

## A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars

Some have argued that using military means in the war against terrorism might ultimately make the problem worse by helping the opposition cast the campaign as a legitimate clash of civilizations.<sup>1</sup> In modern, post-Cold War international conflicts, we must pay attention not only to our military response to conflicts and crises but also to the role that information and media play in creating and feeding these conflicts. For instance, low-tech “hate radio” in hot spots such as Central Asia, Serbia, the West Bank, and Gaza has whipped up emotions and motivated the killing of thousands of people. Military power alone is often insufficient to resolve modern conflicts and will likely be unable to end this current war against terrorism. Effective broadcasting to “win hearts and minds” strengthens the traditional triad of diplomacy, economic leverage, and military power and is the fourth dimension of foreign conflict resolution. Particularly in times of crisis, the United States must deliver clear, effective programming to foreign populations via the media. How does one win modern media wars? All eyes now are on Afghanistan, but the impact of international media has not yet been measured in that war-torn country.<sup>2</sup> For a more complete case study, we have to look a little farther back—to the Balkans.

### **‘Spinning’ in Belgrade**

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In 1993, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), then-chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on European Affairs, visited the Balkans to investigate what he could do to help end the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Staffers at the U.S. embassy in Belgrade warned Biden that Slobodan Milosevic would use Yugoslav state media to leverage the senator's visit to build his own popularity and support among the people of Serbia. They predicted that Milosevic would want to have a press conference after the meeting at which he and the senator could address the press. The state radio and television would not use what Biden said, but would use a voice-over saying that this important U.S. government official had come to Belgrade to pay homage to Milosevic, an influential player on the world scene. Biden made his meeting with Milosevic conditional on no press attendance.

U.S. embassy staff said Milosevic had used his control of state-owned radio and television to inflame the Serbian people. They thought that one of the reasons that the Serb soldiers had committed their crimes in Bosnia and Croatia was because of the daily broadcasts of the manufactured atrocities of the Bosnian Muslims, provoking a desire among the Serbs to seek revenge. They said that Serbian state television and radio had reported that the hated Croats and Muslims were raping nuns and killing babies. The media appeared to be escalating the conflict toward genocide.

Biden said he learned many things about Milosevic and the Balkans during his visit, the most important thing being how media can be misused to start and feed religious, ethnic, racial, and regional conflicts. If the United States is to deal with these problems in the future, he concluded, we have to move beyond military, political, and economic weapons.<sup>3</sup> We must learn how to fight the media war.

Biden became intimately involved in the effort to consolidate all U.S. international broadcasting after that trip. His legislation, the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, created the Broadcasting Board of Governors<sup>4</sup> (BBG) composed of eight private citizens—four Democrats and four Republicans—and the director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). He did this to assure the integrity of the journalists in the organization and to maintain their ability to operate under the Voice of America (VOA) charter.<sup>5</sup> The government-funded BBG became an independent federal entity in October 1999 when the U.S. secretary of state replaced the USIA director on the board.

## **Forget Fire—Fight Media with Media**

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In an effort to resolve the Kosovo conflict, the United States intensified its existing economic sanctions on the Serbs and initiated a number of diplomatic efforts from 1998 to 1999 without success. The news media extensively covered the subsequent U.S. bombing campaign, beginning in 1999, to destroy Serbian heavy military equipment and compel the Serbs to exit

Kosovo. What many U.S. citizens do not know is that the United States also instituted the most concentrated media focus directed toward a single foreign country in our history. The campaign used a plethora of different media methods and platforms, making the media a full-time partner of our military, economic, and diplomatic efforts to win the battle for Kosovo.

U.S. government broadcasters had been broadcasting into the Balkan region for years. VOA had been broadcasting in the local languages since 1943, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) created its South Slavic Service in 1993. In mid-1998, VOA and RFE/RL, using shortwave transmitters, sent more than 40 transmitter-hours<sup>6</sup> of programs daily in Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian, and Serbian to the region. Local AM and FM affiliates added coverage in many areas. Surveys at the time showed VOA to be the number one international radio broadcaster with a regular listening audience of 14 percent in the targeted regions. As hostilities began, Milosevic pulled the plug on international broadcasters by shutting down their access to local affiliates, but this obstruction did not deter the VOA or RFE/RL. They expanded their broadcasting through external shortwave, medium-wave, and Internet transmissions and worked with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development to bolster FM broadcasting in the area that became known as “the ring around Serbia.”

The level of U.S. broadcasting increased dramatically in late 1998. RFE/RL expanded its South Slavic broadcasts and Internet service, added a new Albanian Service to Kosovo in February 1999, and by mid-March had increased shortwave and medium-wave broadcasts to a full 13.5 hours per day. RFE/RL also provided a number of publications by fax and e-mail, including the weekly *Balkan Report*, which was widely recognized as one of the best analyses of events in the region. At the same time, VOA began live streaming of both audio and video programming over the Internet. BBG transmission stations in Morocco, Germany, Spain, and Greece, as well as leased stations in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the United Kingdom, combined to bring total transmission hours to a peak of 80 transmitter-hours per day.

At the same time, RFE/RL began broadcasts via Commando Solo, a fleet of planes developed by the Defense Department to give almost instant surge-broadcasting capability during times of conflict. The BBG had worked out an agreement with the Defense Department that RFE/RL would be broadcast on a dedicated frequency under BBG control.

**Effective  
broadcasting is the  
fourth dimension of  
modern foreign  
conflict resolution.**

## Contemporary Encirclement

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The final piece of the puzzle was “the ring around Serbia.” In March 1999, shortly after Milosevic shut down VOA and RFE/RL access to affiliates in Serbia, BBG directed a team of engineers to place a ring of FM broadcast transmitters in the countries around Serbia. Preconflict information indicated that more than 50 percent of the Serb audience received their news from local FM stations. Because FM signals travel in line-of-sight patterns and are therefore most effective broadcasting over short ranges and serving densely populated areas on flat landscapes, the mountainous terrain and longer distance presented challenges for the engineers.

### How does one win media wars?

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The BBG first assembled a coalition of U.S. government agencies, U.S. embassies, and equipment suppliers, as well as host-country broadcasters, and then surveyed the sites; negotiated agreements; and selected, ordered, and shipped transmitters, antennas, shelters, generators, towers, satellite receivers, and other broadcast equipment. Finally, they installed the equipment and began to operate. By July 1999, three new FM stations were on the air in Bosnia, Croatia, and Romania. A fourth was added in northern Kosovo in October 1999 once conditions on the ground permitted. Transmitters were maximized for coverage of Belgrade.

The results achieved by this U.S. international broadcasting foray were striking. A nationwide survey in October 2000 found that international radio had played a major role in informing the Serbian people during the crisis.<sup>7</sup> Forty percent of Serbian adults tuned to RFE/RL and VOA for news during the elections and the beginning of the massive street demonstrations between September 24 and October 4, 2000. During this time, more Serbs listened to RFE/RL (37 percent) than to the main state radio station, Radio Belgrade (31 percent). On October 3, the crucial day before the start of demonstrations that overthrew Milosevic, 25 percent of Serb adults tuned in to RFE/RL and 20 percent to VOA. A majority of listeners to RFE/RL and VOA were young, blue-collar workers.

These results only bolstered what BBG already knew from a May–June 1999 survey of 448 Kosovar refugees who had fled to Albania during the conflict. That survey showed that international radio broadcasts were the primary source of news for Kosovar refugees in Albania during their expulsion from the embattled Serb province. Some 94 percent of refugees used international radio or television as a primary means of staying informed about the unfolding events in the NATO campaign against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The other major sources of information were Albanian media re-

ports (89 percent) and word of mouth (76 percent). VOA's Albanian programming was the leading service, drawing 83 percent of adult refugees on a weekly basis. Deutsche Welle (55 percent) and the British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) (50 percent) followed VOA. RFE/RL's Albanian Kosovo service also drew a sizeable audience, attracting 31 percent of the adult refugee population weekly.<sup>8</sup>

This extraordinary outcome was achieved because all U.S. international broadcasting had been consolidated under the single authority of the BBG. The single structure facilitated coordination with the Departments of State and Defense and enabled quicker decisions on allocating transmitter time among the stations. Coordinated international broadcasting was as crucial as military, economic, and diplomatic efforts to advance the U.S. agenda in the Balkans. Sadly, the results in other regions of the world, particularly where hate radio is used, have not been as positive.

## **Battling Hate Media**

From the days of the Nazi and Soviet propaganda machines, a particularly powerful form of media warfare, known as hate radio, has been a favorite tool of tyrants and rebels alike. Hate radio keys up emotions among part of the local population and incites violent conflict against a target group by providing rationales for, and legitimizing, violence. It relies on distortions of the truth; misreporting of events; and long, venomous diatribes. Hate radio is a deadly but effective use of media.

In Rwanda and Burundi, hate radio drove genocide. Rwanda's Radio Mille Collines is probably the most notorious example. Its broadcasts, which disseminated hate propaganda and incited the murder of Tutsis and of opponents to the Rwanda regime, greatly contributed to the 1994 genocide of almost one million people. Mille Collines, aided by Radio Rwanda, the government-owned station, called on the Hutu majority to destroy the Tutsi minority. The programs were relayed to all parts of the country via a network of transmitters owned and operated by Radio Rwanda. "What are you waiting for? The graves are empty. Take up your machetes and hack your enemies to pieces," according to one reported broadcast.<sup>9</sup> Four years later, during the 1998 conflict between Democratic Republic of Congo authorities and their army on one side and Rwandan soldiers and Congolese ethnic Tutsis on the other, Radio Candip, a state broadcaster of the Democratic Republic of Congo, openly called for killing Tutsis, saying, "[B]ring a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, and truncheons ... barbed wire, stones, and the like, in order, dear listeners, to kill the Rwandan Tutsis."<sup>10</sup>

Several international stations, including VOA, which rebroadcast via several FM stations locally, attempted to counter hate radio but with little effect. Probably too few hours of broadcast material were delivered locally to make much of an impact against the local media onslaught, but the transmissions did get the attention of the Rwandan government. Rwandan state television accused VOA and other international stations of “giving alarming information that the attackers have been making advances within the national territory ... as part of a vast campaign aimed at diverting the sons and daughters of this country from their noble mission of defending the fatherland.”

**The U.S. must develop a better strategy for combating hate media.**

The television quoted one Kinshasa resident as saying he was “disgusted by the kind of mind-poisoning methods used by the VOA.” The lesson learned was that, if international broadcasting is to impact locally delivered programs, it must be on the air more than just an hour or two per day.<sup>11</sup>

The United States must develop a better strategy for combating hate media because, as in both the Balkan and Rwandan massacres, hate radio is having a powerful, insidious effect in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In these conflicts, newspapers and media other than radio also contribute to the intractable tensions in this region. Clearly, combating hate radio or the broader problem of hate media more effectively will not solve these conflicts. The Intifada, for example, has confounded policymakers for 14 years,<sup>12</sup> but hate media contributes to the problem. An article in an October 2000 edition of the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram*, for example, concluded with the following paragraph:

The bestial drive to knead Passover matzos with the blood of non-Jews is [confirmed] in the records of the Palestinian police where there are many recorded cases of the bodies of Arab children who had disappeared being found, torn to pieces without a single drop of blood. The most reasonable explanation is that the blood was taken to be kneaded into the dough of extremist Jews to be used in matzos to be devoured during Passover.<sup>13</sup>

These days, hate propaganda goes beyond radio and newspapers. Television too is being used to convey escalatory messages. Around the Muslim world, the terrorists' September 11 message of hatred of the United States fit perfectly into the local news. Commentary that the United States was arrogant, anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel frequently accompanied the awful scenes of the collapsing trade towers on television and in local newspapers. Al Jazeera, the influential CNN-like Arab satellite television seen by 10 million people across the Middle East, was anything but evenhanded in its coverage.

## Finally, a Response

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Finding the truth in the Middle East can be difficult. BBG has fought for years for funding to obtain a real media presence in the Middle East. Only now is that effort being realized through the 2002 creation of the Middle East Radio Network (MERN).

MERN will be unique in the Middle East: a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week Arabic language service broadcasting news, analysis, editorial comment, talk, and music for the emerging generation and news seekers of all ages. Produced in the Middle East and in Washington, D.C., MERN breaks the mold of traditional international broadcasting. Its programming format throughout the day will aim to appeal consistently to a particular target audience and will not vary from hour to hour. Its target audience will be under-30 Arabs, who constitute more than 50 percent of the population throughout the region. Using a combination of powerful medium-wave and FM transmitters, as well as popular regional satellites, it will both broadcast to the region as a whole and generate individually targeted programs for Jordan, the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Iraq, Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and Sudan. Other targeted programming may be added in the future. MERN will thus appeal to audiences as a local station concerned for, and involved in, their daily lives. At the same time, MERN will better acquaint its listeners with the United States and make U.S. policies clearer.

## A Growing Role for International Broadcasting

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Combating hate radio and hate media is just one example of the need for a strong international broadcasting policy. In many places around the world, simply clarifying U.S. purpose and policy, not combating hate media, requires new initiatives. China is a good example where a flexible, creative system is needed to provide the U.S. point of view to the Chinese. As China's role in East Asia and the world grows, a disturbing 68 percent of urban Chinese consider the United States to be their nation's number one enemy.<sup>14</sup> Perceptions change when outside information challenges certain assumptions. Providing such information is vital to the well being of the United States, particularly in places where the flow of information is restricted. Currently, the Chinese government jams international broadcasting, blocks Internet sites, and tightly controls domestic media.

Beijing is especially good at giving visiting Western policymakers and businessmen the impression of a free press in China. CNN and the BBC are available at most first-class hotels, and the *International Herald Tribune* and the Asian edition of the *Wall Street Journal* are available in the lobby. None

of these media sources, however, are available to the vast majority of Chinese. Chinese radio, television, and newspaper options exist, but the government tightly controls all of them. Although many are now “independent” business entities fighting each other for advertising, the government closely monitors their news and analysis.

Because the Internet could provide a new means to transmit information, Beijing still fears this medium’s threat to their information monopoly, even though the Chinese government recognizes the Internet’s economic and educational importance.<sup>15</sup> The government has instituted draconian regulations and conducts widespread electronic blocking of particular Web

sites, usually international news sources. Once again, the government choreographs all this activity beautifully. When President George W. Bush visited Shanghai to attend the meeting of Pacific Rim nations in October 2001, the Chinese government stopped blocking a number of Internet news sites including CNN, the BBC, Reuters, and the *Washington Post*.<sup>16</sup> The blocks were reactivated following Bush’s departure.

**The Middle East Radio Network (MERN) will appeal to a particular target audience.**

As a result of all these governmental measures, the Chinese people are woefully short of objective information on the United States and its people. Ironically, they believe that they understand the United States quite well from syndicated sitcoms, movies, and music videos—a major problem for the development of a healthy, long-term Sino-U.S. relationship. In the short term, it is a policy disaster. The Chinese people’s responses to the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the April 2001 captured spy-plane incident are notable. The Chinese government’s monopoly of information media enabled it to orchestrate Chinese public reactions to both incidents. In May 1999, rock-throwing demonstrators attacked the U.S. embassy; in April 2001, Chinese domestic media presented a one-sided version of what happened to the U.S. spy plane but deliberately toned down its rhetoric, and demonstrations were minimal. Finding anyone in China who has heard the U.S. version in either case is difficult. Ultimately, in a time of crisis with China, the U.S. president has no way to communicate directly to the Chinese people. The United States cannot afford to have 1.2 billion people, about 18 percent of the world’s population, so ill-informed.

In order for the president to have what is needed to fight the media war, U.S. international broadcasting must adapt to this modern world and turn the media tide. How can the United States do this?



## How to Make International Broadcasting More Effective

Some specific solutions can improve international broadcasting. With regard to China, Bush must first use his diplomatic leverage at the presidential level. Gaining permission to establish shortwave and particularly cross-border, medium-wave transmitters within range of the United States' high-priority target areas for international broadcasting in the Far East is essential. Fearing the Chinese reaction, local governments in several countries in the region have locked Radio Free Asia (RFA), whose stock-in-trade is coverage of domestic news in the target countries, out of logical transmitter sites. Yet, although China jams VOA and RFA broadcasts and Internet sites, the United States allows Chinese radio and television broadcasters on U.S. cable systems. China government television, CCTV, can be found on many cable systems in the United States and will soon be on many Time/Warner systems, including those in the major media markets of New York City, Los Angeles, and Houston. China government radio, China Radio International, also broadcasts unjammed on shortwave and can be found on a number of affiliated AM and FM radio stations in the United States. Officials at the highest levels of the U.S. government must demand reciprocity.

Beyond China, though, the United States also needs leverage with governments in countries where it wishes to have its own broadcast frequencies or local affiliates. Several years ago, the BBC set the objective to have FM stations in 100 of the world's national capitals by the end of 1999. They achieved 110 by that date and aim to have world service in 135 capitals by 2003.<sup>17</sup> One method the British used to accomplish this goal was having the prime minister contact national leaders in these countries to reinforce the priority the British government places on obtaining these frequencies.

Second, in important media markets, the BBG should own local broadcasting stations. Local censorship and market constraints apply to affiliate stations owned by the host country. Affiliates also do not put a high priority on U.S. broadcasts, and controlling what precedes and follows the U.S. programs on such stations is impossible. BBG ownership helps combat these problems. At the same time, prudence demands backup delivery via shortwave to places where government interference might occur.

Third, the BBG needs more access to modern equipment and satellites. Money can solve most of this problem. The BBG has the programming, but needs more satellite time and modern television production facilities and equipment, not only in the United States but also in regional centers overseas, to combat biased stations such as Al Jazeera. Television is wildly popular in Iran, India, Indonesia, and China. In closed societies such as Iran and others in the Middle East, satellite dishes will be more accessible in the fu-

ture. In more open societies such as Indonesia, Russia, Kosovo, Albania, the Philippines, Nigeria, and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, where satellites are accessible now, the BBG needs Congress to appropriate more funds for satellite time and satellite dishes for local affiliate stations to download programs for rebroadcast.

Fourth, existing shortwave transmitters must be refurbished. Shortwave and cross-border medium-wave are used for two purposes. They are still the media of choice in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, south central Asia, and Eurasia. They are also needed almost everywhere for surge broadcasting in times of regional and international crises. In troubled times, the first

thing that despots such as Milosevic do is block access to local affiliates. In those cases, the BBG must be able to rely on shortwave.

Many of the BBG shortwave transmitters are about 30 years old. Because of jamming and the recent crises in the Balkans and now throughout the Middle East, these transmitters now broadcast many more hours per day. Some of them have been on the air 24 hours a day broadcasting to the Middle East since September 11. Refurbishing these shortwave transmitters

to extend their life would cost approximately \$50 million in a one-time capital improvement expenditure.

Fifth, the key to success of international broadcasting continues to be the credibility of its broadcasts. The BBG must continue to have editorial independence to produce and deliver accurate, objective, and comprehensive programming. People will listen to the broadcasts only if they believe them. Real effectiveness absolutely needs the continued support of the Congress and the administration in maintaining the firewall between the BBG and outside governmental influences.<sup>18</sup>

Sixth, the BBG with congressional help must continue the reforms it started. The BBG's enabling legislation mandates that the board "at least annually" review broadcast languages for additions and deletions and that it evaluate the effectiveness of programs. In its first two Language Reviews, the board has made difficult decisions that have seen resources moved in the post-Cold War period from areas such as Central and Eastern European to grossly underfunded but higher priority areas such as the Middle East. It must continue to use its Language Service Review process to assure the allocation of resources to the proper language services based on the priorities of U.S. foreign policy. Even though resources for research increased fivefold in recent years, the BBG must use more surveys, focus groups, expert panels, and other methods to help broadcasters know what is working. The BBG

**The key to success of international broadcasting continues to be its credibility.**

should continue to assure that U.S. international broadcasting adheres to the highest standards and fulfills the individual, complementary missions of the broadcast entities. It also must start a twenty-first century advertising and promotion effort so that those in the client countries know when and how to access their programs.

Finally, since the BBG was created in 1994, its budget has declined by about 12 percent in real dollars, from \$573 million to \$507 million. Part of this deterioration stems from the logical consolidation of duplicate radio and engineering services after the end of the Cold War. Yet the challenges that U.S. international broadcasting faces are greater and more varied today than ever before. The number of languages broadcast today is higher than during the Cold War, even though the use of a number of languages used during the Cold War broadcasts, such as Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Czech, Slovak, and Brazilian Portuguese, have either been reduced or eliminated.

In the twenty-first century, the U.S. president will continue to face many kinds of international problems. If events at the end of the twentieth century are any indicator, ethnic, religious, racial, and regional conflicts will cause them. Hate media sponsored by individuals, groups, or states will escalate many of them. Military, economic, or diplomatic tools will be insufficient to prevent or solve them. Democracy, freedom, and a civil society require constant advocacy. International broadcasting must return to the front page of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Media is a big part of the problem and, therefore, the president must have a strong and prominent media solution.

## Notes

1. Rob de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no.1 (winter 2002): 90.
2. A 1999 survey of Afghan males (the Taliban would not permit interviews with women) by the Afghanistan Media Research Center in Peshawar, Pakistan, found that Voice of America (VOA) and British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) broadcasts each attracted about 80 percent of the male listening audience on a weekly basis. The impact of the war on the listening rate remains to be seen. Another survey of the population will occur in the spring of 2002.
3. Sen. Joseph Biden, interview by author, Wilmington, Del., December 27, 2001.
4. The BBG oversees all U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting, including VOA, which broadcasts in 53 languages around the world; Radio/TV Marti, which broadcasts to Cuba; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which is a private corporation funded by a grant from the BBG and which broadcast in 25 languages now but will soon add Dari and Pashto broadcasts to Afghanistan as "Radio Free Afghanistan"; grantee Radio Free Asia, established by the BBG in 1996, which broadcasts in nine languages to Asia; and Worldnet Television, a global satellite-delivered program soon to be merged with VOA. All entities are entirely U.S. government-funded.
5. VOA's legal requirement under Public Law 94-350 to broadcast "accurate, objec-

- tive, comprehensive” news has on a number of occasions put the organization at odds with policymakers and U.S. ambassadors. The BBG’s “firewall” function isolates VOA and other entities from direct interference.
6. One transmitter broadcasting for one hour produces one transmitter-hour. Typically, international broadcasters use at least three transmitters for each program on shortwave to ensure at least one clear frequency at any given time.
  7. The Institute of Social Sciences, University of Belgrade, conducted a nationwide survey of 1,104 face-to-face interviews for the Intermedia Survey Institute (ISI). ISI used a short questionnaire designed for a crisis situation that would allow quick turnaround and would measure the audience for radio and television. The questionnaire was distributed October 3, 2000, with results presented three days later.
  8. ISI organized a survey of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo at the request of the BBG. BBSS Gallup from Sofia, Bulgaria, and Index Albania from Tirana, Albania, conducted the fieldwork. The survey was conducted with 448 refugees in Kukes, Tirana, Durres, Shkoder, Fier, and Lezhe. In addition, 36 in-depth interviews utilizing detailed, open-ended questions were conducted with refugees who listened to international radio before and after their departure from Kosovo. Dr. Robert Austin of the University of Toronto monitored the fieldwork and provided analysis of the in-depth interviews.
  9. A version of this quote is now the title of a book on the subject. See Bill Berkeley, *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe, and Power in the Heart of Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
  10. Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep Web site, [www.rnw.nl/realradio/dossiers/html/hateradioafricame.html](http://www.rnw.nl/realradio/dossiers/html/hateradioafricame.html).
  11. VOA programs did, however, facilitate reunification of more than 3,000 (mainly Tutsi) families who had been dispersed during the genocides.
  12. “Intifada” literally means “uprising” in Arabic. The earlier Intifada (1987–1993) consisted of stone-throwing Palestinian youths facing Israeli troops who were using tear gas and rubber-covered steel bullets. Thirteen people died. The current uprising is much more violent, with more than a thousand deaths so far and the level of weaponry employed virtually that of wartime.
  13. Translated and reported by Middle East Media Research Institute, which further pointed out, “*Al-Ahram* is not a fringe publication; it is the *New York Times* of Egypt and has the largest circulation of any Egyptian paper. The Egyptian government funds *Al-Ahram* and its editor is appointed by the president of Egypt.”
  14. Per a September 2000 survey ISI conducted in three large Chinese cities. The second-ranked country was Japan, which drew 10 percent.
  15. Internet use in the September 2000 survey of the three Chinese cities ranged from 8.2 percent to 12.3 percent. Of those Internet users, 77.5 percent reported using the medium to read news and 35.7 percent reported using it to listen to news.
  16. Clay Chandler, “China Again Censoring Web,” *Washington Post*, October 23, 2001, p. E1.
  17. BBC 1999–2000 annual report.
  18. The “firewall” function is one of the board’s most important responsibilities. It is based on the statement in the 1998 act (Sec. 305(d)) that “The Secretary of State and the Board, in carrying out their functions, shall respect the professional independence and integrity of the International Broadcasting Bureau, its broadcasting services and the grantees of the Board.” On March 10, 1998, in the conference report on the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, Congress specified that

the bill did not alter the consolidation of U.S. international broadcasting achieved in 1994, but did prevent the board and the broadcasting entities from being merged into the State Department with the rest of what was then USIA. The report gave two reasons for this mandate: to provide “deniability” for the State Department when foreign governments complain about U.S. broadcasting and to provide a firewall between the department and the broadcasters to ensure the integrity of the journalism.