

Particularly in the Arab and Muslim world, U.S. ambassadors who engage actively and frequently with the local media, students, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and religious leaders are the exception, not the rule. Ambassadors, who are political appointees, often do not speak the language of the country to which they are assigned. Especially in difficult languages such as Arabic, a dearth of fluent senior Foreign Service officers means less-than-effective spokespersons for the United States. Embassy public affairs teams are also understaffed and underfunded. The process of receiving clearance to use policy talking points in public is often so onerous that the points are irrelevant by the time approval is granted.

The State Department retains important communications assets, including the Voice of America (VOA). At its peak during the Cold War, VOA, together with Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, reached 50 percent of the Soviet populace every week and between 70 and 80 percent of the population of Eastern Europe. Today, a mere 2 percent of Arabs hear VOA. It is time for the United States to rediscover its voice.

Pursuing the right policies is not enough. That is where public diplomacy enters.

Rebuilding the Power to Persuade

Bolstering public diplomacy will take time and require a sustained effort. President George W. Bush's administration wisely created a 24-hour crisis response team to fight the short-term information war in Afghanistan. The real test will be whether the administration will support a permanent public diplomacy campaign that will endure long after U.S. troops return home.

The president and secretary of state should appoint a bipartisan commission to evaluate the state of the country's public diplomacy and make concrete recommendations for improving its development and delivery, especially to Arab and Islamic audiences. The commission should include experts in communications from the private sector (e.g., television programmers, film writers and directors, and advertising specialists) and academics with a thorough understanding of the Arab and Islamic worlds. The commission should build on the important work of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. The president and secretary of state should review the commission's findings promptly, decide which recommendations to accept, and order periodic progress reports on their implementation.

*To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism*⁷ lays out a number of ideas and initiatives worthy of consideration by such a commission, including:

- *Prioritize public diplomacy in the foreign policy process.*

Officials responsible for public diplomacy should be included as a matter of course in high-level meetings at which foreign policy is debated and formulated to enable these officials to inform policymakers of the likely impact of U.S. policies on public opinion abroad and to communicate the U.S. government's policy more effectively. Senior government officials should receive periodic media training and should be encouraged to brief foreign media regularly at the Foreign Press Center or in individual interviews. The president and cabinet-level officials should regularly grant interviews to the foreign media in advance of, and during, foreign trips and when "rolling out" policy initiatives. Simply including the foreign media in press conferences or in pressroom briefings does not suffice; exclusive or limited pool interviews garner significantly more airtime for the interviewee.

- *Strengthen research on public opinion.*

Foreign public opinion should not dictate foreign policy, but awareness of other views is vital in helping policymakers shape and explain policy. Funding for research on foreign public opinion remains low—about \$5 million a year—and has declined in real terms during the past decade, de-

spite new opportunities to conduct opinion polling in more open societies. The proposed commission should consider increasing funding for public opinion research.

- *Develop a rapid response capability.*

Technology makes possible the scouring of international, national, regional, and local media; academic publications; and Web sites and chat rooms for critical or erroneous commentary about U.S. policies. The commission should consider developing a rapid response program to correct or clarify distortions of U.S. policy. A team of public affairs officers could be assigned to respond to misinformation or one-sided opinion in real time. Ideally, no false charge in a major or influential medium would go unchallenged. The commission should also look carefully at the system used to formulate and clear talking points for senior officials at home and abroad. The United States needs to be able to act within news cycles, not in their wake.

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- *Empower ambassadors, embassies, and Foreign Service officers.*

In an era of high-speed communications and direct contacts between foreign capitals, some believe that ambassadors have become obsolete. In fact, their relevance is greater now than ever before, but their role should be refined to focus more on public diplomacy. In selecting ambassadors and senior embassy officials, greater consideration should be given to language and presentation skills. These government officials should receive regular training in use of the media. Senior embassy officials should be encouraged to engage in the public debate in the countries to which they are assigned. These representatives should also consider a core function of their jobs to be granting interviews, writing opinion pieces or letters to the editor in the countries' newspapers, participating in televised debates and radio call-in shows, and cultivating writers of editorials and opinion pieces in newspapers published in the countries where they serve.

For effective communication, listening is as important as talking. U.S. envoys should devote more time to a broad cross-section of groups and individuals, including religious leaders, NGO representatives, students, professionals, and union members, not just their counterparts in the host country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In recruiting and training new Foreign Service officers, the State Department should focus more on communications skills. The department should place higher priority on the public diplomacy "cone" through which it trains officers and civil servants in the

international dissemination of information and public diplomacy. The commission also should consider whether the U.S. government could improve the training it offers in foreign languages.

- *Create U.S. presence posts outside of foreign capitals.*

In many countries, regional media reach more people than do newspapers and television and radio programs that are based in the capital city. U.S. officials rarely are present to engage in public debate at the local level. The proposed commission should consider creating regional presence posts in critical countries, modeled after the program that Ambassador Felix Rohatyn instituted in France in the late 1990s.

- *Better utilize the media in the Arab and Muslim worlds.*

Osama bin Laden scored a propaganda coup when Al Jazeera, an uncensored satellite network based in Qatar, broadcast his videotaped remarks on October 7, 2001. Instead of flooding Al Jazeera with comments from U.S. government officials and U.S. voices to counter bin Laden's hate speech, administration officials initially sought to prevent both Al Jazeera and U.S. networks from broadcasting messages from bin Laden or the Taliban leadership. Whereas Secretary of State Colin Powell granted Al Jazeera an interview six days after the September 11 attacks and Condoleezza Rice, the administration's national security adviser, followed with one, Bush has not yet done so. Al Jazeera's Washington bureau chief told the press that his network is "desperate to find any [U.S.] officials. We say every day, 'Please come talk to us, exploit us.'" Although Al Jazeera is hardly free of bias—the network's editors and reporters tend to show their anti-America and anti-Israel stripes—the service claims a global audience of 35 million Arabic-speaking viewers and is an open forum that the U.S. government should seize, not censor. The White House should develop a program to reach out to media in the Arab world, starting with Al Jazeera, other Pan-Arab networks such as the Middle East Broadcasting Center and Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International, and "moderate" newspapers such as *al-Hayat*.

- *Bolster VOA and create new outlets and media.*

Eighty percent of Afghan men listen to VOA broadcasts in the Dari and Pashto languages of Afghanistan; 72 percent say they trust VOA and agree that it provides facts and lets them make up their own minds. VOA's listenership in the broader Arab world, however, is a mere 2 percent. The proposed commission should consider enhancing the content and quantity of VOA's programming in this part of the world. Additionally, VOA should seek out senior U.S. officials and a broad variety of U.S. voices—particularly those of Arab-Americans and U.S. Muslims—for interviews. In so doing, however,

the commission needs to guard against making VOA a propaganda tool of the U.S. government. The misguided effort to stop VOA from broadcasting bin Laden's remarks threatened to undermine VOA's widespread credibility. The commission also should assess the effectiveness and penetration of Worldnet, the State Department's global television feed, and recommend whether more resources should be devoted to television broadcasting services.

The Internet, which has become key to global communications, is especially relevant in countries where the state controls "traditional" media but not access to the Web. The commission should assess the effectiveness of the U.S. government's use of the Internet to promote direct communication with foreign publics. For example, even though both the White House and the State Department Web sites are highly regarded, users must seek them, making the sites passive instruments of public diplomacy. The commission should look at strategies for using the Internet proactively as a way to explain government policy. Moreover, Internet discussions and videoconferencing would allow senior officials to engage in public diplomacy without leaving their desks and would help engage outside experts from the United States in public debates and discussions with foreign audiences. The commission should consider whether these tools are being used effectively.

The role of ambassadors should be refined to focus more on public diplomacy.

- *Develop and support outside partners.*

Academics; opinion leaders; former government officials; and prominent individuals involved in business, the arts and sciences, and sports can validate U.S. policy initiatives and the U.S. way of life. These individuals may be more credible than those serving in official capacities. One example is Muhammad Ali's reported agreement to tape a public service announcement for the Muslim world highlighting U.S. openness to Islam. The commission should consider how the U.S. administration could use outside partners to maximum effect. One place to start would be to develop lists of experts for given issues or countries and offer these individuals regular briefings by senior policymakers.

Similarly, foreign government officials can be important partners for U.S. policy. Great Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair has played a leading role in setting out the public case for bin Laden's and Al Qaeda's responsibility for the September 11 attacks and in forcefully expressing in the Arab media that the war against terrorism is not a war against Islam. U.S. diplomats should consider asking their foreign counterparts to assume some of the public diplomacy burden, especially when the credibility of foreign partners is greater.

- *Cultivate foreign opinion leaders.*

U.S. government officials at home and abroad rarely approach foreign opinion leaders such as columnists, editorial writers, newspaper and magazine editors, television and radio pundits, former senior officials, and academics; they rarely even accept their calls. The commission should consider developing a system to track foreign opinion leaders and engage U.S. officials to communicate with them. Helping inform and shape the opinion of influential foreign voices can be an effective way to communicate the U.S. message.

- *Sustain foreign-exchange programs.*

Student exchanges, visitor programs, and collaboration among universities, foundations, and hospitals are proven mechanisms for opening foreign eyes to U.S. values, culture, and society. Some 20,000 U.S. citizens and foreigners participate in the State Department's exchange programs every year. Because participants tend to be or become leading citizens in their countries, the impact of these programs is disproportionate to their size. Nearly 200 current and former heads of state, 1,500 cabinet-level ministers, and many private-sector leaders have participated in exchange programs in the past. Yet, funding for foreign-exchange programs fell by nearly one-third between 1993 and 2000, measured in constant dollars. The commission should consider ways to sustain and expand these highly effective programs.

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- *Work with the private sector to develop message campaigns.*

The commission should consider whether and how to tap the communications skills found in Hollywood and on Madison Avenue, for example, to present the United States more positively and to foster greater understanding of U.S. policies. U.S. agencies could have devised advertising campaigns to personalize the September 11 tragedy by showing in the Arab media the faces and families of those who lost their lives. A documentary might be developed that contrasts the standard of living in northern Iraq (where the UN and local Kurdish officials administer the oil-for-food program) with that of southern Iraq (where the Iraqi government administers the program).

- *Engage Arab Americans and U.S. Muslims to communicate the U.S. message.*

The perception gap between the United States and Arab and Muslim countries is especially great. This country's Muslims and Arab Americans have unique credibility in their countries of origin, the ability to communi-

cate effectively, and an important vantage point from which to explain U.S. policies. Senior administration officials should meet with a broad cross-section of this community on a regular basis to explain the rationale for government policies. Individual Arab American and Muslim leaders could also be invited to play a formal role in overseeing public diplomacy efforts.

Remaking the Marketplace of Ideas

Limits on freedom of the media in large swaths of the world, as well as educational systems that promote bigotry, intolerance, and obscurantism, will hinder even the most vigorous and sustained public diplomacy campaign. The same holds true of the practice some foreign leaders have perfected of saying one thing abroad and the opposite at home. Winning the war of ideas will require a long-term effort to reshape the marketplace of ideas in countries around the world.

This effort must become a foreign policy priority. The United States should clearly communicate to governments that control their countries' media and educational systems that broadcasting lies and teaching intolerance will have consequences for foreign assistance, political support, and military aid that the United States provides. So will double-talk behind the back of the United States. The United States should promote reform of the media and educational systems in these countries and support independent media around the world. Such efforts might include helping to draft media laws and academic curriculums, supporting watchdog groups, and providing financial and technical support to independent media. Such assistance could be directed in the first instance to independent NGOs to avoid charges of U.S. tampering.

Over time, technology and trade, both of which are needed for countries to succeed in a globalized economy, can help forge a new marketplace of ideas. Satellites, computers, televisions, and cellular phones will be the messengers of the twenty-first century. Technology carries with it ideas and information that can break up government monopolies and overcome intellectual biases. By exposing governments to rules, standards, pressures, and scrutiny and forcing them to be less arbitrary, corrupt, and autocratic, trade can remove barriers that keep individuals locked in and ideas locked out. The United States should deploy technology and trade as strategic weapons in the war to win hearts and minds around the world.

Smart Power

Rebuilding the power to persuade and remaking the marketplace of ideas can help the U.S. government counter critics of its policies. Yet, Washington

must also address those who resent its power. The end of the Cold War was supposed to mark the end of history. Instead, it signaled the true beginning of U.S. hegemony: the preponderant influence and authority of one nation above all others. By most measures of hard and soft power, the United States' global dominance is extraordinary. Throughout history, hegemonies have provoked envy and resentment. Challengers arise to put hegemonies in their place, and coalitions form to contain them. Thus far, the United States has escaped the fate of past hegemonies. The post–World War II generation reined in U.S. power in order to extend it. U.S. citizens created international institutions—NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the UN, and the World Trade Organization, for example—that provided friends and allies fora in which to voice their views and vehicles for influencing the actions of the U.S. government. Europeans and Japanese accepted U.S. hegemony more easily because they were allowed to shape it.⁸ During the Cold War, concern for Soviet tyranny trumped criticism of U.S. clout. The U.S. defeat of communism and its overwhelming power have dissuaded frontal attacks from other countries. So has the benign nature of U.S. hegemony; the imperial reach of the United States is primarily a function of the free will of the conquered, not the force of the conqueror. Now, however, those who find fault with the way the United States wields its power sound a useful warning that the country has begun to take its hegemony for granted and therefore risks losing it.

Some critics complain about unilateralism. According to this view, the United States disregards the interests of others and promotes international norms and treaties, only to flout them when they do not advance U.S. interests. This perception results as much from style as it does from substance. Those governments that are upset with Washington for certain policies—its failure to embrace the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court, a treaty on land mines, and the Kyoto Protocol; its lack of interest in UN mandates; or its imposition of extraterritorial sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and Libya—are bothered as much by the process (in which they perceive the United States as a country that ignores other views and dismisses compromise) as by the result.

Others fault the United States for its perceived failure to use its power at all. One billion people live in poverty, 110 million children go without schooling, seven million children die from neglect every year.⁹ Meanwhile, the gap between the United States and much of the rest of the world is widening, even as more people than ever before are escaping poverty. In the poorest countries, people have incomes of \$100–200 a year, whereas U.S. incomes average more than \$30,000 a year. Thanks to technology, the have-nots are more aware of this gap today than they ever were before.

The first step toward smart power is to defuse the complaint that the United States acts unilaterally. The default approach of the U.S. government should be to work with others whenever it can and to act alone only when it must. This strategy requires building coalitions, sustaining alliances, and forging compromises. It requires listening to others. It requires sensitivity to concerns about cultural Americanization. It requires strengthening international institutions whose rules foster stability, create credibility, and enshrine U.S. norms. This approach also requires working on, not walking away from, difficult issues such as climate change, the biological weapons protocol, the nuclear test ban treaty, and the International Criminal Court, lest the United States alienate its friends and give moral ammunition to its foes.

The second step toward achieving smart power is to win over those who resent the United States' success—and the perceived U.S. failure to exercise its power on their behalf. The United States should become the champion of sustainable modernity. As the most prosperous country on earth, the United States bears a special responsibility—and a profound self-interest—to help spread the benefits and share the burdens of a globalized world. The country must become and be seen as an enthusiastic leader, not a reluctant follower, in international development, poverty alleviation, educational reform, debt relief and trade barrier removal for poor countries, as well as bridging the digital divide, preserving local cultures, combating the spread of infectious diseases, and promoting good governance. It also must reconsider its previously understandable support—in light of Cold War necessities and other strategic interests—of regressive regimes. Only then will the silent majority around the world believe that it has a stake in joining and supporting the status quo that the United States leads. Only then will the silent majority not vent its frustrations on the United States and its citizens.

The war of ideas will help determine whether the new century, like its predecessor, is an American century. The United States brings powerful weapons to the battlefield: freedom, opportunity, and tolerance. The nation's enemies can counter only with repression, regression, and fanaticism. Critics of the United States have useful corrections but no alternative system of values and practices that offers as much progress and possibility as the U.S. system does. The war of ideas is the United States' to win. The United States must approach it seriously.

Technology and trade can help forge a new marketplace of ideas.

Notes

1. See Pew Project on Global Attitudes, Washington, D.C., December 19, 2001.
2. Charles Krauthammer, "Unilateral? Yes, Indeed," *Washington Post*, December 14, 2001, p. A45.
3. William Safire, "Kangaroo Courts," *New York Times*, November 26, 2001, sec. A, p. 19.
4. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
5. See Michael Rubin, "Sulaymaniyah Dispatch: Food Fight," *New Republic*, June 6, 2000.
6. See United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "Consolidation of USIA into the State Department: An Assessment after One Year," October 2000, Washington, D.C.
7. Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Flournoy, *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2001).
8. C. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
9. Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries 2002, www.worldbank.org.