

Task Force Eagle



Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350



FOREWORD

The purpose of this newsletter is to provide follow-on stabilization force (SFOR) rotations with a detailed overview of information operations (IO) plans and operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The newsletter focuses on processes the 25th Infantry Division (Light) as Task Force Eagle (TFE) used to plan and conduct IO in BiH during rotation SFOR 11 (April-September 2002).

IO is considered the main effort in the peacekeeping environment because of its ability to influence targets in a peaceful manner. In BiH, IO shaping elements focused as peacekeeping enablers.

The IO staff continually shaped the Multi-National Division-North (MND(N) AOR by applying the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting process; integrating information operations working group (IOWG) planning into the targeting process; and synchronizing their combined efforts with the division's G3 future operations planning calendar. The 25th ID (Light) conducted concise targeting of every vital element of numerous sensitive and critical operations, resulting in the division's overall success.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS

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The intent of CALL publications is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by soldiers for soldiers. If you have, or your unit has, identified other relevant TTP for the U.S. Army, contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon Seglie, at coml (913) 684-3035 or DSN 552-3035. Email address is segliel@leavenworth.army.mil. Articles must be submitted in Word format. Graphs, slides, and clipart **must be submitted separately from the document** in either ppt, pcx, or wpg format.

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Information Operations (IO)

FM 3-0, *Operations*, defines IO as actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others' decision-making processes, information and information systems, while protecting one's own information and information systems. Conversely, FM 3-13, *Information Operations* (*DRAG*), defines IO as attacking adversary command and control (C2) systems (offensive IO) while protecting friendly C2 systems from adversary disruption (defensive IO). The art of IO combines the effects of offensive and defensive IO to produce information superiority at decisive points.

Offensive IO tasks are to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence adversary decision-makers and others who can affect the success of friendly operations. These tasks are briefly defined as:

• **Destroy:** Damaging a combat system so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.

• **Degrade:** Using lethal or temporary means to reduce (1) the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary command and control systems, (2) the morale of a unit, (3) the target's worth or value, or (4) the quality of adversary decisions and actions.

• **Disrupt:** Breaking or interrupting the flow of information between selected C2 nodes.

• **Deny:** Withholding information about force capabilities and intentions that adversaries need for effective and timely decision-making.

• Deceive: Causing a person to believe what is not true.

• **Exploit:** Covertly gaining access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information.

• **Influence:** Causing adversaries or others to behave in a manner favorable to friendly forces.

Offensive IO also targets the information and information systems (INFOSYS) used in adversary decision-making processes.

Defensive IO protects and defends friendly information and information systems. Effective defensive IO assures friendly commanders accurate situational understanding, not only from a military perspective, but also with a sense of how nonmilitary factors affect the military situation.

The goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority, a condition that allows commanders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. It facilitates more effective decision-making and faster execution. IO involves a constant effort to deny adversaries the ability to detect and respond to friendly operations, while simultaneously retaining and enhancing friendly force freedom of action. IO provides a potent advantage that facilitates rapid military success with minimal casualties when expeditiously exploited.

The synergism concept of IO is new, however the elements that support it and their specialized effort is not new. Synergism is achieved by focusing these elements' efforts towards one goal. The elements consist of operational security, psychological operations, counter-propaganda, military deception, counter-deception, electronic warfare, computer network attack, information assurance, computer network defense, physical security, counter-intelligence, and physical destruction, with civil military operations and public affairs (PA) complementing the effort.

Operational Security (OPSEC). The process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military actions. OPSEC contributes to both offensive and defensive IO.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Planned operations conducted to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objectives, and reasoning, and ultimately to influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, and individuals. PSYOP can also influence foreign populations by expressing information in a fashion that affects attitudes and behavior.

Counter-Propaganda. Programs of products and actions designed to nullify adversary propaganda or mitigate its effects.

Military Deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision-makers on friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Counter-Deception. Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation.

Electronic Warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.

Computer Network Attack (CNA). Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and the networks themselves.

Information Assurance (IA). Contributes to defensive IO by protecting friendly information and INFOSYS against friendly intrusion as well as adversary attacks. IA uses a defense in depth that includes computer network defense to counter adversary computer network attack.

Computer Network Defense (CND). Consists of defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction.

Physical Security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

Counter-Intelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage; other intelligence activities; sabotage; or assassinations conducted by, or on behalf of, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

Physical Destruction. The combat power to destroy or degrade adversary forces, sources of information, C2 systems, and installations.

Civil Military Operations (CMO). Activities that are established to maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and local authorities and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations, consolidate, and achieve operational U.S. objectives.

Public Affairs (PA). Those public information, command information, and community relations' activities directed toward both the external and internal publics.

IO in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

IO is the center of gravity for the peacekeeping process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The IO team uses the key task of influencing its targets for shaping operations to ensure the division's success. The shaping operations set the conditions for successful Multi-National Division North (MND(N)) operations through a detailed targeting process. It is important to ensure that IO is planned for and not an afterthought while supporting G3 Plans. For IO to be effective in shaping the environment, it must focus on accomplishing specific desired effects on its targets. Furthermore, IO tasks must be synchronized through supporting staff elements and subordinate maneuver units to ensure a coordinated and efficient effort is achieved.

The IO group developed nine problem sets for the rotation, which gave IO a framework to work with and provided a focused targeting process for follow-on rotations. These problem sets were categorized as either focus areas or steady state operations. The campaign was built on a multi-year concept to ensure IO continuity across SFOR rotations.

We know that, in general, IO targets the adversary's and others' information systems with offensive IO capabilities and functions, and protects friendly information and information systems with defensive IO capabilities and functions. IO elements in BiH are somewhat different than IO elements in low- to mid-intensity conflicts because of the nature of peacekeeping operations. These elements in BiH include but are not limited to: OPSEC, PSYOP, G5/Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), PAO, Joint Military Affairs (JMA), Provost Marshall's Office (PMO), Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), engineer, and chaplain (as needed). Additionally, five maneuver units, which consist of two U.S. infantry battalions, one Nordic-Polish battle group, one Turkish battalion, and the Russian military contingent, support the effort as well. Their synergism effort is described in Chapter 7 of this publication.

Information operations in BiH was regionally affected by the various peacekeeping forces comprising the MND(N). The relative level of cooperation achieved by different peacekeepers varied by the ethnic background of the local populace and the country of origin of the peacekeepers. Likewise, the level of perceived cooperation varied by the local peacekeepers' bias regarding groups within the local populace. Perception and bias played key roles in the ability to move ahead in the peacekeeping process, and it was important to rule out these variables when managing campaigns to maintain an objective assessment.

All of the multinational units in MND(N) were fully vested in the IO process. On occasion, there were intelligence products that were restricted to certain members of the division, but only rarely. With the exception of this privileged information, all IO campaigns were planned and conducted with the full participation of all units affected, and all members of the division had equal consideration in both the information operations working group (IOWG) and IO targeting meetings.

IO Mission Essential Task List (METL)

The SFOR 11 IO team generated the following nine-point peacekeeping METL prior to deployment to facilitate the targeting process in country:

- Understand the adversary's/obstructionist's perspective and how it can be influenced.
- Synchronize IO independent activities towards a common goal.
- Establish and support IO objectives using IO key tasks.
- Determine the most effective asset for use.

• Identify target sets and then identify targets that achieve IO objectives, and establish a link analysis between them.

- Evaluate the outcome from IO efforts.
- Conduct an IO assessment of the AO.
- Coordinate with HHQ to learn what type of conditions have been set in theater or in e AQ

the AO.

• Seek the commander's focus priority.

Understand the adversary's/obstructionist's perspective and how it can be influenced. The key to understanding the obstructionist's perspective is to conduct research on the individual. The research may center on the obstructionist's background or his current standing within political leadership, local leadership, or military leadership and the weight these relationships carry with other leaders, the populace, or soldiers. The G2 ACE/G2 IO representative generated biographies on these individuals either through databases or personnel folders. The G2 section established a link analysis between the individuals so that the IO team would know who to influence and gain leverage on to achieve its objectives.

It is important to remember when discussing IO targeting that it is possible to target groups. However, within any group are key individuals that may help you in accomplishing your goals. While you may want to target the "populace of Town X," upon further analysis of the larger group (the populace), you will find certain influential persons. In many cases, specifically targeting these people can ultimately accomplish more for your campaign than targeting the entire populace. It is generally understood that the goal is to maximize the impact of IO while minimizing the footprint of IO. Conservation of force applies especially in this arena when dealing with commanders and high-level staff (both military and civilian) as targeting assets. They must be utilized precisely, but sparingly. It becomes quickly apparent that you can have a great effect on the activities of a target group by effective placement of the appropriate target asset against influential group leaders. Consider targeting groups, but first find out how you can affect the individual who will influence the remainder of the group for you. In order to influence these individuals and to achieve IO objectives, one must understand the human dimension and modified behavior. Basically, this is where you get the individual to do what you want him to do regardless of whether he wants to or not. One way of influence is to use the "carrot-and-stick" concept as a leverage tool. This is another form of quid pro quo between both parties, and where division leaders used bargaining chips to achieve SFOR IO objectives. SFOR found that bilateral meetings (bilats) were an effective way of using the carrot-and-stick approach. These meetings were conducted on a regular basis between SFOR leaders (from platoon leaders through the command group) and BiH political, local, and military leaders. Regional governors, town mayors, deputy mayors, local religious leaders, regional law enforcement leaders, local law enforcement leaders, military leaders, and ministers of affairs were some of the individuals included in meetings. During targeting meetings, the IOWG decided which individuals to conduct bilats with (the target) and who would conduct the bilat with them (target asset).

Concurrently, task force leaders met with civilian authorities and the local populace in their AOs on a recurring basis. Additionally, the political advisor (POLAD) was a tremendous asset to IOWG bilat staffing because of his experience and expertise in this arena. Furthermore, the POLAD would hold bilateral meetings with regional political leaders, if needed. The regional leaders imposed their will on local leaders to support SFOR objectives if the objectives were not reached at the lower levels.

Synchronize IO independent activities towards a common goal. SFOR 11 synchronized the IO elements (PSYOP, G5, CIMIC, PAO, JMA, SJA, chaplain, PMO, U.S. maneuver units, multinational units, and POLAD representative) toward a common goal through the IOWG, targeting meetings, and IO huddles. These IO goals (focus areas) were synchronized with the G3 future operations planning (FOP) focus areas for the division calendar that the CG and division staff reviewed weekly. IO shaped the Bosnian environment by setting conditions to favor SFOR, either in daily activities or operational planning. IO considerations began well in advance of operational planning, so IO's focus areas were planned three weeks ahead of G3 synch and FOP's division focus areas.

On another note, "stovepiping" IO information was a real concern because the elements had different methods of disseminating information. These methods included:

- Active patrolling.
- Conducting bilats.
- Generating.
- Disseminating PSYOP products (leaflets, posters, and handbills) to the audience(s).
- Disseminating PAO press releases.
- Conducting maneuver unit radio shows for specific areas of responsibility.

If the IO elements were not synchronized, the information would become "stovepiped," losing the synergism effect and not working towards the same common goal.

Establish and support information operation objectives using IO key tasks. The IO team established target objectives containing key tasks to help accomplish their goals. During an SFOR 11 mission analysis, the IO planner established initial IO objectives and then refined them throughout the MDMP. Historical documents from other SFOR rotations generally assisted the planner. IO objectives were supported by the team elements to inform and modify behaviors and attitudes among target individuals and populations. SFOR 11 used the following IO key tasks to achieve a desired effect within their objectives:

- Inform: Provide information to counter or pre-empt misinformation
- Warn: Provide notice of intent to prevent a specific action.
- Influence: Curtail or cause a specific action.
- **Disorganize:** Reduce effectiveness/ability.
- **Isolate:** Minimize power/influence.
- **Co-opt:** Gain cooperation.
- **Deceive:** Mislead to induce a reaction.
- Promote/encourage: Positively reinforce a desired behavior.

Determine the most effective asset for use. During the targeting process the IO team determined the most effective targeting asset and how to apply it towards the target/objective. The flow of information from the asset may be a coordination measure or a bilat summary between operational and IO elements. The division IO staff categorized its assets into nine separate elements during MDMP. These categories were:

• **Command Group Bilats.** The command group consisted of the Commanding General, POLAD, the Deputy Commanding General (DCG), and the ground forces commander. They are engaged only with their appropriate counterpart or when needed to stress a particular SFOR point.

• **PSYOP.** Their assets are flyers, leaflets, and handbills; tactical PSYOP teams (who distribute messages and conduct assessments); Radio MIR (PSYOP owned and operated radio station that disseminates messages); newspaper, TV, and radio messages; and loudspeaker operations.

• **PAO.** Formerly known as the Coalition Press Information Center. Their contribution is press conferences, press releases, media advisories, local media, and international coordination (to include the media coverage assessment), and producing IO campaign smart cards.

• **G5/CIMIC.** These elements worked together to facilitate the displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees (DPRE) returns process. They accomplished this through CIMIC patrols that distributed IO messages and assessed civilian needs. Both elements coordinated with the international community on a regular basis to ensure that they and SFOR were focused on the same DPRE area. Additionally, they facilitated human rights working groups, local returns and reconstruction task forces, and CIMIC houses.

• Joint Military Affairs (JMA). The JMA chief conducted bilats with Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) military leaders when needed to ensure that they were complying with the Dayton Peace Accords General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).

• **Battalion and Battle Group Operations.** Battalion and battle group operations patrols disseminated messages and talking points to the populace and to key community leaders. Commanders held weekly radio talk shows to reinforce the messages and talking points while

discussing populace issues and concerns. Leaders, from platoons up to the battalion commander, held bilats with local political leaders as needed.

• **Provost Marshall's Office (PMO).** The PMO is a key coordinator with the international police task force, regional chiefs of police, and local police when it comes to law enforcement and security matters.

• **G2.** Tactical human intelligence teams collected assessment information from the field, and open source intelligence conducted media collection and analysis.

• **IO Media.** The IO team contracted a TV producer to highlight and promote "good news" stories between SFOR and the local populace.

Identify target sets and then identify targets that achieve information operation objectives, and establish a link analysis between them. Both the IO G2 and the targeting officer identified target sets for the IO missions. The IO G2, working with the G2 ACE, established an analysis between targets that illustrated how the targets were linked together. By graphically displaying how the targets were linked, the IO team was able to determine where to apply leverage to reinforce its objectives. The graphic display generally consisted of photos of all target individuals arranged much like a task organization chart. The most influential targets were shown at the top of the link analysis chart, with their subordinates and associates listed below. Some target individuals were members of more than one target group. A linkage to all groups with which they were associated was illustrated.

Evaluate the outcome from IO efforts (assessment). The assessment aspect of IO is much more difficult than lethal targeting. In lethal targeting you see "real time" and immediate results of your accomplishments. With IO, the assessment (result) may take one week, one month, or six months to manifest. Additionally, frequently the results are difficult to quantify. The SFOR 11 IO team found that the best way to track the targeting assessment and keep the CG informed was to use the green, amber, red method (see assessment matrix in Chapter 7). This method was used to gauge the objectives and how they applied to the targets; it was also used as a re-targeting measuring device. (See the targeting section and the battle update brief [BUB] slides in Chapter 7 for more details.)

Conduct an IO assessment of the AO. Upon deployment a unit must conduct a current IO assessment of the AOR and adjust their efforts accordingly. The transfer of authority between units can facilitate this. A few problems recur annually, and some are long-term efforts. Each rotation shapes the environment for the follow-on unit. The right-seat (RS)/left-seat (LS) ride program was developed to minimize turbulence between SFOR rotations. During the IO RS/LS, SFOR 12 was given extensive background briefs and also included on three weeks of the IO battle rhythm. The RS/LS calls for a two-week transfer of duties, but the SFOR 11 IO team had extra time available and took advantage of it. During the right-seat phase (week one), the SFOR 11 IO team executed the standard weekly battle rhythm, with SFOR 12 observing. During the left-seat phase (week two), the SFOR 12 team executed the standard weekly battle rhythm, with SFOR 11 observing and contributing as necessary. During the third week of overlap, SFOR 12 executed everything without interference; SFOR 11 was available at that time for assistance if needed. During the entire period of training and transfer of authority, SFOR 11 educated the new team on the area of operations, SOPs, operations (historic, current, and future), contacts (military and civilian), and a host of other issues regarding day-to-day operations.

As it stands, there is little turbulence between SFOR rotations regarding IO. Much of IO is planned and executed over the long term, which makes it relatively simple for the follow-on rotation to assume the duties and maintain the momentum of ongoing operations. As the economic and political situation within Bosnia changes, IO must be adjusted, but this is a function of the weekly targeting process that is fluid and adaptive anyway. As long as there is a competent IO team on the ground and continuity from one team to the next, there should be no concern about cross-SFOR turbulence. When the new IO team takes over, they are thoroughly indoctrinated on the AO and are capable of acting in support of and assessing the validity of ongoing operations and assessing the need for and developing new campaigns.

Coordinate with HHQ to learn what type of conditions have been set in theater or in the AO. Upon arrival in country, the SFOR 11 IO team established a relationship with the SFOR HHQ IO and obtained their current targeting plans for MND(N). Subsequently, the IO staff coordinated with SFOR HQ every other week via VTC, and once a month the HQ held a conference with the MND units to discuss issues and concerns.

Seek the commander's focus priority and receive approval for IO problem set planning. The DCG chaired both the IOWG and the targeting meeting. He provided command group guidance for IO campaign planning and made targeting decisions as needed. His participation ensured that the IO team maintained the division's focus, even considering that IO planning was shaping the AOR ahead of operations.

IO Team

IO Section Duties and Responsibilities

The SFOR 11 IO team consisted of one lieutenant colonel (IO Chief), two majors (one Deputy IO Chief and one IO special projects/media relations officer), two captains (one IO plans officer and one IO intelligence officer), and one CW3 targeting officer. The duties and responsibilities for the team members follow.

Information Operations Chief

• Serves as the division's primary IO staff coordinator with the command group and other primary staff (G2, G3, PSYOP, G5/CIMIC, PAO, POLAD, MND(N) primary staff, Land Information Warfare Activity [LIWA], and the international community, as needed).

• Envisions where to take the MND(N) IO effort within the CG's intent and provides guidance to the IO team on how to get there.

• Provides weekly IO direction for the team and enforces it through the deputy.

- Monitors the IO team's planning and execution on a daily basis.
- Supervises IO day-to-day operations through the deputy.
- Directs the IO intelligence officer's priorities daily.
- Attends the IOWG huddles.

• Attends the IO internal huddles and provides additional guidance to the deputy for the team.

• Reviews/approves current IO plans/activities daily (IOWG, targeting meetings, and focus areas).

- Reviews/approves PAO campaign area talking points that are updated bi-weekly.
- Chairs the SFOR HQ IO VTC on behalf of MND(N) every other Thursday.
- Supervises the MND(N)-contracted television program.
- Validates the CG's BUB slides that the deputy produces.

Information Operations Deputy Chief (Current Ops)

- Serves as the deputy/XO (2IC) for the section and as IO Chief in his absence.
- Facilitates/supervises IO day-to-day operations within the team.

• Chairs the IOWG huddle on Monday mornings to synchronize the effort. Chairs the IO internal huddle on Wednesday and Friday.

• Maintains/updates the IO synchronization matrix that synchronizes IOWG, targeting, and element efforts two times a week.

• Builds the weekly IOWG meeting and facilitates discussion between the other members while briefing the Deputy Commanding General.

- Supervises targeting meetings/rehearsals.
- Posts BUB slides and briefs them to the CG on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

• Attends the SFOR ICB VTC with the IO Chief every other Thursday and chairs it in his absence.

• Cross-walks IO operations with IO plans daily.

• Reviews PAO talking points bi-weekly, staffing with the IO planner and media relations personnel prior to sending to the IO Chief for approval.

• Reviews problem set mission analysis, target synchronization briefs, and implementing instructions (IMPINs) before they are submitted to the IO Chief and executed.

• Provides IO weekly input to G3 synch and training from IO problem set planning and the IO synchronization matrix.

• Backfills other team members, as needed.

IO Plans Officer

• Responsible for IO plans, integrating IO with G3 plans, revising IO, and incorporating IO into CONPLANs.

• Develops IMPINs resulting from targeting meetings and integrates IO into G3 IMPINs.

• Coordinates with SFOR ICB on a regular basis through TACWEB.

• Staffs PAO talking points bi-weekly with other IOWG members and media relations personnel.

• Revises and updates IO SOP, as needed.

IO Special Projects/Media Officer

• Responsible for planning monthly division television show topics through coordination with CIMIC and other IO elements and with the IO interpreter to facilitate coverage.

- Serves as the IO anti-terrorism representative.
- Handles mail call for the IO section.
- Serves as the IO representative for all company training meetings.
- Responsible for all IO admin (hand receipt holder for IO equipment).
- Keeps IO TACWEB revised/updated (IOWG, targeting meeting results, products).
- Maintains the IO battle rhythm.

IO Targeting Officer

- Targeting officer for all IO annexes/IMPINs.
- Facilitates targeting meetings and rehearsals.
- Develops all TSMs for IMPINs from targeting meetings, if needed.
- Manages/updates the bilat calendar with the POLAD and command group.
- Sends the bilat calendar to G3 synch and training.
- Assists the IO G2 with bilat packets.
- Backfills special projects, as needed.
- Maintains the IO nontactical vehicle for the section.

• Coordinates for/ensures that briefing rooms (DCR/plans briefing room) are set up prior to execution.

IO Intel Officer

- Provides the bilat schedule to SFOR after updating.
- Provides intelligence assessments on key individuals who attend the G2 huddle.
- Interfaces with the G2 ACE and G2 operations on a daily basis for IO integration.
- Conducts targeting meeting rehearsals with the targeting officer.
- Provides daily IO intelligence updates to the IO Chief.
- Maintains biographies on all MND(N) political leaders.

• Generates bilat packets on MND(N) political leaders and submits them to the POLAD, as needed.

IO BiH Additional Assets

PSYOP

Radio Mir. A military-owned and PSYOP-run FM radio station, immediately responsive to the MND(N) commander, that broadcasts music and information 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Radio Mir covers approximately 65 percent of the MND(N) AOR and has an estimated 118,000 listeners each day out of a population of about 1.1 million. Staffed by five local civilian DJs and a PSYOP specialist.

Radio Mir functions much like a commercial radio station, but instead of paid commercial advertising, PSYOP and IO themes and messages are broadcast. Radio Mir conducts remote broadcasts throughout the AOR to build the listening audience as well as to support maneuver operations. For example, while conducting a remote broadcast at a local nightclub, the local maneuver commander might make an appearance and talk on the air about IO themes and messages regarding an upcoming operation in that area. Radio Mir is also often made available to members of the international community, IGOs, and NGOs to broadcast information that supports the SFOR mission.

Product Development Detachment (PDD). Produces print, audio, and audiovisual products including posters, handbills, radio ads, and television ads. Print products are designed by the PDD and generally printed by commercial vendors, though a lower volume and lesser quality internal production capability exists. Audio scripts and concepts are developed by the PDD but are recorded by Radio Mir, complete with sound effects. Audiovisual products can be completely produced by the PDD, but generally a script and concept are given to a commercial vendor who actually produces the product along with consultation with the PDD. Some products are obtained from HQ SFOR PSYOP as well.

Requests for products come from the tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) based on their knowledge of the AOR, from task forces/battle groups based on their mission requirements, or most frequently from the IOWG. Product requests from IO are made to the PSYOP IOWG representative and are usually formalized in a division IMPIN.

Product concepts are discussed between the PSYOP commander, PSYOP operations and plans officers, and the PDD NCOIC. A draft product is developed, and once approved by the PSYOP commander, is translated and pre-tested with local civilians. Time allowing, products are pre-tested with a cross section of at least 100 local civilians from a variety of ethnicities and locations in the AOR. At a minimum, products are pre-tested with several interpreters and locally employed civilians on Eagle Base. Less pre-testing increases the risk of issuing ineffective or flawed products.

Products are submitted for approval to the following, in sequence: JAG, IO Chief, G3, POLAD, Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander, and Commanding General. Products are walked through the POLAD in less than 24 hours, and are left with the SGS for the command group. Products are submitted to the command group using the division's staff action packet, but PSYOP also uses bright orange covers to set its actions apart from others and to obtain expedited processing (usually 48-72 hours). A one-page summary sheet is submitted with each product briefly explaining the purpose of the product, the reasoning behind the product design, results expected from the pre-testing, and any other pertinent information necessary to explain and "sell" the product. A prototype of the product is included in English and the translated languages as well.

(Note: Local civilians speak the same language, called Bosnian, Serbian, and/or Croatian depending on their ethnicity. However, two different typescripts are used — Latinic and Cyrillic. All ethnicities can read both scripts, but they tend to ignore or discredit information portrayed in other than their preferred script. Latinic type is used for products intended for Bosniac and Bosnian-Croat media and areas, and Cyrillic is used for Bosnian-Serb media and areas. It should be noted that there are some differences in the spelling and choice of words between Bosniac and Bosnian-Croat language "preferences." However, it is generally assumed that the differences are not substantial enough to warrant publication of a third type of product, especially given the relatively low density of Bosnian-Croats in MND(N).)

Print and audio products can generally go from concept to dissemination in 14 days or less, depending on their complexity, political sensitivity, and the number required. Audiovisual products require 4-6 weeks. Products can be expedited if risk is accepted in the product's development, especially in the time-consuming process of pre-testing. Pre-testing, however, is not recommended, especially for products disseminated in large numbers.

Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPTs). Composed of two teams consisting of three personnel each, the teams conduct dissemination of print products, engage in face-to-face interaction with the local populace, and conduct pre- and post-assessments of the populace's knowledge, attitude, and disposition regarding specific events or situations in general. They also conduct loudspeaker operations for crowd control or when otherwise deemed necessary and appropriate to provide information to the local populace.

The teams are retained under division control, with their activities synchronized through the IOWG process. One of the following methods is used to task the TPTs:

- TPTs submit their recommended locations, tasks, and purposes.
- The task forces/battle groups request TPT support based on their mission requirements.

• TPT support is assigned by division in an IMPIN developed through the IOWG and division plans process.

TPTs are a limited asset, and it is critical that their capabilities and limitations be understood to ensure proper utilization. It requires constant effort to continually assess the best use of the teams' time. There are times when there is simply too much to do, and times when there is no specific mission to support. In this case, the TPTs can generally be best utilized by conducting general assessments of the AOR and disseminating general products (e.g., the HQSFOR PSYOP-produced MIRKO magazine for teenagers). The importance of allowing the TPTs to build personal relationships with local nationals cannot be underestimated. They must be allowed to spend time talking in local cafes, at newsstands, at bus stops, and so on.

Making the best use of the TPT asset requires a two-pronged approach. First, the TPTs' schedules are presented at the weekly IOWG. If there are conflicting demands or periods of time that are not committed, these conflicts are highlighted at the IOWG and worked out either on the spot or following the meeting with TF/BG representatives. Next, the TPT sergeants and members of the PSYOP command group must constantly work directly with the task forces and battle groups to identify and coordinate for proper employment of the TPTs. These one-on-one relationships are critical and require substantial time and effort, especially with the multinational units, but also with the U.S. task forces as well.

TPTs coordinate to be in a task force's or battle group's AOR directly with the unit and follow the unit's patrol pass and reporting procedures. The TPTs complete a weekly report for the PSYOP commander. This information is used for the IOWG and briefed once a week to the CG when PSYOP briefs directly at the BUB. The commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are, of course, reported and briefed as required – immediately if necessary.

Civil Affairs (CA) and Battalion S5. Much has changed over the past few years in the Army CA arena in the concept and practice of IO. Prior to the release of **FM 41-10**, *Civil Affairs Operations* (February 2000), there was hardly a word that addressed IO. With the new release, there is an entire section devoted to IO. Prior to the release of FM 41-10, the best place to find doctrine was **FM 100-6**, *Information Operations*. Now **FM 3-13**, *Information Operations (DRAG)*, is the reference in use.

In the past, IO has always been part of CA's way of doing business. To gain the cooperation of the populace, CA forces integrate PSYOP resources in civil information operations. The problem that CA personnel had was that IO was not always a focused effort between CA, PA, and PSYOP. Now through a combined effort, information disseminated will be focused, be one voice, and will influence the targeted group.

During SFOR 11, the battalion S5 (civil affairs) slice played a critical role in developing the IO targeting matrix and executing the missions to achieve "the desired end state." Fortunately, the task force was deployed during the summer months, which encompassed two potential ethnic-clashing real-world missions in Bosnia. Additionally, the CA team conducted several large-scale humanitarian assistance missions with NGOs and helped to orchestrate four enhanced medical civil action programs (MEDCAPs) during the rotation. The IO targeting section and their ability to precisely track and organize the myriad bilats and associated tasks was instrumental in the task force's success.

CIMIC House: CIMIC houses are used to assist the populace with questions such as legal advice, the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP), returns registration process, and other returns issues. They help facilitate the passing of information through the use of flyers and pamphlets or by verbal means. At the same time, CIMIC personnel collect information on the current security situation, locations from where visitors to the houses are coming, and any other demographics. CIMIC houses also represent a sustained presence of SFOR and the IC to the local populace.

The CIMIC house idea is not new. It started with initial SFOR rotations; some of them were real homes where the soldiers lived. With a reduction in available resources, soldiers no longer live in the houses but commute on specific days. Special connex containers are also used as CIMIC houses. This makes it easy to move a CIMIC house to a place where more are needed.

PAO

For SFOR 11, all PA assets at Eagle Base were consolidated, and a robust "stringer" program was used to gain coverage of unit activities at the outlying base camps. A training workshop and comprehensive reference materials for unit S1s and other public affairs representatives were provided to ensure everyone understood their responsibilities under the reduced PA force structure. The PAO was an active-duty 46A major, responsible for all aspects of public affairs throughout the command.

Talon. The *Talon* is the Task Force Eagle command information product. The staff consisted of two 46Q specialists (one designated as editor) who were tasked to acquire, write, edit, and publish the 12-page weekly command information newsmagazine on the rotation's "good news" stories for SFOR personnel. About a month before the end of the rotation, the size of the weekly *Talon* was reduced to a more manageable 8-page size.

Video Acquisition. This section, in coordination with the *Talon* staff, acquired, wrote, and produced video news stories for the internal command information cable access channel, as well as marketing video products to external news channels and the Armed Forces Network to promote the SFOR cause in BiH. A command information chief (46R staff sergeant) supervised both the editorial staff and the video production.

Command Information. The role of Command Information Chief was filled by a 46R sergeant first class, whose job was to coordinate and oversee both the *Talon* staff and video acquisition. As senior NCO, this individual also took on the roles of information assurance officer, supply and property book NCO, key control, and numerous other mission-essential NCO roles.

Media Operations Cell. This section responded to media queries and requests for interviews, facilitated media coverage, coordinated press conferences as required, and conducted media analysis for the IO section.

Crisis Communications. In the reduced structure, the media operations section consisted of an NCO with two 46Q specialists; the PAO was the command spokesman for on-camera interviews, press conferences, and any other required media appearances.

PAO Planner. This role was filled by a captain who participated in the IOWG and G3 plans group to provide staff guidance on employing public affairs assets to most effectively support operations. The SFOR 11 battle rhythm began with 12 meetings per week among members of the IOWG, but over time the meeting schedule was streamlined and became more efficient. The PAO planner was capable of providing talking points, staff advice during the development of plans and orders, IO objectives to the media operations section, and information on media operations to coordinate the IO effort.

Provost Marshal's Office (PMO)

The PMO is the link between the task forces and the local police (LP). The PMO provides the commander information about current and future LP involvement, which allows synchronization between the LP and military forces. As civil governance continues to develop in BiH, the goal to hold local authorities responsible for providing a safe and secure environment has intensified.

Missions for the PMO in peacekeeping operations include:

- Advising the commander and staff about MP capabilities.
- Preparing plans and policies.
- Directing and reviewing MP operations.

• Maintaining liaison with United States Army Criminal Command (USACIDC) support elements.

• Assisting and supervising interaction of supporting and supported units.

• Coordinating with civilian law enforcement agencies, allied forces, and host nation (HN) military and civilian police.

The PMO supports IO by conducting bilats with LP and International Police Task Force (IPTF) officials; conducting IPTF conferences; and providing accurate, updated information on events occurring within MND(N). The PMO provides links to CA, PA, CIMIC, and PSYOP to assist in delivering task force messages to positively influence domestic, international, and local opinion.

Engineers

Engineers enhance IO campaigns through activities and projects. Currently, the engineers in MND(N) have four primary areas of focus/responsibility:

• Monitor demining.

• Emergency extraction of SFOR personnel and Persons Designated Special Status

(PDSS) in mined areas (or suspected mined areas).

- Clearance of mined areas prior to construction (mostly on SFOR-controlled facilities).
- Plan/coordinate freedom of movement (FOM) within the division sector.

An assistant division engineer (ADE) representative serves on the IOWG.

In addition to engineer projects and activities supporting MND(N) IO campaigns, engineers serve as passive information collectors on the populace (e.g., attitudes, needs, reactions) and on the status of IO campaigns in sector. Engineers assist in the development of situational awareness for the commander and provide input on the effects of IO, using the following engineer IO collectors:

• ADE section members conducting reconnaissance and freedom of movement quality control checks.

• Brown and Root observations (culled by the ADE from the weekly freedom of movement coordination meetings and passed to IO).

• Joint Military Affairs

Demining monitor teams, constantly traveling through sector.

Engineer platoon, during missions.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), during missions.

Synchronizing IO Plans and Operations With Division Plans and Operations

Figure 1 below is a graphic illustration of the SFOR 11 IO problem set operational rhythm process. The process is based on a complete circle concept and is composed of the following steps:

- Identify a problem set.
- Develop the problem set in IO plans.
- Generate a target synchronization matrix (TSM).
- Conduct a targeting meeting (develop an IMPIN or update a TSM).
- Review current TSMs.
- Review the IO synchronization matrix (key to IOWG).
- Develop IO tasks for the week.
- Conduct an IO huddle at the beginning of the week to disseminate the tasks.
- Conduct an IOWG to deconflict targeting issues, review the IO assessments, and update the problem set TSMs.

• Update both the IO synchronization matrix and the G3 future operations planning synchronization matrix (CG's brief).

• Brief the CG daily in the division BUB and provide him with targeting assessments.




Figure 1. Operational Rhythm

IO Plans and Target Synchronization Matrix Development

The groundwork for all IO campaigns started with problem set identification. Problem sets were either identified in the IOWG as part of an upcoming operational mission or as a stand-alone IO mission. After problem sets were identified, the IO Chief took them, as concepts, to the DCG for approval to include them in the planning timeline. The problem sets that were deemed appropriate for MND(N) IO to handle were then resourced and staffed through a modified MDMP.

Problem set MDMP began with an intensive mission analysis by the IO planner and the IO G2. The IO G2 provided an extremely detailed overview (IPB) of the information environment, to include key players (both problem-makers and problem-solvers), key dates and events, background of the problem set (if any), effects of current political climate, and so on — all based on the IO planner's preliminary assessment of MND(N) involvement in the problem set.

All the members of the IOWG attended the problem set mission analysis meeting. (The staff consisted of the same individuals who attended the G3 Plans MDMP. This guaranteed unity of effort between IO Plans and G3 Plans.) The IO planner presented the problem set to the group; the IO G2 followed with the IPB. After everyone was briefed on the problem set, the group focused on the core areas of the mission analysis: facts, assumptions, and constraints; specified, implied, and essential tasks; and RFIs. Because IO in BiH is objective-oriented, the goal at the culmination of mission analysis was threefold: initial objectives, initial target sets, and proposed concept. The tasks became the objectives as they were applied to target sets, and these objectives in turn became the basis for the concept (see Figure 2).

Problem Set Mission Analysis Agenda						
IO IPB Update	IO Objectives					
IO Facts	IO Target Sets					
IO Assumptions	IO RFIs					
IO Constraints	IO Concept					
IO Tasks	DCG Guidance					

Figure 2. IO Problem Set Mission Analysis

The mission analysis was briefed directly to the DCG in the presence of the entire IOWG. This enabled the DCG to immediately clarify any points which might have been overlooked, and assure him that he was getting a product approved by the entire IO planning staff. Briefing the DCG also accomplished another goal, which was to keep IO synchronized with G3 Plans through command awareness and approval. If the DCG had any changes to the mission objectives, target sets, or concept, they were noted and acted on during subsequent mission development meetings.

If the DCG accepted the mission analysis, the IO staff then moved on to target development. This was another meeting attended by the entire IOWG. It was extremely important to get maximum participation to achieve the detailed targeting required for mission accomplishment. Each staff agency had assets available and would know how best to incorporate them into the specific targeting. Once all specific targets were addressed, the staff had accomplished two additional goals: production of the IMPIN brief and building the initial target synchronization matrix (TSM) for the problem set. The IMPIN brief included most of the information on the TSM (see Figure 3), with the exception of the assessment portion (who assesses and when, MOE). This was the next product briefed to the DCG as part of the problem set MDMP.

	Commander's Intent									
	(Objectives					IO Co	oncept		
					Messages					
Definition of Effects										
INFORM: Provide information to counter or preempt misinformation WARN: Provide notice of intent to prevent a specific action INFLUENCE: Curtail or cause a specific action DISORGANIZE: Reduce effectiveness/ability					ISOLATE: Minimize power/influence CO-OPT: Gain cooperation DECEIVE: Mislead to induce a reaction PROMOTE/ENCOURAGE: Positively reinforce desired behavior					
			Ν	leasures of	f Effectiven	ess (MOEs)			
					Targets					
Decide Detect a					nd Deliver			As	sess	
Target Set	Target	Obj Msg	Effects	Assets	How	When	Assets	How	MOEs	When

Figure 3. TSM Example

Instructions for completing the target synchronization matrix (Figure 3) on page 24:

- 1. Fill in the IO problem set mission statement approved by the DCG.
- 2. Fill in the IO problem set commander's intent approved by the DCG.
- 3. Fill in the IO problem set objectives approved by the DCG.
- 4. Fill in the IO problem set concept of operation approved by the DCG.

5. Develop talking points and messages for objectives to achieve the objective effect and produce smart cards, if needed.

6. Develop quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that will be used to achieve the objectives.

7. Walk the TSM from left to right.

8. In the *Decide* column:

• Define which targets you want to engage in each problem set.

• Decide on what objectives you want to achieve with each target and what effect you want on the objective.

• Decide on the talking points you want used to achieve the desired effect.

9. In the *Detect and Deliver* column:

• Define the effect on the target you want to have (use one of the eight doctrinally approved).

• Decide on which asset (IO element) that would be most effective to use to achieve the desired effect.

- Decide on how to employ that asset to achieve your target objective.
- Decide on the timeframe to engage the target.

10. In the Assess column-

- Decide on the most effective asset to conduct an assessment for the objective.
- Decide on how to do the most effective means to assess the objective.

• The MOEs are quantifiable ways to reach the objective. They will be defined by the IOWG.

• Decide when to establish the assessment.

The DCG was briefed on the IMPIN in the presence of the entire IOWG. This again gave legitimacy to the material being briefed as well as allowed the DCG to clarify particular points on which he was unclear with the staff planner who was responsible for that portion of the brief. An IO-oriented IPB update from the IO G2 was included as the lead-in to the IMPIN brief. The political situation in BiH fluctuated noticeably at times, and the DCG needed to understand from the IO point of view how changes in the socio-political situation could affect the operation the staff was proposing. After the DCG was briefed on the IPB, he was given the detailed initial targeting that was developed in the targeting development meeting.

If it seems premature that the IMPIN was briefed after developing only targeting, consider that for IO, targeting was the mission. IO planners were concerned with shaping the environment to accomplish the ends specified in the multi-year road map. IO could not accomplish any of that by moving troops around, but IO could affect the thinking and actions of certain people or even groups of people. IO could not have an immediate effect on peoples' actions at the time of execution of an operational mission, but IO could shape the environment to set the most favorable conditions for the execution of that mission. Just as a commander uses physical assets such as night-vision goggles to set favorable conditions (ability to attack at night) and maximize enemy weakness (inability to see at night), he also uses IO to set favorable conditions.

If the DCG approved the IMPIN brief (see Figure 4), the IO planners then used the TSM and the DCG's guidance to produce the actual IMPIN. The IO IMPIN was written in the standard five-paragraph format, but was always issued as Annex P to the maneuver IMPIN to follow (if any), even in the case of stand-alone IO campaigns. The IMPIN included the TSM as Appendix 1, and the language in the base document of Annex P was a direct reflection of the contents of the TSM. (See Chapter 7 for IMPIN development details and the problem set timeline.)

Issuing the IMPIN took the new campaign from the realm of plans into that of IO current operations, where it would next be discussed at the IO targeting meeting.

Problem Set IMPIN Brief Agenda1. IO Assets5. Target SetsConcept of the Operation6. Targeting3. IPB7. DCG's Guidance4. IO Objectives

Figure 4. IO Problem Set IMPIN Agenda

- 1. Develop IO assets for the problem set (see Figure 5).
- 2. Refine the IO concept of the operation.
- 3. Refine the IO situation from the mission analysis.

4. Refine the IO objectives based on DCG's guidance and enhanced intelligence from mission analysis.

- 5. Develop target objectives for the problem set.
- 6. Define what asset you intend to use to achieve the objective on the target and what assessment you are looking for.
- 7. Seek DCG's guidance.

IO Problem Set Assets

Cmd Group Bilats

CG POLAD DCG GFC

PSYOP

TPTs (distro msgs and conduct assessment) Radio MIR Newspaper/TV/radio messages Loud speaker operations

<u>PAO</u>

Press conferences Press releases Media advisories/coord coverage Assessment of media coverage Smart cards

G5/CIMIC

CIMIC patrols (distro msgs and conduct assessment) IC coordination

<u>JMA</u> Bilats

BN/BG Operations

Patrols (distro msgs and conduct assessment) Radio talk shows Bilats

<u>PMO</u>

Bilats IPTF coordination

<u>G</u>2

THT (collect assessment information) Media collection and analysis

<u>IO</u> Division TV show

Figure 5. IO Problem Set Assets

IO Operational Rhythm (Overview)

IO Battle Rhythm. The IO section developed an internal battle rhythm that tied into the MND(N)'s battle rhythm. The battle rhythm was used in place of a calendar to orchestrate the members' weekly meetings and activities (see Figure 6).

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
0800 ACE Update (Chief)	0800 ACE Update (Chief)	0800 ACE Update (Chief)	0800 ACE Update (Chief)	0800 ACE Update (Chief)	0745 ACE Update (Chief)
0830 IO Huddle (Deputy & Chief)		0830 IO Int Huddle (Deputy & Chief)		0830 IO Int Huddle (Deputy & Chief)	
	Verify VTC & BUB for SFOR VTC (TGT officer)			1000 ATWG (Special Projects)	
		1000 Update to CofS on IOWG (Chief)			1000 Talking Points Review Board (Planner)
			1100 SFOR VTC (TGT officer)		
1100-1200 G3 planners update (Planner)			Update IO synch matrix (Deputy)		
1300 SFOR Bilat Schedule (Planner)	1330 IOWG (Deputy)			Update TSMs and Assess Matrix (TGT Officer)	1300 Review IO Synch Matrix (Deputy)
1300 Update MND(N) Bilat Schedule (TGT Officer)					
1300 CofS Update (Chief)	Update IO Synch Matrix (Deputy)				
1400 Bilat Schedules to CofS (Chief)	Update Div Synch Matrix (Deputy)		1500 Tgt Mtg Reheaersal (TGT Officer & IO Intel)		
1500 Synch Brief Review Mtg (Deputy)		1500 CofS Synch Brief (Chief)	1630 Tgt Mtg (TGT Officer)	1500 CG Synch Brief (Chief)	1630 IMPIN on Tgt Changes (Planner)
1745 BUB (Chief & Deputy)		1745 BUB (Chief & Deputy)		1745 BUB (Chief & Deputy)	1700 BUB (Chief)
			1900 BUB Slide Review (Chief & Deputy)		1800 CofS Update Slide to SGS (Chief)
1900 IOWG Brief Review (Deputy & Chief)	1900 Review Input for CofS Synch Brief (Deputy)	1900 Tgt Mtg Review (TGT Officer)	1900 Review Input for CG Synch Brief (Deputy)		1900 Post New TSM on Web (TGT Officer)
Additional					
Check Mail (Special Projects)	Dispatch Vehicle (TGT Officer)	Coord Activities for Div TV Show (Special Projects)			

Figure 6. SFOR 11 IO Battle Rhythm

Targeting Meeting. The targeting meeting was held once a week. It was facilitated by the targeting officer and chaired by the DCG (see Figure 7 for agenda). The purpose of the targeting meeting was to review and assess IO effectiveness within campaigns, adjust IO campaigns based on assessments, ensure efforts were synchronized within IO campaigns, and ensure the targeting objectives and assessment criteria met the DCG's intent. This was accomplished by discussing the campaigns in-depth. Topics discussed included targeting objectives (one target at a time), determining which objectives were met and which were not, and whether further effort was required against that target. All IO staff and maneuver agents provided input, as the delivery and assessment requirements were spread broadly among the available IO assets.




Figure 7. IO Targeting Meeting Agenda

Once all specified targets were thoroughly assessed, the IO staff decided if any new targets were necessary in the campaign. If so, it was determined at that time what objectives to achieve, targeting assets, MOEs, and so on. Again, the staff conducted the same detailed analysis for each campaign, ensuring all aspects were covered. The DCG frequently interjected his guidance for fine-tuning ongoing campaigns. This guidance helped to ensure IO shaping operations integrated seamlessly with upcoming maneuver operations.

Results of Targeting. The targeting meeting often resulted in the identification of new targets or the deletion of targets, an updated assessment matrix (Figure 8), and guidance from the DCG on current and future operations. Any changes to IO campaigns in the form of targeting guidance, changes, additions, or assessment criteria resulted in the production of a revised target IMPIN for the affected IO campaign(s). The IO planner was responsible for incorporating any changes or additions into an updated problem set IMPIN and submitting that IMPIN to G3 FOP for release.

Targeting Assessment Process. The targeting assessment process occurs immediately after a target is engaged. The following procedures are performed using the target assessment matrix (Figure 8).

1. First column - Identify and label the target.

2. Second column - Designate the legend objective assessment metric color that applies to the target.

3. Third column - Depict which asset to use towards the target to achieve the desired objective.

4. Fourth column - Decide when the target should be engaged. This will come from the initial TSM and may be adjusted as necessary.

5. Fifth column - Explain in detail (bilats and meeting results) the current assessment of how the target relates to the desired objective. Put the objective, its sub-objectives, and the assessment in this column.

6. Sixth column - Adjust the targeting recommendation required to achieve the objective (i.e., reschedule bilat, target a different individual).

Target	Stat	tus	Asset Employed	Date Last Targeted	Assessment	Targeting Recommendation

Figure 8. IO Target Assessment Matrix

IMPIN Development. The IO planner began developing the problem set IMPIN during the mission analysis and continued to refine it after the TSM brief to the DCG. After getting approval from the IO Chief/IO Deputy, it was forwarded to G3 FOP for publishing. The IMPIN was published as an enclosure with the initial TSM that the targeting officer developed. When the IO planner supported a G3 Plans operation, the same targeting process was used to support the division's plan.

IMPIN Production. IO IMPINs were developed and published once the problem set MDMP was completed by IO plans. IMPIN development began with the problem set mission analysis and was refined as the targeting meeting preparation was conducted (see Figure 9).

October 2002										
Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday				
WK 40	1	2	3	4	5	6				
		PROBLEM SE	ET MA prep							
WK 41 7	8	9	10	11	12	13				
		PROBLEM SE	ET MA prep							
WK 42 14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
PRC	DBLEM SET MA	prep	P/S MA		P/S Tgt Mgt					
WK 43 21	22	23	24	25	26	27				
PROBLE	M SET TSM Dev	elopment	P/S Tgt Brief	P/S IMPIN D	Development					
WK 44 28	29	30	31							
P/S IMPIN D)evelopment	P/S IO IMPIN								

Figure 9. Problem Set Planning Timeline

Review IO Synchronization Matrix. The IO synchronization matrix was the key to the IO synergism effort (see Figure 10). The MND(N) IO elements and the maneuver units provided their daily activities for the synchronization effort matrix. This matrix was updated twice weekly — once after the IOWG, then again after the CG's synchronization meeting on Friday — to ensure continuity between G3 FOP and IO. Furthermore, this matrix was key in maintaining IO campaign synergism between the staff and maneuver units. The matrix had a color-coded legend at the bottom that matched the IO problem set calendar.

	1-Apr-02	2-Apr-02	3-Apr-02	4-Apr-02	5-Apr-02	6-Apr-02	7-Apr-02
Entity Actions							
Cmd Grp/ POLAD Bilats							
IO/Division TV Show							
TF 1-151 WarHawk							
TF 1-14 Golden Dragons							
1st PRSAB							
NPBG							
Turkish Bn							
Public Affairs							
PSYOP							
JMA							
CIMIC/G5							
JAG, PMO, Div Engineer, Surgeon, Chaplain							
LEGEND							

Figure 10. IO Synchronization Matrix

Develop IO Tasks for the Week. Both the chief and the deputy developed the following week's IO tasks for the supporting staff on Saturday after reviewing the current TSMs and the synchronization matrix. Staff elements supported the tasks according to their subject areas; i.e., PSYOP began producing products to support a problem set, G5 coordinated with UNHCR for a problem set concern, and PAO prepared problem set smart cards with specific messages. These tasks were issued and coordinated at the IO staff huddle.


IO Staff Huddle. The IO team developed its synergy through three different types of meetings each week. These meetings consisted of a weekly huddle on Monday morning that only the IO staff attended. The IO Deputy facilitated the meeting and the IO Chief chaired it (see Figure 11 for agenda). The deputy conducted roll call, discussed any current intelligence concerns between the IO G2 representative and the group, and explained the week's IO focus. He then had staff members brief what they were doing for the week. The deputy cross-walked coordination measures with the appropriate staff section and provided the current turn-in IOWG slide status, which is the next meeting between all IO members on Tuesday (staff and maneuver units). After the IO staff huddle, the IO internal staff (IO Chief, IO Deputy, IO targeting officer, IO plans, IO intel, and IO special projects officer) held a separate meeting.

IO Huddle Agenda


Roll call
Intel concerns
Week's focus areas
Elements' day's events
Coordination measures
IOWG slide status
Alibis
Internal IO team huddle

Figure 11. IO Staff Huddle Agenda


Information Operations Working Group (IOWG). The IO Deputy facilitated the IOWG meeting, which met on Tuesdays, and the DCG chaired it. Attendees were: PSYOP, G5, CIMIC, PAO, PMO, JMA, ENG, SJA, primary IO representatives from each U.S. infantry battalion, S5 from the aviation battalion, and primary IO representatives from each multinational battalion/battle group. The IO Chief, IO targeting officer, IO G2, IO planner, and special projects representative attended as well. This Week -5 meeting was conducted using the same principles as the battalion six-week training meeting process. The intent of this meeting was to cross-walk the IO staff elements' efforts to ensure that everyone had the same focus working towards the same objective, and that there was no stovepiping of information occurring. The information that was discussed in this meeting tied in with the weekly targeting meeting. (See pages 34-48 [Figure 12] for example IOWG meeting slides and their explanation.) The IOWG meeting on Tuesday afternoon complemented the targeting meeting on Thursday.



Slide 1: Seating Chart



Slide 2: Lead-in graphic



Slide 3: Issues slide (CDG's/IO elements' concerns from previous week)

IOWG AGENDA	
1. Agenda	
2. Focused time periods of meeting	
3. Intelligence Update	
Past two weeks roll-up	
Near term events	
6-week outlook	
4. Review of MND(N) calendar (6 month review)	
5. IO planning calendar/Identify new requirements (IO)	
6. IO focus by week, next five weeks (IO)	
7. Week +1: Assessment of events (staff and TF/Bn/BG)	
8. Week 0: Detailed plan for week (staff and TF/Bn/BG)	
9. Week 1: Detailed plan for week (staff and TF/Bn/BG)	
10. Week 2: Changes (by staff section)	
11. Week 3: Changes (by staff section)	
12. Week 4: IO detailed plan for week (by staff section)	
13. Issues	
14. Guidance	

Slide 4: Agenda (explains IOWG meeting format)

Focused Weeks									
20-26 May	27 May-02 Jun	3-9 Jun	10-16 Jun	17-23 Jun	24-30 Jun	1-7 Jul			
19	20	21	22	23	24	25			
Week +1	Week 0	Week -1	Week -2	Week -3	Week -4	Week -5			
TF/BN/BG and staff		IO Staff/ TF/BN/BG	Changes only	Changes only	IO Staff sections	IO Initial concept to			
brief assessment		and staff brief actions			brief actions for week	MND(N)			
from last week		for week							

Slide 5: Focused weeks - The number of the week corresponds with G3's calendar.

Last week + 1 = Assessment (IO staff elements and maneuver units brief their assessment for the week's identified problem set).

Week 0 = Current week (IO staff elements and maneuver units brief their actions for the week tied in with the week's identified problem set).

Week -1 = IO staff elements and maneuver units brief their actions for the week tied in with the week's identified problem set.

Week -2 and week -3 = Staff sections only brief their changes to the other elements from the week before.


Week -4 = Staff sections only brief their actions for four weeks out.

Week -5 = IO initial concept taken from respective problem set and what the elements are doing from the IO synchronization matrix that is updated twice weekly.

IO Intel "Entity Actions" Slides

- Slide 1 = Past 2 week roll-up
- Slide 2 = 7 day outlook
- Slide 3 = Concerns for next 6 weeks out
- Slide 4 = Concerns for next 90 days out

Slides 6-9: Four intel slides of MND(N) taken from the ACE update and briefed by the IO intel officer.



6 Month Calendar										
Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday				
WK 18		1	2	3	4	5				
WK 19	5 7	8	9	10	11	12				
WK 20 13	8 14	15	16	17	18	19				
WK 21 20	21	22	23	24	25	26				
WK 22 2	28	29	30	31						

Slide 10: Calendar color codes (legend matches calendar)

Slides 11-16: Calendar six months out

	IO Planning Timeline and Identify New Requirements							
Date	Event	Action						

Slide 17: IO planning timeline (chronologically displays IO problem set mission analysis, internal targeting meetings, targeting synchronization briefs to the DCG, and IO IMPIN issue dates).

IO Focus by Week				
Div Focus	IO Focus			

Slide 18: IO focus by week cross-walked with G3 synchronization operations (IO plans five weeks out staying out in front of G3 Plans by three weeks for shaping operations).

	Week +1 Week's Date Staff Selection						
Date	Task	CC	Assessment (Objective(s) explanation)				
Objectives are currently being met, no further targeting required. Accomplishment of objectives is unknown, further targeting required to determine. Objectives not accomplished, retargeting is required.							

Slide 19: Week + 1 assessment slide by staff element and maneuver unit (provide date of the event; what the task is by stating who, what, when, where, why, and how; shading the color of the assessment by following the legend; and the element's assessment).

	Week +1 Week's Date <i>Maneuver Unit(s)</i>						
Date	Task	CC	Assessment (Objective(s) explanation)				
	 Objectives are currently being met, no further targeting required. Accomplishment of objectives is unknown, further targeting required to determine. Objectives not accomplished, retargeting is required. 						

Slide 20: Week 0 concept taken from G3 synchronization calendar, IO problem set planning calendar, and what elements have planned on the IO synchronization matrix.

	Week -1 (Week's Date)					
	M T W TH F SA					
MND(N)						
Entity Actions	Entity Actions					
IO Activities						

Week -0 (Week's Date) Staff Sections				
Date	Date Task Purpose			

	Week -0 (Week's Date)					
	Maneuver Uni	ts				
Date	Date Task Purpose					

Slides 21-32: Week 0 broken down differently between separate elements. PSYOP —

*TPTs = What the TPT is doing; what coordination measures are needed to place with maneuver units.

*PDD = What is purpose of the product; when will it be finished.

*Radio MIR = What is day of broadcast; how many times; directed at what audience.

*Media = What print/TV product; how many times published; who is target audience; what is media source.

G5 —

*Meetings = What is purpose; what coordination measures/suspense are needed.

PAO —

*Purpose of press release/press conference; any coordination matters.

PMO —

*What bilat meeting; with whom; for what reason.

JMA —

*What bilat meeting; with whom; for what reason.

Finnish company civil military cooperation (CIMIC) house —

*What is purpose of CIMIC house; what coordination measures are needed.

Maneuver units —

*Unit CIMIC patrols = CIMIC patrols' purpose that complements maneuver patrols.

*IO purpose for patrols = What themes and messages they are disseminating to the public.

*Unit bilats = Purpose; who attended down to company commander.

*Unit radio shows/spots = Date of the show/spot; its topic; radio station.

	Week -1 (Week's Date)					
	М	Т	W	TH	F	SA
MND(N)						
Entity Actions						
IO Activities						

Slide 33: Week -1 concept taken from G3 synchronization calendar, IO problem set planning calendar, and what elements have planned on the IO synchronization matrix.

Week -1 (Week's Date)					
	Staff Sections				
Date Task Purpose					

Week -1 (Week's Date) Maneuver Units					
Date					

Slides 34-46: Week -1 (same as slides 21-32 with the exception of occurring the next week).

	Week -2 (Week's Date)					
	М	Т	W	TH	F	SA
MND(N)						
Entity Actions						
IO Activities						

Slide 47: Week -2 concept taken from G3 synchronization calendar, IO problem set planning calendar, and what elements have planned on the IO synchronization matrix.

Week -2 (Week's Date) Staff Sections				
Date	Task	Purpose		

Week -2 (Week's Date) Maneuver Units				
Date	Task	Purpose		

Slides 48-55: Week -2 (same as slides 34-46 without the maneuver slides, and with the exception of occurring the following week and briefed only as changes for the staff).

Week -3 (Week's Date)						
	М	Т	W	TH	F	SA
MND(N)						
Entity Actions						
IO Activities						

Slide 56: Week -3 concept taken from G3 synchronization calendar, IO problem set planning calendar, and what elements have planned on the IO synchronization matrix.

Week -3 (Week's Date)					
	Staff Sections				
Date	Task	Purpose			

Week -3 (Week's Date) Maneuver Units				
Date	Task	Purpose		

Slides 57-64: Week -3 (same as slides 48-55 without the maneuver slides, and with the exception of occurring the following week and briefed only as changes for the staff).

Week -4 (Week's Date)						
	М	Т	W	TH	F	SA
MND(N)						
Entity Actions						
IO Activities						

Slide 65: Week -4 concept taken from G3 synchronization calendar, IO problem set planning calendar, and what elements have planned on the IO synchronization matrix.

Week -4 (Week's Date) Staff Sections				
Date	Task	Purpose		

Week -4 (Week's Date) Maneuver Units				
Date	Task	Purpose		

Slides 66-73: Week -4 (same as slides 49-58 without the maneuver slides, and with the exception of occurring the following week and briefed only as changes for the staff).

Week -5 (Week's Date)						
	М	Т	W	TH	F	SA
MND(N)						
Entity Actions						
IO Activities						

Slide 74: Week -5 IO concept presented at the meeting to prepare members for problem set planning focus during week -4. Element input is taken from IO synchronization matrix.

Focus for Targeting Meeting

Slide 75: Targeting meeting focus (ties in with IOWG).

DCG Guidance

Slide 76: DCG's Guidance

Figure 12. IOWG Meeting Slides and Explanation

Review IO Assessment and Update TSM. Following the IOWG, the Deputy IO reviewed the maneuver unit assessments from week + 1 (slide 19) and updated the current TSMs with the targeting officer. These current TSMs were then reviewed at the targeting meeting with the entire IO group. The TSMs were updated following the targeting meeting.

Update IO Synchronization Matrix. Secondly, after the IOWG the Deputy IO reviewed the input from both the staff and the maneuver units and updated the synchronization matrix. The IO synchronization matrix always had staff input for four weeks out and maneuver input for one week out.

Update G3 FOP. The third event after the IOWG was to update the G3 future operations planning synchronization matrix that was briefed to both the Chief of Staff and the CG on two separate occasions. The Deputy IO updated the problem sets on the division G3 calendar once a week, providing the command group with IO's campaign visibility. The IO Chief briefed ongoing and future campaigns to the command group during the meeting. The key to this process was that the DCG chaired the IOWG and was present at the synchronization meetings.

CG's BUB and Weekly Assessment. The Deputy IO informed the CG in the BUB three nights a week what shaping operations were being conducted in MND(N) by depicting the last 48 hours and the next 48 hours of operations. At the Friday night BUB, the Deputy IO provided the CG with a current assessment from the targeting meeting for the ongoing active problem sets (see Figure 13 below for example BUB slides). This completed the IO targeting operational rhythm circle by keeping the command group up to date on the SFOR 11 targeting progress.



Problem Set Last 48 hours					
DATE	EVENT				

	Problem Set Overall Target Assessment Focus Areas:					
Target	Assessment	Targeting Recommendation				
Objectives are currently being met, no further targeting required.						
Accomplishment of objectives is unknown, further targeting required to determine.						
Objectives not accomplished, retargeting is required.						

Figure 13. Example BUB slides

Chapter 8

Talking Points

MND(N) talking points are revised on a continuous basis twice a month. Talking points no longer valid for the environment are deleted. Additional talking points are generated for new problem sets, and others are updated as needed to remain current with changing conditions. Below are examples of what SFOR, local authorities, and AFBiH and SFOR together are doing to ensure a safe and secure environment. These talking points are "active media posture," meaning that commanders and soldiers may disseminate them freely through radio shows and bilats, and while interfacing with the local populace. By contrast, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) "passive media posture" talking point examples concerning war criminals are listed as well. These talking points are to be disseminated only on a response-to-media query (RTQ) or when questions arise.

A. What is SFOR doing to ensure a safe and secure environment? (media posture is active)

1. SFOR ensures a safe and secure environment in accordance with our mandate in the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA). Our primary purpose in this task is to maintain the peace in BiH by our presence, which in turn provides the foundation for civil implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord and the economic revitalization of BiH. Ultimately, however, a safe and secure environment is the responsibility of the citizens of BiH, the country's leadership, and local police forces.

2. SFOR maintains the capability for enforcing the peace through the presence of highly trained, very capable, and very mobile military forces in BiH. SFOR has capitalized on the capabilities of each contributing nation and formed a force that is fully capable of addressing any threat to peace, stability, and progress.

3. SFOR also contributes to a safe and secure environment with our support of operations such as spring cleaning and the demining program. Both of these programs directly contribute to BiH's progress by removing dangerous weapons and ordnance from the homes and fields of BiH, which greatly contributes to the overall safety of the country.

4. Our mandate to ensure a safe and secure environment also applies to our support of the international community for displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees (DPRE) returns.

5. As mandated in the Dayton Peace Accord, SFOR will continue to ensure a safe and secure environment in MND(N) for all citizens, especially those who wish to return to their pre-war homes.

6. SFOR will also continue to work with the AFBiH in accordance with the Instructions to the Parties under the DPA. This includes monitoring AFBiH training and movement in MND(N), weapons storage site inspections, continued demining efforts, and weapons collection and ordnance reporting as part of Project Harvest/spring cleaning.

7. SFOR maintains the capability to quickly move forces between MNDs in order to respond to any threat to a safe and secure environment. This has been demonstrated and practiced through the effectiveness of Joint Resolve.

B. What are local authorities doing to provide a safe and secure environment? (media posture is active)

1. Economic investment and recovery will not occur until local authorities enforce the laws consistently to ensure a safe and secure environment.

2. Corrupt and unethical leaders deny financial aid, infrastructure rebuilding, and investment opportunity to the people of BiH. Corruption and corrupt officials have diverted millions of dollars in potential economic aid meant for deserving BiH communities.

3. Peaceful celebration of religious and entity-specific events provides the citizens of BiH the opportunity to demonstrate their respect and tolerance for one another while showing the world the progress that has been made since the end of the war.

4. Our primary purpose in this task is to maintain the peace with the AFBiH by our presence, which in turn provides the foundation for civil implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord and the economic revitalization of BiH. Ultimately, however, a safe and secure environment is the responsibility of the citizens of BiH, the country's leadership, and local police forces.

5. Dayton Peace Accord, Annex 11, mandates that all parties (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska) shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating within the internationally recognized standards.

6. Crime is a local matter. SFOR's focus is to ensure a safe and secure environment through its presence so local authorities can conduct law enforcement.

7. Citizens of BiH should take personal responsibility by exercising their rights to demand that local authorities implement the necessary measures to provide a safe and secure environment, which is done by holding local authorities responsible through the democratic process.

8. SFOR is committed to supporting the IPTF as they perform their duties to train and monitor police in the execution of their duties.

9. The IPTF is scheduled to be replaced by a new European Union police force.

10. SFOR will continue to maintain the forces required to ensure a safe and secure environment in our area of operations, and to ensure continued progress and compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord.

C. Cooperative efforts (media posture is active)

1. SFOR works with the AFBiH and local officials in many positive ways. Examples of this work can be found in demining, spring cleaning, fall harvest, and infrastructure projects. SFOR continuously reviews improvement projects with the AFBiH.

2. We are pleased with the level of AFBiH and local cooperation on all of these programs. In fact, without the hard work and professionalism of the AFBiH and local officials, these projects would not be successful.

D. International criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (RTQ only/media posture is passive)

1. The Entities have agreed to the provisions of the DPA and are responsible for ensuring that full cooperation and compliance are given to ICTY and SFOR soldiers.

2. SFOR has a well-defined mandate and it has not changed, but it will be interpreted as broadly as possible. This means it will use any and every opportunity, within that mandate, to bring criminals to justice. This is consistent with our past actions, which have led to the arrest and transfer of suspected war criminals to The Hague. The political will of the Allies has hardened and, therefore, suspected war criminals will have no respite.

3. SFOR facilitates free and unimpeded ICTY investigation teams access and movement to and from war crime scenes, investigation locations, and seizure sites.

4. If SFOR soldiers discover a suspected war crime scene, they will preserve the evidence and report the discovery to the ICTY as mandated in the DPA.

5. ICTY, not SFOR, determines the significance of war crimes evidence.

Chapter 9

IO Analysis; Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP); and Lessons Learned

IO Analysis for the Environment

Once in country, the SFOR 11 IO staff immediately evaluated the environment's situation for "problem areas" and "non-issue areas." This was accomplished through close coordination with the IO intelligence officer, who was key in coordinating with the SFOR 11 G2 section. The SFOR 11 G2 section maintains a database on the AOR's problem-makers and problem-solvers. This database must be updated on a regular basis because the environment is fluid. Bilateral meeting feedback with the individuals is one way of maintaining this database. The SFOR 11 IO staff recommends that each subsequent rotation conduct a thorough intelligence analysis of the environment as they assume their rotation.

SFOR 11 TTPs

• SFOR 11 developed their TTPs through synchronizing IO plans and operations with division plans and operations (see Chapter 5).

• It is imperative that IO coordinates with G3 current and future operations aside from coordinating with all of its elements to mitigate any "stovepiping" of information.

• The multinational units (Russian brigade, NORDPOL brigade, and Turkish battalion) worked well with the SFOR 11 team, ensuring that the peacekeepers were speaking with "one voice."

IO Lessons Learned

PSYOP --

• Synchronize PSYOP activities with division and task force/battle group operations through the IOWG process. Early in the rotation, PSYOP – like many other entities – was doing a lot of great work, but some activities were not tied to anything occurring in the maneuver units. Without synchronization, these activities may have only a transitory and localized effect when they could have been tied to an overall IO objective.

• Not every situation requires a PSYOP product. The goal in Bosnia-Herzegovina is to establish a climate of "normalcy" with local officials and provide a safe and secure environment. Calling attention to various observances with PSYOP products is probably not in line with these goals. Messages such as, "Don't throw rocks during the Srebrenica Observance or SFOR will respond," should be avoided. The most effective use of PSYOP in these cases might be a media campaign started well in advance of the event promoting general tolerance, with TPTs conducting pre-assessments to determine the general climate and detect any signs of organized obstructionism.

• Ensure the roles of PSYOP and PAO are clearly defined. In short, PAO presents full information intended for broad, commercially defined target audiences to the media, trusting the media will carry the information in the manner and spirit in which it was presented. PSYOP, on

the other hand, conveys selected information to specific target audiences and controls the means of dissemination by using TPTs and Radio Mir, or by paying for commercial media.

• Ensure PSYOP and PAO work together in a complementary manner. PAOs are generally inclined to keep their distance from PSYOP out of concern for their credibility and to not further confuse their respective roles. The two organizations must coordinate their activities through the IOWG to gain the greatest effect of both.

• Prioritize the efforts of the TPTs on "hot spots." Currently, two TPTs cover an area that was previously covered by an entire tactical PSYOP battalion. Additionally, the SFOR 11 MND(N) CG directed that PSYOP was a division asset and would be used division-wide. (Some previous rotations only provided TPT support to the U.S. battalion task forces.) It takes a significant amount of time to conduct detailed assessments and build the necessary personal relationships. Focus TPT efforts on critical areas, and provide training to the task forces/battle groups to affect product dissemination in other areas.

• Extra effort must be put into relationships with allied task forces/battle groups. Allied forces are the least likely to understand PSYOP capabilities and request assistance or seek clarification. Organizational barriers compound language and cultural differences, making the exchange of information difficult even in the best of circumstances. Information is best exchanged in frequent one-on-one settings. Habitual relationships must be built on a personal level, require frequent "azimuth checks," and must be done in addition to and outside of the IOWG process.

• Establish a timely and responsive product-approval process. There are many staff sections and levels of command that would like to have input into the product-approval process. Too many layers of approval delays products and frequently results in products being changed to such an extent that they no longer have the desired effect.

• Recognize the frustrations and difficulties of peacekeeping PSYOP. Many SFOR 11 soldiers prefer warfighting training and CTC rotations to peacekeeping. Deception operations, surrender appeals, and civilian non-interference provide more immediate and measurable indicators of success (or failure) than the long and laborious process of changing cultural attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in a peacekeeping situation. While the soldiers feel their work is important and personally rewarding, the feedback and benefits are usually not immediate and will take years, if not generations, to manifest.

Civil Affairs --

• In the early days of IFOR and SFOR, civil affairs commands and brigades were deployed. They brought along the specialists belonging to government, economics and commerce, public facilities, and special functions teams. The Combined Joint Civil Military Task Force (CJCMTF) was located in Sarajevo, with battalion staff serving in the G5 sections of the three MND headquarters and their detachments supporting task forces. The Joint Civil Commission (JCC) had specialists from the functional teams, and its personnel were dispatched to help solve problems with infrastructure, educate the populace (including government officials), and help influence the populace. The tactical support teams (TSTs), which are now referred to as civil affairs teams alpha (CATAs), used their patrols to disseminate information, conduct area assessments, find donor money for projects, and indirectly gather information from the populace.

• Downsizing has been an inevitable process that has whittled civil affairs assets down to a minimum. Civil military cooperation teams (CIMIC), which is a NATO or United Nations term for civil affairs teams, have replaced U.S. CA teams in MND(SW) and MND(SE). Even U.S.-controlled MND(N) is down to two CATA teams supporting the two U.S. task forces, a Finnish CIMIC company for direct support to the division, and two CIMIC companies to support their battle groups or battalion. The specialists that were prevalent in the early days of SFOR are no longer in theater. CIMIC and the CATA teams are generalists, and their focus has been drawn down to displaced persons (DPs) issues, quick assessments, and supporting projects that will help facilitate the return of those DPRE.

• The BiH government is now responsible for problems down to the local government level, and the international community and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) are assisting as well. CIMIC and CA teams are still helping to bring donor money for projects and facilitating returns to some of the most contentious areas of the country.

• The international community is also downsizing. They have the same responsibility, but with fewer people. Their goal is to have people return to their pre-war homes. To focus this effort, they created a forum to discuss issues. The returns and reconstruction task force (RRTF) is co-chaired by members from the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The RRTF is a forum where the international community and NGOs discuss political developments, human rights issues, property issues, projects, and returns' issues. This is done at the local municipality level (LRRTF) and at the regional level.

• Civil affairs personnel are working with the IC regarding returns. Focusing efforts on a particular return axis will accomplish more than previous efforts. It will enable CA to come up with IO themes and target sets that can be perfected and adjusted where or when needed and applied to the next return axis. (One word of caution: Do not use the words targeting or target sets around non-military personnel — it makes them very uncomfortable.)

• Synergistic approach: Another way of not only focusing efforts but also facilitating information flow to returnees is through the use of the MEDCAP and combining it with an Information Fair. MEDCAPs are an excellent tool in bringing all ethnic groups together for medical and dental care, but with coordination at the RRTF, NGOs are invited to provide information on everything from micro-economic loans or projects to rebuilding homes or infrastructure. This is usually captured on tape by a TV crew and promoted as a "good news" story through the division television show. This is a great example of a synergistic effort in which multiple audiences are targeted and the total effect is greatly multiplied.

• Sensing patrols: One of the methods of assessing the mood of the local populace is through the use of "sensing patrols." Civil affairs teams are normally involved in community group meetings, and through these meetings they are able to report back any possible fears, threats, or concerns of the majority population. For example, Task Force South sent their civil affairs team to the Women of Podrinje, Women of Kravica, and Women of Bratunac meetings to ascertain the mood and views of the local populace toward two upcoming and possibly contentious events. These groups represent the ethnic minority and majority groups and focus on assisting those who need help and on maintaining community harmony.

Battalion S5 (Civil Affairs)--

• The battalion civil affairs teams participated in a number of operations that encompassed a plethora of host nation, nongovernmental organization (NGO), and international community members. An example of the complexity of this task can be captured in the planning for just one "enhanced" MEDCAP. A total of 16 NGO, IC, and host nation agencies had to be successfully engaged prior to the actual event. This did not include the remainder of the steady-state operations that were ongoing at the time to support the returns process.

• If the CA section did not have the capability to become integrated into the targeting synchronization matrix, it would not have been nearly as efficient. The matrix literally became a time management tool to accurately monitor the status of the ongoing bilats that would achieve the task force end state.

• The battalion targeting process began each Saturday. The IO prepared the suggested targeting matrix with point and area targets that were derived from the line companies, CA, S2, PSYOP teams, and daily INTSUMS. The staff and the assembled company representatives discussed each point and area target. The data from the battalion targeting meeting was carried into the division targeting meeting. The process concluded with the DCG's approval on each specific target.

PAO ---

• Media operations: The goal was to produce two broadcast stories per week to send to American Forces Network, Soldiers Radio and Television, and home station or hometown television outlets; an average of less than one per week was actually produced.

• Three local national Serbo-Croatian translators who had worked for SFOR for more than six years served as media relations specialists, thus expanding the capabilities of the downsized media operations cell.

• Home station command information for family members: Print stories, photos, and broadcast stories were sent back to the rear detachment in Hawaii for family members of deployed 25th Infantry Division (Light) soldiers, to home stations of other active-duty units (including Fort Stewart and Fort Gordon), and to the Adjutants General of the states providing National Guard units for command information purposes. In some instances, key local media outlets in these areas were provided press releases, digital images, and broadcast products.

• *Talon:* The on-line *Talon* was an important source of information for family members, and more easily disseminated than the hardcopy version. The on-line *Talon* was updated on the Monday following Friday distribution of the newsmagazine.

• A crisis situation (i.e., capture of key war criminals, outbreak of violence directed at SFOR, accident resulting in multiple fatalities of U.S. soldiers) probably would have overwhelmed the capabilities of the reduced public affairs section, depending upon the dimensions of media interest. However, the PA group of seven soldiers still had trained individuals who could write, research, and staff press releases, statements, and Q&A; respond to media queries; coordinate an on-order press conference; conduct media analysis of print and broadcast stories; and provide a spokesperson to appear on camera. In the case of international media interest or a protracted crisis, the public affairs section would likely have asked for augmentation from other USAREUR public affairs assets.

• Participation in OSCE/OHR press conferences: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sponsored weekly press conferences in which TFE participated. These alternated between OSCE regional offices in Tuzla, near Eagle Base, and outlying cities in the Republika Srpska, Bosnia, and Herzegovina (Doboj, Bijeljina, and Zvornik). In addition, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) also sponsored a bi-weekly press conference in Brcko in which TFE participated. TFE PAO participated in six press conferences each month.

• Translator support: Public affairs had three dedicated Bosnian-speaking translators. Because of their long association with public affairs, they developed cordial relationships with all of the local media, and they had an intimate understanding of the SFOR mission, command messages, and the requirements of media relations. They were hired as media relations specialists to augment the reduced soldier strength in public affairs.

PMO -- Coordination with the local police has been accomplished through liaison with the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF). The Dayton Peace Agreement directs that the IPTF is responsible for oversight of the local police, which somewhat limits the authority of the PMO. Coordination is sometimes difficult when considering all the nations involved and differences in planning techniques between SFOR, IPTF, and the local police. The means to accomplish synchronizing efforts is constant liaison between the IPTF and LP leaders. It is extremely important to establish good working relationships with both IPTF and the local police to achieve the common goal of a safe and secure environment in this country.

Engineer --

• During the development of IO campaigns, the engineer representative to the IOWG must determine if engineer assets can contribute to the overall IO campaign. The primary area in which the assistant division engineer (ADE) can achieve synergism between engineer projects and IO campaigns is freedom of movement. Under freedom of movement, the ADE monitors and directs maintenance and repair on approximately 1,600 kilometers of routes within the division sector. While the ADE bases the decision to execute a repair project or new work primarily on whether division task forces and battle groups can move freely in sector, the ADE can also use "support to IO campaign" as another planning consideration for prioritizing projects. For example, repairing a major washout on a division route that also supports displaced persons returns is a project that would be a win-win situation for both freedom of movement and a major IO campaign.

• In addition to Brown and Root, the contractor who provides Base Camp Eagle infrastructure support, the ADE can coordinate the efforts of engineer platoons from other nations that contribute troops to MND(N) (e.g., Russian military contingent, the Turkish battalion, and the Nordic-Polish battle group). These engineer assets operate under different national restrictions than U.S. forces and can often accomplish projects that U.S. forces would not be able to execute because of Title 10 restrictions. At times, they can also perform these missions more quickly than U.S.-directed efforts. Unfortunately, U.S. engineer support was more available on earlier rotations that had organic U.S. Army engineer units. Since the decision to go to a primarily contractor-based engineer support mechanism, with its attendant longer request and contracts process, some flexibility has been lost.