


ARTS & MINDS

Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions



Based on a Conference Presented by the
National Arts Journalism Program,
Arts International and
the Center for Arts & Culture

The edited and abbreviated transcript herein originated with "Arts & Minds: A Conference on Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions," presented by the National Arts Journalism Program, Arts International and the Center for Arts and Culture on April 14-15, 2003, at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. The conference was made possible with support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation.

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Funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts and based at Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, in association with Columbia's School of the Arts, the National Arts Journalism Program administers fellowships for journalists in the fields of arts and culture. The NAJP also serves as a forum for discussion of challenging and timely issues at the crossroads of arts and culture, journalism and public policy, through publications, panels and conferences which bring together professionals from these fields.

ABOUT THE CENTER FOR ARTS AND CULTURE

The Center for Arts and Culture is an independent think tank that aims to broaden and deepen the national conversation on culture and cultural policies. Founded in 1994 in Washington, D.C., the Center commissions research, holds public roundtables and publishes new voices and perspectives on the arts and culture. Its mission is to enlarge the public vision of the centrality of the arts and culture in everyday life.


ABOUT ARTS INTERNATIONAL

Arts International is the only private-sector organization in the United States solely dedicated to increasing international exchange and dialogue in the arts, believing that the movement of art and artists across borders fosters intercultural understanding and respect for difference and contributes to the creation of a better, more peaceful world. Arts International carries out its work through direct grant-making to artists and companies and partnerships with the institutions that serve them, through Web-based information services, and through special projects that increase contact and collaboration in and with underserved regions.

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ARTS & MINDS

Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions



Introduction by Michael Z. Wise, 2002-03 NAJP Research Fellow

Based on a conference presented by the
National Arts Journalism Program,
Arts International and
the Center for Arts & Culture



CENTER
FOR ARTS
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Introduction

MOUNTING CONCERN ABOUT America’s image abroad has focused new attention on the use of art and culture as a diplomatic tool. Reviving the official deployment of culture to boost receptivity to American values has been the subject of recent debate, with the chairman of the House Committee on International Relations asking, “How is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has allowed such a destructive and parodied image of itself?”

Over the past decade, overall funding for U.S. government-sponsored cultural and educational programs abroad fell by over 33 percent. Although the United States has largely dismantled the apparatus of cultural diplomacy built up during the Cold War, Sept. 11 and its aftermath have challenged the wisdom of that move. The story of how cutbacks in cultural diplomacy have left the United States ill-prepared to deal with rising anti-Americanism has been largely missed by the American press.

“Arts & Minds: A Conference on Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions,” was held on April 14-15, 2003 at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism to put a needed spotlight on cultural diplomacy’s history, viability and prospects. The event, sponsored by the National Arts Journalism Program, Arts International and the Center for Arts and Culture, brought together prominent U.S. and foreign diplomats, historians, artists, arts administrators and journalists. An audience of over 300 people explored how new cultural programs might play a role in recasting the U.S. image and promote international understanding. The conference also probed the efficacy of American cultural diplomacy during its Cold War heyday and highlighted the cultural diplomacy campaigns now being waged by foreign nations with a view toward drawing lessons for U.S. policy. Special attention was paid to the outlook for U.S. cultural diplomatic initiatives in the Islamic world.

During the Cold War, the U.S. government flooded much of the world with American orchestras, dance troupes, arts exhibits and jazz performances. An intensive operation to covertly support still more cultural and intellectual activity abroad was backed by

the Central Intelligence Agency. Once the communist threat waned after 1991; however, U.S. cultural initiatives abroad were severely cut back. In 1999, the United States Information Agency, which had been responsible for many of the non-covert efforts, was folded into the State Department.

“While it would be completely inappropriate for such [covert] sponsorship to take place today, it is useful to recognize that promotion of the American culture was considered vital to the security of the United States,” Helena Kane Finn, a senior foreign service officer, said in the conference’s opening presentation. “In an era when this great city of New York has been the victim of a horrific act of terrorism, perpetrated by extremists willing to cause the deaths of thousands of civilians in the name of some distorted religious ideology, it is clear that cultural diplomacy is very much in the security interest of the United States. We must reenter the battlefield of ideas with every bit as much determination as we did during the Cold War.”

The Bush administration’s efforts to improve America’s global standing in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks were criticized by many conference speakers as failed moves based on a misunderstanding of anti-American sentiment and its genesis. The administration’s campaign was directed by Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Charlotte Beers, a former leading advertising executive. Just a few weeks before the conference took place, in March of 2003, Beers resigned her post, citing health reasons. In the year and a half she spent at the State Department, Beers helped produce videos, pamphlets, booklets and other materials that promoted the view of the United States as a place hospitable to all religions.

The State Department declined to send a representative to present its latest plans for cultural initiatives at the conference, citing the war in Iraq and recent personnel changes within the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs following the resignation of Under Secretary Beers. Two former U.S. ambassadors, Felix Rohatyn and Cynthia Schneider, as well as former State Department Spokesman Hodding Carter, and former U.S. Cultural Affairs Officer John Brown, joined former Assistant Secretary of State Helena Finn in addressing the conference.

“Arts & Minds” opened just days after U.S. military troops entered Baghdad and forced the regime of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to collapse. When she spoke, Finn, on leave from the foreign service as a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, stressed that “we have a very serious job to do when much of the world views our liberation of Iraq as an occupation and questions the legitimacy of the war.”

People around the world embrace things American and at the same time decry the influence of the United States in their lives.

The depth of antipathy to U.S. power was demonstrated by Andrew Kohut, director of The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, who presented polling results showing a plummeting decline in positive attitudes toward the United States among citizens not only of underdeveloped nations but also of prosperous countries which have been Washington’s traditional allies. Kohut said that in many cases this drop was directly related to American policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although he also cited contradictory polling results that indicated people around the world embrace things American and at the same time decry the influence of the United States in their lives. Cultural diplomacy could only have a marginal effect in improving America’s standing internationally, in Kohut’s view.

But Richard Bulliet, a Columbia University historian of Islam, objected that it was erroneous to think that hostility in the Muslim world could be erased by short-term policy changes, and that deeper forces were involved. And in response to Kohut’s assertion that cultural diplomacy could have only marginal impact, other speakers like Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute insisted that the United States would still be well advised to revitalize cultural programming abroad, devoting far more resources to this area and developing the manpower needed to wage what he called a “war of ideas.”

Many conference speakers urged not only the presentation of a broader range of American cultural achievements abroad than is currently conveyed through commercial channels, but also emphasized the need for Americans to learn more about other cultures, most notably those of the Islamic world. “We have a very difficult time selling a message to an audience where we don’t understand what is motivating the audience,” said Bulliet. He and other speakers described American diplomats as often poorly equipped to deal with cultural matters, and said that even those foreign

service officers possessing a profound knowledge of regional cultures are thwarted from effective use of their expertise.

While many speakers attached considerable importance to cultural diplomacy as a two-way street, conference participants bemoaned the erection of new hurdles to true exchange, with U.S. immigration authorities having made it exceedingly difficult in recent months for foreign artists to obtain visas to come to America for performances and other cultural presentations.

It was also suggested that Washington undertake increased efforts at cultural preservation abroad. By helping foreign cultures preserve their monuments and artifacts, the United States could demonstrate its respect for other civilizations and simultaneously affirm its own values like esteem for diversity and the free flow of ideas. This respect for other civilizations was in scant evidence just days before the conference began, when U.S. forces did nothing to halt looting of the National Museum in Baghdad, although the American army took pains to secure the Iraqi Ministry of Petroleum.

Conference attendees told the meeting that they had strongly warned the Defense Department about the possibility of such pillaging before the war and cited the theft of thousands of objects from museums and archaeological sites after the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. The failure of American troops to protect the museum resulted in a cultural calamity that the United States should make every effort to rectify, the conference was told. In the weeks following the conference, the U.S. government pledged its support for efforts to recover looted artworks, and American investigators in Iraq subsequently recovered hundreds of artifacts and tens of thousands of ancient manuscripts taken from the museum.

The lack of military planning that might have halted the looting in Baghdad, in the view of many conference participants, went hand in hand with the U.S. government’s failure to accord appropriate significance to the role of culture in public life. This corresponded as well to a long held American aversion toward government involvement in the arts that is in contrast to the prevailing attitudes within many foreign nations. In the conference’s keynote address, the choreographer Trisha Brown said that, while in France her work has been valued for over 30 years in the form of state-supported subsidies and commissions, in the United States her dance company was struggling for its very survival.

A panel of historians traced and analyzed the use of cultural diplomacy over time, including the creation in 1938 of a division of cultural relations in the State Department amid considerable American ambivalence about such an endeavor. Also explored were the CIA’s covert funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the State Department’s use of African-American musicians as unofficial U.S. envoys at a time when these musicians’ civil rights were under attack at home. Volker Berghahn, the Columbia University historian who moderated the panel, recalled the important role of major foundations in promoting cultural ventures abroad. But foundation involvement in this area now seems a relic of the past, according to NAJP Deputy Director András Szántó, who said his research for the Center for Arts and Culture had found that of the 50 largest private philanthropies in America, less than 0.2 percent of their combined funding goes to this area. And, within the 50 largest foundations, the cultural exchange programs targeted at the Middle East add up to less than

the price of a decent one-bedroom apartment in New York City.

It is in the Middle East and in other parts of the world with large Islamic populations where the United States faces an epic challenge from fundamentalists violently opposed to American power. The conference considered whether greater efforts to convey a more nuanced image of American culture might help reach young people and moderates in Islamic nations, and weighed the pitfalls in using cultural initiatives in societies where the United States is a lightning rod for such deep anger and resentment.

Bert Kleinman, a veteran of commercial radio who now serves as senior managing consultant to the U.S.-backed Radio Sawa, explained that station’s efforts to use Western and Arabic pop music to lure young listeners to news presented from Washington’s perspective. The station targets an audience under the age of 30, and Kleinman said that in Jordan, for example, 90 percent of people between 17 to 28 years of age listen to it. Contesting the significance of such figures, Georgetown University Professor of Arab Studies Samer Shehata countered that many listeners tune in to Radio Sawa’s music but tune out its news content.

Recent congressional approval of legislation to provide over \$60 million to create a satellite television channel aimed at Arab viewers was lauded by Kleinman, while Shehata termed it “an incredible waste of resources” which could be better spent on cultural and educational exchange.

David Denby, film critic for *The New Yorker* argued that in the Islamic world “this country must look like a nightclub that never closes, a kind of fleshly inferno, which obviously attracts some people and repels them in equal measure.” But he added that only the most commercialized aspects of U.S. culture were known and that more Americans should go abroad to help bring foreign audiences a more accurate image. “We do it,” Denby said, “not by boasting or exhorting, and certainly not by presenting them with a pre-processed film with smiling Americans or branding ourselves, but by showing up, by Americans showing up—a friendly, decently informed American, by standing on his own two feet.”

The long-term nature of the project to alter America’s image among Muslims was stressed by screenwriter John Romano and other speakers. “It’s an embattled voyage that we embark upon,” requiring recognition that we face “otherness” abroad, said Romano. “What we’re talking about here is not the family of man.”

Although most foreign countries have national ministries of culture and regard protection of their artistic heritage as a public responsibility, Americans have been wary of such bureaucratic control. Well before the United States began to deploy culture as an instrument of power abroad, European powers like Germany, Britain and France had become old hands at cultural diplomacy. Many foreign governments continue to actively support the showcasing of their national cultural achievements as an integral part of their diplomatic strategy. Thus another key conference panel was devoted to surveying the activities of institutions like the Goethe Institut, the British Council and the Mexican Cultural Institutes, and also included the leading official French and Dutch cultural representatives in the United States.

The relative independence of agencies like the British Council and Goethe Institut from their national foreign ministries accords them greater receptivity with foreign audiences. Separating the operation of cultural initiatives abroad from the diplomatic corps

was also preferable for reasons of professionalism and efficiency, said Jeanne Wikler, the general director for cultural affairs at the Consulate General of the Netherlands in New York. However, contrasting the trend among European nations to distance cultural diplomacy from foreign ministry control, Mexican Consul General Arturo Sarukhan said that his government, led by President Vicente Fox, believed that making cultural promotion a part of foreign policy helps open up Mexico to greater scrutiny from abroad and thereby promotes democratic change within Mexico itself.

In another contrast to American policy, French Cultural Counselor Jean-Rene Gehan stressed that France strives to promote cultural programming abroad that is not supported through regular commercial channels. “We really try to project an image that people won’t get just by the market,” said Gehan.

In the day’s final panel, two U.S. ambassadors who have regarded culture as an important aspect of representing their country abroad talked of innovative ways to use the arts for diplomatic ends. Felix Rohatyn, who represented the United States in France, and Cynthia Schneider, the former U.S. envoy to the Netherlands, spoke about the value of undertaking cultural initiatives to promote U.S. interests.

But Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist Richard Ford, who has frequently lectured abroad under State Department auspices, cautioned in the final session that artists are involved in art rather than statecraft. “Rather than do the state’s business,” he said, “I do literature’s business.” He noted that he had recently turned down a State Department request for him to travel to Latin America “promoting American values.” Such a phrase, Ford said, was “the language of bureaucracy ... of bumptious statecraft—a language ... I simply don’t speak.”

Throughout the conference, a number of concrete proposals to significantly revive cultural diplomacy were put forward. They included reopening American libraries and cultural centers abroad, reestablishing the United States Information Agency as an entity independent of State Department control and expanding exchange programs and initiatives to bring foreigners to the United States on officially sponsored visits. Peter Awn, an expert on Islam who is also dean of Columbia University’s School of General Studies, advocated increased U.S. educational efforts that targeted students in secondary schools abroad rather than at the university level in order to reach the largest possible audience of young people. Screenwriter John Romano proposed increased exports of the best of Hollywood cinema as well as the creation of a Fulbright exchange program for filmmaking.

All of these proposals would require major increases in government expenditures. For Congress to approve such funds, much more must be undertaken to sustain broad public support for cultural initiatives at home as well as abroad.

In publishing this transcript of the conference, the National Arts Journalism Program, the Center for Arts and Culture and Arts International acknowledge the support of Columbia University, The Pew Charitable Trusts, The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation and the Consulate General of the Netherlands.

Michael Z. Wise, 2002-03 NAJP Research Fellow, and contributing editor, *Architecture*

Opening Remarks

MICHAEL JANEWAY, *director, National Arts Journalism Program*
ELLEN McCULLOCH-LOVELL, *president and CEO Center for Arts and Culture*
ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ, *deputy director, National Arts Journalism Program*
NOREEN TOMASSI, *president and CEO Arts International*

MICHAEL JANEWAY

(Director, National Arts Journalism Program):

The title of this conference of course alludes to the time-honored struggle for “the hearts and minds of men,” as the line used to go. The proposition is that our republic—the city on a hill, inspiration to those struggling against tyranny abroad—faces the question of what we offer the world, along with our military prowess in crisis times, and how we offer it.

Early in 1941, 10 months before Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt, with speech-writing assistance from the poet Archibald MacLeish and playwright Robert Sherwood, proclaimed that America’s purpose in standing against totalitarianism was a function of commitment to four freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear. And after each of the four, he added “everywhere in the world.” One of the most influential journals of the time, *Life* magazine, applauded it this way: “Not very exciting to us, such a statement, perhaps too commonplace to be taken seriously, but to the people of Nazi-occupied Europe, such words are so explosive that they imply a whole new way of life, just as their application in Asia implies revolutionary change.”

In 1977, in the wake of despair about American politics and conduct abroad in Watergate and Vietnam, a new president launched a new international human rights policy, that despite many frustrations, sent messages of hope to people in militarized dictatorships from the U.S.S.R. to South America to Asia, and reasserted America’s purposes in the spirit of F.D.R.’s four freedoms. The press, for a while, didn’t know what to make of the Carter-Vance human rights policy—whether it was real or just rhetorical—but gradually, in the communist bloc and in tyrannies like Argentina and the Philippines, officials, political dissidents, courageous artists, writers and common citizens knew. One of the ways the United States found itself suddenly vulnerable after the shock and horror of Sept. 11, 2001 was with respect to its standing in the eyes of millions of people abroad. There are many reasons of substance for that, as we’ll hear in this conference, and a major reason for communication and use of government resources.

Since the fall of communism, the United States has cut back sharply on its cultural initiatives overseas, and in the lifetimes of many of us here, those initiatives used to be synonymous, among other things, with U.S. government-sponsored travel and exhibi-

tions abroad by our greatest artists, musicians and writers. And so the world came to know in those days, that the United States was the home of Duke Ellington and Benny Goodman, Georgia O’Keefe and Ralph Ellison, and not only as one of two superpowers. The abandonment of those cultural exchange policies has been something of a missed story for the press. Then suddenly after 9/11, American policy makers began groping for ways to deal with anti-Americanism abroad in its various forms. Which brings us back to the war of ideas and the question of what it is in our culture, not to mention our command of communication techniques, we seek to sell. That, too, is a story our news media have been catching up with.

Those events, missed stories and concerns are what bring us together here. With you, we hope to recover and to reinvent a shared sense of how vital it is that the United States’ relations to the rest of the world emphasize the emblems of our freedom as represented by our culture at its best and by our art in all its creativity.

ELLEN McCULLOCH-LOVELL

(President and CEO, Center for Arts and Culture):

The Center for Arts and Culture is an independent cultural policy center in Washington, D.C., and we work to inform and improve the decisions that affect cultural life. One of our signature issues this year is cultural diplomacy. We asked, as did the Center’s Advisory Council for public diplomacy, why, when the obvious need for citizen or public diplomacy is more evident now than at any time since the Cold War, has the apparatus for delivering it been allowed to rust? Why are U.S. values and diversity and democracy so inaccurately conveyed to the world or so misunderstood? Who better to convey them than our artists and scholars, who also stand for one of our most cherished values, freedom of expression? At the conclusion of this conference, I fully expect some of you to say, “OK, we’ve debated the subject, we’ve learned a lot about it, you’ve gotten us engaged. Now what?” So I want to tell you briefly about what the Center is doing and invite your involvement.

First, we’re deeply engaged in research and public education. Two papers, one by Milton Cummings on the history of cultural diplomacy and one by Juliet Sablosky on State Department programs and support, are currently available. Three more are forthcoming: one on private sector support by András Szántó, one on

best practices by Ambassador Cynthia Schneider and another, commissioned with Arts International, by Margaret Wyszomirski that compares U.S. and other nations’ support for cultural diplomacy. The Center is also co-sponsoring two conferences—this one, and one at Georgetown University—and will host future forums. We have built a coalition with foreign policy NGOs and foreign service officers and people in the cultural arena who run and are deeply involved in international cultural programming. We’ve built the foreign policy coalition through an organization called COLEAD, the Coalition for American Leadership Abroad. This new coalition is involving state and local, cultural and internationally oriented organizations to advocate for more support and more effective programming within the U.S. Department of State. We’re also monitoring the development of the new Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, which was written into last year’s reauthorization of the State Department. And we’re continually gathering evidence of how and why international understanding is advanced through cultural understanding. As Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka said, “Politicians tend to polarize, whereas the arts tend to harmonize.” Welcome to this discussion.

NOREEN TOMASSI

(President and CEO, Arts International):

Arts International became involved in co-convening “Arts & Minds” because its subject matter—the role of the arts in fostering intercultural understanding—is at the heart of what Arts International does. We are the only private-sector organization in the United States solely devoted to the movement of arts and artists across borders, across all disciplines and across all areas of the world. Other nations have mechanisms that devote significant resources to the work of international arts exchange. In the United States, we do not have a Japan Foundation or British Council. We have the woefully underfunded international arts exchange programs housed within the Department of State, the small international program at the NEA and, in the private sector, Arts International.

One of the cornerstone programs at Arts International over the past 15 years has been the Fund for U.S. Artists at International Festivals and Exhibitions, which is an outstanding example of what public/private partnership can be. It is a partnership of two major charitable foundations, The Pew Charitable Trusts and The Rockefeller Foundation, with two government entities, the Department of State and the NEA, with additional support provided by The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation. Through that program alone, each year approximately 130 U.S. companies tour the world, and U.S. visual artists are represented at every major international exhibition on five continents. And that is only one program at AI. Other U.S. artists travel, and international work is brought to U.S. stages through projects at AI supported by the Mellon Foundation, the Duke Foundation, the Trust for Mutual Understanding, the Ford Foundation and others.

These artists and companies, who are already doing a great deal of international work, represent our country all over the world. They are our unofficial cultural ambassadors. The question for us as we think about how to win hearts and minds and what the role

of artists can be, is really a question of how we can harness that activity, that energy and the immense creativity and power it represents and use it to good ends, to show the world that we’re more than what we sometimes seem to be.

I think it was Nietzsche, in writing about the Roman Empire’s practice of translating texts from other cultures into Latin, who warned that translation can be an act of conquest. We need to ensure in this new era, a different approach. Translation and interchange between cultures in the world we live in now must be done with mutual respect and in a spirit of real partnership if we are to preserve one of the world’s greatest and now increasingly threatened treasures—our cultural diversity—and build an image of the United States as something other than a cultural hegemonist. I believe that artists can lead this effort, in fact are already leading it, giving lie to Nietzsche’s discouraging vision and proving every day in their international work that the translation and the movement of ideas between cultures is actually an act of the imagination—and that, I think, is ultimately at the center of what we’ll be talking about over the course of this conference.

ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ

(Deputy Director, National Arts Journalism Program):

This conference is, of course, about winning the peace. We can’t take credit for its lucky timing, any more than we can take credit for this beautiful, long-awaited spring weather.

Let me relate an experience that I recently had in St. Petersburg, Russia, which illustrated to me the nuts and bolts of cultural diplomacy. St. Petersburg, as you know, is celebrating its tercentennial this summer. We were traveling with the NAJP fellows there, and we had an opportunity to meet with the U.S. consul and his colleagues. They described to us some arts programs that the American consulate is helping to organize for this occasion. They included, among others: an exhibition on the life and times of the poet Joseph Brodsky, in both Russia and America; an exhibition at the State Russian Museum of early color photographs from the Library of Congress—the images depict life in the Russian empire before the communist revolution, and copies of the images will be donated to the Russian Museum; a show of American Western art selected from various American museums at the Marble Palace; original documents on U.S.-Russian relations at the Kunstkammer, another St. Petersburg museum. In addition, there will be a Mark Rothko exhibition at the Hermitage later this year, followed by exhibitions of works by American artists.

I admit, I was pleasantly surprised that all this work was going on. A guiding premise of our conference is that much of this activity has been scaled back in recent years. It was good to hear that some cultural programs still occur, “under the radar,” so to speak. And I was impressed by the projects. They are thoughtful examples of the kind of cultural bridge-building that governments are able to do with means uniquely at their disposal.

Such programs signal sympathy, admiration and respect for each other’s culture. In ways small and large, they promote a dialogue between nations—in this case, between nations that until only recently, were political adversaries. I like to think of cultural diplomacy as a kind of yeast that can leaven the bread of international relations. We need a lot of that right now.

“Cultural Diplomacy and U.S. Security”

A PLENARY PRESENTATION

by HELENA KANE FINN,
 *fellow in diplomatic studies Council on Foreign Relations,
 and former acting Assistant Secretary of State
 for Education and Cultural Affairs*

ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ

(Deputy Director, National Arts Journalism Program):
Our first speaker is here to talk about the past, present and future of cultural diplomacy as practiced by the United States. Helena Kane Finn was acting assistant secretary of state for education and cultural affairs for three years, and as such, the senior career diplomat at the Department of State for public diplomacy. She is currently on leave from the State Department as the Cyrus Vance Fellow in Diplomatic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ms. Finn's primary expertise is on Turkey, where she served several tours of duty as a career foreign service officer. She has also served as a diplomat in Pakistan, Germany and Austria. An expert on public diplomacy, press, educational and cultural affairs, she is a long-time champion of cultural initiatives within the State Department and an advocate of understanding art on its own terms. As you will hear, she sees cultural diplomacy as a two-way street, involving a genuine dialogue and a cultural exchange between nations.

FINN: It is most significant that the National Arts Journalism Program, the Center for Arts and Culture and Arts International have chosen to sponsor an event titled “Arts & Minds: A Conference on Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions” at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism at a time when we have embarked on an ambitious project to bring democracy to one of the countries of the Arab world. In a National Public Radio interview, just last week, our Deputy Defense Secretary, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, observed that two decades ago, few believed that democracy could flourish in Korea and other countries of the Far East. He noted that he was troubled by the assertion that for some unexplained reason, democracy could not thrive in the countries of the Arab world.

It remains to be seen whether the goal of a democratic Iraq with equal rights and privileges for all its citizens, regardless of ethnicity, religion or gender, can be achieved. Since this goal has long since been met by another majority Muslim country in the region, Iraq's neighbor to the north, Turkey, there is reason to be hopeful. Although Turkey is not an Arab country, it shares some regional characteristics with Iraq. Its democratization has been a long process, beginning with the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Perhaps the most important feature of Turkish democracy is that it has been generated from within the society. It is evident that there are Iraqi dissenters in all leading ethnic and religious groups, who are anxious to take on this enormous task.

In the course of this conference, we are going to take a close look at the image of the United States in the world and examine the ways in which that image is established. There is no question that we have a very serious job to do, when much of the world views our liberation of Iraq as an occupation and questions the legitimacy of the war. Is this view of the United States a temporary aberration, or will this negative image adhere? It seems to me that the world will look closely at what we do in Iraq over the next few months to make a determination. Marketing experts know that purchasers want to review the product performance. We will be judged not only on what we say, what messages we transmit about democracy and human rights, but by what we do. If Iraq remains a united country with full civil liberties for all, a country whose vast oil reserves are used to benefit all its citizens, we will be vindicated. If Iraq dissolves into chaos and civil war, we can be certain that anti-American sentiments around the globe will be considerably exacerbated.

During this conference we are going to discuss the history of cultural diplomacy. It is no secret that such efforts during the Cold War were funded to some extent by the Central Intelligence Agency. While it would be completely inappropriate for such sponsorship to take place today, it is useful to recognize that promotion of the American culture was considered vital to the security of the United States. In an era when this great city of New York has been the victim of a horrific act of terrorism, perpetrated by extremists willing to cause the deaths of thousands of civilians in the name of some distorted religious ideology, it is clear that cultural diplomacy is very much in the security interest of the United States.

We must reenter the battlefield of ideas with every bit as much determination as we did during the Cold War. Years ago, desperate and disenfranchised young people in developing countries around the world sought the solace and solutions of radical communist ideology. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave us a short decade of respite before these same young people became subject to a far more pernicious ideology masquerading as one of the world's great religions. One only has to study the history of Arab Spain or the civilizations created by the Ottomans, the Sefavids and the Moguls, to understand that Islam has given the world some of its greatest architecture and most beautiful poetry. When these empires were at their peak, Muslims and Jews studied together in the universities in Andalusia; Hindus and Muslims experienced a cultural tolerance and artistic expression seldom seen elsewhere

during the reign of Akbar in India; and Muslims, Christians and Jews lived in peace and harmony in the Ottoman cities of Sarajevo, Salonika and Istanbul. It is tragic that such a high civilization should be hijacked by a few fanatics.

The great powers of Europe—Great Britain, France, Germany—have long understood the importance of cultural diplomacy. Anyone who has lived or worked in the countries of the developing world understands the enormous impact of European ideas and values transmitted through cultural programs. Societies in transformation will strike a balance between preservation of their indigenous culture and exploration of the new world of ideas and values inherent in the cultural presentations of these European embassies. Although France, for example, has no historic ties to Pakistan, its cultural programs in Lahore and Islamabad have introduced great works of film and literature to fascinated audiences.

During the military rule of the fundamentalist General Zia-ul-Haq, the German Goethe Institut produced plays like George Bernard Shaw's “Arms and the Man” which spoke to audiences yearning for a return to democracy. I have observed with huge admiration the work of the British Council, the Alliance Française and the Goethe Institut in countries like Turkey and Pakistan. Our European friends understand the extent to which cultural programs can empower the forces of progress and modernity in democratizing societies.

When it comes to the enormous challenge posed by the negative image of the United States throughout the Muslim world, I believe that there are several things that we should keep in mind. While the followers of bin Laden would unify the entire Muslim world in hatred of all that we represent, they are a relatively small, radical element. We do not want to fall into the dangerous track of assuming that this world is a monolith, or that the deranged views of the few are representative of the many. There are 1.2 billion Muslims around the globe. Indonesia in the Far East is the largest Muslim country in the world. India comes second, with its enormous Muslim minority. Nigeria and other countries in Africa have significant Muslim populations. This is true as well of western China. We hear often of the Turkic Muslim peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus, but few know that the Tartars and other Turkic Muslim people are the second largest ethnic group in Russia proper. We should remember as well, that the United Kingdom has a very large number of Indian and Pakistani Muslims. France has a large number of Muslims from North Africa. The vast majority of these people, while possibly critical of specific policies of the United States, are often filled with admiration for our accomplishments and are desirous of visiting or emigrating to America.

It is to this huge silent majority that we must speak effectively. When there are policy differences, we must make the extra effort to engage in dialogue. When there are opportunities to stress our shared values, we must seize those opportunities and make the most of them.

Although there are many elements in the Cold War's diplomacy efforts that could be useful, I believe that what we do today must be tailored to the vastly different circumstances in which we find ourselves. The enemy, let's call it bin Ladenism, is certainly different, employing box cutters and low-tech strategies instead of the grand arsenals of nuclear weapons housed by the Soviet Union.

The victims of Bin Ladenism are the children around the world infected by the germs of hatred at madrassas and other educational institutions originally intended for the benign instruction of religion. The distortion of these educational institutions is one of the great tragedies of the modern Muslim world. Fleeting images of tolerance and the acceptance of Islam in the United States are not sufficient to pose a counterpoint to indoctrination so pervasive.

It is essential that we find ways to assist the many moderate people in these societies to create educational institutions that foster the study of science, history, math, literature and technology so that these young people can enter adulthood interested in interacting with the modern world and equipped to meet its requirements. Children everywhere are filled with curiosity and a thirst for knowledge. The children, who sat on the dirt floor of a school

Children from the slums of India have figured out how to get connected to the Internet. Imagine the potential of the world's children with the kind of support and encouragement we are able to give.

in Karachi shortly after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, have gone on to study abroad and to make a contribution to the world. Despite the severity of the conditions, their instructors were dedicated to imparting useful knowledge. Children from the slums of India have figured out how to get connected to the Internet. Imagine the potential of the world's children with the kind of support and encouragement we are able to give.

As a career diplomat, I have had the opportunity to serve at our embassies around the world. Aside from tours in Frankfurt, Germany and Vienna, Austria, I've had two in Turkey and Pakistan. For the better part of the past two decades, I have lived and worked abroad as an American diplomat. When I returned to Washington three years ago, I had the good fortune to hold the most senior career position in the field of public diplomacy at the Department of State. I know what it means to live for years at a time in another culture with the responsibility of conveying our policy positions and communicating our intellectual and cultural values to extremely varied audiences. I also know how things work at the Washington end, especially since the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department.

It is my belief that diplomacy is always a two-way street. Indeed, I have often thought that in many ways the study of literature is the best preparation, in the sense that it teaches one to enter into the minds, hearts and social circumstances of others. Balzac, Thackeray and Dickens, to say nothing of our own Henry James and James Baldwin, are the best possible exercises to master in preparation for this life work. To be effective, a good diplomat should know the language, culture and history of the country in which he or she is posted. To be effective, a good diplomat must know how to listen—both to what is said and what remains

unsaid. To be effective, a good diplomat must be able to imagine the sentiments and aspirations of those he or she encounters. Traditional diplomacy is the art of negotiation. These skills are crucial. Public diplomacy involves selling America—its ideals, its values, its beliefs to people in far-flung places across the globe.

I once heard that when a salesman knocks on the door, it is not the actual product that he is selling that counts most, but his own presentation. Of course, both are important. The customer will inspect the product. But the customer will initially evaluate the salesperson. The salesperson who speaks his language, knows the cultural sights of his city, is aware of the history of his country, will be far more effective than the bombastic character who tells him what to think without reference to his own point of view.

This is why good diplomacy can never depend on the messages created by people stifled by a bureaucracy that does not encourage them to go out and explore the world. When Secretary Colin Powell first addressed the State Department, he told us to listen to the field. Those were his exact words, the words of a military man, “Listen to the field.” This is profound advice. It is the officer in the field, the person with the language and cultural skills, who knows how to craft the message. It is the officer in the field who sends home the warnings about the deterioration of our image and suggests appropriate remedies. At our embassies and consulates, we have citizens of the host country who assist us in the difficult job of interpreting local reaction to events and devising successful approaches. These wonderful people are called “foreign service nationals,” and they are the bedrock of our outreach overseas.

This conference deals with cultural diplomacy, but I would like to review the range of activities under the rubric of public diplomacy. It is my belief that culture, like politics, can be a part of almost everything we do. I use the term “culture” in the broadest American sense to include all those activities that Senator Fulbright liked to call “mutual understanding.” While the creation of immediate images and impressions through the use of television and radio has tremendous importance, it is the long-term investment in people through our exchange programs that really makes the difference. Every good financial portfolio has its blue-chip stocks. The exchange programs, and especially Fulbright, are our blue-chip stocks. I would even go so far as to say that if the Department of State has a “brand” name around the world, that brand name is Fulbright. Fortunately, despite the misguided draconian budget cuts of the '90s, Fulbright, and its stellar companion, the International Visitor Program, remain intact, if small. Huge damage has been done to the cultural diplomacy infrastructure, but luckily these two most effective vehicles are at the ready for amplification.

What happened in the '90s? Well, it was the end of history, as we all know. The Soviet Union collapsed. We became the sole remaining superpower. Everyone wanted American blue jeans and Coca Cola, so why bother with libraries and dance troupes? Our stunningly isolationist Congress, an amazing mismatch for our new leadership role, challenged the idea that we would want to disseminate information about the United States through cultural centers and libraries. After all, we had won the Cold War. It was time to pack our bags and get out of the business of interaction with our counterparts abroad. After all, technology could do it all.

As Ross Perot so aptly put it, “What do we need diplomats for?

Just send a fax.” He actually said that. So as the war raged in the Balkans, we closed our American library in Belgrade—the only place that Serbs could access information from the outside. As the struggle for Turkey’s soul between social democrats and fundamentalists fomented, we closed our American library in Ankara—the only place where university professors and their students could turn for our latest publications. As the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords took hold, we closed the Center for Democracy that had been created in the Vienna Amerika Haus as a neutral territory for reconciliation between Croats, Serbs and Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As fundamentalist forces gained ground in Pakistan, we closed our magnificent American Center in Islamabad, allowing the fundamentalist opponents of Salman Rushdie, who had attacked it years before, to have the last laugh.

The America I grew up in was one that wished to share its bounty with the world. Have we grown parsimonious in our unprecedented prosperity? Do our young people want to purchase SUVs instead of volunteering for the Peace Corps?

I cannot exaggerate the importance of the American Centers known in the German-speaking world as the Amerika Hauser, or America Houses, an extension of the USIS operation in virtually every corner of the globe. These centers were not just libraries, although that alone would have been ample justification for their existence. The American Centers provided a venue for engagement between American experts invited from the United States—on everything from foreign policy to family planning—and the most influential academics, government officials and journalists in the host country.

The American Centers served another purpose as well. As put to me by a Turkish professor who is an expert in NATO issues, the American Center in Ankara provided a place where Turks, working in different universities and ministries and media, could meet not only with diplomats from the U.S. Embassy, but with one another to share their views about the United States. Needless to say, most of these centers were designed with an auditorium and an exhibition place, lending themselves to every sort of cultural presentation.

During the reckless and short-sighted isolationist budget slashing of the 1990s, these were downgraded to information resource centers—places where a select, few senior scholars could make an appointment by the hour to do research on an Internet outlet. No more could students come to write their papers. No more did faculty come to research their books. No more did journalists come to debate foreign and economic policy issues with American experts and diplomatic staff. No more did we talk

to one another. And all the people of all those countries, from the richest to the poorest, bemoaned the loss of contact with the United States. And the people of all those countries were made to feel that we did not think they were worth talking to, let alone listening to.

By the year 2000, the White House recognized that some serious mistakes had been made. A White House conference on cultural diplomacy was organized that November. The President, the First Lady and the Secretary of State invited a host of prominent artists, writers and cultural figures to participate. Yo-Yo Ma and Rita Dove joined with performers and writers from around the world to discuss winning hearts and minds. The Aga Khan made an eloquent plea for greater contact with the Muslim world. Not even a year later, on Sept. 11, we discovered with horrific severity how right he had been. We discovered that something was dangerously amiss.

The conference had its lighter moments as well, as when the French cultural attaché complained that she had to sponsor cultural programs in both directions, paying not only for French groups to perform in the United States, but for American groups to perform in France. I was reminded that while in Ankara, to my immense embarrassment, it was the French Embassy that sponsored the American Jazz Festival. Even the Fulbright Programs in some countries such as Germany and Japan are almost entirely subsidized from German and Japanese resources. What does this say about us? We do not care enough about such exchange programs to pay even our half?

So what is to be done? It is clear that the resources allocated to public diplomacy are utterly inadequate. An investment of a few billion a year in public diplomacy could prevent wars that cost many, many billions, to say nothing of the loss of human life and the destruction of the environment, and as we’ve seen recently, the destruction of a very, very important historic treasure—the museum in Baghdad. We are the greatest military power since the Roman Empire. However, successful empires—the Greek, the Roman, the Byzantine, the Ottoman, the British, even the Mongol—built roads and bridges, schools and hospitals, aqueducts and canal systems, public baths and theaters. If we are to don the imperial mantle, should we not also take responsibility for the follow-up?

Have we finished the job we started in Afghanistan? While some progress has been made in Kabul, the rest of the country has yet to be brought to order. Is this a good indicator for what is to come in Iraq? It is all too well and good to be cast as Sparta, but whatever happened to Periclean Athens? Did that go out with the Kennedys? We recall with nostalgia the days when Pablo Casals was invited to the White House and no one questioned the wisdom of sending the Merce Cunningham Dance Company or the Boston Symphony Orchestra to perform at the Istanbul Festival. The America I grew up in was one that wished to share its bounty with the world. Have we grown parsimonious in our unprecedented prosperity? Do our young people want to purchase SUVs instead of volunteering for the Peace Corps?

Let’s pretend, then, if only for the most brutally assessed reasons of pure, strategic self-interest, we were to allocate sufficient funding for public diplomacy. What would we do with those funds? We would immediately amplify the Fulbright Program,

enabling more faculty and students to study in the United States, especially from the countries of the Muslim world, and send more American faculty and students abroad. We would expand the International Visitor and Voluntary Visitor Programs to enable more young political leaders, academics, journalists, intellectuals, educators and cultural figures to travel to the United States to meet their American counterparts. We would support youth exchange programs that would enable young people around the world to come to the United States to spend one high school year with an American family and enable young Americans to do the same abroad. We would support secular education systems in developing countries through teacher training and curriculum development programs.

We would reopen the American Centers, including the libraries, worldwide, adapting each to the design most suited for its constituency. We would expand Arts America, the division of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, to enable it to provide once again, performing groups and exhibitions for our American Centers worldwide. We would ensure that every American Center had effective programs for English teaching and computer training and student counseling. We would expand our speakers programs, sending more American experts around the world to engage directly with foreign audiences. We would use each and every program to advance mutual understanding through cultural exchange. Fulbright Commissions would grant scholarships to artists and writers. Performing artists and literary figures would be included in the International Visitors Program.

We have spent about \$2 billion a month bombing Afghanistan. We will spend upwards of \$75 billion bombing Iraq, and that’s just the beginning. No one questions expenditures that are justified by the need for greater security. Just one or two billion spent in the human investment described above could go a long way to preventing future wars.

There has been no greater gift to humanity than the development of information technology; however, it must be used to support the human effort, not replace it. Ironically, both the CIA and the USIA made the same mistake in the '90s. Our colleagues in the intelligence community relied far too heavily on electronically acquired data and too little on what they call HUMINT, or human intelligence, information gathered by real, live people. USIA, ordered by Congress to downsize, replaced many diplomatic postings with technology overseas. So the newspaper editor did not get a visit anymore from the press attaché. Instead he got an electronically transmitted mass mailing. Person to person dialogue was out, data was in. When I asked Middle East peace negotiator Dennis Ross what he would have done differently over the many years he had worked on the Middle East peace process, he answered without hesitation, more person to person contact. There is no substitute. When it is not possible to have direct human contact, technology can provide a second best option. I recently sat in on a wonderful conversation via DVC, digital video conference, between New York novelist Gary Shteyngart and a group of writers invited for this purpose to the home of the public affairs officer in Tel Aviv. When the speaker is unable to travel abroad, this technology enables a good discussion.

In general, the traditional focus in our programs has been telling America’s story. There is nothing wrong with that. We have

a good story to tell, and one that fascinates people around the world. Yet when the Aga Khan addressed the White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy in the fall of 2000, he hit upon something that is missing from our planning. We have not made an effort to make sure we listen to the stories of others. We can do this by making it possible for writers and artists from other countries to come to the United States. Indeed, the International Visitors Program did provide grants for writers to attend the Iowa Workshop for two-month stints. This effort has largely disappeared due to budget cuts, but I was very touched to hear the brilliant Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk tell PBS correspondent Elizabeth Farnsworth that he first came to understand the United States while at Iowa on an International Visitor Program grant.

One of the most important newer innovations is something called the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation. The program invites embassies from the third poorest countries in the world to submit projects for cultural preservation to a committee of regional experts, art historians and archaeologists. Small grants of up to \$20,000 are awarded to the top proposals in this annual competition. The ambassador then has the occasion to publicly announce, and then award, the grant. Ambassadors, needless to say, are wild about this program. The reason they like it so much is that it lets local people know that we value their culture. In countries where cultural artifacts are endangered through neglect, or worse, such a ceremony sends the message that the United States values cultural heritage and thinks it is worth preserving.

In this presentation I have focused extensively on countries of the developing world; however, we have to think seriously about putting money into programs in wealthy countries as well. Both Germany and Japan are eager to have more exchange programs of every kind. It is no secret we have some serious differences with our closest allies. Perhaps these differences would have been more equitably resolved had the relationships not been so neglected over the past decade. Another thing to think about when dealing with the wealthy countries of the Arab world is that we still might want to cover certain expenses. Two decades ago, there were thousands of Saudi students in the United States. Then Saudi Arabia built its own university system, and many stopped coming here. For the past decade, there has been little of the intellectual cross-fertilization that occurred earlier. It is perhaps no accident that this coin-

cided with the rise of radical Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. It might be very much in our interest to continue to encourage Saudis to be educated in the United States.

I've not spoken at length about the arts because I believe that it is so utterly self-evident that we would want to share our rich cultural life—music, painting, dance, theater, sculpture—with the rest of the world. Of course, many of our leading artists perform or exhibit in the wealthy countries of the world. They go to Japan and Europe at the invitation of local entrepreneurs. However, it is very much in our interest that our artists visit those countries that cannot afford to extend such invitations. There are Russian-trained musicians and dancers throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus who would relish performances by visiting Americans.

I believe that it would make eminent sense to create a public-private sector board dedicated to supporting such tours through corporate sponsorship. The board would include diplomats with regional expertise and experience, government officials and representatives from the private sector. Such a board could function in a manner similar to that of Fulbright. In the fall of 2000, we sent the Dance Theater of Harlem to China under such a program. Not only did the dancers perform in major cities, they gave master classes. The performances were broadcast on television, bringing this marvelous artistic experience into millions of Chinese homes. We should be doing much more of this. Unfortunately, the light lit briefly then quickly dimmed.

I'd like to mention here the conference co-sponsor, Arts International, which provides support for U.S. artists invited to participate in major international performing arts festivals and visual arts exhibitions. This fund was founded as a public-private partnership of two federal agencies, the National Endowment for the Arts and the U.S. Department of State and two foundations—The Pew Charitable Trusts and The Rockefeller Foundation. Since 2001 The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation has provided additional support for the performing arts program.

I wish you well at this conference and look forward to the day when its recommendations can be implemented. I certainly implore all of you to demand that the necessary resources be allocated for public diplomacy. There are dedicated professionals at the ready to revitalize the American cultural outreach. It may be the best way to tell an angry world that we care.

America's Global Image: Short-Term Branding or Long-Term Exchange?

MODERATOR:
HODDING CARTER,
*president, Knight Foundation, and
former State Department spokesman*

PANELISTS:
RICHARD W. BULLIET, *professor of Middle Eastern History,
Columbia University*
ANDREW KOHUT, *director,
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press*
JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, *resident scholar
American Enterprise Institute*
JOHN ROMANO, *screenwriter and producer*

CARTER: In 1953, my father was offered the head position of the United States Information Agency (USIA). We had a family conference about it, and I insisted, throwing myself on the floor and screaming and beating my head on the floor, that he must not do it. "Why?" he said. "Because I'll have to leave Sheila," I said. There were things that mattered on that day to me much more than the notions of what we were doing in the world, but he didn't listen, and he took off for Washington to accept, from the man he had supported in the election of '52, his mandate. He got off the plane in Atlanta and called mother and said, "I'm not doing it." She said, "Why?" He said, "Because when I go up to the Senate to talk about my new job, that Irish son of a bitch from Wisconsin is going to ask me, 'Did I know that my researcher at PM in the 1940s was a communist?' And I'm going to punch him out." So he came back up from that non-existent rendezvous, and a year later spent four months touring Asia under the auspices of the very agency he had turned down, from which he came back an even-more convinced convert to the notion that soft diplomacy in the world was at least as important in the world as heavy nuclear weapons.

Well, we go forward some 23 years thereafter, and when asked by the incoming president of the United States' minions what I wished to do, I declared, of course, first that I wanted to be deputy secretary of state, and they laughed. Then I said I'd like to be assistant secretary of state for Europe, and they laughed. Then I said I'd really like to do USIA, and they fell on the ground laughing, and they gave me the job of chief of staff at the Department of State—a job which, in its own way, mandated a reaching out to the rest of the world, as well as to the United States, in ways that tried to be somewhat persuasive, but not very soft about what it was and the virtues of our own policies.

A few years ago there was a brief moment in which it seemed that the new administration, which had inherited the collapse of the Soviet Union, might be persuaded to not back away. But that collapse that Ambassador Finn discussed rather eloquently was, in fact, a collapse of the administration that came into office in 1992. It was a deliberate backing away—from the center-left perspective—that we no longer needed to be actively in the world, because that was a Cold War relic, and now we had to be about other businesses later to be defined. We are still suffering from a variety of such beatings, which were amplified from the other side of the ideological spectrum by an all-out assault on the State Department and USIA, whose net result was the configuration we now find ourselves in, in which there's no longer a separate agency for con-

ducting our cultural and soft diplomacy in the world, but in fact a reduced presence of state.

Here we are, more than 50 years into what we do well, discussing whether we ought to do it better or at all. I think from this panel we're going to be hearing a variety of views on this subject, which is a good and sufficient thing.

KOHUT: The United States' image became the subject of The Pew Research Center's first *Global Attitudes* survey, the largest public opinion survey ever conducted. It was conducted in 44 nations—44 independent national surveys among 38,000 people. It was released at the end of last year, and it documented what everyone suspected—that is, that America had a real image problem, a growing image problem. The outpouring of sympathy post-9/11, a year and a half earlier, had been transformed into increasing hostility, not only in the Arab world, not only among Muslims more generally, but all around the world—in NATO countries, in the developing nations of Africa and Asia, even to the north and south of us. Still, in about the third paragraph of that report, we wrote, "But there's a great reserve of liking and support for the United States. It still exists in most countries." That was then.

We have since conducted surveys that measured the toll of anti-war sentiment on the image of the United States, and we changed the verbs. Rather than "America's image is slipping," "America's image has plummeted." I won't read many numbers to you, but these are so dramatic that I will. In a survey we conducted in early March, in Great Britain, we found that only 48 percent of the British public that we had spoken to had a favorable image of the United States. It had been 75 percent just six months earlier, and the State Department had pegged it at 83 percent in 2000. So it went from 83 to 75 to 48, and that was as good as it got. In the other eight countries, it was dramatically worse. In Germany, the trend was 78 percent pre-2001, 61 percent in 2002, and 25 percent in March of 2003. Even in Italy, where we have such a history of favorable attitudes toward the United States, only 34 percent of the Italians had a favorable view of us.

Unfortunately, clearly the impact of opposition to the war, among the publics of the willing nations, the coalition of the willing and the unwilling, was responsible for this. I'm not so sure that the speed of the war, or the pictures of cheering crowds in Baghdad, will change the image of America very quickly. The poll that we conducted in early March showed that despite opposition to the war, the majorities in most of these countries believed that

the Iraqis would be better off, that the region would be more stable, if the United States and its allies used force to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Seventy-five percent in France and Germany believed this. But even though 80 percent of the French and Germans were strongly opposed to the U.S. military action, the message from this poll was pretty clear: “We agree with your objectives, America, but we don’t like the way you did this.” And we still have to address the problem of the way we did this.

In the Muslim world, our problems go way beyond our approach to dealing with Iraq and our style. True dislike of America, if not hatred of America, exists very broadly across the Muslim world. Even before the war in Iraq, we found 60 and 70 percent of the people in Egypt and Jordan and Lebanon and Turkey and Pakistan saying they had an unfavorable view of the United States. Turkey was the most disappointing and the most dramatic trend with 42, or close to 50 percent, of Turks saying that not only did they dislike the United States, they “strongly” disliked the United States. Now a large part of this in the Muslim world, especially in the Mideast area, has to do with our policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That’s real simple. Another part of it, and it’s hard to figure out what the ratio is, is hostility toward the war on terrorism. In every one of the 11 countries, except Uzbekistan, where we asked questions about the war on terrorism, there was majority opposition, even countries like Indonesia and Senegal, where there was support for the United States at that point and liking of the United States.

Muslim people, inside the area of conflict and around the world, see the war on terrorism as picking on Muslim countries, not protecting the world against terrorism. That’s certainly the view of the Turks with regard to our war on Iraq. I might add, and I want to make it very clear, that attitudes toward the United States are much more complicated and contradictory than opinions of us in the Mideast and among the Muslim publics around the world. People around the world embrace us and embrace things American, and at the same time decry the influence of the United States in their world. The United States is universally, even in places like Pakistan, admired for its technology and its scientific achievements. And in most countries, including many Muslim countries, to my surprise, our cultural exports have been liked—our popular cultural exports—our movies, our music, our television. We were surprised to find how many people said, “Yes, we enjoy these movies, we like these television shows.” But we also found in every one of these countries, a large majority saying, “There’s too much America here; there’s too much America in our culture; there’s too much America in our life.”

Most common policy criticisms of the United States are easy, and they’re familiar to you: The United States acts unilaterally, our policies contribute to the gap between rich and poor countries and the United States doesn’t do its share of dealing with global problems. Attitudes are clearly most negative in the Mideast. But ironically, criticisms of U.S. policies and ideals, such as the way we practice our democracy, the way we do business, are highly prevalent in Europe and among our traditional allies. Criticisms of the United States are much more widespread in Canada, Germany and France than in the developing nations of Africa and Asia. In those countries, at least six months ago, we were still models for governing, still models for commerce. I think America’s war with Iraq

will intensify and enhance differences between us and them, and the greatest relative damage will be to the European-American way of looking at each other. That tie has been so positive for so long, but the rift is so large. The poll that we conducted in April found majorities of Europeans saying, “The problem is George Bush, the problem is not America.” George Gallup taught me never to second-guess my survey results, but in this case I’m going to second-guess them a little bit. Europeans do have a problem with George Bush. We’ve been conducting polls since the beginning of the Bush administration, and there was great hostility toward Bush early on, before the war on terrorism, but I think it’s broader than that.

We have a real big problem in the United States being transformed from the sole superpower to a perceived imperial power. There are two kinds of resentment that are apparent in the surveys we’ve conducted, in the interviews we’ve done all around the world and especially in Europe. The first is resentment of our power: After the 9/11 attacks, we were surprised and saddened by the extent to which the polls that we conducted found people around the world saying, “Well, we sympathize with the United States, but we’re glad the Americans know what it’s like to be vulnerable.” That’s a reflection of resentment of our power and discomfort with our power. The second is suspicion of our power: At the end of last year, when we questioned Europeans and Turks, but especially Europeans and Russians, about a potential war with Saddam, the Turks did not see Saddam as a threat to regional stability. The Europeans largely did, even many Russians did. And by large percentages, almost as large in the United States, Saddam Hussein’s regime was thought to be a threat to stability in that region, almost to the same extent as was the case in the United States. But when we asked the question, “Why does the United States want to remove Saddam Hussein?” overwhelmingly the answer was, “Because of oil.” That answer about oil, which is not shared in the United States even among critics of the war in Iraq, reflects the suspicion that exists of our power.

Certainly, we need all the help we can get, and we can get our money’s worth out of public diplomacy, but I think in the end that public diplomacy can only affect attitudes toward the United States on the margin, given the magnitude of the problem. It’s what we do, not our style, not our culture. It’s not the messenger, it’s the message. In the Mideast, that’s particularly the case. Our policies in Israel, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are a problem. And if we want to change the attitudes over there, we have to give the perception that there’s more fairness, more even-handedness. Secondly, our support for unpopular regimes and things that seem to repress people rather than reflect the people’s agenda is a second element of the message that we have to convey. Among our old allies, it’s policy, too. It’s finding a way to reduce concerns about that power, suspicion about that power. Beyond that, there are value gaps that have always been apparent between the United States and Europeans. These value gaps, now that we’re not bound together by a common enemy, are more divisive. There’s more support in the United States for a free-market approach; there’s more individualism here. The stereotypes are true, but there’s also less willingness to support a social safety net, less willingness to pay for environmental measures. There are really great differences between the American public and the publics of Western Europe,

and we have to acknowledge that in the way we deal with the common problems that the democracies on this side of the Atlantic and the democracies on the other side of the Atlantic have to deal with. The political pressures are very different.

I’m not sure how to sum this up, other than that I’m positive and supportive of cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, but we really have to recognize that to make big changes, you need big events. The big events that are required can only be facilitated, not brought about, by improving our cultural diplomacy.

I have never been sadder about my government than I am today, in the aftermath of the plundering of the Iraqi National Museum and the Iraqi National Library, while our Marines protected the Ministry of Petroleum.

CARTER: Andy Kohut has done a great service, not only to remind us of what the polls seem to show, but also of the fact that reality always does seem to trump image-making and the like in the long-run. What trumps it even more, of course, are deep cultural and other divisions created by history and all the forces of culture. Our next speaker, Richard Bulliet, can come at it both as a historian and as a novelist of the Middle East.

BULLIET: I’m here as an educator and as an historian. I’ve spent the last 40-some years studying the Islamic world as a social historian. I have never been sadder about my government than I am today, in the aftermath of the plundering of the Iraqi National Museum and the Iraqi National Library, while our Marines protected the Ministry of Petroleum. I think that this will prove to be our equivalent of the Sabra/Shatila massacres, where we failed to live up to the responsibilities of a military occupying force. I think it’s one of the great, great, great tragedies of modern culture. There isn’t anything else in Iraq. This is a country that’s been ravaged by war for many, many, many hundreds of years, and what there is, either underground and protected, or was in those two institutions, now has been destroyed or dispersed.

In 1957, the Operations Coordinating Board, which was a high-level operation in government, combining intelligence and USIA and diplomatic representatives, issued a secret report. In that report they made an inventory of resources in the United States for learning about Islam, resources available to the USIA for understanding Islam abroad, or simply a description of what there was in the Islamic world that would be of interest to the United States. It concluded that Islam was very important, and it said that, contrary to intuition, the communists were making more inroads into the Muslim world than we would have expected. Because, despite their atheism and despite the suppression of religion in the Soviet Union, there were great wellsprings of hostility

toward the West in the Islamic world that the communists could play upon. Of course, this was a Cold War document, this was in 1957. This was not when the United States was known for its support of Israel, because in ’56 we had actually intervened in the Suez War to force the Israelis to withdraw. So the idea that it’s policies in the short term that somehow, if miraculously reversed, would cause hostility in the Muslim world to go away is, I think, erroneous. We’re looking at much deeper issues.

That document called for the study of Islam so we would know what we are doing, and particularly noted that American representatives abroad typically learn about Islam from English-speaking, Western-educated Muslims, who, they might add, are also sucking up to the United States. They did not actually learn the languages and spend time finding out what was happening at levels below the level of the intelligentsia or the political influentials whom they saw as their proper interlocutors. This was 1957. One of things that was happening at the same time was the construction of the field of Middle Eastern studies in the United States with Columbia University taking a very important role. What is particularly striking about the field of Middle Eastern studies as it was constructed at that time is that it totally ignored Islam. Despite that being the specific recommendation of where we were weak, and where we were finding the communists were ahead of us, and where we were finding that there was great hostility toward the West, we did not teach about Islam except as a classical thing that happened long in the past. Indeed, between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, which came as a shock to academia as well as to the political world, there were only, I think, three or four books written by American-trained scholars about modern Islam. You simply could not find a book on Shiism in 1962 that would tell you anything about Shiism now.

Since the Iranian revolution, there have been about 4.2 million books on Islam published, and each one is just about the same quality as the other. We have been driven by events, finally, into looking at something. But it is striking that it is during this period from the end of World War II down to 1979 that the major figures who were drawn upon intellectually for this jihad, for this opposition in the United States, that this was when they were writing, this was when they were visiting the United States. This was when their books were being disseminated and read by university and high school students in the Muslim world, and we did not notice it. The reason is that we were driven by modernization theories that essentially said religion is irrelevant in the public sphere in the future, in the modern world that is coming to be. It’s a secular world, and, therefore, who would waste their time studying Islam?

Our assumption of secularism has been a grievous error on our part. First of all, it assumes that secularism means what we have in America, whereas secularism in the Middle East means anti-clericalism and a strong effort to destroy the infrastructure of the Islamic religion as it existed for hundreds of years. It has also failed to recognize that in the dynamic of political theory over the centuries in the Middle East, the primary check on tyranny has been, theoretically—and sometimes even in practice—Islamic law. So that when tyranny reaches a maximum, as it did under Saddam Hussein and as it has reached in a number of other countries, it is natural for a Muslim population to think the people who can do something are the people of faith, the people who can try and

reassert the primacy of Islamic law as a curb upon tyranny. We fail to understand that because we think the people who can do something are secular democrats who believe in globalization and free enterprise and want to visit the United States.

We have not grasped the long-term political system, the political culture, of the Islamic world. And, therefore, we have a very difficult time selling a message to an audience where we don't understand what is motivating the audience. I agree, we should have much more public diplomacy, but to approach it from a marketing point of view—"let us sell our product"—without doing more consumer research and finding out what it is that would cause people to actually buy our product, is a waste of money, as any marketing person could tell you. When Ambassador Finn quoted the Secretary of State saying, "Listen to the field," what I

Tens of millions of Muslims who would never fly an airplane into a skyscraper still agree with the political analysis of Osama bin Laden.

would say is, "Teach the field to listen." Because I'm fairly sure that we are not getting a feedback from the region, from the Muslim world, that is fully informing us. As evidence of this—and I can use Ambassador Finn, with all apologies, as an example—when you talk about Osama bin Laden and his followers as "demented fanatics, opposed to everything we stand for" etc., name-calling does not help you understand the fact that tens of millions of Muslims who would never fly an airplane into a skyscraper still agree with the political analysis of Osama bin Laden. Many people look upon it as a very sound and credible and persuasive analysis of the world, and yet they are not terrorists. When you dismiss everything he says and everything he does with pejorative labels of demonization, you miss interrogating what it is that appeals to people about his message, leaving aside the question of the terrible terrorist tactics that he adopts to advance his message.

I have spent many, many hours reviewing videotapes from jihadist sources, as a consultant for various police forces, and it's amazing how appealing they can be to a young Arab audience, and how little we seem to grasp of what is going on in the society. I believe in more public diplomacy, but the shape of it as described by Ambassador Finn seems to lack a certain point of contact with reality. I recall in the early 1980s, being in Abu Dhabi, and I was traveling with a Columbia professor who was a former ambassador, and, therefore, we were treated with ambassadorial courtesy. We had a meeting with political officers in the embassy, and I asked them, "Tell me about Islam and the United Arab Emirates." They said, "You know, with congressional delegations and business men, we hardly have time to move the paper that we have to move every day. We're not thinking much about Islam here." That was pretty much the answer I got. Then we went over to visit with the British ambassador, who didn't have a whole lot to do, sitting around in a largely vacant embassy as far as we could tell, and I

asked him, "What about Islam and the Emirates?" And he said, "Well, I had a young man—he speaks Arabic fluently—I gave him six weeks leave from his job to simply go through the Emirates and talk to people, and here's the report." I was struck at how different diplomatic cultures handle things differently.

It's good to sell. Americans are good at selling. It's an American specialty. But you have also to listen, and this is what I hope will happen. It's not just listening in the field, but it's also listening to people in this country who can talk to you about what is happening in Islam. I say that because obviously I'm writing a book, which I'd love to talk about. It's called "The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization" because one of the things that we will discover is that we're pretty much like them and always have been. Judaism, Christianity and Islam—there's not a dime's worth of difference between them at a certain level of spirituality, and we need to understand the ways in which we are like them and, particularly with respect to the American Muslim population, the ways in which we have to love the Muslims that we know, as well as fear and destroy those who would work us evil.

CARTER: Josh Muravchik has been, since I first met him, an active and ardent proponent of very distinct views about America's place in the world, the way it should comport itself in the world, and the attitudes and ideologies it should bring to the world. You could catch it in his 1991 book, "Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny."

MURAVCHIK: What we heard from Andrew Kohut reflected with real evidence a feeling we've all had, certainly that I've had very much, that never in my memory has the United States confronted so much hostility and distrust around the world. And yet, at this very moment, we find ourselves, to a very great degree, unilaterally disarmed of our capability to conduct ourselves in the war of ideas.

Not in his fondest wishes did George McGovern ever propose to cut our military defense budget as much as Jesse Helms and company succeeded in cutting our ideological defense resources in the last years, including, in fact, doing away with the only agency of government that we had, the U.S. Information Agency, that had the mission of presenting America to the world. And it may be that Andrew Kohut is right, that public diplomacy is only going to be able to have a marginal effect, but for crying out loud, we ought to try to find out. We are doing almost nothing, or just a tiny fraction of what we ought to be doing, in this realm. It's particularly shocking to realize that when we have the recent lesson of how much the conduct of the war of ideas contributed to our victory in the Cold War. That was an effort that was carried out in the early stages of the Cold War in very large measure by the CIA. After the revelations of the 1970s—which put those CIA operations out of business—a lot of similar work was carried on, that is, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty ... and other kinds of activities that had once been done covertly began to be done overtly by USIA, by the National Endowment for Democracy. Yet, as of a few years ago, we had the abolishing of the USIA under the presumed notions that its functions were being consolidated into the State Department, but the State Department was ill-equipped to carry out this work, and the work was further handicapped by the substantial reduction in resources.

The ability to conduct a war of ideas is every bit as important to us today as it was during the Cold War. I thought there might be a disagreement without a difference, without an obvious contradiction, on the point which Professor Bulliet took issue with Ambassador Finn: Of course Osama bin Laden is a demented lunatic. There's really no doubt about that, and there's no harm in saying it. But contrary to the official position of the State Department, it's also true that he has a tremendous following in the Islamic world and that defines the challenge that faces us, which is to wage an argument against this demented lunatic.

The levels on which we need to be working are, first of all, to do our best to counteract the influence of radical Islam, and that's best done by such Muslim allies as we can find—and we have to find them and support them—but we have to address the question directly ourselves. Secondly, we have to work to present our case about terrorism, because the terrible fact is that, in the Islamic world at least, terrorism is not regarded as anathema. Kofi Annan tried to put through the United Nations after Sept. 11 a new international convention against terrorism, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference turned him down flat, would not consider any compromise language, just laid down the fact that it would not support any convention that did not make an explicit exception for terrorism on behalf of good causes. They were willing to support a convention that said terrorism on behalf of bad causes is bad, so long as it said that terrorism on behalf of good causes is OK. We have a tremendous task to try to persuade people around the world that terrorism is bad on behalf of any cause.

Finally, there is this very great reaction that we face in Europe and everywhere in the world, of anxiety in the face of American power. No one can remember any time in history when there's been no balance of power and no imaginable balance of power. No combination of forces, countries in the world, could stand up militarily to the United States, and it's perfectly understandable that this is frightening to other people, or at least makes them uneasy. We have a lot of work to do to explain our concept of the proper uses of American power in a way that aims to make it less frightening to people.

So far, since Sept. 11, there's been an inchoate recognition within the government that we are missing something, but all we have done to this point is thrash about. We've brought in Charlotte Beers as under secretary for public diplomacy on the grounds that she was a great advertising executive and would re-brand America. Secretary of State Colin Powell said that she had persuaded him to begin buying Uncle Ben's rice, and, if she could do that, she could do—I don't know what. Then the President had Muslims to the White House for Ramadan, and we abolished the Arabic service of Voice of America and instead created Radio Sawa, which is devoted almost entirely to playing pop music, on the grounds that somehow we can solve this problem if we just pour a lot of syrup over it and speak to the Arab world and say, "You should like us; we like you; there are a lot of Muslims who live in our country, too." Not surprisingly, this has gotten us not very far at all.

What we need to try to do is to wage a war of ideas and of explanation of ourselves the way we did during the Cold War. To do that we need resources that pale in comparison to defense expenditures, but they need to be very much greater than they are

now. We need a way to find personnel to carry out this war of ideas, and I think we have not even begun to think about how we are going to do that. We had a tremendous reservoir of personnel for the war of ideas in the Cold War, starting with former communists who made up a kind of cadre of people who had a very deep sense of what our enemy was, what he believed, what was wrong with it, and were able to carry out a campaign of fighting back. We don't have a cadre of ex-Islamists that can play a similar role, and we need to figure out ways to develop the manpower, as well as devote the resources, to do that.

CARTER: We have for our fourth panelist someone who can speak directly from the creative side as well as from the political and the diplomatic and the side of academia. John Romano is a man who has, in the work he has coming now, examined part of the subject that consumes us all in a piece he's done on John Walker Lindh.

ROMANO: In the wake of invading Iraq, exporting dance troupes and, as I'm going to suggest, movies and television, isn't going to do a great deal for the patient while in intensive care, as it were. Let's be clear that when we talk about what public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, can accomplish, it doesn't address gaping wounds of the present. We are—I am, Hollywood is, the arts are, the Boston Symphony Orchestra—in the business of long-term healing of wounds and long-term exchanges. One remains, I think, convinced that in the long term good can be done there. I don't want to sound too silly when I suggest that returning to, revivifying programs of cultural exchange is going to do some good in the world. It's not as if I don't have CNN at home. I know what we're looking at. Now I'm going to make three points. One's going to have to do with getting the best kind of Hollywood product abroad, the second's going to have to do with Disney's "Lion King" and Julie Taymor and the third's going to have to do with John Walker Lindh.

The first point is on Hollywood. I'm a pretty happy capitalist most of the time, but there are some things the free market can't do very well, and I have no confidence in the market doing them. One of them is the way in which the free market arranges which products of my industry and of TV are broadcast, let's say, in the third world, fourth world, developing countries and beyond. Left to itself, the market has ordained that the most common shows watched abroad are "Baretta," "Dynasty" and "Baywatch." "Baywatch" is mentioned so often as the thing seen most abroad that I was sure it couldn't be right, but my assistant, who is my right brain, says that "Baywatch" is in fact the most commonly watched show in the Middle East. This is not, she went on to say, because of any closeness of the accessibility, of the values, of "Baretta" or "Baywatch" or "Dynasty" that people want to see abroad, so much as the fact that they're cheap. You can get more episodes of "Baywatch" for a nickel to run on your local broadcast—public or private, by the way—than you can of "The Practice" or "ER" or "Law & Order," which are very expensive to buy a hundred of. Therefore, I think we have to jump in.

Imagine what you would think of a culture if your only images of it had been "Baretta," "Dynasty" and "Baywatch." Kind of maundering violence of an amusing sort, and then extremes of rich and poor and terrible clothes—that would be "Dynasty"—and

then these leggy blondes on the beach. That would be your image of the culture. It's very hard to imagine what a fourth-world reaction to such a product is. When you discover that it's plentiful there, and has been going on for years, and they're ordering more, you really start to wonder. If one guesses it's going to have any effect at all—and Andrew Kohut says it actually is being watched and being consumed—we ought to get involved in seeing what material goes over there.

Not long after Sept. 11, Henry Hyde called us before his committee in Congress to talk about what and how we could get better stuff abroad. It led Norman Pattiz [founder and chairman, Westwood One] to propose Radio Sawa. It's not led to anything in broadcast, but I said, "I think you should put the finger on Hollywood studios. They certainly enjoy sufficient tax advantages and prosperity in our economy. Have them give up episodes of television and movies at-cost, or for free, God forbid." Let me be very clear about this: I think the key is to export typical "good" Hollywood product. Imagine, for example, that you exported Spielberg's "Amistad" to the fourth world. You'd be showing a movie filled with vicious anti-American propaganda, and what America did about such a problem. You'd be showing a slave revolt based on color. You'd be showing the system of American justice trying, semi-failing, to cope with it. This is clearly not jingoism ... and yet what could be more stirring, what could be more relatable to people living under tyranny, or let's say people struggling toward some social formation of justice, than to see episodes of "The Practice," rather than "Baretta."

David Kelley is a conservative, it's a conservative-slanted show. Every week he tries to make his legal problem as complex as possible, complexity being what you really want to say about America. I'm not particularly interested in Joshua's "battle of ideas." I don't want to go abroad and say, "We have better ideas than you." I want to go abroad and say, "We're kind of a mess, and the mess is invited to the table, and we sometimes come up with OK solutions and sometimes we don't. This is what freedom looks like." Send that abroad. Typical Hollywood product: Send "ER" abroad—corny, multi-racial melodrama, not always very good. Typical Hollywood product, that's what to send abroad. There's an invitation in this for people to see the human face of America, and, again, it has more of what a free society looks like than other types and kinds of products.

The other thing we can do is simply what Helena Finn suggested: How about a kind of Hollywood Fulbright Program that sends filmmakers, film writers, directors and so forth to work with people around the world? For some reason they want their movies and TV to look like ours. It won't in the end, but we'll learn something and they'll learn something. That's a project that someone just needs to write a check for. The willingness is there. There are ways in which—only addressing things in a long term—Hollywood can, and I think, would, actually be willing to act.

By way of illustration of what I consider the willingness, let me tell a fairly positive story. It's the story of Julie Taymor and "The Lion King." When Michael Eisner had the idea of turning it into a Broadway play, he turned not to a kind of song-and-dance team, but to Julie Taymor. She had been doing very odd, off-Broadway productions, mostly with dance, which she had learned by spending years in Java, and puppetry, which she had learned by spending years in Sicily and in the South Pacific. She put together

a very distinctive and profoundly multicultural signature art, which she had developed under the auspices of the Watson Foundation. So here's IBM entering the lists. They asked Julie Taymor to make "The Lion King" into a Broadway show—one of the most successful Broadway shows in history—employing with a very free hand African dance, Javanese music and Sicilian mask-artistry in a tale that derives from African folktales. It's Broadway, it's Hollywood, it's Disney, it's 42nd Street, it makes money for everyone, and it's eminently exportable.

The happy punch line to the story—when they said to Julie Taymor after years of its successful American run, "We'd like to take this abroad," she said, "Here's how: When we go to Africa—these are their stories—I want African dancers; I want to redo the dance in the villages; I want to put it on there. Let's start from scratch with native materials. That's how I became who I am, that's why 'Lion King' looks so good." And Disney said, "Done." There is no sleeping punch to this story. This is a good story about people who like making money, doing cultural diplomacy with a free hand. Why aren't there a million ways in which the State Department, government organizations, private and public organizations can back up this demonstrated interest in international cultural diplomacy?

Then we come to the story about John Walker Lindh. I've spent the last year neglecting other tasks to try and get the mystery of John Walker Lindh right. Surely I've failed. Really interesting year though. Let me begin by saying I was in the courtroom when he pled guilty to two counts of the 10 that were offered, and he identified himself happily as a "soldier of God." That's the form that pleading guilty took. He is not crazy, despite Barbara Bush's comments to that effect. He is not crazy; he is not psychotic; he is not Charlie Manson; he is not the Unabomber. He is quite simply—and this is all one needs to know—an extremely religious young man. He is a very serious student of Islam. One of his teachers at a madrasa in Pakistan, who is not a terrorist but was a serious ... the kind of fundamentalist that has been described as intelligent, learned, fundamentalist and there for years, said "I know men in their 80s who've read the Koran all their lives, and the Shariah, and who know less about Islam than John Walker Lindh did at 19." He means business, and he is motivated by a sincere appetite for international culture of a very specific kind.

His lawyers told me that the night when the deal that gave him 20 years—of which he'll serve 17—was made, they went back and forth between the State Department, the Justice Department, the White House and John in prison in Alexandria, saying, "Well, they'll settle for 40 years. We can get you 30. If we hold out we'll get you 20. Maybe they'll say 30. They want to name the prison." Like when you're buying a house, these were the terms he was offered: 20, 30, 40, you pick the prison, whatever. He was, according to one of his attorneys, spectacularly uninterested. It was as if they were talking about someone else's life. He said only one thing about the deal they were making. He said, "When I get out, if it's 20, 30, 40 years from now ..." They said, "Twenty, 30, 40 years? John, that's a big difference!" He said, "Whenever I get out, I'll be a felon, won't I? And I can't get a passport, which means I can't make my hajj, and I'm a Muslim. Can you get me a passport?" It's the only deal point that he showed any interest in. They said, "Well, you know, it's kind of tricky, we're talking to the Justice

Department, and this is really State, and they don't ..." If he was in Hollywood, he would say, "It's a deal-breaker. It's all I care about, see what you can do."

Of course, the government did give in, but the message from this is that he's serious about Islam. His mother, the day that he was sentenced, said, "One of the great things about his getting out a mere 17 years from now—he'll be in his 30s—is that he can teach Americans so much about Islam." What he's doing in prison is studying, he's going for his Ph.D. A number of academics have said, "Yeah, he's ready; I wish I had him in my class at UCLA; he's a serious student." Of course, he carried an AK-47 and he was wound 'round with hand-grenades.

The message is that as we go forward with the cultural diplomacy that in points one and two I advocated, I want the combined effect of current history and my year of research to show that "the other" is really other. What we're talking about here is not the "family of man." As we go abroad with our values, our art, our storytelling, our dance, our music and encounter "the other," we should avoid the kind of optimism that's based on the idea that all religion is basically benign, all sincere religious attitudes are fundamentally benevolent—"If we can only connect to the little boy in John Walker Lindh, or, indeed, to Osama bin Laden, whom he met and hated, then we will form a happy family." No, it's an embattled voyage that we embark upon. It is one where their values, even when they're fully understood, will clash with ours. It's not mere misunderstanding. I'm trying to sound like the syrup Joshua said we shouldn't pour over the problem, and I'll probably succeed. What we will encounter is true "other"-hood, and they hate us. As Salman Rushdie said, "They hate us for our cheese graters, they hate us for our silk stockings." It's not that they hate *us*. ... They genuinely hate what we ordinarily and simply value. Let's take that abroad; let's mingle that. Let's not expect easy solutions.

So in my third point, I want to cast a shadow over the first two. I believe in cultural diplomacy. I know spectacularly attractive stories of the joy and understanding it can bring, and I want to echo Dick Bulliet's sense that we are facing some genuine otherness in "the other." John Walker Lindh had his first exposure to Islam by watching the movie "Malcolm X" by Spike Lee. He was enchanted by Denzel's interesting performance as Malcolm X. He memorized the movie. It was his way in. He went on the Web, he found in black rap pseudo-Islamic references—this is American popular culture, forgive me, at its worst—and this was his way in. I can imagine, as I listen to Dick Bulliet, that if we had a culture that was filled with informed and available images—I'm not saying positive images, but authentic images, as good as Spike Lee's movies are—if he, as a 12-year-old boy in Marin County, had gotten interested in Islam and there were books on the shelves and teachers who knew what they were talking about, perhaps—one can only say in retrospect—he wouldn't have ended up under the influence of extremist groups that he found in San Francisco and that led him down that path. ... The outcome of this clash, which I'm foreseeing, might still in the end be positive. So three notes. I hope they converge in a dark time. The effort is still worth making. Don't look for results tomorrow.

CARTER: The Secretary gets to say a few words since I think her rather long exposition had a few glancing shots. I would only say

very quickly that one thing we've done is taken care of half the topic. No one here is in favor of short-term branding. Whatever else they are in favor of, they are not in favor of short-term branding, and so we can talk about the need for longer range or a lack of need for longer-range efforts.

FINN: For Andrew Kohut, I thank you for bringing up what's happened between the United States and Europe, because, as a diplomat who's had several tours in Europe, I'm deeply concerned about this. Europeans should be our partners. It's one thing when we talk about people in very, very different cultures from our own, having completely different value systems and so on, but we and Europe are really awfully close to one another, and what's hap-

We should avoid the kind of optimism that's based on the idea that all religion is basically benign, that all sincere religious attitudes are fundamentally benevolent.

pened is very, very disturbing, and we have to make serious efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to put that back together.

Professor Bulliet, I don't think you listened to me, because I'm just going to read you something that was in my speech. I said, "To be effective, a good diplomat should know the language, the culture and history of the country in which he or she is posted. To be effective, a good diplomat should know how to listen, both to what is said and to what is unsaid. To be effective, a good diplomat must be able to imagine the sentiments and the aspirations of those he or she encounters." On that point we are very much in agreement. No one could be a more profound supporter of language and historic training. I would like to see your students from the Middle East program coming into the State Department. They would be prized. You hit upon something else: One of the great tragedies ... is that we've got people who've done a Ph.D. with Professor Bulliet in Middle East studies, and they go out to a posting in the Middle East, and they spend all their time taking congressional delegations carpet shopping. He heard that complaint because that's a real complaint. We've lost some very good people who said, "I didn't become a diplomat of public diplomacy, or of the political section of the embassy, to spend all of my time taking visiting delegations carpet shopping." So that's a very legitimate criticism.

On the other issue having to do with the secular: First of all, I've spent a lot of time in the only Muslim country that is secular, and that secularism is not something that belongs only to a superficial elite. It's obviously being challenged now with the rise of an Islamist party. I'm talking about Turkey. But the secularism in Turkey goes very, very deep into the lowest levels of the society. That's my experience. It's very different from things that go on in the Arab world. But when it comes to the whole question of education, I spent five years in Pakistan, and in Pakistan what I saw was that people who could afford to—and I'm talking again not

just about elite-elites, I'm talking about middle-class people who could afford to—wanted to send their children to school where they learned math and science and history. It was only the poorest of the poor who put these kids in madrassas. I have nothing against a religious education, but religious education should be imparted by people who are educated themselves. They were going into schools where they were given enough food so they didn't starve at home—in a country where we've interrupted family-planning programs and people have enormous families that they can't afford to support—putting these kids in schools where they are just indoctrinated, and really with some very hateful kinds of messages. That's a distortion of Islam. I've lived much of my adult life in the Muslim world, and I have seen its huge contribution to world civilizations. What's going on there is a distortion, and I think that there are ways in which we can support people, because the vast majority of people have a peaceful outlook.

The kind of product that will sell America's image is the stuff we're already making because it's filled with social criticism, our flaws, our messiness.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Victor Navasky; I teach at the Journalism School; I publish *The Nation* magazine. I have a question for Josh Muravchik or for anybody else who wants to answer. I have always thought of Alan Harrington's definition of public relations as distinguished from journalism, as right, where he says, "Journalism is the search for truth. Public relations is the distortion of truth in favor of your client." And I am all for the kind of cultural exchange that a number of the panelists have described, and I think we have as much to learn about them as they have to learn about us. However, I wonder whether, when you cite the example of the 1950s and the Cold War stuff, you include the secret CIA culture war as a valid instrument. According to the Church Committee, the CIA subsidized over a thousand books during that period. We don't know to this day what they were, or how many of them were true information, false information. The stuff that Voice of America used to put out, not in its incarnation under Geoff Cowan but in the old days, and some of the stuff Radio Marti put out—it may be one person's version of truth and another person's not-version of truth. To me, it's just a matter of resources. I'm curious what you think about that.

MURAVCHIK: I think that the overall effort to carry out a battle against communism, and communist organizations, and communist ideas and so on, was a very positive thing. I think it's something you can't do twice, covertly—that once the whistle was blown on the CIA operation, it can never again be done by the CIA or some other covert mechanism, but there are lots of things of that type that can be done overtly. And as I said, after the Church Committee revelations, lots of similar types of stuff began to be done overtly, and to the surprise of some people, it was effec-

tive overtly. The fear had been that, if it was openly sponsored by the U.S. government, that would undermine it. Maybe it did to some extent, but it still has had a positive impact.

CARTER: Victor, let me get this thing expanded a little bit. What I'm really interested in is whether the other panelists are prepared to say yes or no to the idea that we ought to be re-entered on the governmental level into major efforts implicit—explicit, actually—in what the Secretary outlined. Whether we're ready to go back to major governmental efforts to, in effect, engage across both the information and cultural fields, as opposed to other forms and to some degree precisely—the argument would be—because the old approach simply is going to collapse under the weight of suspicion and some histories that some people share.

ROMANO: I'd like to say, "no" to that in a very specific way. My only hesitation in saying that Hollywood is willing, able and eager to participate in public diplomacy is that we will find ourselves being asked to do a type or kind of propaganda. We are terrible at it. When we do it, we don't do our best and it's no good for anyone. I was trying to say very specifically the kind of product that will sell America's image is the stuff we're already making because it's filled with social criticism, our flaws, our messiness. I remember meeting undergraduate students in the early '70s from Czechoslovakia, who'd been active in the '68 rebellion. They were inspired by the American image, and their favorite author was Allen Ginsberg, their favorite movie was Nicholas Ray's "Rebel Without a Cause"—in other words, pretty darn subversive, not mainstream stuff at all. But they got from the very existence and spirit of that kind of art a very positive image of American life. That's probably not what the State Department would ask us to make.

KOHUT: A comparison between now and the Cold War is not a very productive one. That was an argument about ideas. It was also a geopolitical struggle for power. It was an argument about ideas, not an argument about oppression. And the idea that we're going to say to people in the Mideast, "We have some good ideas." Their reaction will be, "You may have some good ideas, but get your foot off my neck." A real focus on persuading on the basis of our values and our notions about democracy is so secondary to what the real problem is. I'm going to give you one piece of data. My old colleagues at the Gallup organization did a poll in nine countries of the Mideast at the end of 2001, and in only one country was there any sense of acknowledgement or agreement that fundamentalist Muslims were responsible for the 2001 attacks. Now, we're going to wage a war of ideas when the world is seeing through the prism of such hostility and resentment toward us because of what we do? Sorry, I don't think it's a productive approach. It's useful, but the major problem is focusing on what are the complaints of these people that create such unbelievable hostility. And, with all due respect, to say that this is just a matter of this religion being hijacked by Osama bin Laden is understating the case and minimizing what the problem is. The problem is not a clash of values; the problem is one of a whole culture, a whole part of the world, thinking that we represent a reason and rationale for their failures and their inadequacies, which is only reinforced by the war in Iraq.

MURAVCHIK: Yes, but we don't. That's exactly the problem. They may think so, but they're wrong to think so, and the only people whose necks we have a foot on, in the form of recent military presence, are in Iraq right now and Afghanistan last year. The people in those two countries were quite happy to have us there. The problem is elsewhere, where we don't have any foot on any neck.

KOHUT: What they will turn around and say is, "Look at our policies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; look at our support of regimes that they feel are repressive and are stifling them." I'm not going to argue their case, I'm giving you their perception.

MURAVCHIK: I'm saying we should argue our case, that's the point.

CARTER: Let me suggest one other thing that we might also remember. Despite the flavor of the moment, there's a world out there that goes beyond this specific engagement, and the United States is engaged worldwide. As we go forward with this conversation, let's not do the usual thing, which is to think that today's obsession is tomorrow's long-term, only problem. We have a lot of things to deal with and we might want to go do them.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Marion Dreyfus. I work for WSNR radio. On the one hand you have something that has not been mentioned, which is the contextualization of every error in something like Al-Jazeera and textbooks and movies, that is almost a matrix, that completely envelops those in that culture, a force for changing ideas and minds and cultural mindset, and that has a great deal to do with why Osama is popular. We saw the information minister of Iraq this past week, "Baghdad Bob," who made a fool of himself but that isn't irregular in that part of the world. You keep lying until somebody says, "But you're being invaded, right behind you is a tank!" And then he goes, "Oops! Sorry." That is very common, and that is why millions, *millions* of people think the way they do. It's not only our cultural exports. Secondly, when I was living abroad in a number of capitals, we had USIA materials, and the cultural materials that were given to us were shown in a very hothouse manifestation. Hardly anyone saw it except people who went through the particular doorway of the embassy or the cultural attachés. Very few people who were on the average ground saw such things and they meant very little.

BULLIET: Your starting point about the distortions of everything is very good, because one of the efforts that we have, that we haven't talked about, is who rewrites the textbooks for Iraqi children. Right now, somebody is going to have to decide what the history of Iraq is for the next generation of Iraqi children. In the process, that will be a litmus test of our public diplomacy. Do we write textbooks that say Israel is the friend of Iraq? Do we de-legitimize Iraq's long war with Israel? Do we de-legitimize Iraq's war against Iran, and say Saddam led you into a terrible war? Does that by reflex imply that Iran is good? Do we write a textbook teaching Iraqi children about Islam? And if we don't do it, do we vet the textbook written by a Shiite here, or a Suni there, to see whether what they're teaching about Islam is what we like? We have now taken on responsibility in Iraq, to not only rebuild the

state, but to rebuild the next generation of Iraqis, and I'm not sure we're prepared to do it. What it's going to amount to is reinventing the history of Iraq.

FINN: The term is no longer used because it's politically incorrect, but it was called "re-education." That's what all those America Houses ... there were 50 America Houses all over Germany, and that's what that was all about.

BULLIET: Let me just point out one difference. ... If we write textbooks that teach Iraqi children a certain thing about their last 50 years that is totally different from what other Arab children are learning in their textbooks, then we're setting up a very, very peculiar situation for these people.

FINN: I don't think we should write the textbooks. The textbooks should be written by Iraqis. ... The Israel-Palestine conflict is incredibly important, but it's only one thing. There's a whole lot of other things that have to go into those textbooks. There's a tremendous amount that could be done in curriculum development and so on.

CARTER: As you go forward with this conference, think Japan and argue about Japan. It's an interesting question about how all of these questions, including who writes the histories and what kind of democracy and all the rest.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Natalya Scimeca. I'm a student at the law school. You just arrived at the gist of my question, which stems from an analogy. In Germany, after the Second World War, our first cultural diplomatic strategy, which never came to fruition, was that we would bring back the German classics to the German people to de-Nazi-fy and humanize the Germans. We'd bring them German classical music and literature and so forth and obviously that would not harm our goals as well. I'm wondering whether that has been spoken about, or what your thoughts are on the subject in terms of bringing classical Islamic culture, rather than exporting American goods to the region, but actually bringing them quality—that's judgmental—but traditional non-fundamentalist ... their own culture.

FINN: That's very important. One of the things I was trying to emphasize in my presentation is that we must show respect for other cultures; that's why I think this Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation is so important. It demonstrates the value we place on other cultures. The people who write Islamic history texts don't have to be people sitting in Iraq. There are scholars around the world, and there are Muslim scholars around the world who can do some of this work, and I really believe in consensus when it comes to this kind of thing. It's not something that should be taken over by one or another group with a specific message to communicate.

Let me just go back to one other thing. American literature is a wonderful treasure that we have, and it speaks to people. John mentioned Ginsberg. We should be translating out literature into many languages and making it available to people around the world, and at the same time promoting the knowledge of the

English language because the Internet is basically English-language. That opens up a whole world for all the kids who have all kinds of crazy ideas about what actually happened here on 9/11 and everything else.

KOHUT: We have a large unreleased part of the survey that we've done in 44 countries, many of these countries are democratizing countries. What we find in the Muslim nations are very strong democratic aspirations, *very* strong democratic aspirations. In fact, in many ways the desire for equal treatment under the law, for multiparty systems, for all the things that we value, are stronger in Muslim countries than in Eastern Europe. That represents an opportunity for us, à la Japan.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Albert Maysles is my name. It was interesting that it wasn't until this woman just before me brought up this matter of how in Islamic countries they do a very good job of misinforming themselves, and that was a matter that wasn't brought up at all until she mentioned it. Right now, at this moment, there's a 41-hour television program going all over that part of the world proclaiming that Jews, "The Protocols of Zion" ... that the Jews want to take over the world. And all kinds of myths that are misinformative. Those countries don't have freedom of the press!

CARTER: We do, and we get Fox instead.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Rob Snyder, Rutgers, Newark. If there's going to be a long American cultural exchange with Islamic nations, surely the minds of the American people have to be prepared for that, too. And journalism is going to play an important role for better and for worse in that.

CARTER: Last remarks from the panelists building on what you just heard.

ROMANO: I'll use a moment of that to ask Richard Bulliet whether it is so that an exposure to classic Islamic literature and culture would be curative the way the questioner supposed. My understanding is that fundamentalism is a perfectly authentic version of Islam—terrorism may not be—but that there's nothing inauthentic about fundamentalism; it *is* Islam; it's one type and kind. That's a question for you. In a general sort of way, I think the question should broaden out to Western Europe, the exchange there. There's as much repair to be done there as anywhere, and the prospects are more hopeful, that what we share culturally, is all the greater.

MURAVCHIK: One point that we didn't touch on at all until you did a moment ago, Hodding, is the case of Japan. We haven't talked much—except Ambassador Finn did in her remarks—about what lies before us in attempting to implant a democracy in Iraq. There's a great deal of skepticism about our ability to do it, and justifiably so. But the challenge of doing that in Iraq is no greater than the challenge was of doing it in Japan. Indeed, the official State Department position going in was that it would be impossible to

do, and in fact we did it with really spectacular success.

BULLIET: In answer to John's question, there is as much range of possibility in Islam as there is in Christianity and Judaism with respect to views of the world, fundamentalism included. One point that you mentioned several times, the Internet, as somehow something that would be good—the Internet is one of the most important disseminators of Islamic jihadist doctrines. One of the illusions we have is that somehow Osama and his people are against the modern world. In fact, they use the tools of modernity with great skill.

CARTER: A subject you know perfectly better than I do, but I recollect those little cassette recorders in Iran making sure that everybody knew every word that was being said by Khomeini when he was not there.

KOHUT: There is strong support for nation building in Iraq; there was stronger support than we could've imagined given the attitudes of the American public in the 1990s for nation building in Afghanistan. The pictures are doing the job, and the American public is getting it that we just can't leave Iraq to fall apart and turn ugly again.

FINN: I'm going to go back to my main point, which is human investment, and the fact that diplomacy has to be a two-way street. One of the things that occurs to me is that—it's a sad fact—many of the greatest academic and intellectual resources, in terms of manuscripts, documents, books and research materials are in the United States. I was involved in a program with the Smithsonian before 9/11 because we wanted to start up a cultural exchange with Iran because Iranian scholars wanted to come here and study some of the fantastic miniature paintings we have in the Smithsonian collection. So I go back to human investment, and that means two-way exchange—sending Americans out, bringing people here.

Also, and this is a different point, we have to work more to educate ourselves and our kids about the world. When I was in Germany even, and other countries where I've served, we sent enormous numbers of young people to study in the United States, and it was like pulling teeth to get American kids to come even to a country where there would be a comparable standard of living. The study of foreign language is not emphasized in the United States. That's something we're really going to have to think about, because if we're going to exchange ideas with the world, we have to make that effort to understand other cultures. On this business about the tools of modernity: Yes, it's true, and you reminded me of an old Cold War argument that we should close the libraries because people could come into American libraries and read about communism, and think how dangerous that would be. I believe in openness, and I believe that it's very, very important to encourage the English language but also for us to learn the languages of these other countries. It's the world of ideas where the battle is, not the world of technology.

CARTER: On that note, I want to thank the five panelists.

Keynote Address

KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
TRISHA BROWN,
choreographer and artistic director,
Trisha Brown Dance Company

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ, *deputy director,*
National Arts Journalism Program
MICHAEL Z. WISE, *NAJP research fellow,*
and contributing editor, Architecture
NOREEN TOMASSI, *president and CEO*
Arts International

SZÁNTÓ: Yesterday we started telling a story about cultural diplomacy, and some of the big issues were put out on the table already about the political and cultural framework that surrounds this activity today. Now we zero in, we bore down into the details. Right after me, you will hear from Michael Wise, who sparked the fire for this conference. Michael is an NAJP research fellow who came to us more than a year ago with the idea of organizing this conference. This is also a very good time to acknowledge again our institutional partners who then joined us in this effort, Arts International and the Center for Arts and Culture. After Michael's overview of the day's themes, Noreen Tomassi, the president and CEO of Arts International, will introduce our keynote speaker, Trisha Brown.

WISE: In 1962, during the heyday of U.S. government-sponsored cultural diplomacy, Dave Brubeck and his wife, Iola, wrote a musical titled "The Real Ambassadors." It starred Louis Armstrong and Carmen McRae. Summing up the giddy rush of art and music that flowed across the Atlantic and beyond at the time, the lyrics went like this:

*The State Department has discovered jazz
It reaches folks like nothing we have.
Say that our prestige needs a tonic
Export the Philharmonic ...
We put 'Oklahoma!' in Japan
South Pacific we gave to Iran.
And when our neighbors called us armin
We sent out Woodie Herman ...
Gershwin gave the Muscovites a thrill
Bemstein was the darling of Brazil.
And just to sap internal mayhem
We dispatched Martha Graham.*

Of course, it was never so simple. But for decades, the U.S. Information Agency flooded much of the world with American orchestras, dance troupes, art exhibits and jazz performances. Once the communist threat waned after 1991; however, U.S. cultural initiatives abroad were cut back severely.

In 1999, the USIA itself was folded into the State Department. Whereas there were once over 30 people working within a U.S. government cultural division to send exhibits, presentations and performances abroad, today the State Department has a staff of seven assigned to this task. France, by contrast, employs 85 people

in 10 offices around the United States to promote French culture in this country alone. Whereas the State Department spends \$2 million annually to present U.S. culture abroad, Germany's Goethe Institut has been spending about \$7.5 million to showcase German cultural achievements in the United States. The once-proud network of American libraries and reading rooms overseas has now been sharply reduced, with some U.S. officials arguing that the age of the Internet has rendered them obsolete and that security concerns make it ill-advised to retain such facilities. Less than a quarter of those that remain are traditional lending libraries where readers can actually peruse current American periodicals or look at American literature. The rest are what the Department calls "information resource centers" and often consist of a single computer terminal.

But just as the American apparatus of cultural diplomacy has been largely dismantled, the United States faces an urgent task in confronting discontent around the globe. Resentment and distrust has grown most vociferously in Islamic societies, but these days the increasingly pressing question—"Why do they hate us?"—is being asked almost as frequently about attitudes toward the United States among the citizenries of our long-time European allies. There is anger and bitterness that local customs and identities are being swallowed up in an insurmountable wave of McDonald's, Ruggats and Britney Spears. This rising tide of anti-Americanism often does not take note of the wider range of American artistic accomplishments. Can strategic use of cultural initiatives help change this?

In the waning days of his administration, President Clinton held a White House conference on the same topic we consider here today. Standing beneath the chandeliers of the East Room, Clinton quipped about cultural diplomacy in December 2000: "You know, you send your artists to us; we send our musicians to you, and everybody feels better." But little came of the talk that day at the White House, and the world seems an infinitely more dangerous place than it did back then. Cultural diplomacy—best deployed in tandem with an openness to outside ideas, international collaboration and genuine exchange—has been seen over the years by many policy makers as a fuzzy, feel-good practice with little tangible benefit. However, the recognition that Washington has done a glaringly poor job of countering growing anti-American sentiment is putting cultural diplomacy in a new light.

In our opening session yesterday, former acting Assistant Secretary of State Helena Kane Finn eloquently argued that har-

nessing the power of the arts can actually be a cost-effective way to help insure U.S. national security. With commercial exports of American culture having given this country hegemonic influence over the viewing and listening habits of young people the world over, some, like the political scientist Joseph Nye, argue that these exports already exert a form of soft power, something that influences other societies by implicitly promoting American values like personal freedom, upward mobility and democratic openness. We began yesterday to explore whether these commercial exports present an adequate picture of American society and its values. Today we'll look at what else might be done. Although the organizers of this event do not deny the relevance of countless political and economic factors at play in international relations, today we hope to focus on the exchange of ideas, arts and other aspects of culture among nation-states and their peoples as a means of fostering mutual understanding.

After our keynote address we'll look at the history of cultural diplomacy—how it developed from its earliest days, how it was used by the United States during the Cold War, and how it has fared in the most recent decade. Next we'll hear from representatives of foreign governments that are particularly active in this area and look at whether there are lessons in their activities for American policy. Most other countries recognize that cultural relations are an essential third dimension in relations between states, along with politics and trade, and even when official ties between governments are strained or non-existent, culture can keep open channels of communication. This has been vividly illustrated with the acclaim accorded in the United States for Iranian cinema, which despite the severing of official relations between Washington and Tehran over two decades ago, has offered clear signals of ferment beneath Islamic fundamentalist rule.

A third panel will take a look at the prospects for cultural diplomacy in the Islamic world. The question of what role culture might play in post-war Iraq looms large. In the anarchic conditions that have reigned over the past few days, the picture looks bleak, with reports from Baghdad about the wholesale plundering of the National Museum of Iraq, looters hurling Mozart records and history books from the German Embassy, and still others ransacking the French Cultural Center. But when calm is restored, enormous potential remains. The relevance of foreign experience to this question was highlighted last September, when 32 Iraqi exiles drew up what they called "A Report on the Transition to Democracy in Iraq." The exiles urged the return to their country of institutions like the British Council and the Alliance Française to help educational reform, the publication of new textbooks, as well as the creation of free and uncensored media. These institutions are well-poised to offer more in terms of art and culture to Iraq and other Islamic nations struggling along the road to modernity and rule of law.

Finally we'll have a chance to examine some case studies of specific ways that cultural diplomacy has been practiced by U.S. ambassadors, a Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist and a leading film critic at the state, in contrast to the federal, level. As we've witnessed over the past three weeks, U.S. strength measured in military power is unparalleled. But while this may win fear and respect, it does not necessarily engender admiration and affection. For that we need, as Michael Ignatieff has observed, not to "subdue by force of arms," but to "inspire by force of example." The vitality and inge-

nuity of American artistic creation are a wellspring for this inspiration. It may not be easily quantifiable, in the words of the Brubeck musical, whether the Philharmonic can be a "tonic." And the dispatching of some modern-day Woody Herman when our enemies call us "vermin" may not on its own ensure national security, but surely culture offers us a potent way to export hope as well as fear.

TOMASSI: It is my job and my great pleasure this morning to introduce you to our keynote speaker, the choreographer Trisha Brown. Can there be anyone in this room at all who does not know who Trisha Brown is, her distinguished body of work, her long record of touring the world, her international fame, her immense contribution to American dance? If there is, go buy a ticket as soon as you possibly can, and be astonished by this great artist's work. I want to say simply this about Trisha: She's an artist, an artist of the very highest order. When I think of her work, two words immediately come to mind: astonishment and recognition. And that is what great art does for us. First, as with all great work, when we sit in that darkened theater, her work astonishes us. We think: Can that be possible? Can a body move that way? Have I ever seen so much in a gesture? Did I know that space could work that way, or that a human being could move through time and sound and silence in quite that way? When we see the work of a great artist, that moment of astonishment is fundamental to what we are seeing.

The other word that comes to mind when I think of Trisha's work is "recognition." Yesterday we talked a great deal about the artist's work in cultural diplomacy, the artist as a tool in a tool kit

I like diplomacy. I like reason, discussion, negotiation and working it out. You have to, in dance, where there is not an exact equivalent in words for a physical idea.

to show the world our values, or to show our common humanity. To, in a sense, say to the world, "We are like you; we are born, eat, drink, laugh, die, love our children." While this is a valuable role for the arts, in some ways CNN can do that as well for us. Is there a parent in the room who hasn't seen the pictures of a father leaning over his injured child in a hospital in Baghdad, who doesn't think as he watches that parent quietly reassure that child, smile for the child, take care of him, hold her hand, "I'm that person, we're exactly alike?" We get that sense of common humanity sometimes through the news.

But what great art like Trisha's can do for us is give us a moment of recognition that we are more than that. And that is why art is such an important part of cultural diplomacy, and why Trisha's work is so important to the world. It's not simply to say, "We're all human beings." It's to say, "We are human, and we are more than this." In this particularly difficult time in the world, that notion that art gives us, that we are more, that we can imagine ourselves in the world as something different, is key to why artists must be involved in crossing borders constantly, and must be

involved in remaking the world for us. So it is my very, very, very great pleasure to introduce Trisha Brown to you, an artist of the very highest order.

BROWN: I'm honored to be here. I made a promise to myself not long ago that I would reenter the world of art and peace advocacy. So when the invitation came, I didn't even look at it, I said, "Yes! I'll take it!" I thought to myself, "I'll sit in the back row and I will study how they do it." Then the schedule came in, I read it quietly at my house on a Sunday, and I said, "Keynote speaker!" And I had an anxiety attack. . . . I was going to try to come up with an oil/gas metaphor here, but I think I'm not going to go there with that.

Let me start by saying that many dance companies are fighting for their lives at this time. Mine is one of them. We looked at a long lease on a large space; we took it, 16,000 sq. ft. in 2001, and embarked on a huge renovation. The company was working temporarily in an old loft downtown while we waited for our new home. The plan was to divide the space into four studios, two for us, two for renters, and when the company was out of town, four for renters. This was a prudent notion about underwriting the rent for the space altogether. On 9/11, the Twin Towers were struck and then fell, followed by other buildings. Then Enron imploded, struck from within, and fell too, followed by the economy, and we have not recovered yet. Our renters withdrew, they are coming back slowly. Funding shrank, and the famed Trisha Brown cut back and cut back. I have tightened my belt so many times that soon I shall have garroted myself mid-torso, never to be able to enact another Martha Graham contraction. There's more. Against our usual 20 weeks of tour each year, we have eight confirmed weeks of work for our dancers, July '03 to June '04. That is 12 weeks of no tour income next year. I am told that if I made a choreography on ordinary people in a community and augmented that group with my professional dancers, I could get bookings. But damn! That is not what I do.

My subject here is international diplomacy through the arts in a country that just eschewed diplomacy. I like diplomacy. I like reason, discussion, negotiation and working it out. You have to, in dance, where there is not an exact equivalent in words for a physical idea. In fact, in new modern dance, where there are few codified techniques, the choreographer must find a way to get others to understand what they want, especially if the movement is complex and never been seen, done or thought of before. I do this through metaphor, instruction and numerous tries again and again until I get what I think I see—somewhere in the periphery of my vision—what I want them to do. The notion of cross-cultural communication of American values through art caught my attention while I was reading the materials that were sent to me in preparation for this conference. What are American values? They are certainly not just one thing. For example, a marketed preemptive war is cynical and anathema to the value system of my early training in the 10 Judeo-Christian commandments. I do try—and this is going to sound foolish—to be a good person. It's how I was raised. I try hard to be a good person. And you are right in that regard; those values do infuse my work.

My work now has no simple explanation because I work in three disciplines. Choreography, you know. My company returned last Thursday from a four-week tour of 14 cities in France. I

remained here to work on new work. I was nervous about them being there without me. It turns out that they were welcomed by sold-out houses everywhere that they went. It seems the French can make a differentiation between politics and artists. This afternoon I have rented a ballerina, Emily Coates. She is coming to my studio so that I can study the lexicon of ballet technique, because I have a commission at the Paris Opera Ballet in 2005. This year I had a commission from the Lyon Biennale to do a choreography, and from the Cannes Festival for another choreography. Yes, the French discovered me in the early '70s, held my head above water in the '80s, gave my company fabulous commissions for new work, combined with residencies where my dancers and I taught classes and lectured, as did many other colleagues from America. A true international artistic exchange ensued. France imported American indigenous modern dance, and in turn those French students learned their lesson, came of age and demanded that their government support their work at home in France, instead of all those Americans. That was soon followed by a demand that America invite them to our cities, which we did. Reciprocity was established. There are many foreign companies that are at BAM, American Dance Festival, Lincoln Center, The Joyce and other places, for sure. I focus on France because I have witnessed the result and impact of my work there, and they continue to support my company to this day. And it has been something like a 32-year love affair. What choreographer wouldn't fall in love with a country that calls her "the high priestess of postmodern dance"?

I also work in visual arts. My visual work was first presented at a show in France. There is an exhibition at the Fabric Workshop in Philadelphia right now. There is an exhibition in London at White Cube. There is an exhibition touring this country, started at the Addison Gallery, Phillips-Andover. It is now at the Tang Museum in Saratoga. It will go to Houston soon, and it comes to the New Museum in New York next October. It is a compilation of artifacts, notebooks, drawings, sculpture, evidence of collaborations that are displayed in an extremely vivacious way.

I also work in opera. I began directing opera in 1998, Monteverdi's "Orpheo." Then on to contemporary composers and most recently Schubert's song cycle at Lincoln Center, and it will be there again.

All of these things are circulating through the world. They represent this work, this aesthetic, my company and me as an artist. At the center of all of this is a company that is struggling to just hang in there. I mention that to you because it is a measure of what America thinks of its artists. We were vilified, trampled, called names, in the early '90s. And the National Endowment, which is the brain of policy making in America, was cut to pieces. Now comes this invitation to think about American artists going to other countries to conduct diplomacy and exhibit their values. But here at home, I don't think we're really quite there yet. I think maybe there's some inversion that should take place here. I guess I would close by saying I am an art-o-gogue. I am ga-ga about art. I have been throwing myself in it and at it since 1961. I love making it, seeing it, doing it, performing it, hearing it, looking at it. If I didn't have art in my life . . . I would hate to think of what I would be like. So I thank you very much for this opportunity. I am outed as an advocate of the arts and peace in this country and before this august assembly. I thank you very much for that opportunity.

Cultural Diplomacy in Historical Perspective— From 19th Century World’s Fairs to the Cold War

MODERATOR:
VOLKER BERGHAHN,
*professor of history,
Columbia University*

PANELISTS:
JOHN BROWN, *research associate, Georgetown University,
and former U.S. foreign service cultural affairs officer*
FRANK NINKOVICH, *professor of history, St. John’s University*
PENNY VON ESCHEN, *professor of history, University of Michigan*
MICHAEL WARNER, *historian, Central Intelligence Agency*

BERGHAHN: This is the hour of the historians. There is on my extreme left, Professor Frank Ninkovich. He is very well known, has been working in the field of cultural diplomacy from a historical perspective for many years, and I hope he will start off to give us this long-term view. Next to him is Michael Warner, who is a historian at the Central Intelligence Agency. As some of you will know, during the Cold War period, the CIA was deeply involved in cultural diplomacy. Next to him is John Brown, who has worked at USIA, one of the other major agencies in this. And then finally, Penny Von Eschen, who has just finished a fascinating book on jazz and cultural diplomacy. As you can see, we are starting off with agencies, if you like, that try to conduct cultural diplomacy, and then we will have Penny at the end to give us a view of the artists and the cultural producers that were sent abroad and their connections with the international community.

I should say straight away that this is a very courageous panel, because you probably know that historians are often—here I have to make a self-confession—rather cowardly. They rummage in the past and find out all sorts of wonderful and fascinating things, but when you ask them, “Are there any things to be learned for the present and perhaps even for the future?” they leave it to the political scientists or economists to talk about that. I hope that this panel will not be cowardly, but on the contrary will stick their necks out and also in the question period will try to look at some of the lessons, perhaps negative but also positive, that can be learned from the past. In this connection I would also like to mention perhaps one aspect that could also be raised in this panel—partly because it’s my own research—is not just the official cultural diplomacy of USIA and the State Department and other official bodies in this country, but also, very important and often forgotten, the big foundations and American philanthropy and what they achieved in the past in terms of projecting an image of this society. Which, when you draw the balance sheet, was in fact a very important initiative. Millions of dollars, as you probably know, went precisely into the support of cultural ventures abroad.

There is currently among historians a very fascinating discussion, a very sophisticated discussion, about the meaning of Americanization, actually. It is no longer seen simply as America imposing itself almost like a steamroller, not just in military or economic terms, but also in cultural terms. It’s seen now as a much more sophisticated dual-carriage highway, if you like, where indeed ideas and people are exchanged. If you ask me, from a historical perspective, one of the most successful programs was the

exchange of people, and that may be something we should try to get back to.

We always forget that, I believe, 50 percent of the population in Iran and also in Iraq now are young people, who were born after all these crises of the 1970s and 1980s. I’m a product of the “jazz generation,” if you like, in the 1950s, that became fascinated by American popular culture. It’s very important that what the United States brought—certainly to Europe but also more broadly to the world after 1945, during the Cold War—was a very broad definition of culture. The Europeans had a very narrow definition, as you know, which was essentially high culture, and anything beyond that was beyond the pale. That created many criticisms and tensions between different continents. But this broad definition should be remembered, because it’s not just popular culture and American “mass culture,” so-called. I look at the activities of the big foundations—the Ford Foundation, for example, which had an international program that promoted precisely cultural ventures, but closely related to it they also had an overseas development program, which actually spent more dollars abroad, and that was a program that supported education, poverty programs and very important ventures also in the sciences. The American definition of culture was really as broad as you can possibly think of it, and that is an important element that perhaps we should remember when we now look at the cultural activities of the 1900s, going back to the World Exhibitions and then especially looking at the Cold War period.

NINKOVICH: Modern efforts to promote cultural relations were pioneered by the European powers in the era of high nationalism. In the race for cultural influence, the French set the early pace by setting up institutes abroad to teach the French language and literature. In 1910, a Bureau for Schools and French Foundations Abroad was created in the Foreign Ministry. German cultural foreign policy started with the establishment of a division for cultural affairs in the German Foreign Office in 1921, but the pre-war imperial government had supported German schools and libraries abroad and had lent a hand in the formation of public school systems in China, Turkey, Japan, South America. The first British Institute was founded in 1926, but the integration of cultural and foreign relations came with the creation of the British Council in 1935, which was intended to serve as “a school of national projection” and to mediate between governmental and private needs. In the U.S.S.R., the All Union Society for Cultural Relations with

Foreign Countries (VOKS) was created in 1925 as an arm of Soviet foreign policy.

The Europeans had also been culturally active in the private sphere. The Rhodes scholarships, established in 1902, are one important example. Another well-known illustration is the Alliance Française. Founded in 1883 to promote the French language and culture abroad, the Alliance saw the United States as its most fertile ground for the expansion of French civilization. Between 1880 and 1900, the Alliance established committees in San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles, Texas, Chicago, Denver, Brooklyn and New York. During the next 14 years, it established some 150 new local committees around the country. By 1904, the Alliance counted more than 25,000 members in the United States.

Although the U.S. government was a latecomer to formal programs of cultural relations as a foreign policy activity, it had a long, if haphazard, history of promoting an understanding of American culture abroad. In 1867, the Smithsonian Institution was appointed as the official center for exchanges of literary products and government documents. The many world’s fairs and expositions held in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which generally required modest governmental backing, were intended to project to non-Americans a favorable image of the American way of life. At first, this meant an emphasis on industrial innovation, indeed, the term “Americanization” first made its appearance in the 1867 Paris Universal Exposition as a synonym for industrial modernization. By the early 20th century, U.S. efforts sought increasingly to promote national artistic and intellectual achievements as well as industrial successes.

A small number of cultural efforts had obvious foreign policy connections. The remission of the Boxer indemnity in the amount of \$18 million, which resulted in approximately 2,000 Chinese being trained in American universities, was clearly aimed at strengthening U.S.-Chinese ties. The exchanges of statues and busts between Wilhelmine Germany and Theodore Roosevelt was a symbolic way of improving U.S.-German relations. World War I brought a potentially path-breaking change with the creation of the Committee on Public Information, or Creel Committee, but the brief period of American belligerency and the desire to return to “normalcy” led Congress to ax the agency, which, in any case, was distrusted by many because of its propaganda activities. The government backed a few other modest efforts. In 1908 and 1915, Pan-American scientific congresses were held under the auspices of the Pan American Union. In the 1920s, the U.S. government worked through the Union to promote cultural relations with Latin America. By the 1930s, as an outgrowth of the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States began to sign modest cultural conventions with Latin American nations.

However, if one tries to trace the origins of systematic programs in cultural relations, one must look to the private sector, especially the philanthropic foundations—especially the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Guggenheim Foundation—which in the two decades following World War I established an extensive system of international educational exchanges. The foundations were themselves trying to systematize earlier private efforts. By the end of the 19th century, an imperium of American schools abroad in Cairo, Beirut, Sofia and most notably, in China, was in existence. Here, too, the initial pat-

tern was the emergence of a hodge-podge of unrelated activities consisting chiefly of various inter-university exchange programs and missionary efforts.

The major philanthropic foundations substituted system for chaos. In the core field of educational exchanges, they took a major step by subsidizing the creation of the Institute for International Education in 1919, a clearinghouse which is still in existence. The Rockefeller Foundation’s extensive programs in China were an example of a well thought-out attempt to promote modernization by cultural means. As part of its four decade-long effort, the foundation created a modern medical school, the Peking Union Medical College, in 1919, promoted the study of Basic English, funded fellowships and subsidized relations between scholarly societies of different countries.

By the late 1930s, educational and scholarly exchanges had developed to the point that greater centralization and coordination were desirable. The Division of Cultural Relations was created in 1938 with a first year budget of \$28,000. The new Division was intended to be a clearinghouse to coordinate a hodge-podge of private activities, and not a policy making body. Policy, such as it was, would flow from advisory committees composed of representatives of private institutions.

Although nearly everyone involved professed satisfaction with this setup, there were some problems. It was no secret that private organizations hoped for government funding without government direction, a hope that ran counter to the common sense notion that money is power. There was also agreement on the need to avoid a close connection with U.S. foreign policy. The antipathy to getting into bed with the State Department stemmed from a fear that cultural activities might come to be seen as propaganda. Cultural advocates worried that the activities themselves would be compromised if they were perceived as political. It may be useful to recall that, even at the high tide of the New Deal, education was not conceived to be a sphere fit for federal intervention. However, the creation of the Division was justified in part by the German cultural threat in Latin America, which we now know to have been exaggerated. This willingness to cry wolf to the legislative branch would establish a pattern for the future in which cultural programs would be justified before the legislative branch by linking them to national security.

Unlike the European programs, early American proponents of cultural relations were liberal internationalists, who believed in “international understanding” as a way of lessening international conflict and, eventually, eliminating war. Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University, an important early figure, looked to the eventual creation of an “international mind.” In a period of rapidly growing functional interdependence, the promotion of international understanding seemed to be a prudent way of assuring that greater global integration did not collapse. Conflicting ideas and beliefs could be reconciled by improved communication. Cultural internationalists were driven by a universalist belief that, at bottom, all cultures had common interests. In principle, at least, the programs viewed cultural relations as a two-way street on the assumption that Americans had much to learn abroad. The programs were also elitist in character—that is, they defined culture as high culture in the expectation that those most influenced by exchanges would be in a position to put their new understanding

to effective use in positions of importance in their societies. The ambition was to create a like-minded, liberal, international elite that would be the core of an effective world opinion.

Once created, the cultural programs had little opportunity to function as intended. The rapid onset of World War II and unstoppable pressures to conscript cultural programs in the service of the war effort quickly transformed them in ways no one had anticipated. For many, culture had a very important role to play, as the war seemed as much a conflict of ideas as it was a matter of power politics. The result was that cultural relations very quickly took a political turn. Cultural attachés were created within the State Department in 1943. New agencies with new functions acted on different definitions of intercultural contact. The Office of War Information, the reincarnation of the Creel Committee, specialized in the use of mass media in the effort to sway international opinion. Unlike programs of cultural exchange, it was concerned to influence mass culture in the form of public opinion, in getting rapid results and in a one-way flow of information, and in forging close connections to the twists and turns of foreign policy. In Latin America, the coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, under the leadership of an ambitious Nelson Rockefeller, felt few qualms about the mobilization of culture. As part of the surge of enthusiasm for international organization, the United States also played a leading role in the creation of UNESCO, the cultural arm of the U.N., which began its career in 1946.

During the war, there were some debates about the degree to which the programs should explicitly promote American values. But those who warned against going too far too fast in the embrace of politics were trying to hold back an unstoppable tide that ebbed only with victory. After the war, it was not certain for a few years that cultural programs had a future even if tied directly to foreign policy. To be sure, cultural programs were an important feature of the American occupation policy in Japan and Germany and later in the Marshall Plan. But there was a good deal of conservative, sometimes nativist, resistance within the 80th Congress to continue funding of activities that had been justified as wartime measures.

The onset of the Cold War proved to be the salvation of cultural programs. What could not be sold in the abstract or in practical terms was peddled much more easily under the label of anti-communism. Convinced that the Soviets were making strenuous cultural efforts, Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which formally adopted the programs that had grown up during the war and, since then, had seemed on the verge of abandonment.

In agreeing to institutionalize the programs, Congress also institutionalized various tensions that the programs had never resolved—tensions between culture and information, elite and mass targets, nationalism and internationalism and short-term and long-term approaches. These embedded tensions had made impossible the formulation of any coherent concept of cultural relations. They also ensured that the cultural programs would have a rather rough ride, politically, even at the height of the Cold War. Congressional skepticism about their usefulness was a constant. Liberals and radicals also raised objections on occasion, as in the late 1960s, when the programs were tainted by association with the CIA. Tension between those who advocated informational programs tied to foreign policy and those who continued to argue

for an apolitical internationalism made for some interesting times in the cultural affairs bureaucracy. But the problems did not go away with the end of the Cold War. On the contrary, present-day difficulties are very much a product of this muddled history.

In the remainder of this presentation, I want briefly to highlight five problem areas. The first problem is that of institutionalization, which, more than 50 years after it should have been settled, is still rather confused. If one looks at the organizational history of the cultural programs, one cannot help but be amazed at the bureaucratic confusion, the constant reorganizations and shuttling about, the changes of rationale and the ups and downs of funding. Part of the problem is traceable to the changing emphases of different presidential administrations. But the more fundamental difficulty is conceptual—the failure to define in a convincing and consistent way what the governmental function of cultural relations is.

The success of cultural policy depends to a significant extent on the wisdom of foreign policy with which it is associated.

The second problem has to do with the public-private relationship. Although a governmental role in culture has over time become more widely accepted, Americans continue to have mixed feelings about a state role. Unlike Europe, where the history of aristocratic patronage and the acceptance of a more powerful state make a leading governmental role unproblematic, Americans can be quite uncomfortable about being asked to perform cultural functions for political purposes. On occasion, the disturbing element in the public-private relationship has originated in the private sector. When intellectuals or artists have expressed ideas that seemed not in keeping with mainstream views, the result, at times, has been a backlash against government funding of cultural functions. Democracy and art-for-art's-sake have not always been reconcilable in a governmental context.

A third problem has to do with the definition of cultural relations. What exactly are we talking about? Are we actually talking about culture? If so, the history of the programs displays remarkably little critical analysis of fundamentals. For example, if cultural relations are indeed about culture, few have noticed that cultural relations were and are, in fact, *anti-cultural* relations. This is a problem that is usually finessed verbally by phrases like “breaching of cultural walls” or “intercultural understanding.” But internationalism as an ideology would be totally incoherent and unsustainable if culture were the last word in our definition of humanity. At a minimum, it implies the promotion of a worldview that is supra-cultural. At the maximum, it requires the creation of a “global culture.” This deracinating side of cultural relations has become more obvious from a post-Cold War perspective, an era in which the clash of ideologies has been replaced by a conflict of civilizations. It is of central importance to understanding our relationships with underdeveloped areas because it presumes the necessity of major transformations in their ways of

life. The idea of cultural relations as a two-way street is clearly out of place in this context.

Fourth, the relationship between culture and policy has always been rather muddy. One often sees cultural relations referred to as a “tool” of foreign policy, but it takes only a moment’s reflection to realize that they are not tools in the ordinary meaning of the word. Tools are used to do specific things, to achieve specific tasks. But cultural programs are not instrumental, in terms of rational means/ends calculation, because we still do not know how they work, or even if they work. The early cultural advocates feared that too close a connection to policy might defeat the purposes of cultural relations. But even in the most optimal of circumstances, it was not clear how they would function. For instance, shortly after the Havana Conference, Raymond Leslie Buell of the Foreign Policy Association admitted that “the defect, or perhaps the advantage” of promoting cultural diplomacy “is that we never know whether it has any results or not.” So, then, should the emphasis be upon high culture or mass culture? Intellectual relations? Mass opinion? The mass media? The long term or the short term? Only when questions of instrumentality are answered satisfactorily, and it is not clear that they can be answered, can choices begin to be made rationally about what kinds of programs to emphasize.

The means/ends problem is something that Congress, long a whipping boy of cultural enthusiasts—and oftentimes for good reason—has intuitively understood. It was always very hard to sell the cultural programs to Congress, which was not only ideologically suspicious of the cultural programs, but which also, understandably, wanted to know in quite concrete terms what they were achieving and how they were achieving it. Inasmuch as the internationalist rationale alone was insufficient to get Congress to open its purse strings and explicit instrumental rationales were not available, the programs were sold, *faute de mieux*, as a way of combating communism in the Cold War. It is this need to show results that has led some to see promise in using Madison Avenue and advertising as its model. I personally am quite skeptical of this approach. Advertising is a business necessity, in part as a matter of self-defense, but it cannot save a bad business. Can Detroit continue to sell cars if it doesn’t improve its product? The ad campaign, “This is not your father’s Oldsmobile,” one may recall, has been followed up by the disappearance of Oldsmobile altogether.

The success of cultural policy depends to a significant extent on the wisdom of foreign policy with which it is associated. If the foreign policy is sound, cultural policy can only be a supplement—there are some good reasons why cultural specialists rank low in the foreign policy pecking order. If not, no amount of good cultural policy can retrieve faulty political and military policies. To the extent that U.S. foreign policy is internationalist and is successful, an internationalist cultural policy will also likely be successful, or so I believe.

But even if they are associated with wise foreign policies, the expectation that cultural programs can create a favorable international climate of opinion is unrealistic. They might, perhaps, contribute in some measure to this end. But in my view this is something that is beyond the reach of any cultural or informational machine; indeed, it is beyond the reach of foreign policy altogether. Cultural relations are an act of faith based on the

creedal assumption that contact, which produces a transformation, preferably an expansion, of intellectual and cultural horizons is, on balance, a good thing. Only the long-term outcome of globalization, whose success depends on a myriad of other factors, can tell us whether that assumption is true or not.

Fifth, and most broadly, the relationship between culture and power in its broadest terms remains unexplored. The sense of the early cultural pioneers was that too close an association with power had a tendency to corrupt. But inasmuch as the exercise of power is unavoidable and cultural relations always take place within political contexts, compartmentalization may be impossible. The extreme expression of this point of view is summed up by Charles Colson of Watergate fame, who believed that “if you have them by the _____, their hearts and minds will follow.” It is clear to me, at least, that cultural policies cannot work well in the absence of relations of power, but we are unable at this point to generalize about the kinds of political contexts in which cultural policies work well. Historians of international relations who are interested in cultural affairs are only now beginning to take up such issues, but there may be no general answer to that question.

BERGHAWN: I now introduce Michael Warner, and I rather envy him, because he is one of those historians who has access to material that most of us will only receive 40 years from now.

WARNER: Professor Ninkovich’s survey of the institutions of American cultural diplomacy puts me in mind of another set of federal agencies. These were created by the Roosevelt administration in the world crisis before Pearl Harbor and served with distinction in the World War but fell on hard times just afterward. The Cold War brought them statutory sponsorship, but congressional attention, both in the McCarthy era and during the investigations during the 1970s, was not an unmixed blessing for them. Their activities are sometimes difficult to explain to the public, and, after the Cold War, some wondered if they needed to exist at all. But recent events have won them more attention.

I am speaking, of course, of the Central Intelligence Agency and its predecessors, and I draw this parallel with cultural diplomacy not to be arch, but to note how the similar institutional paths of cultural diplomacy and intelligence work in America and suggest that this nation, since 1940, has gathered many of the appurtenances of its mentors and the statecraft of the great powers of Europe. To glimpse some of the ramifications of this development, let us examine that brief period in American history when cultural diplomacy and intelligence work were secretly combined.

In 1976, a Senate Select Committee headed by Frank Church of Idaho, issued a lengthy public report that stands as a monument to public accountability. Its chapters on the Central Intelligence Agency revealed, for instance, that the CIA had briefly and secretly become one of the world’s largest grant-making institutions. Indeed, in the mid-1960s, CIA funding was involved in nearly half the grants in the fields of international activities made by American foundations other than the big three, Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie. Some of these grants went to influence foreign, cultural and intellectual elites like Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Most such subsidies ended abruptly in 1967, although the agency

sponsored what it called, the “Radios,” until 1972. I do not have time to examine such programs in detail, but I can give a brief account of the CIA’s role.

Covert cultural diplomacy arose from the Truman administration’s efforts to halt the spread of communism on the continent and to give the Marshall Plan a chance to rebuild the economies and societies of Western Europe. “Psychological warfare” was the term of the time, and it seemed a powerful new weapon that totalitarian regimes employed with more dexterity than their democratic opponents. Fighting communism with bullets and bulldozers was not enough, Truman’s lieutenants argued. America and the West also needed to publish the social, economic and cultural achievements of liberal democracy. This is one reason why President Truman told Americans in 1950, “We must make ourselves heard around the world in a great campaign of truth.”

Truman officials soon found, however, that organizing such a campaign was harder than it looked. Time after time, American and foreign groups and leaders discovered that overt government agencies and private sector programs seemed unwilling, or unwilling to help. Propaganda seemed downright un-American, and congressmen such as Joseph McCarthy wanted no government funds spent on groups whom they deemed critical of the American way of life. Covert funding thus seemed the only alternative to leaders in both the Truman administration and its CIA. In the words of agency veteran Tom Braden, “The idea that Congress would have approved many of our projects was about as likely as the John Birch Society’s approving Medicare.” As diplomat George Kennan also added in 1967, “This country has no Ministry of Culture. The CIA was obliged to do what it could to fill the gap.”

The CIA’s early psychological warfare operations accordingly sought to prevent communism from winning new adherents among various sectors of foreign societies, such as students, youth, labor and intellectuals. These projects began during the Korean emergency, when the emphasis was on getting operations started as fast as possible in anticipation of a Soviet assault on Europe. At the time, the agency’s Covert Action Office was brand new and was thus dependent on the foreign connections of concerned American citizens, many of whom were themselves friends and contacts of CIA officers. Many projects continued after the Korean War, well into the 1960s, enjoying bipartisan support at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Nevertheless, this era of the CIA’s history ended abruptly in February 1967. As dissent over the Vietnam War rose on American campuses, the new left magazine *Ramparts* exposed the agency’s long ties with the National Student Association, the nation’s largest intercollegiate student group. Reporters from the mainstream press followed leads in the *Ramparts* story, and soon tracked agency money to other clients, including the Radios and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. President Johnson banned covert subsidies of student groups, and the CIA quietly terminated many of the compromised projects.

Much debate has ensued since 1967 over the degree of ideological conformity that agency subsidies imposed on artists, writers and others who wittingly, or not, took CIA funds. I cannot settle this controversy here or anywhere else, but I can note, what CIA leaders believed to be the case, while the opera-

tions were still ongoing. They were convinced that covert funding of a diverse range of publications, exhibitions, conferences and activities was ultimately in the interest of the United States, because it demonstrated to foreign thinkers, who might be wavering between East and West, that art and thought could flourish in liberal democracies. And there was, indeed, a bias toward funding particular political views, but that bias was toward what the Agency called the non-communist left. The CIA’s late Gordon Meyer explained, “The right wing and conservatives had their own sources of financial support and the real competition with the communists for votes and influence was focused on the left side of the political spectrum.”

Volker Berghahn is much better qualified to speak on the Agency’s effects on Europe than I am. So I will only mention that testimonials for groups such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom and other projects are not that hard to find, nor are criticisms hard to find either. A final accounting must await a full opening of Eastern and Western archives. Future historians, however, will also want to consider the bitter allegations and countercharges prompted by the 1967 revelations of covert CIA subsidies, as well as the extravagant speculation that surrounds them, even today.

Since this gathering more rightly looks to the future than to the past, I offer two parting observations on the CIA’s secret campaign to influence the hearts and minds of foreign cultural and intellectual elites. That experience surely represented something unique in American history. Never before had the United States attempted such an effort, which was already a thing of the past when the Church Committee issued its report in 1976. The end of the Cold War, as well as stricter covert-action oversight, make it unlikely that the agency will ever again have the authority and the means to do something similar. And finally, I submit that the unlikelihood of repeating such covert cultural diplomacy is not necessarily a bad thing, since it is always a risky business with significant unintended consequences.

VON ESCHEN: In 1955, Felix Belair, Stockholm correspondent for *The New York Times* proclaimed that “America’s secret weapon is a blue note in a minor key ...” and named Louis (Satchmo) Armstrong as “its most effective ambassador.” The jazz/Cold War metaphor was infectious. In 1956, Armstrong performed before a crowd of more than 100,000 in Accra, Ghana. Signifying on the trumpeter’s virtuosity and pervasive fears of nuclear disaster, Africa-wide *Drum* magazine quipped, “Satchmo Blows Up the World.” Beginning with Dizzy Gillespie’s 1956 tours of the Middle East and South America, over the next two decades, the State Department sent hundreds of jazz musicians on tours of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and South America.

While the State Department performing arts tours involved many areas of the performing arts, it was jazz that became the pet project of the State Department. Unlike classical music, theater or ballet, U.S. officials could claim jazz as a uniquely American art form—and there are many resonances with modern dance although time does not permit discussing them today—and, critically, jazz was an African-American art form. U.S. officials pursued a self-conscious campaign against worldwide criticism of U.S. racism in a

world of 40 new African and Asian nation-states and a world of U.S.–Soviet competition for the resources and allegiances of formerly colonized peoples. The glaring contradiction in this strategy was that the United States promoted black artists as “goodwill ambassadors”—symbols of the triumph of American democracy—when America was still a Jim Crow nation.

As I discuss in my forthcoming book “Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz, Civil Rights and the Cold War,” which Harvard is publishing in 2004, in the Cold War cultural presentation programs, U.S. officials quickly caught onto the value of jazz over didactic programming and propaganda. Through informal polls taken at exhibitions, State Department and USIS officials learned that Soviet citizens, for example, tended to resent what they regarded as the heavy-handed propaganda of Radio Free Europe. In contrast, they welcomed the cultural programming of Voice of America, and Willis Conover’s jazz programs ranked as the most popular. Praise for the success of the early tours flowed from audiences and the State Department alike. “The language of diplomacy,” one Pakistani editorial argued, “ought to be translated into the score for a bop trumpet.” Jazz tours worked precisely because they were *not* propaganda. Musicians talked freely about their own struggle for civil rights and put their own stamp on diplomacy by promoting egalitarianism. In Karachi, Pakistan, Dizzy Gillespie refused to play until the gates were opened to the “ragamuffin” children who couldn’t afford tickets.

The ironies and contradictions of the jazz tours were explored in “The Real Ambassadors,” a 1962 collaboration between Dave and Iola Brubeck and Louis Armstrong. Both artists and their bands had recently returned from tours. Both artists and their bands had deliberately been sent into foreign policy crises—Brubeck into the 1958 Middle East crisis, and Armstrong into the Congo crisis. In the song “Cultural Exchange,” note lyricist Iola Brubeck’s telling observation that “no commodity is quite so strange, as this thing called cultural exchange.” Indeed, cultural exchange was a commodity that closely pursued the quintessential Cold War commodities, oil and uranium. The very first stop of the hundreds of jazz performances that would follow was in Abadan, Iran. As Dizzy Gillespie’s band’s alto saxophonist Phil Woods remembered, they flew into to “the smell of crude oil.” While in Abadan, the musicians lived in the oil workers’ barracks “as the upper echelon workers did.” In addition to the Brubeck tour during the Middle East crisis and Iraqi coup of 1958, the Duke Ellington Orchestra ended up in the middle of the November 1963 Iraqi coup. But rather than focus on the coups, I want to talk about the Ellington performance before the coup. This is a very painful example, but we have had a lot of discussion here about how to form alliances with forces of modernization and democracy in the Middle East, and I want to suggest that artists and musicians are a powerful force for connecting modern, democratic and critical elements in any society, as they certainly were in the Middle East 40 years ago.

In November 1963, the Duke Ellington orchestra’s eventful visit to Baghdad, Iraq began auspiciously with a performance at a party celebrating the founding of the U.S. Marine Corps at the home of U.S. Ambassador Robert C. Strong. Noting especially that the 188-year-old birthday party took place in a 1200-year-old city, one U.S. official reported, “The ambassadorial residence

rocked,” as 400 Iraqis and Americans danced to “such old favorites as ‘Take the A Train,’ ‘Mood Indigo,’ ‘Sophisticated Lady’ ... or crowded around the orchestra for a closer look at the ageless Duke.” The first concert on November 12 not only sold out but was broadcast in its entirety by the Baghdad Television Station, Iraq’s sole station. “An enthusiastic first-night audience,” reported U.S. officials watching the concert at Khuld Hall near the Presidential Palace “while all over the city thousands sat around television sets in open-air cafes and restaurants or in the comfort of their own homes and enjoyed the artistry of one of the great contemporary figures in American music.”

How we got from there—Ellington’s ease in a modern Iraqi nation—to here is certainly not a simple story, but the musicians’

The United States promoted black artists as “goodwill ambassadors”—symbols of the triumph of American democracy—when America was still a Jim Crow nation.

views of the tour may help us to ask the right questions. On this same tour, when the Ellington musicians protested that they were only playing for elites already familiar with jazz when they had expected to play for “the people,” escort Officer Thomas Simons struggled to reconcile his role in the State Department with the musicians’ view of “the people.” The orchestra members, Simons explained, had a “different conception of what they were to do” than the State Department. Simons reported: “The orchestra members had misunderstood the word ‘people,’ and were disagreeably surprised.” Positioning himself as a mediator between the musicians and the State Department and not attempting to mask his sympathy for the musicians’ perspective, Simons attempted to explain that in that “part of the world ... the ‘people,’ the lower classes, do not in fact ‘count’ as much as they do with us, and that we are trying to reach out to those who did count.” Few of these arguments made any real impression. Band members continued to feel that they would rather play for the “people,” for the men in the streets who clustered around tea shop radios.

Of course, today, one might argue that it was U.S. officials who had misunderstood the word “people,” *not* the members of Duke Ellington’s orchestra, and that misreading of “the people” as Middle-Eastern neo-colonial elites in unholy alliances with Western oil interests has cost the people of the region and the world dearly.

Artists have a good deal to teach policy makers. Jazz artists were warmly embraced throughout the globe, not by presenting propaganda, but because of their creative brilliance and the fact they spoke freely about their own struggles for freedom. Indeed, the international power and appeal of jazz lay, not as some officials would have it, in representing the music of a free country. Rather, the jazz ambassador, epitomized by Louis Armstrong,

conveyed through his inimitable horn and voice, hopes and aspirations for freedom—something audiences from Africa, to the Soviet Union and the Middle East, could relate to all too well.

The jazz tours worked not because they claimed to present a perfect or superior American democracy, but precisely because they exported the conflicts and contradictions of America, even tending to convey an oppositional American culture. Jazz Ambassadors presented America at its creative, irreverent best. Indeed, American artists need to be at the forefront of reconnecting to the forces of modernity, creativity and democracy throughout the globe.

BROWN: Let me very briefly talk about the United States Information Agency in terms of its drawbacks, if you will, maybe failures, and in terms of its achievements. As you know, the United States Information Agency was created in 1953 at the height of the Cold War to be a propaganda agency—the word was not used—in part because the State Department did not want to soil its hands with the nasty word “propaganda,” even though the administration then in power believed we had to win the war of minds through propaganda. This agency was created in 1953 separate from the State Department, and it existed until 1999, when it was consolidated into the State Department after the demise of communism. There is no definitive history of the USIA. The archives and the records are hard to get at. They’re scattered. I understand a British scholar, Nicholas Cull, is working on a history. I’ve been in touch with him, but there is no history and it’s really a challenge to write.

What would be the drawbacks of the USIA viewed from a historical perspective? I would say four of them. The first one is that, it’s not that it practiced propaganda—I personally don’t think there’s anything wrong with propaganda, *per se*. The best scholars on the subject would suggest that it’s a morally neutral process of persuasion that has existed under other names since at least the ancient Greeks with their rhetoric. The problem is when propaganda is used stupidly or abused, and unfortunately there are many examples in the history of USIA since 1953, when it really did not do a very good job with propaganda. When the propaganda was vulgar, it was simpleminded—when the propaganda was directed to an audience the USIA did not know very well. In 1978, the Office of Cultural Relations became part of USIA. It was then in the State Department. That, on the whole, may have toned down a bit the propaganda-side of USIA by making USIA responsible for the administration of the Fulbright program, for example, which up until then had been within the State Department. Oddly enough, when USIA was consolidated in 1999, Secretary of State Albright characterized it—if I recall the words correctly—as the greatest anti-propaganda agency in the history of the United States. So it went from being a propaganda agency to an anti-propaganda agency. But its main drawback, as I say, is that it often did not do very intelligent propaganda, if you will, with war.

A second drawback was that it was hampered by bureaucratic rules, regulations, obstacles, you name it, which slowed it down. The institutionalization ... meant it was a smaller agency than the State Department, but nevertheless, there were many bureaucratic obstacles in Washington and abroad that made implementation of programs difficult.

A third drawback was that USIA didn’t quite know what it was doing much of the time. There’s no word that’s harder to define than public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is equally difficult to define. “Public diplomacy” was coined in the mid-1960s by Dean Gullion of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy as an effort to describe activities that went beyond traditional diplomacy, people-to-people exchanges, that went beyond national borders, if you will. So they came up with the term “public diplomacy.” By the 1970s, USIA appropriated the term to try to define what it was doing. It essentially was U.S. government-supported programs, and information, education and culture. But still, the debates within USIA, at the State Department, in the Congress, about what USIA is doing, continued throughout its history. And many people in the field were not always sure either.

A final drawback is that very often USIA was not on the front burner, it was a secondary player. The directors of the USIA did not have the ear of the White House. There were exceptions. For example, when Charles Z. Wick was director of the USIA, he was very close to Ronald Reagan. But as a rule, the directors did not have the pull to have a strong impact on policy. Edward Murrow, who was, as you know, director during the Kennedy administration, made the point. He said, “Look, we want to be present at the take-off, not at the crash-landing.” Very often USIA was there at the crash-landing. “What are we going to do about it now? We’ve got to explain what happened.” So those are some of the drawbacks, but I would say on the whole the achievements were considerable as well.

I would list four main achievements. The first one is that, for all its faults, USIA and the people working in the field for USIA represented America in all its complexity, really. And especially, I would argue, at the field level where USIA officers were able to talk one-on-one with people, to visit academic institutions and so forth, it presented a human face of the United States that had a considerable impact during the Cold War. The second achievement was the establishment of a framework of educational exchanges that still exists today. The Fulbright program was created in 1946. As I say, it was in the State Department until 1978, but it still exists today. I think USIA did manage to maintain the integrity of the Fulbright program and to make it quite efficient despite the bureaucracy. For example, the Fulbright Alumni Associations were encouraged by USIA. It’s a very important thing, people who took part in the Fulbright program organizing themselves abroad to maintain traditions of this wonderful program. A third achievement—and here I feel very strongly about this because I’m essentially hedonistic—one of the things that USIA provided through its cultural programs, through its exhibits, were moments of sheer delight. I think that’s very important abroad, for Americans to be able to say, “Let’s look at a beautiful picture together; let’s look at a wonderful ballet together.” Finally, USIA instilled memories, shared memories between Americans and foreigners, that still continue today. Programs like the International Visitor Program enabled distinguished foreigners to come to the United States and examine a problem or issue that interests them for two to three weeks. They remember that trip. Just as people who visited American Centers throughout the world remember that first time they looked at an American magazine, and these memories are tremendously important. I think the USIA establishment.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Naima Prevots from American University. I wrote about the modern dance going abroad. I have a couple questions. One—this is for Penny—was it not the State Department and the USIA in terms of the jazz? Then also, did you write at all about “Porgy & Bess”? That’s another, rather fascinating issue in terms of sending issues of racism abroad. Then I have two comments. One, there seems to be a deep hesitation, which relates to Trisha Brown’s comments about art. There are issues of low art/high art. We seem to be afraid of sending high art abroad, and I think that is not something other people are necessarily afraid of. I don’t think we repeat the Cold War paradigm where we sent Martha Graham and so forth. Yesterday we heard a lot about Hollywood. I wonder if we might address the issue of what’s wrong with sending some of our great artists, who are not necessarily commercially viable. And then the big question that was raised is, who are we sending this for? Can we reach everyone, and who are we trying to reach? The issue of the elite, the non-elite, the people ... do we send different kinds of things? Can everyone receive some of the same kinds of things?

VON ESCHEN: “Porgy & Bess” is very much related to our topic. That’s something Eisenhower, who was very complacent about race relations and just completely uninterested in change, understood—that that had a powerful effect abroad, so I think that was what prompted educated policy makers to dive into jazz.

The issue of high art versus low art is fascinating. [The State Department] was fixated on promoting high art and high modernism and they define jazz as high modernism. There are all sorts of contradictions here. It divorces it from its origins in African-American working-class institutions of leisure. It’s as absurd to say that Armstrong isn’t an entertainer as to say he isn’t an artist. But, nonetheless, that was the ideology they fastened onto. What I see in the tours is that that ideology breaks down by the ’60s, precisely because of the issues you’re talking about. Who are they trying to reach? They’re trying to reach a lot of audiences. Initially it’s more of the elite. They then try to get to the youth and broader audiences. So that whole notion falls apart. Related to the issue of race, they start exporting by the late ’60s R & B, a lot more pop music and gospel, which they wouldn’t have seen as high art in the initial state.

BROWN: As somebody who was in the field, if you will, for 23 years, I grew somewhat skeptical trying to define audiences too specifically. One of the wonderful things about the Center is that, in a sense, they were generous to the extent that they didn’t ask you to be part of an audience to participate in the program. The doors were open to everyone. That doesn’t look very good on paper, except to say, “Well, we had 1,200 people,” when you’re asked to define specific audiences. Giving a certain leeway in the kind of audience you’re addressing provides a symbol of generosity, which is very important in cultural diplomacy.

NINKOVICH: If you speak about effectiveness, you have to talk about cause and effect, and we just don’t know what the relationships are. It’s much too complicated. So, as I indicated earlier, cultural relations in my view are not instrumental in a technical sense, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have cultural policies or pro-

mote cultural interaction. We have lots of government policies in other areas that are not instrumental. For example, the space shuttle might be considered one of them. Some may consider military programs to be another, another aircraft carrier. We have lots of programs that profess to be instrumental but which are, in fact, not, but are just being sold that way. I think the commitment to cultural relations has to be rooted in a larger understanding about the dynamics of international relations in which all your categories of thinking—such as realism or imperialism, in my view—are outdated. Essentially, we are committing ourselves to an internationalist destiny, which is more than anything, an act of faith, I believe. And if you say that’s silly, I could make a long argument—and in fact I have done, in some of my writings—that this is what American foreign policy in the 20th century has been all about, and that the promotion of cultural relations is no different.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Susan Jenkins. I’m a writer, and I also have been a cultural specialist for the State Department in the last year. I traveled to Uzbekistan and Bangladesh with an exhibit of photographs taken by the photographer Joel Meyerowitz, whom I worked for for the last five years. I’d like to ask the panel if you’re aware of what kinds of programs have been happening in the last 18 months, since Sept. 11, and if you could characterize those at all in the context of this discussion.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Tanya Melich, and I’m a political writer and political consultant. I wonder if the panel would speak about the impact of the Olympics, about Mohammed Ali, about all of the American teams that have gone all over the world, all the way back to the ’50s, and give us a perspective on how that relates to the discussion we’ve been having about art.

BROWN: In the past 15 months, to speak very generally, there’s been a close connection between propaganda and war. In World War I, the Committee on Public Information was established by Woodrow Wilson in 1917 as a propaganda agency to whip up the war spirit at home and to sell the message of democracy abroad. In World War II, you had the Office of War Information (OWI) that essentially produced propaganda, somewhat reluctantly, given that you had people like Archibald MacLeish in the OWI. In the Cold War you had, of course, the USIA which was created to propagandize to fight this war. There’s a war on terrorism now, and again the pattern is coming back, that because of this war—whether you like the term or not; people have legitimate reservations about it—the emphasis for the past 15 months has been on propaganda. Again, as I was trying to point out in my presentation, there’s nothing wrong with propaganda in itself, but for the past 15 months the kind of propaganda that’s been produced by this administration has been appalling. It shows an absolute ignorance of the audience, as was pointed out yesterday by Professor Bulliet, of how important it is to understand the audience, especially in Muslim lands. The results were lame videos about American values and Muslim Americans. There has been an abuse of propaganda, in that it has made it the most important public diplomacy tool of this administration at the cost of cultural and educational programs. Finally, what has been happening in the last 15 months, in my modest opinion, is that there has been

an absolute disconnect between the propaganda and the policy. As a result, the world isn't convinced of what we did in Iraq, and as a result there are all kinds of conspiracy theories: "What are the Americans up to?" That's perhaps an overly partisan response to your question, but I really do think propaganda is what's been happening in the last 15 months.

VON ESCHEN: I very much agree with that, and it's striking that it seems a real throwback to an earlier period, and in a sad sense what was learned from the enormous value of the arts and things that were clearly not propaganda. The question on sports I find very, very interesting, and there are many parallels. I don't think arts and sports are the same thing, but I don't want to draw a sharp distinction and say that sports are very different because it's that Olympic or versus-the-Soviet-and-Chinese intense competition that you get. But in terms of the racial politics of sports and promoting black American athletes—and you bring up the example of Mohammed Ali, which was not something necessarily promoted through the State but became this national and international symbol—I think the racial politics are quite similar.

NINKOVICH: Just a general comment on the larger implication of international opinion about hero-athletes, be it Mohammed Ali or Michael Jordan or whomever. What's important here is to try to ask yourself what the larger significance of this is. My way of understanding it, which may not be yours, is that this all connects with the development of something that we might call "world opinion." This is something that's been talked about since at least the 19th century, and the existence of which has been strenuously denied by various theoretical types, in particular realists who argue it doesn't exist, it can't exist and so on. But I think if you're talking about something like sports, you see a version of it in that narrow area. You can see it in a host of other areas as well. This is important, I would argue, because it's incontestable that we have a global society, a functioning global society, not very well at times but functioning nevertheless. The question that that raises is whether or not the continuation of this kind of society is conceivable without the formation of something like a world opinion, because you just can't have functional interconnection without some common basis in values that keeps it all together. You can't hold them together simply by power. It's a long way from sports to international society, but nevertheless there are connections to be drawn.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Roslyn Bernstein, professor of business journalism, Baruch College. I'd like to do a slight shift from political relations to economic relations and address this to everyone on the panel. Would you say as the world economy has developed, that we have seen tourism co-opt cultural relations, and, if so, what are the consequences of the global tourist industry shaping, adopting, controlling and deriving its revenue from cultural relations?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bianca Baumler. I'm from the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy. Regarding the issue of American musicians performing for the people versus the elites ... I worked at the French Cultural Institute in Morocco for six months, and that was a very big issue. The issue was more how to inspire the people to come to the events. There was, maybe, a fear of coming to the French Institute and also a different culture of performance, not the sort of "sit down and watch" type of performance. Could you or anyone else on the panel respond to the issue of how to deal with that?

VON ESCHEN: I want to go back to this issue of Michael Jordan as a way of trying to sum up. It's an interesting example because Michael Jordan is associated with Nike, not the U.S. state. And for all the contradictions of the policies we're talking about, I do think there's something greatly lost when we have turned over something that is potentially democratic and accountable, something a nation is doing, something that has to do with its citizens, totally to the realm of corporations that are not accountable to anything. Back in the time I was doing research, the State Department tried to do private/public sponsorship, and they did, in a sense, and it really worked. And in another sense they would talk about, "Well, the audiences are confused. They don't know—is this Pepsi, is the U.S. government?" They did feel it was very important that these performing arts were associated with the U.S. government, the U.S. state. We lose a lot when we give up any connection to potential democracy and accountability.

BROWN: It's very important to try to define target audiences. On the other hand, having been out in the field, you try to leave the door as open as possible to everyone.

NINKOVICH: I'll just take 30 seconds on tourism, and I'll talk about what historians know about this. Historians of foreign relations are just beginning to take seriously the study of cultural interaction, and the answer to what they know about tourism is very little. What historians have to do, I think, is a bunch of micro-studies. As far as I can see, they're starting to do this, to see if we can get any hard information as to exactly what happens when people interact in various ways, what the dynamics are and what the implications are.

BERGHAHN: What really fascinated me about this country, as a young person in the 1950s, were precisely the things that we were talking about on this panel. The greatest pity of the moment is that as there are millions and millions of young people in these areas that we will talk about this afternoon, especially the Middle East, and I think their relationship with us is being ruined. The kind of enthusiasm that I certainly felt—I can't see this happening. It's not an older generation that's anti-American at the moment, but it may also continue into the next generation. If that happens, we are in for a very bad first half of the 21st century.

The Cultural Diplomacy of Other Nations

INTRODUCTION:
ELLEN McCULLOCH-LOVELL,
president and CEO
Center for Arts and Culture

MODERATOR:
ALEXANDER STILLE,
author and editor
Correspondence: An International
Review of Culture & Society

PANELISTS:
JEAN-RENE GEHAN, *cultural counselor,*
French Embassy
ANDY MACKAY, *director,*
British Council USA
ARTURO SARUKHAN, *consul general of Mexico*
PETER SÖTJE, *director, Goethe Institut,*
United States and Canada
JEANNE WIKLER, *general director for cultural affairs,*
U.S., Consulate General of the Netherlands

McCULLOCH-LOVELL: The Center for Arts and Culture is a cultural policy center, and we work to inform and improve the decisions that shape cultural life. Cultural diplomacy, or perhaps better expressed "citizen diplomacy," is one of our signature efforts. One of our objectives is to create a written record through a series of studies, including "Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Policy" by Juliet Sablosky. That's where you can find some figures that I don't think have come out as vividly as they should, such as the 30 percent decline in support for these activities since 1993, and the fact that only about 10 percent of the Fulbright exchange program and only 5 percent of citizen exchanges, although they are signature programs of state, are arts-oriented at all. So while they're important culturally in a broad sense of people understanding each other, a very, very modest amount of those programs are devoted to exchange of artists. Another study you can get today as well is a survey of the history of cultural diplomacy and the U.S. government by political scientist Milton Cummings. Three more studies are forthcoming: a study of the private-sector funding for cultural diplomacy, best practices in cultural diplomacy—which is very important because we need to know how, and why, and if these programs work—and a comparative study of other nations' approaches, which is so relevant to this next panel that we are about to begin.

The Center is also forming a coalition with arts and humanities organizations, foreign policy NGOs and foreign service officers to expand federal, state and local government activities and cultural diplomacy. There will be other forums that will follow this, and for those of you who will ask, "What's next? What do we do about it?" I want to invite you to join this education and action agenda.

Now continuing this valuable conversation means learning from our counterparts in other countries, not only in France, England, Germany, the Netherlands and Mexico, but also Japan, Singapore, Austria, the Nordic states, Brazil, Colombia and many, many others. Alexander Stille is here to guide us in this conversation. He's an important freelance writer. His most recent book, "The Future of the Past," will be familiar to many of you—portions of it were printed in *The New Yorker* and I can't think of anybody better qualified to guide this next panel.

STILLE: I wanted to start out by simply asking each of the participants to introduce themselves and explain what the basic cultural policy or philosophy is in their different countries, because they do vary a great deal. For example, some countries have a sep-

arate culture ministry, which has the exclusive role of promoting culture in their society. Others have culture as part of the foreign ministry and see it as a part of foreign policy. It might be interesting to understand a little bit about how that works, if they're also able to give us an idea of the resources committed to culture in their respective countries, as well as introducing themselves to all of you.

GEHAN: I'm cultural counselor at the French Embassy in the United States. So I'm a diplomat. I'm leading a service that is part of an embassy, but which is basically composed of all kinds of people, American and French. I think it's a network of more than 150, and I'm the only diplomat in this organization. All the others come from different walks of life. Our base here is in New York in terms of artistic and communication and audiovisual, and we have another main office in Washington, which is for education, universities and French schools. And then we have people all over the country. That being said, in terms of what we do, a lot of our activity, and I would say more than half of our activity, is linked to education, meaning what we do in support of French-teaching in schools, French schools in this country, and in terms of the programs we have with universities, in our presence in the universities to effect exchange between French and American universities. Additionally, we work on promotion of contemporary creation in the different fields of the arts, in music, visual arts and so on. We also promote literature, and we have also an individual program where we support radio and television and cinema. And we have also an open dialogue with the NGO. We have within our department people now dealing with that.

To be very brief, I will say three things. One, in terms of method: We are not an administration. We don't work as an administration. We are more like a little company. We work in partnership. All our action is linked to the network. We have a network of American partners, whether they are the traditional partners like Alliance Française, which are in all the countries—about 160 Alliance Française in the country. But we have partnerships with museums, with universities, with radio. Whatever project we do, we do it with the partners. We have not the means, and it's not our aspiration to direct anything. We always negotiate, meaning that if Carnegie Hall is interested in a concert, we are not going to impose anything; we negotiate with them to facilitate. This is really a central theme, and we even have a foundation that we work with very closely.

Another remark in terms of addressing the general framework: What is the objective? I mean, we pay for, as I say, more than 150 people. We have a small budget, but still, why do we do that? I would say first, there is no question about it. It is called in this country “soft power.” I don’t like the term. It’s more like image, influence, knowledge. We wish through that to make better known where our country comes from. There are many implications in terms of better knowledge, meaning intellectual implications, political implications, economic implications, that go with that when people know better. Two, we consider that the market won’t do it. Most of our action, for instance, in terms of movies, is directed toward programs for the universities, to show them movies that they might not see normally. We really try to project an image that people won’t get just by the market in terms of exhibits, in terms of offers that they will come and talk, in terms of philosophers. So we do all that, and we feel that the market won’t do it. We feel that it’s very important for people to understand France, that they have this understanding and knowledge that won’t be provided by the market.

Three, I think it’s even more true today, we feel that it is very important in terms of international relations, meaning that cultural diplomacy is a part of diplomacy. The French-German relationship is a good example. After the Second World War, there were a lot of political discussions, but we created the Franco-German Office for Youth, which was for the exchange of youth. There is a point where in fact—and obviously we speak in the context that we are all aware of—when you have disagreements between countries, and it becomes very serious when these disagreements become fed by prejudice and not knowing, because that’s when you become an enemy. ... That’s when you start the process of conflict. So we feel that it’s also very important to do cultural diplomacy; in fact, it’s a general support of our relationship.

We obviously don’t want to be an enemy of the United States, so we feel it’s very important that there’s discussion that exists of understanding and knowledge. Obviously today it’s more important than ever that we have this discussion. That means that Americans, aside from what they see on pop news or whatever, have an understanding and a knowledge of at least some of what this country’s about, so that in fact we don’t rush into larger conflict. Last, we are not at the level that we were at in 1945, that’s for sure. But I personally feel there’s certainly a need for new initiatives to get a better understanding between French and, I would say, Europeans and Americans.

STILLE: I want to ask one specific question before moving on to our German colleague, about whether there is still a separate French Ministry of Culture. Prestigious authors such as Andre Malraux was Minister of Culture, and I was wondering if that’s still the case, or whether it’s been subsumed by the Foreign Ministry.

GEHAN: No, you’re right on both counts, there is still a Minister of Culture, more than ever. But—it’s important for the theme of the conference—the principle is that in terms of outside, the Foreign Ministry is leader, meaning, we work with the French Ministry of Culture, but the French Foreign Ministry is leader in terms of what we do abroad. But understand again, I’m not trying

to sell anything. I think that people would feel that it would be propaganda. What we are doing is to try to better understand France; we are not promoting French government views. That’s not what we do, that’s not our mission.

SÖTJE: I’m just a couple of weeks here in New York City, as the regional director of the Goethe Institut, the German cultural institute. My responsibilities are for Canada, United States, Mexico and, last but not least, Cuba, where we will have a special institute by the end of this year. The Goethe Institut was founded directly after the Second World War and our legal framework conditions depend pretty much on the responses to our experiences with the Nazi regime and with the totalitarian system, especially with the role of propaganda in the framework of such a totalitarian system.

There is a common understanding, that cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, is in the enlightened self-interest of our country.

That is the main reason why we have a common understanding, a deep partisanship including all political parties, that foreign cultural policy, as we call it, should be totally independent from the government. That is the main reason why the Goethe Institut is one of the main players in foreign cultural policy but not the only one. It is not dependant on the policy of the government. We have an understanding of a division of labor: I’m not a diplomat. Diplomats are abroad to explain the policies of the government. We are abroad to explain our country and to give a self-critical, controversial portrayal of our own culture, our own society. That is the reason why we are a legally private institution, but we are nearly fully subsidized by the federal government. Our advisory board members are scientists, artists, journalists and only very few politicians, and these politicians have not the opportunity to vote when it comes to decisions.

The next basic factor is that there is a common understanding in politics in Germany, interior politics, that the autonomy of institutions like the Goethe Institut or the German Academic Exchange Program, the second big player in international foreign cultural policy, that the autonomy of these institutions is an absolute pre-condition, an absolute prerequisite, for our credibility abroad. Nevertheless, we are dependent, as I explained before, because we are dependent on the financial sources from the federal government. There is, of course, a lot of debate because the Goethe Institut and the German Academic Exchange Program—not so much German Academic Exchange Program but the Goethe Institut—during the last 10 years suffered budget cuts because of indifference toward our programs in the federal government. We have the same experience as our colleagues all around the world, not only in the United States but in Europe as well, that it is a special challenge in maintaining the government’s interest and funding in times when there seems to be less of a foreign policy threat. But again, there is a common understanding in all

political parties in Germany that cultural diplomacy is one of the three so-called pillars of our foreign policy: one is diplomacy, the second is economic relations, the third is cultural relations. Twenty-five percent of the total budget of our Ministry of Foreign Relations is going to cultural relations; it’s a quarter. And it underlines the importance of cultural diplomacy in the framework of the German foreign cultural policy. Only a third of these funds are devoted to our work at the Goethe Institut.

There is a common understanding, again, that cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, is in the enlightened self-interest of our country. And I would underline this term “enlightened” interest. It’s not a short-term interest. We understand foreign cultural policy as a long-term investment. We are not serving as a trouble-shooter ... but after a war situation, it’s not possible to look at foreign cultural policy or public diplomacy as troubleshooting, as it seems to me it sometimes is, as the discussion of yesterday afternoon was looking at cultural diplomacy. But anyway, we have had some changes of paradigm during the last 10 years.

MACKAY: I’m the director of the British Council here in the United States. I’m not a diplomat, but for the last 16 months of my life I’ve found myself, since arriving in Washington, sitting in the British Embassy wearing a hat as cultural counselor as well. So I’m working very, very hard to try and be diplomatic, and I’ll do my best this morning not to let the side down. Being British, I can tend only to think in fairly straight lines, so you’ll forgive me if I diverge very slightly from the question, just to give you a couple of definitions that are helping me to shape the way my own thinking is going as this conference evolves.

The British Council is described as Britain’s principal agency for educational and cultural relations with other countries. Culture in that sense goes back to one of the questions in the last session. It includes sport; it includes science and technology; it includes the arts; it includes all those things that are going to help us to bring greater understanding. So we take a very broad definition of what culture is, and the important thing is what we are using the culture to do in terms of increasing the understanding. We’ve been talking a lot about public diplomacy and about cultural diplomacy. In my own simplistic way, I try to keep a divide. For me, in my interpretation, the way I’ll be talking public diplomacy is about, generally, government messages. Government wants to get out something about a country, about what it’s doing. So you have public diplomacy messages, and if you want to get them across better, you switch up the volume more, you increase the frequency, or you produce a new leaflet. Alongside that there is cultural diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy, for me, is much more what we’re talking about here. It is the creation of long-term relations that will endure. They will endure because there is a mutual understanding that results from those relationships.

To answer the question a little bit more: structure—I’m afraid we’re now going to great British bureaucrat-ese—the British Council is a non-departmental public body. This means that we do not answer to government, but we receive a proportion of our funding from government. About 30 percent of our funding comes through the British government. Seventy percent of our funding is generated through the services that we provide in different countries. In many countries, it’s through things like the teaching of

English, the delivery of British qualifications and examinations. In other countries, it’s the management of development projects where they contribute to our objectives. So, semi-governmental, but the important thing is, as with the Goethe Institut, we are independent of government. So it can result in situations as we have at the moment in New York, where there is a visual arts exhibition that has some sponsorship from the British Council, where I got a call from the Consulate-General, saying, “Do you know what’s in this exhibition?” I said, “Well, not really, no. It just happened, really.” And they said, “Well, it’s not very helpful to our public diplomacy effort, because it’s actually quite *anti* the war.” I said, “Well, that’s your public diplomacy message. Our cultural diplomacy message is that we support the propagation of quality in the arts, so we have sponsored this exhibition, because in the judgment of our experts, this is quality.” We take no responsibility for any political messages contained within that exhibition. In fact, if you think about the long term and you think about cultural relations, there are an awful lot of people in this country who don’t necessarily agree with their government’s position. It’s going to be quite important to talk to them as well, once the war is done and dusted. Actually being able to represent the full spectrum is extraordinarily important if you’re talking about true cultural relations, rather than simple public diplomacy relations. So we’re non-governmental. We’re established as a charity in Britain, which is a bit bizarre, but it’s just for various tax reasons, I think.

The closest body we work with in Britain, as with Goethe Institut and the French, is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as it’s called. In terms of our funding, it’s another slightly convoluted question. In pure government funding, for every one dollar that the British Council receives from government, the Foreign Office receives about eight dollars. That said, as I said before, only 30 percent of our funding actually comes through the British government. So we actually get about \$225 million a year from the British government. We generate twice as much as that through our own earnings. It’s also slightly complicated by the fact that, for very boring historical reasons, not everything that happens in terms of cultural diplomacy is funded through the British Council. So, for example, the scholarship schemes with which you’d be familiar are actually funded through the Foreign Office. The Marshall Scholarships here, the Fulbright Scholarships, which are incidentally 50 percent funded by the British government—it’s one of the greatest U.S. marketing ploys of all time that Fulbright is seen as purely American when it’s actually funded truly internationally and bilaterally, the Chevening Scholarship scheme—which is the biggest post-graduate British scheme in countries other than the U.S. So it’s very difficult to say, “This much is spent on cultural diplomacy; this much is spent on traditional diplomacy.” But in a rough government sense, it’s one dollar for every eight.

WIKLER: I’m the general director for cultural affairs, U.S.A., at the Netherlands Consulate General in New York. Normally, my title would be cultural counselor, like all my colleagues here are, but unfortunately, as you may understand from my accent, I’m a dual-national. I’m Dutch-American, “dual-national,” meaning two passports, meaning if I’m living and working in the United States, the State Department has decided that I pay all my taxes,

all my parking tickets, have no diplomatic immunity and therefore also do not get a diplomatic title. So I had to relinquish my title as cultural counselor and find another one. Even though I am “embedded” within the diplomatic system here and work at the consulate, in fact, I personally am not a diplomat, and my background, as you may have read, is also not as a professional diplomat. I come directly from the arts.

Briefly, there are a lot of elements that have already been discussed. I’ll try to take out a couple of very specific aspects of Dutch cultural policy. First of all, it is definitely a marriage between the foreign service, or the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture, Education and Science. They’re both in on this. It’s not so that the Ministry of Culture is only inward-focused. For the last 10 years it has been this way. They have joined forces with the Foreign Ministry to form a comprehensive international cultural policy. And I would like to state that in our view in the Netherlands, cultural policy—the way I was hearing it earlier this morning, it seemed to be foreign policy and political policy and how to use culture for it—is how you structure support for the arts in your own country and abroad. Now, you have reasons for supporting certain artists and certain groups and you have reasons for others, but they are not politically driven. They are driven by quality first of all.

Secondly, and this is another point where the Netherlands is very strong, we have what we call a demand-side international cultural policy. What is a demand-side? It sounds very market-oriented. We are a market-driven country, the Netherlands, big traders, big salespeople. The demand-side means that we first listen to what the host country wants, what they’re about, what will appeal to them. Now how do they know to want something? We have to inform them. So my job is really not to promote Dutch arts and culture, although I guess you could say in the long-run it is. It’s really more to broker, to make sure that the people in the host country, in this case the United States, know what we have to offer in the Netherlands, are given the opportunity to read about it, to see it. We have a very wide program for sending programmers, presenters and curators over to the Netherlands to see what we’ve got to offer. My job is to get the right people and the right institutions talking. I do not, and we do not as a government, make any decisions on what is to be sent over here. That decision is made by our American partners.

We also, as the British Council said, have structural relationships with a number of arts organizations, foundations, festivals, theaters here, galleries, museums. We have an ongoing relationship with them. We listen to them, what they’re looking for. We make sure they know what we have to offer, and if they’re interested—and we hope they are—we help facilitate that. That’s actually what our job is. Our job is not to try to sell a message. If a message is anything, it’s, “We’re not just tulips and wooden shoes.” That’s the public diplomacy image, which, unfortunately, is still being used in certain parts of the country and, unfortunately, by certain of my colleagues at other posts in the United States. The message that I’m getting from the Ministry of Culture is “Smash that.” That’s really not what the Netherlands is about. Leave that to the Netherlands Board of Tourism. The message that we’re trying to project is a modern, vibrant, maybe a little anarchistic image of our art scene. Our main goal is to help the Dutch arts

and Dutch artists by exposing them to other countries, by raising their profile in other countries, sometimes by helping them measure themselves against higher standards, because we don’t have the illusion that everything we do is the best in the world.

There are certain areas we’re pretty good at and others that we can learn a lot from. So one of our jobs is to try to get people over here and to pull themselves up by the bootstraps, and just see actually how well they’re doing rather than only measure themselves against the rather limited measure of their own cultural community. Some of the statements made yesterday—about listening to the host country, listening to what people are all about, what they’re interested in—can go a lot further and that really means—and sometimes I describe my job as—infiltrating the cultural infrastructure. Get in there and make sure you understand what people are talking about, that you can speak to them on their level and know what you’re talking about, know what’s going on in your own country, know what’s going on in your host country, and try to get the right people together. I’ll end, but, before that, I would definitely say, even though it’s not the system that we have in the Netherlands, I very much applaud the German and the British system of separating the cultural diplomacy from the diplomatic corps. Not so much in our case because of damage control reasons or because of trust, but rather because of professionalism and efficiency. On the whole, in my experience, diplomats—there are a few exceptions, and one of the exceptions was the most recent ambassador to the Netherlands, who will be speaking later today, who herself is an art historian and knows a lot more about Dutch art than I do—don’t really know how to speak to artists and heads of arts organizations. They are either mystified by artists, or they’re enthralled by them, and neither is really the appropriate attitude in order to be able to work on a professional level. So I feel that besides the possible political and trust issues, it’s very important for the people doing this cultural diplomacy to be arts professionals who have a feeling and understanding of the other side.

SARUKHAN: Thankfully, as one of the two diplomats on this panel, I get to speak last and fend off some of these allegations against diplomats. I’m the Mexican consul general in New York, and I will probably beat my German colleague here, because I arrived on Saturday and yesterday was my first day at the office. Let me speak very briefly about what the traditional structures of cultural diplomacy in Mexico were, what we’ve been doing to try and change them around, and you will probably identify that as different from my British colleague’s linearity. Many of the things I will talk about will be extremely fuzzy. Some will be quite colorful, as probably Mexico is. The lines are not as clear-cut as some of the examples that we’ve heard about.

Traditionally—and I will oversimplify—there have been three main structures in Mexico for promoting culture, basically in and out of the country. There’s the National Council for Culture and the Arts, which has traditionally been based in Mexico and has promoted culture within the country. There is the Foreign Ministry, which promotes basically Mexico abroad, a public diplomacy-type of program, but also manages scholarships, exchange programs, the Fulbright-Garcia Robles program, which is the equivalent to some of these bilateral scholarship programs to the United States. Then you have within the Foreign Ministry a very

specific office called Program for Mexican Communities Abroad that deals with the relationships within Mexican communities that live outside of Mexico, which is basically of course in the United States, given that we have at least around 8 million Mexicans living in the United States, either legally or undocumented. That was the structure that existed before 2000.

Once the Fox government came into power in 2000, there was a very specific decision. I know many of you will probably blink and say, “My God, the world is moving in one direction and these guys are going backwards.” There was a very explicit decision made in Mexico to harness cultural diplomacy and cultural promotion to foreign policy. The basic reasoning behind this was that we believe that by opening Mexico up to NGOs, artists, the eyes and

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ears of the world, we will be able to make democratic change in Mexico, that we will be able to anchor the democratic change that has occurred in the country. We feel that with culture and cultural diplomacy we can play an important hand. So in 2000, the Foreign Ministry pushed, lobbied and got the funds and the green light to create something that has become the Cultural Institute of Mexico. It is based loosely on what the Goethe or the Instituto Cervantes in Spain have done. It’s an institute, which is based inside the Foreign Ministry, which is run by the Foreign Minister directly. It organically comes straight out of his office. Most of it is a governmental budget. We get about 70 percent governmental budget, and then we have about 30 percent matching private funds that are channeled either for the head office in Mexico City, or the Institutos de Mexico that we have been creating in other countries and especially in cities like New York and other big cities in the United States. Obviously, I won’t hide it here, there are bureaucratic problems with our friends from the National Council for the Arts, because there’s a bit of “Is this our responsibility? Is this the Foreign Ministry’s responsibility?” But so far we’ve been able to kick off a very successful program.

Usually you end up discussing whether the chicken or the egg was first. I think the Institute in Mexico has been able to capitalize on a certain newfound cultural vibrancy going on inside Mexico. There are various examples: films like “Y Tu Mamá También,” “Amores Perros,” “El Crimen del Padre Amaro.” These tell of a certain—it would probably be bold to say a Mexican cultural renaissance—but there has been a certain effervescence going on in Mexican culture in the past five, six years which has suddenly mushroomed as a result of a freer press—sometimes uncomfortably so for those of us who are diplomats. But there is a lot that the government is doing to promote this. We’re using the institutes in the United States to spearhead these efforts. In fact, I know many of you will say, “Well, if the Foreign Ministry is controlling this, is this an a-critical program?” I think it is. We, in fact, got into a

tussle with the Mexican Catholic church, because when there was this whole row over the film that was Mexico’s candidate to the Oscars, “El Crimen del Padre Amaro,” the Church tried to ban the film. What we immediately decided to do in the Foreign Ministry was to show the film for all the diplomatic corps in Mexico City. So that the Foreign Ministry has decided to play a very active role in promoting what has been going on inside the country, but also funding, providing private support for some of the activities. It’s a very mixed model, and, obviously, if you compare it to what some of my European colleagues have talked about here today, it’s probably a much more centralist and government-controlled program than probably a lot of us would like to see, but given what has happened in Mexico, and given that we really believe that we can foster and anchor democratic change, accountability in Mexico via the arts, we will try and continue to do so.

GEHAN: I would just like to react very quickly, because I don’t want to leave a wrong impression in terms of diplomats, because I happen to be a diplomat. As I said, I am the only one and not only that, but I just happen to be a diplomat, meaning that, in the past, my job has been regularly occupied by non-diplomats. I was actually asked to take this job because I’m a university person as well and have long-term experience in universities, and I’m a Franco-American, meaning that my wife is an American and I live in this country as much as mine. Second, I would say that in terms of the agency, it must not be also overemphasized, the difference between a ministry and an agency. We have in France a recurring debate on this issue, meaning, “Should we be an agency or should we be a ministry?” I’m not sure, to tell you the truth, that in a year or two from now we won’t be an agency. It’s really a question that is debatable. Three, in terms of the way we work here, as I said, we work with partners, but not only with partners. We have an evolution that is more and more mixed between public and private. We have a foundation that we work with, and actually my budget goes in large part to this foundation, which means part of my actions, I have to defend them in front of a board, which is composed of French and Americans. The executive director of this foundation, who is American, is my direct counterpart for everything we do.

A fourth thing: I would dispute what was said by my Dutch colleague, even if I agree on the rest. Obviously we have an office where we have experts, meaning that we have people who are coming from the audiovisual world, from the arts world. I agree—I certainly wouldn’t feel competent, and I don’t, to discuss these things. But there is no way you could have an expert on all the kinds of things that you would cover—from audiovisual to universities and to schools. What happened—and I think one of the reasons I was chosen—I think what’s important is to negotiate. In my office, at least, the main thing that is important is ... to be expert maybe a little bit ... I’m an expert in universities, but what’s important is to be able to negotiate with your partners because this is really the key to success in terms of cultural diplomacy.

STILLE: Andy already answered this question for the British experience about the fact that there’s a structural independence built-in to the British Council and that 70 percent of their money is independent. I’m assuming this puts you in the kind of situation you described where somebody from the embassy is saying, “What

about this exhibition you're putting on? Isn't that working against what we're trying to do in our foreign policy?" The fact that some of your money, and an important part of your money, is coming from another source, they give you the authority in that conversation to say, "No, I'm terribly sorry, this is how we're going to do it, and this is our—?"

I'm wondering in the case of the Goethe Institut, whether the fact that the Goethe Institut, as you indicated in your introduction, is in a paradoxical position, because it's legally independent and yet financially dependent. How does that work in terms of the kind of situation that we're describing there?

SÖTJE: It works totally because there is a common sense between the political parties and the political class in our country, that they should avoid any influence on our policy abroad. There is no problem. I remember only three examples where an ambassador tried to influence our policies abroad, and in all of these cases our ambassadors failed.

MACKAY: In the vast majority of my experience working overseas, it actually works very well for the diplomatic service to have an arm which is not purely governmental, which is able to raise the issues and say the things that they cannot, because they have to represent governmental policy. Generally, and I would say certainly in our case, we are welcomed by the diplomats because we are able to say things that they can't and to take the debate to another level. It's a very, very rare exception that that's not the case.

WIKLER: I've never heard of an instance where there's been this kind of conflict with the Netherlands. Our supply-side policy preempts that in a certain sense. In other words, we don't bring anything over that people here haven't asked for. Now that can also be a problem, because if we would like to express something that maybe is not welcomed here, we don't really have the channel to do it. But if there were an enormous demand for, let's say, some very politically loaded artistic expressions over here, we would bring them because there is a need for it, and I would very, very much doubt that the government, the ambassador, would interfere in that.

STILLE: One thing that is—and Jean-Rene mentioned this—a big difference, I suppose, between the United States and Europe in cultural policy is the role of government and the role of the market. Jean-Rene mentioned the idea of promoting things that the market will not promote. One of the areas that has been the biggest bone of contention in many ways between the United States and Europe is the film industry, and most European countries accept as a given that, because of their smaller domestic markets, the government has to have an active role in promoting, subsidizing, financing film. Since, Jeanne, your background is as a filmmaker, and Holland, of course, has a small domestic market, how does that work and how do you feel about it, as someone who also has long experience here and as a dual-citizen? The United States more or less operates on the principle that we have a wonderful and vibrant art scene, not just in cinema, because it's private—the fact that the government is not saying, "We want abstract expressionists; therefore, we will subsidize abstract expressionists"—the fact that the private anarchy in this country is part

of its vitality. I'm curious as both an artist and cultural diplomat and filmmaker, how you see that tradeoff?

WIKLER: Whether subsidizing the film industry is a good or a bad thing?

STILLE: The arts in general. In other words, you can talk specifically about film, but whether you think it's a good idea.

WIKLER: Let me answer this in two parts because I'd like to speak just very briefly about the whole problem of film, what is seen very much in Europe as American cultural imperialism. I'd like to briefly touch on that, and what we, the Netherlands, have done about that problem. And then the second one is the general

It actually works very well for the diplomatic service to have an arm which is not purely governmental, which is able to raise the issues and say the things that they cannot, because they have to represent governmental policy.

funding, subsidies for the arts. It is true that there is an enormous flood still of American films into Europe, and a lot of it has to do with the incredible marketing resources and distribution resources of the American film industry. Some of it has to do with the fact that the movies are pretty good, actually. They're not all pretty good, and the big blockbusters that are sent over in droves—they appeal to certain segments of the population. In the last 10 or 15 years, the European Union has implemented a number of programs for all kinds of cultural activities ... and that has strengthened the European film industries by helping them, not just paying for the films—as a matter of fact, production grants have been very, very limited—but by strengthening the marketing, the distribution and the training. My particular background was in film training, and what we decided to do was: Let's not see the Americans as the enemy; let's learn some of their tricks. So we invited the best that we could find to come over and have a dialogue with our filmmakers, who didn't agree in certain aesthetic ways with the way the films were being made, but in many ways were dying to learn those techniques. A lot of that has happened all over Europe, where there has been an exchange—exchanges of ideas in training, in conferences, in seminars and so on. What has happened in my country, as well as many others, is our domestic box office for Dutch films has risen dramatically. It used to be there was a tiny percentage. No one would ever go to a Dutch film. Now the Dutch films have an enormous audience, and a lot of that has to do with having strengthened the industry. Once again, not just throwing money at a producer, but training producers. How do you become professional? How do you fundraise? How do you market your film? That was what my institute

was involved in, strengthening the infrastructure there. Part of it also is learning the best practices from the Americans. That's one way in which we have absolutely addressed that problem.

There are a lot more Dutch films, but we do not have a quota. There are other countries that do have a quota as far as how many of their own national films are to be shown. It's the same with radio and television. We do not have that in the Netherlands. We try to make a very natural kind of quota, an organic quota by making sure that the product is just as good as we can make it.

As far as subsidizing is concerned—we have a very, very generous subsidy system for the arts in the Netherlands. However, right now there are cries going up for more private funding for the arts. First of all, the extent to which one can fund major exhibits, or major shows, or international work is very limited, so they feel that in order to be able to compete—a museum, for example—on the international market for a wonderful exhibit, they need more than what they receive from subsidies. So, they want to learn the techniques for convincing rich people to part with their money. We're not good at that. Rich people don't give to the arts. There's actually not a charity tradition, a giving tradition, at all. There's no culture of giving in the Netherlands because we're taxed, as they would say here, up the yazoo. You know that your tax money is going to the arts; therefore, why should you give extra? On the other hand, tax money is going toward a lot of things. So people in the arts feel that in order to be able to compete internationally, they have to get private money.

There's also a feeling, and I do share it to a certain extent, that a kind of laziness can creep in. When you are subsidized from the cradle to the grave as an artist, you don't really have to worry about anybody ever buying a painting or coming to your performance. It really doesn't matter. One of the problems with the film industry is that the filmmakers made the films for themselves, and that's a wonderful way to start. But if you don't even have a window into how your audience is reacting to your film, you don't care because you can be as murky and obscure as you want because you've gotten your subsidy upfront, then you don't have a strong and vibrant film industry. So there have been steps certainly in the last five years, in the Netherlands to concentrate on what they call "cultural entrepreneurship," to make sure that the culture-makers, the artists, do have a sense of the market, do have a sense of their audience. It's a balance.

One of the major ways to strike that balance is to be sure that you're helping starting artists, new ones. Put a lot of money into training, a lot of money into development, a lot of money into new groups, getting them going, and then at a certain point, hopefully they'll be able to stand on their own. Now some groups who have done that have then complained, "I've been punished, penalized for my own success. We're so successful now, we don't get any subsidy anymore." Well, that is the idea basically, that you don't have a right for the rest of your life to it. There are certain art forms that will constantly and continually need to be subsidized because they don't appeal to a mass public, and those need to be cherished and they need to be protected.

STILLE: As we know, the French take the financing of cinema very seriously and see it as a fundamental part of maintaining a healthy film industry. I think there was a period, for instance,

where France was making a lot of funds available for first movies, and then they found it wasn't working and that you'd have the first movie and the second, and careers would sort of fizzle out after that. It seems to me, and correct me if I'm wrong, in recent years it's been working. France has made some adjustments to its policies, and the exporting of French cinema has been more successful in the last several years. There are a number of movies, from "Va Savoir," among others, that have reached large international audiences. Has there been an adjustment to French policy in terms of film that accounts for that, or is it just the fact that certain individuals have made movies that have been successful, that draw?

GEHAN: I'm going to piggy-back on your question very briefly. I'm really struck by the commonality of much of what is being said. For instance, what was just said about the Netherlands, it happens the same in France. There has been a strong evolution toward a mix in arts funding. We just passed a recent law to encourage gift-giving. With regard to film, I don't think there's a change in terms of our policy. The real change is more linked to economy. As you know, Canal Plus was part of the system for financing, which has some problems right now.

STILLE: I had a question for Peter specifically, but it may apply to the others. We in this country, of course, have a significant problem of relations with the Arab world, and we may be able to learn something from our European cousins on this, who have longer experience in this part of the world. I know, for example, that the Goethe Institut sponsored among other things a trip of the writer Günter Grass to Yemen, which produced interesting results. I'm wondering if you could speak a moment about that and the role culture can play in terms of bridging that particular divide.

SÖTJE: This is a particularly good example of our approach to foreign cultural policy toward the so-called—I like to say "so-called"—"Islamic world," or Arabic world, because it's not a monolithic block. There are a lot of cultural differences between the so-called Islamic countries, and there's a strong movement in democratization and participation, development-oriented movements, NGOs especially, in the Arabic world. We try to collaborate with these movements. I had the opportunity to go with Günter Grass to Yemen for 10 days in early December last year. This is a very good example for this approach because the participants in these meetings are authors, intellectuals, from all around the Arabic world, coming from Lebanon, from Egypt, from Algiers, from Paris. One of the famous authors in the Arabic language is Adonis, an exiled Syrian author living now in Paris; Mahmoud Darwish from Palestine is one of the most famous authors nowadays in contemporary literature in the Arabic world. There were many exiled authors. It was a sign of generosity, of hospitality, of the Yemeni government to meet in Sana'a. The issues, which the authors and the intellectuals and the journalists included in the party focused on, are the vision of state and religion, the role of sexuality in literature, censorship, state censorship and censorship from the religious bodies, from the society, from the conservative part of the society. It seemed to me that for some of the participants, for the first time in their socio-political existence, they had this opportunity. To provide such room at the

podium is our approach for current cultural policy, especially in non-democratic framework conditions.

SARUKHAN: There's one issue where I'd like to jump in here, and I think that for some reason a lot of what we keep talking about has to do with highbrow or higher-end cultural diplomacy, but there's also a very interesting role now for "lowbrow" culture. In this, Mexican soaps have been absolutely phenomenal in building bridges with countries with whom regionally, geographically, Mexico does not have a strong relationship. An example: Almost two years ago, a very prominent Indonesian businessman was visiting Mexico and happened to stumble upon a soap opera in his hotel and watched the thing. It seems the guy actually fell in love with one of the stars on the soap opera, and after six months of diplomatic negotiations with the government, with the producer in Mexico, we were able to promote the export of two of those soap operas to Indonesia. It became a huge hit in Indonesia, crossed over into Malaysia, and now the Mexican ambassadors in Malaysia and Indonesia are the star guests in every single reception in those two countries. So there is also room to talk about what "lowbrow" culture is doing in terms of perceptions of countries that in this case—I'm not even talking about the U.S. and Mexico—I'm talking about Mexico, Malaysia and Indonesia.

STILLE: I can't remember if it was Germany or Holland that invented "Big Brother."

WIKLER: Yes, I'm afraid that's one of our major exports.

STILLE: So you're doing some lowbrow exporting of your own.

WIKLER: That's private; that's not public television. That's commercial TV; we don't support them.

MACKAY: The British Council's been doing a lot of work with the Islamic countries since the events of Sept. 11. There's a Web site: www.connectingfutures.com, which gives all the detail. I'll just say that it's grown out of a major research exercise, which was done in the leading Islamic countries at the tail end of 2001, the beginning of 2002, which threw up the complexity and the confusion of our relations with those countries—and I mean "our" in terms of the developed, Western world. There is no simple paradigm. If you're interested, have a look at the research document. It is fascinating.

WIKLER: There's one other thing about the Islamic world. Like most Western European countries, the Netherlands has a large population of, in our case especially, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their children and now their children's children. These people came as guest workers in the '70s, and when the economy was in such good shape, there were a lot of jobs left over. Although the Netherlands has not felt the need to have any new programs for the Islamic countries post-Sept. 11, one of the very important things is that we do focus on the countries of origin of the people who make up the largest immigrant populations that we have. You have so many interesting indigenous cultures here in the United States with very highly developed cultural forms. Just as the speaker this morning was talking about how jazz appealed to people abroad,

I think the African-American experience could appeal enormously to the diversity of people in the Netherlands. There is quite a large black population in the Netherlands, and some of the African-American achievements here are an enormous inspiration for them. A lot of what can be done to reach out to the European countries is not just appealing to their mainstream, but appealing to their very interestingly ethnically diverse cultural world.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Natasha Gauthier. I'm with the Canadian Museums Association, based in Ottawa. My question is directed primarily to Mr. Mackay, Mr. Gehan and Ms. Wikler, in terms of how you approach cultural relations and cultural diplomacy in nations that are former colonies and particularly the recently independent colonies.

MACKAY: Our approach is, as in every country in which we work: We look at that country; we go into the field; we listen; we try to work out what it is that is going to help us to build those enduring relationships, which is what we're talking about. Anything that will help us to develop that relationship that lies within our limits and within our parameters, we do, if it is of mutual benefit, because mutuality is at the core. We have a series of things that we call "cultural cornerstones," which is a bit of a naff term, but our organization recently has started working toward these things called "cultural cornerstones" which are basic common sense about being nice to people and respecting their views and things. One of the cultural cornerstones is about mutuality, and it came up yesterday. From my own personal point of view, I can't emphasize strongly enough how important the mutuality is. If we can't achieve that mutuality in our relations between X country and Y country, whatever their economic status, whatever their political regime, then we've failed before we've begun.

GEHAN: I'll approach the question from a different angle in two respects. One is in terms of relations with our former colonies. France, as you probably know, in terms of contemporary culture, is a mixed culture. Which means that within the culture of today in France, we actually incorporate part of the culture of these countries. The new music in France is really world music or the rap or whatever. It's coming from people who are basically usually from former colonies. That's the first thing. The second thing is that we have also a general approach to the culture of these countries, which means that we actually do promote also African artists. We have programs for that. It's like the distinctions blur. We have many things happening in terms of dance, literature. The distinction between France and the countries that are linked to France is really blurred, like the French literature is also today an African-French literature. The distinction is less and less obvious between the traditional French culture and this culture that is broader, that includes those countries.

WIKLER: The Netherlands has 13 so-called "priority posts," and those are diplomatic posts around the world that have a heightened focus on culture, New York being number one of all of them. Some of them in the major Western European countries (London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, etc.) are chosen because of their importance in the global cultural landscape. If you perform at the Paris Opera,

that's good for you, good for your career. The same with New York, the same with London. A number of the other posts are chosen because of historical reasons—either because they were former colonies, for example, Jakarta or Pretoria, or they are countries, as I said, of the origin of a lot of our immigrant groups, such as Morocco, Turkey, etc. There are a number of countries that are chosen for those reasons, and they also have extra money, extra staff, extra funding for culture. They pretty much report to a certain office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is Culture and Development. We have a lot of lively discussions amongst ourselves, because the way we work, the demand-side work we do here in the West, is irrelevant when you're talking about Rabat or you're talking about Pretoria—well, Pretoria a little bit—but much less so in some of the countries where there really isn't a demand at all. They pay for a lot more things than we do here, a larger percentage, and they are stimulating the local cultures as well as showing what we have to offer.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Irene Krarup of the Culture and Information Department at the Danish Consulate in New York. Allow me to address a question to my colleagues up there. It seems that we are increasingly having problems doing our part of the cultural dialogue with America. I'm talking about the visa problems. It's not only a question of Americans doing it better, or paying their half, or doing it at all. It's a question of not, at least, sabotaging what we're trying to do here. John Brown mentioned what has characterized the American cultural diplomacy of the last 15 months, and he said it's a propaganda mode somehow. We feel it. At first I thought the Danes were specifically having problems with the immigration agency, but now we're having American presenters, our venues and programming, people from American festivals and venues with an international profile, coming to us and saying, "We have to do something together here because we're not going to have very much international culture presented at our festivals because we can't get the visa to you." The question is, is it just the Danes? Do you have the same feelings? Is there some kind of mistaken thing going on in the immigration authorities, thinking that the Danish Children's Theatre groups might be suicide bombers? And how can it be that when I'm inviting a children's theater group to come here, together with American festivals as my partner, it has to prove the international standard? This just happened yesterday that Philadelphia Children's Festival, which has a Scandinavian program this year starting May 1, we didn't get the visas. The thing we had to do is to prove the international standard, and that is disturbing. A Danish filmmaker ... was just casting for his next film. The Danish director in L.A. was told by the casting, "Stay away from the Brits or any other foreigners. Make it easy for us; keep to American actors." That is concerning. Is it payback time for the polls indicating anti-American feelings in Europe? What's going on? And what can we do to help keep that door open, not only for our sake, but also to have that dialogue keep going on?

GEHAN: I'll just open my heart for a second. To be representing French culture in the U.S.A. today, and at the same time being Franco-American—I could have been American at some point in my life—it's very depressing. It's not that we see so much in terms of demonstration, but you have no idea the amount of mail, hate

mail, that we receive. I don't care if some people disagree with the politics of my government—that is their right. But I usually open my mail, and the other day I was being accused of being a coward, dirty, whatever. And I must say I don't know what to do because that is really the limit of what we do, for me. Maybe that's because I'm a diplomat, but I'm very concerned because basically what we do is promote, and we deal with people like you. The problem is the people who are out there, outside of this—how can we reach these people that have grown such ideas? That for me is depressing because I really don't know what to do.

We are increasingly having problems doing our part of the cultural dialogue with America. I'm talking about the visa problems.

WIKLER: We've tried intervening when Dutch groups have been denied visas, and we're told, "Just stay away." I don't know if most people in this audience know that you can get them if you pay an extra thousand dollars. Your chances are better if you pay the extra thousand. Supposedly this is because there's such an incredible back-log, that they're so busy and overworked that if you want a speedy procedure ... American presenters bear the burden of getting the visas and losing incredible amounts of revenue because their groups can't come over, they can't perform. It's terrible for us bringing them over, but it's worse for the presenters who are dependent on those. A lot of it is blind incompetence by some of these people who work for the INS who can't see the difference between a children's theater clown and a mass murderer. It's the same kind of civil servant mentality, or whatever that mentality is, "These are the rules, I'm just following orders. I don't care where you're from or who you are, whatever—no. Take your shoes off."

To answer the question of my Danish colleague, I don't think it's anti-Danish, because we're all experiencing it. I don't think it's there as retribution for any kind of anti-war sentiment that any of the countries have been expressing. I think it's a general paranoia mixed with a certain amount of incompetence.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Cynthia Schneider. I teach at Georgetown University and used to be the ambassador in the Netherlands. Working at Georgetown means that I live in Washington and get to take advantage of the incredible programs that these embassies and organizations put on, and they are, every single one of them, best practices. But I want to ask you all a question—two questions, actually—about who should be doing this and for what purpose? Yesterday we heard a lot about culture as a tool for diplomacy, and now we've heard the reverse—that it should be culture for culture, done by people who know about culture. I'd like to ask about that with the following point: I found as ambassador that actually it was beneficial to have it be the official place that hosted the sometimes edgy, controversial thing—that that helped the image of the official America. One example is, we did a thing with the Dutch with that movie about drug-dealers in Mexico, "Traffic," and it was a very ... well, a film that showed the

bad sides of everything. We intentionally hosted our Dutch counterparts in dealing with the drug problem, to go together with us to that movie, recognizing that it had a pretty unflattering portrayal of America. I felt that was a good thing for me officially to be doing, and I would rather have the official person do that than some separate arm where you don't get the benefit. ...

WIKLER: But you weren't showing that to Dutch film professionals, you were showing it to drug-enforcement officers. ... So that's a different story. That's not what we're talking about.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (CYNTHIA SCHNEIDER): OK, but I thought also other people said the idea is good to have separate from the embassy someplace that can do controversial things. I think it's *good* for the embassy to do controversial things. So what about the role of pure culture and culture as part of foreign policy? And how about your training? This isn't part of our foreign service training at all, how to do this, and I'm curious, particularly Jean-Rene, about the background. How do you learn to do this as part of the foreign service, if you do at all?

GEHAN: I was not trained for that at all. As I say, I think I was asked to do this job more because of my personal experience. But to your question: I don't think it's a real debate, from what I hear. In fact, the objective is really for us, like for my colleagues, to promote a country. It's not to promote a government. We have the same distinction; they have a press office to deal with that—we don't. The distinction between the embassy or not-the-embassy is not that important. That's the way it sits. As I say, I'm the only one, the only diplomat; all the other ones are trained for their specific fields. I don't think it's really a very important consideration because the mission, which is to promote the country, can be done by someone like me or by someone else. I'm not there to promote a government.

MACKAY: I think we're unusual in Washington. We don't have an embassy program; we do not organize cultural events through the embassy. As other countries, we do all our work in partnership with American bodies. Our aim is to get out to the audiences we want to attract. Our perception is that the audiences that we wish to attract would never dream of coming to an event in an embassy. They perceive it as something very, very different. So we partner with bodies, with agencies, with institutions, which will draw in a younger, slightly more challenging audience that we're seeking.

GEHAN: We do the same, with one consideration that might play a part. ... For instance, for me, aside from any direction from anyone, my priority right now is to address the issue of this climate, aside from what we continue to do in different fields. This is something I feel as being a diplomat, and it's not because I've been directed. I think it's our mission to do that. How would you react, for instance, if you had a crisis in general relations of your country with the United States? Would you also consider it a priority, or do you really think it's something you wouldn't want to deal with? Because that's where you can make a difference.

MACKAY: As was said yesterday, I think we are heading for a crisis generally in relations between young people in the United

States and the European countries, and I include the United Kingdom in that. I arrived 16 months ago with a severe question in my mind about whether the British Council should be in the United States at all, given the history of the special relationship, given the strength of the ties, given the strength of the interchange all the time. And I realized from my own personal experience of arriving, having lived in recent years in the Middle East and South America and Europe, arriving here and finding this one of the hardest cultural adjustment experiences I've had in a long time. And then talking to our partners out in the field about the struggles they have to engage the successor generation, the young, educated U.S. citizens in a global agenda, in an international agenda. I think that is absolutely at the heart of what all of us can and should be doing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: A quick comment on the visa issue: I wanted to say that for two years we've been part of a national coalition that's in place in Washington with immigration attorneys, other cultural organizations and other sectors, and we came into being at the initiation of the Premium Processing Fee in May of 2001. Things have certainly heated up since that time. I'm happy to talk to anyone off-line because we've been working directly with Department of Homeland Security, the new agencies there, and we're well on the way to some administrative relief for the processing side and trying to make some new relationships with the diplomatic corps. I wanted people to know that there is something in place. It's a pretty targeted effort. I'm with the Association of Performing Arts Presenters; the coalition is under the American Arts Alliance, and you can go to their Web site to get details.

SÖTJE: I found it extremely encouraging to be participating in a conference that is clearly aimed for re-entering the field of foreign cultural policy for the United States. I put it last night over the dinner session that my European colleagues all around the world, abroad, don't miss our American colleagues on the battlefield during the last decade, but on the field of foreign cultural policy. And one of the phrasings used yesterday afternoon sounds a little bit strange to European ears. If you say, for instance, that you need a branding of the images of a country, or to sell your own culture as a product, or to export it abroad, this is a different approach from our philosophy as it comes out here on this panel. We should look more on another edge—our ability should be increased to listen and to hear and to look at different cultures in all parts of the world as sources of enrichment for our own countries, for our own cultures. We need this increasing ability for intercultural dialogue and exchange as air to breathe, especially in a more and more interdependent and globalized world. If we do not look at each other as a part of a learning community all around the world, all these efforts to encourage foreign cultural policy are not worth doing. It's a long-term investment, a long-term achievement; credibility will not grow overnight but over decades. I think this effort is still worth making, as somebody put it last afternoon, but don't look for results the next day.

STILLE: On that wise note, we conclude for now.

Can Cultural Diplomacy Improve America's Standing in the Islamic World?

MODERATOR:
CARYLE MURPHY,
religion reporter,
The Washington Post

PANELISTS:
PETER AWN, dean, School of General Studies
and professor of religion, Columbia University
BERT KLEINMAN, senior managing consultant to
Radio Sawa and Radio Fada
SAMER SHEHATA, professor of Arab studies
Georgetown University
FAOUZI SKALI, founder and director,
Fes Festival of World Sacred Music

ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ

(Deputy Director, National Arts Journalism Program):

As those of you who've been following this story from its beginning know, we've now canvassed several aspects of the topic. We began yesterday by laying out the political situation and how America can get its message across in the world and what, generally speaking, the role of public or cultural diplomacy may be in that equation. The challenge in all of this—and this very much applies to the next panel as well—is to bring our story back to the arts. The issues with the Islamic world and the conflicts at large in the world today could fill many conferences. The aim of this one is really quite particular. We are taking a small slice out of a very large cake. Our goal here is to turn our attention to what the role of culture, what the role of the arts, may be in reconciling our differences or building new relationships with other nations.

The next panel specifically asks the question, "Can cultural diplomacy improve America's standing in the Islamic world?" The moderator is Caryle Murphy, religion reporter at *The Washington Post*. We will then move to a second panel of former ambassadors and other notable cultural figures to look at what culture can do for statecraft.

MURPHY: My name is Caryle Murphy, and I cover religion at *The Washington Post*. I did spend five years in the Middle East based in Cairo, covering the Arab world. I've just written a new book called "Passion for Islam," in which I discuss the role of culture in precipitating some of the attitudes among Muslims in that part of the world. The title of our session today is "Can Cultural Diplomacy Improve America's Standing in the Islamic World?" I'm sure you all know that the Islamic world is not monolithic, but I'd like you to keep in mind that we are discussing the Islamic world and not just the part of that Islamic world that is most problematic for us, which is the Islamic world in the Middle East.

Just beside me is Samer Shehata, who's acting director of the Arab Studies program at Georgetown University. He teaches Middle East politics at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. He finished a Ph.D. at Princeton and has taught here at Columbia. He's a native of Egypt, has dual nationality and has lived in this country since he was about five. Seated next to him are Mr. and Mrs. Faouzi Skali. Faouzi is Moroccan, founder and director general of the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music. He is a highly regarded cultural anthropologist, writer and speaker, and has written on Sufism,

which is the mystical aspect of Islam and one of the most popular aspects of Islam in the West. Faouzi created the Fes Festival in 1994 after the Gulf War, with the intention of bringing people together. Then in 2000, he founded the intellectual component of the festival called "Giving a Soul to Globalization." I hope, Dr. Skali, that in your remarks you will tell us why you created a music festival to sacred music. Next to Mr. Skali is Bert Kleinman, who's a radio guy. All his working life, starting here at Columbia University, from which he graduated in 1963, he's been involved in producing radio programs and stations. Right now he's the senior managing consultant to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a federal agency that produces Radio Sawa, or Radio Together, one of the popular Arabic/Western radio stations in the Middle East, and Mr. Kleinman's going to tell us why it's become popular. And finally, Peter J. Awn, who's dean of the School of General Studies and professor of Islamic religion and comparative religion at Columbia. He's written many books, also one on Sufism. In 1995 he got an award I think every teacher would like to get: He was awarded the Great Teacher Award from the Society of Columbia Graduates. I'm going to ask Samer to start our conversation.

SHEHATA: I'm going to be talking about recent U.S. efforts at public diplomacy specifically directed at the Arab and Muslim world, and I'll try to address a couple of different questions. I'll try to talk about what they are in particular, and I will talk about whether public diplomacy can really help America's image in the Muslim world. Let me just start by saying that it's clear, the polling data reveals, and it should be clear to most people—and I'm referring to the polling data by The Pew Charitable Trusts as well as Zogby International of the Arab world—that policy is really the most important factor in determining how people look at the United States. We know the policies that are the drivers of opinion toward the United States. But nevertheless, public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can be effective if done well, if done successfully. They're certainly not a magic bullet. They're not going to solve our problem. Our problem isn't primarily one of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. It's really a question of policy.

Regarding public diplomacy efforts since 9/11—and there have been a number of them, new programs and so on—I would argue that for the most part they have been a failure. Unfortunately, that is true for the public diplomacy programs directed at the Arab and Muslim world. One of the reasons is because they profoundly misunderstand the problem. The Office of the Under Secretary for

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, an office of the State Department, has been incredibly active since 9/11. As many of you might know, Charlotte Beers was appointed the under secretary for public diplomacy in October of 2001, about three weeks after 9/11. She comes from Madison Avenue, is a very successful advertising executive famous for marketing Uncle Ben's Rice and Head & Shoulders and so on. In addition to Charlotte Beers' appointment, the office created a number of new programs and spent millions of dollars trying to win the war for the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim world. So, for example, they've developed a number of Web sites targeted at the Arab and Muslim world about 9/11, about terrorism, about Muslims in America. They've produced a number of publications and pamphlets, including the ones I have here, "Muslim Life in America" and "The Network of Terrorism," as well as other ones on Iraq, such as "Iraq: From Fear to Freedom." This one is actually particularly interesting, because 1.3 million copies of this pamphlet were produced, making it the largest publication ever in the history of the State Department. It was translated into 36 languages in an effort to have some effect on how people view the United States, as well as specifically the events of 9/11. A very nicely made publication.

Another endeavor has been Radio Sawa. As we heard, "Sawa" means "together." It's an FM and AM radio station that targets specifically a younger audience in the Arab world. The idea was—I can assume only—that these are the people that are very important in terms of potential acts of terrorism, or who-knows-what, and that they're really not being served properly in terms of radio. That's really the target audience. The format of Radio Sawa is 56 minutes of music—an Arabic song followed by a Western song—and then four minutes of news. I think \$35 million so far has been spent or appropriated for Radio Sawa, but we can hear about that later.

A number of mini-documentaries have been produced by the Office of Public Diplomacy under a kind of campaign, titled the "Shared Values" campaign. These mini-documentaries, really commercials, have been viewed in a number of Muslim countries, and I'll talk about them. They're also about Muslim life in America—Muslims talk about their lives in America. And there are more initiatives in the works: a proposed teen magazine in Arabic, a "Sesame Street" for teens in the Arab world—"Sesame Street" already exists in the Arab world, but this is particularly for teens—and most recently, although the thinking has been around for some time, a proposed Arabic-language TV station directed at the Arab world.

A lot of these things have failed. I think almost all of them have failed. The Web site is quite obvious. It's simply a question of connectivity. There is only one region in the world that is less connected to the Internet than the Arab world, and that is Africa, sub-Saharan Africa. Those people that do have access to the Internet aren't really, I would imagine, spending their time surfing State Department Web sites. They're probably doing other things. "The Network of Terrorism" and "Muslim Life in America"—I don't think they're going to be terribly effective. There is a tremendous amount of skepticism and cynicism in the Arab world directed at all government publications, whether it's *Al-Ahram*, the national newspaper in Egypt, or these types of things. People have come to be savvy and cynical, after years of government-controlled media. So I'm not sure really whom these things are directed at. In

other words, I don't know what effect this would have if they were distributed in the Jenin refugee camp, for example, or Tikrit. I don't think it would really persuade anyone.

Radio Sawa is interesting because it really has been heralded as a success, and I must say it is incredibly successful. I myself listen to Radio Sawa when I'm back in Egypt, and all of my friends do, too. I haven't really seen any serious polling data about Radio Sawa. I'm told that there is a study, but I don't think it's publicly accessible. However, there was an interesting BBC segment done about Radio Sawa on "The World Service," and I'll just read a little bit because it gets at least my impression and my informal survey of how people are reacting to Radio Sawa in the Arab world. They did this program in September of 2002, in which a BBC reporter in Jordan spoke to a number of young Jordanians about Radio Sawa, who actually listen to Radio Sawa. He asks the first person named Samir about Radio Sawa. Samir says, "I listen to the music *bes*,"—meaning "but" in Arabic—"I turn to another station once the news starts." The BBC reporter asks, "Why do you do that?" Samir answers, "Because it's like listening to Israeli radio. It's biased. I feel like it's propaganda to serve the Israelis." The BBC reporter then asks another person named Dina, and he says, "Do you want to talk about your impressions regarding the station?" Dina says, "I have the same to say, basically, because when you listen to what they say on the news, like they say, 'Arab extremists,' or 'Palestinian extremists'—that is not fair at all. Basically they're like, you know, a mouthpiece for the Americans, and I think, sort of, they're brainwashing Jordanians, Syrians, whoever, you know, is listening to these people." Then he asks Nisreen; he says, "What part of the radio do you like to listen to mostly?" Nisreen says, "I think the songs, because they are so much updated and they have the mixture of Arabic and foreign songs as well. But I think it's biased somehow"—now she's talking about the radio station generally—"because maybe it's sponsored by the U.S.A. or funded by them. Sometimes the news is shallow, not accurate." And finally he asks the fourth young person, Elias, and Elias says, "Well, sir, if we're talking about entertainments—songs and music—Sawa is number one. But if we're talking about news and media, the material they're producing is very cheap and they should be more balanced. We don't need advices," he says, "and we don't need their point of view." You basically get the idea.

Radio Sawa has been incredibly successful. Everybody is listening to it. Certainly there was that kind of need in the market. But are people buying the message? Certainly not. People aren't listening to the four minutes of news, and they realize it's coming from a particular perspective. In that sense, it's been a failure. The mini-documentaries I talked about—"paid media programs"—quote, unquote—they have also been a tremendous failure. They were actually pulled recently. About \$15 million was spent developing them. They were screened in a number of Muslim and then Arab countries via satellite. Basically the message was: Muslims love America, and America loves Muslims. Muslims talking about their experiences after 9/11 ... I find it terribly problematic. First of all, because it's not really true. We all know about the increase in hate crimes, indefinite detentions, the Patriot Act and so on. And secondly, this isn't the issue that's really behind public opinion in the Arab world. They're not so concerned about Muslims in America. They're concerned about U.S. policy toward the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, and they're concerned about Iraq. Those are really the drivers of public opinion.

Let me conclude by saying that public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can be incredibly effective. It's not a magic bullet, and it's not going to change things immediately but certain programs work and others are likely to work, including the Fulbright program, the Hubert Humphrey program, American cultural centers, American educational institutions in the region like the American University in Cairo, the American University in Beirut, the American Research Center. There are a number of other initiatives that have been proposed that are likely to work, but things like this really, in the words of John Brown and others who spoke in the morning, are more akin to propaganda than cultural diplomacy.

SKALI: For me, culture has to be understood in the anthropologists' meaning. Like the global way of life, the global behavior, the way each society organizes itself. The representation, the symbolic representation of each society has a very huge meaning in such a world. Of course, I'm a little bit biased in this definition by the fact that I'm an anthropologist myself. But it's very important to see that there is an extraordinary diversity of culture around the world. I'm also very interested and involved in the question of Islam and Sufism. After the first Gulf War in 1991, I felt compelled to do something, to express that this "clash of civilizations" is not fatal. It is not something that is absolutely necessary. We can do something about it. We can try to develop some kind of cultural diplomacy. We can act. It was obvious to me that, through media and all this sort of conflict, we would have, from my point of view, a very false understanding of what Islam is.

I'm in an Islamic country and a very Islamic city, which is Fes. It is very ancient and has a very rich Islamic civilization. And I know from my own experience, from my father, that Islam is not extremist, that Islam is this understanding of culture that I've spoken about. Its way of life is value, which is absolutely universal, which we share together, and love, compassion, acceptance of the others. And I was wondering how through media, through conflict, through politics, it could seem absolutely the reverse. It is so amazing to see ourselves through media as so completely different from what we feel.

So came the idea of creating an international event that could bring people together to share this fact that the world is built upon diversity and universality. Both are important, and both have to be learned together. Diversity is the different civilization, different tradition, different music, for instance. Universality is the great value that we share together with every human being. So the idea came to create this festival of world sacred music, and bring it to Fes for 10 days: Jewish tradition, Christian tradition, Islamic tradition, Hindu tradition, Buddhist tradition, and people coming from all around the world and together sharing this event. This event says a lot more than we can express by words. It says that I recognize you like you are, in this city of Islam, in a city that has a great heritage, where there were important encounters between Christians, Jews and Muslims for many centuries. It worked, of course, also because music is beyond words. You have just to feel; you have just to share; you have just to discover.

To give an example: For the first meeting, and it was not so far from this first Gulf War, this was the concert between Munir

Bashir, who was Iraqi, one of the most famous lute-players, and Gerard Edery, who is American, Jewish and a very great player of guitar. They played together before an international audience coming from all the cultures of the world. It was clear that we had to be very careful in how we approach the sacred, and about the fact that the culture had to be unassimilated by political issues. In preparation for the first edition of the festival, which took place in the desert of Morocco, and in the moment of preparation for that, I was with a friend and when we arrived at the desert. It was so beautiful, and I told him, "It's incredible. In the desert, it's like if you meet God." And he said, "It's normal, there is nobody." It's to me so interesting. This emptiness gives everybody the liberty to approach God. God doesn't belong to any special culture. He's the universal by itself. And so it means that the sacred could have this understanding of creating this universal space where everybody can

The world is built upon diversity and universality. Both are important, and both have to be learned together.

meet and discover and know the other. It is about the mutuality, the mutual acceptance. The problem is not how to spread our value—the Islamic one, the Western one, or any value it would be.

American values are well known in Eastern society through lots of tours, film, theater, music, a lot of things. And I can tell you that people like America. They like this culture, or else they would not accept it like that. But the question is: How do we improve cultural diplomacy so that we could recognize each other? Sometimes people have the feeling they are not recognized. They are not taken as they are, really. There is not a great effort to understand "the other."

Creating positive images of "the other" is the best cultural diplomacy that we could have. If we can see a movie and have the feeling that in fact we are recognized in the eye of "the other," in the heart of "the other," it will open everything and encourage us to build the real bridge for that. We need democracy, but democracy is not Westernization. And having a different culture is not to be against the West. What we need is a global democracy of cultures. I'm sure that America plays a key role in the world for promising that, because it is very important to see that a multicultural society is something like what exists here. It's a reality here, but people don't realize that outside America. There is a difference between life here and the image that people have outside this country.

KLEINMAN: We're going to go from the world of the sacred to the world of the popular. And yet, I could not agree more with what Dr. Skali has just said. In a way, I hope I can explain to you that so much of what he just said is exactly what Radio Sawa is, not in the sacred but in the popular. There were some statements made about Radio Sawa that I'd like to add to and comment on. Let me first correct a misapprehension that has been in the press. Radio Sawa is not part of the public diplomacy of the State Department. U.S. International Broadcasting, of which Radio Sawa is a part, was at one time part of the USIA, before 1998.

Then Congress, during the Clinton Administration, passed a law that set up a civilian commission, called the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which is four Republicans and four Democrats and with the Secretary of State *ex officio* as the ninth member. This was an attempt to take U.S. International Broadcasting, which included at that point the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and Radio Marti and Radio Free Asia, and to create, if you want, a firewall, as one has in Canada with the CBC, as one has with the BBC in England. And Radio Sawa is one of the first new projects of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. We are not part

Sawa tries to be what it is that people like about the United States. And, quite frankly, right now that's not our foreign policy.

of public diplomacy. I've never met Charlotte Beers. We didn't have anything to do with the branding of America or the selling of America or Uncle Ben's Rice. It is not our intention to be propaganda. We are not the voice of the U.S. government, although we are clearly perceived as such by many people.

The goals of U.S. International Broadcasting—I'm going to have to quote to you some language here—are “to communicate with the peoples of the world by radio, and to get their attention and respect.” In the Middle East the second part is particularly important, and respect, of course, is a two-way street. A second goal is “to report the news fairly and objectively and in a balanced manner.” Of course, an American perception of what that is, is not necessarily what an Al-Jazeera perception of what that is. And a third: “To represent the different segments of America with the multiplicity and the diversity of America; and to reflect American values and ideas; and to present responsible discussion of American foreign policy.” That's what we're about. This is very different from the idea of public diplomacy at the State Department, which was to sell America. If people happen to like, or if people do like, America because of Radio Sawa, that's wonderful. But we're not a sales operation or a propaganda operation.

Radio Sawa was born out of a project that began with a gentleman named Norm Pattiz, who was head of the Mideast subcommittee. He's also the chairman of the board of Westwood One, which is one of the largest American broadcasters. He was part of a review of what was going on in the Middle East in the beginning of 2001. At that point, the Voice of America (VOA) was broadcasting seven hours a day on shortwave. The largest audiences they had were reaching 2 percent of the public. It was almost entirely male. In some places they couldn't find anybody who was listening to the Voice of America. At the same time, the Middle East was an extremely important region to the United States—70 percent of the population was under the age of 30—and so the decision was made to do two things.

First, to use American commercial radio techniques—if you want, private enterprise ideas and techniques—and to try and make a radio station that would broadcast and fulfill the mission to

people under the age of 30. I cannot stress how important a target is. I don't care what media you are, or what kind of culture you're doing, what kind of art you're doing, generally one has some target audience in mind. Is one talking to 50-year-old, university-educated people, or is one talking to 15-year-old rappers? Who are you talking to? The VOA Arabic service wasn't working, and we had the opportunity—which some people consider unusual and I considered extremely surprising—to get FM licenses from a series of nations in the Middle East. We actually have FM licenses throughout the Gulf and also in Jordan. In other places we were able to get AM transmitters to broadcast, for example, to Egypt. And we put together a format, which I would call a full-service format. It involves music; it involves news, but most of all it involves projecting the American spirit of optimism, of hope, just why it is—as Dr. Skali said—that people all over the world love the United States.

Sawa tries to be what it is that people like about the United States. And, quite frankly, right now that's not our foreign policy. That doesn't mean that we don't report on our foreign policy and events, but we are, if you want, to represent the American spirit—those great words, “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”—which is not only the goal of Americans but is the goal of people throughout the Middle East. One of the unique things we do—and we do this with pop music and it was never done before on the radio in the Middle East—is we alternate one Arabic song, with one Western song. This was such a revolutionary idea that when we went out to test it—and we've done a lot of research in the Middle East—we tried to explain to focus groups what it was we wanted to do, to see if they thought it was a good idea, and people couldn't even understand what it was we were talking about. They said, “No you must mean one hour of Western music, and then one hour of Arabic music.” “No, no, no. One Western, one Arabic, one Western, one Arabic.” I have a little piece of audio, it's 50 seconds long. This is actually a promo from Radio Sawa. The announcer basically says, “Radio Sawa: The best of Western music and the best of Arabic music.” But it will give you a sense of the pop music that we play, and how Western and Arabic pop music does work together. That is a very radical political statement. It may not sound that way to you, but when we put it on the radio and people heard it, all of a sudden here they were hearing an intermixture of cultures. Here we are the Americans, and we're putting Arabic music on the same plane as Western music.

However, we are a lot more than just a unique mix of music. We do a lot more news than some people think. We broadcast between five and 15 minutes of news per hour. During the war we broadcast about 20 and sometimes 30 minutes of news an hour. To Iraq right now we're broadcasting 30 minutes of news per hour. Clearly, this was a time when our news department had to step up to the plate. Our audience desired a great deal more news.

The BBC is, of course, our competitor in Jordan. We had some focus groups, and we saw the same thing: It's not fashionable for young Arabs to say, “Oh, yeah, I listen to the American news and I really like it!” Have you ever heard an American say, “You know, I watch Al-Jazeera, and I really like that stuff?” Maybe there are some people who do. I've rarely run into anybody who said that they look at the pictures in *Playboy* either. As far as polling results are concerned—I'm not comparing us to *Playboy* by the way—we

do weekly research in three major cities in the region. Large surveys were done last October when we had been on the air for six months. In Jordan, among people 15 and above, 36 percent were listening to us at least once a week. That compared to 2 percent for the Voice of America. In Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, the figures were between 23 and 25 percent. When you get down to our target audience, which is 17- to 28-year-olds, in Jordan the numbers approach 90 percent that listen to us. I am sure there are people who, when the news comes on, say, “Oh well, I'm certainly not going to listen to that.” But they listen.

How do we measure the success, not just in numbers, but what have we accomplished? I'll say two things: Have we changed dramatically opinions in the Middle East? No, we're only a radio station. Have we created a situation where sometimes some people give America more of the benefit of the doubt? I think so. Is the Middle East better off today because Radio Sawa exists? I think so.

AWN: One of the great dilemmas we have as Americans is our fundamental lack of familiarity with foreign cultures in general, in that especially the Islamic world, to us, still appears to be monolithic. I remember with the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis in '79 through '80; it took about two or three weeks for most media to figure out that Persians weren't Arabs. It was a fundamental revelation, that not just linguistically, but culturally they were radically different one from the other. We don't train people in languages. In the '70s with the old Peace Corps, and when Iran was governed by the Shah, we had hundreds and hundreds of young Americans who spent two and three years in Iran come back incredibly familiar with the culture, and many went on to advanced degrees or went to work in companies that had some sort of affiliation with Iran. We've lost that. And Persian studies in the United States is, to be blunt, in the toilet. We have very few people bothering to take the language because we don't encourage students to do research there. We produce no more Ph.D.s of any substance, except at one or two major universities. So once again we'll be forced to play catch-up. Crises will arise, we want to somehow communicate ideas, but we have nobody who can speak the language.

This is equally true when we look at the largest parts of the Islamic world—Indonesia, Malaysia and Africa don't exist in the minds of 95 percent of the American population. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the largest and most vibrant Islamic cultures. What do people know about it? Nothing. They couldn't even tell you where Nigeria is on a map. We have to put much more effort, in cooperative efforts, rather than silly American efforts in terms of cultural diplomacy. As many of us have said, we're not selling toothpaste. Our credibility would appear much more serious if we were working with local groups and institutions in a number of areas, and I'll line some up for you in a moment.

I would also say, let's get over thinking that Muslims are more pious than anyone else. It is absolutely baloney. Muslims may believe in God. Do they pray? Do they fast? Who knows? It's really their business, but they are Muslims. ... I am very much a part of my cultural heritage, but don't tell me I'm going to have my wife veiled, I'm going to do this or do that. I'm a very modern individual, and I can be a Muslim at the same time. I would argue

that that's where our focus ought to be, and not constantly be worrying about the conservative religious establishment whose power comes because we give them the power. In a sense, we hand over power to the religious right in this country and elsewhere because we're too afraid of standing up and saying, “Keep your nose out of public discourse and stop trying to shape the way society functions.” Americans have no ability to critique religion in any positive way. Someone can come up to you and say, “Well, I go home every night and worship an albino marsupial.” I guarantee you will nod and walk away smiling, rather than saying, “I will defend your right to do that, but I also think it's an incredibly stupid thing to do.” If you couch anything in terms of religion, somehow it takes on greater power and prominence, which I think is silliness.

Where are these cooperative ventures we should be focusing on? Education is a cultural phenomenon, and I would love to see us put far more money in cooperative educational ventures in various parts of the Islamic world. Believe it or not, I wouldn't put it all in universities. I'd put it in secondary schools. That, I think, is where the action is. You get people when they're younger. This isn't in a sense indoctrination, but it's putting serious money behind it, so you're not dealing solely with the elites.

Baghdad College, in the old days in Baghdad, as well as my university, were American-Jesuit operations. Where they missed it was that it was solely American. I knew someone who taught at Baghdad College, and he couldn't figure out why every day—he was teaching one of the lower grades—the kids would plead with him, “Can we sing that song you taught us last week?” The song was “Zip-a-dee-doo-dah, Zip-a-dee-ay.” He couldn't figure out why they wanted to sing this. Well, “zip” in Arabic sounds like “zib,” which means penis. So they were delighted to sing “Zip-a-dee-doo-dah, Zip-a-dee-ay” all day long. And he stood there, as a delightful Bostonian with a fabulous accent, and just said, “Gee, aren't they really into this?” Well, they were.

It's cooperative efforts that will make the difference, that will show we have respect for the language, the culture, but also for the American value of teaching people how to make up their own minds and how to think. Diversity really is that ability to respect differences of opinion and to give people the foundations to do so. Yes, we can do that on the university level, but I have a feeling we'd have far more success on the secondary-school level. I'd also hope that we'd spend more time trying to articulate better our values in terms of diversity in the separation of church and state. Unfortunately, I think, given the current administration's attitudes toward religion and especially our very, very conservative religious movements, we don't really have a lot of credibility in this area.

But what is my problem? My problem is that the heart of traditional religion is not the privileging of diversity but the privileging of homogeneity, especially in many parts of the Islamic world. The ability to engage in substantive debate—the way they did in the '50s—argues for the privatization of religion and diversity in the public sphere, but without imposing either secularity or conservative religion on anyone. We have to represent that better. I don't think we do. So much of the rhetoric being used in the current conflicts has religious overtones. It is not lost on the Muslim populations that this really does seem to be a war of Christians against Muslims. Unfortunately, I'm afraid that the first arrival in Iraq of cultural diplomats will be missionaries under the guise of social-

service agencies. So you ask yourself, how can we be credible about core American values when we sell them out ourselves?

But, let's not be too antiquarian about it. There really is an enormous amount of modern art that is of high value in various parts of the Islamic world. We should try to create cooperative environments where we're funding and sponsoring the creation of all kinds of music, theater, sculpture, painting and the local modern arts in various Islamic environments. Cultural preservation: To me, we show our own values by helping local areas preserve their own cultures. I'm sure you saw the videos of the museum that was ransacked in Baghdad. Much of that is from the University of Chicago's excavations over the last quarter century, if not longer. We need to provide the funding so that people can preserve their heritage, and, much more importantly, teach them how to use that as a way of reaching out to their own populations. There is not that great tradition of educational institutions tied to museums.

Finally, the values of environmentalism, social and public health and their ability to enhance the economy are areas we really haven't focused on enough, and we could do a lot of work together. If the music festival in Fes represents anything, it is that cooperative spirit—sharing common values by having joint efforts rather than simply trying to sell the abstract American values.

MURPHY: Many people when I was overseas, both in Africa and the Middle East, expressed to me how much they loved the USIS libraries. These libraries, many of which I think have closed, are a very passive form of cultural diplomacy. I think that's one reason why they were so popular. They were there; everybody knew they were there. I know a lot of kids used to go there after school—it was quiet; they could study. There were books there; there were resources there. This is where they came to find out how they could get a visa to get into the United States. But we should not lose sight of the fact that some very successful cultural diplomacy can be done passively, just by being there.

I'll start the discussion by asking Peter about cultural preservation. It's in the news. What could the United States do, as a government, to repair their negligence in protecting the museum in Baghdad, as a cultural statement?

AWN: It would be an enormously valuable contribution to our own credibility were we to spend some money in terms of helping the local populations, not only repair the damage that's been done in Iraq to various sites, but also to begin cooperative efforts between American museums and museums in the Islamic world, to share preservation techniques, management techniques, educational techniques—

MURPHY: But specifically on this disaster, is there something we can or should do to help retrieve those objects?

AWN: The level of destruction was enormous when you see the tapes. Things were broken just to be broken. So it wasn't as if people were just stealing them to put them out on the black market. Enough of that goes on already. We can do something there, but to me it's the much broader commitment—cultural preservation is tied to economic development. If you don't have the money, it's the museums who get hit the worst. We should be

there trying to enhance people's ability to truly preserve these amazing, amazing cultures. I also think that would show that we recognize that to be an Iraqi is not to be an Egyptian. You have a very different and equally amazing cultural history of which you should be proud, and which we therefore respect, both in its ancient forms and its modern forms.

KLEINMAN: I have been struck by the blame that has been put on the United States for this. No doubt the soldiers should have done more to protect the museum, but it's not American soldiers that plundered the museum. It was Iraqis. ... If we really care about this, then shouldn't we not only try and retrieve these things? But does all the blame belong just with the American soldiers? Is there not one person who took something from there, who destroyed something, who could be blamed?

SHEHATA: I'd like to say, moving on a little bit, why not immediately set up a fund, whatever it may be—\$5, \$10 million—very, very small stuff, less than the cost of one new Apache helicopter—and have a special commission immediately in Baghdad to buy these things back, what is left, from the people who stole them, no questions asked? Some specialists would be there to authenticate what it is, and that would be the beginning at least of an attempt to rectify this incredible, incredible tragedy and really irresponsibility. Did they not foresee that this was likely to happen?

MURPHY: Apparently they had been warned, yes. Absolutely. Dr. Skali, I would like you to address this question. You go to any country in the world—forget if it's Muslim or non-Muslim—and American culture is all over, and this is American TV culture. You see it on billboards; you see it on TV; you see it in the movie theater—action movies, violent action movies, “Dallas.” Why isn't it that Martha Graham dance troupes get the same visibility overseas? How can the United States promote its sort of “highbrow” culture versus its popular culture?

SKALI: We speak a lot, of course, about globalization. We can speak about what has happened since the end of the Second World War—of political globalization, with the U.N. and multi-laterality and things like that—and then came economic globalization, when everybody was just working on economic issues, markets and making all the world one market and six billion consumers in the world. But it doesn't work, so now we are shifting to something that is very important and strategic for all of us. This is to understand the cultural diversity of the world. Public diplomacy must now be on the surface for cultural diplomacy in the world.

MURPHY: So governments do have a role?

SKALI: Yes, but not the leading role. People from all around the world must have this leading role, creating events, creating space to encounter, creating programs, real cultural programs and not propaganda from each side, of course, from every side. It is very sad that a lot of people in Muslim or other countries know only the superficial level of American culture.

MURPHY: Peter, what is your feeling about the role of govern-

ment/private sector in what Dr. Skali was saying? Do you agree with him or disagree?

AWN: I do agree. Would I love to see the private sector more heavily involved? Absolutely. But I do think that to get these processes going, government really ought to be involved on some levels.

MURPHY: In a secondary role?

AWN: Hopefully, yes. Because I really do think if you have cooperative ventures going, you're really looking at the experts in the field and not having it solely appear to be a government-sponsored operation.

MURPHY: There's a proposal [for a U.S.-funded Arabic-language television station] to compete with Al-Jazeera. I'd like to address this to you, Mr. Kleinman. The question is: Should these funds be spent, perhaps in cooperative educational ventures instead, such as the ones Peter suggested?

KLEINMAN: I believe that both the House and the Senate, with the supplemental that was passed yesterday, have fully funded a satellite television channel for the Middle East. When you say “to fight Al-Jazeera” you make it sound like it's an all-news channel, which it's not going to be. It's going to be a channel, which has news and also has other cultural, informational and educational-type programs—what you would consider not super-highbrow—but a combination, a television channel that you would, if you looked at it, say, “very interesting,” brain food.

MURPHY: How much money is being proposed to spend on this?

KLEINMAN: Sixty-two and a half million dollars. That involves capital expenditure and then operating expenses. I will say something about television in the Middle East. ... The reason that “Seinfeld” is on television there, and all the American knock'em-sock'em movies, and “How to be a Millionaire,” is not because the United States is putting that stuff on television in the Middle East. In fact, it is the governments in the Middle East who control virtually all of the television that is not controlled by families that are connected to the government, that are purchasing these programs. They're putting them on because they get the highest ratings. I would also add that—which I'm sure everyone in this room knows—Al-Jazeera is a government channel, as is Egyptian state television, as was Iraqi state television, and one of the things that is kind of a slippery slope when you start getting non-democratic governments involved with cultural things of that sort is they're not always as independent as we would like them to be. I do think there are arguments, by the way, for having exchanges, for spending money to work with local Arab media. The BBC tried it. They had connection with NBC, which is Saudi-owned. That fell apart. The United States tried it at one point. The problem is that everything works very well when we're spending the money and everything is working fine, and when there's something that somebody doesn't want on the air, then it becomes a problem. So we're not dealing with a free media environment. I believe it was the Heritage Foundation—I could be wrong on this—that rates press

in all areas of the world, and the least-free press of anywhere in the world was in the Middle East.

MURPHY: Samer, what do you think about this proposal for a U.S.-funded Arabic-language television station?

SHEHATA: I think it's an incredible waste of resources. I wish the money would go to real public diplomacy efforts, real, substantive public diplomacy efforts that provide tangible benefits to people. For example, sending a jazz group to tour the Middle East, more Hubert Humphrey and Fulbright scholarships, educational initiatives, funding English-language learning in primary schools. Is there a better way to endear yourself to the parents of a student than to provide education for their children?

Al-Jazeera is just as good as any of these cable stations or CNN. It's not inherently propaganda. It's not anti-American.

Let me just say one other thing about the Al-Jazeera. It's incredible, the obsession with Al-Jazeera in this country. People are fixated. I'm quite frankly sick of people who don't speak Arabic, who haven't watched the station, slam it. Al-Jazeera is not any worse than MSNBC or CNN. I watch Al-Jazeera. I watch it regularly. I watch it in Europe, here and in the Middle East. Of course, Al-Jazeera has a particular perspective and that perspective is more interested in the suffering of the Iraqi civilian population than it is in how many people fit nicely into an Abrams tank and how many miles per gallon it gets. But it is not inherently anti-American, by any means. In fact, before 9/11, all of the writing and all of the work about Al-Jazeera in this country was pro Al-Jazeera: “Al-Jazeera—it's criticizing all of the Arab states.” “60 Minutes” did a show on this. Every single Arab country has lodged a complaint against Al-Jazeera because it reports things that the Egyptian television is not going to report or that Jordanian television is not going to report. Al-Jazeera is just as good as any of these cable stations or CNN. It's not inherently propaganda. It's not anti-American.

Also, let's examine the model of the Arab media consumer that we're using to trash Al-Jazeera. The model is a passive receptacle that sits in front of Al-Jazeera consuming everything uncritically—anti-Americanism, as it were—and then it having a result. That's nonsense. Consumers of media in the Arab world, like here, are critical. They have brains. They realize that different things have different perspectives and different lines. That's why I read *The Washington Post*, but I also read the *Guardian*, as well as the Arabic press. People in the Arabic world are similar, so we have to examine the assumption and get over the obsession with Al-Jazeera. Real public diplomacy can have some impact; it's not the magic bullet. It's policies that are primarily important, but let's do real public diplomacy as opposed to the stuff that really isn't going to get us anywhere.

KLEINMAN: I was not trashing Al-Jazeera. I was merely stating that they were government-supported. I think that is an example, by the way, of the fact that a government-supported television does not necessarily have to be, as you used that example, like Egyptian television. I also happen to agree that we need to spend a tremendous amount of money as well on public diplomacy. The biggest tragedy of 9/11, which no one has mentioned here yet, is that students are not coming to the United States from the Middle East. That has been cut off. Not just because of our government but because parents don't want to send their children here. I cannot tell you how many people I ran into in the Middle East who were educated here and then go back there. They may or they may not like us; they may or they may not love us, but the people who come and study here at the very least have some understanding of the reality of America. That's extremely, extremely important, and it's one of the big tragedies of 9/11 that that has stopped.

MURPHY: I'm going to direct this last question to Peter because you've had the most experience in different parts of the Islamic world. I want to step out of the Middle East for the moment. Can you tell us your opinion of where you think American cultural diplomacy has been the most successful in predominantly Muslim countries? In which country or countries do you think it's been the most successful?

AWN: I really don't know. It really depends on the current political situation in a particular region. In the past, we had made enormous headway, but it simply was because the societies were more stable. Now that that isn't the case, to me, the ball game is totally different. So to say where we are currently being successful—I just don't see places where that's occurring to any great degree because we're looked upon with such enormous suspicion.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Kearney, student at the Columbia School of Journalism. Two items just concerning U.S. policy: Nicholas Kristof quoted a columnist for *Al-Hayat* in a recent column, saying, "Regardless of cultural diplomacy, it's the policy, stupid." What do various cultural diplomats feel about the fact that many people in the Arab world are not so gullible to believe that this is going to assuage their concern for the effects of U.S. policy in the Middle East? Secondly, in Paris, there's a museum, a beautiful museum designed by Jean Nouvel, called the Institut du Monde Arabe. It's a very sophisticated, well-funded museum devoted to the Arab world. Somehow I have a very hard time imagining such a museum in Washington, D.C. Why is that? And will that change?

KLEINMAN: To the "policy, stupid" question: Of course, American foreign policy is a major component of our relationship with the Arab world. The question is, do we therefore do nothing, and do we let the entire dialogue between America and the Arab world only be over our foreign policy? Clearly, Americans have an issue with what they perceive to be, let's say, "Islamic extremism"—I'm just taking a buzz word. Is that the whole, is that 100 percent of what our feelings are, or could be, or should be about the Arab world? We're trying at Sawa and at other things, and the people at this table, if you want to—I'm not going to say, "in spite of

American foreign policy" but—even while that continues, we've got to keep on trying to connect. We've got to keep on trying to find things where we have something in common. Otherwise it's just going to be hopeless.

SHEHATA: I agree that policy is most important, and that's what I've been saying. Nevertheless, public diplomacy is very important and it can actually help. It can affect different segments of that population that we're trying to factor or influence or target, if you will, but it has to be done properly.

The problem is not American people; it's not American culture; it's not our educational institutions; it's not Madonna. Those things might bother Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda folk, but for the vast majority of people, that's not the issue. The polling data actually says that. One poll I have here in front of me says that over

I think there was a complete meltdown within the government itself, the highest levels of the government, in the lead-up to the negligence, as someone had said, at best, in connection with the museum in Baghdad.

50 percent of people in five Arab countries—Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates—viewed American freedom and democracy very, very favorably. They realize the political freedoms, the civil rights, all of those things that we have here. They would love to send their children to Disneyland; they would love to come here and so on. The Institut du Monde Arabe question is very, very good. Maybe it's a residual Orientalism in the United States, broadly, that makes something like that less imaginable. It would be wonderful if something like that could be established in the United States, an educational and cultural institution.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ken Jones, and I'm the executive director of the New York Foundation for Architecture. Last night I was watching "Antiques Roadshow," and there was a woman and her mother on TV, and they were talking about a vase that the father had "liberated" from France, when he was in the U.S. Army during World War II. Your conversation today made me think: How do you feel about encouraging our cultural institutions in this country to return some of the artifacts that have been "liberated" from countries overseas?

AWN: That's a snake. The museum people will really get on my case. I think it becomes an impossible task. Can one do something in terms of a symbolic gesture? Yes. But are the Elgin Marbles going back to Greece? The answer's no. What we see is that collecting is based on economic development. I can remember how appalled some of the Europeans were, and Americans were, when the Japanese started buying up 18th-century European textiles and

frocks to establish costume museums in various parts of Japan. It seemed totally incongruous that they'd be outbidding the British government on an Elizabethan dress or bodice. There is, to me, the concern that objects not be looted and sold on the black market. And the amount of Afghan material showing up in this country is extraordinary—Afghan Buddhist material. ... So it's not just Iraq. The Afghan war created another whole series of clandestine art markets. To me, controlling that ought to be our first cooperative effort, to help people to preserve their cultural identity.

MURPHY: Best done bilaterally, or at the United Nations?

AWN: I would hope the U.N. would be heavily involved in something like that. But it needs some teeth; it really does, in terms of legal sanctions for people who are caught doing it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name's Jim Fitzpatrick. I'm a lawyer from Washington involved in the arts community and also a member of the board for the Center for Arts and Culture. I think there was a complete meltdown within the government itself, the highest levels of the government, in the lead-up to the negligence, as someone had said, at best, in connection with the museum in Baghdad. The government was indeed warned. I was part of a group that went first to the Defense Department and identified sites, hundreds of sites, including the National Museum. The Defense Department was basically identifying sites around the country that were of high cultural value. The group that went included the World Monument Fund, the head of the American Association of Museum Directors, senior people in the arts world and a leading archaeologist who knows Iraq backward and forward. In the afternoon, we met with the State Department, and the people were worried about civil authority post-Saddam and urged the State Department to create an additional working group, dealing with material culture, which they did. And we talked about the necessity of guarding the museum. We offered the assistance of the American museum community—

MURPHY: Did this get communicated to the Pentagon?

AUDIENCE MEMBER (JIM FITZPATRICK): Yes. The State Department and Defense were talking. The museum community wanted to help with conservation, restoration of the museum system and providing American resources as a palliative. Then we come up to the time of the actual crisis in the last 96 hours. I talk about a meltdown. You had, at the highest level of the State Department, apparently a complete inability to convince the Defense Department, which was well about guarding the Oil Ministry, to send the troops to the museum. Indeed, we got calls asking, almost in desperation, "Can anybody get in touch with the senior members of the administration?" We talked with Wolfowitz and with Scooter Libby, who was the senior assistant to Cheney, all without benefits.

My question is this: The State Department now has an opportunity take a very strong initiative in terms of getting the cooperation of the American museum system, the auction houses, dealers and so forth, in terms of getting materials back. There are procedures under the government in terms of keeping stolen materials

out of this country, which is what this material is. ... I'm wondering if the panel agrees that the State Department, in light of the earlier problems, should undertake aggressive efforts in this regard.

SHEHATA: Sure, I agree with you. They're concerned with Syria right now, if I'm not mistaken.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yesterday Afghanistan, today Iraq, tomorrow Syria.

AWN: I would say that's an essential thing to do, but to presume that the museum community can fund a great deal of this is naïve, given the state of museum finances in the current economy—that most are facing serious deficits. Will they provide expertise? Will they provide as much onsite assistance as they possibly can? I would think the answer would be yes, but the money's got to come from somewhere else.

KLEINMAN: Clearly, we bear some of the responsibility for what happened there, and we have a responsibility to do whatever we can. But this is not an isolated incident. This didn't just happen in a vacuum and is perhaps indicative of the whole place of culture in our country and how we regard national treasures of ours and other people. This is not just something that happened; it happened in a context.

SKALI: We have to be careful not just now—after the destruction—to consider the rebuilding of Iraq through this issue of the museum and things like that, a very important thing. Museums are built by people and managed by people, so we have to manage how to re-give to the Iraqi people the power to do what they want to do, to help them assuredly, but to give them the freedom and the power to rebuild their country, including this cultural side.

MURPHY: One of the big problems here, and I think that Mr. Kleinman alluded to it, is that if we try to help the Iraqi people do this under a regime that is like most regimes in the Middle East now, the government would want to control that cooperation. The government would be saying, "You must help the museum through us, and nobody else." Now this is what apparently the U.S. government is hoping to break in Iraq by installing at least a more representative regime with a bigger space for civil society because it's only in civil society that these cooperative cultural ventures are going to work.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Max Anderson, director of the Whitney Museum of American Art and the president of the Association of Art Museum Directors. I was with Jim at the Pentagon and at the State Department some months ago, and wrote an op-ed piece in *The Washington Post* in November, urging that the museum be protected, which led to our meeting. The article was co-authored with Ashton Hawkins. To Mr. Kleinman: I'm concerned a little bit about the "context" statement. The context I know is that an institution, which was by all accounts the richest trove of antiquities for the region, was in jeopardy, and the Defense Department decided, in variance with what we were told

some months ago, to ignore the situation. As museum directors, we had a board meeting yesterday to talk about the situation, and we expect to be very much active and hope to supply a mechanism, a mechanism both in fomenting the creation of some funds to provide for those who return artifacts and for amnesty, which is as important as a fund. What context do you feel makes this separate from or not-distinctive as an unusual circumstance?

There was discussion of branding and talk about sales and market research and so forth. For cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy we may need to think of a different language to use, because America isn't a commodity.

KLEINMAN: First of all, I agree with your efforts. I think it's totally appropriate, and I would totally support it. What I was referring to was the fact that in our country, as someone said, "They were worried about the oil wells." And that the problems that you and other people are having—getting the attention of our society in terms of protecting this art—is part and parcel of a whole attitude toward culture in the United States, which results in under-funded museums, etc. I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm saying, you look at this, and you can say, "It's horrible, it's terrible." And I can give you some other things, maybe not quite so bad, but it happens in that same context. It doesn't excuse it at all.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (MAX ANDERSON): Thank you. I did want to assure you that the museum community is actively engaged and organized, and we hope to have something to contribute soon.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Larry Blumenfeld. I'm a freelance writer, and I focus very much on music. For those of us old enough to remember eclectically formatted radio stations in the United States, that 50-second promo for Radio Sawa was really provocative. I have two questions: one for Mr. Kleinman and one for anyone on the panel related to Radio Sawa's music formatting. The first question is: Who is doing the programming, selecting the American and Arabic music, and what is their criteria? The larger question for anyone else is: It's clear who your demographic is, and it's clear that you're working with commercially popular music for the most part—or it seems that way—and that's logical in terms of the target market, considering that I bet that many of us in this room look away from commercial radio (and toward NPR and other places) with disdain not just for the actual content but the cultural content of commercially popular music in the West. Is this well-aligned with your larger goal?

KLEINMAN: The first question about programming: Our approach was to create a radio station that was connected to its

audience, which is something that is unique in the Middle East. In most radio stations in the Middle East, you have whoever happens to be at the radio station—sometimes it's a sheikh who owns it; sometimes it's a businessman; sometimes it's just the guy who happens to be program director—he picks whatever music he wants. It is very common for record companies to purchase plays on the radio in the Middle East, etc. We decided to do a radio station that was research-based, which is very similar to what is done with many commercial radio stations in the United States, in the sense that we use one of the top American research companies, and we literally go out and we research all of our basic music. We spent months and months and months doing this. Then we conduct actual research about current music in Amman, Cairo and Abu Dhabi every week. And so this gives us a handle on what music is popular with the target audience we want to reach.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (LARRY BLUMENFELD): Who are the "we" doing the research and selection?

KLEINMAN: There's a company called Edison Media out of Somerville, N.J. They are one of the major American research firms in terms of music and radio positioning research, and they subcontract out to the top research companies in the Middle East to execute the actual research because the local Middle Eastern companies are more aware of the cultural issues involved and how to get the research executed. The second question as to whether we should be a pop-radio station or an eclectic NPR radio station or an all-classical music radio station or a jazz station: One makes one's choices. We were asked, based upon U.S. taxpayer money, quite frankly, to reach a large audience, to reach the broad audience of young Arabs under the age of 30, and that's what we're attempting to do. That doesn't mean that other types of radio are not valid or couldn't be very good. If you ask me to reach 60-year-old males, university-educated, I'd do a different radio station.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (LARRY BLUMENFELD): If I may, while I respect what you said, as a marketing-strategy that makes sense, but since the motive here is not to sell records, as commercial radio is or to sell advertising, does that choice of programming align well with your actual purpose, building an understanding?

KLEINMAN: Yeah, look, most people will tell you, and Samer has quoted some research, about the tremendous anti-American feeling in the Middle East, and this is true particularly among young people. The difficulty is normally when you ask, "What's your opinion of the United States?" you don't get a cultural answer; you get a political answer. So when you look at the research, there's a lot of admiration for some things American, but when you say, "What do you think about the United States?" people don't like the United States. Even Radio Sawa listeners, over 50 percent don't like the United States, but that's less than the population in general. If we are not communicating and connecting with people who don't like us, what are we doing? All we're doing is just spending taxpayers' money to get the people who already like us, and that doesn't make any sense. So we've got to engage with people who are skeptical of us, and it's very, very, very difficult. If

you've ever walked into a room to face, face-to-face, someone who you know really doesn't like you, and you have to try and talk and establish a relationship with that person, that's not easy. It's not always as successful as you would like it to be, but we have to try. Because if we don't try, the only thing out there would be the policy, and everybody agrees that would be terrible.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Bianca Baumler from the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy. In discussing the most effective ways of furthering cultural diplomacy, we've talked about Fulbright programs, we've talked about bringing jazz musicians, often versus, or maybe in addition to, or better than or worse than, U.S. government-funded television in the Middle East. One thing I think of, though, when I think of Fulbright programs and jazz musicians is: Who benefits from this? It's definitely a very small, small proportion of the populations we're trying to reach. It's a very elite part of these populations. It's probably not going to get to the poorer parts and larger parts of the population. What does all this do if it's not linked to some sort of economic development programs? My question is: Is there a link, should there be a link, with economic development, and what can cultural diplomacy do without more of a solid economic basis?

KLEINMAN: I'll address one quick part of it, and that is the question about whether you spend a lot of money getting to a relatively small number of people or a large number of people. One of the things we're trying to do with Sawa and with Middle Eastern television is not just get to the elite, but get to the broad masses.

SKALI: It is sometimes a very small event somewhere that has very great and intense strength of symbolism and could then be spread all over the world by the media. In Fes last year, we had gospel from New York, and more than 50,000 people were clapping. It has been recorded on CNN and then spread all around the world. That, I think, could be a very, very strong thing. We have to keep

in mind that what is very important in our time is the connection between media and cultural diversity. It could give another impact to the meaning of this cultural diversity in our world, because of the media precisely.

SHEHATA: I was actually asked to speak to some members of Congress last year about some of these issues, and we've advocated things, like primary-school education and so forth, that obviously reach much larger audiences than Fulbright. Things like collaborative training programs for not only archaeologists but people involved in hotel managements and tourism and so forth. I think those things are important and would certainly reach a larger audience. The other thing I'd like to say, to end with, is I'm uncomfortable with the language of marketing and some of the language of capitalism. Yesterday there was discussion of branding and talk about sales and market research and so forth. For cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy we may need to think of a different language to use, because as John Brown said, and others: America isn't a commodity. Hopefully that's not the type of exchange or model we're thinking about. I would think that there'd be more reciprocity and that the goal would be mutual understanding as opposed to profit, as it were. Maybe if we try to find a different language to use also—one that is a little removed from marketing, sales and branding—it would get us some place.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (HELENA KANE FINN): I'd like to make a point that Fulbright does not exist just to benefit the individual professor. When that professor does research here and goes back to his country, he writes books, he goes on television and he influences generations of students, thousands of students. So this is not just to benefit the individual, and it works the other way, too. We send someone out to Morocco or Egypt or Turkey, that person comes back here and is an enormous resource for our students and our culture. So don't get the idea that Fulbright is some sort of elitist project; it is not.

Culture as a Tool of Statecraft: Case Studies

MODERATOR:
CELESTINE BOHLEN,
culture writer,
The New York Times

PANELISTS:
DAVID DENBY, *film critic*, *The New Yorker*
RICHARD FORD, *Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist*
DAVID FRAHER, *executive director, Arts Midwest*
FELIX ROHATYN, *president, Rohatyn Associates,*
and former U.S. ambassador to France
CYNTHIA SCHNEIDER, *professor of art history,*
Georgetown University, and former U.S. ambassador
to the Netherlands

ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ

(Deputy Director, National Arts Journalism Program):

The concept of cultural property and patrimony was conspicuously raised in the last panel. I'm happy to say that four years ago we organized a major conference on that subject on this very campus called "Who Owns Culture?" We do have a publication based on it, and it's available at our Web site, www.najp.org.

We already saw in this last panel a wonderful mix of passions and ideas and practical suggestions, and it is in that spirit that we proceed now. Some of the words sticking in my mind from the last panel are the idea of "passive" cultural diplomacy, as distinct from aggressive or proactive cultural diplomacy. I like the expression "spaces of interaction," which was also used—places where people can gather and do what they do. And we heard some interesting new ideas about how we can be preemptive in other respects when it comes to safeguarding the cultural treasures of the countries that are involved in military conflicts. Perhaps there are new organizations, institutions or aspects of our armed forces that should be thinking about these issues, going forward.

What is evident from these past two days is that, of course, cultural diplomacy is a target of opportunity, not just for our government institutions, but also for our private funding institutions, since they already shoulder so much of the task of cultural management in this country. In this respect, there is indeed an enormous opportunity. We recently concluded a study that shows that of the 50 largest private philanthropies in America, less than 0.2 percent of their combined funding goes to this area. And of these 50 largest foundations, the cultural-exchange programs targeted at the Middle East add up to less than the price of a decent one-bedroom apartment in New York City. So there are opportunities everywhere.

We finally come to our last panel, which is moderated by Celestine Bohlen of *The New York Times* who is soon moving to Paris to become Bloomberg's new diplomatic correspondent. Having surveyed the various aspects of our subject in the earlier panels, we hope that we can now come away from this conference with some very real ideas that others can carry forward in the months and years ahead.

BOHLEN: I'll quickly introduce everybody, many of whom will be known to you by their names and bylines and the jackets of their books, as well as by their illustrious careers. First is Felix Rohatyn, who of course needs no introduction to New Yorkers as the hero of

our last fiscal crisis, but also a former U.S. ambassador to France. Also Cynthia Schneider, U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands from 1998 to 2001. Richard Ford, well-known author, Pulitzer Prize-winner and speaker on the circuit on behalf of the United States. David Denby, film critic for *The New Yorker* and also a participant in U.S. culture-abroad programs. David Fraher, who's executive director of Arts Midwest, which is a network of regional organizations throughout the Midwest that has been involved in international partnerships in the arts.

I've been a foreign correspondent for *The Washington Post*, but mostly for *The New York Times*. I'm also a foreign service child, so I can say I've spanned a lifetime of cultural programs abroad, starting with being a child in Moscow when my father was there as a diplomat. "Porgy & Bess" was brought to enormous success and was a great cultural eye-opener to Soviet audiences then. I returned to the Soviet Union only to sit in many a dingy dance hall and in tourist hotels all over the Soviet Union, listening to "I Just Called to Say I Love You" many, many different times in many, many different ways. I was amused when Radio Sawa introduced, saying, "American music interspersed with local music." That was going on on the other side of the Iron Curtain very successfully, I would say, even in the darkest days of the Cold War through the post-communist period when Russian and Eastern European television was swamped with American products from "Santa Barbara" to "Dynasty" to "Dallas."

So American culture had never been absent. The question is which culture, and what is it that we're trying to promote. That's part of the issue here, that the job of American diplomats isn't only to promote dancers and poets and musicians, but is on occasion to help Hollywood lobby against restrictions on foreign content on national television, say, in France or in Russia. And when they say "foreign content," they mean American content. There are laws in countries that say there should only be 30 percent of non-national product on the airways. So another job of the U.S. State Department is insuring that our culture at home is as open to foreign films, books, artists and opinions as we want other countries to be open to ours. The policy on visas in the last year needs watching as we see many well-known artists, who have struggled just to come to this country to do that which we are all in favor of—cultural exchange. Some of these issues are obviously not part of the U.S. government's job because we are in a country that promotes a free market, so what people want is often what they get, but, at the same time, I think that cultural diversity is something

that is a government mission. Today, we have people here who can talk to us about what it is they believe should be done, has been done, what they've promoted in terms of these goals.

ROHATYN: It's a great pleasure to be here with my colleague Cynthia and be here at this wonderful university. When I came to Paris as ambassador to France, I had no idea, even after the training program that you have at the State Department, what you do when you're an ambassador. By the time I got to Paris, I still didn't know what I was supposed to do as ambassador, although I knew I wasn't supposed to make Franco-American policy. That was left to the State Department, to the heads of state. So you start looking around at what can you do, and you find you can do almost anything as an ambassador, as long as you're staying within the guidelines of American policy. From that start we got into all kinds of things.

One of them was a museum-exchange program that my wife put together, but which was really an outgrowth of a philosophy of positioning the American embassy not in Paris, but in France, and getting into French culture on a broader basis in terms of where people live, in the regions with business, with mayors. We had an exchange of mayors. We had French, German and American mayors in Lyon, 30 of them, to talk about how you run cities, as how you run cities is part of the culture.

We also diversified the embassy. When I came to Paris we had two consulates. One in Strasbourg, because of the European parliament, and one in Marseilles, because we used to have a fleet down there, which we didn't anymore, but we still had the consulate. But we had nothing. We had closed Bordeaux, we had closed Lyon, we had closed practically everything in France, and we were there in a country of 60 million people with an embassy in Paris with 1,000 people, and nothing out in these big regional cities. So we decided to go out to the cities, my wife and I, and we saw a hugely wonderful market, not for product, but for explaining to people who we were. What is America? How do we function? What do we think? So we opened up, one after the other, over the great objections of the State Department as a matter of fact, six consulates, which we called "American Presence Posts" because they were tiny. We took one foreign service officer, two foreign service nationals, and we put them in Bordeaux, in Lille, in Reims. My greatest ally, to whom I will give everlasting credit on this, was Senator Jesse Helms, who understood what we were doing. We were doing what any big American multinational company does, which is to decentralize and to go where our customers are. Our customer essentially was French public opinion. By doing that we made friends with mayors. We made friends with local media. We made friends with local business. We made friends with local politicians who went to Paris twice a week, and we made friends with American business.

After we had created these six or seven new American Presence Posts in the major regional cities of France, I asked my wife—because by then we had a business initiative, we had a mayoral initiative and my wife is the eleemosynary part of our family—and she came up with the idea of having a museum-exchange program, putting together nine regional museums in France with nine regional museums in the United States, and not including Paris, and not including Washington, D.C., and not including New York

City. She started on that course with the director of the French museums and with a young man who worked for the Sara Lee Company, who had been the curator of the Dallas Museum. His name was Rick Brettell. We started on this program that involved two totally different cultures: One is the culture of the French museum, which is all-government, all Napoleon, all centralized, and the culture of the American museum, which is all private, all decentralized and having nothing to do with the government except to try to get a little money from the National Arts Foundation, etc.

These 18 museums—in the United States starting in Portland and ending at the Yale Museum, and in France beginning in Reims and finishing up in Montpellier—over the last four years have had a series of remarkably successful joint exhibits, the first one being the week after Sept. 11 in Bordeaux. It was titled "Made in America." In Bordeaux, 10 days after Sept. 11, having a "Made in America" exhibit was a touchy thing, but it was spectacularly successful. We got Madame Chirac to help sponsor these from a French cultural point of view, and we had a group of advisors. We put up a little money, our family foundation and Sara Lee. The embassy probably put up a little travel money for a couple of people.

For four years we have had these exchanges, and they actually go beyond the exchanges themselves. I'm not an expert on art, so I'm just sitting in for my wife. She did this. We had an exhibit that came mostly from Minneapolis, which was called "Sacred Symbols," and it was about 4,000 years of American and American-continental artworks and pre-Columbian and things of that kind, which really had never been seen before in France. The result was that it became a place for schoolteachers to bring their students. We had—and continue to have—a huge amount of students that are coming to these exhibits. In fact, the program itself is developing a student-exchange program, just as we developed a curator-exchange program.

This is obviously just one piece of something. But what we did was to go to the local, to the regional culture of France. We went to the city culture. We went to the artistic cultures—one that is government dominated; one is private sector—and the arguments between these two groups at the beginning ... They were very passionate about what you can do, what the government should do, what the government shouldn't do, what a terrible thing it is for private people to finance culture because then it means that big corporations dominate what kind of paintings you show. ... In each one of these cities—and these eight cities we went to are now 80 percent or 70 percent of France—made a very big difference, combined with the fact that the biggest newspaper in France is not in Paris, it's in Reims. There is a paper in Reims called *Ouest-France*, and it has a circulation of 800,000 a day. If you take the three biggest Parisian newspapers, you get 250,000. You really have to go where you can connect up with the rest of the country, with their intellect, with their schools, with their media.

I don't think you need to snow people. I made a lot of speeches in France, and I never tried either to tell them what to do, or to indicate that I thought what we were doing was the answer to the maiden's prayer. I tried to tell them, "This is what we do. If you like it, use it. And if you don't like it, ignore it." We were trying to see what we could learn from being there. France is a highly developed, modern country with a long culture. If you're dealing in the

Middle East, or if you're dealing in Africa, or if you're dealing in a developing country, this might not work, or it would be very different. But for a developed country I think cultural diplomacy is really public diplomacy. It's having people understand a little bit better what you're trying to do and who you are. You don't need to do it by contracting with some ad agency to do a television film about how wonderful we are. I think we have very good, able, young foreign service officers who are usually in a big embassy in a capital. They're number 28 down on the list of the political section, and if you can just liberate them a little bit, send them to Bordeaux, tell them, "Write your own speeches; make your own mistakes; bring your two advisors with you and go do it." I think that is far and away the best way for America to connect up with cities and countries that think we're 80 percent B-2 bombers. That was just one aspect of something that we did, that I think worked pretty well.

In the Islamic world, this country must look like a nightclub that never closes, a kind of fleshly inferno, which obviously attracts some people and repels them in equal measure.

BOHLEN: Next, David Denby, can you tell us a little bit about your experiences?

DENBY: I will give a very brief account of my very trivial experiences during the Cold War period. And the triviality of them is part of the point, which was that there were thousands of people who were sent out by the USIS, principally, and the State Department in that period. I want to say at the end of this account, briefly, what I think the peculiar difficulties are at the moment of performing similar operations, explorations, in the Islamic world, and particularly the Arab world, because it's pressing down on us very hard.

I made two trips in the '70s. One I think you'd have to say was completely innocuous, and that was one I took near the end of the Vietnam War around '74. I trolled around the edges of the conflict lugging 16 mm prints of old American films to Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, as it was then called, and they were good entertainments intended to illustrate some aspect of American life. So "12 Angry Men" and Otto Preminger's "Anatomy of a Murder" served as jumping-off points for little discussions about the jury system and the legal system and so on. "Stagecoach" and "The Gold Rush" allowed me to talk about the frontier and the Turner thesis and so on. And there would be brief exchanges afterward, mostly very pleasant.

The second one was not so innocuous, and that was in 1978. The State Department in London organized a little tour of Eastern European capitals, and I convinced them without any real difficulty that we should show "All the President's Men" as an act

of enlightened propaganda for a free society. It turns out that, as you remember, the Soviet line was rather pro-Nixon, and he had been removed by four capitalists, who got into a room and decided he had to go. Of course, there were people with access to the BBC or Radio Free Europe or underground press and many, many other ways of leakage who knew there was a lot more to it. But the notion that two journalists could initiate a process that brought down an American president was an electrifying idea in Eastern Europe in 1978. We had some heady evenings, in Krakow at the Jagiellonian University. It was very difficult screening because the translator would have the script in front of him and have to do simultaneous translation during this very complex screenplay, during the movie. ... But the students were rapt. There were 800 students there, and a pin could have dropped and you would have heard it. And a fabulous discussion afterward.

There was one other moment in that little Eastern European tour that I remember, and that was in Bucharest, which in those days was a very dreary place. I went to the state-run documentary-film production unit, and they showed me their films, and I was really in for it—I saw noble tractors reclaiming Romanian soil with Mendelssohn on the soundtrack. Then we reassembled around a table, and there'd always be one guy at all these meetings in the Eastern bloc who never said a word, who was, of course, the party apparatchik who was keeping notes. The filmmaker said, "What did you think?" And I was polite and pointed out strengths and so on, and then there was a dead silence and then, "Yes, but what did you think?" I finally caught on, and I then launched into a much more vigorous discussion and said what was wrong with it and how boring they were, and I mentioned *cinéma vérité* and the documentaries by Frederick Wiseman and others. As it happened, the filmmakers knew about these films because they had access to them at the Berlin Film Festival, which was sort of the entry point for East and West. But I had fulfilled my role, which was to point out the inadequacies of their state-sponsored cinema in front of the state sponsor.

Now does this sort of thing make a difference? Does it ever go beyond righteous tourism and meddling? I think Mr. Rohatyn has already answered the question. I'm inclined to give the Cold War cultural ambassadors the benefit of the doubt. They were one tiny strand in an enormous process. But for years, people who would go to these things—and they're generally educated people, elites—heard and saw things from the State Department and the USIS that may have increased their dissatisfaction with communism as a system. And as the economies of those countries continued to weaken, life in the West seemed more and more appealing. Dissidents pressed their case. We know the end.

I think we were successful exactly as Mr. Rohatyn says because we did not engage in overt selling of America. That wasn't quite our job. To be most effective we had to exercise our craft, whatever it was, and to *be* Americans. That is, we had to stand there and be reasonably well-informed and to answer questions, a friendly, well-informed American embodying a free society, being a free person, and if necessary at times disagreeing with American policy. Can we do the same thing? Obviously, it's going to be much harder. We shared perhaps more with the Poles and the Czechs and the Hungarians than we do with the Iraqis or Yemenis or Syrians. How do we explain or present such core Western values as

pluralism and secularism? We do not believe that life has any single end, any single goal, an over-arching purpose that reconciles everything and under which all other aspects of life must be subsumed. We believe that religion has its realm and its truth, and science has its realm and truth, and literature and the arts have theirs, and government administration is important, but that private associations and private entrepreneurial and business activities and the universities are just as important.

Each of these areas exists side-by-side, jostling each other but not, in the end, subordinating any of the others. And despite this and despite that, we are a complicated people who live with many different goals. We are not necessarily lost in great numbers or confused or incoherent. All of this, of course, is the opposite of fundamentalism. I'm not sure we can speak to fundamentalists with any success since pluralism is, I think, anathema. But there are obviously many people of moderate temperament in the Arab world who may believe some version of this, or certainly understand it, and we can make certain practical arguments.

The Arab countries are no longer isolated and haven't been for a long time. They live in a world, whether they like it or not, with many, different powerful systems impinging on them. In other words, they have to recognize the value of other beliefs—not embrace them, not convert to them, but recognize their force. Otherwise, they're going to get brutally shoved around by systems more powerful than their own. We can imply that our wealth and our power have something to do with secular education and unfettered exchange of information and transparency and the emancipation of women and all the rest. We do it again, as I say, not by boasting or exhorting, and certainly not by presenting them with a pre-processed film with smiling Americans or branding ourselves, but by showing up, by Americans showing up—a friendly, decently-informed American, standing on his own two feet.

How much do they know of us? Many people in the Islamic world, I suspect, know only the most commercialized aspects of our culture: Coca Cola, McDonald's and Internet porn, if that gets through, and the most spectacular and empty of our movies, which, by the way, are consciously being formed and made in many cases for such countries, less and less made for us. The shift of gross receipts in box offices has gone from 30 or 40 percent of the total to, like, 60 percent, so many of these big movies aren't made for Americans anymore. They're made for international audiences. But in the Islamic world, this country must look like a nightclub that never closes, a kind of fleshly inferno, which obviously attracts some people and repels them in equal measure, and maybe repels them because it so much attracts them. Look at Mohammed Atta and some of the others. We talk of freedom all the time, and what they see is license. They don't understand, necessarily, that liberty is also inextricably tied up with notions of order. They know MTV, but they don't know Jefferson and Madison and the Bill of Rights and the writ of *habeas corpus* and the rest. So there are other enormous differences.

Westerners are often struck by intellectual and emotional habits in the Arab countries—and now here's where it gets a little bit unpleasant—that to our mind, border on self-pity and blaming other people constantly for one's own problem. Syria has oil, for instance, and Israel does not. Yet Israel's per capita income is many

times that of Syria. Is Israel responsible for the woeful Syrian economy? I don't think it is, but it serves as a scapegoat for rulers who don't want their own inadequacies scrutinized. So how do we deal with, what is to us, an investment in being unconscious? How do we do that without explaining the value of a critical realism, without arrogance? I don't know the answer to that, and it's a very hard issue to broach because it speaks to the causes and the nature of belief itself. And any attempt to introduce the notion is going to be regarded not as an attempt to strengthen people but to undermine them. So it's going to take years. It's going to have limited practical benefit. Most of these cultural events at first will fail, I think. But I think we have to begin and keep at it. I certainly would have been very happy if after Sept. 11 there had been some Americans standing up in Islamabad or Riyadh or Damascus to say, for instance, that the widespread charges that the Israelis bombed the World Trade Center as a provocation are ridiculous, and by the way the last four interventions—in Kuwait, Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo—were all done on behalf of Muslims.

BOHLEN: And now David Fraher to talk about the microscope at the other end.

FRAHER: While this has been an incredibly stimulating conference, in many ways, I found it horrifically depressing, and I don't know if anybody else felt that way. But for me it's been horrifically depressing because I've heard a vast majority of speakers coming at this whole issue from a position of paranoia and fear in this drum-beat. I don't get this. I'm torn. Maybe because I'm working in cultural exchange on a daily basis and not thinking about it, but rather working in it, I don't feel that the same way. I feel much more positive, and I hope that you can also get some of that positiveness into your lives with this.

Secondly, I wanted to say that I heard a gentleman speak last fall from Canada, Laurent LaPierre, who's a senator in Canada, who said that as deeply committed as he is to Canadian culture and worried about globalism and the impact of globalism on Canadian culture, he was very, very committed to the notion of not having everyone tell the same story, but rather have everyone tell their *own* story and have the opportunity to be heard. What I've heard us talking about a lot is telling our story, but I haven't heard enough about listening to other people's stories. It's come up occasionally, but it hasn't come up a lot. So we're out marketing, marketing, marketing, export, export, export. We haven't listened yet, and unless we can listen, we're screwed. Unless we can fix the visa problems, we won't be able to hear very much. Another idea that we had in the back of the room: Maybe Halliburton could make the first contribution to the museum fund.

I'm supposed to be talking about a different perspective on cultural diplomacy or cultural exchange, and that topic is the role not of the federal government, but of the state agencies. I direct an organization called Arts Midwest. We are a nonprofit, regional arts organization. We are headquartered in Minnesota. We work with state arts agencies, state governmental, public-sector arts agencies, located throughout the heartland of the United States, but then also nationally as well on several projects. There are six regional organizations in the country. We cover all 50 states, and most of us are involved at some level or another in international programs.

During the course of the last 15 years, we've had at Arts Midwest deep and ongoing cultural exchanges with approximately 22 different countries worldwide. I want to emphasize a couple of points. One is "deep"—we spend a lot of time and a lot of effort and a lot of conversation getting to know people. And "ongoing"—we have relationships that we've been working on for 15 years. These are not drive-bys. This is not, "Let's take a dance company, and go to a particular city, do a performance, leave, adiós, thank you very much." This is a relationship. I think the gentleman from the British Council spoke this morning about mutuality. We try to approach it this way.

Arts Midwest and the regional arts organizations, because of our nature, work with state arts agencies. So when I talk about our projects, I talk not only about regional organizations but about state agencies, state governmental agencies. And the question comes up as to, "Why would states be involved in international programming, in international exchanges? They have enough to do within their own state borders." In thinking about this, what I've looked at is four or five different categories of rationale for a state agency to be involved in this, and I've broken them down. I'm going to run through them quickly and then come back and give you some key examples of programs that I've seen happen that I think are really intriguing and important kinds of programs that might offer a different approach and a different model to some of the relationship building we might go forward with.

One is economics. States are very concerned about economics, trade-development. Commerce has essentially passed the ball and said, "Hey guys, you're the governors. Build your own market." So states are concerned about that. Secondly, community building—community building at the state level and community building internationally. We'll come back to that. Third, education, both within the state and beyond the state. And fourth, believe it or not, altruism. There's actually some altruism still out there.

I'm going to quickly run through some examples. In trade development, states are concerned about building export markets, attracting investors to their state, attracting foreign business placement, foreign students and researchers, foreign tourism. They're actually interested, in some places in the country, in immigration, in trying to have more of it, not less of it. States that work in this area, and I would use the Pennsylvania Council on the Arts as one example, are actively involved with their state trade office, with their governor's office in developing state trade missions so that there's a cultural component to every trade mission that goes out. And oftentimes the cultural components lead the mission so that there's an interplay on an ongoing basis. Pennsylvania even is concerned about raising and creating new markets for their artists abroad, separate and distinct from playing a role in supporting trade in other areas. We're doing an extensive amount of work right now, actually, with Pennsylvania in Japan with support from the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and building an ongoing network there.

In community building, an example is a project that one of my colleague organizations, New England Foundation for the Arts, has been involved with for 10 years. It's out of their Newcomers Program, where they work with the state arts agencies in the New England region and the Cambodian community that had immigrated into New England following the devastation of the wars in

Cambodia. Over the course of this period of time, by working first with the newcomer community in New England and then identifying cultural resources still present within Cambodia, they have worked to rebuild an entire tradition of the royal dance, within Cambodia and within the United States. They saved the culture. They also built an important component within their own community in New England, which helped to install a greater sense of pride and belonging for that newcomer community within New England. So people in New England learned about Cambodia. They learned about the people from Cambodia living in New England, and in Cambodia, they got their culture back; they got their dances back, and they got opportunities to learn back. Last year the Cambodian dance company did a tour in the United States, and we've begun this process of expanding that learning out into a university basis as well.

In education I would look at two different approaches. One is the concept of creating a generation of students in the United States that are more knowledgeable about global cultures and their place in the world. Even if it's being able to pinpoint a county on a map, it would be a nice thing. We're really actively committed, and the states that we're working with are actively committed to understanding that kids need to know what the world is about. One of the ways to understand what the world is about is by learning about cultures. We run a program called the Midwest World Fest out of our office that brings in performing artists—next year from four different nations—for weeklong residencies, not in big market schools, but rather in schools in tiny little communities like Sioux City, Iowa, where they really don't have access to this knowledge and this kind of experience. We couple that with a huge in-depth curriculum, and the curriculum is integrated. It goes beyond issues around art and culture and gets to what I would consider *ci vitas*.

We actually have the founding documents, the documents of statehood of the countries we're working with, and have lesson plans for teachers to be able to work with students in a kind of comparative analysis of what are the values that are exhibited in the Declaration of Independence, as compared with the Declaration of Statehood for the Republic of Turkey. How do those values get expressed? How are those values realized in our societies, or not? We enter these kids, K-12, into really deep discussions that are then complemented by the performances from the artists coming through. Another quick example of education is a project out of the state of Ohio, where they recognized that the artists in their state can grow and learn by being in other cultures and other countries. So they've actively set up residency programs in nearly 20 countries worldwide where their artists can go, spend a considerable amount of time, learn something and come back. Last year I had the opportunity to hear a panel of about 20 of the visual artists who participated, talk about their experiences, and to see an exhibition of work that they created as a result of the residencies. It was remarkable.

The last project I'll just mention is a project that we worked on again with Ohio, called "Aspirations," which was an exhibition of Palestinian and Israeli photographers—not U.S. at all. It was an exhibition we created with a co-curating process of an Israeli and a Palestinian curator, that toured for approximately two years, until, unfortunately, the beginning of Intifada II, when all the programs were cancelled. But that was total altruism.

BOHLEN: Now to Cynthia Schneider, who was ambassador to the Netherlands, but is also a professor of art history at Georgetown University, so has two perspectives on this.

SCHNEIDER: I want to begin with some general ideas and then give you some examples of things we did while I was in the Netherlands. First of all, I found it was possible to leverage a lot, that is, leverage American performers, scholars, artists, already visiting the country, then to just glob onto them and appropriate them in a nice way for the embassy. I also found it very valuable to do things at the embassy and to show that it was in fact the U.S. government and our official presence that was honoring, supporting these visitors, who had actually been paid for by someone else, but we at least usually managed to give them dinner. And the

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other thing is know your audience, which has been said a lot, and in this case I was particularly fortunate because my field of specialization is 17th-century Dutch art, and that is kind of an unusual situation. But I was able to leverage that so that I could, for example, take members of the Dutch government through the Rembrandt exhibition, and they loved to brag about that—the American ambassador cared so much about their culture. In fact, the current Dutch ambassador—I bumped into him at the Mauritshuis one of my trips back to Holland—said, "I was just explaining to my friend that you taught me everything I know about Dutch art." That's the kind of win-win thing, which is great for me, but is also great for them, because even the Queen said to me, "We are honored that you know so much and care so much about our history." Obviously, I'm an exceptional case, but there's no reason that we can't teach our foreign service employees something more about the culture and the history of the countries that they're going to. There are several steps along the way of foreign service training where this could be done.

Let me give you an idea of some of the things we did, both long-term and short-term. Long-term, we had a millennium project in conjunction with Ellen McCulloch-Lovell's millennium White House project, which nationally was about rediscovering American history and culture. Internationally, it was about the embassies linking up with their home country for some kind of project during the millennium year. We chose the moment in history that was really the peak of Dutch-American relations, and that was, of course, World War II. We went out to the high schools, and involved high-school students—we had about 100 students—involved in oral histories of World War II using both American veterans and Dutch citizens who had been part of the

resistance, who had played a role during World War II. Our motivation was somewhat selfish in this because these memories of World War II are such a strong part of the Dutch-American relationship, but for high school students they're very distant. They have no connection to this at all in many cases, so we wanted to keep these good memories alive, as well as preserve some of these extraordinary histories. These students did the most amazing projects—videos, interviews, they had long, long Internet correspondence with their interview subjects. In the end there's a competition—the winners got to go for a week to America—judged by Dutch teachers. And we made a CD, so that is now part of the Dutch history curriculum in the high schools, this CD done by their own students.

Another opportunity for every American ambassador is to organize an exhibition at their residence of American art. If you're rich enough, it can be your own collection, or something that interests you or some connection between your country and America. I chose American artworks that had to do in some way with Holland, either contemporary, like de Kooning or earlier, such as Rembrandt Peale's great portrait of Thomas Jefferson. We then wrote a catalog for which we had help from Sara Lee in publishing. Then we could distribute the catalog to visitors at the residence, and I would always take them through. What they loved to see were the really tight connections between contemporary American artists and the Dutch 17th-century tradition, another link.

We were also involved with quite a few artistic performances. The largest indoor jazz festival in the world is the North Sea Jazz Festival, which takes place right across the embassy residence every summer. I innocently asked the first summer what the embassy did in connection with the jazz festival, and I was told that someone could get me tickets. I said, "But what do we do?" And the answer was nothing. This is an example of leveraging. There are hundreds of American musicians who come every summer to this festival, so we started a tradition of linkage with the festival. I don't know if they're keeping it up, but they did for a year. We would have a jazz-jam festival at the embassy residence with Dutch and American musicians. One year we tied it to Chicago because that was the theme of the jazz festival. We had the mayor of Chicago and his wife talking about Chicago and jazz; we had the Dutch and American musicians jamming together; we had about 500 people very informal, blue jeans, students to government ministers. We served chicken fingers and brownies, and I spoke for five minutes on why jazz is American, about freedom, spontaneity, risk taking, the individual. If you just make that little link—and this is kind of overused but—make it a whole American event, with the informality, the complete range of people there, and just remind people what's American about jazz, then I think that stays with them then, when they keep going to the jazz festival. Maybe some little thing goes on the next time they listen to jazz.

We also did more low-key, smaller things. I did a lot using films—that's not very expensive. "Saving Private Ryan" came out soon after I got there, and everybody, every embassy, did something with "Saving Private Ryan." I thought, rather than doing a big cocktail reception after the screening, I would try to use it in a more targeted way. I said to my protocol officer that I wanted to invite the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Dutch military and their wives, together with my military staff and their spouses. We would

go see the film and have dinner after and discuss it at the embassy. But this event kept never appearing on my schedule, and I kept asking, and it kept never appearing. Finally I said, “You think this is a bad idea, don’t you?” And my protocol officer said, “Of course I do. You can’t go to the movies in the afternoon with these people; this is impossible.” I said, “I really want you to do it. Please do it.” So she did, and we had an extraordinary experience, all 10 or 12 of us in the movie theater at 4:30 in the afternoon, and then going to the residence afterward.

We had an extraordinarily open discussion, and I insisted that the spouses speak as much as their partner. The Dutch heard each other say things they never knew they thought about. The Americans heard the Dutch say things. They really shared their most personal views about the meaning of war, the meaning of the military in today’s society, would they want their children to join the military, whose orders do you follow, what’s the point of it all. People talked to me about the “Saving Private Ryan” dinner right up until the moment that I left.

We also did more schmaltzy things, taking advantage again of what was going on. The movie “Pay It Forward” opened right when Secretary Colin Powell took over in the State Department, and we had long planned with Warner Bros. to do a big event on this movie. It was sort of a schmaltzy movie about doing good things in society. We decided to do something about philanthropy in both countries in connection with it. We had something about American philanthropy, and Dutch people talking about what they did in the Netherlands. And it suddenly occurred to me, about three days beforehand, that of course who was the most famous philanthropist in the new American government? It was the Secretary of State. So I quickly wrote the State Department and said, “Can I please draft a statement and have it be from him and read it at this opening?” Of course I got back the answer saying, “What a wonderful idea, but the next time you have an event with 400 people about philanthropy, give us a three-week warning, and we’ll be happy to help you.” I said, “There’s not going to be a next time. Here is the statement, please figure out some way to OK it.” Miraculously, they did. So I was able to read the statement from Secretary Powell about the importance of philanthropy in American society and what it meant. That was a front-page news story in the Netherlands, and they took it very personally—Secretary Powell personally greets the Dutch people in his first week in office. It cost nothing. It didn’t take that much effort. It pointed out connections and made a big difference to them.

We did that with other guests, Michael Graves, Richard Meier, Joel Cohen—lots of different guests who came. We would just have them to the embassy and put them together with architects, with musicians, whoever their Dutch counterparts were. To me, the saddest part was the number of times the person would say to me, “This is the first time I’ve ever been in an American embassy.” Including Richard Meier, who’d built the town hall in the Hague and spent months there. I think it would make a big difference if people would just take advantage of what’s there, in their country. It would help if there were a system to inform embassies of who is coming to their country, a centralized system—that would make a big difference.

I’m going to close by reading something from Thomas Jefferson. There have been lots of definitions, questions about what is cultural

diplomacy, and, as always, he already had it figured out in 1785. This is what he wrote to James Madison from Paris: “You see, I’m an enthusiast on the subject of the arts, but it is an enthusiasm of which I am not ashamed as its object is to improve the taste of my countrymen, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world, and to procure them its praise.”

BOHLEN: On that note, Richard Ford from another part of the country, the South, will talk about having been another kind of ambassador.

FORD: For somewhere now between 10 and 15 years, I’ve visited a variety of European countries with the support of the United States Information Agency, and, after that, the State Department. I’ve done this, on average, every couple of years—going to France and to Spain and to Norway and to Italy and to Finland and to Germany, and to slightly less usual places, like the Czech Republic after communism fell, and to Egypt as well. My activities during these visits were fairly uniform and as David said, benign. Typically, I delivered university lectures, mostly to students, and on issues that I thought were pertinent to contemporary American literature, or I gave public readings of my own work. I also sat for print and radio interviews on literary subjects and had conversations that occasionally turned to political subjects. Europeans, and indeed most nations except ours, think imaginative writers know something about politics, and have political consequence, and so could actually be worthy of being listened to.

Going to these places under the State Department’s insignia has meant a number of things to me, which I will briefly try to express. I always felt that going abroad, albeit under the State Department’s flag, was an opportunity for me to see something of the world and to learn something about it. I didn’t go abroad until I was 42 years old. I’m from Mississippi. I’ve written books now that have been translated into 23 languages, and so it has also been, frankly, an opportunity to advance my publishing interests, to meet readers, to meet other writers abroad. I heard John Romano say that mostly what we export is “Baywatch,” but we actually also export Don DeLillo and Jane Smiley, and even me.

Recently, however, I was involved in planning a State Department trip to a Latin American country. This is only in the past two or three weeks. But when the post communicated to me its expectations for my activities when I was there, the letter said I would be “promoting American values” in the host country. I quickly wrote back to say that were I to come—and I have since declined—I wouldn’t be “promoting” anything unless it was the books I had written and, by that act, promoting literature itself, I hoped. The officer at the post replied that her choice of words was perhaps, she said, unfortunate, but it was the necessary language, she said, for attracting support from higher-ups, and I shouldn’t take it too seriously or feel much confined by it.

I tell this, although this sounds ludicrous, because, as an official exchange, it was unique to my experience with the USIA, and quite unique in my experience since the USIA has been absorbed into the State Department. To my memory, no one at any point along the administrative way over the years has ever said to me what ought to be the substance, or what I should lecture about, or what I should say in readings, or what I should say anytime at all. I

think that though the Latin American officer I communicated with seemed to want to direct my behavior, she in fact didn’t. Hers was as much as she said, the language of bureaucracy—the language of a sort of bumptious statecraft—a language, however, I simply don’t speak. Our exchange is useful for characterizing, I think, my usual relations with this arm of the State Department, and for occasioning two or three small observations.

The concept of cultural diplomacy, ... is to me, the marriage of the amorphous to the satisfyingly ambiguous. No autodidact worth his mettle would miss the chance to look up both terms—diplomacy and culture. The nicest thing I found said about diplomacy can be summed up in the remark: “Diplomacy is the intercourse of nations with each other.” I assume no pun was intended by that. The by far more numerous and uncomplimentary sentiments expressly view that diplomacy is to do and to say the nastiest things in the nicest way.

The concept of cultural diplomacy is to me, the marriage of the amorphous to the satisfyingly ambiguous.

Culture, of course, the other word I needed to look up, is a word bandied about both loosely and sometimes fearsomely in our country, and almost always is employed to valorize, as academics used to say, one quadrant of human life, a belief and sense of what’s good, at the expense of another. So much so that culture’s origins—the origin of the word “culture,” the thought of what a culture is, its origins are in nurturing and Arnold’s notion of the best that can be known and thought in the world, the classless interest in perfection—that notion of culture has lost much of its useful potency in normal parlance. Culture has in essence been made adversarial.

Relying on none of these definitions, though, as I went abroad for the USIA and the State Department, did I consider myself a diplomat—cultural or otherwise. This of course isn’t to say the State Department, the USIA, the post and anyone in my foreign audiences saw me in any way but as a representative of the American society and government. To the extent that there is a discrepancy of self-image here—how I see myself, versus how I am seen—it is a discrepancy that is resolved in the spirit of Auden’s wonderful line, which I paraphrase slightly: “Literature makes nothing happen.”

The view has been, and continues to be, that people like me, novelists and poets and playwrights—in the general opinion of American society, at least, and specifically in the view of our government—don’t matter, frankly, very much at all. Real consequential American diplomacy is practiced either by experts or by well-connected and sometimes well-informed captains of industry and commerce. Mostly. But not specifically by artists, this conference notwithstanding. With this reason then, it wouldn’t be worth anyone’s time really to try to tell us writers what to do or what to say—or not to do or not to say. Because we’re not consequential enough to be even mildly annoying or provocative. Although if we

were consequential enough to be genuinely annoying or provocative, we almost certainly would not be chosen to go. This is not as self-abnegating or as resigned as it sounds. It only speaks to how American society and our government thinks of artists. I certainly don’t mean to express how I think of artists by that, or how I think of my own aspirations as a novelist by that.

I sort of hold by Kundera’s notion that novels are the fruit of the illusion that we can understand each other. And I don’t mean to express, by that my own intentions going abroad are in any way skeptical. They are in fact important reasons for going abroad, or I wouldn’t go. I think that no one like me can go to Egypt or Norway or the Czech Republic under the State Department’s banner without knowing that he or she will be viewed by audiences there but as some kind of artfully chosen specimen of American culture. It is simply for that individual novelist or playwright to define for his audience and for himself or herself what manner of specimen you will be. In this way our government’s relatively hands-off attitude confers a sort of existential freedom to us, really.

There will always be skepticism among foreign audiences about just what is the agenda of any writer coming to talk under the U.S. government’s auspices. No amount of fulminating against the Bush Administration, if that is your persuasion, as it happens to be mine, or general bona fides seeking willingness to fairly discuss our foreign policy, or talk about how America is viewed abroad, can succeed, in my opinion, in overcoming that skepticism. Thus, in a sense, one will be perceived as being involved in the intercourse of nations whether one wants to or doesn’t want to. This in fact is a precariousness one must really address if you go abroad—both in private and before you have to address it in front of a lot of people—because you *will* have to address that in front of a lot of people. In other words, you need, God forbid, to sort out what it is you’re doing and decide if you can stand up beside your own behavior before you do it. What I’ve done is merely to try and comport myself abroad as I would if I were in Ohio talking to the Elks Club. Though that may not be the best comparator, because probably the Elks Club wouldn’t want me as much as even people abroad do.

The specimen American that I am believes that I am not a typical American. Since most Americans aren’t privileged, middle-aged novelists. And I am not representative American, either, because the real culture in our country is much too diverse in race, in years, in wealth, in memory, for any one human being to be its apt representative. These things I always say because audiences abroad, on account of their distance from us and because they do know—or think they do—much of us by TV, are often in a dismayed way interested in what is a typical American. On that behalf, I am only willing to be an exponent of my own views, political or literary. And to the extent that I am insistently viewed to be a representative of America by my overseas hosts, what I always say is, I represent not American values, nor am I seeking to promote them, but rather I represent my personal human values, which I am simply free to acknowledge.

Though for countries and citizenries that only identify America with its leaders, this, who I happen to be, may yet convey useful information. The only other thing I do when I go abroad is I conduct myself as a writer. And what that means is, rather than doing

state's business, I do literature's business. I advocate that literature, not statecraft, is the supreme means by which we renew our sensuous and emotional lives and learn a new awareness. And that these means are the ones that *do* cause something to happen—not only what our statecraft should promote across international boundaries—but also that these means are at least as critical to the world's survival as any of those artificial boundaries that separate us will ever be.

BOHLEN: It was really such a great range of experience, knowledge, views, testament to good deeds well done, to thoughtful analysis of what it means to go abroad and be American, and in so doing to represent but not promote American culture. In a funny way, one of the things that we're really saying, the best thing, is to just be yourself and there shouldn't be any of this promoting and the branding and all the rest—that the best thing is to go to the small towns, to let a foreign service officer be himself, use the training that he's had to go and collect the people that come to the Netherlands, and let them show off who they are, and on down the line. I thought the experiences from the United States were almost the most telling of all—that there's an audience here that's willing to listen, just as there's an audience there that's willing to listen.

I have a couple questions. One is—the question of being yourself and doing your best, which sounds so corny, seems worth coming back to—to the two ambassadors. Do we think that the State Department is adequate to the task of training the people to be responsive in the ways that you've described? And then over to Mr. Fraher: Do you think that the State Department and other American agencies are sensitive to this question of cultural exchange when it comes to facilitating better, to helping people come here with visas? First, Mr. Rohatyn.

ROHATYN: I don't think anybody should go represent this country overseas without speaking the language. I think especially in countries like France or Germany or Italy or Spain. It's inexcusable to send people abroad who aren't fluent in the language because it makes the country feel that we're looking down on them, which is a terrible way to start anything. Secondly, we ought to do something very basic now in terms of cultural diplomacy. We should try not to lose what we've got, rather than trying to gain what we probably can't. We're rushing after public opinion in the Muslim countries, which is a really, really hard climb, and we're losing Europe. We had public opinion in favor of America two, three, four, five years ago in the 60s and the 70s, and in the last few months, we've had 70, 75, 80 percent of our European allies with public opinion that is dramatically against us. I think that should be our priority. I mean, we're people with similar values, with histories going back a long way, and maybe if we can't convince them to be with us, maybe we should begin to think about why they aren't. And that might also be a helpful exercise in public diplomacy. I don't think they're going to learn very much in Washington.

BOHLEN: Ms. Schneider, do you think that foreign service officers going over, or other people who are representing the government, are equipped in language, in cultural awareness?

SCHNEIDER: I just want to clarify something. People such as Felix and myself—political appointees—are allowed to go to the country without speaking the language. Neither of us did, but it is allowed. Foreign service officers always learn the language of the country. So all the career ambassadors always know the language of the country they're going to. But I agree with you that everyone should have to. For people such as us who come out of private life, they do what they can in two weeks to teach you, and then you just have to hope that we're smart enough to listen to the foreign service people in our embassies, and we don't do something terrible. It usually seems to work out. Or my employees would say, it worked out as much for political appointees as it does for foreign service professionals—just as many are good or bad in each category. For the foreign service professionals, I would just reiterate: They have several junctures along the way where they receive training in their career. And I wish very much for some form of cultural awareness—an understanding of how to use American culture and how to be receptive to the culture of the country they're going to, not country-specific—would be part of that training. For that to be the case, there would have to be an overall valuing of culture in the “tool kit,” as Madeline Albright used to say, of a diplomat. At the moment, and I'm afraid that in the past administration, too, that doesn't exist.

BOHLEN: The other part of the question is whether we're finding, in this period when we're feeling sensitive to foreign opinion, that we're sensitive to the needs of people who come here as artists or performers or novelists.

SCHNEIDER: I think that we've been fortunate to have worked with incredibly positive, constructive posts overseas, with both foreign nationals in the post who have deep knowledge and understanding of the situation—they've always been supportive—and with career foreign service officers. So I would say that to a certain extent we've had great support. Simultaneously, we also know that the structure and the underlying system, for instance, on visas, is not necessarily “How can I help you get into the country?” but “How can I keep you out?” That is the nature of the beast, and this is just ratcheted up even more so. Secondly, when it comes to the area of culture, there has been, especially over the last decade, maybe even 12 years, an underlying culture within the foreign service (and this really goes back to USIA days) where actually the review process for officers was not favorably disposed toward spending time on culture. In some posts or some regions of the world, it punished officers for spending time on cultural issues, where they would be flat-out told, “If you spend time on a cultural project, it will count against you during your review.” You cannot call that a favorable environment to work in.

BOHLEN: If that's not encouraged, what was encouraged? Spending more time ...

SCHNEIDER: On political issues, on economics issues, ... You could cut it off into education even. But do not go to culture.

BOHLEN: I'm wondering for both David Denby and Richard Ford, whether you think this current climate—again, where we're all suddenly very sensitive to the antagonisms out there, not that

they didn't exist before, but obviously everything's much more acute—whether this would somehow give you pause to go and do the kind of tours that you've done before. Not only because of fear of the audience, but also because of what you were describing, Richard, of people saying, “Your job is to come and promote something.” It seems that the two tendencies have gone hand-in-hand—the more antagonism, the more we're supposed to promote.

FORD: No, it wouldn't deter me that there was a greater degree of voiced anti-American spirit in another country. What would deter me is our government. I don't want to go over there and spend my time fielding questions for a government that I think is wrong. But as far as going someplace where what I say might make a difference to the things I care about—the fact that they don't like Americans, or say they don't like Americans—I mean, I wouldn't want to be stupidly just walking into the face of vicious, violent, hideous hostility in which I knew I was going to get killed, but, short of that, I would go.

BOHLEN: To this idea that the mission is changing, that somehow one has gone from just being an American novelist, who's talking to other people who are interested in literature, to being part of an ad campaign—David, you haven't done it in a while, I guess.

DENBY: I haven't done it in 25 years. And I don't want to be shot on my way back to my hotel, but I don't think that I'd be deterred, either. As long as the bombs are falling and the machine guns are going it's not the right moment. But when the atmosphere, one hopes, changes a bit—sure. It's an adventure. You can expect to get into tremendous arguments with people. You don't want to defend the government's policy. In fact, in some cases, you have to make it clear, if you're going under government auspices, that you have the right to criticize it if someone asks you. I did that 25 years ago. I said, “If someone asks me something, I'm going to say what I think.” They seemed to accept that. As I said before, you're taken as representative no matter what you say, no matter what denials you make. But the best thing you can represent is the nature of a free society by just standing on your own two feet and functioning as you would in a debate in New York and giving your opinion and answering as straight as you can. It would be a great adventure.

If we're going to reconstruct Iraq, it has to be done. The government has to tap into the vein of idealism in this country. If you're going to have thousands of hospital workers and civil engineers and schoolteachers and constitutional lawyers and all those people, they can't just be government people. They're going to have to get people like me. They're going to have to protect us to some degree, but they're also going to have to give us the freedom to be Americans as we want to best present ourselves.

FORD: Let me just add one thing. I don't think anybody really is asking novelists and playwrights and poets to go abroad and promote American values, at least not as I understand it. What that woman said to me was, I think, something that she misspoke. I think most people who practice this kind of vocation don't think that our culture is isolable enough, encapsulable enough, that we could ever go over and hand it over.

BOHLEN: Let's not forget there was a time when there was a blacklist on who could go, so politics has entered into that vocation as you called it before. The question is, are we at that stage again?

ROHATYN: I don't suggest that we try to change the minds of people, necessarily, but you can't be scared of having your own view. Now take one of the most controversial issues in Europe—the death penalty. The death penalty is a profoundly felt issue in Europe. It's a cultural issue; it's a conscience issue. At the same time back in Washington, people are very nervous about your going out to talk about the death penalty because some senators are very much for the death penalty. But you have to do it, and after a year of dancing around I gave an interview saying I was

I advocate that literature, not statecraft, is the supreme means by which we renew our sensuous and emotional lives and learn a new awareness.

against the death penalty. It made the front page of *Le Monde*. There was a big shudder in the State Department, but after that nothing else happened. We cleared up a big issue, and I think that is as much a part of cultural diplomacy as anything. I'm not going to give an opposite view to my government on the anti-ballistic missile treaty, or something like that, because that's not necessarily my thing. But take an issue like the death penalty, or the so-called election in Florida. On a Sunday, I was on the biggest talk show in France, expecting to discuss casually why Al Gore was elected president. When Al Gore wasn't elected president, I was there trying to figure out what to say. And the first question from the French reporter was, “Well, Mr. Ambassador, how does it feel representing a banana republic?” It went downhill from there. So you do have to be prepared, and if you can speak to them in their own language, it does help a little bit.

BOHLEN: Do you think that the foreign service officer that you say you sent down to Bordeaux on his own to, as you say, make his own mistakes, if he had been interviewed on either the election or the death penalty, could he have spoken his mind?

ROHATYN: On the election? No. On the death penalty? Yes, I think so. I think you can talk about it and explain its history in the United States without necessarily saying all of us are right or all of us are wrong.

BOHLEN: One of the things that's so hard abroad is how Americans support the arts. It's a complete mystery to much of the world, because in most of the world, particularly in Europe, it's just done in a completely different way. It's state-supported and this running around, having charity balls and raising money and sending out flyers and televised appeals—all these things are absolutely very foreign to them. I was wondering if you find your-

self, particularly Mr. Fraher, having to repeat the speech. How do you get this across? Do you find people becoming aware of it now, after many years of explaining?

FRAHER: No, because it's a little bit dynamic even in our scenario as to how things are supported, or not supported. So we actually do spend a lot of time trying to understand a lot of the operational support structures—either the ones we're working with overseas or explaining what we have operating here. We figured out different ways of approaching it, but ultimately that becomes less of an issue. The things that are always the biggest challenges are issues around language, nuance, time and the time you're willing to spend in the relationship. Those are the biggies. If you're not willing to go seven times and have coffee before you actually even broach the concept of an exchange, you might as well not go.

SCHNEIDER: Two quick thoughts on support: Our largest export is products from the aerospace industry. Our second largest is cultural products. Our government spends a lot of money, and I can testify that we spend a lot of man-hours, targeting the sales of those aerospace products. One of the things I did was to work on the joint-strike fighter, which the Dutch eventually bought into. But we spent virtually no money at all and very little time targeting those cultural products. They're just kind of an, "Oh, well, it's out there." That may be why people see mostly "Baywatch." If we put just the smallest fraction of the amount of money and time we put into aerospace products into targeting cultural products and even subsidizing some cultural products, I think it would make a big difference.

Secondly, my favorite thing on the differences in support is, at the cultural diplomacy conference held at the White House in 2000, I had a question from a French member of the audience. She said, "But I just don't understand it. We spend 1 percent—I think some phenomenal amount of our GNP on culture—and you spend nothing whatsoever, and yet everyone in France wants to go to American movies and buy American music." And I said, "Yes, and your question is?" That is a frustration.

BOHLEN: It reminds me of a joke, that the French do everything to support their film industry except go watch the movies.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Bruce Rosen. A possible opening for New York City and state because everybody seems to say that there's no hope at the moment in Washington, D.C. The city has nine or 10 comatose sister-city relationships. The only extant relationship that I know of is with the second largest art collection in the country, which is in Brooklyn, with its counterpart in Cairo. I'm wondering what opportunities are there.

ROHATYN: At least from what I've seen, these city partnerships, these twin cities, never accomplish much. Where you can accomplish things is if one city has a particular project that works with another city, whether it's a museum project, whether it's the Olympics, whether it's music, whatever. But there are twin cities all over the world. They have a little ceremony the first time. One mayor goes to the other, then you hardly ever hear of them again.

There has to be something more than just the idea of "We're twin cities." Twin cities to do what? I see substance in projects in cities that go with each other, and I think if those projects work, you can find financing for at least part of them.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'll be starting a two-year term in Tokyo, Japan, as a Rotary world peace scholar this coming summer. We've spoken a lot about the importance of cooperation, listening, and mutuality, and we've also spoken a lot about U.S. government programs. I was wondering why we haven't focused more on multilateral organizations to address cultural programs and if there are any that can provide us with a forum to continue this conversation so that we can perhaps—in concert with our friends, our allies and those around the world—work with them to build secure funding and to create mutually sponsored events.

FRAHER: One of the issues is UNESCO. There's a reason why we're not talking about it. That's because we haven't belonged to it for a long, long, long, long time, and we're just now getting ready to rejoin UNESCO as a dues-paying member. But even within that, there's a great degree of complication, and I think consternation, and a great deal of fear in the current administration about what that is, because let's face it—it's UNESCO; it's the U.N.; let's go down the list. The other piece here is that there are, at the governmental level, multilateral relationships that exist among Ministries of Culture, that again, because we don't have a Ministry of Culture, our participation in some of that dialogue is fairly limited, if not non-existent. So that becomes a little more complicated, too. Does that mean that there is no multilateralism? I think there are bilateral institutions, bilateral relationships. I think you find those more in the private sector. There is a ton of bilateral, and to a certain extent, regionally lateral, organizations.

BOHLEN: Do you feel or do you fathom that there may be some improvement if the teaching or the endorsing of human sciences in cultural operators would be promoted?

DENBY: Absolutely. But the most important thing for those of us who are going abroad is to learn how to listen and familiarize ourselves with where we're going and what we're doing. Americans, as many people have said, are astonishingly ignorant of the rest of the world. It's going to be a problem though, particularly in an Arab country. For all of the talk about multiculturalism in the last 20 years, multiculturalism has really been about us, not other cultures. That is what feeds into our mix. Something like a handful of American undergraduates actually graduated last year who had majored in Arabic—literally 10 or 12. That is an extraordinary scandal to my mind. And I don't think anyone should go abroad into the Islamic world without having grappled with the Koran, which is very, very difficult for Westerners in many cases, but is absolutely essential and is a virtually unknown text in this country. But there's a lot more to be said about this.

BOHLEN: We've said a lot. We certainly haven't said it all, but we should wrap it up and thank all of you.

BIOGRAPHIES OF "ARTS & MINDS" PARTICIPANTS

PETER J. AWN is Dean of the School of General Studies (GS) and Professor of Islamic Religion and Comparative Religion in the Department of Religion at Columbia University. Professor Awn has served as chair of the Department of Religion, chair of the Steering Committee of the Chairs of the Arts & Sciences Departments and chair of the Executive Committee of the Faculty of Arts & Sciences. Professor Awn's book, *Satan's Tragedy and Redemption: Iblis in Sufi Psychology*, received a book award from the American Council of Learned Societies. Professor Awn has received awards for distinguished teaching and research and has received numerous grants including a Fulbright and several grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

VOLKER BERGHAHN

specializes in modern German history and European-American relations. He received his M.A. from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in 1961 and his Ph.D. from the University of London in 1964. He taught in England and Germany before coming to Brown University in 1988 and to Columbia 10 years later. His publications include *Der Untergang des alten Europas, 1900-1929* (1999), *Quest for Economic Empir* (1996), *Imperial Germany* (1995), *The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945-1973* (1986), *Modern Germany* (1982), and *Der Tirpitz-Plan* (1971). His book *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* appeared in 2001.

CELESTINE BOHLEN has spent 15 of the last 19 years as a foreign correspondent, first for *The Washington Post* and then for *The New York Times*. She did three tours in Moscow, during three different phases of the transition from failed communism to struggling democracy, and was also the *Times* bureau chief in Rome from 1994 to 1998 covering Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Vatican, and in Budapest from 1989 to 1991, covering Eastern Europe. For the last three years she has been a cultural reporter for *The New York Times* based in New York and in June will be moving to Paris as European diplomatic correspondent for Bloomberg News.

JOHN H. BROWN, a Princeton Ph.D., joined the Foreign Service in 1981 and has served in London, Prague, Krakow, Kiev, Belgrade and, most recently, Moscow. A senior member of the Foreign Service since 1997, he has focused his diplomatic work on press and cultural affairs. Under a State Department program, he has, up to now, been an Associate at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, where he was assigned in August 2001.

TRISHA BROWN is founder and artistic director of the Trisha Brown Dance Company. A member of the Judson Dance Theater in the 1960s, Brown founded her own company in 1970. Brown has created a repertory including the Robert Rauschenberg/Laurie Anderson collaboration "Set and

Reset," "Newark," made in collaboration with Donald Judd, the classic, "For M.G.: The Movie," and "M.O." Her first opera production, Monteverdi's *Orfeo*, won the *Grand Prix* in 1999. Brown's latest choreography, "Geometry of Quiet," received its American premiere in December 2002. Trisha Brown is the first woman choreographer to receive the MacArthur Foundation Fellowship, along with five fellowships from the National Endowment for the Arts and two John Simon Guggenheim Fellowships. In 1988 she was named *chevalier dans l'Ordre des Arts et Lettres* by the government of France and in January 2000 was elevated to the level of *officier*. She was a 1994 recipient of the Samuel H. Scripps American Dance Festival Award and, at the invitation of President Bill Clinton, served on the National Council on the Arts from 1994 to 1997. In 1999 Ms. Brown received the New York State Governor's Arts Award. Recently, she won the National Medal of Art.

RICHARD W. BULLIET is Professor of Middle Eastern History at Columbia University where he also directed the Middle East Institute of the School of International and Public Affairs for twelve years. He came to Columbia in 1976 after undergraduate and graduate work at Harvard and Berkeley. He is a specialist on Iran and the social history of the Islamic Middle East and the author of *Islam: The View from the Edge* published in 1994. He is currently completing a book entitled *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization*. His earlier books include *The Patricians of Nishapur, The Camel and the Wheel, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period, and The Earth and Its Peoples: A Global History* (co-author). He has also written four novels set in the contemporary Middle East. His most recent book is a multi-authored collection of essays entitled *The Columbia History of the Twentieth Century* published in 1998 by Columbia University Press.

HODDING CARTER became president and CEO of the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation in 1998. For the preceding three years he was the Knight professor of journalism at the University of Maryland, following 10 years as president of MainStreet TV. From 1980 to 1995, he was involved as anchor, correspondent, panelist or producer of a number of public affairs series, documentaries and talk shows, winning four Emmys and the Edward R. Murrow Award. During the same period he was an op-ed columnist for the *Wall Street Journal* and latterly was a syndicated columnist with NEA. Following seventeen years with his family's daily newspaper, the *Delta Democrat-Times* of Greenville, Mississippi as reporter, managing editor and editor, he served as State Department spokesman under President Carter from 1977 to 1980. He served on the Princeton University board of trustees from 1983-1998 and has been a trustee of the Century Foundation since 1969. The author of two books and contributor to seven others, he has written for numerous newspapers and magazines over the past 45 years.

DAVID DENBY was born in New York in 1943 and was educated at Columbia, both at the College and the Journalism School, and at Stanford, where he studied film. His first regular job as film critic was at *The Atlantic*, and he was later critic of *The Boston Phoenix*. In 1978, he joined *New York* magazine, and remained as movie critic until September, 1998, at which time he joined *The New Yorker* as a film critic and staff writer. His essays and reviews have also appeared in *The New Republic* and *The New York Review of Books*. In 1991, he went back to Columbia and audited two core-curricular courses in literary and political-theory classics. The result was the book, *Great Books: My Adventures With Homer, Rousseau, Woolf, and Other Indestructible Writers of the Western World*, which was nominated for a National Book Critics Circle Award and has been translated into nine languages.

HELENA KANE FINN is a 2002-2003 Cyrus Vance Fellow in Diplomatic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. A career foreign service officer with experience in Turkey, Austria and Pakistan, her expertise is in public diplomacy, press and educational and cultural affairs. She has served as acting Assistant Secretary, Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs; Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Ankara; Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Vienna; Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Consulate-General, Frankfurt; Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Islamabad and US Consulate, Lahore; Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Ankara. Her published articles include: "Turkey's Crisis, Iraq's Future, and the Wolfowitz Visit" (July 2002); "Public Diplomacy: Effective Strategies for the Future-The Importance of Academic and Cultural Exchange" (April 2002); "Building Community Amid Diversity" (April 2001).

RICHARD FORD was born in Jackson, Mississippi and lives in New Orleans. He has written five novels and three books of stories, and his work has been translated into twenty-three languages. He has won the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction as well as the Berlin Prize from the American Academy in Berlin. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters and the Ordre des Arts et des Lettres of The Republic of France.

JEAN-RENE GEHAN is Cultural Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States. Before he became Cultural Counselor in New York in 2001, Jean-René Gehan had held numerous diplomatic positions in Haiti, China and the United States. He also served as an advisor for international relations to the Minister of Defense and as an advisor of the Foundation for Studies of National Defense. A graduate of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Jean-René Gehan holds a Ph.D.-level degree in History and is a former research fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

DAVID FRAHER is the Executive Director of Arts Midwest, a national network of regional organizations that connect the arts to audiences throughout

the Midwestern U.S. Since 1983, Fraher has led Arts Midwest in aggressively building a diverse and successful array of international partnerships and exchange programs, which directly link the Midwest to many world cultures. Previously, Fraher was Executive Director for the Wyoming Council on the Arts, and a Program Director at Western States Arts Federation in Santa Fe. He currently resides in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MICHAEL JANEWAY, dean of the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University from 1989 to 1997, joined Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism as professor and director of the NAJP in 1997. Janeway was previously executive director of the Trade Division at Houghton Mifflin & Co., editor of *The Boston Globe* and executive editor of *The Atlantic Monthly*. He led a *Boston Globe* editorial team that was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting in 1983. He is the author of *Republic of Denial: Press, Politics and Public Life* (Yale University Press, 1999).

BERT KLEINMAN is a consultant to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (U.S. Government) and senior managing consultant to Radio Sawa and Radio Farda, Arabic-language youth-oriented radio stations that broadcast across the entire Middle East. Previously, he was President of WHS International, Inc., guiding development of "Radio Maximum" to become a major station in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia. He has worked as a radio producer and consultant for Casey Kasem's Syndicated Radio Shows and for many of Westwood One's independent radio specials. He received his B.A. from Columbia College and resides in Alexandria, VA.

ANDREW KOHUT is Director of The Pew Research Center for the People & The Press in Washington, D.C. In recent national elections he has served as a public opinion consultant and analyst for National Public Radio. He often comments on public opinion for TV news programs including the "NewsHour with Jim Lehrer." He has written widely about public opinion for leading newspapers and magazines, as well as for scholarly journals. From 1979-1989, he was President of the Gallup Organization. In 1989 he founded Princeton Survey Research Associates. He served as founding director of surveys for the Times Mirror Center 1990-1992, and was named Director in 1993. Kohut has served as president of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, president of the National Council on Public Polls, and as a member of the Market Research Council and the Council on Foreign Relations. Kohut has co-authored three books: *The Diminishing Divide, The People, The Press and Politics* and *Estranged Friends? The Transatlantic Consequences of Social Change*.

ELLEN McCULLOCH-LOVELL is the President of the Center for Arts and Culture, an independent think tank in Washington D.C. dedicated to research, publication, and discussion of public policies in the arts and the humanities. She also serves

as the part-time director of the Veterans History Project at the American Folklife Center, Library of Congress. Until recently, Lovell served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Advisor to the First Lady on the Millennium, leading the White House Millennium Council from 1997-2001 as it developed national programs such as Millennium Evenings at the White House, Save America's Treasures, Millennium Trails, Millennium Communities and international cultural programs. From 1984-1997, Lovell was executive director of the President's Committee on the Arts and the Humanities, an advisory commission of government and private sector leaders chaired by John Brademas, with Hillary Rodham Clinton as Honorary Chair. The PCAH conducted research and published reports, including *Creative America*, a study containing 55 recommendations on strengthening cultural life in America. For 10 years Lovell was Chief of Staff to Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, in charge of his staff and of planning his legislative, policy and political objectives. She began her career in 1970 as program director for the Vermont Council on the Arts, the state arts agency, which she directed from 1975-1983.

ANDY MACKAY trained in Languages and Linguistics at Exeter and Reading Universities and obtained an M.B.A. from Durham University. He initially worked in education and teacher development in Africa and the Middle East. Mackay worked for the British Council in Europe, the Middle East and South America before becoming Director of the British Council USA in October 2001.

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a specialist in U.S. foreign policy and international relations. He has written extensively about democracy, human rights, the role of ideas and ideologies in international politics, and America's role in the post Cold War world and about the conflicts in Central America, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans, as well as about the democratization of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China and South Africa. His articles appear frequently in *Commentary*, the *New Republic*, *The New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. He has contributed to numerous other magazines and newspapers, including *Foreign Affairs* and the *Washington Post*. His newest book, *Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism*, was published in March 2002. He is the author of *The Imperative of American Leadership* (1996), *News Coverage of the Sandinista Revolution* (1988), *The Unertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemma of Human Rights Policy* (1986), and *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (1991).

CARYLE MURPHY covers religion for *The Washington Post* and is the author of *Passion for Islam*. She was the *Post's* correspondent in the Arab world from 1989-94, during which she won the 1991 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. She is a graduate of Trinity College in Washington, D.C. and of the Johns

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FRANK NINKOVICH is Professor of History at St. John's University in New York. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. He is the author of *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938-1950* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy* (Foreign Policy Association, 1996); *Modernity and Power* (University of Chicago Press, 1994); *The Wilsonian Century* (University of Chicago Press, 2000); *Germany and the United States* (Twayne Publishers, 1988); and *The United States and Imperialism* (Blackwell, 2001).

FELIX GEORGE ROHATYN serves as President of Rohatyn Associates LLC, a firm he founded in April 2001, which provides financial advice to corporations. He served as United States Ambassador to France from 1997 to 2000. Born in Vienna, Austria in 1928, Ambassador Rohatyn received his secondary school education in France. He has lived in the U.S. since 1942 and resides in New York City. Prior to his appointment as Ambassador in Paris, Rohatyn was a Managing Director of the investment-banking firm Lazard Frères & Co. LLC in New York, which he joined in 1948, becoming a partner in 1961. From 1975 to 1993, he was also Chairman of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) of the State of New York, where he managed the negotiations that enabled New York City to resolve its financial crisis in the late seventies. He served as a member of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange from 1968 to 1972. He served on the Board of Directors of several NYSE listed corporations. Rohatyn is presently Vice Chairman of Carnegie Hall, New York City, and is a Trustee of the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, D.C.

JOHN ROMANO is a screenwriter and TV producer, as well as a literary critic. His credits include "Hill Street Blues," "L.A. Law," "Third Watch," "Party of Five," and, currently, "American Dreams." (TV); "The Third Miracle" (for Francis Coppola), and currently Philip Roth's Pulitzer novel, "American Pastoral" (Movies). His TV movie on John Walker Lindh is coming in fall 2003. He completed his Ph.D. in English at Yale, was an Assistant Professor at Columbia, and authored the critical book *Dickens and Reality*. He has lectured in literature and television at Princeton, M.I.T., and the National Endowment for the Humanities, as well as appearing before the House Committee on International Affairs, and is currently on the board of the Center for Arts and Culture.

ARTURO SARUKHAN is consul general of the Consulate General of Mexico in New York. Previous to his career in government, he was Executive Secretary of the non-governmental Bilateral Commission on the Future of Mexico-United States Relations (1988-89). In 1991, he was appointed advisor to the Secretary of Foreign Relations in charge of national and international security issues. In 1992, he was

appointed Director for Inter-American Negotiation at the Foreign Ministry. During this tenure, he was responsible for the Ibero-American Summit and Latin American cooperation mechanisms such as the Rio Group, the G-3 (Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia) and the Tlatelolco Treaty. In 1993, he was commissioned to the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C. where he held the position of chief-of-staff to the Ambassador, and was later appointed the officer in charge of counter-narcotics and law enforcement issues. In 1998, he was commissioned to Mexico City as an Advisor to the Secretary for North American and Organized Crime issues and as Deputy Director for Policy Planning at the Ministry. In 2000, he was designated as the National Coordinator for the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism against Illicit Drugs of the Organization of American States. In December 2000, he was appointed Chief of Staff for Policy Planning to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

CYNTHIA P. SCHNEIDER has been a member of the Georgetown University faculty since 1984. She teaches Renaissance and Baroque art history, culture and diplomacy. As Ambassador to the Netherlands (1998-2001), Schneider was active in cultural diplomacy, military and business relations, international law, cyber security, education and biotechnology. Currently she is leading a University-wide "Life Sciences and Society Initiative." She organized a conference on smallpox preparedness in March 2003 and co-organized a cultural diplomacy conference at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown on April 30, 2003. Schneider is a non-resident Fellow at the Brookings Institute and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and a supervisory Board member of Royal Ahold. She has published works on cultural diplomacy, on Rembrandt and on 17th century Dutch art.

SAMER SHEHATA is the Acting Director of Arab Studies Programs at Georgetown University. He teaches Middle East politics at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies in Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. Shehata finished a Ph.D. at Princeton and has taught at Columbia, New York University and the American University in Cairo. He has written about politics in the Arab world and Egypt and U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

FAOUZI SKALI is Founder and Director General of the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music. He is a highly regarded cultural anthropologist, writer and speaker, and the author of several important works which have been translated into many languages on the subject of Sufism, the mystical aspect of Islam. Faouzi created the Fes Festival in 1994, during the Gulf War, as the world was polarizing, with the intention of bringing people together. In 2000, he founded the intellectual component of the Festival with the "Giving a Soul to Globalisation" Colloquium, which examines vital global issues. The United Nations honoured him as one of the seven heroes in the world in 2001, who have contributed in a remarkable way to

the dialogue of the cultures and civilizations. Recently he was chosen as a member of the High-Level Advisory Group on the Dialogue between People and Cultures of the European Commission.

PETER SÖTJE has worked as Executive Director of the Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes, New York and Regional Director for the U.S.A., Canada, Mexico and Cuba since January 2003. He has also served as Board Member of Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes, Munich, and as Government Adviser for the World Bank (Brazil and Indonesia). Previous to holding the latter post, he was Executive Director of the German Foundation for International Development, a bilateral development corporation. From 1977-1981, he was State Secretary for Senate of Berlin (Head of Senate Chancellery). Prior to 1977, he held various positions in journalism and academia. He holds diplomas in law and political sciences.

ALEXANDER STILLE is a freelance writer who lives in New York. He graduated from Yale University in 1978, where he majored in English. He worked in book publishing at Random House in New York and Mondadori in Milan. And then attended the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, in 1982-1983. He began his journalistic work as a reporter researcher at *Newsweek* and then became a staff writer at the *National Law Journal* in 1984. He began working on his first book, *Benevolence & Betrayal: Five Italian-Jewish Families Under Fascism* (Penguin, 1991) and left his job to complete it. His book won the *Los Angeles Times* Book Award for best work of history in 1992. He moved back to Italy in 1990 and worked as a freelance correspondent for *The Boston Globe*, *U.S. News & World Report* and the *Toronto Globe & Mail* until 1993. During that time, he did research for his second book, *Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic* (Vintage). His latest book, *The Future of the Past*, was published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Stille is also a regular contributor to *The New York Times* Arts & Ideas page as well as to *The New York Review of Books*. He is also the editor of *Correspondence: A Magazine of International Culture*.

ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ is Deputy Director of the National Arts Journalism Program. He was formerly research manager of the Media Studies Center in New York. He has taught courses on the sociology of culture at Columbia University and Barnard College. At the NAJP, he has spearheaded research projects on arts coverage and architecture criticism; he is co-editor of *ARTicles* NAJP's journal, and organizer of conferences on arts, culture and journalism. His writing has appeared in *The New York Times*, *The Boston Globe*, the *International Herald Tribune* and numerous other publications. He earned his Ph.D. in sociology at Columbia with a dissertation on New York's visual art world and art market.

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