From Info Ops to Edu Ops:
Strategic Communication in the Age of the Long War

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> Victory in the Long War ultimately depends on
> strategic communication by the United States
> and its international partners (...). In particular,
> winning the Long War requires strengthening the
> Department's ability to train and educate current
> and future foreign military leaders at institutions in
> the United States.
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In the wake of 9/11, there was in America a lot of hang-wringing over the question: "Why do they hate us?" Was it because of our values, our policies, their poverty, etc.? Most of us realized fairly early on that "poverty" could not be the answer: not only do most jihadists come from privileged backgrounds, but half the planet lives in poverty and does not indulge in terrorism. But for most of us non-specialists of the Middle East, it took a good three years to begin to realize that the answer was disarmingly simple: they hate because, from a very early age, they have been *taught* – methodically, systematically – to hate us.

This pedagogy of hatred toward "Jews and Crusaders," reflected in elementary school textbooks from Palestine to Saudi Arabia, is now well-documented. It is of an altogether different magnitude than the anti-Judaic "teaching of contempt" which existed in Catholic countries until the Vatican II Council in the 1960s (1). Unlike the latter, the pedagogy of hatred in the Middle East today is not a residual, but a pervasive, phenomenon; and far from being confined to religious theology and/or liturgy, it is a state-sponsored activity in schools, mosques, media, etc.   Should one be so naive as to ask "why are they being taught to hate us?," here again, the answer is disarmingly simple: because blaming outsiders remains the most convenient way for corrupt and incompetent rulers to account for the kind of "negative exceptionalism" which exists in the Greater Middle East today (2).

I suggested elsewhere that the single most significant step in the battle for Hearts and Minds would be for Saudi Arabia, which in the past thirty years has become the

Virtual Caliphate of the Muslim World, to undertake its own Vatican II.(3) This aggiornamento, obviously, is unlikely to happen overnight. But it should be clear that, since the problem at bottom is not so much one of "mis-information" as one of "mis-education," the answer will not be found in "info ops" alone, and will require what, by lack of a better term, one could call "edu ops."

"Edu Ops" begin at home, obviously, which is why President Bush earlier this year unveiled a National Security Language Initiative to increase the linguistic and cultural competence of today's American students who will be tomorrow's policy-makers. Within the federal bureaucracy, the deficit of "actionable cultural intelligence" of soldiers and public diplomatists (who have a similar imperative: "know thy enemy" for one, "know thy audience" for the other) is also being remedied but, as Secretary Rumsfeld warned early on, it's going to be "a long, hard slog." Within the limits of this essay, I would like to review, in a resolutely "interagency" perspective and didactic manner, some of the major pitfalls to avoid when discussing the question of "strategic communication" in the context of the Long War, and also to suggest possibilities for improvement for both "info ops" and "edu ops."

Strategic Communication for Dummies:
Deconstructing Three Common Fallacies

To begin with, when discussing "strategic communication" in the context of the Long War, one should first of all guard against three common fallacies:

The first fallacy - and by far the most widespread both in and out of government –

is what is sometimes referred to derisively as the "Marylyn Monroe Doctrine" of public diplomacy. Simply put, it is the idea that, since Hollywood's market shares have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, government-sponsored public diplomacy is less necessary than ever. Between 1920 and 1980, to be sure, Hollywood was indeed the most effective vector of the American Dream, and the State Department, having recognized this fact very early on, consistently supported entertainment industries and continues to do so today all the more so that, in the meantime, entertainment has become the second most important U.S. export (4).

But as film critic Michael Medved pointed out a decade ago, Hollywood in the past 25 years has morphed from being the main advertiser of the American Dream to being the main promoter of the American Nightmare (5). So much so that in 1999 - in the wake of Columbine High School shooting, and in view of the 300 studies over 30 years that show "a link between sustained exposure - hour after hour, day after day, week after week, year after year - to violent entertainment and violent behavior," President Clinton launched an 18 month federal enquiry into the entertainment industry's marketing of violent movies, music and video games to children, while Senators McCain and Lieberman decided it was time for the U.S. Senate to hold hearings about "Marketing Violence to Children in Entertainment."

It is therefore no surprise if, by that time as well, the EU Commission was imposing quotas on Hollywood products on EU public televisions, and if more traditional societies were even more vocal in their criticism of what could be called Hollywood's "Decivilizing Mission." As Michael Medved remarked recently: "Those images

inevitably exert a more powerful influence on overseas consumers than they do on the American domestic audience. If you live in Seattle or Cincinnati, you understand that the feverish media fantasies provided by DMX music video or a *Dark Angel* TV episode do not represent everyday reality for you or your neighbors. If you live in Indonesia or Nigeria, however, you will have little or no-first hand experience to balance the negative impressions provided by American pop culture, with its intense emphasis on violence, sexual adventurism, and every inventive variety of anti-social behavior that the most overheated imagination could concoct."(6)

As Hollywood was become a cultural liability in spite of its commercial success, the budget of U.S. public diplomacy in the post-Cold War era was slashed by thirty percent, dozens of cultural centers, libraries and branch posts were closed, "high-brow" cultural diplomacy was replaced by a mindless promotion of pop culture, and in 1999, USIA was finally "merged" with State. In the meantime, the Saudi Caliphate was spending an estimated four billion dollars annually on its own brand of "public diplomacy", i.e. more than the Soviet Union in its heyday, and ten times what the U.S. was spending on PD in the Muslim world. Long before the Iraq War, the U.S. had developed a major image problem abroad, and not just in the Arab world.

"Entertainment" has everything to do with psychological "gratification" and nothing to do with sociological "endorsement," and the popularity of many Hollywood movies abroad is due to the fact that they simply reinforce the image of the kind of America some foreigners "love to hate." Once and for all, then: there is no correlation between the size of Hollywood's economic market shares and the degree of popularity of

America. If anything, as empirical studies have shown, the greater the exposure of foreign audiences to Hollywood, the greater the intensity of anti-American feeling (7). The few observers in government willing to concede this point are quick to argue that the USG cannot impose censorship - and are happy to leave it at that. Yet, if we are at war, there is a priori no reason why Hollywood cannot do its part the way it did during World War I and World War II (8).

Curiously, even though the current Deputy Secretary of State has a longstanding interest in what is variously called "corporate diplomacy" or "strategic philanthropy," and even though the twenty-some reports on public diplomacy have all recommended establishing an independent Corporation for Public Diplomacy along the lines of the existing Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the State Department has not been overzealous so far in developing partnership with the private sector in general, and with the entertainment industries in particular. DOS continues to support pro-Hollywood trade policies which are hugely unpopular with the EU and/or at UNESCO, yet somehow Foggy Bottom never tries to remind Tinseltown that support should be a two-way street, and that Hollywood could play a constructive role in the Battle for Hearts and Minds without losing its sacrosanct market shares.

The Pentagon, for its part, has a long and more intimate experience with Hollywood: after all, during WWII, General Marshall himself commissioned one of the most talented photographer of his generation - Frank Capra - to do a series of now-legendary short films entitled "Why We Fight"; upon becoming Secretary of State, the same Marshall made sure that the public diplomacy dimension of the Marshall Plan

received full attention by commissioning 200 short films on the subject (9). Today still, as every Pentagon insider knows, the two major strategic commands are not EUCOM and CENTCOM, but DOD's Outreach Offices on Capitol Hill and in Hollywood.

It should not be too difficult for DOD to identify Arab-American soldiers whose deeds during World War II are worthy of being immortalized on the screen, thus bringing much balance to the less-than-flattering image of the Arab world traditionally propagated by Hollywood (10). Similarly, there is no shortage of characters in the U.S. military whose adventures would be worth a major motion picture. Think of USMC Reserve Lieutenant-Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, assistant DA in civilian life and part-time art lover who, like a modern-day Indiana Jones, went recently on a search to recover the artefacts looted from the Baghdad Museum (11). At a time when a handful of reservists are gaining an unwelcome notoriety at Abu Graib, it would not be such a bad idea to remind foreign audiences that the Bogdanos of this world represent the American Soldier-Citizen at his finest.

The second fallacy – which is particularly widespread in corporate America - is best described, in Neo-Kiplinesque fashion, as the "Wired Man's Burden." Simply put, it consists in equating "communication" with mere "connectivity," and in believing that "connectivity" is inherently positive. In one form or another, the gospel of world-peace-through-global-connectivity has been around since the Industrial Revolution and it would have been surprising if the advent of the Information Revolution had not it given a new lease on life. Among the many essayists who, since the end of the Cold War, have tried to recycle the functionalist and transactionalist theories of "integration" in vogue in the

immediate post-WWI era, military planner Thomas Barnett deserves special mention here, would it be only because of his burning desire to find a role for DOD in the ongoing globalization process.

Surveying what most of his contemporaries are happy to call simply "zones of peace and zones of turmoil," Barnett attempts to combine, so to speak, Mitrany with Mackinder by renaming the two zones "Functioning Core" and "Non-Integrated Gap" – and why not? But while this neo-functionalist geopolitics is harmless enough, Barnett's particularly crude form of transactionalism is cause for worry. Arguing that the "enemy is neither a religion (Islam) nor a place (the Middle East) but a condition – disconnectedness" (12), and calling for DOD to play its part in "Shrinking the Gap", is a recipe for disaster.

The first problem with the idea that "disconnectedness defines danger" is that, either you define "disconnectedness" in such a broad way as to include everything from lack of foreign direct investment to absence of women's rights, and it comes pretty close to a tautological discourse with no operational value - what you end up with is simply a Global War on Disconnectedness (GWOD?) as unfocused as the Global War on Drug and the Global War on Terrorism combined. Or you equate "connectivity" with high-tech (the choice of metaphors is never innocent, and Barnett's discourse is geek-speak all the way), in which case you precisely avoid tackling the very issues that matter to Muslim Man (i.e. "culture", "knowledge," "religion," etc.) and require discrete, finely-calibrated, and laser-guided strategies. Worse still: by approaching the problem in terms of "disconnectedness defines danger," you fail to notice the obvious, namely that jihadists

are for the most part students in science, technology, engineering, in short - experts in "connectivity."

If anything, the problem of the Greater Middle East today is not so much one of "disconnectedness" as, so to speak, one of "cross-wiring." Simply put: the Middle East is at once "misundereducated" and "overdisinformed." On the one hand, close to 200 (mostly Saudi-controlled) satellite television channels on which the "news" consists in a *pot-pourri* of the most bizarre conspiracy theories, while the menu for "entertainment" is limited to one dish only: the Palestianian Intifada, served over and over again as documentary, soap opera, reality TV, etc. On the other hand, an illiteracy rate of 40% or higher, no Arab university listed in the top 500 universities in the world, and the amount of books translated in the Arab world in 1,000 years barely equivalent to the number of books translated by Spain in one year.

This kind of "cross-wiring" will not be solved by more "connectivity," as public diplomatists only know too well. The difference between the old fashioned USIA libraries and today's "American Corners" set up in the libraries of the Middle East and Central Asia is that, while the latter provide high-tech information resources that the older libraries did not have, the visitors of American Corners today are as likely to use the internet to visit "adult sites" as to consult the Federalist Papers homepage. Besides, as the ongoing "Internet Jihad" shows, Internet connectivity is as likely to function as a "rage enabler" as it is to function as a "knowledge enhancer."(13) More broadly, as history amply shows, greater technological connectivity and/or economic integration are as likely to increase risks of war as to enhance chances of peace. As every historian

knows, France and Germany in 1913 were more integrated than they are today, yet that did not prevent Europe from plunging into its "second Thirty Year War."

At its best, Barnett's Blueprint for the Future is reminiscent of the 18th century Abbe de Saint-Pierre's Project of Perpetual Peace, of which Frederic II said derisively: "It's perfect! All that's needed now is the approval of the ruling houses of Europe" (one could add today: and the willingness of American Boys to shed their blood for "global connectivity"). At its worst, Barnett's Brave New World is in fact more Orwellian than Kiplingesque. If Muslim Man lived by connectivity alone, surely we would know by now. At any rate, last time this writer checked, the Muslim Street's vision of a "future worth creating" somehow did not appear to include having-their-Gap-shrunk-by-a-SysAdmin-force.

Since Barnett saw no need for prior consultation with the Natives before designing his blueprint, it does not come as a surprise that he sees no need for explanation afterward either: "We should abandon efforts to create a U.S. Government-wide "strategic communication policy" designed to win the "hearts and minds" of young males inside the Gap who are perceived to be at risk for becoming terrorists. Such an approach only reinforces the notion that somehow globalization is really all about Americanization, when it isn't (sic)."(14) But as Edward Murrow famously said, in communication with foreign audiences, it's "the last three feet" that count, and the last three feet have everything to do with "culture," and little to do with "connectivity."

For the Pentagon to bet on Barnett's Blueprint would be a "Pascalian Wager" in

reverse in which DOD would have a lot to lose and little to gain. Little to gain: like it or not, the Pentagon's business is not "world peace" but "strategic vigilance," and Barnett's discourse, with its idea of conflating and/or diluting *national strategy* into *global security* cannot but lead, over time, to a kind of unilateral analytical disarmament ("demission creep", so to speak). A lot to lose: since there is nothing more culture-specific than the concept of security, the project of exporting an American concept of "security" as if it was universal would be the surest way to create the mother of all "security dilemma." (15) When all is said and done, the GWOT will not be won by technocratic planning and social engineering, but by time-tested "strategic thinking" and "statecraft."

The third fallacy is to altogether dismiss the need for "strategic communication" by arguing that radical Islamism is merely "a byproduct of modernization itself, arising from the loss of identity that accompanies the transition to a modern, pluralist society" and that, over time, the "realities of governing" will lead even a terrorist organization like Hamas to come to its senses. This "identity" thesis, which is as popular among the literary crowd as the "connectivity" thesis is among the techno-geeks, was most recently peddled by the author of a once popular manifesto on the "End of History."(16) Sadly, when futurists get caught in a time-warp, they begin to resemble the old Bourbons of lore, who had "learned nothing, forgotten nothing."

No, Radical Islamism can't be said to be a mere "by-product" of Globalization. If anything, it would be more accurate to say it is Global Jihad which is the byproduct of a deliberate strategy of global re-Islamization inaugurated by the Saudi Caliphate in 1962 (creation of the Muslim World League), developed in 1969 (creation of an Organization

of the Islamic Conference intended to outflank the Egyptian-sponsored Arab League), and extended after 1979 (in a bid to outdo Iran in religious fundamentalism).(17)

As for what columnist George Will derisively calls "the garbage collection theory of history," the historical record of the past 25 years shows that it is sheer fallacy. Since the Revolution of 1979, Iranian mullahs have had plenty of time to collect the garbage and come to terms with the mundane "realities of governing": yet, in 2006, not only does garbage collecting in Iran continue to leave much to be desired but, having failed on just about every real political and economic fronts, the mullahs have "logically" decided that the only way to regain a modicum of popularity is to play the nationalist card to the max and opt for a "flight forward" in nuclearization. A fundamentalist take-over in, say, Algeria or Saudi Arabia tomorrow would simply lead to a similar outcome. Like the end-of-history thesis (especially in its Kojevian form), the "garbage collection theory of history" belongs to the garbage-heap of History *tout court*.

Among those who do not subscribe to either one of the fallacies mentioned above, many policy-makers continue to genuinely believe that the Battle for Hearts and Minds can be won through a mere *information campaign*, be it in the sense of "strategic political communication" or of military "information operations". For two very distinct reasons, the White House and the Pentagon are in fact more prone to succumb to this temptation than the State Department itself.

The White House Office of Global Communications tends to be staffed with "ballot-box warriors" who are real "smooth operators" when it comes to domestic political communication, but come across as "innocents abroad" when it comes to

anticipating the pitfalls of cross-cultural communication. It is, for instance, self-defeating to have the President say too often and too loudly that "the Arab world should imitate the Turkish model." It may well be that in Washington, Turkey is seen as the most-democratic-Muslim-state; but in the Arab world, Turkey is first and foremost the former-colonial- power-par-excellence (France and England, by contrast, are latecomers). Politics is perception, and telling the Arab world to adopt a "Turkish model" (though justified in substance) cannot but be perceived as an indirect way of saying that the Arab Revolt of 1916 was at best a waste of time, at worst a step backward.

The problem with White House communication is not just one of content, but of form as well. The rhetorical codes that are appropriate for a domestic campaign in the U.S. do not necessarily travel well abroad: American audiences are used to advertising and "message repetition," but for foreign audiences these days, the White House's repetitive messages on "democracy, prosperity and security" sounds increasingly like the Soviet *langue de bois*. Communicating "urbi et orbi" in a manner that can resonate positively *both* at home and abroad is actually one of the greatest challenges facing the "Post-Modern Presidency."(18)

The Pentagon's problem with information campaign is somewhat different. The advent of the Information Revolution and the ensuing RMA debate has led most defense intellectuals to focus on "network-centric warfare," "information dominance," "getting into the enemy's decision-making cycle" to ensure a swift defeat, etc - and not without good reason: after all, the Gulf War had been a "1,000 Hour War" in which the importance of information gathering, processing and disseminating had been decisive at

every level. (19)

With the Iraq War a decade later, though, two unexpected developments occurred: 1) whereas CNN had had the quasi-monopoly of images during the Gulf War, the Iraq War marks the emergence of what I have called elsewhere the age of the "three-screen war" (CNN, Euronews, Al-Jazeera), which singularly complicates the question of "strategic communication" in space (20); 2); with every passing day, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities are turning the Iraq War into something closer to a "1,000 Day War" than to the "1,000 Hour War" - and that in turn complicates "media management" in time. Embedding close to 3,000 journalists during three weeks of combat operations is the easy part, but leaves the question of what to do with the press corps for the next three years. The question is not going to go away: now that Pentagon Directive 3000 has raised – theoretically at least – Stability operations at the same level as Combat operations, the need to rethink "strategic communication" has never been greater.

But beyond stability operations proper, there is also a broader question. Now that the GWOT has been re-conceptualized as a "Long War" bound to last a generation, what is the meaning of "strategic communication" with such a timeline? As it now stands, "strategic communication" is used by NSC, DOS and DOD to span several activities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, etc., in short, "fast media" (interestingly, an activity like IMET is never considered part of it). The temptation will be great to simply stretch the meaning Info Ops, to extend the range of information operations beyond wartime and into peacetime, to broaden the definition of target

audiences to friends and not just foes (and to civilians and not just military), etc. Yet, when all is said and done, "fast media" alone is not the optimal way to do strategic communication in what promises to be a Long War. Interestingly, the first government official who realized that "info ops" alone would not be enough to win the Battle for Hearts and Minds was Secretary Rumsfeld himself. In his now-famous leaked memo of October 16, 2003, Rumsfeld was already asking the right questions:

"Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists everyday than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? the US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ration is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions. Do we need a new organization? How do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassas schools? (...) Should we create a private foundation to entice radical madrassas to a more moderate course?"

In an interview with the *Washington Times* a week later, Rumsfeld added:

"One of the things I had in mind organizationally is that there is not an institution in the U.S. government that can address in a *consistent, coordinated, purposeful* way *over time* the problem that I posed about the fact that terrorists are being trained every day...The natural tendency of big institutions is to keep doing what they're doing and to make incremental adjustments. And big institutions tend to be tactical. They tend to react to the circumstances that are immediate as opposed to strategic...People talk about Iran and Afghanistan, and they're terribly important, but they are [mere] battles in this war. We need to keep the broader global war on terror on our minds and look at it as something that's long range."

What the SECDEF was arguing in essence, back in 2003, was that in a Long War the "Medium is the Message", and that some kind of "edu ops" - distinct from the day-to-day "info ops" - will have to be implemented if we are to win. What is the state existing "Edu Ops" conducted at the interagency level in general, and by the State Department in particular? What can DOD learn from DOS, and vice-versa? Within the limits of this

essay, I would like to highlight just a few points on these two issues.

"Fast Media" vs. "Slow Media":
Information vs. Education in Public Diplomacy

In the field of Public Diplomacy, it has long been customary to distinguish between "fast media" and slow media", short-term and long-term communication, i.e. Information activities and Education activities (21). With the merger of the USIA with the Department of State in 1999, USIA's former Information Bureau ("I" bureau) has been renamed 'International Information Programs'(IIP), and its former Education Bureau ("E" bureau) has morphed into "Education and Cultural Affairs"(ECA), but the distinction between short-term and long-term activities still remain.

Historically, USIA's "Edu Ops" grew out of the military occupations in Germany, Austria and Japan, and throughout the Cold War, "Edu Ops" were the strong point of U.S. diplomacy at just about every level (high-school to post-graduate), and in just about every domain (academic, vocational, professional). Alone or in partnership with the CIA and/or private entities like the Ford Foundation, the State Department's Edu Ops covered just about every educational angle, from developing the social sciences to redesigning history textbooks to setting up business schools and schools of journalism, to the development of student and teacher exchange programs, etc. Today, the public diplomacy bureaucracy is justly proud of the record number of heads of state, cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, judges, etc., who are alumni of USG educational programs.(22)

As for programs that are not geared toward future leaders but are "societal" in scope, like the English Teaching Program, they turn out to have a much greater impact than one would suspect at first. One of the major problems in the Middle East is "rote learning," which prevents the development of the mind from "factual knowledge" to "critical thinking": one of the least-known, yet most effective, PD program in the Battle for Hearts and Minds is the State Department's English Language Program which, *through* language teaching (from primary school to university level), introduces new pedagogical approaches fostering individual thinking and ultimately have a positive "spillover effect" on the way other disciplines are taught.

During the Cold War, USIA's Edu Ops had for logical complement a major Book-in-Translation program which has become quasi-inexistent today. One suspects that, if State has so far failed to address what, according to Arab intellectuals themselves, is today the main cultural problem in the Middle East, it is in part because of lack of resources, in part also for bureaucratic reasons (a Book-in-Interpretation program does not fall clearly in either the Information or the Education Bureau). This year marks the 300th anniversary of Benjamin Franklin, the American Renaissance Man and arguably the Founder Father of U.S. public diplomacy, and one can only hope that State will recreate the USIA-supported Franklin Book Programs which existed between 1952 and 1978 and played an invaluable role in the Middle East.

In the post Cold War era, the State Department was given oversight of the newly-established Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training which coordinates the "Edu Ops" of 25 Federal departments and

agencies, including the Department of Defense (23). At the same time, though, the budget of USIA's Educational activities (especially for Middle East) was slashed by 30% or more. The net result? As Secretary Rice pointed out recently, while there were 200,000 Iranian students in the U.S. in the 1970s, today the number is only 2,000.

Tobe sure, bringing more foreign students to the U.S. is not necessarily the "silver bullet": on the one hand, foreign students enrolling in "American Studies" on U.S. campuses won't necessarily end up having a positive view of American society, since many Departments of American Studies have become de facto Departments of Anti-American Studies (24); as for foreign students who come to the U.S. study law, science or medecine, they have a marked tendency to stay in the U.S. afterwards, thus creating a brain drain which aggravate the problem of under-development in the Middle East.

The optimal answer would be to have U.S. universities go to the Middle East and open branches in vocational/professional education. But in many foreign countries – and not just the Middle East – there exists a variety of formal and informal "barriers to trade in education", sometime for economic reasons, more often for political reasons: these barriers range from preventing foreign educational and training providers from obtaining national licenses to non-recognition of diplomas to difficulties in obtaining visas and/or government pre-approval of local students allowed to apply to foreign universities, etc.(25) Still, the State Department should be giving more attention to creating a "forward presence," particularly when it comes to business schools in the Middle East.

If Edu Ops have been State's traditional strongpoint, Info Ops, by contrast, have

increasingly become the Achille's heel of U.S. public diplomacy for two reasons:

1) The existence of a cumbersome clearance process which, with the emergence of the 24/7 news cycle some 25 years ago, means that the USG is condemned to remain behind the news cycle. This "vertical", and in-house problem, is compounded by a "horizontal", and interagency problem: the lack of the most basic familiarity with the Pentagon's media and/or military operations led to sub-optimal exploitation of one-time events with unlimited PD potential, like the large-scale involvement of NATO - seen in some quarters as an alliance of "Jews and Crusaders" - in humanitarian assistance to a Muslim country like Pakistan. In that respect, one of the most positive contributions DOD could make would be to have the Defense Information School create a week-long training program for DOS Public Affairs Officers.(26)

2) At State, the Battle for Hearts and Minds continues to be approached too much in terms of "media placements" rather than "media effects." To put it in military parlance: DOS remains prisoner of the "firepower" approach, and has yet to develop a new approach in terms of "effects-based operations" (EBO). More generally, due to the lack of genuine continuing education for PD practitioners, the State Department's conception of "strategic communication" has not kept up with the revolution in domestic "political communication" ever since the emergence, 25 years ago, of the "permanent campaign" phenomenon. Unlike "political communication", for instance, public diplomacy has not adapted well to the increasing blurring of media genres. Yet, in the new media age, American and foreign audiences alike get their knowledge of U.S. foreign policy - and of the Iraq war in particular - from so-called "soft news."   The State

Department does not quite how to communicate effectively in the age of "infotainment" and "edutainment"(27). Since continued world leadership is not divine right, the U.S. needs to launch a "permanent campaign" of sorts abroad - preferably more sophisticated than the endless re-iteration of the benevolent character of a United States eager to promote "democracy, prosperity and security," apple pie and motherhood.

Imperial Mission, Insular Education:
Military Info Ops and Edu Ops Before 9/11

If DOS is strong on Edu Ops and weaker on Info Ops, DOD would appear to have the opposite problem. The past 15 years have been marked by an increasing sophistication of military Info Ops, and a continued neglect of Edu Ops.

Here again, Edu Ops begin at home. If the Pentagon does not given Professional Military Education (PME) the attention it deserves, chances are that it will all the more so neglect the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. While the excellence of the Naval War College program is recognized throughout the military community and beyond, the overall state of PME is worrisome. In an article published earlier this year, General Scales lamented the neglect of PME in an Army that has become "too busy to learn." The former Commandant of the Army War College points out that in World War II, "31 of the Army's 35 corps commanders taught at service schools. Today the Army's staff college is so short on instructors that it has been forced to hire civilian contractors to do the bulk of the teaching." Similarly, "after Vietnam the Army sent 7,400 officers to fully funded graduate education. Today that figure is 396, half of whom are studying to join the weapons buying community."(28) This relative

lack of interest is reflected in the research of military historians as well: while the post-cold war era has produced interesting works on the evolution of information and communication in warfare in general, there is practically nothing on the history of U.S. security assistance in general and edu ops in particular. (29).

Who, in the military today for instance, remembers that between 1942 and 1946, the U.S. armed forces brought more than half a million German, Italian and Japanese POWs to 511 camps in 45 of the 48 American states, to be taught democratic values in a program which, in retrospect, can be seen as a sort of (compulsory) Expanded IMET program (30)? Now, let's indulge in daydreaming for a moment. Imagine the U.S. military sending General Anthony Zinni, former Commander of CENTCOM, to Teheran for an informal chat with the Iranian military. Imagine Tony Zinni taking his best Godfather-like voice and saying: "We'll make you an offer you can't refuse: *resist*, and get vaporized; *desist*, and get a free education in the U.S. courtesy of Uncle Sam." There is of course no guarantee that the whole Iranian military would make the right decision, but I would submit that this is the kind of offer guaranteed to "concentrate the mind." On a more serious note, let me suggest four concrete examples of possible Edu Ops which could be conducted by the Pentagon at very little cost.

Closing the Transatlantic Gap:
From Strategic Concept to Strategic Culture

Historically, time lags have been the rule rather than the exception in transatlantic relations. World War I started in Europe in August 1914, but America became participant only in March 1917. World War II began in September 1939, but the U.S.

joined the fray only in December 1941. The Cold War began in earnest in 1947, but it took a good two years for Europe to give up the temptation of a neutralist "third way" and side with the U.S. The Long War began in September 2001, but Europe came on board only after the London bombings in July 2005.

Between September 2001 and July 2005, not a few American observers were tempted to reify a gap that had been allowed to develop between the Fall of the Berlin Wall ("11/9") and the collapse of the Twin Towers ("11/9"), and to argue that that the two halves of the West now lived on two different planets. While not entirely false, the "America is from Mars, Europe from Venus" mantra is not terribly illuminating: it could equally apply to "Red America" vs. "Blue America" or, for that matter, to DOD vs. DOS. As EU Foreign Minister Solana wryly remarked, the fact that Mars was from Mars and Venus from Venus never prevented the two parties from getting down to business and producing a healthy baby named Harmonia.

At worst, the Mars/Venus metaphor is misleading, for it obscures the genuinely disturbing transatlantic gap, which is above all a gap in terms of *strategic literacy*. In a nutshell: having gone from "sleeping giant" to "superpower" the United States, after World War II, became a National Security State; meanwhile, having gone from subject to object of History, Europe evolved into a Social Security State, and throughout the Cold War, had no particular incentive to develop "strategic studies" in European universities (a textbook as basic as "Makers of Modern Strategy," published in the U.S. in 1941, was translated in French only in 1983). Instead of developing International Relations and Strategic Studies, Europe developed a bizarre "discipline" called European Studies,

which is not so much a combination of area studies, comparative government and international relations as a Eurocracy-sponsored *gnosis* fulfilling in the European Union the same ideological function as the legendary *Diamat* (Dialectical Materialism) in the Soviet Union (31).

After half a century of this steady diet, European elites exhibit a certain deficit when it comes to strategic literacy. And by lack of "strategic literacy," I do not mean simply a lack of familiarity with fancy "netwar" or "4GW" theories, but an ignorance of basic concepts like "coercive diplomacy." As was apparent in 2002, most EU elites apparently still do no grasp that a *collective threat* to use force is still the best way to avoid having to *actually* use force (in Iraq yesterday, in Iran tomorrow). For the past fifteen years, U.S. policy-makers, putting the cart before the horse, have been pressuring Europeans to close the *military capabilities* gap, when the first (logically and chronologically) challenge is in fact to close the *strategic literacy* gap.

Similarly, the ongoing debate about the need to update NATO's common "strategic concept" (last revised in 1999, i.e. before 9/11) miss the broader challenge: namely, that a common strategic *concept* is bound to remain a scrap of paper so long as there is no common strategic *culture*. General James Jones, the new SACEUR at SHAPE, recently raised the issue of how NATO can create a new "Alliance Culture"; Ambassador Victoria Nuland, the new U.S. Permrep to NATO, has also called for the Alliance to become the "trainer of first resort," and that too will require a common strategic culture. (32)

Traditionally, enhancing the strategic literacy of NATO International Staff has not been a priority for the various NATO Schools who have focused instead on providing Training for military staff rather than Education for civilian staff (as even former NATO SecGen Robertson complained in 2001, NATO may be the only IO that does not have in-house training). This absence of continuing education is largely responsible if, in the information age, the quality of the NATO Public Diplomacy shop leaves much to be desired. It is no secret that the multinational staff of the NATO Office of Press and Information, who brief 20,000 visitors to NATO every year, has a very uneven grasp in both strategic and media matters. How can they possibly sell NATO to their European audiences (and in particularly explain the value-added of NATO compared to the "rival" EU) if they themselves do not have the kind of strategic literacy and media savvy required?

I would argue that NATO Defense College currently located in Rome need to open a Brussels branch targeting the 3,000 civilians of the NATO International Staff, and opened as well to the various opinion-shapers and policy-makers of the "Brussels Beltway." For Brussels is, for better and for worse, the capital of Europe today, if not for high politics, at least for strategic communication. The Brussels Beltway consists of 20,000 high-level Eurocrats, 15,000 lobbyists, 1,000 media correspondents (the second largest press corps in the world after Washington), not to mention the 700 Euro-parliamentarians who, since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999, have genuine "powers of co-decision" with the EU Commission in more than forty policy areas.

Recognizing that the Brussels Beltway has become the European "center of gravity" in the Battle for Hearts and Minds, the State Department today is in the process of creating a Regional Public Diplomacy center in Brussels. As a complement to regional Foreign Press Center (which will focus on information activities), there is room for education activities, perhaps in the form of a joint NATO Defense College/National Defense University school of continuing education patterned on the model of NDU's new School of National Security Studies Executive Education (SNSEE) in the Washington Beltway.

Too many centrifugal forces are already pulling America and Europe apart. The transatlantic conversation needs a little less "problematizing" (which all too often amounts to what Freud called "the narcissism of petty differences") and a little more "strategizing." In the absence of a transatlantic "epistemic community" in the realm of security studies, there will not a common strategic literacy among transatlantic policy-makers and, in a generation from now, there will no longer be a "security community" called Atlantic Alliance. And since the Alliance, however imperfect it may be, remains the best manifestation of the West-as-Will-and-Representation, chances are there will no longer be a West either.

The Operational Art of Democratic Transition:
Empowering the Muslim Military

Edu Ops are at the center, if not of the new QDR proper, at least of the strategy outlined by the QDR: "In particular, winning the long war requires to strengthen the Department's ability to train and education current and future foreign military leaders at

institutions in the United States." Since 1949, over 600,000 international officers have received training through the International Military Education and Training program run jointly by DOS and DOD. Today, through the IMET program, DOD trains about 8,000 international military officers from 125 countries a year (33). The new E-IMET program which began in 1991, and constitutes now 30% of IMET budget, has in fact broadened its audience from military and MOC civilian to government civilians from other ministries as well as NGO representatives. It has also broadened its content since its includes courses on civil-military relations and on human rights.

But even in its expanded version, E-IMET remains long on Training and short on Education proper. The military in Muslim countries plays an important political (and economic) role, yet is often overlooked as a genuine interlocutor by U.S. foreign policy-makers in their promotion of democracy. DOS, AID, NED, IRI, NDI, reach out quasi-exclusively to representatives of "civil society," in the somewhat naive belief that the cumulative effect of ad hoc activities will somehow, someday, lead to "democracy." In the "democracy promotion" activities of the humanitarian-industrial complex, there is an unstated - and possibly unconscious - manicheism of the "civil society, *good*; military, *bad*" variety. And so we may end up sponsoring seemingly harmless Dawaists who may turn out later to have been nothing more than Jihadists under deep cover, while we continue to neglect military actors even though the armed forces in non-Western countries have a long record of being genuine agents of modernization (34).

There are only two certainties. One is that, in much of the Middle East, the military is in power, directly or indirectly. the other is that, as numerous U.S. studies

have shown, the successful promotion of democracy is not just a matter of economic-social development on the one hand, and political-legal institution-building on the other (let alone election-holding): the success of democratic transitions ultimately rests on the *quality of the strategies adopted by the ruling elites*. (35) Call it the "operational art" of democratic transition, which is not an innate, but an acquired, talent.

All too often, what the Muslim military learn from IMET is the theology of Western military relations, not the praxeology of democratic transitions. But while Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* can give them an idea of the ideal end state (which is still honored in the breach in the West itself), it is S.E. Finer's much neglected *Man on Horseback* which offers a more useful point of departure for a "strategization" regarding the role of armed forces in a transition process. In the past thirty years, there has been no shortage of "lessons learned" on this subject from earlier transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe. There are winning and losing strategies of democratization, and the gradual disengagement of the military from politics requires a finely calibrated strategy

The Naval Postgraduate School is at the vanguard of what IMET should look like. NPS now has the largest number of in-resident international officers and government – sponsored civilians than any other DOD PME Institution. With 300 foreign students from 60 countries a year attending various graduate degrees, and another 495 students from more than 103 countries in shorter courses. (36). And NPS covers everything from Stabilization and Reconstruction to Civil-Military Relations. But 300 students from 60 countries means that, on average, only five military officers from each country of the so-

called Non-Integrating Gap get an education in the fine art of democratic transition every year.

"Who Will Educate the Educators?":
The U.S. Military and the Home Front

According to a recent Australian study of the coverage of the Iraq war in the Western media, there were, on an average day in 2005, 1,992 stories about suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks and 887 stories about alleged prisoner abuses by British soldiers; but only 16 stories about security successes in the fight against insurgents and 7 stories about positive developments related to Iraqi elections (37). How did the Western media, who prides itself on its "objectivity", end up delivering, on a daily basis, this kind of unbalanced reporting - and what is to be done?

The quick answer to the first question would be to argue that, in the hypercompetitive environment of today's media world, the old formula "if it bleeds, it leads" has become the unavoidable iron law of journalism to the exclusion of any other consideration - and to leave it at that. Economic considerations, to be sure, do play an increasing role: because "war sells," the U.S. media, back in 2002, were more than eager to push for what promised to be a "splendid little war"; and because "if it bleeds, it leads," the same U.S. media are more than eager today to accentuate the negative. But two other considerations deserve scrutiny: one is the knee-jerk, adversarial relation to the government that the press corps as a whole felt compelled to adopt since the 1960s; the

other is more simply the lack of strategic literacy of today's journalists, who are unlikely to learn the grammar and logic of "Netwar" or "Fourth-Generation Warfare" in schools of journalism. And here, the culprit may be the military as much as academe.

Just like, on U.S. campuses today, it is forgotten that there was a time when "scholarly originality" was not exclusively measured in terms of "policy irrelevance, " in the U.S. military it is equally forgotten that, during the first part of the Cold War, the Pentagon was one of the main sponsors of academic research in social sciences in general, and in the then-emerging discipline of "Communication Research" in particular: all the pioneers of the field, at one point or another, worked for the Pentagon (38). From the 1960s on, though, the Pentagon deserted the "battlefield of ideas," abandoning the research agenda of Communication Studies to marketers on the one hand, and on the other to a "left-over Left" whose warped sense of "civism" is to loudly protest the presence of ROTC on campuses while remaining strangely silent about the pollution of academic research by Saudi donations.

The disengagement of the Pentagon from media research is all the more paradoxical that it happens exactly at the time when the media were playing a larger role in the conduct of warfare ("living room war"), and redefining their relation to government in an adversarial way. Published in 1966, James Reston's aptly named *The Artillery of the Press* can be considered as a declaration of war on the government in general and - given the context of the Vietnam War - on the military in particular: "My theme is that the rising power of the United States in world affairs, and particularly of the American President, requires, not a more compliant press, but a relentless barrage of facts

and criticism, as noisy but also as accurate as artillery fire."(39). But as it turned out, without a minimum of strategic *literacy*, a seemingly value-neutral "barrage of facts and criticisms" can lead to outright disinformation and "objective complicity" (as Marxists would say) with the enemy: and so it is that, two years later, the U.S. media presented the Tet offensive as a defeat for the U.S. when it was in fact an overwhelming American victory, and from then on, the Fourth Power, for all practical purposes, became indistinguishable from a Fifth Column.

What is to be done? In the context of a Long War, "media management" alone won't do. It's up to NDU to "engage" schools of journalism, offer seminars on "media and security", develop internships in the Defense Information School, offer postgraduate fellowship for policy relevant research, etc. If not, U.S. journalists will continue to be strategically illiterate at worst; at best, they will take a couple of course in "security studies." But here again, security studies, as taught in the academic world, is becoming increasingly policy-irrelevant: nowadays, security studies is about "theory-building", and only marginally about "policy-making." For the "Greatest Generation," scholarship in security studies was synonymous with policy-relevant Quincy Wright and Hans Morgenthau; for the not-so-great generation of today, it has become synonymous with Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane.(40) If that trend continues, who will considered "eminent scholars" by the next generation? It is perhaps time for NDU to consider becoming a doctoral degree-granting university, would it be only to ensure that the professors of the Service academies in a generation from now won't equate "security studies" with Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio.

Which leads us to a broader societal question: "who will educate the educators?" All too often, we have been hearing the same two dozen academics denounce loudly the existence of a (largely imaginary) "civil-military gap" and gravely raise the question: "who will guard the guardians?". Given the sorry state of both the Ivory Tower and of the Fourth Estate, the time may have come for the U.S. military to launch a counter-offensive and, pointing out to the well-documented civil-academic gap and civil-media gaps, ask themselves seriously: "who will educate the educators about the strategic challenges of the new century." Not a few military officers are today complaining about the toxic effects of "Cultural Marxism" on U.S. campuses, but a wholesale rejection of postmodern thinking would amount to intellectual capitulation. In the rich conceptual arsenal of postmodernism, there are many weapons which could be used to wage "counterinsurgency warfare" against the semi-literate academic lumpen-intelligentsia.

But I digress. In the short-term, there are other priorities. In mass communication, ours is the age of Blog Journalism and Buzz Marketing; in the military, as General Krulak pointed out, ours is the age of the Strategic Corporal, for better and for worse. For worse: two dozens reservists can seriously impede the war effort in Abu Graib. For better: the Iraq war has seen the emergence of the Grunt-Journalist through the phenomenon of "warblog." Not only do warbloggers routinely do fact-checking correct the account of the main stream media, but dozens of blogs have an audience comparable to a midsize regional paper (41). By choice or by necessity, your average military blogger find himself waging guerrilla warfare against the mainstream media, and it would not be inappropriate for the Defense Information School to teach would-be milbloggers the fundamentals of Netwar. Whenever the situation calls for it, Strategic Corporals could

thus function as "Swarming Bloggers."

From 'Force Protection' to 'Strategic Fraternization'?:
The DOD-UMUC Program in the Age of the Long War

Since 1949, DOD has had a partnership with University of Maryland (University College) for U.S. troops abroad. In nearly half a century, more than one million service members have taken courses with UMUC, and more than 50 flag officers are UMUC graduates. As of 2004, UMUC served more than 47,000 active-duty military and dependents abroad and managed classes, classrooms and faculty at approximately 123 bases in 48 countries. (42)

As the recent QDR reminds us, "on any given day, 350,000 men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed or stationed in approximately 1300 countries." Like it or not, they are as much "ambassadors" of U.S. as the 6,500 Foreign Service Officers posted abroad. With the new language and culture requirements put forward in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap of January 2005, one can assume that learning programs will go beyond Defense Language institute and Foreign Service Institute and that UMUC will be a full partner: if you have 20,000 troops stationed in Qatar, it makes all the sense in the world to have some of them learn Arabic there rather than at Monterey. And since the U.S. military has been criticized for an excessive attention to "force protection" and lack of "cultural sensitivity" (the two issues are not unrelated), it would equally make sense to try pilot programs in, so to speak, "strategic fraternization," whereby UMUC's military campuses abroad are open to selected local

students.

Edu Ops as Counter-Info Ops:
Cartoon Jihad Revisited

Now, some will object that Edu Ops are fine and dandy, but there is still a 24/7

news cycle out there, and you have to feed the media beast. Edu Ops won't do much

good when confronted to an Info Op as sophisticated as the recent Danish Cartoon affair,

right? Wrong. Sophisticated it was, indeed:

Take a dozen cartoons published in a Danish paper in September 2005, add three

truly offensive (but fabricated) cartoons in a dossier that you subsequently present to the

summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in December.   Then, at the time of

own choosing, and through a "deep coalition" of various Muslim NGOs, governments,

and IOs, orchestrate a "spontaneous" campaign of indignation (in the streets, in the

courts, in the media, on the internet) for several weeks; finally, to crown it all, have the

56 countries of the OIC petition the UN to introduce laws against "blasphemy"(43). In

short, the "culminating point" of Swarming is what the Pentagon these days rightly refers

to as "Lawfare" (whether at the level of international law or, as in Europe today, at the

national and EU levels).

Impressive as this kind of "info ops" is at first sight, the truth is that it simply

builds up on the tactics inaugurated by the Algerian FLN, Nasser's "Voice of the Arabs,"

and the Arab League some fifty years ago.(44) Except for the existence of "new media,"

the only thing that was possibly new in the Cartoon affair is "Lawfare" – and the

concerted actions of various Muslim NGOS, states, or informal "caucuses" in the UN system in the past two months shows a great degree of orchestration and sophistication. These info ops are indeed sophisticated, and we should expect more of the same in the future.

But U.S. government officials should also avoid the temptation of trying to react in "real-time" at all costs, i.e. before sorting the facts. There are times when you think that you are in the enemy's "decision-cycle," only to realize later you have simply fallen in his trap. With a minimum of "cultural intelligence," the counter-offensive to the Cartoon Affair could have been based on two critical talking points: 1) These cartoons were deemed so harmless that they were reproduced in November 2005 in an Egyptian paper *during Ramadan* without any outcry – so what's the fuss all about? 2) Where does the ludicrous idea that Islam *as such* prohibits the depiction of the Prophet come from anyway? Throughout the centuries, there have been countless depictions of Mohammed by Muslim artists, some of whom are in Western museums today. Let us *teach* you a thing or two about your religion (the BBG - the State Department's television station – could produce a documentary which, ostensibly packaged as "Islam in American Collections," would set the historical record straight on the question of depiction and put a purely Salafist interpretation of Islam on the defensive).

The Cartoon affair was a perfect illustration of the concept of "swarming" developed by theoreticians of "Netwar." But this kind of info ops must always be met with a two-pronged counterattack: one that focuses on factual information (and if we ever manage to fix the interagency process, we could, from time to time, indulge into

swarming-type "show of force," just to signal that America's patience with orchestrated cartoon-like campaigns is not infinite); the second that takes the fight at a higher level, that of education – the only level where a campaign of De-Salafization can be won.

That said, one of the main challenges of the Battle for Hearts and Minds at the operational level will continue to be how to conduct an effective "information campaign" in societies which do not particularly value "factual truth." For it is one thing to deliver accurate information to foreign audiences, and quite another to make them value "accurate information" as such. As military analyst Ralph Peters shrewdly remarked in an essay which would be worth quoting in its entirety:

"Our sloppy rhetoric about the Information Age is ever short on specifics, and generally cites the wonderful volume of data now available to the average citizen as revolutionary. But that flood of information has the quality of an act of nature – immense, uncontainable and irreversible, and, as with a natural flood, some countries and cultures prove better prepared than others to cope with the consequences. There are two salient factors that determine the success or failure of states in the post-modern world: the *quality* of information available to the population, and the *ability* of the population to discern quality information. That sounds simple. It isn't.

Consider Egypt. While a great deal of data is available to literate Egyptians, those individuals are not "truth literate." If you read the Egyptian papers, you will be astonished at the difference with which they interpret the world. The media is about cultural and national self-justification, not about reporting facts. In one brief stretch this year, Egyptian papers reported that Israel was behind the attacks on local tourist sites (a fabrication created by the government to avoid admitting a domestic terrorist problem); that Princess Diana had been murdered by British intelligence so that she would not deliver a half-Arab, Islamic half-brother to the heir to the throne (this story has astonishing credibility throughout the Islamic world); and that Egyptian school children were suffering convulsions because Israelis had slipped them poisoned pencils that infected them as they did their lessons (perhaps the best excuse for non performance since "The dog ate my homework'). A country or culture that cannot tell fact from fiction cannot succeed in the postmodern era, with its dependence on data to create wealth." (45)

Here again, there is more to communication than "connectivity" – or, for that

matter, than "media development." For even the West succeeds in have Muslim journalists adopt Western standards of professionalism and accuracy, this will not, by itself, guarantee that the reading public itself will end up valuing the outcome (i.e. "fact reporting"). It's going to be "a long, hard slog" indeed.

One thing is sure: nearly five years after 9/11, the Global Jihad remains primarily an Insurgency within Islam, not a Clash of Civilizations. The Jihadists will certainly not stop trying to turn this limited insurgency into a Clash between the West and Islam, and the West should carefully avoid falling into that trap. But, equally important, the West should never go out of its way to pretend it does not exist as "the West"; for a civilization that does not respect itself certainly should not expect to be respected by others.

NOTES:

(1) Jules Isaac, *The Teaching of Contempt: Christian Roots of Antisemitism*, New York 1964 [Paris 1947]. A leading historian of the Third Republic, Isaac played a decisive role in convincing the Papacy to undertake an "agonizing reappraisal" of the Church's relations to Judaism.

(2) The best analysis of Middle Eastern Exceptionalism to date is Barry Rubin's *The Tragedy of the Middle East*, Cambridge University Press, 2002. For a day-to-day monitoring of this systematic "culture of hatred," see www.memri.org.

(3) The expression of "virtual caliphate" is not used here a mere metaphor, but as a theoretical concept, i.e. as a particular kind of "virtual state". See Richard Rosencrance, *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*, 1999

(4) On U.S. Government support for Hollywood, see Ruth Vasey, *The World According to Hollywood, 1918-1939*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1997; Andrew Higson, ed., *"Film Europe" and "Film America: Cinema, Commerce and Cultural Exchanges, 1920-1939*, University of Exeter Press, 199; Geoffrey Nowell, ed. *Hollywood and Europe: Economics, Culture National Identity, 1945-1995*, British Film Institute, 1998; Toby Miller, ed., *Global Hollywood*, British Film Institute, 2001.

(5) Michael Medved, *Hollywood vs. America*, HarperCollins, 1992.

(6) Michael Medved, "That's Entertainment?: Hollywood's contribution to anti-Americanism abroad", *The National Interest*, Summer 2002.

(7) The standard study here is Melvin L. Defleur and Margaret H. Defleur, *Learning to Hate Americans: How U.S. Media Shape Negative Attitudes among Teenagers in Twelve Countries*, Marquette Books, 2003.

(8) As one study pointed out, the golden age of Hollywood happened to coincide at the time when the greatest censorship was in place. See Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*, University of California Press, 1987

(9) On the public diplomacy of the Marshall Plan, see the recent film festival/traveling exhibit at www.sellingdemocracy.org. I am not aware that the mini-Marshall Plan launched in 2002 under the name of Millennium Challenge Account has had the same kind of media exposure.

(10) Jack G. Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*, Interlink Publishing, 2001

(11) Matthew Bogdanos, *Thieves of Bhagdad*, Bloomsbury, 2005. It is worth noting that

the U.S. "lost" European public opinion on Iraq not on the eve of the campaign, but in the aftermath of the looting of the National Museum. The very first PD disaster - before Abu Graib - was the perception that the U.S. military's priority had been to guard the Oil Ministry rather than the National Museum of a country which, under the name of "Mesopotamia," is after all considered as the "cradle of civilization." As it turned out later, stories about the scale of the looting were vastly exaggerated: but to this day, foreign public opinion has not been made aware of the real story.

(12) Thomas PM Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map - War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004, p.49. For earlier - and more flexible - interpretations, see James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two World: Core and Periphery in the Post Cold War Era," *International Organization*, Spring 1992; Aaron Wildavsky and Max Singer, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil*, Chatham House, 1993; Robert Cooper, *The Post-Modern State and the World Order*, Demos, 2000; and Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, June-July 2002. For the limits of neo-functionalist theories of "integration" (which were given a new lease on life with the advent of "globalization"), see Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, St Martin's Press, 2000.

(13) David Ignatius, "From "Connectedness" to Conflict," *Washington Post*, February 22, 2006.

(14) Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action - a Future Worth Creating*, C.G. Putnam's Sons, 2005, p.231.

(15) On the "security dilemma," see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1976 (arguably the most policy-relevant work in I.R. theory in the past 30 years).

(16) Francis Fukuyama, "After Neoconservatism," *The New York Time Magazine*, February 1 19, 2006. On the one hand, the "identity crisis" created by globalization is not uniquely Muslim (for the past 15 years, the French chattering class has been whining about the threat posed to the "modele francais" by "la mondialisation"). On the other hand, the specifically Muslim form of "identity crisis," which is centered on gender relations, predates globalization proper (Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi's seminal *Behind the Veil - Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society*, was first published in 1975) and, at any rate, is less decisive than the active campaign of Salafization conducted by Saudi Arabia.

(17) For a close examination of the empowerment of the Saudi Caliphate by the West (and of the Western instrumentalization of Islamism against Communism) during the Cold War, see Rachel Bronson's *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership With Saudi Arabia*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

(18) On Ballot-Box Warriors, see Robert V. Friedenberg, *Communication Consultants in Political Campaigns: Ballot-Box Warriors*, Praeger, 1997; on White House Public

Diplomacy, see Richard Rose, *The Post-Modern President: the White House Meets the World,* Chatham House, 1991

(19) Thomas A. McCain, d.: *The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf*, Greenwood Press, 1003

(20) On the Three-Screen War, see my "World War IV as Fourth-Generation Warfare," *Policy Review*, web special, January 2006 (www.policyreview.org)

(21) See Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating With the World - U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, St Martin's Press, 1990, and more recently, the 2005 Report of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/55903.htm)

(22) On educational activities during the Cold War, see Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe*, Princeton University Press, 2001; Giuliana Gemelli, ed. *The Ford Foundation and Europe: Cross-Fertilization of Learning in Social Science and Management*, European Interuniversity Press, 1998; Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy - The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Post-War Europe*, The Free Press,1989; Sallie Pisani, *The CIA and the Marshall Plan*, University Press of Kansas, 1991.

(23) See FY 2004 Report of the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training (www.iawg.gov/public_index.html), which includes the Department of Defense's educational programs.

(24) Alan Wolfe, "Anti-American Studies," *The New Republic*, 10 February 2003. It is worth remembering that it is during the course of a USIA-sponsored stay in the U.S. that the Egyptian Sayyed Qutb became the Lenin of Islamism.

(25) On the "business" of global education, see www.tradeineducation.org.

(26) Because USNATO Public Affairs is familiar with DOD operations, USNATO was able to send journalists from the NATO Med Dialogue countries (Middle East and North Africa) to cover operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the feed-back was remarkably positive. But overall, and through no fault of their own, the 614 public diplomacy officers have very little knowledge of DOD operations in general, including media operations.

(27) Kathleen Hall Jamieson: *The Interplay of Influence: News, Advertising, Politics and the Mass Media*, Wadsworth, 2000. On soft news and the Iraq war, see Matthew A. Baum, *Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age*, Princeton University Press, 2003. To this writer's knowledge, the only instance of "edu ops" through "Edutainment" is the current partnership between RAND and "Sesame Street" in Afghanistan.

(28) Major General Robert Scales, "Too Busy to Learn," Military.com, January 23, 2006

(www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,86149,00.html). See also Col. Lloyd J. Matthews, "The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American Arms," *Army Magazine*, July 2002

(29) On the evolving role of information in military history, see for instance Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed. *Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*, RAND, 1999. On security assistance and edu ops, see Duncan L. Clarke et al, *Send Guns and Money - Security Asssitance and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Praeger, 1997 and Chester J. Pach, *Arming the Free World - the Origins of the United States Military Asssitance Program, 1945-1950*, The University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

(30) The episode deserves a better treatment than Ron Robin's *The Barbed-Wire College - Reeducating German POWs in the United States during World War II*, Princeton University Press, 1995. See also Arnold Krammer, *Nazi Prisoners of War in America*, 1996. For a comparative study of U.S., British and Soviet re-education of German soldiers, see Arthur L. Smith, *The War for the German Mind: Re-Educating Hitler's Soldiers*, Berghahn Books, 1996

(31) Chris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, Routledge, 2000

(32) John Vinocur, "A question of nerve close to NATO's heart," *New York Times*, January 17, 2006; On NATO as global trainer, see Ambassador Victoria Nuland, Speech at the German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Center, Brussels, September 22, 2005.

(33) Derek Reveron, ed. *America's Viceroys - The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p.4

(34) Steven A. Cook: *The Unspoken Power: Civil-Military Relations and the Prospects of Reform*, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings, 2004.

(35) Tatu Vanhanem, ed., *Strategies of Democratization*, Taylor and Francis, 1992

(36) See special issue of the *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Winter 2004-2005.

(37) Quoted in Norman Podhoretz, "The Panic over Iraq," *Commentary Magazine*, January 2006. By the same token, it is worth noting that there are out there a significant number of fatwas against al-Qaedas, but they never get reported by the mainstream media.

(38) Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960*, Oxford University Press, 1994.

(39) James Reston, *The Artillery of the Press*, 1996, p. vii

(40) A recent survey of the field of international relations showed that the traditionally dominant Realist paradigm has been by the Liberal paradigm; a full 80% of I.R. professors opposed the Iraq war, and only 10% are in favor of increasing defense budgets; last but not least, 69% define themselves as being left of center, against 13% as being right of center. *Foreign Policy Magazine,* November-December 2005. On policy-irrelevance in both international relations and area studies, see respectively Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Ninci, *Beyond the Ivory Tower - International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Irrelevance*, Columbia University Press, 2001, and Martin Kramer, Ivory *Towers in the Sand - The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001

(41) Glenn Harlan Reynolds: "The Blogs of War: How the Internet is reshaping foreign policy," *The National Interest* 75, Spring 2004, and "Milblogging.com joins forces with military.com" (www.milblogging.com. January 19, 2006).

(42) Patrick Dickson, "University of Maryland University College get 10-year pact," *Stars and Stripes*, December 20, 2004.

(43) As numerous observers pointed out, the timing of the campaign (January 2006) was convenient for at least three state actors. The first was Saudi Arabia - to distract the attention of the Muslim world away from the trampling deaths of 345 pilgrims in Mecca on January 12 (an event that got little press coverage in the est, but an enormous amount of press in the Middle East); the second was Syria - to distract attention from the UN probe on the assassination of former Lebanese premier; the third was Iran - since Denmark will chair the UN Security Council when the issue of nuclear Iran is going to be addressed. (see Olivier Guitta, "Perfect Timing for Cartoon Jihad," *FontPageMagazine*, February 15, 2006, and Jack Kelly, "The War Behind the Cartoon War," *RealClearPolitics*, February 7, 2006). Swarming-type actions like the Cartoon Jihad are not meant as mere diversionary *tactics; the strategic* goal is to take advantage of the brief moment of surprise when the West is destabilized to extract (incrementally) irreversible concessions.

(44) On the Algerian precedent, see Matthew Connelly: *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*, Oxford University Press, 2003, and Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: States, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*, Cambridge University Press, 2003. On the role of the Cairo-based "Voice of the Arabs" (the ancestor of Al-Jazeera), see Abdel-Kader Hatem, *Information and the Arab Cause*, Longman, 1974 (a scholar and an officer, the author was Minister of Information and Culture under Nasser and Sadat).

(45) Ralph Peters, "The New Strategic Trinity", *Parameters*, Winter 1998.