

Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy

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The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.

National Security Strategy, 2002¹

Our strategy must be comprehensive, because the challenge we face is greater and more complex than the threat. The victory of freedom in the Cold War was won only when the West remembered that values and security cannot be separated. The values of freedom and democracy—as much, if not more, than economic power and military might—won the Cold War. And those same values will lead us to victory in the war on terror.

Condoleezza Rice²

On October 14, 2001, President George W. Bush complained at a prime-time press conference, “I’m amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I, like most Americans, I just can’t believe it, because I know how good we are.”³ The president’s plaintive remark, made only a month after a global outpouring of sympathy for the United States but only a week since American bombs had started falling upon Afghanistan, captured a tension between values and security that is at the heart of the U.S. pursuit of the “war on terror.” Strategic goals of “national security” might be achieved with military force, but would the goal of spreading “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” be assured or jeopardized by the pursuit of military projects?⁴ This remains a crucial question for the United States as it seeks to extend the “unipolar moment” of global hegemony in which it has unprecedented power. It is also the defining question in the regeneration of public diplomacy as a strategic tool of U.S. national security.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ignited media discussions about the merits and failings of American public diplomacy and hastened a political review of its role in the planning and execution of foreign policy. U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde, chair of the House International Relations Committee, underlined this role in introducing the Freedom Promotion Act of 2002:

“Public diplomacy—which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves—has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies.”⁵ In the last few years, U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign publics.

This is not a new role, for the emergent ideas and activities of public diplomacy as the “soft power” wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations in U.S. international relations. In this essay we situate the history of the cold war paradigm of U.S. public diplomacy within the broader framework of “political warfare” that combines overt and covert forms of information management.⁶ However, there are distinctive features to the “new public diplomacy” within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. We consider the relation of this new diplomacy to the broader pursuit of political warfare by the state in its efforts to transform material preponderance (in terms of financial, military, and information capital) into effective political outcomes across the globe. In a post-9/11 context, we argue, public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire.

The term “public diplomacy” was coined by academics at Tufts University in the mid-1960s to “describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda” under control of the U.S. government.⁷ As the term came into vogue, it effectively glossed (through the implication of both “public” and diplomatic intent) the political valence of both its invention and object of study through emphasis on its role as “an applied transnational science of human behaviour.”⁸ The origin of the term is a valuable reminder that academic knowledge production has itself been caught up in the historical foundations and contemporary conduct of U.S. public diplomacy, with the American university a long-established laboratory for the study of public opinion and of cross-cultural knowledge in service of the state.⁹ American studies, of course, has had a particularly dramatic entanglement with public diplomacy and the cold war contest for “hearts and minds,” and legacies of that entanglement still haunt the field imaginary today.¹⁰ We do not intend to directly revisit that history here, but we do contend that the current regeneration of public diplomacy by the U.S. government is an important topic for

critical study by American studies scholars, in particular as they negotiate the “internationalization” of their field in the context of post- and transnational impulses, now conditioned by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism. In this essay we posit a need to retheorize the modes and meanings of public diplomacy in order to reconsider the ways in which the power of the American state is manifested in its operations beyond its national borders, and to examine the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinking shaped by the operations of this power. At issue is not so much the way in which American studies has been shaped internationally through diplomatic patronage (though this remains an important and underexamined issue) but rather the articulation of field identities in the expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures.

Freedom’s War

We must pool our efforts with those of the other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard around the world in a great campaign of truth.

Harry Truman¹¹

The origins of American public diplomacy may be traced to the founding of the state and its architects’ “appeal to the tribunal of the world.”¹² Public diplomacy was not explicitly enshrined within state-private activities, however, until the first half of the twentieth century when the imperatives of commerce and then war fostered large-scale, government-led information programs targeted at overseas audiences. The public diplomacy of the cold war built upon the structure and experience of these programs, particularly those developed by World War II agencies such as the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services, but it was more immediately a response to the postwar concerns about the roles of public affairs and psychological operations within the emerging governmental security structure. Far from being a developing function of an established system, the mandate for public diplomacy paralleled and even influenced the formation of a “national security state” created both to devise and pursue a “total” strategy abroad and to appeal for public support at home.

In December 1947, less than five months after its establishment, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a directive, NSC 4, for the “Coordination of Foreign Information Measures.” The instruction both confirmed the State Department’s management of existing outlets and initiatives such as the Voice of America radio system, the United States Information Service, and the

Fulbright educational and cultural exchanges, and pointed toward the development of new activities. (We use the term “state-private network” to refer to the extensive, unprecedented collaboration between “official” U.S. agencies and “private” groups and individuals in the development and implementation of political, economic, and cultural programs in support of U.S. foreign policy from the early cold war period to today.)¹³ Legislative backing was obtained in 1948 with the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, popularly known as the Smith-Mundt Act, for “the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the U.S., its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad . . . to provide a better understanding of the U.S. in other countries and to increase mutual understanding.”¹⁴ With these mandates, public diplomacy could carry forth the rhetorical command of the Truman Doctrine “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” In an expansion supporting, but also constructed as distinct from, the extension of U.S. political and economic influence, U.S. projects by early 1951 covered ninety-three countries, broadcasting in forty-five languages and disseminating millions of booklets, leaflets, magazines, and posters. Touring exhibitions, already established by the late 1940s, received more coherent if often contested support and were common throughout the 1950s.¹⁵ In 1953 the organization of public diplomacy moved beyond the State Department with the formation of the autonomous United States Information Agency (USIA) “to tell America’s story to the world.”¹⁶

The modern history of U.S. public diplomacy is often focused on the USIA, telling the story of its contributions to the winning of the cold war and of its “decline” as the agency was downsized in the 1990s. This story tends to separate public diplomacy from the system of political warfare that emerged in the late 1940s, limiting understanding of the intersections between overt and covert practices. The overt measures of sponsored media production and cultural exhibitions, though central to the formation of cold war public diplomacy, need, however, to be understood as part of a broader restructuring of the national security state and of a strategic framework designed to promote an “America” that would win a total campaign for “hearts and minds.” The authority granted to the State Department by NSC 4, forged in the immediacy of a crisis in which the NSC feared communists might legitimately take power in France and Italy through elections, was complementary and potentially secondary to another mandate, NSC 4-A, which directed the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “to initiate and conduct, within

the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.”¹⁷ With the threat of French and Italian communism always at the forefront in the wider American objective of securing Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, NSC 4-A, like its more mundane counterpart, was the cornerstone of a regional and indeed global strategy. A special clause in the Marshall Plan, when it was passed in April 1948, set aside 5 percent of “counterpart funds” for undefined operations under NSC 4-A. This translated into hundreds of millions of dollars for propaganda and covert action.¹⁸

Thus public diplomacy, beyond providing the informational overlay for “containment,” was already part of a broader operational conception for a more ambitious objective. In May 1948, George Kennan, the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, drafted a proposal for “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare” against the Soviet Union. The national security state would support “liberation committees” and “underground activities behind the Iron Curtain” as well as “indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World.”¹⁹ Victory over the Soviets, achieved with the “liberation” of captive peoples, which went beyond “containment,” would come not only through the reality of American economic and diplomatic superiority but also through the projection of that superiority as inherent to the American system and way of life. The sanction of NSC 4-A and the testing grounds of France and Italy were only the first stages of this campaign. The NSC endorsed Kennan’s plan in November 1948, and within months the Policy Planning Staff, CIA, and Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a new agency created to carry out covert operations, converted the proposal for “a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees” into the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE). The NCFE’s guidelines came from the State Department and 75 percent of its funding from the CIA; its chief executive officers were psychological warfare veterans from the army and the CIA’s forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Its best-known operation, Radio Free Europe, was on air in 1951, but even before that, the NCFE was already promoting the idea of liberation from communism through pamphlets, magazines, books, and a Free European University in Strasbourg, France.²⁰

NCFE’s creation was far more than an organizational response to the challenge of developing and implementing covert, large-scale initiatives for the spread of “freedom.” It served as an ideological marker, embodying Kennan’s fundamental principle that political warfare must emanate from the autonomous expression of private Americans.²¹ After all, if the U.S. government por-

trayed the enemy's proclamations of devotion to equality or progress as the propaganda of a totalitarian state or party, then it had to ensure that it could not stand accused of propaganda itself. The dilemma was that a truly "private" sphere (without state guidance) could not lead a U.S. crusade. Even if organizations could be trusted to put out the right message to foreign audiences, they did not have the resources or structure to organize global campaigns.²² The government's response was to redouble its stake, elevating official rhetoric about the commitment of every good American to "freedom" while expanding covert programs. The elements of the evolving strategy were brought together in NSC 68 in spring 1950. The document, the blueprint for a total victory over Soviet communism, asserted:

The vast majority of Americans are confident that the system of values which animates our society—the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual and the supremacy of reason over all—are valid and more vital than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet dynamism. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other peoples, our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement, and insecurity.²³

While the strategy was designed to be "top secret," its approach was quickly leaked to the American public through the Campaign of Truth launched by President Truman: "We must make ourselves heard round the world. . . . It is a necessary part of all we are doing . . . as important as armed strength or economic aid."²⁴ With its avid promotion of the American "system of values" as a diplomatic weapon, the campaign lent impetus and focus to diverse diplomatic agencies and activities. Overt media and cultural initiatives and educational exchange programs were expanded to become an integral part of the campaign, while covert support for diplomatic activity was escalated. The CIA subsidized trips to the Soviet Union by numerous artists and sculptors; writers such as Mary McCarthy, Arthur Koestler, and Lionel Trilling; students; women's groups; religious organizations; journals and journalists; the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; the U.S. Olympic Team; university programs and academics such as Henry Kissinger and Walt Rostow; and intellectual vanguards such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom.²⁵

The links between overt and covert activities, between state and private groups, and between these groups and cultural producers all contributed to the entanglements of public diplomacy in the early cold war period. Within the broader strategy of political warfare, public diplomacy blurred not only the boundaries of information, culture, and propaganda, but also the bound-

aries of state and private identities and actions. It politicized the international spread of American popular culture, linking “American capitalism to freedom of expression, consumerism, and the good life,” promoting “modernization” as the American-cum-universal model of progress, and linking “free trade” with political and military strategies.²⁶ This is not to say that diplomatic interpellations of American cultural producers and intellectuals as state actors were always passively inhabited, or that their actions were passively received in other countries. (See, for instance, Penny Von Eschen’s essay in this forum, in which she relates the tensions surrounding the Duke Ellington concerts in Iraq in 1963.) However, if the state-private network of early cold war public diplomacy cannot be reduced to a model of hegemony, the independence or autonomy of the “private” individual was nonetheless compromised as a diplomatic subject, and Kennan’s invocation of private American citizens banding together was a convenient fiction that glossed state propaganda as collective civic action.²⁷

As the cold war unfolded, political warfare would soon encounter major setbacks. While it was largely successful in securing and promoting a Western European bloc linked politically, economically, militarily, and culturally to the United States, it could not roll back the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, as the outcome of the Hungarian rising of 1956 graphically demonstrated. It could not check the consolidation of communist rule in China or contain the perceived Chinese menace to Asia. The extent and momentum of the American system was such, however, that the U.S. government easily moved its attention beyond Eastern Europe and East Asia to the overthrow of governments from Iran to Guatemala to Egypt to Indonesia, mobilizing the state-private network in the cause of freedom to further American national interests.²⁸ Even when the systematic crisis for political warfare occurred in 1967 with the exposure of the CIA-supported network, the government met this crisis through realignment of the state-private dynamic. As Richard Bissell, the former deputy director of the CIA, told the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968, “If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have been ‘blown’ cannot be resurrected. We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of ‘cut-outs.’”²⁹ Short-term responses to the crisis included the shift of organizations such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to a “semipublic” standing, with congressional sanction of state funding, as well as deeper cover for other state-private initiatives, channeled not only through the CIA but through the White House.³⁰

In the longer term the system needed the revival of a rationale provided by the Reagan administration's invocation of a renewed battle with the "evil empire." In 1983 the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created, ostensibly based upon "the idea that American assistance on behalf of democracy efforts abroad would be good both for the U.S. and for those struggling around the world for freedom and self-government."³¹ As an autonomous, nominally "independent" program, the NED could acknowledge a link with the government while maintaining the illusion of detachment from the state. With the ending of the cold war, understood as a victory of and for "liberal democracy," the NED flourished under successive administrations that variously recognized and supported its mission of integrating "other nations and governments into a democratic network consistent with U.S. values and norms."³² This mission incorporated information programs, educational exchanges, and international forums—all based on state-private networks—to promote political reform in other countries while providing strategic support for the expansion of the national economy. Cultural and information efforts promoted core standards of free-market liberalization, increasing trade and freeing the flow of U.S. goods, service, and capital. A "corporate-based" diplomacy would be developed throughout the 1990s, designed to reflect and exploit the effects of media globalization and electronic technologies, promoting "soft power" strategies to "virtualize" public diplomacy and take advantage of "America's information edge."³³ The NED's strategic achievement lay in its ability to wed the objective of market and trade liberalization to the renewal of political warfare against those "countries of concern" that supposedly presented a political or military threat to U.S. security.

The history of American public diplomacy from the beginnings of the cold war to the beginnings of the "war on terror" is often told in isolation from the system of political warfare, producing the misleading lament that the United States had withdrawn from the "contest for hearts and minds" with the ending of the cold war—a lament widely articulated in the wake of 9/11. However, to understand the strategic and ideological efforts to "revive" public diplomacy in support of the war on terror, we need to recognize the trajectories of public diplomacy during and after the cold war as continuous with the political warfare that shadowed the formation of the national security state. In 1992 Paul Wolfowitz, then assistant secretary of defense, established the post-cold war cognizance of this for the George H. W. Bush administration: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival."³⁴ Nine years later, with the inauguration of the George W. Bush administration, in which Wolfowitz was undersecretary of defense, the question was finally posed: what

would happen when U.S. political warfare was harnessed to a new national security strategy, one in which dominance had to be established not only through American leadership in global, political, economic, and cultural institutions and environments but through the clear projection of a “preponderance of power”?³⁵

Wars of Preponderance

Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historical importance.

Richard Holbrooke³⁶

We have to do a better job of telling our story.

President George W. Bush³⁷

A week before the terrorist attacks of September 11, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared to a State Department audience: “What are we doing? We’re selling a product. The product we are selling is democracy. It’s the free-enterprise system, the American value system. It’s a product very much in demand. It’s a product that is very much needed.”³⁸ Powell’s assertive promotion of “Brand America” confirmed that the confluence of public relations and public diplomacy in the post-cold war period was now an official platform for strategic communications. The post-9/11 “revival” of public diplomacy was embodied by the appointment in October 2001 of Charlotte Beers as the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs. Beers, the former head of the J. Walter Thompson and Ogilvy and Mather advertising agencies, led the “rebranding” of America to counter what she termed “the myths, the biases, the outright lies” being presented about the United States throughout the Muslim world.³⁹ Testifying in her confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, she declared that she would communicate “not only the facts but also emotions and feelings” of what it means to be American: “We promote U.S. interests not only through our policies but also in our beliefs and values. Never have these intangibles been more important than right now.”⁴⁰ In speeches and other communications she reiterated this approach, arguing that public diplomacy must present a “total communication effort” by “putting the U.S. in whole context” with “communication that includes rational and logical discourse but also evokes our deepest emotions.” With Beers’s invocation of “the emotional and ratio-

nal dimensions” of cultural diplomacy, the “hearts and minds” rhetoric of cold war cultural politics had been burnished with the language of public relations.⁴¹

A plethora of initiatives were speedily drafted and launched under Beers’s leadership. Reproducing the practices of cold war diplomacy, the State Department sponsored tours by American authors and artists, supported exhibitions and publications specifically prepared to advertise messages about American life in the aftermath of September 11, and increased the volume of exchange visitors with selected countries in the Middle East, targeting groups of “opinion managers” such as journalists, teachers, and political leaders. A striking example of this old-style diplomacy was the implementation and support of an exhibition of photographs by Joel Meyerowitz recording the destruction and recovery effort at the World Trade Center’s “Ground Zero.” The exhibition, launched in twenty-eight countries on the same day in March 2002, was promoted by American embassies and consulates throughout the world to shape and maintain a public memory of the attacks on the World Trade Center.⁴² Complementing this appeal to an elite global audience were the larger and more expensive information campaigns, notably the use of broadcast media to reach large Muslim publics throughout the world. In 2002 the Arabic language Radio Sawa, aimed at a youth audience in the Middle East, was launched on FM stations, while Arab television delivered the “Shared Values” initiative, a public relations campaign designed to combat anti-American sentiment in Arab countries. In the first campaign in which the U.S. purchased international broadcast time, \$15 million was devoted to thirty- to sixty-second advertisement slots featuring Muslim Americans talking about positive life experiences in the United States. Building on this initiative, the State Department began to work with international media to produce “TV Co-Ops that document American values, culture, issues, and life.”⁴³

At the same time, Beers supported programs using newer technologies and marketing techniques drawn from public relations fields. An Internet campaign to reach Muslims overseas supported the Shared Values initiative, while the State Department revamped its international Web site, seeking to mirror cultural and national concerns in selected regions and to support educational and informational outreach missions across the world. The International Information Programs (IIP) office coordinated the circulation of information as older styles of communications and exchange programming were supplemented and restyled by more “flexible” forms of virtual diplomacy to speed up the delivery and collapse the distance of gathering and dissemination of information. This included, for example, plans to “develop tracking mechanisms for

monitoring placement of media products in foreign markets . . . Expand the use of digital video conferencing technology to widen the reach of its newsmaker briefings, linking posts in countries with no U.S.-based journalists to allow their media to ask questions . . . Initiate a new service of thirty-second audio clips from major briefings, web-delivered for posts to market the material to local radio broadcasters and reporters for placement.”⁴⁴ Beers announced the growing department intent to bring public diplomacy into the cyber age, promising to

continue the premise of the information centers and libraries, many of which were closed in the last ten years. . . . we can do this in a way that is actually an improvement because we can make these a virtual reality. . . . We can ask universities or local libraries or shopping malls to take these rooms. . . . You will walk in, and not only will you get the scholarly references, the computer banks, all of which are made more possible by technology, but you can also use virtual reality to see a small town in America, to have an interview, to listen to someone recite the Declaration of Independence, to hear a beautiful piece of music. That’s the goal.⁴⁵

The goal was to virtualize the role of public diplomacy “to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves,” reaching beyond the more rarefied spaces of embassy diplomacy to the imaginary sphere of “the Muslim street.”⁴⁶

Understandably, the tragedy and drama of September 11 established a context for these initiatives as responses to a new, global terrorism. What was overlooked in this conception was the possibility that the U.S. government was extending an established framework for political warfare, seeking the furtherance of American power through strategic confrontations with established enemies.⁴⁷ Months after the first Gulf War in 1991, the CIA and the Department of Defense had created the Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by the controversial Iraqi exile and financier Ahmed Chalabi, as the vanguard of the resistance to Saddam Hussein. The “private” Rendon Group, which claims to specialize in “assisting corporations, organizations, and governments achieve their policy objectives,” was commissioned to promote the INC. Rendon worked closely with U.S. agencies to encourage the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, designing the Iraqi Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) and establishing Radio Hurriah, which broadcast Iraqi opposition propaganda from Kuwait.⁴⁸ At the same time, Rendon furthered the private dimension through close contacts with key American think tanks and the U.S. media, expanding the effort after 9/11. Between October 2001 and May 2002, more than a hundred articles in the U.S. media were based on the INC’s “information” on Iraq, some of which was used to promote the notion of Saddam Hussein’s

weapons of mass destruction as an imminent threat; meanwhile, the White House created an interdepartmental Iraq Public Diplomacy Group to promote Iraqi opposition figures.⁴⁹ This was all part of a carefully orchestrated political warfare that was only occasionally picked up by the U.S. media. One of the more controversial discoveries was that late in 2001 the Pentagon had quietly established an Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) designed to foster propaganda “from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of the white.”⁵⁰ After revelations in the *New York Times* in February 2002, the OSI was closed down amid accusations that it would spread disinformation in foreign news reports that could be picked up by U.S. news outlets.

The early stages of U.S. efforts to revive public diplomacy in the wake of 9/11 can appear as a litany of spectacular fumbblings and failures. High-profile campaigns such as the “Shared Values” television advertisements turned into embarrassments when countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan refused to air them, and in March 2003, citing ill health, Charlotte Beers resigned, as did her replacement Margaret Tutwiler after only a few months in the job. Such events fueled media interest in the State Department’s efforts to revive public diplomacy, though this was only part of a much broader public debate as a wide array of sources charged the government with poor diplomatic operations as well as intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks, and many more questioned how successfully it was conducting the “PR war” with Arab and Muslim societies.⁵¹ In July 2002 the Council on Foreign Relations issued a damning report: “The promise of America’s public diplomacy has not been realized due to a lack of political will, the absence of an overall strategy, a deficit of trained professionals, cultural constraints, structural shortcomings, and a scarcity of resources.”⁵² A December 2002 survey by the Pew Research Group found that “despite an initial outpouring of public sympathy for America following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, discontent with the United States has grown around the world over the past two years. Images of the U.S. have been tarnished in all types of nations: among longtime NATO allies, in developing countries, in Eastern Europe and, most dramatically, in Muslim societies.”⁵³ U.S. public diplomacy was widely interpreted as a communications disaster, with commentators offering variations on the question posed by senior U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke in the *Washington Post* in October 2001—“How can a man in a cave outcommunicate the world’s leading communications society?”—a question repeated by the 9/11 Commission.⁵⁴ Osama Siblani, the publisher of the largest Arab-American newspaper in the United States, highlighted the gulf between production and reception: “They could have the prophet Muhammad doing public relations and it wouldn’t help.”⁵⁵

This outpouring of public commentary and criticism of the efforts to revive U.S. public diplomacy is in itself a significant indicator of broader public concerns about America's role in the world and about the changing political culture in the United States under conditions of perpetual war. Notably, the question of America's "image" abroad—fed by regular polls showing a rising "anti-Americanism" across the globe—was at the center of the public debates. The widespread articulation of a "crisis" in American public diplomacy interacted with a broader domestic unease about the implementation of a "war on terror" that seemed to lack international support (and had no clearly defined enemy to focus it) and so had to be explained as an issue of communication in which "they" don't understand "us," as in President Bush's amazement that "there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us" or secretary of state-designate Condoleezza Rice's later promise in her confirmation hearings in January 2005 "to do much more to confront hateful propaganda, dispel dangerous myths, and get out the truth."⁵⁶ The concern about the failings of public diplomacy as a communications problem kept the focus on the form rather than the content of the message, displacing issues of policy to the periphery of public discourse. It was not until September 2004 that a major government report—from the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory panel—finally challenged the notion of a communications problem and accepted that U.S. political warfare was being undermined by U.S. policies: "The critical problem in American public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim world is not one of 'dissemination' of information or even one of crafting and delivering the 'right' message. Rather it is a fundamental problem of credibility. Simply, there is none—the United States today is without a working channel of communication to the world of Muslims and of Islam." The Pentagon's response was muted, a spokesman stating only that "no formal decisions had been made about reorganizing how the Pentagon and military communicate."⁵⁷ When Karen Hughes, a close confidante of President Bush, was brought into the State Department in March 2005 to head the public diplomacy effort, her new colleagues had to resort to dissent through background comments in the *New York Times*: "Some senior State Department officials say that the problem is American policy, not inadequate public relations, and that no amount of marketing will change minds in the Muslim world about the war in Iraq or American support of Israel."⁵⁸

The government's avoidance of any discussion of policy as a contributing factor to the communications "crisis" corresponded to its efforts to promote the war on terror as "a war of ideas," as asserted in the National Security Strategy of 2002: "We will wage a war of ideas to win the battle against inter-

national terrorism. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an arena where America must excel in enlisting the international community.”⁵⁹ This effort to retrofit a cold war paradigm of ideological warfare to the war on terror exacerbated the State Department’s difficulties in managing public diplomacy, not least because it misrecognized the changed conditions of international relations. Communications scholar R. S. Zaharna testified before a government subcommittee in August 2004:

Fighting an information battle was ideal for the Cold War bi-polar context; it no longer fits with the multi-polar political context and global communication era. . . . The bi-polar context that once neatly defined and sorted all information has given way to a multi-polar context of diversified global concerns, glaring regional conflicts, and heightened cultural awareness. Each dimension adds another layer of filters capable of distorting even the most skilfully crafted message that America can devise.⁶⁰

The failure of current attempts at U.S. public diplomacy can be attributed in part to their dependence on old paradigms of ideological warfare. The conditions for the production and enactment of public diplomacy have changed significantly because of the ways that global “interdependence” has radically altered the space of diplomacy. The founding premise of traditional diplomacy, that it was an activity between states and their formal representatives, began to break down as the bipolar, state-centered context of the cold war gave way to multilevel relations conducted not only by national governments but by multinational corporations, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), private groups, and social movements using new technologies of communication to interact with and petition foreign publics. Moreover, this dispersal and reterritorialization of public diplomacy occurs amid the post-cold war (re)emergence of regional conflicts in international relations. American foreign policy is not only rendered more global by communications technology but also more local by interventions in selected conflicts in which issues of “cultural difference” magnify the problems of communication encountered by American public diplomacy.

The difficulty of conducting a “war of ideas” is compounded in a global information sphere that can swiftly expose and interrogate contradictions of declared values and apparent policies and actions. When George Kennan wrote his 1948 memorandum, the chief technological difficulty for U.S. agencies was circumventing the jamming of American radio broadcasts into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Today the American state-private network faces alternative systems that are not trying to block “information” but are seeking to expand it through local, regional, and even global radio and television out-

put and the Internet. In the process, the “receptive international environment” sought by the U.S. government has become a questioning and often challenging one. There is much evidence of this in the responses to recent public diplomacy initiatives from sources in the Middle East, as journalists and other commentators in the region pick up American policy and media discussions and critique them. At the same time, the emergence of pan-Arab satellite TV stations, such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, has influentially challenged Western depictions of conflicts in the Middle East and has shaped a new public sphere that brings together Arab locals and diasporas. (See Ron Robin’s essay in this forum for a fuller consideration of this.) Given such challenges—heightened but not created by 9/11—the U.S. government has struggled to adapt its public diplomacy machinery to fight a war on terror.

Despite the continuing criticisms of its public diplomacy planning and initiatives, the State Department has continued to emphasize a “soft power” complement to the potential and actual use of military force, maintaining its commitment to a “public diplomacy [that] has value as a strategic element of power in the information age.”⁶¹ The 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy underlined that “in the information age, diplomatic influence and military power go to those who can disseminate credible information in ways that support their interests and effectively put public pressure on the leaders of other countries.”⁶² To date, this often-repeated promise to seize the communication initiative has produced activities that have crudely exposed the diplomatic illusion of reconciling interests and ideals in international relations. The new public diplomacy might be conducted on the basis that the cultural and economic dimensions of political warfare can be divorced from military dimensions, but its revival cannot efface the tensions between values and security shadowing the relations between overt and covert operations. If anything, these tensions have been exacerbated by the extensions of media and diplomatic communications that blur the meanings of diplomatic messages and the boundaries between domestic and foreign publics. The efforts of public diplomacy strategists can never define the totality of political warfare, particularly when the objective of an American “preponderance of power” abroad is paralleled by the struggle for bureaucratic power at home. An illuminating incident came in February 2002 when, in response to media pressure to disband the Pentagon’s covert Office of Strategic Influence, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters, “If you want to savage this thing, fine, I’ll give you the corpse . . . but I’m gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have.”⁶³

Paradigm Wars

Freedom's untidy.

Donald Rumsfeld⁶⁴

Members of the Bush Administration are fond of drawing analogies between the America of the early cold war and the America of the present, especially to emphasize the material preponderance of the United States at both historical moments and to underline the special responsibility that the nation bore and continues to bear in the execution of its power.⁶⁵ Yet, even as the U.S. government promotes the assumption that “public diplomacy helped win the cold war, and it has the potential to win the war on terror,” it has established a framework for the waging of the contemporary battle that is very different from that promoted fifty years ago.⁶⁶ In both instances, a “war of ideas” is evoked to frame a bipolar clash of civilizations and promote a national ideal of liberal democracy, yet the combination of value and security in each instance is shaped by different geostrategic frameworks of “national security.” During the cold war the (publicly stated) regulatory paradigm was that of “containment,” which functioned to segment publics and information; in the war on terror the leading paradigm is “integration,” which seeks to draw publics into an American designed “zone of peace.” The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that “ridding the world of terrorism is essential to a broader purpose. We strive to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners.”⁶⁷ Both paradigms, however, conceal strategic tensions. For many inside and outside U.S. administrations in the 1950s, containment pointed toward coexistence with the Soviet bloc and its captive peoples, precluding the extension of freedom through “liberation.” For many inside and outside the current administration, “integration” does not provide a solution for long-term war with rogue states and tyrants, a war that has to be waged by and for a U.S. “preponderance of power.”

It is our contention that political warfare tries to bridge, if not resolve, these tensions. In 1950, NSC 68 concluded with the mandate not only to “strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations” but also “to encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.”⁶⁸ A half-century later Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department (and far from an acolyte of the “neoconservative” movement), easily moved from describing the goal of post–

cold war U.S. foreign policy as “a process of integration in which the United States works with others to promote ends that benefit everyone” to acknowledging it is “an imperial foreign policy . . . a foreign policy that attempts to organize the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them.”⁶⁹

The National Security Act of 2002 states: “The U.S. will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. . . . We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”⁷⁰ As in the cold war, “freedom” is a prized trope of U.S. international affairs, but is now framed by a different set of ideological and policy aims. The cold war conflation of “national interest” and the “free world” was a rhetorical reflection of a *realpolitik*, state-centered approach to international affairs, often defined by struggles over territory and sovereignty. The goal of the war on terror is “not to defend the free world but, rather, freedom itself.”⁷¹ This is to say that freedom is now more fully abstracted and deterritorialized, just as the empire is unbound in a perpetual war. “Freedom” is certainly the key trope of the war on terror, *the* integer of idea and value, as Henry Hyde has clearly articulated: “In addition to genuine altruism, our promotion of freedom can have another purpose, namely as an element in the U.S.’s geopolitical strategy.”⁷² In this sense, freedom is an abstracted signifier of American imperialism; it is not a promise of negative liberty and social respect (the “empire of liberty” reflected in the Constitution), but rather a harbinger of the “empire *for* liberty,” which combines the reinstantiation of the national security state with the pursuit of “virtuous war.”⁷³ This combination makes a “regulatory fiction” of the American mythology of freedom, transforming it into a master rationale for the neoliberal empire’s symbolic dramas of emergency and extension.⁷⁴ Actions against the “enemies of freedom” (as defined by President Bush) extend “national security” around the globe, producing spectacular military and media campaigns in the process. In the promotion of “freedom” to foreign audiences, public diplomacy is inextricably connected with the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, charged with the awkward task of reconciling interests and ideals. This reconciliation is always deferred, forever incomplete, yet it cannot be disavowed since it is the horizon of the imperial imaginary projected by the extension of the national security state.

It is with due regard to the complex role public diplomacy plays within the international affairs of the United States that we have sought here to sketch some of its key features. The shifting terrains and frameworks of public diplomacy have rendered academic engagement with it a trickier yet all the more

necessary task for those for whom “America” functions as object of knowledge in international political culture. The changing conditions and contexts of public diplomacy have been shadowed by paradigm shifts in those realms of academic study that are focused on the nation or/and the state, and there are signs of fresh scholarly interest in public diplomacy in several disciplines. Both diplomatic history and international relations, for example, have expanded their fields of explanation and enquiry in recent years to incorporate “aesthetic” or “cultural” turns. In both fields, ideas of “interstate relations,” “the sovereign state,” and “the diplomatic subject” have been called into question.⁷⁵ There is, however, little consensus and limited conversation across the disciplines about precisely what is at issue in studying public diplomacy. Rosaleen Smyth observes, “While public diplomacy may be a euphemism for propaganda, it occupies a grey area in much scholarship on cultural imperialism and globalisation.”⁷⁶ We would caution against conflating public diplomacy with ideas of cultural imperialism or globalization or seeing it as a surrogate of “Americanization,” but Smyth is right to suggest public diplomacy is a grey zone in much cultural and political scholarship. In part this is due to the blurred relations between state-sponsored and corporate diplomacy and perhaps too to the fragmented history of public diplomacy within government structures, but it is also due to the vagaries of academic interest and disinterest, the methodological frames used to study it, and the theoretical assumptions attending these.

On the one hand, those who conflate public diplomacy with cultural imperialism have a tendency to elide the role of state power and foreign policy interests in the formation of public diplomacy initiatives. On the other hand, those who focus closely on state power as demonstrated by policy-making elites or within the political economies of world systems tend to ignore or play down the productivity of culture in international relations. We do not propose a magical synthesis of these different approaches—different paradigms can and should exist for different questions—but much can be learned from working with and across disciplines such as diplomatic history, international relations, communication, and American studies. Cross-disciplinary alliances and negotiations place productive tensions on key terms—such as nation, state, power, identity—that can too easily be taken for granted within disciplinary frames. This forum is an instance of such cross-disciplinary negotiations, bringing together diplomatic history and American studies practitioners and their concerns. We have framed our study of public diplomacy so as to emphasize the role of the state in managing the relationship between cultural diplomacy, U.S. foreign policy and neoliberal empire. In so doing we have taken a selec-

tive approach—focused more on policy than reception, for example—with a view to (re)positioning the state as the focus of American studies analysis. Such an approach may appear retrograde within Americanist scholarship, but we believe it to be timely. The power of the American security state in an age when state power is said to be waning is not an anomaly but the structuring center of an American empire that demands analysis by American studies scholars as well as those in other political and cultural fields. In her reflections on what the ongoing debates about empire mean for the field of American studies, Amy Kaplan notes: “We have thought much about ‘national identity’ in American studies, but we also need to study more about the differences among nation, state, and empire, when they seem to fuse and how they are at odds, to think of how state power is wielded at home and abroad in the name of America.”⁷⁷ The study of public diplomacy (and, more broadly, political warfare) can advance such critical thinking, bringing the state into fresh analytical focus in American studies.

The ongoing “war of ideas” advanced by the Bush administration is a war that American studies should not ignore, as “we” are already caught up in it. It is a war that (ex)poses the question of American studies’ relation to the state, a question that is now being taken up by some interested and concerned scholars.⁷⁸ Michael Bérubé, for example, in his examination of relations between American studies and “the corporate multiversity,” has challenged fellow academics to “undertake some hard thinking about [their] relation to the nation-state.”⁷⁹ He characterizes CIA involvement in the cultural front of the cold war as “a halcyon time when American intellectuals had a well-defined function for the state and for crucial segments of the private sector that identified freedom with free markets.” Today, he suggests, an internationalist American studies finds itself accommodated as a comfortable political class of globalizing American capitalism and is intellectually hobbled by either its ignorance of or hostility to the state. Meanwhile, Paul Bové has written a troubled reflection on the complicity of “‘progressive’ American Studies” with “the business of the state.” Bové poses the question “Can American studies be area studies?” in order to answer “no,” because it does not “exist to provide authoritative knowledge to the state” and because “American studies best serves the interests of the nation-state in terms of hegemony and culture rather than policy.” He uses this question to underline his view that American studies intellectuals misrecognize the workings of the state: “American studies scholars have principally focused on matters of culture and history, the areas of ‘civil society’ or ‘the public sphere,’ acting as if, in this way, they were accessing the U.S. state through its extensions . . . nor do they take the fact of the U.S. state as itself an

agent that must be confronted, in itself, by means of detailed, concrete, material and theoretical analyses.” And yet, even as Bové advances this critique to suggest that American studies formulate a “realist model of power” that would make it more relevant to the workings of state policy, he is unable to envisage such relevance.⁸⁰

We believe Bové is right to argue that American studies scholarship has not tended to recognize the specificity of the state in formations of “American” power and knowledge, but we question his need to bracket off “the theory of the extended state” as the terrain of civil society and redundant cultural theorizing. His realist model of state power is limiting, if not suggestive of a parochial vision. To some degree, Bové’s pained scepticism (like Bérubé’s knowing jeremiad) is symptomatic of a very *American* American studies perception of the global immanence of an empire that has no externality. Bové summons the unipolar spectre of the American imperium to ask: “If America has had this structural intent to be identical to the world—for what else can it mean to be the world’s only remaining superpower—then where can American studies people stand to get a view of all this?”⁸¹ The spatial logic of Bové’s question—that there is nowhere for American studies scholars to stand given their epistemological blindness—verifies the unipolarity of U.S. global power. We suggest, however, that the state’s reterritorialization under conditions of imperial emergency opens up spaces of political cultural inquiry in the opportunity and impetus to track the workings of empire internationally and transnationally. To be sure, the state, with its resources and command of networks, may be dominant, but unipolarity is itself a dominant (realist) fiction of international relations. What this fiction discounts is “the advent of heteropolarity, the emergence of actors that are different in kind (state, corporate, group, individual) and connected nodally rather than contiguously.”⁸² In the expanded, virtualized space of international relations, the networks of American studies can and do function as a flexible economy of knowledge production—though there remains the challenge of turning a preponderance of critical knowledge into political effect.

The academic labor of tracking the American empire opens American studies to new methodological considerations and extends its boundaries of cultural and political inquiry. This reshaping of the field should not be conceived as yet another totalizing enterprise. Rather it should take account of the “intellectual regionalism” that already exists and recognize the need to collaborate with related disciplines, which are likely experiencing their own paradigm dramas in relation to the production of knowledge under conditions of empire.⁸³ The moves to “internationalize” American studies, already a distorted

mirror of neoliberal enlargement, all too readily seek to expand the field rather than seek partnerships with other fields. They also tend to subordinate the study of diplomacy to an analysis of culture in its postnational and transnational imaginings, glossing the workings of state power across national borders. Critical study of American public diplomacy and broader strategies and effects of American political warfare offer a valuable focus on the workings of empire in the matrices and interstices of American foreign policy, media, and commercial relations around the globe. Comparative and cross-disciplinary study of the histories and geographies of American political warfare can offer a fresh way to “get a view” of pax Americana, one that critically explores the relationship between “values and security.” It might also have something to say about how and why the American state, at home and abroad, (mis)represents the promise of “enduring freedom.”

Notes

1. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
2. Condoleezza Rice, address to U.S. Institute of Peace, August 19, 2004, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040819-5.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
3. George W. Bush press conference, October 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html#status-war> (accessed April 10, 2005).
4. This tension stemmed from a fundamental but often unexamined illusion. “National security” is always more than the objective of protecting the territory of the United States and the lives and livelihoods of its inhabitants. It is also a construction rationalizing and justifying the extension of power—political, military, economic, and cultural—beyond the boundaries of the nation. See, for example, the critiques in David Campbell, *Writing Security: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), and Anders Stephanson, “Commentary: Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors,” *Diplomatic History* 17.2 (spring 1993): 285–95.
5. “Hyde Introduces Reform of U.S. Public Diplomacy; Will Improve America’s Outreach to International Mass Audiences,” March 14, 2002, reprinted at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/107/news0314.htm (accessed April 10, 2005).
6. The concept of “political warfare,” recognized and bureaucratically incorporated into British strategy in World War II through initiatives such as the Political Warfare Executive, has received little attention in histories of U.S. foreign policy and operations. In part, this is because the concept has rarely been acknowledged openly by U.S. policy makers, with terms such as “psychological strategy” being used in the early cold war. However, the guidelines, portions of which are cited in this article, which were drafted by George Kennan and the State Department Policy Planning Staff, establish the central place of “political warfare” in U.S. strategy. Indeed, before and after setting out the guidelines, Kennan consulted closely with British colleagues and visited London to discuss the development and implementation of political warfare. See William Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, eds., *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958); Scott Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The U.S. Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–1956* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
7. See “Origins of the Term ‘Public Diplomacy’” in *What Is Public Diplomacy?*, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005), and Wikipedia, “Public Diplomacy,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_diplomacy (accessed April 10, 2005).

8. Jarol B. Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7.
9. See *ibid.*; Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Noam Chomsky et al., *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years* (New York: New Press, 1997); and Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
10. See, for example, Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas, "Master and Servant? The U.S. Government and the Founding of the British Association for American Studies," *European Journal of American Culture* 21.1 (2002), 16–23.
11. Harry Truman address to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1950, Truman Library, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=715&st=Campaign&st1=Truth> (accessed April 10, 2005).
12. Thomas Jefferson, "Letter to Henry Lee," May 8, 1825, in *Thomas Jefferson: Writings* (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1984), 1501.
13. NSC 4, "Coordination of Foreign Information Measures," December 17, 1947, reprinted at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-4.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005). The concept of the "state-private network" has been introduced and developed in recent work such as Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945–1956* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Scott Lucas, "Mobilising Culture: The CIA and State-Private Networks in the Early Cold War," in *War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy, 1942–62*, ed. Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (London: Macmillan, 2002); Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, eds., *The State-Private Network: The United States Government, American Citizen Groups, and the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).
14. U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, January 1948, Public Law 402, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 62 Stat. 6.
15. Draft Senior NSC Staff Report NSC 114 and Annex 5, July 27, 1951, *U.S. Declassified Document Reference System*, 1980 284B-285A.
16. On the history and activities of USIA, see Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: Macmillan 1997); Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Alvin A. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning of the Cold War* (New York: Arcade, 1995); Nancy Snow, *Propaganda Inc: Selling America's Culture to the World* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998).
17. NSC 4-A, "Psychological Operations," December 9, 1947, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-4.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005).
18. Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 321–22.
19. Policy Planning Staff report, "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare," May 4, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 269, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/260_269.html (accessed April 10, 2005).
20. On NCFE, see Sig Mickelson, *America's Other Voices: Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (New York: Praeger, 1983); Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 100–104.
21. Kennan had set out the principle in his 1948 memorandum: "What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. . . . Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis." Policy Planning Staff report, "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare."
22. See Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: New Press, 1999).
23. NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, reprinted at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005).
24. Harry Truman address to American Society of Newspaper Editors.
25. Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, "Here, There, and Everywhere," in *Here, There and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture*, ed. Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2000), 6. See also Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*,

- Lucas, *Freedom's War*; Scott-Smith and Krabbendam, *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe*; Laville and Wilford, *The State-Private Network*.
26. See Scott Lucas, "Introduction: Negotiating Freedom," in *The State-Private Network*.
 27. See, for example, Scott Lucas, "Revealing the Parameters of Opinion: An Interview with Frances Stonor Saunders," and Hugh Wilford, "Calling the Tune? The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, 1945–1960," in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe*, 15–52; Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture* (London: Routledge, 2002).
 28. See the conclusion in Lucas, *Freedom's War*, which has been extended in Scott Lucas, "Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control: Approaches to Culture and the State-Private Network in the Cold War," in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe*, 53–72.
 29. Quoted in Richard Cummings, *The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and the Liberal Dream* (New York: Grove, 1985), and reprinted at Bob Feldman, "Time for Ford Foundation and CFR to Divest?" October 8, 2002, http://www.questionsquestions.net/feldman/ff_divest.html (accessed April 10, 2005).
 30. One notable example is the range of covert activities between 1970 and 1973, supervised by Henry Kissinger, to remove Salvador Allende from power in Chile. See, for illustration, the documents provided by the National Security Archive at <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/index.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005).
 31. David Lowe, "Idea to Reality: NED at 20," <http://www.ned.org/about/nedhistory.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
 32. See Pierre Pahlavi, "Cyber-Strategy: A New Strategy of Influence," May 30, 2003, paper for the Canadian Political Science Association, www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/pahlavi.pdf (accessed April 10, 2005).
 33. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19980901faessay1419/robert-o-keohane-joseph-s-nye-jr/power-and-interdependence-in-the-information-age.html> (accessed April 10, 2005). Retrenchment of public diplomacy within an enlarged State Department in 1998 included creation of the International Information Programs (IIP), which consolidated the use of new communications technologies in the dissemination of strategic public information to foreign audiences. This was supplemented in April 1999 by Bill Clinton's secret Presidential Decision Directive, PDD68, creating an International Public Information (IPI) office, initially to address the challenge of a propaganda war in support of the military mission in Kosovo. Presidential Decision Directive 68, "International Public Information (IPI)," April 30, 1999, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005).
 34. In 1992 Paul Wolfowitz, then assistant secretary of defense, set out the new post-cold war, post-Gulf War course of U.S. foreign policy in a Defense Planning Guidance: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia." Consideration of the Guidance was complicated when portions of it were leaked in the *New York Times* in May 1992, but it was approved by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in a revised form in January 1993. See the documentation in Public Broadcasting System, *Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
 35. See the account of Bush's secretary of the treasury, Paul O'Neill, of the first meeting of Bush's National Security Council in Ron Suskind's *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 70–86: "A weak but increasingly obstreperous Saddam might be useful as a demonstration model of America's new, unilateral resolve. If it could effectively be shown that he possessed, or was trying to build, weapons of mass destruction—creating an 'asymmetric threat,' in the neoconservative parlance, to U.S. power in the region—his overthrow would help 'dissuade' other countries from doing the same."
 36. Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, October 7, 2001, B7.
 37. Quoted in R. S. Zaharna, "The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World," *Foreign Policy in Focus* 8, no. 2 (June 2003), <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol8/v8n02diplomacy.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
 38. Colin Powell speech to State Department staff, September 6, 2001, in Maureen Sirhal, "State Department Looks to Technology to Boost Mission," *Government Executive Magazine*, September 7, 2001, <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0901/090701td1.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005).

39. U.S. Department of State, "Under Secretary of State Beers Salutes Visitors Council," March 14, 2002, International Information Programs, <http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/usa/volunteer/s041502.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005).
40. Quoted in Ralph Dannheiser, "Senate Panel Speeds Action on Nominees to Key State Posts," September 24, 2001, <http://israel.usembassy.gov/publish/peace/archives/2001/september/092516.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
41. U.S. Department of State, "Under Secretary of State Beers Salutes Visitors Council."
42. See Liam Kennedy, "Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy," *International Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March 2003), 315–26.
43. See James D. Boys and Scott Lucas, "With Us or Against Us: Cultural Projection and U.S. Foreign Policy After 9/11," *49th Parallel* (summer 2003), <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue10/lucas.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005); "Strategic Goal 11: Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs," 2004, <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfplan/2004/20495.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005).
44. U.S. Department of State, "Strategic Goal 11."
45. Beers speech at Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 15, 2002, "The United States, Europe, and the Muslim World: Revitalizing Relations after September 11," www.csis.org/islam/beers.pdf (accessed April 10, 2005).
46. See Pahlavi, "Cyber-Strategy."
47. CBS News, "Plans for Iraq Attack Began on 9/11," <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830.shtml> (accessed April 10, 2005).
48. Rendon first made its mark by promoting the "liberation" of Kuwait as U.S. troops entered the country in 1991, carrying out operations such as the distribution of American flags to Kuwaiti bystanders. See the Rendon Group, "Crisis Communications Planning and Management: Kuwait. The Gulf War," <http://www.rendon.com/rendon/layout7/crice2.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005). On Rendon, the Pentagon, and INC, see Laura Miller and Sheldon Rampton, "The Pentagon's Information Warrior: Rendon to the Rescue," *Center for Media and Democracy*, <http://www.prwatch.org/prwissues/2001Q4/rendon.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
49. Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau, "List of Articles Cited by the Information Collection Program (ICP)," March 15, 2004, <http://www.realcities.com/mld/krrwashington/8173201.htm> (accessed April 10, 2005); Eli Lake, "U.S. Pushes PR for War with Iraq," United Press International, August 20, 2002, <http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20020820-050908-1065r> (accessed April 10, 2005).
50. Jessica Hodgson, "Pentagon Steps up Propaganda Efforts," *Guardian* (London), February 19, 2002, <http://media.guardian.co.uk/attack/story/0,1301,652789,00.html> (accessed April 10, 2005).
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