

宣傳與資訊作戰

Propaganda and Information Operations

菲利普 泰勒
Philip M. Taylor

前言 Introduction

本文所使用的專門詞彙，常被大眾所誤會與誤解，特別是那些不是政府部門編制中的專業宣傳家以及資訊作戰者。尤其在民主社會中，大部份的人都認為「宣傳」就是操縱人心、洗腦與欺騙詭計的「惡劣」做法。而某些宣傳型的確涵蓋了上述各項作為，但這些「骯髒的」與見不得人的行徑通常是由一些情治機關所進行的。然而，也有另外一種宣傳型式，即「乾淨的」或是公開的活動，其方式或是其必要性，是反對說謊的。然而，這些持續被「骯髒的」活動所吸引去注意力。一般人也許會期待把說服技巧當成目標的專家們，能夠驅除許多圍繞於他們工作上的迷思。然而，整個語言修飾的工業已發展出了能夠轉移掉對他們實際上所做所為的注意力，從政治層次上的「玩弄詮釋手法」到外交與軍事層次上的「國際資訊」散播均屬之。為了更進一步地釐清我們在這裡所要檢視的部份，有必要先瞭解一些定義與歷史。

菲利普 泰勒博士為英國里茲大學博士，現為英國里茲大學傳播研究中心主任。泰勒博士的研究領域是國際傳播的歷史與作法、軍隊與媒體關係、心理戰/作戰、國際電影與電視等。泰勒博士著有：《心理武器：遠古到核子時代的戰爭宣傳》（一九九〇年）、《戰爭與媒體：波灣戰爭的宣傳與說服》（一九九二年）、《全球性傳播：一九四五年後國際事務與媒體》（一九九七年）、《二十世紀英國的宣傳：民主的推銷》（一九九九年）等。本文中文由許博彰先生（《國防政策評論》編輯助理）翻譯。Dr. Philip M. Taylor gained his PhD from Leeds University, UK. Dr. Taylor is currently the Director of the Institute of Communications Studies at Leeds University, UK. Dr. Taylor's research interests include the history and conduct of international communications, military-media relations, psychological warfare/operations and international film and television. His recent publications include: **Munitions of Mind: War Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Nuclear Age** (1990), **War and Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War** (1992), **Global Communications: International Affairs and the Media since 1945** (1997), and **British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy** (1999). Chinese translation is arranged by Mr. Po-chang Shu (Editorial Assistant of **Taiwan Defense Affairs**).

The terms in the title of this article are the source of much popular misunderstanding and misconception, especially outside those governmental offices inhabited by professional propagandists and information operators. "Propaganda" is regarded by most people, especially in democratic societies, as a 'bad' thing related to mind manipulation, brainwashing and deception. While some forms of propaganda do indeed cover these areas, they are the ones relating to what is known as "black" or covert propaganda, usually conducted by the intelligence services. But there is another form of propaganda, namely "white" or overt activity that, by and of necessity, is the opposite of telling lies. Yet this remains tarnished by the "black" brush. One might have expected such experts in targeted persuasive techniques to dispel many of the myths surrounding their work. Instead, an entire euphemism industry has developed to deflect attention away from the realities of what they do, ranging from "spin doctoring" at the political level to "international information" at the diplomatic and military levels. In order to be clear about what we are examining here, some definitions, as well as some history, are essential.

宣傳的意涵

The "P" Word

歷史的確是關於這個主題的焦慮來源，而且它是在修辭標籤之後的驅動者。這是因為「宣傳」一字並不總是個骯髒的字眼。在某些國家，尤其是前蘇聯，¹或是現在的中華人民共和國，²「宣傳」是、或者是被相當公開地用來描述官方的訊息活動。但在西方的國家中，它卻因第一次世界大戰（一九一四至一九一八年）暴行的結果中，得到了輕蔑的意涵。一九一四年以前，「宣傳」的意義，僅僅只是概念與資訊上的「增殖」，觀念能夠藉由此種方式來成形。十七世紀時，天主教教會發明了「宣傳」這個字彙，藉以描述建立一個主體，來反對新教教會於歐陸上散佈；其後，「宣傳」這個字也運用到政治領域中。但即便如此，一九一一年版的大英百科全書上仍認為這個字的字義，相近於播種（或傳播概念）及培育植物（或培育行為）的活動，而不是製造謊言或部份事實的陳述。³

History is indeed the source of nervousness about this subject and it is the driver behind the euphemistic labelling. This is because "propaganda" wasn't always a dirty word. In some countries, especially the former Soviet Union,¹ or in the People's Republic of China today,² it was and is used quite openly to describe official state informational activity. But in western countries, it acquired pejorative meaning largely as a result of the excesses of the First World War (1914-18). Before 1914, propaganda meant simply the *propagation* of ideas or of information on which ideas could be formed. Invented by the Catholic Church in the 17th century to describe a body set up to counter the spread of Protestantism in Europe, the word subsequently attracted political applications but even the 1911 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica was still describing it as an activity more akin to sowing seeds (or ideas) and cultivating the plants (or behaviour) that resulted, rather than telling lies or at best half-truths.³

第一次世界大戰卻改變了這個觀念。德國人首先佈署與運用了此種逐漸被認為

是戰爭中的新式武器，特別是用在初期保持中立的美國人身上，更是一種「贏得人心」的方法。⁴德國同時也是早在一九一五年首先運用空投傳單對協約國陣營進行心理戰試驗的國家。雖然，協約國陣營對此類戰爭型態的回應顯得遲緩，唯獨英國隨即瞭解到了這種目前已成為法則的方式：即控制住資訊的流動，並誇大自己贏得戰鬥的能力。這也正是英國為何能在戰爭爆發後的幾個小時內，便切斷德國橫越大西洋的越洋海底電纜。審查制度接著也就變成了「負面的宣傳」。許多人開始相信，美國於一九一七年參戰之所以會加入了協約國陣營，是因為英國有比對手更強而有力的國際宣傳。但在西方國家，真正損害了宣傳聲譽的，卻是在於戰爭時期的報紙上所充斥的暴行宣傳——即許多鮮少官方證實，卻無的放矢的故事，就像是在戰事氛圍下自然出現的愛國、仇恨與狂熱情緒一般。事實上，此類報導大部份是虛妄不實的，也在戰後一一被人揭發出來。從那時開始，宣傳就被認為是沒有公信力的官方行為，至少在民主國家是這麼認為的。⁵

The First World War changed all that. The Germans were the first to deploy what was increasingly being seen as a new weapon of war, especially in the initially neutral United States as a means of 'winning hearts and minds'. They were also the first to experiment with psychological warfare by dropping leaflets over Allied lines as early as 1915. Although the Allies were slow to respond in kind, the British in particular understood then what has become axiomatic now: namely control the flow of information and you heighten your ability to win the conflict.⁴ This was why the British cut the direct German trans-Atlantic submarine cables within hours of war's outbreak. Censorship thus became "negative propaganda". The US entered the war on the Allied side in 1917, many came to subsequently believe, because the British were better than their opponents at international propaganda. But what really damaged the reputation of propaganda in western countries was the burst of atrocity propaganda which permeated the wartime press – stories which rarely had an official origin but which erupted in the newspapers like spontaneous combustion in the wartime climate of patriotism, hate and demonisation of the enemy. These were largely, in fact, falsehoods – and exposed as such after the war. It was at this point that propaganda came to be discredited as a state activity, at least in the democracies.⁵

在歐洲的其他地方，隨著一九一七年布爾什維克革命以及兩次世界大戰間在義大利與德國的反共產政權出現後，宣傳變成了極權國家在承平時期的被認可的功能。⁶它也意味著確認「大眾」在政治上的重要性，及包括報紙、廣播與影片在內的傳播媒體做為官方資訊的供應者的重要地位。雖然，民主國家一開始的反應相當地遲緩，但到了三〇年代晚期，英國已在白廳設立了官方新聞部門，來進行長期的「文化外交」工作（另外一種婉轉辭令）。此外，英國國家廣播公司也在一九三八年開始用政府名義以外語廣播。⁷二次世界大戰期間（一九三九年至一九四五年），英國國家廣播公司歐洲廣播服務部門，建立起了一定程度的公信力，並一直延續到了冷戰時期。⁸只有少數人才會指控此種世界性的宣傳作為。這是因為英國國家廣播公司把它在新聞處理方面的工作，將「平衡與客觀」和廣播的「公共服務傳統」視為是一致的。但英國國家廣播公司創辦董事長瑞司，仍維持「新聞即是宣傳的突擊先鋒」⁹的信念。外語廣播的大部份經費來自於外交部。新聞事業與宣傳的手法極為類似，

皆是處理、選擇與刪除的事務。但是區別出英國和在一九四一年十二月參戰後的美國或其極權陣營對手在宣傳策略的不同地方，便是在於「真理的戰略」。由二次大戰的經驗顯示，民主國家奉為法則的理念便是「說出事實、僅止於事實；並且盡可能地說出全部的事實」。¹⁰

Elsewhere in Europe, following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the emergence in the inter-war years of anti-communist regimes in Italy and Germany, propaganda became a recognised function of the totalitarian state in peacetime.⁶ It was a recognition that the “mass” now mattered in politics and that the mass media – press, radio and film – were significant as purveyors of official information. The democracies were at first slow to respond although, by the late 1930s, the British had created press departments in Whitehall, they had established the British Council to conduct long-term ‘cultural diplomacy’ (another euphemism) and in 1938 the BBC began to broadcast in foreign languages on behalf of the government.⁷ During the Second World War (1939-45), the BBC’s European Service built up a reputation for credibility that was to serve it well during the Cold War.⁸ Few people would accuse the World Service of being propaganda. This is because it based its work on news based output in which views were “balanced and objective” in accordance with the ‘public service tradition’ of broadcasting. But it was the BBC’s founding Director General, Lord Reith, who maintained that “news is the shocktroops of propaganda”.⁹ Much of the finance for foreign language broadcasting came from the Foreign Office. The news business is, like propaganda, a matter of selection and omission. But what distinguished British propaganda, and indeed American propaganda once the US entered the war in December 1941, from that of its totalitarian rivals was a “Strategy of Truth”. It became axiomatic for democratic propaganda as a result of the Second World War experience that it should “tell the truth, nothing but the truth and, as near as possible, the whole truth”.¹⁰

這並不意味著所有的事實被說出。事實並不總是立即地被說出。的確，雖然真正的做到了事實的呈現，可能會使我們處於不利的立場，但英國與美國卻認識到了蓄意欺騙下所引致的不良後果。不過，我們還是需要再度去區分出真實的與虛假的宣傳。真實與公開的宣傳來自於清楚、可確認的訊息來源，並且會去驗明自己，像是「這是美國之聲」或「這是莫斯科電臺」。根本地來說，這些公然進行宣傳的電台，必須去避免像是如集權政體那種已被貼上「巨大謊言」標籤的明顯而露骨之宣傳方式。宣傳過程中必須要以發生的新聞為基礎，視吸引到多少的海外收聽者及收聽者對其公信力與名望的迴響程度，而非盡然都是有關於其說「真話」的能力，來量測出此電台經營上的成功與否。「具公信力的事實」也就成為了常被運用的字彙，或許接下來我們應該要開始討論這串字彙。舉例來說，美國人在一九四三年時，製作了一批傳單，越過了德國戰線，空投到了義大利境內。傳單上敘述如果德國士兵投降的話，將會受到良好的待遇，可以享用一頓培根蛋早餐，這確實也是實情。然而，德軍卻拒絕相信。因為敵手所運用的概念，諸如提供戰俘培根肉與雞蛋等稀有物資，很容易就被認為太不符合現實而難以接受。心理學家稱這種情況為認知上的不一致。¹¹

This does not mean that whole truth was told. Nor was it always told immedi-

ately. Indeed, although we are on dangerous ground with the very word “truth”, the British and Americans learned that it was counter-productive to deliberately lie. However, here we need to again distinguish between “white” propaganda and “black” propaganda. White or overt propaganda originates from a clearly identifiable source and identifies itself as such, as with “This is the Voice of America” or “This is Radio Moscow”. It is essential that these overt propaganda radio stations avoid obvious or blatant propaganda of the kind associated with totalitarian regimes and what has been labelled “The Big Lie”. They do this by being news based and their success is measured by the number of overseas listeners they can attract, which in turn is influenced not so much by their ability to tell “the truth” but by their reputation for credibility. This is a much more useful word, and perhaps we should now begin to talk about “credible truths”. For example, in 1943, the Americans dropped a leaflet over German lines in Italy stating that if German soldiers surrendered they would be treated well, including a welcome breakfast of bacon and eggs – which was true. However, the German forces refused to believe it because the notion that their enemy would serve prisoners with such rare commodities as bacon and eggs was simply too fantastic for them to accept. Psychologists call this cognitive dissonance.¹¹

為了達到特定的政治目的，政府會透過任何工具或媒體，將訊息指向外國。民主國家對海外聽眾所持的立場，通常僅止於提供一些為當地政府所制壓的不同訊息與觀點。所以事實上，這不能盡然算是一種宣傳方式。「我們說真話。他們說假話，或至多只是一半的事實。」以分析的角度來看，或許更適合去談論何謂「我方的事實」與「對方的事實」。然而，二次世界大戰期間，英國卻倡導了偏離這個概念的一種宣傳形式。這就是「虛假的宣傳」，或是發出自蓄意遮掩來源的宣傳。¹² 換句話說，宣傳者會做出指鹿為馬、睜眼說瞎話的行徑。這是用謊言來操縱目標民眾認知的一種宣傳形式。然而，公信力在這類的宣傳效度上，仍有著極高的影響力。聽眾需要相信消息來源是真實可信的。這便牽涉到了訊息是由誰釋出，或者即便釋出的訊息是真實的，宣傳活動背後是否能維持中立而不隱含其它的動機。此外，它也必須百分之百的保密，這便是為何宣傳活動經常在暗地裏進行。一旦訊息不慎走漏，便會危害到主導的情報機構於其他資訊性或者是「真理性」活動中的公信力。舉例來說，二次大戰期間，英國政治作戰執行機構便是在完全機密的狀況下運作。他們在「研究單位」外殼的掩護下，秘密地主持著地下廣播電臺，偽裝成看似活動於歐陸淪陷區內地下工作人員發出的訊號。但實際上，這些活動訊號卻是來自於英倫三島上。¹³ 同樣地，冷戰時期的前蘇聯國家安全局與美國中情局也從事與設計一些「在大眾之間散播不實消息」的運作，藉以打擊或破壞對手陣營從醫學實驗到介入第三世界革命活動等領域裡的公信力。¹⁴

Governments direct information into foreign countries by whatever means and media that are available for specific political purposes. Democratic governments often maintain that they are merely supplying foreign audiences with news and views that are otherwise denied them by their repressive governments. As such, they are not conducting propaganda at all. “We tell the truth. They tell lies or, at best, half-truths”. Perhaps, for analytical purposes, it would therefore be more appropriate to talk about “our truth” and “their truth”. During the Second World War, however, the British pioneered a form

of propaganda which deviated from this. This was “black” propaganda, or propaganda which emanates from a deliberately disguised source.¹² In other words, the propagandists would say they were one thing when in fact they were something quite different. Born of a lie, it is this kind of propaganda which more justifiably equates with the popular perception of targeted persuasion. Credibility is still essential to its effectiveness, however. The audience needs to believe that the source is authentic, that it is who it says it is, and it is for this reason that this type of activity must be kept completely separate from any “white” operation operating in conjunction or alongside it. It must also be kept completely secret, which is why it is often conducted “in the shadows”; as soon as the source is revealed, if it ever does, the intelligence community who tend to conduct this work can compromise the credibility of other informational or more “truthful” activities. For example, in World War Two, working in complete secrecy, the British Political Warfare Executive, under the cover of “Research Units”, ran clandestine black radio stations that purported to emanate from inside Occupied Europe as authentic dissident or resistance movements but which, in fact, were transmitted from British soil.¹³ Similarly, during the Cold War, the KGB and CIA conducted ongoing “disinformation” operations designed to discredit the other side and undermine their enemy’s credibility in areas ranging from medical experiments to involvement in Third World revolutionary movements.¹⁴

走出陰暗，面對陽光 Out of the Shadows

冷戰由許多層面來看，都可視之為一場心理與精神上的鬥爭。這場鬥爭不僅只是由華盛頓與莫斯科為首的兩大陣營在意識型態上互不相容的競逐，同時也是可能造成「保證互相毀滅」的潛在核武毀滅性軍備競賽。正因如此，不論是「真實」或是「虛假」的宣傳，都假設世界上存在著一種囊括心理、心智、忠誠度與盟國在內的核心武器。這種摩尼教義下全球化與緊張化的戰略性挑戰，唯一的能避免軍事擴張的安全閥，便是透過「代理人戰爭」。宣傳已經是這些戰爭——韓國、阿爾及利亞、越南、阿富汗——到其它像是來自肯亞與薩爾瓦多的低度衝突中的經常性特徵。¹⁵在戰場上，戰鬥宣傳通常已經被視為和戰術上的心理戰是一致的。但在更寬闊、滲透入日常生活的全球性意識形態鬥爭，在戰略層次上也是一種心理戰的形式；從太空競賽到奧運比賽、從科幻電影到反核示威運動，在在都讓「事實」要從「小說」區分開來已變得不太可能。事實上，冷戰結束只不過是近十年發生的大事；因此我們能夠開始來正確地評價：在之前四十年間滲透入我們日常生活，由莫斯科和華盛頓所定義的宣傳「架構」，是如何地普及化。

The Cold War was, if anything, a psychological war in which not only were there two competing, and essentially incompatible, ideologies emanating from Washington and Moscow but it was also a potentially fatal competition in which the actual deployment of nuclear weapons would have resulted in “mutually assured destruction”. As such, propaganda – both black and white – assumed the role of a central weapon in a world-wide struggle for hearts, minds, allegiances and allies – a strategic Manichean struggle of such global proportions and tension that the only safety valves for military

aggression could be provided by the conduct of “proxy wars”. Propaganda was now a regular feature of such wars – in Korea, Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan – and in other low intensity conflicts from Kenya to El Salvador.¹⁵ Combat propaganda came to be more closely identified with tactical psychological warfare, in theatre, but the wider global ideological struggle was also a form of psychological warfare at a strategic level which so permeated everyday life, from the Space Race to Olympic Games, from science fiction movies to anti-nuclear demonstrations, that it became virtually impossible for those living through it to separate “fact” from “fiction”.¹⁶ Really, it is only in the decade since the end of the Cold War that we can begin to appreciate just how all-pervasive the propaganda “framework” defined by Moscow and Washington permeated everyday life for just over forty years.

宣傳體制的形成，大部份要歸因於兩極的環境下，保持了通訊的相對穩定性。雖然，像是麥克魯漢的部份媒體理論學者，在六十年代提出了「地球村」的概念，但真正穿透「鐵幕」的能力仍相當地有限。事實上，前蘇聯當局在干擾與壓制如自由歐洲之聲（中情局幕後資助）與自由電台等西方廣播電臺上，比起他們的對外廣播上，投入了更多的費用。¹⁷ 前蘇聯的媒體要在官方嚴格把關與西方國家衛星監控下運作，非經上級准許的資訊都要一一地過濾掉。¹⁸ 一九五十年代初期麥卡錫的政治迫害事件後，美國媒體熱衷於接受華盛頓官方版本，即雷根隨後稱之為「邪惡帝國」的說法。然而到了一九八十年代，新的傳播科技問世。此項科技一開始時，以傳真機與衛星電視的型式出現，便開始創造出了前所未有的新環境。不僅全球資訊的流通更為自由，同時資訊偵測與防堵的困難度，也變的越來越困難了。¹⁹ 回首過往，自網際網路開始蓬勃發展後，我們仍然視目前一切為理所當然的。但在那個時候，對堅決想維持住共產社會的封閉性、遠離西方文化與價值觀污染，甚至還禁止被普遍使用的影印機的前蘇聯政府來說，新傳播科技的存在就如同特洛伊木馬一般地難以防堵。

This was possible largely because the bi-polar environment remained relatively fixed in terms of communications. Although media theorists such as Marshall McLuhan began to speak in the 1960s of a “global village”, the ability to penetrate the “Iron Curtain” remained relatively limited. The Soviets in fact spent more money on jamming western radio stations such as Radio Free Europe (originally CIA-backed) and Radio Liberty than they did on external broadcasting.¹⁷ The media operated under strict state control within the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc satellites and could thus be relied up to omit any other “truth” than that decreed by the Communist Party.¹⁸ The American media, following the McCarthy witch-hunts of the early 1950s, was only too happy to accept Washington’s version of the truth about what Ronald Reagan would later call “the Evil Empire”. By the 1980s, however, new communications technologies (NCTs), initially in the form of the fax machine and satellite television, were beginning to create a new environment in which information could flow far more freely around the globe than ever before and, moreover, it was becoming harder and harder to detect or prevent.¹⁹ Looking back now, especially since the massive growth of the Internet, we can still take this somewhat for granted. But at the time, NCTs were like Trojan horses to a society like the Soviet Union whose determination to remain hermetically sealed off from the pollution of western culture and values even extended to a ban on the popular

use of photocopiers.

戈巴契夫卻看到了先機，在一九八七到八八年間取消了封鎖西方廣播媒體，並藉由推行開放政策，鼓勵蘇聯媒體進行前所未有的改革工作，諸如新聞學調查研究的引進等。但是各項改革工作開始進行後，對於促進冷戰結束的國際傳播卻很難給予精確的定位。²⁰的確，東德部隊獲准穿越捷克的電視形象，有鼓勵其它國家跟進的作用。到目前為止，在全球新興媒體如 CNN 的實況轉播鏡頭下，東歐極權國家一個接著一個的垮臺，但卻唯獨遺漏了發生在匈牙利與捷克的俄國軍事干預畫面。遠在東方的天安門廣場上，在中共人民解放軍坦克克大舉鎮壓民主示威活動前，CNN 的攝影機插頭被強制拔除（雖然這只是代表新國際環境下的資訊流通的些微滲透而已，但北京當局企圖封鎖廣場上的消息外流，也是徒勞無功）。但也使人聯想起，這並不像一九五六和一九六八時蘇聯的東歐駐軍待在營房中一般，說明了是中國的坦克而不是電視，才是在那裡真正阻撓根本性變化的主要因素。或許要在後者的出現，連同前者的欠缺，是蘇維埃帝國瓦解的關鍵因素。前後兩者間所產生的諷刺關係，在一九九一年在莫斯科發生的流產政變中顯現。當葉爾欽爬上坦克，象徵著要抵抗已控制住國會大廈與國營電臺的謀反者時，他的英勇形象卻是透過美國的 CNN 播送到世界，且立即獲得了彼岸布希總統的支持。此次事件也預告了國際媒體外交的新紀元。在此同時，在克里米亞遭到軟禁的戈巴契夫也正透過英國國家廣播電臺，收聽著葉爾欽的進展。距離他取消了封鎖西方廣播媒體的政策，僅僅才過了四年而已。²¹

It was Gorbachev who saw the writing on the wall. He stopped the jamming of western broadcasts in 1987-8 and, through the policy of glasnost, encouraged unprecedented reform of the Russian media through, for example, the introduction of investigative journalism. But when all is said and done, it is difficult to pin down the precise role of international communications in helping to end the Cold War.²⁰ Certainly, television pictures of East Germans being allowed across the Czech border encouraged others to follow suite. Yet, as one Eastern Europe dictatorship after another collapsed before live television cameras from the new generation of global news stations like CNN, the one thing that was missing in places like Hungary and Czechoslovakia was Russian intervention. In Tiananminh Square, CNN had had its plugs pulled before the tanks of the People's Republican Army rolled in to suppress the "Pro-Democracy" demonstrators (although such was the porousness of the new international environment in terms of information flow, even the Beijing government failed to suppress all news from the Square). But in Eastern Europe, unlike 1956 and 1968, the Russian troops stayed put in their barracks, suggesting that in China it was tanks rather than television that remained the critical factor preventing fundamental change there. Perhaps the presence of the latter, combined with the absence of the former, was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet empire. All this was not without its irony in 1991 during the abortive coup in Moscow. When Boris Yeltsin climbed aboard a tank to symbolise his resistance to the plotters who had seized not only the Russian Parliament but also the state television, his image which was beamed around the world on CNN and immediately prompted President Bush to offer his support, heralding a new era of international television diplomacy. Meanwhile, in the Crimea, as Gorbachev was under house arrest, he listened to Yeltsin's

progress on the BBC World Service that he had stopped jamming barely four years earlier.²¹

波斯灣戰爭是戰略性宣傳與媒體戰的催化劑

The Gulf War as a Catalyst in Strategic Propaganda and Media Operations

福山嘗試著將這些重要事件組合起來，並稱為「歷史的終結」。²² 雖然歷史不會真的終結，但他的觀點是人類歷史正逐漸朝著布希總統所說的「世界新秩序」演進。這個世界新秩序在一九九〇年八月伊拉克入侵科威特後，遭遇到了第一次的試煉。往後的六個月內，以美國為首的二十九個國家組成了卓越的聯盟，將近五十萬美國大兵派遣到沙國，預備進行一項代號為「沙漠風暴」的軍事行動。當一九九一年元月波灣戰事爆發後，輪廓鮮明的焦點開始聚集於媒體宣傳的發展趨勢與官方對於宣傳的思考上，此兩個不同層次皆有助於形塑雙方在後冷戰時期的當前角色。²³

Francis Fukuyama attempted to contextualise these momentous events as “the end of history”.²² Although history does not end, his point was that a significant era of human history had drawn to a close, to be superseded by what President Bush termed a “New World Order”. The first test for this new order was to occur in the Middle East following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Over the next six months, a remarkable coalition of 29 countries was assembled under American leadership and half a million US troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia in preparation for “Operation Desert Storm”. When the Gulf War broke out in January 1991, it brought into sharp focus many of the trends in the media and in official thinking about propaganda that have helped to shape the current role of both in the post Cold War era.²³

首先，讓我們先來檢視媒體所扮演的角色。波斯灣戰爭是個「大故事」，上通常都是以「即時播放」的方式，成了全球關注的焦點。它本身，這成了一個極為有趣的現象。我不懷疑後世的歷史學家們，會認為蘇聯帝國解體比起僅持續六個星期、始於伊拉克入侵科威特且一面倒的波斯灣戰爭，是個較大的「故事」。然而，在媒體報導的層次上來看，這兩件大事的重要性，卻會有與前者迥然不同的觀點。的確，有許多國際新聞機構將會關閉在東歐地區的辦公室，只因為他們的觀眾對蘇聯解體後的情勢發展，已漸漸不感興趣。當一千五百名記者蜂湧至波斯灣時，媒體所扮演的偏頗角色便不言而喻了。

First let us examine the role of the media. The Gulf War was a “Big Story”, earning round-the-clock global coverage, often in ‘real-time’. This, in itself, was an interesting phenomenon. I have no doubt that future historians will deem the collapse of the Soviet Empire a much bigger “story” in the course of world history than a one-sided conflict that lasted barely six weeks and resulted in the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. However, the media coverage of both events would suggest a reverse priority. Indeed, many international news organisations were closing down their Eastern European bureaux, deeming the course of change in Russia to be of lesser interest to their audiences. As

1500 journalists descended on the Gulf, the role of the media as a distorting microscope was all too apparent.

然而，那些莫斯科的謀反者卻顯現了他們有多麼震驚，即使在控制了國營電臺後，卻仍無法掌控 CNN 向外發送訊息（而不像一九八九年時，中共的做法），因為美國人已發展出更精細處理國際媒體的手法。有幾個理由可以解釋這個現象。最重要的因素是來自於越戰的經驗。那場戰役通常被稱為「第一場電視戰爭」。這場戰爭在美國人的心目中佔有極特殊的地位，此種現象並不能說是因為這是美國軍事史上的第一場失敗所造成的。²⁴ 戰敗的一方通常都會對其軍事失利的理由找出合理化的解釋，然而對許多人而言，要在這個失敗的個案中找出為何美國的軍事力會不敵這個第三世界國家，卻是不太可能。拋掉一些美國軍事實力以及造成北越勝利的政治因素後，關注的焦點便投射到了媒體身上。特別是在處理一九六八年的新年攻勢的新聞時，一般認為媒體藉由播放具批判性與攻擊性報導來中傷軍方，並導致了這場戰爭努力爭取民意支持基礎的損害。儘管此種說法是否成立仍有許多疑問，但民主國家必須藉著媒體與民意支持的力量方能贏得戰爭的概念，卻已經深植人心。美國軍方在往後的十年間，便一直不斷的尋求解決之道。而波斯灣戰爭也就成了驗證美國軍方的第一場嚴峻考驗。²⁵

Whereas the Moscow plotters demonstrated how much they were stuck in the past when they seized the domestic television stations and did nothing to prevent CNN from transmitting (unlike the Chinese in 1989), the Americans had evolved a much more sophisticated approach to the international media. There were several reasons for this. Most significant of all was the legacy of Vietnam. That conflict, often termed the “first television war”, had earned mythical status in the American psyche not just as the first war to be lost in American military history.²⁴ Defeated nations search for rationalisations for military failure and, in this case, it was impossible for many to understand why the might of the American armed forces had been unable to overcome those of a Third World power. Instead of focusing on the real military and political reasons for North Vietnam’s success, attention turned on the media which, especially after the 1968 Tet Offensive, stood accused of stabbing the American military effort in the back by increasingly critical and hostile coverage of events, undermining popular support for the war effort. Although there is much to question in this, the idea that democracies could not win a war without media and thereby popular support took root. The US military spent the next ten years looking for solutions and the Gulf War was the first serious test as to whether they had find the right one.²⁵

新型態的媒體戰略是由兩個字首同為「P」開頭的單字所組成，即訊息共享與記者招待會。訊息共享或是媒體報導團隊，都是由來自各種媒體機構的十名左右記者所組成的小團隊，以正式的頭銜隨軍進行採訪。來自媒體報導群的記者們，必須身著制服且嚴守一定程度的保密規範，避免將有價值的敏感資訊流向敵營。此外，流出的影像與副本等資料，也要經過嚴密的審核手續（或安全檢查）。仰賴軍方提供的戰場資料來源後，將報導回傳到利雅德，再透過內部網路傳遞回到訊息中心。換句話說，任何來自戰場實際訊息都必須經過軍方認可後，才可以分送給世界上的其

它媒體。這個結果可視之為宣傳上的勝利，因為看來自由、公開的新聞報導過程裏，實際上還是有一定程度的侷限性，新聞報導的自由度還是必須受到「軍事作戰保密」的前提下來決定。美國軍方已在越戰這場「未經過濾的戰爭」中學到了教訓，確實也由英國的福克蘭戰役中的經驗中學到了，只要能夠管制住前線訊息的取得方式，便可以掌控住報導的走向。有些記者瞭解到，若是抗拒或是破壞現存體制的話，便會變成「單打獨鬥」。然而，由於 CBS 的記者很早便已經開始進行，也已在科威特境內遭伊拉克的逮捕，「單打獨鬥」也就對記者形成了極大的障礙。戰場確實是危機四伏的地方，所以大多數的記者都接受了此種媒體報導群的设计，他們認為這是唯一能在安全的前提下最接近事實的做法。對有限度的報導來說，這種交易的做法一方面可以取得資料，一方面也可以維持安全。就算是在當時，它也不一定都能如願以償的做出迅速的報導。舉例來說，當二月底的地面戰爭展開後，聯軍的收復科威特的攻勢過快，以致於沒有時間停下來提供記者關於地面戰之即時訊息，以對外發佈新聞稿或修改播出畫面。這也造成了全球觀眾要在地面戰全部結束後，方能一窺戰爭全貌。

The new media strategy consisted of two new “p” words: pools and press conferences. The pools, or Media Reporting Teams to give them their official title, consisted of small groups of around ten journalists from a variety of media organisations who would accompany the troops into the field. The pool journalists would wear uniforms, agree to certain rules regarding disclosure of sensitive information which might be of value to the enemy, submit their copy and images for censorship scrutiny (or “security review”), and rely upon the military to get their stories back from the field to Riyadh for onward transmission to their news rooms. In other words, no news story left the actual battlefield without the approval of the military before it was shared by the rest of the world’s media. The result was a triumph of propaganda in that the media coverage appeared to be open and free when in reality it was quite restricted, usually justified on grounds of “operational security”. The military had learned from the “uncensored war” in Vietnam, and indeed from the British experience in the Falklands War, that if you can control the access from the fighting front, together with communications by journalists from that front, you can control the way the story is covered. Some journalists realised this, rejected and broke away from the system, becoming known as the “unilaterals”. However, because a CBS crew which had done this early on and had been arrested by the Iraqis on the Kuwaiti border, there was a tremendous disincentive for journalists to “go it alone”. Battlefields are indeed very dangerous places, and most journalists accepted the pool system because they thought it was the only safe way to get near the story. The trade-off was access and safety for restricted reporting. Even then, it was not always possible to report as quickly as they would have liked. For example, when the 100 hour ground war started at the end of February, coalition forces moved so quickly to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty that there was no time to stop for the reporters to file their copy or edit their pictures with the result that the ground war coverage did not reach a global audience until after it was all over.

媒體戰略的第二項元素包含了記者招待會。以這個部分來看，美國軍方也從越戰中學到了經驗，特別是在惡名昭彰的西貢 five o’ clock follies 的事件中。當全球大

部份媒體工作團聚集於利雅德與達蘭的旅館內, 等待著前線傳回的共享報導時, 記者幾乎要完全依賴軍事發言人來提供戰事進展訊息。尤其是電視記者招待會, 幾乎引不起觀眾收看的興趣。但美國人還握有兩張王牌。首先便是如明星級一般的人物諾曼·史瓦茲柯夫將軍本人的公開露面。聯軍最高統帥隨時準備走向媒體前線的作法, 顯示出了當時軍方對媒體的重視程度。但萬一記者的態度變得太尖銳時, 軍方決定開放記者會以現場直播的方式播出。事後證明這是值回票價的作法。觀眾可以在電視上看出兩方的互動過程, 當多數在國際與軍事領域不專業的記者們提出了一大堆蠢問題, 卻得到了軍方溫和與專業的回應後, 民調顯示出了大眾對媒體的信任度遠遠落後於軍方。軍方因此抓住媒體想藉著科技傳遞即時性與刺激性戰爭訊息的心態, 來提高民意支持度。現場直播的記者會允許媒體繞過傳統的傳達角色, 直接的呈現給全球觀眾。運用這種方式能確保軍方版本的報導成為主流。但如果有的話, 軍方手上還有第二張王牌。他們可以播出由精確導彈鼻端攝影機所拍下的命中目標畫面, 展示出在聯軍部隊的精準打擊下, 儘可能的只造成一些不必要的微小損失。然而, 對於 B-52 轟炸機在伊拉克南部及科威特的地毯式轟炸, 軍方卻未提供任何資料畫面。使用媒體記者視為已有的視訊科技, 軍方展現了它們充份了解到媒體所扮演的偏頗性角色。在戰後才得知, 所謂的「智慧型科技」僅涵蓋了伊拉克境內轟炸行動中的百分之八而已。

The second element of the media strategy consisted of press conferences. Here, the military had again learned from the lessons of Vietnam and especially the notorious Saigon “five o’ clock follies”. With the majority of the world’s press corps holed up in hotels in Riyadh and Dhahran, waiting for the pool reports to come back from the front, journalists were completely reliant upon the military spokespeople for news about the progress of the war. For television in particular, press conferences are hardly riveting viewing. But the Americans had two aces up their sleeves. The first was a star performer in no less a figure than General (‘Stormin’) Norman Schwarzkopf himself. That the Supreme Commander of the coalition’s armed forces was prepared to front the key press conferences of the war was an indication of how seriously the military now regarded the media. But just in case journalists became truculent, the military decided to allow these press conferences to be transmitted “live”. This paid off with spades. Polls revealed that audiences, who trusted the military more than they did the media, watched these press conferences and saw journalists asking stupid questions – most were not specialised foreign and defence correspondents – and receiving polite and professional responses from military spokesmen. Public support for the military was thus achieved by highjacking the very technology the media wanted to exploit by making the war live and exciting. Live press conferences allowed the media to by-pass the traditional mediating role of the media and speak directly to global audiences. This ensured that the military version of events prevailed in the media coverage but, just in case, the military played their second ace when they began to release video-footage shot from nose cameras aboard precision-guided weapons hitting their targets in order to demonstrate that the coalition was causing as little “collateral damage” as possible. There was no footage released of the B-52 carpet-bombing of Southern Iraq and Kuwait. Using video technology that journalists had assumed was their own, the military had demonstrated that they too understood the role of media as distorting microscope. It was subsequently learned after the

war that the “smart technology” consisted of just 8% of the bombing of Iraqi forces.

對於這場猶如「電動遊戲戰爭」中發生的微小傷亡及損害的一面倒印象——是遠離事實的——只受到兩個真實挑戰的支配。首先便是由伊拉克人發射飛毛腿飛彈攻擊阿拉伯城市開始。來自媒體界的「旅館戰士」²⁶們，開始有機會親身體驗這場戰爭的真實了。但是它們到底看到了什麼？他們認為這次正親身見識了聯軍的「智慧型」戰具，在利雅德的現場看到了聯軍愛國者飛彈還擊的場面。愛國者飛彈的命中率在戰後受到了特別的檢驗。但記者們此時便能在同一時間內由下榻旅館屋頂提供精采畫面，而不再僅僅只扮演著始終受制於軍方操控下的角色。

The overwhelming impression of a “video-game war” in which little death and destruction was taking place – which was far from the truth – was subjected to only two real challenges. The first of these began when the Iraqis launched Scud missile attacks against Saudi cities. The “hotel warriors”²⁶ in the press corps now had a chance to see the ‘real war’ for themselves. But what did they see? They thought they were seeing for themselves this time coalition “smart” weaponry in live action in the form of the Patriot missile knocking out the Scuds as they reigned down on Riyadh. After the war, the accuracy of the Patriot missile came under particular scrutiny. But journalists were meantime able to transmit exciting footage from hotel roofs than merely served to reinforce what the military had been telling them all along.

對此種印象上挑戰的其他潛在威脅，以巴格達彈坑的型式出現。²⁷海珊也堅信越南症候群的力量。他相信或許無法贏得科威特境內的「戰爭之母」，但至少可以打擊西方國家內部的民意支持度，他允許西方媒體在戰事爆發後持續駐留首都巴格達，冀望媒體能捕捉到無辜婦孺與孩童在空襲下的淒慘畫面，引起大眾憤慨進而蔚為全球反戰風潮。無論在戰爭史與媒體播報史上，這都是一種史無前例的做法。對海珊來說，最大的問題在於聯軍瞄準巴格達的導彈，其擊中目標的精確度非常的高，命中率往往高達了九成，這在戰爭史上也是一種史無前例的現象。所以海珊的獨特宣傳計劃便宣告失敗。而在這期間僅有兩次可能成功的契機。第一次契機發生在號稱伊拉克的嬰兒奶粉工廠設施事件。聯軍宣稱這個工廠的用途為化學工廠，但當西方記者被護送進入該工廠採訪後發現了證據，證明了伊拉克的說法是成立的。雖然這個事件仍有許多可議之處，多數顯現出的證據仍是視情況而定的。整場戰爭中，伊拉克人僅持續護送媒體記者到平民區現場勘查一般民眾的損害狀況，卻根本不允許記者進入炸損的軍方基地與建築物採訪，因為擔心可能會提供敵方下一波的珍貴攻擊資訊。雖然，發生意外狀況的機率甚低，但不見得就不會發生。如果嬰兒奶粉工廠確實像聯軍所堅持的是軍事目標的話，試問，伊拉克人為何這次會違反了自己的一貫政策呢？

The other potential challenge to this impression came in the form of the Baghdad loophole.²⁷ Saddam Hussein also believed in the Vietnam Syndrome. Believing perhaps that he could not win the “Mother of All Battles” in Kuwait but that he could undermine popular support for the war in the west, he allowed television cameras from western news organisations to remain behind in Baghdad once the bombing began in the hope

that stomach churning images of bombed out innocent “women and children” would cause a wave of global revulsion. This was unprecedented in the history of warfare, and of media coverage of warfare. The problem for Saddam was that the coalition only targeted Baghdad with precision guided weapons, and these invariably hit their targets with a precision that was also unprecedented in the history of warfare, with about a 90% accuracy rate. And so his unique propaganda ploy failed. There were really only two moments when there was a possibility of success. The first came with the alleged bombing of Iraq’s sole ‘baby milk plant’ facility. The coalition claimed that it was a chemical weapons facility but the western journalists who were escorted to the scene saw evidence only of what Iraq claimed it to be. Although there is still much debate about this incident, the most revealing evidence remains circumstantial. Throughout the war, the Iraqis only ever escorted western journalists to scenes of civilian damage; at no time were journalists allowed to see military sites or buildings that had been hit for fear that their pictures would relay valuable targeting information to the watching coalition military. Although rare, accidents can, and do, happen. If the baby milk plant was indeed a military target, as the coalition maintained, why would the Iraqis break their policy now?

第二次契機發生在二月中旬，當巴格達近郊Amiriya軍事設施遭兩枚雷射導彈擊中造成了四百人傷亡，其中多數為無辜的婦孺與孩童。西方媒體記者在攻擊數小時後便被護送到現場，親眼見證了令人驚悚的場面，在搜救的過程中他們目睹了殘缺的屍塊由瓦礫堆中一一的清出。此事件終於證明了聯軍的攻擊正是衝著伊拉克平民而來的，而且根本不像聯軍所聲稱的僅攻擊軍事目標與指揮系統的說法。但海珊這一次還是又失算了。因為拍攝到的遇難者畫面是如此的慘不忍睹，以致大部份西方記者們不願意將這些血腥畫面完整的播放出來。基於維護電視播放畫面的「品味與體面」，剪輯者刪掉了（或自己過濾掉了）最駭人的畫面。就這樣，電視觀眾又再一次的錯過了目睹戰爭的真實殘酷面貌。儘管如此，播出的畫面還是相當的寫實，但主要的民意支持度卻沒有因此下滑。軍方還是有辦法透過現場直播的記者會來說服民眾相信，如果早知道那棟大樓內有四百位民眾，那這場攻擊絕對不會發生。某些通俗小報抓到了對此事件的解釋說法，認定了海珊有意犧牲自己民眾的生命，獻祭給了猶如祭壇的媒體。

The second incident came in the middle of February when an installation in the Amiriya suburb of Baghdad was hit by two laser-guided bombs, killing around 400 people – mostly innocent “women and children”. Western journalists were escorted to the scene within hours of the attack and were horrified at what they saw as rescue teams pulled out the charred remains of the victims. Here at last was evidence that the coalition was waging war against the people of Iraq and not just, as the coalition maintained, the Iraqi military and leadership. But again Saddam miscalculated. The images of the victims were so horrifying that most western broadcasters would not transmit them in the full gory horror. Editors omitted (or “self-censored”) the worst images on grounds of “taste and decency”. Once again, what real war can do to real people never reached the television audience. Although the images that were transmitted were still pretty graphic, majority public support for the war was not undermined. The military at its press conferences was able to convince its live television audience that if it had known those 400

people were inside the building, the attack would never have taken place. The tabloid media seized upon an explanation for what had happened: Saddam had deliberately sacrificed his own people on the altar of propaganda.

總結來說，波斯灣戰爭顯示了民主國家能在資訊世代中，藉著媒體與民意的力量來成功地進行戰爭。²⁸因為媒體無法親身參與「真正的戰事」，資訊的取得非得透過嚴密的資訊共享體制或嚴格過濾的巴格達當局不可；正因如此，美軍便能夠利用媒體記者對資訊的渴求度，提供了軍方版本的資訊與影帶來主導了媒體走向。軍方僅放出了正面資訊，卻迅速與強制的駁倒了任何來自巴格達彈坑的不利訊息。這種作法事後證明是可行的，因為這樣便可以軍方版本的戰爭模式與戰爭過程來「架構」媒體。海珊已被聯軍指揮系統被辨識為「新希勒特」，他們也塑造出了道德框架，來支撐聯軍由黷武與殘暴的伊拉克人手中進行解放科威特的「正義之戰」的形象。在這套體制的運作下，來自聯軍那方的訊息便成了「資訊」，來自伊拉克那一方的訊息就被解讀為「宣傳」。然而，聯軍成功的媒體經營，轉移了對於軍隊是否引導運作宣傳的注意力——在民主國家戰爭時期的傳統——而真正媒體的成果就被軍隊。我們可以預期現代的專業軍隊去引導媒體的管理，而在波斯灣戰爭中，他們做得非常的有效。媒體能否克盡職責的扮演好傳統角色，端視其在關鍵少數的立場上的如何來自我定位。

To sum up, the Gulf War demonstrated that democracies could wage war successfully with media and public support in the Information Age.²⁸ The US military did this by releasing information and video-tapes that journalists were hungry for because they could not get to the 'real war' themselves except via the severely restricted pools or in heavily censored Baghdad. It released only positive information and countered any negative impressions coming through the Baghdad loophole quickly and authoritatively which it could do because it "framed" the media agenda about what the war was about and the way it was being fought. Saddam had been identified as a "new Hitler" by the coalition leadership which established the moral framework for a "just war" to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression and atrocities, a framework in which coalition information was received as 'information' and Iraqi information was interpreted as "propaganda". The success of this coalition media management, however, diverted attention away from whether the military were conducting propaganda - in the democratic wartime tradition - and onto actual media performance in swallowing the military agenda uncritically. One can expect modern professional armies to conduct media management, and in the Gulf War, they did this very effectively. Whether the media performed their traditional role as effectively as they should have done depends upon one's own view of what role the media should play in mediating the doings of the few to the many.

就歷史觀之，國營媒體總會在戰爭時期顯現其愛國立場。這種現象常會被忽略掉。但當一個國家的軍隊（「我們的子弟兵」）為了追求國家利益（「我們的戰爭」）而出征，國營媒體機構（「我們的媒體」）在報導自己部隊的戰事進展時，常常會站在有利於軍方的角度。這種情形也不是一直如此。克里米亞戰爭（一八四五至一八五六年）期間，來自時代雜誌的民間媒體記者羅素首次出現在戰場時，就不喜歡眼前所看到的景象。他目睹了有名的英軍輕騎兵旅魯莽的衝鋒後，並沒有在報導中批

判軍隊，但他們卻批判了軍中的領導體系。結果，伴隨著媒體總是十分地吹毛求疵，使得報導產生了失真的假設，軍方檢查制度因而誕生。或者說，至少要到了也許是二十世紀媒體最不受管束的越戰（一九六三至一九七五年）時才發生。事實上，特別是在一九六八年後的媒體報導是否正真如軍方所宣稱的那樣地的充滿敵意，仍有許多的歷史研究對此說法持懷疑的態度。但可以確定的是，當代媒體經營管理技術應歸因於這個主張之上。

Historically, national media have always been patriotic in times of war. This is frequently forgotten, but when a nation's troops ("our boys") are deployed in pursuit of national interests ("our wars") the national media organisations which report on their progress ("our media") have more often than not supported the national war effort. It was not always thus. When civilian reporters first appeared on the battlefield for the first time during the Crimean War (1854-56), William Howard Russell of The Times in particular did not like what he saw. His reports did not criticise the troops – he witnessed the Charge of the Light Brigade – but they did criticise the military leadership. As a consequence, military censorship was born, along with the assumption that the press would always be critical, which did not prove to be the case. Or at least until the Vietnam War (c. 1963-75), which was perhaps the least censored war of the twentieth century. Much historical research has in fact questioned whether the media were as hostile to the military, especially after 1968, as is often alleged. But what is certain that contemporary media management techniques owe their origin to this allegation.

資訊戰與心理作戰

Information Warfare and Psychological Operations

不論是有意或是不經意地，自由媒體仍參與其中；在戰爭時期，宣傳戰並沒有排除軍隊需要去擁有自己的通訊媒體，以和敵人作戰。波斯灣戰爭時期就是心理戰的轉捩點，或者說，心理作戰在那時成為眾所皆知的名詞。這種戰時的軍事宣傳活動是由傳單、廣播及擴音器傳遞消息所構成的，用來勸告伊拉克軍隊「逃亡才能活命，留守只有死路一條」。大部分的伊拉克軍隊皆能高度地接受這樣的訊息，而且令人驚訝的是有六百萬九十萬的伊拉克軍人投降、逃亡或者變節。這些數量比實際在戰時被殺死的軍隊人數還要高出許多，而且為心理作戰新建立了一個所謂「戰力倍增器」的名聲。

That the free media become involved, willingly or unwittingly, in wartime propaganda campaigns does not preclude the need of the military to possess their own media of communication to engage with the enemy. The Gulf War was a watershed in the conduct of psychological warfare or, as it had become known by then, psychological operations (PSYOP). This combat propaganda campaign consisted of leaflets, broadcasts and loudspeaker messages directed at Iraqi troops urging them to "flee and live, or stay and die". The largely conscript Iraqi army was highly receptive to such messages, and an astonishing 69 million of them surrendered, deserted or defected. This figure was higher than the number of Iraqi troops that were actually killed during the war, and earned PSYOP a new found reputation as a "combat force multiplier".

波斯灣戰爭也被標榜為「第一場資訊戰」。²⁹這並非僅是一個對於軍隊的心理作戰或是媒體戰的簡單描述，它也包含了對於通訊的使用，以支持指揮與管制的作戰。在波斯灣戰爭開戰的第一個夜晚，有許多的成果在於打擊了伊拉克的指揮與管制作戰的能力，這包含了攻擊伊拉克的空防的防禦工事，以及其通訊系統（電話交換及發電廠）這波攻擊不僅僅是為了獲得空權優勢，也是為了阻隔斷絕伊拉克軍隊與其領導者之間的聯繫。再者，這個成功有助於聯軍以最少的傷亡贏得勝利，並且促使了一種準則上的轉變：即由指揮與管制的作戰轉變成指揮、管制、通訊、電腦以及情報系統。這樣的轉變發生於一九九〇年代，首先是「資訊戰」，以及較晚期的「資訊作戰」。

The Gulf War was also labelled the “first information war”.²⁹ This wasn't a simple description of the military's PSYOP or media campaigns. It also embraced the use of communications in support of Command and Control Warfare (C2W). On the opening night of the war, an enormous effort was made at striking at Iraqi C2W capabilities, including attacks on the Iraqi anti-aircraft defences and on its communications systems (telephone exchanges and power plants) in order not just to gain air superiority but also to cut off the Iraqi troops from their leadership. Again, the success of this effort was felt to have aided coalition victory with minimum casualties to the point where it prompted a doctrinal shift from C2W to C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) that was to emerge during the 1990s first as “Information Warfare” (IW) and latterly as “Information Operations” (IO).

值得重要強調的一點是，這些新的準則仍然是目前軍事事務革命中的一部份。³⁰至目前為止，仍沒有任何一項準則是穩固的——除了確認自冷戰結束之後，結合新國際環境所帶來的新科技，已經改變了我們去思考戰場、防禦、攻擊、人民的角色、資訊的角色等的傳統概念。在很多方面，對於資訊戰以及資訊作戰的想法並非新穎的。從古至今，戰爭的指揮官們總被認定為最重要的溝通角色，就如同拒絕相信敵人的情報以及保護自身的通訊系統一樣重要。在今天不同的是，通訊與資訊科技在戰爭作戰能力中的重要性。不論是否使用間諜衛星、採取雷達無法偵測的秘密轟炸行動、巡弋飛彈導航系統、夜視能力、飛行電訊監控系統、以及廣播電台；或者是使用行動式解碼通訊系統；就今日的軍事狀況而言，皆相當依賴在固然有很多好處、但也很脆弱的系統上。

It is important to emphasise that these new doctrines are still emerging as part of the on-going Revolution in Military Affairs.³⁰ Nothing is, as yet, fixed – only the recognition that new technologies, combined with the new international environment brought about since the end of the Cold War, have changed the way we need to think about traditional concepts of battlefields, defence, attack, the role of people and the role of information. In many respects, much of the thinking about IW and IO is not new. Commanders throughout history have always recognised the importance of communication in warfare and that it was just as important to deny information to an enemy as it was to protect one's own communications system. What is different today is the centrality of communications and information technology to war fighting capability. Whether it be

spy satellites, Stealth bombers invisible to radar, cruise missiles driven by computers, night-sight capability, flying television and radio stations or mobile encrypted communications, today's military forces are heavily dependent – perhaps too heavily dependent – upon systems that not only present new opportunities but also new vulnerabilities.

在介紹基本的資訊作戰準則之前，有必要指出前述提出的準則中幾個隱含的主要概念。就本質上而言，共產主義的瓦解以及「歷史的終結」，可說是民主政體國家的勝利；或嚴謹地說，這應該是民主的自由市場資本主義的勝利。愈來愈多的國家轉變他們的政治體系為不同形式的民主政體，共同的概念是民主國家不會相互攻擊；到目前為止，對於所謂的「新世界秩序」皆能相互達成一種檯面下的共識。民主國家依賴公眾意見、注重人權，以及能夠容許少數的政黨政治。自由市場資本主義與全球化息息相關。假若民主國家將其首要的敵人視為不民主的國家——如今被貼上「流氓國家」的標籤——其理論在於自由市場資本主義的民主國家，是偏好和平與貿易、而非戰爭的。當流氓國家威脅自由貿易市場，例如伊拉克威脅波斯灣的石油供應國家，那麼發動戰爭是「可以被證成的」；當流氓國家迫害人權時，例如塞爾維亞人對待科索沃的阿爾巴尼亞裔人民，那麼「人道介入」是可以被證成的。當流氓國家能夠放棄他們的極權獨裁體制以及反民主的政策時，那麼新國際共同體會樂觀其成地歡迎他們（例如塞爾維亞）；如果流氓國家無法這樣做，他們將受到國際的制裁（例如伊拉克）的確，在一九九 年代的國際共同體的軍事介入中——如索馬利亞、波士尼亞、海地、科索沃——無論是甚麼原因，但其背後所隱藏的假設是民主國家願意遵循這樣的規則，以及新的貿易伙伴能夠擴展全球市場。

Before outlining the basic principles of Information Operations, it is necessary to point to certain key ideas behind the emerging doctrines. The collapse of communism and “the end of history” was essentially a triumph of democracy or, strictly speaking, a triumph for democratic free-market capitalism. As more and more nations on earth transform their political systems into differing forms of democracy, the notion that democracies do not fight democracies – so far – constitutes an underlying assumption about the “New World Order”. Democracies rely upon public opinion, respect for human rights and toleration of minorities. Free-market capitalism relies upon trade within the context of globalisation. If democracies see their principal enemies as non-democracies – now labelled “rogue states” – the theory is that free-market capitalist democracies prefer peace and trade to war. Where free trade is jeopardised by a rogue state – such as Iraq's threat to oil supplies from the Gulf – then war is ‘justified’. Where human rights are violated and minorities persecuted by a rogue state – such as Serbia's treatment of the Kosovar Albanians – then “humanitarian intervention” is justified. When rogue states abandon their authoritarian or anti-democratic regimes, they are welcomed back into the new international community (e.g. Serbia). When they do not, they are subjected to international sanctions (e.g. Iraq). Indeed, in all the military interventions of the 1990s by the international community – Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo – for whatever reason, the hidden assumption was that democracy would follow and new trading partners could expand the global market.

假如民主的改革是尋求重獲和平，以及重建民主社會的價值，仍必須付出某種程度的代價成本。和其他事物相比，那些代價是可以衡量的，尤其是對人類生活造成危險的事物上。在西方的民主國家中，尤其是美國，對於在衝突中傷亡人數的注意，是相當敏感的。如前所述，民主國家認定非國家的主體，如國際恐怖份子，視同一種新的威脅，尤其在不對稱性的戰爭中特別不易防範；如二〇〇一年九月十一日的世界貿易大樓攻擊案，以及五角大廈攻擊案皆是活生生的例子。但在如波斯灣戰爭的「傳統」衝突中，聯軍的力量，在所謂「誤擊」下，殺害的聯軍數目比起伊拉克軍隊所造成的傷害還大。在一九九九年時介入科索沃，因為上述理由而採取空戰，而非地面攻擊。常被提及的是美國在索馬利亞的希望重整任務，因為電視播放在印度洋摩加迪休海港街上陣亡的陸戰隊員影像，形成意外的結果。這件事，在學術上引發關於被稱之為「CNN效果」的討論，戲劇化的照片能夠藉以驅策外交政策的決定。³¹假如上述是一個事實，這樣影像的欠缺，可能解釋了國際共同體讓其自身涉入在某些衝突、而非是其他衝突的原因之所在。再一次，它強化了現代媒體可以扮演的宣傳性角色。

If the price for the restoration of peace and the rebuilding of civil society was to be democratic reform, there was however to be a limit on the cost. That limit was measured, inter alia, in terms of the risk to human life. The western democracies, and the United States in particular, have become quite squeamish about absorbing casualties in conflicts. Accordingly, they identify non-state actors such as international terrorists as new threats to which they are particularly vulnerable in asymmetric warfare, as the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon revealed only too graphically. But in “traditional” conflict, like in the Gulf War, coalition forces killed almost as many of their own troops in “friendly fire” accidents than the Iraqis managed to achieve in combat. The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was to be an air campaign, not a ground attack, for the same reason. It is frequently asserted that the US mission in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) came to an abrupt end because of televised images of dead marines being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. This, in turn, has given rise to an academic debate about what has been termed “the CNN Effect”, whereby dramatic pictures can drive foreign policy decisions.³¹ If this is the case, the absence of such images is a possible explanation for why the international community involves itself in some conflicts but not others. Once more, it reinforces the propagandistic role which modern media can play.

更甚的，在另一方面，民主國家對於傷亡人數的增加過於敏感。當電視上播放民主國家開始進行反戰遊行，訴求「婦女與小孩是無辜的」時，看起來是不好的，並逐漸損害了他們自己的民主原則與價值的道德地位。因此，只有用「聰明」的武器來對抗巴格達以及貝爾格勒，而任何的「附加傷害」才能夠立即被原諒。在記者們之間針對一九九九年北約轟炸塞爾維亞國營電視台一事所發出國際性強烈的抗議，錯失了資訊戰的根本關鍵。傳播媒體不再單單只是戰爭的觀察者，他們是實際參與其中的，並且因此被認為是「合法的目標」。有鑒於第二次世界大戰中，對德國納粹空有虛名的「戰略性」轟炸，其首要目標是攻擊武器工廠以及船塢；若是現今，大部分所謂精準的導航武器皆能夠指向發電廠、電視、廣播以及電信局等單位。

Furthermore, there is squeamishness about inflicting casualties on the other side. It looks bad on television if democracies are being seen to wage war against “innocent women and children”; it undermines their moral position about democratic principles and values. Hence, only “smart” weapons were used against Baghdad and Belgrade and any “collateral damage” was apologised for immediately. The international outcry – amongst journalists – at the NATO bombing of Serbian State Television (RTS) in 1999 missed an essential point about Information Warfare. The media are no longer simple observers of war, they are actual participants within it and are thus regarded as ‘legitimate targets’. Whereas in the deceptively named World War Two “strategic” bombing campaign against Nazi Germany, the primary targets were weapons factories and ship-yards, now the largely accurately labelled precision-guided weaponry is directed at power stations, television and radio transmitters and telephone exchanges.

這依序展示了對於資訊戰/資訊作戰的另一種層面上的重要想法。在他們具有影響力的研究中——《戰爭與反戰爭論》，³²艾爾文·托夫勒和海迪·托夫勒論證國家從事戰爭，反映了他們在承平時期的如何經營他們的經濟。在《第三波》這一本早期的論著中，艾爾文·托夫勒提出這樣的論點：就歷史上來看，一個國家發展的過程需經歷三個階段，或者是說三個「波」。在第一波中，大都是農耕的社會型態；第二波是工業社會；第三波是後工業或所謂的「資訊」社會。農業社會是依季節週期性進行戰爭，以方便具有農夫身份的士兵能夠在沒有戰爭時回去農耕。工業社會進行的是工業化的戰爭，整場戰爭使用機關槍、坦克、戰艦以及炸彈和飛機等武器，並造成大量的死傷人數(軍人以及平民)。資訊社會中的電腦化資訊是目前最被廣為探討的一種戰爭方式，強調資訊情報可以與武器系統相比擬。

This in turn illustrates another important strand of thinking in IW/IO. In their influential work, *War and Anti-War*,³² Alvin and Heidi Toffler argued that the way nation states wage war reflects the way they conduct themselves economically in peace. In an earlier work, *The Third Wave*, Alvin Toffler argued that nation states historically develop through three stages, or “waves”. First wave societies are largely agrarian in nature, the second wave is industrial and the third wave is post-industrial or “informational” society. Agrarian societies wage war seasonally so that the farmer-soldiers can return for the harvest. Industrial societies wage industrialised warfare with machine guns, tanks, battleships and bombers and fight to the bitter end – Total War – suffering mass casualties (military and civilian). Informational societies for whom bits and bytes are now the currency of commerce thus place greater emphasis on information as a weapons system.

這些關於資訊時代的資本主義民主國家的廣泛議題，仍發現一些將理論付諸實際執行上的困難。在有些社會當中，前述的三波社會型態是重複且同步發生的。但在進步的民主社會中，其已建立了先進的軍事設備，並由漸漸地第二波社會型態發展至第三波社會型態。上述跡象顯示由大規模機械製造生產的基礎轉變為商業與金融服務上的經濟層面基礎。傳媒機構，像是時代華納公司，是世界上最大的跨國公司企業之一；如同微軟公司一樣，目前世界上有大約百分之九十的電腦使用人口皆是使用他們的作業系統。當CNN的創辦人泰德透納，可以捐獻一億美元給聯合國以協助改善其財政狀況時；貝魯斯康尼，義大利最富有的媒體大亨，則被選為該國首

相。在這樣的環境當中，許多的企業正思考如何進行所謂的「企業資訊作戰」著實不會令人感到驚訝。

These larger issues about Information Age capitalist democracies belie some of the difficulties about applying theory to practice. In some societies, the three different waves overlap simultaneously. But in advanced democratic societies with advanced military establishments, they are moving swiftly from the second to the third wave. Indications of this include the transition from manufacturing industrial bases to commercial and financial service based economies. Media organisations, such as Time Warner, are amongst the largest multinational corporations in the world, whereas about 90% of the world's computers utilise Microsoft's operating systems. Italy's richest media baron, Berlusconi, is elected Prime Minister while CNN's founder, Ted Turner, can donate one billion dollars to the United Nations to help it with its finances. In such an environment, it should come as no surprise that many businesses are now thinking about "corporate information warfare".

從資訊戰到心理作戰之演變

From Information Warfare to Information Operations

上述這些究竟和宣傳有些甚麼樣的關聯？當我們開始詳細探討資訊戰與資訊作戰的準則時，答案變得更清楚。首先我們必須區別資訊在戰爭中所扮演的角色，以及資訊戰本身。前者總是包含了涉及情報收集、監視與偵察，關於天氣狀況與地形的資訊，以及其他有助於在何時與何地進行有關軍力部署之指揮決定等的活動。另一方面而言，資訊戰由主要四個基本的要素所組成：(一)資訊的防止及保護，包含了作戰安全；(二)攻擊敵人資訊與資料系統的運用與能力，尤其目前是採取所謂的電子戰來攻擊對方的電腦網路以及電力系統等；(三)以包括欺騙、偽造及扭曲等各式各樣的方式，以進行詭計；(四)是影響戰爭態度的能力。根據聯戰出版品第三之一三號對資訊戰一詞所下的定義為「在危機與衝突的時期實施資訊作戰，以達到或促進針對特定敵人或敵人們的特定目標」。³³在相同文件中，對於資訊作戰一詞定義為「當防禦自己的資訊及資訊系統時，亦能夠發動影響敵人資訊及其資訊系統的行動」。³⁴這將資訊作戰區分為兩個更進一步的活動：網路作戰（包含電腦網路攻擊及其防禦）以及由心理作戰和欺敵詭計所組成，去影響其戰爭態度。

What is the relevance of propaganda to all of this? The answer will become clearer if we now turn in detail to IW/IO doctrine. We first need to distinguish between the role of information in warfare and information warfare itself. The former has always consisted on activities involving intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance, information about weather and terrain and indeed any other activity designed to assist command decisions about where and when to deploy armed forces. Information warfare, on the other hand, consists essentially of four elements: (1) the denial and protection of information, including Operational Security (OPSEC); (2) the exploitation and ability to attack enemy information and data systems, which now embraces electronic warfare (EW), attacks on computer networks and on enemy power systems; (3) deception by various means including spoofing, imitation and distortion; and (4) the ability to influ-

ence attitudes.³³ According to the Joint Publication 3-13, IW is defined as “information operations conducted during time of crisis of conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries”. The same document defines IO as “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems”.³⁴ This divides IO into two further activities, Cyber Operations (consisting of Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Defence), and Influence Attitudes, consisting of PSYOP and Deception.

影響的作戰是相當特別的領域，逐漸為人所知的「知覺管理」，便是在這裡最關係到我們的。知覺管理可能成為宣傳的另一個化名。根據一些理論學家的論點，它需要包含建構許多的溝通實踐，包括公共交際（以及個人交際）、傳播媒體關係（像歐洲的公共資訊，以及美國的公共事務）、心理作戰以及甚至像文化與教育關係上的「軟性」力量。這些領域皆有能力說服他人接受「我們的真理」，主要奠基於具公信力的資訊來源，進行著無論是短期性的行動，像是電台廣播或印製論文；或者是教育和文化領域的長期性活動。就像我們所見的歷史案例，可信度取決於目標觀眾與聽眾的意願（不論是個人的、或整體人口中的特定團體）願意相信他們所被告知的訊息。在傳播媒體由國家監控，以及像是意見投票這樣的基本民主訴求不被重視的極權政體中，這些目標觀眾與聽眾已經被國家機器設定接受並相信一些不同的「事實」或是價值，那麼這就是一個較為棘手的課題。「他們的真理」也許年復一年地深根於「他們」國家的宣傳，並在嚴厲懲罰任何拒絕接受國家規範的異議者之恐怖政策的政權下被強化，資訊作戰就可能無效。舉例來說，在資訊作戰剛萌芽且尚未成形時，適逢科索沃衝突，而當時就被運用來對付塞爾維亞政府。這嘗試讓塞爾維亞人民相信，由米洛塞維奇政府所傳達出要讓人民相信的訊息並非全然地正確。當時有超過百萬張的傳單空投至塞爾維亞以及科索沃境內，傳單內容說明北約並不是對抗塞爾維亞人民，而是對抗米洛塞維奇政府，抗議其政權在科索沃境內進行「種族淨化」的不當行為。國際媒體再度重演一場波斯灣戰爭的媒體管理戰，並使得前述議題再度引起討論；但甚至是當「間接傷害」發生時，卻鮮少質疑北約空襲在國際法上的正當性。然而，此時這些傳播媒體如CNN、Sky News、英國國家廣播公司卻也捕捉了部分塞爾維亞人民的目光。雖然，許多在幾個月前上街示威反對米洛塞維奇政府的塞爾維亞人民，他們拒絕相信自由民主的西方傳播媒體，因為其與北約可能為同一陣線聯盟。他們寧可更準備去相信是北約組織的轟炸行為，而不是由「他們」部隊所進行的種族進化，使科索沃境內的阿爾巴尼亞裔人民逃離其省分。當一個國家被攻擊，會相當大程度地發生認知的不一致。

It is this particular area, Influence Operations, increasingly known as “Perception Management”, which concerns us most here. Perception Management may well be yet another pseudonym for propaganda. According to some theorists, it needs to embrace a number of established communication practices, including public diplomacy (and private diplomacy), media relations (known as Public Information in Europe, and as Public Affairs in the USA), PSYOP and even the exercise of “soft” power such as cultural and educational relations. These are the areas in which the ability to convince others of “our truth”, whether by short-term activity such as radio broadcasting or press conferences, or by longer-term work in the areas of educational and cultural activity, depends criti-

cally upon the credibility of the information source. That credibility, as we have seen through our historical examples, very much depends upon the willingness of the target audience (whether it be individuals, specific groups of entire populations) to believe what they are being told. This is a much harder task when the target audience, especially in an authoritarian regime where the media are state controlled and fundamental aspects of democracy like opinion polling are denied, has been subjected to believing a different set of 'facts' or values. "Their truth" may be so deep-rooted by years of "their" state's propaganda, and reinforced by a terroristic police regime which punishes harshly any dissent from the accepted state norm, that IO has its work cut out for it. For example, a rudimentary and far from co-ordinated Information Operation, was conducted against Serbia during the Kosovo conflict. This was an attempt to convince the Serb people that all was not as the Milosovic regime would have them believe. Over 100 million leaflets were dropped over Serbia and Kosovo during the campaign explaining that NATO was not fighting the Serbian people but the Milosovich government which was conducting "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo. The international media, in a re-run of the Gulf War media management campaign, bought into this agenda and rarely questioned the legitimacy of NATO's air strikes in international law, even when "collateral damage" took place. This time, however, news services like CNN, Sky News and BBC World could be received by a sizeable portion of the Serb population. Although many Serbs, only months earlier, had been involved in street demonstrations against Milosovic, they refused to believe the free democratic western media because they seemed to be in collusion with the NATO alliance. Rather, they were more prepared to believe their own media which argued that the Kosovar Albanians were fleeing the province because of NATO bombing, not because of ethnic cleansing by "their" troops. When a nation is attacked, cognitive dissonance takes place on a massive scale.

這並不是倡議「種族淨化」沒有發生在科索沃。至目前為止，戰後調查所顯示的，並沒有像北約發言人在當時所宣稱的情況發生。因此，鑑於北約的知覺管理對於北約的成員國而言具有高度的效力，在他們相當支持空戰必要性的人民之間，以及在他們自己的國營媒體，對塞爾維亞的短期感受，是失敗的。當電視新聞記者群報導南斯拉夫軍人從科索沃撤退的情況，是想要簡單地讓大家都看到——排除心理作戰做為「戰力倍增器」之真實性的質疑；或至少當目標是一個專業軍隊時，而不像是被徵召來的伊拉克軍人。當米勒塞維奇以忽視國家選舉的結果來表明他自己對於民主的態度之後，塞爾維亞的人民透過「柔軟革命」在第二年推翻其政權。當一個國家舉行民意投票時，就必須要接受投票的結果。

This is not to suggest that no "ethnic cleansing" took place in Kosovo. Yet post conflict investigations are revealing that it was nothing like on the scale that NATO spokespeople were claiming at the time. So whereas NATO perception management was highly effective in NATO's member countries, among their populations who largely supported the necessity of the air campaign and within their own national media organisations, it singularly failed in any short-term sense with the Serbs. The defiance of Yugoslavian soldiers as they withdrew from Kosovo, filmed by television news crews, was plain for all to see – casting some doubt on the veracity of PSYOP as a "combat force multiplier", or at least when the target was a professional army, unlike the conscripted Iraqis. As for the Serb population, it took another year to overthrow the Milosovich re-

gime in a “velvet revolution” after he had revealed his own attitude to the democratic process by ignoring the outcome of the national election. When a nation goes to the polls, the state does need to accept the outcome.

令人感到諷刺的是，做為將資訊作戰當成是二十一資訊時代新準則的領導擁護者的美國，發現自己在二〇〇〇年總統大選中，遇到最終必須透過法律途徑解決的選舉窘境。小布希總統最初宣稱「新世界秩序」的存在是透過拒絕簽訂京都生態議定書，以及決定推動「星戰計畫」飛彈防禦系統區分了國際社會。軍事顧問們向小布希總統提供許多有關於誰才是新國際情勢中的真正敵人——例如流氓國家、非民主政體、恐怖份子、國際性犯罪組織以及毒販等。目前尚存的共產政權，如北韓、中華人民共和國、以及較次要程度的古巴，皆經由私下的交往，以及像是自由亞洲電台或是馬蒂電視電台般的「軟性」力量相適應。冷戰時期的反共產政權的心理戰已稍稍趨於緩和，幾分是因為民主尚未完全進入這些政權中；既然這樣，透過自由市場資本主義的力量帶來其覺醒，也許就有一些希望。然而，布希與高爾選戰的荒誕，只是使他們領導、鼓吹民主轉型的好處的公信度瀕臨於危險之地。

It is ironic that the United States, as the leading proponent of Information Operations as the new doctrine for the 21st century Information Age, found itself in an election quandary following the Presidential campaign of 2000 that was eventually resolved by legal process. The son of the President who had originally declared the existence of a New World Order is dividing the international community through his rejection of the Kyoto environmental protocols and with his determination to push ahead with the “Star Wars” missile defence system. The military advisors to President George W. Bush share many of the concerns about who the real enemies of the new international system really are – rogue states, non-democracies, terrorists, international criminals and drug traffickers. The surviving communist regimes, in North Korea, the People’s Republic of China and, to a lesser extent Cuba, are being accommodated through private diplomacy backed up by the use of “soft” power in the form of Radio Free Asia and Radio and TV Marti. The anti-communist psychological warfare of the Cold War era has moderated somewhat because if democracy hasn’t quite arrived in those regimes, then there is some hope that the forces of free-market capitalism might bring democracy in its wake. Yet the farce of the Bush-Gore election can only serve to jeopardise the credibility of the leading advocate of the benefits of democratic transition.

有一個可預見地更進一步的威脅。當資訊作戰的準則獲得支持後，有一些人會透過知覺管理的角度，視欺騙詭計為在未來衝突中取勝一個不可分的部分。雖然欺騙詭計在特洛伊木馬屠城之後，已經成為戰鬥中的一部份；但它被運用在嚴密的不為人知狀態，且奠基在假設它通常只能運作成功一次。隨著資訊作戰準則將欺敵詭計與其他影響態度的面向並置在一起，其包含了心理作戰，以及可能甚至是媒體作戰。假若它發生了，那些活動的公信度——奠基在其成功的公信度——將嚴重地妥協了。假如某一部份的資訊作戰失去其可信度時，那麼整個作戰將會遭遇同樣的命運。倘若勝利的慾望是在避免傷亡的同時，幾乎必須花上那些民主價值的代價；那麼，「我們的真理」，以及其民主價值的基礎，可能會遭受無法挽回的損害。

There is one further threat on the horizon. As IO doctrine unfolds, there are those who would see deception as an integral part of winning any future conflict through perception management. Although deception has been an integral part of war-fighting since the Trojan Horse, it has largely been conducted in strict secrecy and on the assumption that it can usually only work once. Emerging IO doctrine places deception alongside other aspects of Influence Attitudes, including PSYOP and possibly even media operations. If that happens, the credibility of both of those activities – which depend upon credibility for their success – will be severely compromised. And if one part of the information operation loses its credibility, then the entire operation will suffer the same fate. “Our truth”, with its basis in democratic values, could be undermined irreparably by the desire to win while avoiding casualties almost at the expense of those values.

這並不是否認欺敵詭計在戰時的重要性。這只不過是去警告在部署時固有的危機，舉例來說，像是二次世界大戰的黑暗宣傳。那時，像英國國家廣播公司般的正當機構，瞭解到他們無法冒險以政治戰爭事務執行機構的骯髒活動來玷污其公信力。。長期來看，這似乎是不值得的。只能希望這個教訓不會在資訊作戰的鼓吹者中喪失掉。舉一個近來具相關性而被扭曲的，那就是軟性戰爭的概念。其被定義為「具有敵意地使用全球性視訊媒體，特別是電視，藉著改變其對現實的觀點，來形塑某一個國家的意志」。³⁵ 因為資訊戰 / 資訊作戰有其如同攻擊優勢般地脆弱性，是故，塞爾維亞就成功地以包括使用網際網路的軟性戰爭概念，³⁶ 以及一種誘敵而不單只是防禦敵方的攻擊，贏得科索沃的衝突。這告訴我們在未來的衝突事件中，有必要去規劃攻擊性地軟性戰爭的戰略。假若這透過自由媒體來完成，而除非它在不確定的時間中保持絕對的機密度，所有其他的資訊作戰的公信力將嚴重地損害。

This is not to deny the importance of deception in wartime. It is merely to warn of the dangers that were inherent in the deployment, for example, of black propaganda in World War Two. Then, white organisations like the BBC understood that they could not risk their credibility by being tarnished with the black activities of the Political Warfare Executive. It simply wasn't worth it in the long term. One can only hope that the lesson will not be lost on the proponents of Information Operations. Take for example a relatively recent twist, namely the notion of SOFTWAR. This is defined as “the hostile use of global visual media, especially television, to shape another nation's will, by changing its view of reality”.³⁵ Because IW/IO embraces vulnerabilities as well as offensive opportunities, Serb success with this SOFTWAR concept during the Kosovo conflict, including the use of the Internet,³⁶ there may be a temptation that instead of just defending against such attacks, there will be a need to plan offensive SOFTWAR strategies in the event of future conflict. If this is done via the free media, then unless it is kept absolutely secret for an indefinite period of time, the credibility of all other information operations will be seriously undermined.

結論 Conclusions

宣傳行為是個複雜的事務，且透過定義它是「好的」或「壞的」事情，也是無幫助的。宣傳似乎是一個設計用來對其發起人有好處的說服過程。目前北約組織對其定義為「任何的訊息、理念、準則或者是以傳播方式影響公眾意見的特定請求、情感、態度或者特定團體的行為模式等，皆是為了直接或間接地提供利益給遊說者」。這個廣闊的概念亦可以輕易地運用於廣告或者公關方面。它因而保持著一個價值中立的過程。價值判斷實際上是否為好或壞的方式因人而異，但若透過參考這些遊說的訊息意圖來檢視其好壞，應該將會更有助益。假如這些意圖提倡了侵略以及仇恨行為，妨害了人類權利，迫害少數族群，或者是禁止言論或宗教自由，那麼就無法見容於民主的過程中；但假如這些意圖可以提倡民主的價值，不論是存在於或不存在於人民意見的聖壇上，那麼民主政體皆不需要害怕發聲相挺。然而，其主要的問題為因為宣傳行為是為了提供消息來源者之利益而設計的一種手段，而非那些訊息接受者；假如訊息接受者能夠與消息來源者站在同一個陣線的話，那麼就可以減少這個問題的發生。換句話說，假如人民選舉了一個政府，並且有機會在未來的同一天推翻它，那麼這些可以決定政府統治以及軍事戰爭的人民們，就可以完全地準備接受或者是反對這些用以驗證其政府行為的批評和意見。

Propaganda is a complex business and one which has not been helped by those who define it in terms of it being a "good" or a "bad" thing. Propaganda is simply a process of persuasion designed to benefit its originator. The current NATO definition is that it is "any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly". This broad concept could just as easily be applied to advertising or public relations. It therefore remains a value-neutral process. Value judgments about whether it is in fact a "good" or a 'bad' thing would more profitably be examined by reference to the intentions of those originating the messages. If the intention is to promote aggression and hatred, violation of human rights, persecution of minorities, or denial of free speech or religion, then there is no place for it in the democratic process. But if the intention is to promote democratic values, which survive or fall on the altar of the will of the people, then democracies need not fight shy of the word. However, the main problem arises because propaganda is designed to benefit the interests of the source rather than those of the recipient. This problem diminishes if the desires of the recipient coincide with those of the source. In other words, if a people has elected a government - and has the opportunity to reject it at some future date - then the people in whose name the government rule and its military fight are quite prepared to accept, or reject, the arguments and opinions used to justify their government's actions.

就傳統上而言，自由民主的傳播媒體等同於守門人一般，不論是必須的還是適當的，其責任是為了確保政府是否實施其政策，以及對政府的議題提供平衡報導。在「我們的戰爭」中，如我們所看到的，這個並沒有傾向像媒體或公眾一般平息在「我們的孩子」的背後。其問題在於過於期望伊拉克以及塞爾維亞兩個戰爭情況，我們不再是與「我們的戰爭」進行作戰。對於日漸衰退的意識型態我們必須做些事情，或者至少對所謂的冷戰時期兩極化的意識型態做些事情。當許多的敵對政權在衰頹時，民主政體已佔有優勢。其敵人的本質正逐漸改變為跨國界的因素，以及

有時候甚至是個別行動者所引起的極大危險情況，如同紐約以及華盛頓的人民在代價中所學得的。我們應期望我們的專業軍隊仍然可以在國家發生危急事件時保持其專業性，而他們應該在這個快速變化的世界中，擁抱新的思想模式以及新技巧，並且以一種人道和其他形式的介入中進行部署，是適當的。假如他們未來的角色不只是捍衛民主政體，且去促進它的話，那麼這就可以建構出一個對於其主要敵人所組成非民主政體之新形式的「意識形態」攻擊。在這樣的大環境氛圍下，對他們而言是相當基本的去瞭解，假使他們是在販賣民主的生意中，他們也應該注意將民主賣出後的危險。

Traditionally, the free democratic media served as a watchdog to ensure that this concordat was happening, and to provide a counter-balance to government arguments where necessary or appropriate. In "our wars", as we have seen, this tends not to happen as the media and public alike rally behind "our boys". The problem is that, with the exception of the Iraqis and the Serbs, we don't fight "our wars" anymore. This may have something to do with the decline of ideology, or at least of the kind of polarised ideology of the Cold War era. Democracy is in the ascendancy while the number of its enemies is in decline. The nature of its enemies is changing to one where transnational factors and sometimes even individual actors pose the greatest dangers, as the people of New York and Washington have learned to their cost. We would expect our professional armed forces to remain professional in the event of a national emergency, and it is appropriate that they should embrace news ways of thinking and new skills in a rapidly changing world in which they might be deployed in humanitarian or other forms of interventions. If their future role is not just to defend democracy but also to promote it, then this could be construed as a new form of 'ideological' attack on those non-democracies that constitute its principal enemies. In such a climate, it is essential for them to realise that if they are to be in the business of selling democracy, they should also beware the dangers of selling it out.

註釋

Reference

- ¹ See Ladislav Bittman edited, **The New Image Makers: Soviet Propaganda & Disinformation Today** (Washington & London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).
- ² Alan P. L. Liu, **Communications and National Integration in Communist China** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
- ³ See Philip M. Taylor, **Munitions of the Mind: A History of War Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day** (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).
- ⁴ For further details, see M.L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, **British Propaganda during the First World War** (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982).
- ⁵ In particular, see Lord Ponsoby's **Best-Selling Work Falsehood in Wartime** (London: Allen & Urwin, 1928).
- ⁶ See Richard Taylor, **Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany** (London: Croom Helm, 1979), David Welch, **Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations** (London: Croom Helm, 1983) and Peter Kenez, **The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
- ⁷ On British inter-war propaganda, see Philip M. Taylor, **The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-39** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), D. Le Mahieu, **A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind in Britain between the Wars** (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) and M. Grant, **Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain** (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).

- ⁸ There are now numerous works on Cold War propaganda, but in particular see Nancy E. Bernhard, **U.S. Television news and Cold War propaganda, 1947-1960** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and G.D. Rawnsley edited, **Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s**(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
- ⁹ J.C.W. Reith, **Into the Wind** (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1949).
- ¹⁰ On Second World Propaganda, see M. Balfour, **Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany** (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), George H. Roeder, Jr, **The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War Two** (London: New Haven, 1993)
- ¹¹ For a psychology perspective on this topic see Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, **Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion** (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2001).
- ¹² On British psychological warfare see C. Cruickshank, **The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938-45** (London: Davis- Poynter, 1977)
- ¹³ See Ellic Howe, **The Black Game: British Subversive Operations against the Germans during the Second World War** (London: Michael Joseph, 1982).
- ¹⁴ L. Bittman, **The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View**(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985).
- ¹⁵ Susan L. Carruthers, **Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-60** (London: Leicester University Press, 1995); Caroline Page, **U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: the Limits of Persuasion** (London: Leicester University Press, 1996); Jon Elliston, **Psywar on Cuba: the Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda** (New York: Ocean Press, 1999)
- ¹⁶ See W. L. Hixson, **Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-61** (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) and Tony Shaw, **British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus** (London: I.B. Taurus, 2001).
- ¹⁷ Gary D. Rawnsley, **Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956-64** (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Michael Nelson, **War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War** (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); A. Puddington, **Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty** (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000).
- ¹⁸ L. Bittman edited, **The New Image Makers** .
- ¹⁹ Gladys D. Ganley, **The Exploding Power of Personal Media** (Norwood: New Jersey, Ablex, 1992)
- ²⁰ Philip M. Taylor, **Global Communications: International Affairs and the Media since 1945** (London: Routledge, 1997).
- ²¹ Jeffrey T. Checkel, **Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
- ²² F. Fukuyama, **The End of History and the Last Man** (New York: Avon, 1993)
- ²³ Philip M. Taylor, **War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War** (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, 1998).
- ²⁴ D. Hallin, **The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
- ²⁵ J. Sharkey, **Under Fire** (Washington: University Press of America, 1995).
- ²⁶ John Fialka, **Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War** (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992).
- ²⁷ Peter Arnett, **Live from the Battlefield: from Vietnam to Baghdad: 35 Years in the World's War Zones** (London: Corgi, 1995).
- ²⁸ Work on these aspects of the Gulf War are too numerous to mention here. But especially important are: J. R. Baroody, **Media Access and the Military: The Case of the Gulf War** (Lanham: Md, University Press of America, 1998); W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz edited, **Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War** (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Rik Atkinson, **Crusade** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993).
- ²⁹ Alan D. Campen, **The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War** (Fairfax: Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1992)
- ³⁰ Colin S. Gray, **The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment** (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997).
- ³¹ Philip Seib, **Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy** (Westport: Ct., Praeger, 1997).
- ³² A. & H. Toffler, **War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century** (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1993).
- ³³ M. Libicki, **What Is Information Warfare?**(<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum28.html>).
- ³⁴ The document can be downloaded from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf .
- ³⁵ Chuck de Caro, "SOFTWARE and Grand Strategy: Liddell Hart Updated" in A.D. Campen and D. H. Dearth edited, **Cyberwar 3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict** (AFCEA International Press, 2000) pp. 87-96.
- ³⁶ See Philip M. Taylor, "The World Wide Web Goes to War."