'If War Should Come': Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War 1935-1939

Philip M. Taylor

Philip M. Taylor

'If War Should Come':[1]
Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War
1935-1939

When British representatives set off for Russia in September 1941
to attend the Moscow Conference, they went fully expecting the
Soviets to enquire exactly how Britain proposed to win the war
against Nazi Germany. The delegation had been instructed to reply:

> We shall undermine them by propaganda; depress them with the blockade; and,
> above all, bomb their homelands ceaselessly, ruthlessly, and with ever increasing
> weight of bombs.[2]

Two years earlier, one of the British Cabinet's earliest decisions
following the outbreak of the Second World War had foreshadow-
ed this statement. Within hours of the Anglo-French declaration of
hostilities on 3 September 1939, authorization was given for the
Royal Air Force to initiate the psychological offensive against the
Third Reich.[3] That same night, Whitley bombers from RAF 4
Group showered six million leaflets over selective targets on Ger-
man soil. This exercise, the technical success of which helped to
pave the way for Bomber Command's crippling night-time bomb-
ing raids later in the war,[4] launched what was to become the most
vociferous war of words yet waged by belligerent powers.
  That such emphasis should have been placed upon the weapon of
propaganda from the very outset of the conflict stands out in sharp
contrast to the situation which had existed in August 1914 when the
British government had entered the First World War almost com-

pletely unprepared for the conduct of psychological warfare. Although some prior consideration had been given to the related question of censorship,[5] as reflected by the immediate severance of the German transatlantic cables, the government was thereafter forced to improvise the machinery required for more positive forms of action in order to combat the widespread activities of an already fully-operational German propaganda machine. However, despite the establishment of Charles Masterman's War Propaganda Bureau at Wellington House in September 1914,[6] and despite the undervalued work of the various Whitehall departments in this direction,[7] it nonetheless took three and a half years for a full Ministry of Information to emerge and before a specific Enemy Propaganda Department was created at Crewe House.[8] The mistake, if such it was,[9] was not to be repeated in September 1939. On the outbreak òf the Second World War, not only did a Ministry of Information spring immediately into action but preparations for the conduct of psychological warfare were also sufficiently well advanced to enable the British to launch their first offensive strike against the enemy with teeflets rather than with bombs.

That the government should have been prepared for propaganda in 1939 in a way that it had not been in 1914 was made all the more remarkable in light of the situation which had existed during the Munich crisis merely twelve months before. On 5 September 1938, Stephen King-Hall, the distinguished publicist and expert on international affairs, had been convinced that

> a moment might arrive when the whole situation might be saved by an immediate and nation-wide appeal to the German people. If we are involved in a war, a shower of pamphlets over Germany should precede a shower of bombs over the Ruhr (I hope we've got the bombers).[10]

Yet even if the bombers had been available, the Air Ministry had still to be consulted as to its willingness to release the necessary men and machines for what would obviously be a highly dangerous mission. Moreover, there did not at that time exist a pamphlet, even in draft form, let alone one translated, printed and ready for dissemination. There was thus a very real danger, as King-Hall warned, that 'if the crisis gets worse . . . we may be caught with our trousers down' in so far as propaganda was concerned.[11]

Despite some impressive improvisation in the weeks that followed, including the drafting of various leaflets[12] and some experimen-

tal leaflet-dropping raids carried out by the RAF in the north of England,[13] such an embarrassment was avoided only by Neville Chamberlain's third flight to Germany to bring Europe back from the brink of war by signing the Munich Agreement. In other words, Britain would almost certainly not have been prepared for psychological warfare in September 1938. Clearly, therefore, much progress was made during the final year of peace. Several recent publications, most notably Ian McLaine's *Ministry of Morale*[14] and Michael Balfour's *Propaganda in War*,[15] have thrown much new light on that progress but, overall, the authors tend to be somewhat critical of the pre-war planning process in view of the disastrous start made by British propagandists during the initial stages of the Second World War. Whereas many of those early mistakes can undoubtedly be attributed to the peacetime preparations, others cannot. The difference between the anticipated nature of a future war and the reality of experience is often very wide. When, for example, the long feared 'knock-out blow' from the air failed to materialize in 1939, British propagandists had to deal with the peculiar problems (such as boredom) raised during the period of the 'phoney war'.[16] Similarly, when the *Luftwaffe* did begin to appear over British cities, it was learned that aerial bombardment often served to consolidate rather than shatter civilian morale. Moreover, not only do Balfour and McLaine tend to examine the pre-war preparations from the retrospective standpoint of the 1940s, but they also examine the planning process in isolation from the considerable peacetime propaganda machinery which the British government had been developing throughout the 1930s and in isolation from developments elsewhere in Whitehall which were to affect considerably the wartime organization for propaganda. This article will therefore attempt to re-examine those preparations in light of these factors and in light of the lessons provided by the 1914-18 war and by the Munich crisis.

During the 1930s, there was a widely held conviction that, if war should come, it would be a long war of attrition in which a strong economy would serve as the fourth arm of defence.[17] Although Chamberlain's policy as Prime Minister was to suffer dearly from his own restraining influence while serving as Chancellor of the Exchequer,[18] he remained determined to ensure that Britain's preparations for war did not weaken the nation's capacity to actually wage

war. The roots of this conviction lay in the experience of the First World War. The use of the economic weapon, whether in the form of the Allied blockade of the Central Powers or Germany's attempt to starve Britain into submission by the unrestricted U-boat campaign, had been designed to weaken the capacity of the other side to continue the struggle on the field of battle. From the British point of view, the successful application of the former, combined with her ability successfully to resist the stranglehold of the latter, was felt to have played a critical role in determining the final result. The cost of doing so, however, had been high. True, Britain had emerged victorious, seemingly at the height of her power, but in reality Britain also emerged from the war in a process of both relative and absolute decline. A repetition might signal her complete collapse as a great world power.

But the blockade had not simply been designed to deprive the enemy's armed forces of their basic equipment and supplies. It was also directed towards the mass of the enemy population. Indeed, the First World War substantially narrowed the distance which had previously existed between the military and civilian theatres of operation. Sections of the community which had hitherto remained generally uninvolved in the exigencies of national survival now found themselves directly affected by events at the front line. Nor could the military afford to ignore events on the home front. For the British, the introduction of conscription in 1916 was a major step on her road to total war in which the entire resources of the nation had to be mobilised against the entire resources of the enemy before victory could be secured.[19]

The impact of these developments, combined with the lessons to be drawn from the alarming frequency of mutinies within the mass conscript armies and the outbreak of revolutions in Russia, central Europe and elsewhere, led to a heightened appreciation within the British governing élite of the role which the masses would henceforth play in the survival of the state or, alternatively, in its destruction. This in turn led to an acceleration of the development of means to influence and control the opinions of people whose actions were becoming increasingly more significant with improving standards of literacy and education, growing politicization, and the broadening base of political power. Morale and opinion thus became military assets and propaganda began to emerge as the principal instrument of control over them. By 1918, it had become the fifth arm of defence.

In Germany, British war propaganda seemed more like an effective weapon of attack than of defence. Evidence of its profound impact was readily available in the form of testimonies by such prominent enemy personalities as Ludendorff and Hindenberg. In the 1920s, Adolf Hitler was to perpetuate further the British reputation for success by stating in *Mein Kampf* that the German army had not been defeated on the field of battle but had lost the war due to the disintegration of morale from within, a process which had been 'brilliantly' exploited by British propaganda. Admittedly, Hitler used this line of argument for propaganda reasons of his own — the 'stab-in-the-back' theory was but its logical conclusion — but the fact remains that British propaganda was believed by friend and former foe alike to have played such a decisive role in Allied victory that its revival in any future war seemed virtually guaranteed.

However, at the close of the 'war to end all wars', such a possibility seemed inconceivable. Accordingly, just as the British armed forces were gradually demobilized and reduced, so also was the wartime propaganda machinery dismantled in optimistic anticipation of a lasting peace in which neither would be necessary. Although a skeleton organization remained in the form of the Foreign Office News Department upon which to build in future should the need arise, the likelihood of it being so used seemed remote. Not that the British were particularly proud of their wartime reputation for being successful propagandists. Propaganda, as Baldwin said in 1918, was 'not a word that has a pleasant sound in English ears'.[20] It was regarded as a necessary evil of war, an 'unEnglish' activity associated with subversion and secrecy. Indeed, such was the overwhelming degree of prejudice against its continued use in peacetime that the British government was prepared to forfeit the considerable lead it had gained by 1918 and surrender the initiative to other governments which were less reluctant to put this new weapon to peacetime use. As a result, during the inter-war years, Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany utilized the lessons of the British wartime experience and combined them with new developments in communications technology in order to mould propaganda into a powerful weapon of peacetime nationalistic expansion.

As the lofty idealism of the post-war era came to be progressively eroded by the aggressive policies of Japan, Italy and Germany, the prospect of another war had to be considered as a distinct possibility. When, therefore, British defence planners were forced to con-

sider the question of contingency plans for a future war in the wake
of the abandonment of the Ten Year Rule, the painfully slow death
of the World Disarmament Conference and the production of the
Defence Requirements Committee's first major report, there was
every reason to assume that propaganda would play an even greater
role in the next war than it was believed to have done in the last.
The advent of the first truly mass media in the form of radio and
sound film, combined with the widespread peacetime exploitation
of propaganda by the totalitarian regimes, merely served to rein-
force this conviction. But there was one significant addition to the
anticipated nature of total war: the bomber. During the 1930s, the
fear of the bomber and of an aerial knock-out blow 'critically af-
fected the making of British defence and foreign policy'.[21] It also
affected the planning for propaganda in the next war.

Britain's insular position could no longer protect her people
from direct involvement in a continental war as the bomber reduc-
ed still further the distance between soldier and civilian. British
cities were vulnerable to attack in a way that they had not been
before. If this threat was portrayed as something of a fantasy in
Alexander Korda's 1936 science fiction film, *Things to Come*, the
reality could only have been driven home by newsreels showing the
bombing of Guernica and Madrid during the Spanish Civil War.[22]
It was therefore not unnaturally assumed that, if war should come,
civilian morale was likely to prove a critical factor, and indeed it
might be assumed that film would have a key role to play in helping
to sustain the populace through the dark hours of saturation bomb-
ing. But, in fact, the overriding assumption that the bomber would
always get through led to the decision to close all cinemas in the
event of war in an attempt to reduce the potential devastation and
loss of life.[23] Clearly, only if Britain could survive the *Luftwaffe*'s
anticipated initial knock-out blow from the air would the fourth
and fifth arms of defence begin to play a decisive role. Even so,
during that crucial initial phase, propaganda would still have an
important role to play, both at home and abroad, and it was
therefore felt that Britain would need to be sufficiently well-
equipped for such work from the outset.

Significantly, the initiative came from the Air Ministry. The
precise origins of the decision to begin planning for propaganda in
the next war remain somewhat vague but it does appear that, dur-
ing the summer of 1935, as the Committee of Imperial Defence
(CID) was preparing for the impending clash with Italy in the

Mediterranean over the Abyssinian affair, one of its sub-committees was deliberating over the delicate question of censor-ship in time of war. It was recognised that propaganda and censor-ship were different sides of the same coin; some method of releas-ing news would be required to work in conjunction with the system for controlling it.[24] C. P. Robertson, press attaché at the Air Ministry, appears to have taken the initiative in proposing that plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information should be set in motion so that 'we should not merely start off in the case of a future conflict where we ended in the last'.[25] In September 1935, Robertson produced a lengthy memorandum which argued that the wartime system had been deficient from an organizational point of view largely because of the multiplicity of bodies engaged in official propaganda. Crewe House had been responsible for enemy pro-paganda, with the exception of Turkey which had been the respon-sibility of the Ministry of Information, which in turn had been responsible for allied and neutral propaganda. The National War Aims Committee had been responsible for home propaganda, although the Press Bureau also had a strong interest. The War Of-fice had been responsible for propaganda in military zones. In other words, Robertson's point was that in any future war pro-paganda must be conducted from under one roof. Centralization was, in his opinion, an essential precondition of success.

Robertson's memorandum was considered by the CID on 14 Oc-tober 1935 when it was decided to establish a sub-committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information on the outbreak of war.[26] The chairman and Minister of Informa-tion Designate was Sir John Colville, at that time Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade but shortly to become Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland. His sub-committee boasted an impressive membership: Sir Warren Fisher represented the Treasury and Sir Robert Vansittart the Foreign Office; Sir Russell Scott, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office and his counterpart at the Dominions Office, Sir Edward Harding; J. A. G. Troup and Major-General J. G. Dill, respectively the Directors of Naval and Military Intelligence; Sir Donald Banks and Sir John Reith, the Directors-General of the GPO and of the BBC; and Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet and to the CID, Rex Leeper, head of the Foreign Office News Department, and Stephen Gaselee, the Foreign Office Librarian, were also present in view of their considerable ex-

perience of propaganda in war and peace. The government was certainly taking the whole business very seriously. Warren Fisher informed the only member who was not a government official — Sir John Reith — that this was 'as strong a CID committee as had ever been called'.[27] This may well have been so, but it was also true that few of its members had any detailed knowledge or experience of propaganda. This was presumably the reason why meetings of the sub-committee proved to be infrequent; only five full meetings were convened between 1935 and 1939, three of which were held within the first nine months of its creation. Rather, the detailed planning was undertaken largely by subordinate officials.

Those officials were faced with a formidable task for an alarming eventuality. The defensive thinking which characterized all aspects of war preparations also permeated the planners of the Ministry of Information. For example, little time or thought appears to have been given to the question of enemy propaganda until 1938, and the decision to close all cinemas on the outbreak of war was perhaps one reason why film received relatively little attention until 1939. Because there was felt to be no effective form of defence against the bomber, the RAF devised the retaliatory strike against the Ruhr, a strategy which remained in force until after Munich when the emphasis was shifted more on to the air defence of Great Britain. Paradoxically, however, it was only then, when the RAF was concentrating upon the development of the fighter in conjunction with radar, that thoughts of a psychological offensive against the enemy began to determine an alternative use for the bomber.

A major problem for the planners was that although the march of technology ensured that the character of the next war would almost certainly be radically different from that of the last, they had only the precedent of the Great War on which to model their new structure — unless of course they chose to model their organization upon that of Goebbels. If that was effectively what happened, as Michael Balfour has argued, it created a ridiculous situation: 'in the war of words the British imagined that they were copying from the Germans something which the Germans imagined they had copied from the British!'[28] But, as Ian McLaine has pointed out, references to the German propaganda organization are extremely rare in the records of the shadow Ministry of Information, 'and no reference whatsoever to Goebbels by name'.[29] The British were, after all, planning for an entirely different set of criteria and a liberal democracy with its own peculiar historical

idiosyncracies required different propaganda techniques than that of a dictatorship.

If the lessons of the past were to prove of any real value for the future, they had first to be discovered. During the 1930s, this proved easier said than done because the records of the various wartime propaganda organizations had largely been destroyed in 1920, or else 'lost' in the years that followed. Detailed information on the wartime experiment was simply not available. Instead, the planners were forced to consult the memoirs of former participants, such as E. T. Cook's *The Press in Wartime* (1920), Douglas Brownrigg's *Indiscretions of the Naval Censor* (1920) and Sir Campbell Stuart's *Secrets of Crewe House* (1920). This exercise meant that the planning proceeded from a highly misleading premise because these works tended to exaggerate the role which British propaganda was believed to have played either in bringing the United States into the war on the Allied side in 1917 or in bringing Germany to her knees the following year. As a result, Robertson's initial warning went unheeded. The second Ministry of Information would, it seemed, merely turn out to be a more streamlined version of the first after all.

The outcome might well have been different, however, if the Foreign Office had originally been allowed to have its way. At the first meeting of the CID sub-committee on 25 October 1935, Leeper challenged the basic assumption of Robertson's memorandum that the ministry should be an entirely separate entity. Alternatively, he argued, the Foreign Office News Department should constitute the nucleus of any future wartime organization. Although he failed to mention it, he did have the support of a CID decision made in October 1923 which inserted into the War Book a clause which stated that, in the event of another war or emergency, the Foreign Office should be responsible for propaganda 'or for recommending if and when a separate body for dealing with such work should be constituted'.[30] Leeper considered that in the News Department, with its reservoir of resident experts and its links with the fast growing peacetime propaganda organizations such as the British Council,[31] there already existed an ideal basic structure capable of expansion and conversion to wartime requirements.[32] Under his scheme, it would merely be necessary to appoint a large advisory committee to maintain close contacts with the Foreign Office, the BBC and with other government departments. In effect, Leeper's proposal amounted to the reintroduction of the system which had existed in

1917 prior to the establishment of the Ministry of Information and Crewe House, a system which had enabled the Foreign Office to control the policy and direction of Britain's overseas propaganda before losing that control on Lloyd George's instructions to Beaverbrook and Northcliffe.[33]

The scheme divided the sub-committee. Hankey, Gaselee and, if to a lesser extent, Colville, considered the peacetime apparatus capable and worthy of expansion and conversion if war should come. But theirs was a minority view. Warren Fisher considered Leeper's proposal 'too parochial and narrow' and dismissed it as beyond the sub-committee's terms of reference, which clearly called for the creation of a separate ministry. He also pointed out that the experience of the Foreign Office was limited to overseas propaganda in peacetime; there was no guarantee that its News Department could undertake home propaganda and censorship in time of war. Fisher's objections gained the support of the rest of the sub-committee and it was decided that smoother running and greater efficiency would ensue if the ministry was created as a unit apart from the existing machinery and free from the interference of Whitehall. The implication was that a return to the 1918 system was infinitely preferable to a return to the arrangements which had existed before the Ministry of Information had taken charge of propaganda from the Foreign Office.

That the planners were subsequently prepared to accept the 1918 model as a blueprint for their work was entirely understandable, particularly as their sources of information gave them little reason for starting afresh and in view of the fact that the planning was undertaken on a part-time basis by civil servants who were already overworked in their normal peacetime duties. Small wonder, therefore, that progress was slow. Moreover, their hands were tied to a considerable extent by the somewhat rigid conception of the ministry laid down in a report of 27 July 1936 and accepted by the CID as the basis for planning some months later.[34] They were also restricted by decisions made before they had even been appointed. For example, in September 1935, another CID sub-committee had recommended that, in the event of war, a Ministry of Information should assume control over broadcasting and over the BBC.[35] This proposal was embodied in a report[36] and approved by the full CID on 14 October 1935 — nearly a fortnight before the first meeting of the sub-committee to establish a Ministry of Information. This decision meant that a disproportionate amount of time was devoted

by the planners to working out the wartime structure of the BBC and its position in relation to the ministry. Whereas broadcasting would undoubtedly prove an invaluable medium of wartime propaganda, there were other important instruments which demanded equal attention but which were denied their due consideration at first because of the determination of the BBC to be effectively exploited while, at the same time, preserving its autonomy and reputation.

The intolerable situation which resulted from these hindrances was shortly reflected in the plea of one official who wrote after being forced to consult an article on propaganda in the *Encylopaedia Britannica*, 'there must be experts somewhere'.[37] In fact, there were. In the first place, there was an abundant supply of experience and expertise within the existing peacetime propaganda machinery. For example, Lord William Tyrrell, the first chairman of the British Council, had not only served in the wartime propaganda organization but had also been head of the News and Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office for a brief period after the war. He was also currently serving as President of the British Board of Film Censors. John Buchan (Lord Tweedsmuir) had been in charge of the Department of Information in 1917. Lord Beaverbrook was still alive, as indeed was Sir Campbell Stuart, Northcliffe's right-hand man at Crewe House. Arthur Willert, head of the Foreign Office News Department from 1925 to 1934, had served in Britain's American propaganda organization while working as Washington correspondent of *The Times*.[38] There were also many journalists working in Fleet Street who, at one time or another, had been connected with the wartime organization, men such as Henry Wickham Steed, the former editor of *The Times*, and Sir Roderick Jones, the Managing Director of Reuters. H, Noble Hall, the Travel Association's Paris representative, had worked in Wellington House. So had Arnold Toynbee and various other Chatham House experts. Rex Leeper, Willert's successor as head of the News Department, was perhaps the leading Foreign Office exponent of increased peacetime propaganda, being personally responsible for the foundation of the British Council to conduct cultural propaganda in 1934 and for persuading the BBC to inaugurate broadcasts in foreign languages in 1938. Leeper had, in fact, been appointed Assistant Director-General Designate of the proposed News Division of the Ministry but was forced to withdraw his services in 1938 in order to concentrate upon his nor-

mal peacetime duties. Even Miles Lampson (Lord Killearn), Britain's ambassador in Egypt, had been involved in film propaganda work in 1916.[39] Sir William Jury, head of the Cinema Department of Beaverbrook's Ministry of Information, was still alive. Sir Joseph Ball, who in 1939 was placed in charge of the ministry's film work, was currently serving as deputy director of the National Publicity Bureau. In the private sector, there existed a growing body of industrial publicity experts such as Sidney Rogerson, the public relations officer at Imperial Chemical Industries, whose influential book, *Propaganda in the Next War*, was published in 1938.[40] The list is endless. But the only man, apart from Leeper, with any real idea of the problems involved who was directly involved in the planning before 1938 was Sir Stephen Tallents, who was appointed Director-General Designate in late 1936. Tallents had been Secretary of the pioneering Empire Marketing Board, 1926-32, and it had been under his aegis that John Grierson had been able to launch the British documentary film movement.[41] Following the Board's closure, he had been appointed public relations officer at the GPO, a post he held for three years before he became the BBC's public relations officer. But Tallents took up his appointment in the shadow Ministry of Information after the complete acceptance by the CID of the July 1936 report.

Essentially, the principal reason why Tallents was unable to consult the considerable body of expertise available derived from the intense secrecy which surrounded the planning for propaganda in the next war. It was felt that, should the preparations become public knowledge, it might create a political outcry at home. Despite the enormous progress which had been made in so far as the peacetime machinery was concerned, there was still a great deal of suspicion of official propaganda in Britain.[42] The first Ministry of Information had been disliked because it was directly responsible to Lloyd George and was financially independent of Treasury control.[43] During the only major wartime debate on the subject, the attitude of Parliament had been hostile, to say the least.[44] It was not beyond the imagination of many people to suspect that an unscrupulous government might utilize such a body as a means of sustaining political power. Moreover, a Ministry of Information essentially meant war, and the government could not allow the impression to form that it had resigned itself to such a probability. Knowledge of the planning might also provoke Hitler. However,

the effect of this policy of secrecy was to impose a severe brake upon the progress of the preparations.

By February 1938, a critical stage of the planning was reached. Tallents urged that, although 'considerable progress' had been made, the time had now come for the preparatory process to be extended 'beyond the limits of government departments and the BBC, so as to enlist representatives of such interests as the press and the film industry in the discussion of the machinery appropriate to the changed conditions of 1938'.[45] He then warned that the planning was not sufficiently well advanced to enable the ministry to spring into existence in the event of a sudden emergency. He wrote:

> Even in a war in which the actual operations were geographically restricted, public opinion might come to be engaged on a world-wide front, and might materially affect its issue. Our preparations for the conduct of war on land, by sea and in the air, are the concern of powerful existing departments, and their planning the subject of continuous study by specialised staffs. Our preparations for the conduct of wartime operations of great possible variety and extent in the field of public opinion have no comparable peacetime basis, and their planning is dependent on a handful of men, all, with one exception, very fully employed on other work.[46]

Both his sub-committee and the full CID agreed. With Hitler's annexation of Austria, the time had clearly arrived for a greater sense of urgency to be injected into the planning process.

When, however, a crisis did erupt over the question of the Sudetenland, the preparations were found to be hopelessly inadequate. The shadow Ministry of Information was partially mobilized on 26 September 1938 amidst chaos and confusion. Important decisions concerning appointments, accommodation and demarcation of duties had still to be resolved, while its relationship with the peacetime propaganda machinery had still to be clarified. The planners had still not consulted the media and there did not exist any draft leaflets or pamphlets. Tallents admitted to Leeper that the important foreign section of the proposed Publicity Division was 'not yet organised'.[47] Arrangements were made for the Foreign Office to transfer certain of its staff and facilities to the ministry, and on the 27 September the Foreign Office made arrangements with the Air Ministry and Stationery Office to print ten million leaflets in German which would be dropped by the RAF immediately war was

declared, but not before.[48] The theme to be adopted was to be that employed in 1918 — the destruction of the German governing regime rather than of the German people.

These improvisations did, however, raise a serious problem. At precisely what point was the ministry to assume responsibility for propaganda from the Foreign Office? Before the outbreak of war? Or immediately after? If the ministry sprang into existence prior to a formal declaration of hostilities, it might provoke opposition at home, particularly if war was averted at the last minute. Such action would also provide the enemy with advanced warning of what to expect in so far as psychological warfare was concerned, thereby providing him with an opportunity to prepare, say, for a leaflet raid, which in turn would merely serve to increase the considerable risks involved in such a mission. If, on the other hand, the Foreign Office was left in charge right up to the last minute, serious confusion might result from the wartime organization suddenly taking over from established Whitehall departments without any advanced preparation.

But there was a further complication. The Ministry of Information was not the only organization being prepared for the conduct of propaganda. In the wake of the Anschluss, two organizations came into being which were designed to conduct subversive activities against the enemy, including covert or 'black' propaganda (i.e. that emanating from an unattributable official source). The first of these, established under the auspices of MI6 and known as Section D, was set up 'to investigate every possibility of attacking potential enemies by means other than the preparation of military forces'.[49] Major Lawrence Grand was placed in charge of Section D's preparations in the fields of espionage, subversive propaganda designed to cause disaffection amongst the enemy, and what was described as 'moral sabotage'; it 'handled the unavowable'.[50] Together with another outfit known as GS(R), Section D was eventually to evolve into SOE.[51] The other organization which appears to have come into existence at about the same time was known as Department EH, after the initials of its headquarters at the Imperial Communications Committee at Electra House on the Victoria Embankment. Established initially under the auspices of the Foreign Office, Department EH was eventually to evolve into the Political Warfare Executive.[52] During the penultimate week of September 1938 (the exact date remains vague, but on or about the

24th),[53] Campbell Stuart was called in to take charge of Electra House and he began his work in complete secrecy, albeit too late to prove effective when the possible need of psychological warfare arose at the height of the Munich crisis.

Whether Tallents knew of the existence of these two organizations is not certain. It was subsequently discovered, however, that on 26 September Major Grand had been instructed (by whom is not known) to secure the dissemination of leaflets in German 'through all channels outside this country' — presumably this meant the Secret Intelligence Service — 'and had apparently got a few of them into Germany'.[54] Confirmation of this event is not available. Nor is it known what Electra House was doing during those critical days, although it does appear that Campbell Stuart had hardly begun to gather his staff together when the Prime Minister 'felt that in the Munich meeting he had achieved world peace, and I was instructed to suspend my operations'.[55]

From the point of view of the shadow Ministry of Information, the lessons of Munich were only too clear but, as Tallents wrote shortly afterwards, 'the sharpest and most urgent of them was the need of properly co-ordinated arrangements for the conveyance of information into enemy countries'.[56] On 5 October, he accordingly established contact with Section D, seemingly for the first time, in order to establish clear lines of demarcation and thus avoid the danger of overlapping. Grand informed the planners that there was no real problem for his concern was largely with black propaganda.[57] For example, in November 1938, he invited Hilda Matheson, a former Director of Talks and News at the BBC, to set up what came to be known as the Joint Broadcasting Committee and examine the possibility of broadcasting black propaganda 'from stations outside Great Britain, primarily to Germany but also to any other countries which proved available'.[58] Matheson began her work in February 1939 for a six month experimental period. Following a fact-finding tour of European radio stations, she discontinued an unprofitable arrangement recently made with Radio Luxembourg and instead advised the creation 'of a "goodwill" committee to sponsor broadcasts arranged through the broadcasting authorities of friendly countries, while the possibilities of getting programmes into Germany were explored.'[59] The Joint Broadcasting Committee of Section D was the result. Little more is known about this particular development, except that

Matheson chose as her liaison officer with the Ministry of Informa-
tion one Guy Burgess, but the peacetime work of this unit remains
a tantalizing mystery.

Tallents meanwhile continued to establish contacts with other in-
terested concerns, such as the Air Ministry, SIS and the War
Office. On 6 October 1938, he met with Majors E. K. Page and W.
T. Stephenson (later known as 'Intrepid') to establish a liaison with
military intelligence.[60] But of the various Whitehall departments
consulted, the Foreign Office proved the most reluctant to accept
his demarcation lines and, in the aftermath of Munich, there
developed a major inter-departmental struggle for control over
propaganda. Although the 1936 report had specified that the
Ministry of Information was to be responsible for all propaganda
at home and abroad in time of war, the events of September 1938
had merely served to cloud the issue. Now there existed a separate
body for black propaganda and one for enemy propaganda. The
ministry, it seemed, was now to be in control only of overt or
'white' propaganda (i.e. that conducted from an attributable
government agency). Moreover, on 27 September, the Treasury
had authorized the recreation of the Foreign Office Political In-
telligence Department to supervise the collection and analysis of in-
formation of value to the propagandists and to the government as a
whole.[61] In 1918, struggle for control over this temporary wartime
department had frequently led Beaverbrook and Northcliffe to
despair.[62]

Leeper did not believe in the idea of a Ministry of Information in
peacetime. He was keen to maintain the Foreign Office News
Department as the nerve-centre of Britain's peacetime propaganda
overseas, particularly as the government was devoting renewed at-
tention to the subject, as reflected in the appointment of the Vansit-
tart Co-ordinating Committee for British Publicity Abroad earlier
in 1938.[63] He had lost the 1935 battle to ensure a central role for the
Foreign Office in the planning for propaganda in war, but when
Tallents submitted a proposal in November 1938 to revise the
ministry's terms of reference so that it could come into being im-
mediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities, he was determined
not to lose this one. Essentially, Tallents proposed a six-stage
mobilization process, the first three phases of which would take
place in peacetime. Of the first stage, which he termed 'Undisturb-
ed Peacetime Conditions', Tallents wrote:

> Nothing has struck me more forcibly in my recent exploration of this field than the emphasis spontaneously and separately laid by representatives of all three Service Departments on the need in present continental conditions, in which the boundaries between peace and war are so largely obliterated, of an efficient peacetime centre for the close study of 'enemy' public opinion, and the conveyance through channels appropriate in peace of truth about events and British policy to both 'enemy' and other foreign countries. They have recognised that the country needs specialised armament in the world of opinion not less than in that of munitions of war, and have bluntly remarked that such equipment might well make the difference between future war and peace.[64]

The second stage, which Tallents described as 'Peacetime Conditions Disturbed by Factors which might lead to War', provided for the establishment of machinery to conduct propaganda immediately prior to a possible explosion in a last-ditch attempt to save the peace while other forms of evasive action were being explored. Stage three would provide for complete mobilization 'immediately preceding a decision for peace or war'.[65] Tallents further sought authorisation for the advanced preparation of propaganda material such as leaflets so that they would be ready for use at short notice.[66]

Leeper found these proposals completely unacceptable. He reminded the planners that not only was the Foreign Office the proper authority for the conduct of all official propaganda overseas in time of peace but was also responsible for the study of foreign opinion. The News Department had already examined means of disseminating the British case into Germany in consultation with the Berlin Embassy, the British Council and with SIS and was about to submit its own proposals to the Cabinet. Besides, he added, propaganda material prepared well in advance might become obsolete by the time war did come.[67] He therefore requested that his objections to Tallents's proposals be formally recorded at the full meeting of the CID sub-committee scheduled to take place on 14 December.

On that same day, the Cabinet considered a memorandum signed by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax (but almost certainly written by Leeper), in which the Foreign Office sought permission to increase its peacetime propaganda in Germany. The Nazi government, it was felt, feared counter-propaganda to such a degree that any British activity in this direction 'should be unobtrusive and unprovocative, as the German government will do their best to counteract it or even stop it, but it also means that our propaganda, if wisely done, may produce a big effect'.[68] Various specific proposals were made including the extension of the BBC's German

news bulletins (which had begun on 27 September), increased per-
sonal contacts among businessmen, the expansion of the British
Council's long-term cultural and educational activities such as stu-
dent exchanges, lecture tours and so on. 'Money so spent', it was
argued, 'may rightly be regarded as an important item in our
general defence programme.'[69]

   It has been suggested that these proposals were 'a pitiful package
of barrel-scrapings' and that the Foreign Office merely put them
forward as the latest exchange in an inter-departmental battle.[70]
But that the Foreign Office wished to retain control over a system
which it had championed since the end of the First World War in
the face of continuous opposition was entirely reasonable. If war
should come, it would surprise neither Leeper, who had been warn-
ing of the German danger since at least 1935, nor those few officials
who supported his innovative ideas in the field of peacetime pro-
paganda. Yet Leeper's success had very much been determined by
the degree of acceptance which others, particularly in the Treasury,
were prepared to allow in light of financial stringency and, at times,
of overwhelming prejudice. In the aftermath of Munich, there was
a real chance that his ideas would begin to gain much wider sup-
port.

   Nevertheless, when the Cabinet discussed the Foreign Office pro-
posals, strong doubts were expressed concerning the suitability of
the News Department serving as the nucleus for any programme of
increased peacetime propaganda because its press office 'had not
always been in complete harmony with Government policy' — a
reference to Leeper's recent behaviour during the Munich crisis
when he had been responsible for issuing the unfortunate com-
muniqué of September 26.[71] Moreover, the financial implications
of the proposals were severe, and the Cabinet decided to defer any
decision pending further investigation by the Exchequer.[72]

   Later that day, 14 December 1938, the CID sub-committee on
the Ministry of Information convened to discuss Tallents's pro-
posals. Grave concern was expressed at the lack of preparedness
during the Munich crisis, and Tallents attracted most of the
criticism. Warren Fisher poured cold water over the six-stage
mobilization plan and warned that a shadow ministry must not be
allowed to 'usurp in peacetime the functions of existing agencies or
Departments, which should remain responsible for working out
their own plans'.[73] In this inter-departmental struggle for control

over propaganda in peacetime, Leeper's objections had won
through while Tallents was chosen as the sacrificial lamb for the
débâcle of Munich as, shortly afterwards, he was dismissed as
Director-General Designate and replaced by Sir Ernest Fass, the
Public Trustee. This was an astonishing decision. The only full-
time planner with any real idea of the problems raised by Munich
was replaced by a man with no prior experience of propaganda.
Although the precise reasons for his dismissal remain unknown, it
would appear that Tallents had upset too many influential people
to warrant his replacement by a man who was less willing to rock
the Whitehall boat. Conversely, the Foreign Office proposals for
increased peacetime activity were approved by the Cabinet a week
later.[74]

Not surprisingly, Fass did not prove to be a success, although he
was certainly more willing than Tallents had been to accommodate
the wishes of the established government departments. Sir Samuel
Hoare, the Home Secretary, reluctantly assumed overall respon-
sibility for the planning, although his level of commitment to the
cause of propaganda in the next war was, as he himself admitted
later, half-hearted to say the least.[75] In other words, both men were
entirely unsuited to the enormous task of rectifying the serious defi-
ciencies which had been exposed in the planning by the Munich
dress-rehearsal.

Apart from the decision to increase the number of full-time plan-
ners working on the preparations from one to three, the only other
satisfying outcome of the sub-committee's meeting of 14 December
was a decision to appoint a new sub-committee under the chair-
manship of Sir Campbell Stuart to re-examine the entire question
of enemy propaganda in time of war. The first and only formal
meeting of this body took place at Electra House on 26 January
1939. Discussion largely centred around a lengthy memorandum
written by Leeper which revealed the considerable amount of pro-
paganda currently being conducted by, or under the auspices of,
the Foreign Office.[76] The Foreign Office was then confirmed as the
proper authority in time of peace for the conduct of propaganda
abroad and for the official study of foreign opinion.[77] Different ar-
rangements would come into force on the outbreak of war when
Campbell Stuart would assume responsibility for the conduct of
enemy propaganda. Meanwhile, Leeper was to ascertain the views
of the British Council concerning the possible role of cultural pro-

paganda in wartime, while negotiations with the BBC and with the
Air Ministry concerning the role of broadcasting and leaflets in
enemy propaganda were to be accelerated.[78]

Campbell Stuart continued his own preparations in complete
secrecy. Arrangements were made to move his organization from
Electra House to Woburn Abbey on the outbreak of war.[79] He also
began to recruit a small nucleus staff and to establish contact with
the service departments, the Foreign Office, BBC and shadow
Ministry of Information, from which he was to be completely
separate[80] (as in 1918). Alternative methods of distributing pro-
paganda into enemy countries were also investigated but were not
disclosed 'in the public interest'.[81]

Despite these improvements in the planning for enemy propagan-
da, the preparations for the Ministry of Information were still
being conducted at a relatively leisurely pace. The German invasion
of Prague in March 1939 was to provide the necessary injection of
urgency and realism which had not always been evident before,
even after Munich. In May 1939, the Prime Minister authorized the
appointment of a special ministerial committee composed of the
Home and Foreign Secretaries and the Minister for the Co-
ordination of Defence to consider 'what steps should be taken dur-
ing peace to counteract anti-British propaganda and to institute a
more active policy of British publicity overseas'.[82] Although there
appears to be no available record of any formal proceedings, the
committee did submit a report to the Cabinet containing two major
recommendations to expand the existing propaganda programme
and to facilitate the planning for propaganda in war. Hoare pro-
posed the removal of two of the principal obstacles which had
hitherto tied the hands of the wartime planners, namely the obliga-
tion of strict secrecy and the lack of funds made available to the
shadow organization (which had up to now been carried on the
Secret Service Vote). Moreover, because the Ministry of Informa-
tion intended to assume responsibility for propaganda abroad from
the Foreign Office in time of war, it had now become important to
ensure 'continuity between the peacetime activities of the Foreign
Office in relation to publicity abroad and the work that will in war
fall upon the Ministry of Information.'[83]

This recognition was certainly long overdue, and Hoare's report
produced two important results. The first was the re-organization
of the Foreign Office News Department. The purely propaganda
side of the department's work was separated from the press work

and placed under the auspices of a new body called the Foreign Publicity Department of the Foreign Office.[84] The head of this new department was to be Lord Perth, the recently retired Ambassador to Rome. Perth was also made Director-General Designate of the shadow Ministry of Information, replacing Fass. Hoare felt that this dual role would greatly ease the transition from peace to wartime arrangements, and the Cabinet agreed,[85] although not without causing a major scandal in the process.[86] Perth was certainly an unusual choice. Despite his enormously distinguished diplomatic career, like Fass he had little or no personal experience of propaganda matters, and many believed that Leeper should have got the job.[87] When announcing the decision in Parliament on 15 June, thereby revealing the existence of plans for a Ministry of Information for the first time publicly, Chamberlain was subjected to a series of difficult questions which failed to dispel the suspicion that Perth's appointment was 'a ramp of Sam Hoare's'.[88]

The other major outcome of Hoare's report was the establishment by the Treasury of the Overseas and Emergency Publicity Expenditure Committee, known as OEPEC. This body was set up in late June 1939 under the chairmanship of Sir Alan Barlow, a senior Treasury official, assisted by Mr J. Cairncross as his secretary.[89] It was designed to cut across the normal time-consuming process of sanctioning expenditure for requests which required immediate action. For example, when the Foreign Office submitted to the Treasury a proposal to authorize its missions at Bucharest, Belgrade, Sofia, Athens and Budapest 'to spend up to £100 each, if necessary, to induce newspaper editors to print articles . . . calculated to put across the British point of view', Cairncross minuted: 'as we have already agreed to the "Operational Expense" (i.e. palm-greasing) . . . I do not think we need boggle at this further analogous charge'.[90] But OEPEC was also designed to provide speedy decisions to requests from the planners of the shadow Ministry of Information and other wartime propaganda bodies. As the drift towards war increased during the summer of 1939, it naturally concerned itself more with propaganda in the coming war than with the conduct of propaganda during the final months of peace.

There can be no doubt that the Ministry of Information entered the Second World War hopelessly ill-prepared for the tasks which lay before it. Despite the considerable progress made during the final year of peace, there still remained much more preparatory

work to be done, particularly in the areas of propaganda techniques and content. Small wonder that it should become something of a public joke, the subject of Evelyn Waugh's satire,[91] at least until Brendan Bracken took over in 1941. The same could not be said of the enemy propaganda department which had sufficiently prepared the ground to enable the RAF to conduct a leaflet raid on the opening night of the war. So why was it that, despite five years of pre-war planning, Britain entered the war of words in September 1939 not speechless, as she had effectively been in August 1914, but certainly inarticulate? It was not due simply to the fact that new machinery tends to need running-in before it can begin to operate smoothly and effectively, because Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, which after all had had six years of practice, also entered the war in chaos and confusion.[92] Nor would it be entirely accurate to attribute the planning deficiencies solely to inter-departmental rivalry and squabbling, although that undoubtedly played its part. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that before Hitler's seizure of Prague in March 1939 few people in British governmental circles were prepared to accept the idea that a Ministry of Information would be necessary. A Ministry of Information did, after all, mean war.

Notes

1. *If War Should Come* is the title of a film, alternatively known as *Do it Now* and *If War Comes*, made by the GPO for the Ministry of Information in September 1939.

2. L. Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London 1971), II, 38.

3. CAB 65/1, 1 (39) 2, 3 September 1939.

4. C. Webster and N. Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-45* (London 1961), I, 201-204.

5. P. Towle, 'The debate on wartime censorship in Britain, 1902-1914' in B. Bond and I. Roy (eds.), *War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History* (London 1975).

6. M. L. Sanders, 'Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War', *Historical Journal*, XVIII, I (1975), 119-146.

7. P. M. Taylor, 'The Foreign Office and British Propaganda during the First World War', *Historical Journal*, XXIII, IV (1980).

8. The best accounts of the work at Crewe House remain C. Stuart, *Secrets of Crewe House: The Story of a Famous Campaign* (London 1920) and G. C. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* (Stanford 1938). There is still no satisfactory account of the work of the Ministry of Information.

9. See the forthcoming reappraisal of the wartime experiment by M. L. Sanders and P. M. Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War*, to be published by Macmillan in 1982.

10. King-Hall to S. G. Tallents, 5 September 1938. FO 898/2.

11. Ibid.

12. They can be found in FO 898/1.

13. Memorandum by Tallents, 'Information in Enemy Countries', 7 November 1938. CAB 16/127, MIC 15.

14. London 1979.

15. London 1979.

16. McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, ch. 2.

17. D. N. Dilks, 'The Unnecessary War? Military Advice and Foreign Policy in Great Britain, 1931-39' in A. Preston (ed.), *General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second World War* (London 1978).

18. D. J. Wrench, 'The Influence of Neville Chamberlain on Foreign and Defence Policy, 1932-35', *RUSI*, 125, 1, March 1980, 49-57.

19. M. Howard, 'Total War in the Twentieth Century: Participation and Consensus in the Second World War' in B. Bond and I. Roy, op. cit.

20. *Hansard*, 5th series, Vol. 109, 5 August 1918, col. 999.

21. U. Bialer, 'The Danger of Bombardment from the Air and the Making of British Air Disarmament Policy, 1932-34' in B. Bond and I. Roy, op. cit.

22. A. Aldgate, *Cinema and History: British Newsreels and the Spanish Civil War* (London 1979).

23. F. Thorpe and N. Pronay, *British Official Films in the Second World War: A Descriptive Catalogue* (Oxford 1980), 17.

24. Balfour, *Propaganda in War*, 53.

25. Memorandum by C. P. Robertson, 12 September 1935. CAB 16/127, MIC 2.

26. CAB 16/127, MIC 1.

27. C. Stuart (ed.), *The Reith Diaries* (London 1975), 122.

28. Balfour, op. cit., 54.

29. McLaine, op. cit., 12-13.

30. Extract from the minutes of the CID's 177th meeting, 12 October 1923. FO 371/9405, W 8762/293/50.

31. P. M. Taylor, 'Cultural diplomacy and the British Council, 1934-39', *Brit. J. International Studies*, 4 (1978), 244-65.

32. First meeting of the CID sub-committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information in time of war, 25 October 1935. CAB 16/127.

33. P. M. Taylor, 'The Foreign Office and British Propaganda during the First World War', *H.J.*, XXIII, IV (1980).

34. The report is paper number 12538, PREM 1/388. Its acceptance is recorded in CAB 16/129, MIC (CC) 1.

35. CID sub-committee on the general policy of broadcasting in time of war, 25 September 1935. CAB 16/120.

36. CAB 16/120, BW 14.

37. H. V. Rhodes to Tallents, 12 July 1938. INF 4/1A.

38. A. Willert, *Washington and Other Memories* (Boston 1972).

39. Lampson to H. Montgomery, 28 July 1916. FO 371/2835, 184995.

40. London, Bles, 1938.

41. P. Swann, *The British Documentary Film Movement, 1926-46*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Leeds, 1979.

42. P. M. Taylor, 'British Official Attitudes Towards Propaganda Abroad, 1919-39' to be published in a collection of essays edited by N. Pronay and D. Spring entitled *Film, Politics and Propaganda* (London 1981).

43. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, *Baldwin* (London 1969), 68.

44. *Hansard*, 5th series, Vol. 109, 5 August 1918, cols. 947-1035.

45. Progress report by Tallents, 23 February 1938. CAB 16/127, MIC 10.

46. Ibid.

47. Note of a discussion between Leeper and Tallents held on 27 September 1938. INF 1/442.

48. Minute by H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, 27 September 1938. FO 898/1.

49. M. R. D. Foot, *SOE in France* (London 1966), 2.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid; see also B. Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street Irregular* (London 1965).

52. R. Bruce Lockhart, *Comes the Reckoning* (London 1947).

53. See Tallents's account in his memorandum of 7 November 1938. CAB 16/127, MIC 15.

54. Ryan to Tallents, 5 October 1938. FO 898/1.

55. C. Stuart, *Opportunity Knocks Once* (London 1952), 185.

56. Tallents to Sir Donald Banks, 4 October 1938. FO 898/1.

57. Ryan to Tallents, 5 October 1938. FO 898/1.

58. Memorandum on the Joint Broadcasting Committee, 24 August 1939. Appendix to OEPEC paper 82. T 162/858, E 39140/4.

59. Ibid.

60. Record of a meeting held at the BBC, 6 October 1938. FO 898/1.

61. Memorandum by Warner, 6 October 1938. FO 395/624, P 2853/2853/150.

62. See Lord Beaverbrook, *Men and Power, 1917-18* (London 1956), 290; R. Pound and G. Harmsworth, *Northcliffe* (London 1959), 652-653.

63. See the chapter on this committee in the forthcoming book by P. M. Taylor, *The Projection of Britain; British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-1939* to be published by Cambridge University Press in 1981.

64. Memorandum by Tallents, 7 November 1938. CAB 16/127, MIC 18.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Leeper to Ryan, 7 December 1938. CAB 16/127, MIC 18.

68. Memorandum by Halifax, 'British propaganda in Germany', 8 December 1938. CAB 24/281, CP 284 (38).

69. Ibid.

70. C. Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare, 1938-45* (London 1977), 14.

71. K. Middlemas, *The Diplomacy of Illusion* (London 1972), 388; I. Colvin, *Vansittart in Office* (London 1965), 266-267.

72. CAB 23/96, 59 (38) 5.

73. Fifth meeting of the CID sub-committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information in time of war, 14 December 1938. CAB 16/127.

74. CAB 23/96, 60 (38) 3, 21 December 1938.

75. Viscount Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years* (London 1954), 420-421.

76. Memorandum by Leeper, 'British Publicity Abroad', 20 January 1939. CAB 16/130, MIC (P) 2.

77. Undated draft report by Campbell Stuart. CAB 16/130, MIC (P) 5.

78. CID sub-committee on Propaganda in Foreign Countries in time of war, first meeting, 26 January 1939. CAB 16/130, MIC (P).

79. Balfour, *Propaganda in War*, 88-89.

80. Memorandum by Campbell Stuart, 8 February 1939. CAB 16/130, MIC (P) 3.

81. Undated draft report by Campbell Stuart. CAB 16/130, MIC (P) 5.

82. Memorandum by Hoare, 2 June 1939. CAB 24/287, CP 127 (39).

83. Ibid.

84. FO 366/1071.

85. CAB 23/99, 31 (39) 12, 7 June 1939; CAB 23/99, 32 (39) 9, 14 June 1939.

86. J. Harvey (ed.), *The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937-40* (London 1970), 292.

87. Ibid., 294.

88. Ibid., 292.

89. T 162/858, E 39140/2.

90. Minute by Cairncross, 31 August 1939. T 162/858, E 39140/2.

91. *Put Out More Flags* (London 1942).

92. R. E. Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won* (London 1979).

Philip M. Taylor is a Lecturer in International History at the University of Leeds. He is the author of several articles on the subject of British propaganda in the twentieth century, and his first book, *The Projection of Britain; British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-39* is to be published by Cambridge University Press later this year. He is currently working on a book concerning British propaganda during the First World War with M. L. Sanders of Middlesex Polytechnic, to be published by Macmillan in 1982.