PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:

THE EVOLUTION OF LITERATURE

"There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run, the sword is always beaten by the mind" ~Napoleon

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Introduction

The term public diplomacy was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Malone 12); subsequently, the study of public diplomacy commenced. After receiving heightened attention during the Cold War, the literature on public diplomacy and international broadcasting waned. However, it took the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 attacks for the United States to gain a renewed interest in public diplomacy. First, a chronological overview of the literature in public diplomacy will be provided, with a particular emphasis on the role of international broadcasting. Afterward, the major themes that have reappeared throughout the literature will be examined with respect to the aforementioned literature. Such thematic issues will include the debates over the relationship between propaganda and public diplomacy, the identity of US information agencies, particularly the VOA, the clash between political and cultural components of public diplomacy, the degree of integration of public diplomacy within foreign policy, and the efficacy of public diplomacy. The fact that some of the public diplomacy scholars have had policy roles is a unique aspect of this literature compared to other fields of political communication. This is significant because the professional background of the author skews his or her point of view. For example, if a former Fulbright scholar is writing about public diplomacy, he or she will most likely emphasize the importance of cultural communication. Despite resistance, every human being has an ego and wants to believe that their career is valuable to society. As a result, the professional backgrounds of each source of literature were noted when possible in order to discern the credence of his or her argument.

I: Early Research

"We must persuade or perish in the attempt" ~Edward R. Murrow

Early research in the field of public diplomacy began in the 1960's. Both John Lee, a journalism professor, and Arthur Hoffman, a USIA Murrow fellow, recognize the new rise of public diplomacy and conclude that more research about this rapidly expanding field is necessary. Lee's *The Diplomatic Persuaders: New Role of the Mass Media in International Relations* (1968) expresses the notion that we are living in an age of public diplomacy, an era in which people-to-people dialogues are becoming more important than communicating between governments. Lee argues that governments, especially democracies, are frequently forced to abide by public opinions. As a result, international opinion yields incredible power, making it imperative that we inform ourselves, along with our friends, allies and enemies. Lee warns, "The government that fails to do so may find itself inarticulate in the face of world opinion" (Lee x). Lee concludes that there have been few attempts made to describe how public diplomacy functions or to indicate its impact.

In *International Communication and the New Diplomacy* (1968), Hoffman contends that the revolution of mass communications has given rise to a new diplomacy, whose techniques are as of yet imperfectly understood. This "new" diplomacy refers to public diplomacy— the ways in which both governments and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on other governments' foreign policy decisions. This new diplomacy is essential

because “The failure to recognize that there are many worlds, not merely one, is the deepest source of confusion between us…” (Walter Lippman in Hoffman 30)

II

“A war of ideas is being waged around the world, and the believers in liberty had best act or risk losing by default” ~ Kenneth L. Adelman.

The late 1970’s through the late1980’s brought a high interest in the field of public diplomacy. The US government’s approach during this time period was grounded in the belief that “relatively straightforward efforts to disseminate information that accorded with the US viewpoint to the largest possible audience in the greatest number of countries, while keeping a bit of a wary eye on those targeting their efforts” toward us, would best serve US interests (Manheim 7). Scholarship enlightened by this perspective is characterized by focusing on management, general content and direction, and integration with larger foreign policy interests and initiatives, of public diplomacy efforts.

David M. Abshire’s *International Broadcasting: a New Dimension of Western Diplomacy* (1976) analyzes international broadcasting in the context of Soviet-US relations. The automatic flow of ideas and information worldwide inherent in what Abshire terms the “new communications diplomacy” allows the conflict between two forms of diplomacy (statist and people-to-people) to be escaped. Rather, this new communications diplomacy synthesizes them as harmonious—not divergent approaches to our international relationships. Abshire argues that international broadcasting plays an essential role in this process because it permits free discourse of peoples, distinct from

governments. This type of communication acquires a special opportunity and responsibility to concern itself with humane and democratic values to help meet the need affirmed in the Helenski Declaration for an "ever wider knowledge and understanding of various aspects of life in other participating states" (Abshire 78). As a result, a dual diplomacy becomes available with two mutually reinforcing aspects. Abshire opines that international broadcasting can alone "sustain the dialogue required for progress toward a broadened and more constructive level of coexistence" (Abshire 10). The importance of international broadcasting lies in the fact that it offers a major channel for establishing necessary communication between nations and peoples to build a reliable structure of peace.

In 1981, Kenneth L. Adelman (a member of the Strategic Studies Center of SRI International and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in 1976-77) accurately predicts in his *Foreign Affairs* article entitled, "Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in our Time" that public diplomacy—the dissemination of America's message abroad— would become Washington's major growth industry over the next four years. Adelman contends that although America has a captivating message to convey, and one would expect we would be eager to do so, for some time the contrary has been the case. Still, he argues that despite its "virtual invisibility outside the diplomatic community and antipathy on the part of many within", a congruence of three factors makes its revival a reasonable prospect: personality, technology, and history (Adelman 913). First, as a member of the Reagan Administration's foreign affairs transition team, Adelman believes the personality of Ronald Reagan dictates that public diplomacy is the component of international affairs he knows and does best; therefore, it has the makings of becoming a

hallmark of his administration's foreign policy. Second, the technology of the evolving global communication network has made public diplomacy a more powerful instrument. Lastly, the history of the rise of a fiery pro-Americanism after the twin Iranian-Afghan crises may burn as the political flame of the coming years. The American mood is pride—not shame; the national desire is to exalt America's virtues—not to veil them. The US has altered its self-deprecating temper of the 1960's and 1970's to a highly chauvinistic one (Adelman 913).

Adelman believes that America's disengagement in the late 1960's and 1970's including the decrease in American consulates, bases, and information outlets such as libraries, magazines, and exhibits "was penny wise and foolish" (Adelman 916). This is reflected in the growth of US interests abroad corresponding with the steadily declining representation of those interests. For example, in 1969, there were 1,040 information officers, which fell to 661 in 1981. According to Adelman, the number of information officers in Western Europe decreased by 80% since 1954 (Adelman 916). This sharp decline was justified on two grounds. First, Europeans have an abundance of information about the US from private media. Second, "America's friendship with Western Europe is so unshakable as to obviate the need for many US government information programs" (917). However, Adelman contends that those arguments ignore the fact that much of the developing world's climate of opinion is derived from European cultural and intellectual centers, calling Europe "the world's grand salon of respected opinion" (917). In addition, the US is beat our by other countries in its output of public diplomacy and international broadcasting, especially the Soviet Union.

III

"Communication between peoples widely separated in space and thought is undoubtedly the greatest weapon against the evils of misunderstanding and jealousy…"

~Guglielmo Marconi

In the late 1980's through the mid 1990's, scholars and practitioners devoted more systematic attention to the relationship between communication and diplomacy than previously. The focus shifted to administration, foreign public opinion, communication technology as the interactive world gave the communication of ideas more importance, and the debate over political/informational versus educational/cultural fields.

Glen Fisher's *American Communication in a Global Society* (1987) should be perceived as a benchmark in the study of public diplomacy because he applies social scientific knowledge to public diplomacy. Fisher, from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, expresses that since we are in an era of public diplomacy, "government actions must be increasingly responsive to the views and judgments of their peoples, particularly as media services make their impact and as public groups articulate their concerns more effectively" (Fisher 8). Fisher contends that whether or not these publics are objective or rational in their perceptions, how they get their information and how they are predisposed to react to it is just as significant a consideration in foreign affairs as real-politik strategy or the private views of national leaders. Additionally, he argues that the public diplomacy dimension is even more important because the "stream of nongovernmental transnational linkages and activities has also become part of the

international relations process" (Fisher 8). These linkages, which all carry their share of negotiating and decision-making responsibilities, include newsmen, transnational corporations, labor groups, religious and educational institutions, nonprofit organizations, and political parties.

Fisher also analyzes the value of officially sponsored public communication of governments and extols similar views as Hachten on purposeful, official information 15 years earlier. He states that USIA's efforts are a small part of an ever-growing communication flow that creates images, reports events, and suggests their meaning. Fisher suggests that it is easy to overestimate the capacity of purposeful information and exchange programs to change the terms of dialogue or influence patterns of thought. He argues that planned official efforts are "dwarfed by the magnitude and volume of the uncoordinated commercial and private of mass communication" (Fisher 9). Fisher articulates that the problem for a purposeful US governmental program is to define its unique function by asking—what can it communicate that is not already communicated? What are the essential gaps? How can it facilitate a constructive flow? (Fisher 9).

Gifford D. Malone, who served as a deputy assistant and associate director of USIA from 1974-1984, addresses the organization of public diplomacy in the USIA and the Department of State in *Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organizing the Nation's Public Diplomacy* (1988). Malone contends that public diplomacy has become an essential element in the conduct of foreign policy. He questions the present organ of government and whether our institutions fit the intended purposes of diplomacy. He discusses and relates the fundamentals to the actual practice of diplomacy in the present and the recent past. He strongly believes that the government's ability to manage

foreign affairs is significantly affected by its adopted organizational forms. Malone ultimately argues that the underlying weaknesses in the US management of diplomacy are organizational and institutional (Malone xiii-xvi).

Malone broadly defines public diplomacy as public activities directed abroad, primarily in the fields of information, education and culture. He believes that "A world that is shrinking requires better communication and mutual comprehension if nations are able to survive and prosper" (Malone 7). Public diplomacy is ideally communicating directly with foreigners to affect their thinking in ways that are beneficial to us and to them. The goal is to influence the behavior of a foreign government by influencing the attitudes of its citizens. Therefore, the target is private individuals—not governments, utilizing both government-to-people communication and private-sector activity. Malone explains that the US government activities cover a broad spectrum, and can be divided into the information field and the educational/cultural field. The information field includes publications for foreign readers, speakers to overseas audiences, and radio and TV broadcasting. The educational/cultural field consists of exchange programs, artists and exhibits abroad, operation of libraries and cultural centers abroad, and overseas corps of career officers to manage programs and establish contact with opinion leaders. Malone believes the degree of enthusiasm with which cultural activities are viewed and the extent to which they are seen to contribute to the achievement of diplomatic objectives distinguishes the present from previous periods. It is precisely this attitude that has created both opportunities and problems for government efforts in this field (Malone 2).

Malone briefly traces the history of public diplomacy among different administrations. In the early 1960's, Kennedy used programs aggressively in direct support of US foreign policy. Eisenhower and Kennedy issued mission statements for the USIA and both emphasized the need to depict assets of American life and culture that would help others understand US policies and objectives and the need to counter hostile attempts to frustrate and distort US policies and objectives. Kennedy's point of view was more activist and policy-oriented, as he recognized the importance of assessing foreign opinion for policy formulation. Subsequently, Carter's approach in the 1970's failed. However, in the 1980's, the Reagan administration once again fully embraced the advocacy function of international information programs (Malone 19-21). Malone confirmed that Adelman correctly envisaged that under the Reagan administration public diplomacy would become a "growth industry" because its members approached the idea of public diplomacy from a different standpoint than their immediate predecessors and were willing to substantially increase the resources applied to it (Malone 68).

Malone reviews the problems and challenges that public diplomacy efforts face, exploring what public diplomacy intends to accomplish and what kind of government structure is best suited to the task. He analyzes the compatibility between public diplomacy designed for specific policy purposes versus that of a long-term "nonpolitical nature" and the arising tension between policy and non-policy oriented activities combined in one program such as speakers. He reviews the recent cutbacks and compromise of exchange programs and stresses the need to maintain their integrity.

He considers that the USIA is handicapped by its separation from the State Department and examines whether and to what extent foreign public opinion should be taken into consideration as foreign policy is formulated (Malone 94-99)

Allen C. Hansen, a 32-year veteran of public diplomacy, emphasizes the importance of public diplomacy in achieving US foreign policy goals in his book, *USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age* (1989). He says that despite the growth in interest and knowledge of public diplomacy, it is not necessarily better understood. On the contrary, the term has been misused in recent years because its meaning is elusive. Still, recognition of the value and importance of the type of public diplomacy conducted by USIA has generally grown steadily—not dramatically, among members of Congress and many others in the diplomatic sphere (Hansen xiii-xiv).

Dr. Benno H. Signitzer (Head of the Public Relations Area in the Department of Communication and Journalism at Salzburg University, Austria) and Dr. Timothy Coombs (assistant professor in the Department of Communication at Illinois State University) argue in “Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergences” (1992) that there exists a relationship between public diplomacy and public relations. The two fields seek similar objectives and employ similar tools to reach those objectives; however, the exact ideas and concepts which can be transferred from one area to the other have yet to be fully delineated and tested and deserve future research by practitioners and researchers. They define international public relations as the “planned and organized effort of a company, institution, or government to establish mutually beneficial relations with the publics of other nations” (Signitzer 137). The purpose of their theoretical consideration is to explore ways in which public relations models can be conceptually

related to notions that were derived from a branch of international relations: public and cultural diplomacy. Their objective is to integrate public diplomacy with public relations by first, defining public diplomacy and its related concepts, then presenting a combined model of public relations and cultural communication, and finally considering future research concerns (Signitzer 138).

Signitzer and Coombs claim that the shift away from traditional diplomacy, which emphasizes government-to-government communication or the "art of conducting negotiations between governments"(Deutsch 1966 p.81) and toward public diplomacy—"…the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government's foreign policy decisions" (Delaney 1968 p.3) has been facilitated by both the expansion of communication technology and greater public participation in the foreign affairs process. The global marketplace of ideas cannot be ignored by nation-states since mass media and political science research has revealed that public opinion can shape policy decisions and conduct of governments (e.g., Page & Shapiro 1983) (Signitzer 138-39).

Signitzer and Coombs argue that public diplomacy and public relations practitioners often pursue the same objective—affect public opinion for the benefit of the client or organizations. Public diplomacy practitioners seek their objective through the use of communication programs directed at societies abroad and are designed to change or maintain the attitudes of the publics in these foreign cultures (Signitzer 139). Koschwitz (1986) identifies the sub-objectives of public diplomacy including information exchange, reduction of clichés and prejudices, creation of sympathy for one's own

foreign policy and model of society, self-portrayal, and image-building. Signitzer and Coombs suggest that these sub-objectives reveal further similarities in the relationship between public diplomacy and public relations because public relations is similarly used to achieve information exchange, reduction of misconceptions, creation of goodwill, and construction of an image (Signitzer 139). "Even with this conceptual overlap, it appears that public relations and public diplomacy thinking have been shying away from one another instead of having a fruitful encounter" (140). According to Signitzer and Coombs, Koschwitz, a German public diplomacy theorist, is the only one to make explicit use of term public relations when describing public diplomacy activities. Signitzer and Coombs state that aspects of public relations are gaining importance in public diplomacy theory and practice; nevertheless, "two areas which could benefit from a union remain divorced from one another" (140).

Signitzer and Coombs offer a comparison of two models to reinforce the substance which is shared by public relations and public diplomacy. The Peisert Model of Cultural Communication is comprised of four ideal types of cultural communication based on two axes: interested versus disinterested in the culture and cultural issues of the other country and intends cultural changes in the other country versus accepts the cultural status quo in the other country. The four models include *exchange and cooperation* (interested and intends changes; both partners have equal rights), *one-way transmission of own culture abroad* (disinterested and intends changes; unbalanced structure using language as persuasion versus information exchange), *information* (interested and accepts; seeks to create abroad understanding and sympathy for one's own country), and *self-portrayal* (disinterested and accepts; aims at conscious drawing of specific picture

abroad of one's own country) (Signitzer 143). The Grunig/Hunt Model of Public Relations is also comprised of four models based on two axes: one-way versus two-way communication and informative versus persuasive communication (Signitzer 145).

Signitzer and Coombs contend that two of the four models of public relations fit best with *cultural diplomacy*. Press agentry/publicity is similar to one-way transmission of one's own culture abroad because both models are both one-way, the propaganda has aggressive language policy, and an unbalanced relationship. Public information is comparable to self-portrayal because they are both one-way modes of information and are concerned with comprehension, yet contain little persuasion. The other two models fit best with *cultural relations*. Two-way asymmetric is analogous to information because they share the goal of sympathy and acceptance, consist of careful, scientific planning, and contain no change of one's own behavior. Two-way symmetric is similar to exchange and cooperation because there is dialogue, balanced effects, and a change of one's own behavior on each side Signitzer 144-45).

Signitzer and Coombs conclude that areas of public diplomacy and public relations share basic concepts and a strong similarity. They argue that modern technology and the needs of modern nation states to influence opinions of foreign publics have created a convergence between public diplomacy and public relations, a process that should be cultivated—not ignored: "Only a series of theory-based empirical studies will facilitate this convergence of research traditions which, in the past, have evolved in quite different intellectual and academic settings and in near isolation form each other" (146). They conclude that neither public relations nor public diplomacy is fully equipped to handle the new demands which face them; each area can benefit by learning strengths of

the other and adapting them to the practice of dealing with foreign publics. While public relations is fairly unsophisticated in the strategies nation-states must use when engaging in international public relation because “nation-states pushing foreign policy is not the same as a multi-national corporation peddling an image” (145), public diplomacy lacks the tools and tactics necessary to affect change in foreign publics.

Wang and Chang (2004) agree with Signitzer and Coombs that in many ways public diplomacy is a form of international public relations. After all, public relations are more likely to have effect in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs because there is less knowledge and experience on part of the citizens (Manheim 127). As a result, media coverage of foreign affairs is particularly significant in framing public perceptions and policy actions (Manheim 131). Nonetheless, achieving desired media coverage is not always guaranteed; results are often mixed.

According to Jarol B. Manheim in *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy* (1994), the practice of public diplomacy has expanded in scale and in sophistication by those who deliver US-directed media, public, and government affairs management services to foreign governments and corporations. International strategic communication is one of the leading growth industries of 1980’s and 1990’s. Public diplomacy has emerged from obscurity in recent years although it is not generally a high-priority subject on the public’s political agenda. Such communication can be perceived as political campaigns with the objective of advancing policy interests to the client government or corporation. Lobbyists have been replaced by individuals and firms with experience in managing domestic political campaigns (Manheim viii). Manheim articulates that service providers including individuals, consulting firms who deliver

lobbying and public relations, constitute a sizable and rapidly growing industry, comprising more than 800 firms with annual billings around one-half billion dollars (Manheim 35). This industry is built on expertise in fields such as social science research, mass communication, marketing, interpersonal persuasion, and are fueled by significant sums of money from a growing clientele (Manheim 14).

Manheim explains that there are two forms of public diplomacy: people-to-people contacts and government-to-people contacts. People-to-people contacts are characterized by cultural exchanges such as the Fulbright Program and media development initiatives, which are all designed to explain and defend government policies and portray a nation to foreign audiences. On the contrary, government-to-people contacts, identified by Davison (1974) and Merritt (1980), include "efforts by the government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to its advantage"; it is this aspect of diplomatic activity that provides the context for Manheim's analysis (Manheim 4). Manheim's approach emphasizes "*strategic* public diplomacy": "public diplomacy practiced less as an art than as an applied transnational science of human behavior"—"the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behavior" (Manheim 7). Manheim's analytical framework:

> …examines the internal decision-making of, and the interactions among, the media, the public, and the makers of US foreign policy, all with an eye toward identifying the opportunities each creates for influencing the process by some interested outside party". Manheim's analysis is limited to US-directed strategic communication efforts initiated by governments—not foreign activity on behalf of corporations or other commercial enterprises (Manheim 10).

Manheim argues that communication strategies employed in US-directed public diplomacy are grounded in a newly emergent social technology that draws on an increasing base of knowledge, derived from conceptual development in fields such as political science, social psychology, and supported by survey research, focus group data, organizational studies, and content analysis (Manheim 159). Manheim contends that the trend of this growing industry has two implications. First, over time the services provided by the industry to the most sophisticated clients will evolve away from consulting on technique and toward the marketing of narrower forms of expertise. Second, foreign policymaking in the US will become increasingly subject to subtle but effective influence from interested outside parties (Manheim 162).

In Robert S. Fortner's *Public Diplomacy and International Politics: the Symbolic Constructs of Summits and International Radio News* (1994), the use of the media as vehicles of public diplomacy is examined by asking: were US efforts to exercise public diplomacy through the media effective in influencing how news organizations reported news, specifically U.S.-Soviet summit meetings? (Fortner 1). Fortner, an international communication scholar, examines how the news organizations of international shortwave radio services covered superpower summits and ancillary summit meetings between the 1987 Washington Reagan-Gorbachev summit and the 1990 Washington Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting (Fortner 2). He addresses whether or not the VOA is truly an independent news medium. The basic methodology used in the study is content analysis with a coding scheme to calculate the number, placement, and length of the summit stories broadcast on the VOA, Radio Moscow, and the BBC, as well as other services (Fortner 8). He aimed to compare and contrast the nature of the reporting that

characterized the broadcasts of the services. Fortner addresses whether or not public diplomacy works, insofar as the activities of international radio news organizations are concerned. In other words, "were the US government's efforts to put across its version of events, or its spin on them, successful in influencing how summit stories were reported?" Did Washington set the agenda for the international radio press? Did the ideological commitments of individual radio stations insulate them from US public diplomacy efforts or make them more likely to be sympathetic to these efforts? (Fortner 13).

Fortner discovers certain trends in news coverage and propaganda. He finds no consistent confirmation of the hypothesis that coverage intensity is affected by either distance from the country broadcasting (regionalism) or by its characterization as "friendly", "hostile", or "neutral" (Fortner 144). He finds that the VOA described US actions consistently positive, with only the portrayal of the Moscow summit dipping slightly under the norm for its reports. The BBC was also consistently positive, but at a lower rate—except for Malta, when its reports exceeded even those of the VOA (Fortner 156). Radio Netherlands portrayals of the US were the reverse mirror image of Radio Moscow's: whatever one service saw the US doing positively, the other saw in precisely opposite terms. Radio Moscow was consistent with expectations: all of its portrayals were positive, with the level of positive portrayal rising as each summit occurred (Fortner 157).

Fortner found that most organizations depend on wire services for their brief reports of summit events and decisions. The VOA, BBC, and Radio Moscow depended largely on their own news staffs to determine the focus of summit coverage and what information to use to report their stories (Fortner148-52). No measures such as the

placement of stories in the newscast, importance attached to each summit or patterns of reporting changed significantly over the summits studied and thus do not reveal any shift in emphasis in the coverage of these three radio news services. "Whatever the particular commitment of these services to journalistic forms, their coverage of issues was more convergent than divergent over this four-year period "(Fortner 160). Fortner concludes that evidence from this study does not suggest that efforts to practice public diplomacy by influencing international radio coverage were particularly effective (Fortner 160).

Historian and Chairman of the Research Council for the Center for Strategic and International Affairs, Walter Laqueur's *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "Save Public Diplomacy" (1994) argues that public diplomacy is being ignored by US foreign policy and has been declining over a long period of time. He criticizes the attitudes of influential congressman that have gone from indifference to hostility. USIA programs have been discontinued and scaled down, accompanied by a decreased budget. He argues that radio, especially shortwave broadcasting, is still important despite the prevalence of television. Laqueur suggests that the budget of various agencies in public diplomacy should be around three-four times higher to remedy the present dismal state of affairs, to give agencies more freedom of action and the ability to attract the best available talent. He condemns the Clinton administration for being apathetic by phasing out Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Laqueur 19).

Laqueur contends that the explanations for such apathy are poor. One explanation is that public diplomacy is not needed since the Cold War is over and the US no longer faces major threats, yet Laqueur warns that the world has entered a period of heightened disorder characterized by such events as regional conflicts, weapons of mass destruction

and anti-Western attacks. He argues that a reexamination of old priorities is needed and emphasizes the importance of cultural diplomacy over traditional diplomacy and military power in coping with most of these dangers. Critics consider public diplomacy activities a luxury that are not in America's self-interest but rather serve as a favor we are doing other nations. However, Laqueur argues that this view betrays the fact that events outside the US are relevant to our security and well-being. A third explanation assumes that the advantages of the American way of life, values, and institutions are self-evident and do not need special promotion and that democratic institutions are secure, but Laqueur emphasizes that an official record is needed as to avoid confusion. A final explanation argues that public diplomacy is only engaged in by the US, but he counters that ignorant view by citing evidence that the BBC World Service is widely listened to and more respected than the US. Furthermore, France, Spain, and other nations spend more money than the US on public diplomacy, there is no US equivalent of the German foreign presence and activities, and Iran has more powerful radio than the VOA (Laqueur 20-21).

Laqueur contends that the weakness of public diplomacy lies in the fact that it has no powerful domestic constituency since the consensus of need did not survive the Cold War; still, he says there is a greater need than ever before. Skeptics also argue that public diplomacy is a two-edged sword: why magnify our mistakes and our lack of foreign policy? Laqueur answers that such a narrow view is invalid because public diplomacy is not merely concerned with daily affairs and making US policies look good, but rather to project an image of American life and values irrespective of daily events; US public diplomacy must be evaluated in longer time frames (Laqueur 22). Opponents of public diplomacy argue that the private sector should shoulder the financial responsibility;

however, Laqueur mocks that such a proposal "is about as sensible or practical as suggesting that the private sector should be responsible for U.S. defense, health, education, and street cleaning" (Laqueur 24). Even if corporations are willing to invest in regions of special interest to them, this does not help areas where the needs are greatest.

Gary D. Rawnsley's study in *Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956-64* (1996) focuses on the relationship between the BBC external services and the VOA and propaganda objectives as devised by their governments, foreign services, and intelligence services. Rawnsley, a political science professor at the University of Nottingham, identifies the relationship between broadcasting and international relations in a theoretical manner, providing many examples of how international radio was used for substantive bargaining as part of diplomatic process. He analyzes how the BBC and VOA reacted to four crises which enveloped them in a crucial period of the Cold War: the Suez Crisis, the Hungarian uprising, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam. He aims to ascertain the role of international broadcasting as both an instrument and determinant of foreign policy. His principal discovery is that governments need to communicate events and history to their publics (Rawnsley 1-5).

IV: Post-9/11

"How can a man in a cave outmaneuver the world's leading communications society?"
~US diplomat Richard Holbrooke

The depth of public interest in public diplomacy and international broadcasting has always been cyclical; before September 11th, 2001 scholarly treatment lagged (Price 199, 202). In 1994, Laqueur predicted that in the future there will be a major international crisis which will diminish delusions about the state of the world and increase our awareness of the dangers facing America and end the lethargy and indifference. Unfortunately, the events of September 11th, 2001 proved him right. Post-9/11 and the War on Terrorism, public diplomacy and international broadcasting came to the forefront of foreign policy once again, and this time, revamped and in full force.

In *To Prevail: an American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism*, Kurt M**.** Campbell (former Harvard professor and director of the International Security Program at CSIS) and Michele A**.** Flournoy (senior advisor in same CSIS program) contend that there are two reasons for America's side of the story being largely unheard in the Arab and Islamic world: the lack of freely flowing information, along with widespread official censorship and propaganda, and the failure of American public diplomacy. The success of our foreign policy and particularly our campaign against terrorism is "inexorably linked to America's ability to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics" (Campbell 144). They opine that if the US fails to seek understanding, if not endorsement, from peoples and countries that are sympathetic to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda's issues, this will broaden the base from which terrorists can draw sanctuary, support, and even successors. They stress that "The war of ideas is America's to win. It is time that we take it seriously" (Campbell 151). Winning the war on terrorism and securing peace will be as much an act of persuasion as of coercion, and public diplomacy should play a central role.

According to Campbell and Flournoy, public diplomacy was an effective weapon in the West's arsenal in the Cold War. It gave confidence to dissident groups of politicians, intellectuals, and artists throughout the Eastern bloc, put a spotlight on the stark differences bet capitalism and command economies, between democracy and despotism, and ultimately helped provoke the collapse of communism from within. "With the ideological war won, policymakers began to perceive public diplomacy as an expensive anachronism" (Campbell 143). Advocates of reducing public diplomacy argued that the spread of and broad access to private media, via satellites and the Internet was enough to carry America's message abroad. Campbell and Flournoy counter that this is problematic because these media tilt heavily toward materialistic expressions pf American success, rarely deal with foreign policy issues, and do not penetrate some critical parts of the world. As a result of such prevalent views, resources devoted to shaping America's message have been in decline, wit public diplomacy representing a miniscule percentage of the State Department's budget.

In *Media and Sovereignty* (2002), Monroe Price demands that we urgently need a far-reaching discussion about the relationship between state international broadcasting and concerns over national identity, national security, and terrorism (Price 248). He explains that until 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan, there was little public attention paid to the role of international broadcasting in the armament of external influence. 9/11 caused the US and others to reexamine the role of public diplomacy, including international broadcasting as tools in the long process of counter-education and counter-programming. The US is engaged in a battle for "hearts and minds": "the mental and emotional kilns in which hatreds are stoked and positive attitudes formed" (199).

According to Price, the debate on the significance of a "clash of civilizations" is no longer confined primarily to academic institutions. He asserts that military responses are insufficient to "counter reservoirs of intensely inculcated belief that nourish future terrorists or aggressors against the West" (199). As part of any broader strategy adopted, the US and others are required to be actively involved in the way opinions across the world toward the West and its policies are shaped.

Price articulates that the VOA, Deutsche Welle, and BBC World Service are best-known examples of international broadcasters. With the advent of technology such as newer satellite services often linked with government or regional policy but not "state sponsored" in the literal sense, the lines have become blurred. For example, some argue that CNN is an instrument of US foreign policy and hegemony, but it is not an international broadcaster in the traditional definition of the term. Likewise, Al Jazeera is described as being regionally biased, but it is not officially state-sponsored or financed. Price explains that while shortwave radio is the dominant mode of distributing signals of international broadcasters, there are now many technologies (FM, Internet, and satellite) involved. Price emphasizes that a line must be drawn between transparent international broadcasters and clandestine or "black" radios—instruments of information transfer that are secretly sponsored by governments, intelligence agencies, or state-linked political movements. "These differences in style track broadcasting histories, varying foreign policy objectives, responses to the nature of societies targeted, political involvement at home, and deep-seated domestic cultural proclivities" (Price 201).

Price demonstrates how international broadcasting has been resuscitated by the War on Terrorism. The Middle East Radio Network (MERN) targets new young

mainstream educated Arabs under thirty years old and the emerging Arab leadership. MERN is the brainchild of Norman Pattiz, a successful radio entrepreneur. MERN incorporates pop music, the strategic use of music and entertainment, more specific demographic analysis and objectives, and the medium of formats—not shows. Pattiz's solution to the VOA's problems lays in that US international broadcasting will come to use the same techniques and technologies that drive the US commercial media today. There is also the emerging strategy to "rebrand" the US. Together, MERN and rebranding are the "embodiment of a revolution in public diplomacy" (Price 221). In his recommendations and predictions for the future of international broadcasting, Price agrees with the notion that institutions of international broadcasting will begin to mimic their commercial counterparts, evolving from news to entertainment. Objective and impartial reporting will fade as the promotion of a particular culture or style erupts and new technologies, new genres, and new kinds of partnerships like MERN will emerge. Still, Price offers this warning: "To trust this weapon [the shaping of public opinion thru electronic media] to advertising agents and interested corporations seems the uttermost folly" (Price 225).

In *the World News Prism* (2002), William A. Hachten, a journalism and mass communication professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and specialist in international communications and press/government relations, concurs with Price's conclusions that the spotlight on public diplomacy and international broadcasting is cyclical. According to Hachten, public diplomacy and political warfare are somewhat ignored and diminished in peacetime, yet are mobilized by the government to win the hearts and minds of followers and adversaries in times of war. Hachten argues that public

diplomacy and propaganda have important roles to play in the war on terrorism. He says the current struggle in war on terrorism is the effort to convince world public opinion of the relevance of the antiterrorism cause (Hachten 101). Furthermore, he suggests it is very likely Congress will substantially strengthen various facets of our public efforts such as the VOA and more targeted broadcasting, cultural exchanges, and more person-to-person contacts with foreign nationals overseas.

Since 9/11, there is concern that since the USIA was abolished in 1999 the US's ability to conduct public diplomacy has diminished. After all, France, Spain and many others spend far more money on public diplomacy than the US. However, Hachten stresses that public diplomacy is needed by a nation at war. Since the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, there have been budget cuts and less interest in Pakistan, one of many countries where US cut its public diplomacy programs in the early and mid-1990's. Additionally, across Arab world where anti-Western propaganda is a staple, VOA broadcasts are barely audible and reach less than 2% of the population in twenty-two targeted countries. Funding for foreign exchanges such as the Fulbright fell by nearly one-third from 1993-2000 as well. But now policy makers in Washington are listening again to advocates of increased cultural exchange and public diplomacy (Hachten 112).

Hachten contends that International Political Communication (IPC) encompasses public diplomacy, overseas information programs, cultural exchanges, propaganda activities, and political warfare. His definition of IPC is: the political effects that newspapers, broadcasting, film, exchanges of persons, cultural exchanges, and other means of international communication can achieve. IPC consists of four categories. The

first category is *official communications intended to influence foreign audiences (public diplomacy).* This encompasses the former USIA, VOA, Radio Moscow, British Information Service, Deutsche Welle, Radio Havana, BBC's World Service, and most international shortwave broadcasting. The second, small type is *official communications not intended to influence foreign audiences* such as the US Armed Radio and TV Network (AFN). The third kind, also small, is p*rivate communications intended to influence foreign audiences politically*. This includes various organizations and groups working to promote international understanding such as peace groups advocating a freeze on nukes. The last category is p*rivate communications without a political purpose*. This consists of Western news agencies, media enterprises overseas such as advertising agencies, distributors of film, TV, videos, relief organizations, American mass culture (Hollywood music and movies), and has both negative and positive effects (but not intentional effects) on IPC. Similar to Fisher**,** Hachten argues that the overseas impact of private US communications, though difficult to assess, is far greater than that of US public diplomacy, signifying that unintended effects sometimes can be more profound than those caused intentionally (Hachten 103-4).

Still, the lines between these four categories are blurred for many reasons. First, official IPC efforts are usually a supplement to diplomacy—serving as ways by which governments try to extend their influence abroad and pursue foreign policy objectives. Second, the fourth category, particularly the news media transmit lots of purposive official information (propaganda) because all governments work hard to get their versions of news and events into the world's news media, reflecting the official dominance model. Since most news from official sources in national capitals is intended

to serve foreign policy goals, news and propaganda are not mutually exclusive categories. For instance, the media serve the purposes of public diplomacy when they carry a story of Bush's views of bin Laden, yet is what the president says is always "news" (Hachten 104).

Hachten contends that like WWII and the Cold War (including Korean and Vietnam), shortwave radio is the preferred medium in the War on Terrorism. Audience surveys reveal that listening on shortwave continues to increase. He argues that "in this day of direct-broadcast satellites, global TV, and the Internet, the powerful and pervasive medium of international radio broadcasting, long capable of carrying messages around the world almost instantaneously, is easily underestimated or ignored" (105). In the 1930's political leaders such as Nazi Germany's Josef Goebbels spoke of international radio as a "limitless medium" and viewed it as a powerful instrument of international diplomacy, persuasion, and coercion. For more than a half century, transnational radio has been a "key instrument of international political communication", yet most Americans, unlike many other nationalities, do not listen to international radio and are therefore unaware of how pervasive it is; there are 1,600 shortwave stations emanating from 160 countries with diverse formats (Hachten 105). Hachten declares that audience targeting, a debated policy issue within the USIA must be addressed: Who are we trying to influence? He argues that if the answer is elites, then we need person-to-person efforts of USIS posts as well as cultural and educational exchanges. However, if we are trying to target the mass public, we will need expanded, more aggressive international radio broadcasting (Hachten 108-9).

John Brown argues in his article “The Purposes and Cross-Purposes of American Public Diplomacy” (2002) that public diplomacy is a prime force in the furtherance of American foreign policy. According to Brown, the principal facets of the field are information, education, and culture. Information provides the “truth” about the US and its foreign policy and counters lies and disinformation of adversaries. Education includes exchanges in order to promote better understanding of the US around the world; strengthen cooperative international relations. Finally, culture consists of presentations to display the best of American artistic achievements, though after the Cold War, many programs were abolished. Brown contends that sometimes those functions are at cross-purposes; nonetheless, those tensions can contribute to a more effective presentation of America’s story to the world (Brown 2)

David Hoffman, President of Internews Network (a nongovernmental media organization), argues in his article “Beyond Public Diplomacy” (2002) that the US must support indigenous open media, democracy, and civil society in the Muslim world. Based on the fact that Osama Bin Laden is still widely approved in the Muslim world, Hoffman contends the US is clearly losing the propaganda war. Therefore we must address the “virulent anti-Americanism of government- supported media, mullahs, and madrassas (Islamic schools)” that cannot be helped by military operations or new security measures (Hoffman 83). Washington’s immediate response to 9/11 was to focus on image-cultivation in order to figure out how to best spin its message; thus, former advertising executive Charlotte Beers was appointed Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Hoffman argues that slick marketing techniques and US spokespersons on satellite TV are insufficient. Widespread antagonism to US regional

policies further limits what diplomacy can achieve. Consequently, until policies are addressed, US efforts to intensify their message are more likely to hurt than help (Hoffman 84).

Hoffman highlights that public diplomacy, once the stepchild of diplomats, has only recently taken its rightful place in national security. Hoffman argues that instead of censorship and counter-propaganda, the State Department should promote independent media where oppression breeds terrorism. "…the unrelenting and unquestioned anti-Western propaganda in those countries' media (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) creates fertile ground for suicide bombers and would-be martyrs" (Hoffman 84). Open media provides a new space for moderate voices that can combat anti-Western propaganda. He cites evidence that local media in the Soviet territories and Indonesia was vital in promoting freedom. While Bin Laden is extremely adept at public diplomacy by using al Jazeera to reach Western news media and Arabs, Hoffman contends that the best way to reverse the tide in the propaganda war is to support Muslim forces that are struggling to create modern democracy and institutionalize rule of law. Although they may disagree with policies, they crave independent media (Hoffman 85-6).

Hoffman considers the other side of the argument by asking: can stronger local media add to anti-Americanism and strengthen fundamental Islamic voices? (Hoffman 87). While his answer is one of uncertainty, he argues the US should not only quickly help establish diverse and democratic media in Afghanistan such as Radio Kabul, but extend a media assistance program to the Middle East as the War on Terrorism moves beyond Afghanistan. Since Iraq, Iran and Libya are closed societies, foreign broadcasting is essential to providing outside information. He opines the US should

assist in the development of independent newspapers, Internet service providers, on-line content providers and local radio and TV channels to countries with opportunities for local media (Hoffman 88). Hoffman maintains that “Freedom of speech and exchange of information are not just luxuries; they are the currency on which global commerce, politics, and culture increasingly depend” (Hoffman 89). Hoffman concludes by stressing that the Muslim world needs access to information, freedom of expression and a voice for women and disenfranchised minorities more than any number of ads about American values, in order to decrease terrorism.

Although Hoffman’s professional role in media might taint his opinion, other scholars and practitioners support his argument. Williams College professor Mark Lynch equally asserts that the US must create an open direct dialogue with the Arab and Islamic world through transnational media in order to ease the anger over our perceived arrogance, skepticism and hypocrisy. Lynch argues in his 2003 *Foreign Affairs* article "Taking Arabs Seriously" that the Bush Administration's "tone deaf" approach to the Middle East "reflects a dangerous misreading of Arab public opinion." He offers thoughtful assessments of the independent media outlets that are transforming the region and how US public diplomacy should engage the "new Arab public sphere” (Lynch 81).

Similar to Hoffman and Lynch, Ambassador Christopher Ross, the US Department of State Special Coordinator for Public Diplomacy, stresses the importance of *national and transnational media*, his fifth pillar of public diplomacy, in “Pillars of Public Diplomacy: Grappling with International Public Opinion” (2003). According to Ross, the US must repeat key messages to audiences of millions—not just opinion leaders:

> We must leverage our messages through all communication channels at our command: Internet-based media (email-publishing and websites), broadcasting (radio and television), print publications and press placements, traveling speakers, and educational and cultural exchanges (Ross 25).

This includes independent government broadcasting services administered by the International Bureau of Broadcasting (IBB) under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) such as the VOA. Ross emphasizes that the primacy of TV and the impact of images cannot be overestimated. Along with national and transnational media, Ross asserts that there exist six additional pillars of public diplomacy in today's world as it relates to the war in Iraq: policy advocacy, context, credibility, tailored messages, alliances and partnerships, and dialogues and exchanges.

Senior American diplomat who recently served as Cyrus Vance Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and now PAO in Tel Aviv, Helena K. Finn argues in her 2003 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences" that "Cultural diplomacy is one of the most potent weapons in the US' armory, yet its importance has been consistently downplayed in favor of dramatic displays of military might" (20). This has, in turn, put America at a disadvantage in our response to radical Islamist terrorism.

According to Manheim, foreign head-of-state visits to the US are one of the most frequent occasions of public diplomatic exchange. Research reveals that the accomplishments of "government-to-government diplomacy are neither automatic nor focused exclusively on expressly foreign *policy* outcomes"; rather, these visits aim to achieve their policy objectives, which may often include specific public diplomacy goals (Manheim 82). In "Strategic Public Diplomacy and Local Press: How a High-Profile

'Head of State' Visit was Covered in America's Heartland", Wang and Chang (2004) use research from public diplomacy and media communication in a case study of Chinese President Jiang Zemin's state visit to the US in 1997. They discuss the effectiveness of the use of head-of-state visits as instruments of public diplomacy, while examining the news values and judgment of the US local press in covering a major public diplomacy event. Just as Manheim (1994) did, Wang and Chang focus on two aspects of media coverage: visibility and valence (Wang 15). Their main findings were that despite the public relations efforts, the image of China, as reflected in the local press coverage, was not improved. Still, their comprehensive article highlights the critical role of the local press in managing the perception and reputation of a country in the eyes of a foreign public. Wang and Chang argue that the local aspect is not only significant in studying public diplomacy and the US media, but also relevant to US public diplomacy strategies and tactics overseas, including presidential visits, especially in the present time of low world public opinion of the US.

Based on this case study, Wang and Chang make suggestions to public diplomacy practitioners on ways to improve the local press coverage of a country represented by visiting heads of state. According to Manheim (1994),

> as 'strategic public diplomacy' events, head-of-state visits are those rare platforms where one nation's leaders has the opportunity to reach the public of another nation's, through ceremonial events, improvisational moments and, most of all, press coverage of the visit, to influence and improve public perceptions of a country's national image (Wang 11).

If effectively executed, such media-oriented events can "transform a nation's image, smooth differences, and dispel trust between nations and peoples" (Wang 11). Wang and Chang assert that the revolution in modern communication technologies and the rapid

globalization of international politics and economy has caused public relations events to become increasingly important to governments in cultivating and mobilizing international public opinion support, making public diplomacy "an indispensable vehicle of international relations" (Wang 13).

Wang and Chang attempt to uncover the answer to research questions including: How visible was the Jiang visit in the local press? What were the salient events and issues concerning the visit in the local press? To what extent was the local press coverage critical of or favorable toward China? Their method was to perform content analysis of three newspapers from Iowa representing three tiers of market segments as well as the *New York Times* for a comparative national reference. In their coding, Wang and Chang identified the form of placement, visual presentation, event and issue salience, and the tone of coverage (Wang 16).

Their findings include that reporting in local papers was more visually stimulating than that in the *New York Times* (visuals accentuated the prominence of a story) and that the diplomatic rituals were the focal point in the coverage of events and issues (Wang 17-18). In addition, conflicting images of China continued in the coverage of Jiang's visit. This contrast was most evident in the newspapers' choice of two types of photographs, which were either focused on Jiang himself or his activities during visit, or focused on organized anti-China protest along Jiang's itinerary. Wang and Chang discovered that two of the local papers and the *New York Times* focused mostly on Jiang as opposed to the protests, with one local paper not using any protest photographs. The Iowa papers' coverage was mostly more critical of China than that of the *New York Times.* The *New York Times* was more even-handed in their use of photographs, whereas the local papers

were more likely to use the protest pictures in larger print sizes. The image of China remains ambivalent and conflicting with focus varying from human rights to the economy. Moreover, the general uniformity of content and tone between coverage in the *New York Times* and the local papers suggests that the local press merely served as an extension of national media. For instance, the Iowa papers depended heavily on Associated Press and other US news organizations, representing relayed stories from national media by following their script. However, it is still noteworthy that local papers used stronger visual components in presenting events when repackaging stories (Wang 19-22).

Based on the editorial content and photographs, Wang and Chang found that the net scores in the treatment of China among local papers showed a somewhat negative result. Since the negative tone of the coverage corresponds with public opinion poll results of Iowans' attitudes about China, perhaps the reporting reflects the public's expectations and reinforces public opinion (Wang 20). Wang and Chang conclude that despite the efforts made by the Chinese government in carefully planning and executing the Jiang visit, the image of China as reflected in the local media, was slightly negative and not improved. Therefore, Jiang's visit may have achieved diplomatic objectives, but it only achieved limited success as a public diplomacy event. Jiang did not transform the Chinese image in the US as did his predecessor Deng Xiaoping during his historic 1979 trip (Wang 21).

Wang and Chang say that more research is needed to examine the transformation that has occurred in the local media in other countries due to the development of modern communication technologies and the globalization movement. Future investigation and

theorizing on the role and function of local media in public diplomacy and international public relations is needed. They argue that practitioners and scholars in international public relations and public diplomacy must recognize the power of the local press. The local press has an expansive reach and presence in the US and in many other countries accompanied by a great capacity in developing and shaping foreign affairs news to audiences (Wang 23).

One of the scholars to make a recent significant contribution to the study and application of public diplomacy is Joseph S. Nye, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. In his 2004 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry," he applies his soft power concepts in the context of the struggle against Islamist terrorism, increased funds for public diplomacy, greater support from the White House, and development of short, medium, and long term public diplomacy strategies. Nye emphasizes that although the Bush administration dismisses the relevance of soft-power, it does so at great peril. He argues that success in the War against Terrorism depends on Washington's capacity to persuade others without force, and that capacity is in dangerous decline. As a result of the rise in anti-Americanism in recent years, the US soft power (its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of US policies and the values that underlie them) is experiencing a significant decline. Negative attitudes toward the US undercut soft power, thereby reducing the ability of the US to achieve its goals without resorting to coercion or payment (Nye 16).

Nye recognizes that skeptics of soft power, such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, claim that popularity is ephemeral and therefore should not guide foreign

policy. However, Nye retorts that the recent decline of US attractiveness should not be easily dismissed because the extent of other countries' cooperation often depends on this factor, and the US desperately needs this cooperation to beat terrorism. Nye also admits that the US' "sheer size and association with disruptive modernity make some resentment unavoidable today"; however, "wise policies can reduce the antagonisms these realities engender" (Nye 16). After all, that is what Washington achieved after WWII: it used soft- power resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions that lasted for sixty years. Furthermore, the Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft and hard power.

Contrary to Dizard and Price, Nye contends that the war against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations; rather, it is a struggle closely linked to the civil war raging between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilization. Consequently, the US and its allies will only win the war if they adopt policies that appeal to those moderates and use public diplomacy effectively to communicate that appeal. Unfortunately, the US uses as little funds for public diplomacy as France or the UK. As a result, the world's only superpower and leader of the information revolution "is all too often outgunned in the propaganda war by fundamentalists hiding in caves" (Nye 17).

Nye articulates that soft power became identified with fighting the Cold War; as a result, Americans did not realize that soft power would assume more importance with the advent of the information revolution—not less. Regrettably, 9/11 opened our eyes to this fact. Nye credits Washington with rediscovering the necessity of public diplomacy. The BBG (the board that oversees the VOA and other specialized radio stations) has taken favorable steps by creating Radio Sawa to broadcast in Arabic, Radio Farda to broadcast

in Farsi in Iran, Al Hurra (the Arabic-language TV station), and the White House Office of Global Communication. Given those facts, Nye contends that Washington has "failed to master the complexities of wielding soft power in an information age" (Nye 18)

After 9/11, Americans across the country asked, "Why do they hate us?" Nye believes that many in the Middle East do not hate the US: "

> As polls consistently show, many fear, misunderstand, and oppose US policies, but they nonetheless admire certain American values and aspects of American culture. The world's leader in communications, however, has been inept at recognizing and exploiting such opportunities (Nye 18).

Since American technology and culture are more attractive than US policies, there is still a chance of isolating the extremists due to widespread moderate views. However, the US must understand that it cannot impose democracy through force, but that soft power is vital to prove that liberal democracy is not inconsistent with Muslim culture.

I recently interviewed Pamela Smith, former U.S. Ambassador to Modlva, Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs in London, Press Attaché in Jakarta, and Cultural Attaché in Belgrade. Smith expressed her view that Nye's concept of soft power is the "most coherent intellectual framework for public diplomacy". She believes the "power to attract countries rather than coerce them is particularly effective in the modern world," given that military power is increasingly less effective in achieving country's goals aborad. Smith concurs with Nye that the US has a great deal of soft power—the appeal of our popular culture, our establishment of international organizations after WWII, and our dominance of the Internet and use of the English language, for example— and is not using this to achieve our ends.

According to Wilson Dizard, who worked for the State Department and USIA from 1951-1980, NGO's make use of global electronic networks; the digital information that flows through them is an essential part of the "soft power" that Joseph Nye sees as a defining element of the new internationalism. Dizard calls soft power the "major factor influencing the role of US public diplomacy in a new era" (Dizard 227)

Dizard (2004) argues in his book *Inventing Public Diplomacy: Story of USIA* that although the USIA shut down in 1999, it left an important legacy in what works and what doesn't—in presenting US policies and values to the rest of the world. Dizard asks: Do public diplomacy programs still serve US national interests in the new global order? He concludes that the US still needs to articulate its policies and actions overseas, if only to assure that an official account of them is available (Dizard 229). Public diplomacy constitutes a critical instrument of US policy in the wake of today's rising anti-Americanism. Dizard contends that what is needed now is not a return to the programs of the USIA era because the new communication environment created by the Internet and other transnational resources is too multidimensional for such an approach. The challenge of international terrorism calls for policies and actions that respect the integrity of the world's many cultures along with a practical recognition of the influences created by the information age. Dizard claims that public diplomacy (the uncertain art of winning public support abroad for one's government and its foreign policy) has a limited but necessary contribution to make in this effort.

Propaganda vs. Public Diplomacy

Since public diplomacy has been studied, debate has arisen over the comparison of propaganda versus public diplomacy, causing scholars to struggle in operationalizing these terms in their research (e.g., Rawnsley 1996). Opinions on this issue range from refusing to acknowledge similarities to stating there are no differences in the two terms. Due to the controversial and subjective nature of this debate, it will probably never be resolved.

According to Lee (1968), differentiating propaganda and information simply depends on one's point of view. Lee reports that despite propaganda becoming a loaded word since WWII, many information specialists including the writers of his book use the words propaganda and information interchangeably.

Abshire asks: "Is international broadcasting, in view of its political aspects, to be labeled propaganda?" (Abshire 38). He concludes that the answer depends on the definition used: communication versus manipulation. If propaganda is defined broadly as communication that tries to influence and aims to affect audiences, then the answer is obviously "yes". However, if propaganda is given the pejorative implications that it holds in the West including manipulation, deceit, and concealed motives, then the answer must be "no" (Abshire 39).

According to Adelman (1981), one explanation of why public diplomacy has long floundered, simultaneously misunderstood and mistrusted, is due to its lack of a domestic constituency. This is, in part, a direct result of the fact that it conjures up Orwellian images of a "Ministry of Truth"—a fear of America having propagandists, which Adelman says literally would be true since these people would propagate ideas and

information. This fear provoked Congress in 1948 to ban domestic dissemination of materials produced for overseas info programs. As a result, Americans do not understand the value of truthful radio broadcasts since there is never a deficit of multiple sources of news in the US, the difference between societies with information overload versus information scarcity due to central control of information (Adelman 914). In a phone interview, John Brown, a twenty-year veteran of the US Foreign Service who has practiced public diplomacy in London, Prague, Kiev, Belgrade, and Moscow, concurs with Adelman. Brown similarly believes the irony of the Smith-Mundt Act is that since the domestic population is not aware of foreign information campaigns, international broadcasting is understaffed and underfunded; as a result, a sense of urgency to get on the air with the latest news is lost.

Malone (1988) contends that though the US has engaged in international information, education, and cultural programs for several decades, it has never been entirely comfortable with all it was doing. For instance, cultural communication, especially exchanges, was considered desirable but this verbal support did not translate into monetary support. On the other hand, the main area of discomfort in regard to information activities was the inability to agree what the US wishes to achieve and because of our ingrained aversion to anything resembling “propaganda,” explaining versus persuading policies. Malone argues that the long-term effort of cultural communication is at least as important to US interests. Still, the US government is not as well of an organ as it should be to conduct effective public diplomacy now and in the years ahead. Malone emphasizes that public diplomacy must be an integral part of the overall US diplomatic effort.

Hansen discerns three types of propaganda: black, grey, and white. Black propaganda consists of material that may or may not be true and falsely attributed to a third party. Gray propaganda contains unattributed material, sometimes of questionable validity. Lastly, white propaganda is legitimate propaganda because it is overt and clearly attributed and contains true and accurate information for a worthy cause. USIA officials would argue that only by this last definition (white) can they be considered a propaganda agency (Hansen 10). According to Hansen, the fact that the USIA is a propaganda agency should not be disputed, yet still US officials continue to be defensive with respect to this term. Hansen declares that the propaganda label is not inappropriate for US public diplomats. In many aspects of public diplomacy, whether US officials are acting as propagandists depends on one's point of view. Hansen relates that US public diplomacy leaders have "learned that their programs and activities must be honest to be credible" and show "warts and all" if credibility is to be maintained (Hansen 11).

Manheim (1994) contends that more recently the term public diplomacy characterizes what would have once been described as "propaganda-like activities". Manheim asserts that the change in label from propaganda to public diplomacy "represents a lesson learned from the propagandists themselves—that what one calls an object helps to determine how it is perceived by others" (Manheim 5)

Fortner states that the "ability of international broadcasting to break down monopolies of knowledge had often led to criticisms that it is merely propaganda (a rhetorical "devil" term in the US)" (Fortner 20). He says it is difficult to entangle propaganda from its devilishness, despite the fact that scholars have suggested it is an "integral feature of democratic societies" (Fortner 20). Fortner maintains that it is

integral because people pay attention to public opinion. If public opinion is crucial in decisions about policy and governance, then it is also important to governments that they influence public opinion; otherwise, they will be at its mercy. The more government can manage opinion, the better able they are to assure that it legitimizes their own policies. As a result, there is incentive for all governments to use propaganda and to prevent its taint. Fortner highlights that democratic societies ironically object to propaganda as an illegitimate means to distort public opinion, although they attempt to manage it themselves (Fortner 21). Fortner claims that the underlying rationale for using persuasion is the desire to control information; propaganda is merely a specific form of persuasion (Fortner 25).

Price (2002) defines international broadcasting as a complex combination of state-sponsored news, information, and entertainment directed at a population outside the sponsoring state's boundaries. He articulates that this use of electronic media by one society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another involves propaganda. Hachten (2002) argues it is important to remember that international radio is a substantial news source for millions, "but nowhere is the truism that one person's news is another person's propaganda more apparent" (Price 107). Though international broadcasting can be self-serving, it still provides a diversity of news and views. He reports that most of international broadcasting is purposive—not disinterested. Thus, words, sounds, and images are intended to influence people's perceptions and opinions and can be considered propaganda—"the systematic use of words and symbols to influence the attitudes or behaviors of others," despite insistence by transnational communicators, journalists, and broadcasters, that they deal in information and truth—not propaganda (Hachten 102).

Brown describes the major tensions in the field of public diplomacy. First, there is the debate over the information role being neutral or propaganda. Brown states that the view often expressed in the media is that public diplomacy is a euphemism for the black art of national propaganda promotion. The VOA and other propaganda outlets were important instruments in winning the Cold War as Soviet and Eastern Europeans were targeted with a simple, consistent message: "Your government is lying to you. It is lying about your condition in life, about itself, and most of all about the West" (Brown 4). Some advocates and practitioners of public diplomacy are resistant to accept the equating of information programs with propaganda (Brown 4). Edward R. Murrow, director of the USIA during the Kennedy Administration contributed to the information versus propaganda debate in categorical terms, which Brown contends is an oversimplification because the issue is not that black and white:

> American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that. (Brown 5)

Second, the dichotomy exists between presenting facts and pushing propaganda. On one level, this tension "stems from the notion that while information can provide facts, it is not sufficient to lead to the deeper understanding provided by education, including among different societies" (Brown 5). On another level, it could be argued that when information is used as a unilateral process of propaganda to persuade audiences, this inherently conflicts with education's quest for knowledge among people with different perspectives. Senator William Fulbright stressed the need to distinguish propaganda and education, rejecting implications linking educational exchange to

propaganda weapons (Brown 6). On the contrary, former ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke believes there is a close link between public diplomacy and propaganda: “Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare or—if you really want to be blunt—propaganda” (Brown 3).

Dizard (2004) articulates the USIA’s instrumental role in making public diplomacy integral to both US foreign policy and executing organized international propaganda efforts. He claims the role of the USIA is to portray the US through a prism of national strategic interests; thus, it is a propaganda operation, replicating similar programs of other governments, both friendly and hostile. According to Dizard, the “USIA added new dimensions to the old craft of propaganda, under the new rubric of public diplomacy” (Dizard xiv). One of these new dimensions is the large scope of its activity, including agency posts in three hundred cities and town abroad and the VOA.

Ambassador Pamela Smith defines public diplomacy as “a government’s communication of its national interests, ideals, culture, policies and goals, including the promotion of its national identity, beyond governments to foreign publics” with the goal of achieving understanding and broadened dialogue between Americans and US institutions and their counterparts. Smith argues that public diplomacy, as defined above and as practiced by the US and most other countries should be distinguished from propaganda. “Propaganda, thanks to the Nazis and the Soviets, has acquired a very negative meaning, and implies the use of lies or distortion to manipulate people’s opinions”. She maintains that “although public diplomacy does try to influence opinions, it does so (when it succeeds) simply by presenting the facts in a persuasive manner”.

Identity Crisis

Another issue that has yet to be resolved is the mission of US public diplomacy agencies, particularly the VOA. Abshire (1976) articulates the essence of this debate in his argument that the present organizational structure and responsibilities of VOA must be reassessed. He expresses the existence of two opposing schools of thought in the debate on the VOA's organization. "The first holds that VOA must retain its official status—either kept as an integral part of a government overseas information agency, or else incorporated into the State Department itself" (carefully circumscribed by State Department); otherwise, "it would be little more than commercial international broadcaster, and congressional support for it would wane". The rival school states that the "VOA needs the latitude made possible by the BBC format so that it can speak out more forthrightly and effectively" (Abshire 28).

However, Rawnsley (1996) questions the assumption that the BBC is in fact more objective than the VOA in his study of their coverage of Cold War crises. Rawnsley asserts that although the "BBC is ostensibly independent in everything but finance, while the VOA is very much the voice of the US government", he suggests that these two stations are in fact more alike than they care to admit (Rawnsley 1). Rawnsley concludes that there is little differentiation between the BBC and the VOA. The two stations are similar in their objectives, application, and approach, are both used as agents of their government's propaganda, and are the principal means by which their foreign policies have been projected. Ultimately, the difference is semantic: while the VOA is undoubtedly the voice of the US government (except for the case of Vietnam), the BBC

has tended to be regarded as the mouthpiece of the British government by its audiences throughout the world (Rawnsley 166).

Adelman (1981) states that in order to integrate public diplomacy with foreign policy (an issue that will be discussed later), the VOA's commentaries (which comprise approximately ten percent of broadcasts) should be molded to the contours of US foreign policy and become expressions of clear positions rather than extensions of general news reports or analyses. Furthermore, commentaries should adapt to varying US relations with different countries at different times. However, the rest of the 90% of the VOA's broadcasts (cultural, regular news, and features) are best handled without interference by the government in order to secure its credibility, morale, and in-house efficiency (Adelman 936). Adelman contends that the VOA's "thrust has been toward more journalism and less diplomacy" (918), attempting to operate similarly to independent commercial journalists. Adelman emphasizes that the VOA's credibility is vital, especially since most listeners also tune in to other international services. Adelman explains that since the "VOA does the most good in societies where polemics and distortions fill the home airwaves," "To beam its own polemics and distortions on the news—albeit from the opposite ideological vantage point—would cripple VOA's stature"; still "total objectivity is never possible" (919).

Likewise, Ambassador Smith confirms that objectivity is essential because we are not credible without it. Smith argues that the best way to achieve our interests is for "editorials that convey administration policy views to be kept to a minimum and very clearly labeled". Since people in most parts of the world have plenty of other choices, the "VOA must not come across like a propaganda station in order to keep its credibility and

listenership". Adelman argues that the VOA's problems lie in the timeliness of its news (the VOA is less timely than BBC, Deutsche Welle and Radio Liberty) and the value of its commentaries (lack of a clear viewpoint, themes, messages) because the "VOA editors may bend over so far to prove objectivity that they dampen any US government perspective, even if so identified" (919).

Hachten (1987) claims the USIA and VOA have long had an identity crisis: are they objective news organizations reflecting the diversity of American life and culture or are they arms of the State Department, vigorously advocating US foreign policy objectives? Is the VOA a "government mouthpiece" or public radio capable of making independent news judgments? This debate continually tests the "charter", which dictates that people from other countries should be provided with the opportunity to hear about their cultural traditions, explain official policies of government, and report about world events using their own news values (Hachten 97). Hachten reiterates this conflict of interests in his 2002 edition when describing how this dispute has risen again during the War on Terrorism, thereby revealing its unresolved status. According to Hachten (2002), past directors with journalism backgrounds such as Murrow suggest the former role; at other times including the Vietnam War and the Reagan administration, the latter role was stressed (Hachten 108). Hachten stresses that the key question for policymakers should be whether or not the VOA is a propaganda tool pushing hard for US foreign policy objectives or a reliable source of accurate, unbiased news.

. Price (2002) describes the struggle to harmonize goals of objectivity (acting as a credible journalistic enterprise) with the need to act as an effective instrument of propaganda (advancing national policy) in his call for increased post 9/11 international

broadcasting. In demonstrating how 9/11 has had a profound impact on all of public diplomacy, including institutions of international broadcasting, Price contends that propaganda goals have become vital to national security. Though Campbell and Flournoy warn that the VOA must guard against becoming a propaganda tool to retain its credibility, Price argues that with the harsh reality of 9/11, the VOA has in turn come in immediate conflict with the principle of objectivity.

Political advocacy vs. cultural communication

Abshire differentiated two roles of international broadcasting that continue to be debated among practitioners and scholars alike: political and cultural programming. According to Abshire, while both forms of broadcasting are directed to a foreign audience, the listening motives and programming content are distinct. Audiences of political programming are motivated by political interest, whereas people are attracted to cultural programming, which deals with music, the arts, or humanities, due to either their cultural curiosity or its mere entertainment value. Abshire views the lines of these two roles as not being easily drawn for three reasons. First, an audience that listens to music of a foreign broadcaster is “manifesting a community of interests, a sharing of common pleasures and human creativity”, which is not a trivial bond (Abshire 38) Second, when a nation offers an illustration of their own cultural life to a foreign audience, it is doing more than merely asking for admiration, yet is expressing something significant about itself that can be said in no other way that may be more eloquently revealing than the text of their constitution or their GNP. Third, international broadcasting directed to an audience “whose own cultural choices are suppressed or restricted by political dogma”,

even if free of political content, can have implicit "political" significance; therefore, links can be established with listeners who would otherwise distrust, reject, or be bored by material that touched directly on political issues and events (Abshire 38).

Adelman (1981) describes how the International Communication Agency (ICA), the current main organization, has two influential, yet conflicting sides. "How to tap this staggering power and how to channel it along constructive rather than destructive paths is the challenge of public diplomacy" (915) While the ICA's information side has an image of a more confrontational attitude, the cultural exchange activities such as the Fulbright Program evoke more cooperative sentiments. Adelman contends that although recently there has been more focus on the exchange side, the future emphasis will be on information because the Reagan Administration will aim to promote America's values and interests (Adelman 915).

Similarly, Signitzer and Coombs express that public diplomacy is a multi-faceted concept. Deibel and Roberts (1976) maintain that there are two schools of thought in public diplomacy: tough-minded versus tender-minded. The tough-minded purpose of public diplomacy is to exert influence on attitudes of foreign audiences using persuasion and propaganda. Tough-minded public diplomacy asserts that hard political information is more important than cultural programs. Fast media, such as radio, TV, newspapers, and newsmagazines are given preference over other forms of communication in tough-minded public diplomacy. Objectivity and truth are important tools of persuasion to tough-minded diplomats but are not extolled as virtues in themselves. The "supreme criterion for public diplomacy is the raison d'etat defined in terms of fairly short-term policy ends" (Signitzer 140). On the other hand, tender-minded public diplomacy argues

that informational and cultural programs must bypass current foreign policy goals to concentrate on the highest long-range national objectives. Tender-minded diplomats aim to create a climate of mutual understanding, while viewing public diplomacy as primarily a cultural function as opposed to conveying hard political information. Slow media including films, exhibitions, language instruction, academic and artistic exchanges with the goal of transmitting messages about lifestyles, political and economic systems, and artistic achievements are utilized. Truth and veracity—not persuasive tactics— are considered essential (Signitzer 140).

Signitzer and Coombs argue that neither school is correct; rather, the schools function best when synthesized. Deibel and Roberts provide such a synthesis by identifying shared aspects and functions of the two schools. First, "all public diplomacy programs have a primary responsibility to *explain and defend government policies to foreign audiences*" because foreign policy at least partly depends on popular acceptance for support; this role as spokesman for governmental policies must be performed. The second function is *portraying that national society in toto to foreign audiences*; the cultural side of public diplomacy (Signitzer 142).

According to Signitzer and Coombs, public diplomacy is divided into political information and cultural communication. Political information is administered by a political section of the foreign ministry or by a political secretary of an embassy, while cultural communication is entrusted to a cultural section of the foreign ministry, a cultural institute abroad, or some type of semi-autonomous body such as the British Council. Malone confirms this distinction with a slight modification as he calls the political information side of public diplomacy "political advocacy" and adds to the term cultural

communication a two-way meaning: Malone maintains that the purpose of cultural communication is both to help foreign citizens gain a better understanding of US culture and institutions and to foster mutual understanding between our people and those of other countries (Malone 3-4) (Signitzer 142).

According to Mitchell (1986), cultural communication can be differentiated into cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Cultural diplomacy has two levels of meaning: the creation of formal cultural agreements via negotiations and the execution of agreements and the conduct of cultural relations flowing from them. This second activity may be viewed as either the extended responsibility of governments or delegated by governments to agencies and cultural institutions with the goal of conveying a favorable image of one's culture with a view toward facilitating diplomatic activities as a whole. Conversely, cultural relations aims to achieve understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit—not unilateral advantage. It proceeds ideally by the expansion of open professional exchanges instead of selective self-projection, provides an honest picture of each country rather than a beautified one, and does not conceal national problems but also do not make a show of them. Ultimately, the goal of cultural relations is information exchange; however, according to Burke (1966) it is "difficult if not impossible to separate information exchange from persuasion" (Signitzer 142).

Malone (1988) argues the most serious problem with public diplomacy is that it "covers a diverse ray of activities whose only common bond is that they are intended to affect people's attitudes and that they support the foreign policy interests of the nation" (Malone 3). The two basic types of activities—political advocacy and cultural

communication— both serve the national interest but are nevertheless distinct. Political advocacy has the purpose of encouraging support for particular US policies and is associated with immediate policy interests. Cultural communication, on the contrary, is designed for long-term and should be largely unaffected by shifts in political winds, yet still may contribute to creating a climate in which US policies may be better understood. Malone argues that the failure to clarify between cultural communication and political advocacy has caused confusion and difficulty in the field of public diplomacy (Malone 3-4).

While skeptics argue that public diplomacy's range of programs (from producing brochures on terrorism to administering the Fulbright exchange and organizing art exhibits) have conflicting purposes and therefore fail to serve US interests, Brown (2002) conversely argues that "the tensions that arise within and among the public diplomacy functions of information, education, and culture do not necessarily jeopardize its effectiveness in advancing America's agenda abroad" (Brown 1). Rather, such multifaceted programs of public diplomacy "keep lines of communication between the US and other countries open and depict America in all its complexity to the outside world" (Brown 1). For example, visits by heads of state, one of many instruments of public diplomacy that include a series of high-profile newsworthy activities, serve as vehicles for governments to achieve both political advocacy and cultural communication objectives (Wang 13). In our interview, Brown stresses the foolishness of attempting to create "firewalls" between propaganda and education. From his experience as a practitioner, Brown realizes that in reality, it is difficult to make a distinction between the two forms of public diplomacy; still, he fully sympathizes with the desire for scholars to

do so. Likewise, Ambassador Smith claims that most “scholars are out of touch with the realities on the ground, or are absorbed by academic questions, such as cross-cultural communication.”

According to Brown, tension arises between “culture vultures” who believe in the value of displaying American art abroad and its role to play in advocating US national interests versus real-politik colleagues whose priority is limited to targeting hard policy information to key opinion leaders (Brown 6). Such enjoyments of culture clash with priorities of “action-and-results-oriented Foreign Service Officers and ‘bottom- line’ government officials” like George Creel, the WWI head of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) (Brown 6). “Knowing from experience that life abhors strict definitions and that purposes must be adapted to circumstances, they [public diplomacy practitioners] realize that public diplomacy’s tensions can be a source of creativity, if dealt with in ways that harmonize individual programs while respecting their autonomy and uniqueness” (Brown7). Brown argues there is room for culture activities, truthful, persuasive and credible information campaigns, and educational exchange programs in the War on Terrorism.

Furthermore, Brown contends that although we live in a globalized world where non-state actors have been granted greater importance, we cannot rely on the private sector to perform the vital function of telling America’s story overseas: “it would be ill-conceived to assume that overseas programs in information, education, and culture sponsored by the US government are a waste of US taxpayers money” (Brown 9) Brown stresses that “For our own national survival in an age of terror, we cannot afford to think

that others will eventually become ‘like us’ to the point where there is no need to persuade or communicate with them through public diplomacy” (Brown 9)

Ross’s (2003) final pillar of public diplomacy, *dialogue and exchanges*, acknowledges that the US must build foundations of trust and mutual understanding through genuine commitment to dialogue such as educational and cultural exchange in order to ensure that the diversity of our society and culture is better represented to foreign audiences. Ross stresses that we must listen to the world to avoid stereotypes as “arrogant” via opportunities for feedback like the International Visitors Program (Ross 26).

Likewise, Finn (2003) emphasizes that Washington must remember that winning hearts and minds is just as crucial as battlefield victories in fighting foreign extremism. She stresses that cultural diplomacy is vital to national security and that we must remember the Cold War when constructing a current cultural diplomacy plan. When young peopled in developing countries sought refuge in communism during the Cold War, American officials mounted a determined, and ultimately successful, ideological campaign in response to this trend. Similarly, the war on terrorism cannot be won with military force or traditional diplomacy alone; rather the US must offer desperate youth abroad a compelling ideological alternative, helping to eliminate growing global anti-American sentiment. Finn argues that rather than making erroneous assumptions about the inherent evil and violence of Muslims, US policymakers must recognize there are practical causes of widespread discontent in the Middle East, and attempt to offer practical solutions. In the process, they should be inspired and learn from the success of

cultural diplomacy of Cold War, while tailoring their efforts to the new circumstances and enemies with which they are confronted (Finn 16)

Finn maintains that "Technological prowess must never be considered a substitute for people power" such as the Peace Corps and American Centers acting as "crucial organs of local outreach" (Finn 20). She stresses the value these institutions have in instilling positive perceptions of the US abroad. Therefore, the US cannot rely solely on technology, electronic data and communication and must recognize the need for "humint" (human intelligence gathering). This person-to-person contact and dialogue is critical in winning the hearts and minds of moderate elements in societies vulnerable to radicalism. She argues that public diplomacy should be national priority—not an optional extra; thus, the inadequate resources allocated to public and cultural diplomacy must increase. "Like its predecessors during the early Cold War era, the Bush administration must realize that in waging its self-proclaimed war against extremism, winning foreigners' voluntary allegiance to the American project will be the most important prize of all" (Finn 20).

Finn suggests that the US should focus on five areas of activity in order to cultivate a better image abroad: encourage foreign educational reforms, extend existing foreign exchange programs, improve access of foreign publics to American institutions and values, encourage better cross-cultural understanding at home, and revitalize American volunteerism overseas (Finn 17).

Integration with Foreign Policy

The struggle has continued to discern a key intellectual problem in the field of public diplomacy: the relationship between public diplomacy and policy.

Adelman argues that the ICA should "insure that our government adequately understands foreign public opinion and culture for policy-making purposes," yet this has not been done effectively since the Eisenhower and Kennedy eras (Adelman 933). Eisenhower conferred often with USIA leaders, thought US information programs had shortened WWII and saved countless lives, and believed in "the P factor", the psychological dimension of foreign affairs. Since those days, information agencies have had less direct effect on policy formulation, yet Adelman contends that such contributions could again become valuable if given greater attention for many reasons.

First, ICA and Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) studies on foreign public opinion are now of high quality and direct policy relevance. Second, ICA officers abroad routinely interact with foreign students, educators, journalists, artists, cultural and intellectual leaders—groups infrequently contacted by the State Department political and economic officers. As a result, ICA officers are more aware of a nation's mood and opinions. Lastly, ICA officers could provide useful judgments on probable social and cultural effects of political and economic events in their country, an area of increasing significance. Regular diplomats assert that such insights by the ICA are of secondary importance; this tension between normal diplomacy and public diplomacy has thwarted US information services over the years. According to former ambassador and veteran diplomat William H. Sullivan: "for most senior practitioners of diplomacy, the public aspects of policy are usually an afterthought" (Malone 87).

Traditional diplomacy of the State Department severely contrasts with public diplomacy. While traditional diplomacy is formal and official, public diplomacy is informal and engages non-officials. Traditional diplomacy is private and quiet—not open and noisy. Finally, the former seeks to avoid controversy and to smooth out differences as opposed to the latter that exposes and stimulates controversy (artistic, intellectual, and political) (Adelman 933-34).

Adelman ultimately argues that the ICA must be reintegrated into the highest councils of foreign policymaking in order to fulfill its role, but he does not delve into how this should be done with respect to institutional arrangement—only that it must be done so that the interpretation and advocacy of US foreign policy can be folded into the formulation of US foreign policy including the VOA (Adelman 935-36). According to Adelman, public diplomacy must convey American values and be an instrument of US foreign policy. Public diplomacy must "advance US national interests before friend and foe alike and, more vitally, bring the message of freedom to today's gloomy regions of despotism. The personalities, technologies, and international conditions now seem ripe for the effort" (Adelman 936).

Fisher (1972) outlines the social scientific knowledge base on which increasingly sophisticated efforts at public diplomacy might be grounded. He argues that "expanding communication technologies and greater public participation in foreign affairs policymaking were challenging the traditional means of conducting international relations in ways that must be taken into account" (Manheim 8). Subsequently, Fisher (1987) calls for a more pro-active role of the USIA in US foreign policymaking in two ways. First, the USIA should foster more systematically the psychological infrastructure

that would sustain a more sophisticated effort, and second, bring its expertise in communication and psychology to bear in the formative stages of the policy process rather than an implementation alone (Fisher 134-5).

Correspondingly, Malone contends that one weakness in the USIA's present organizational structure is that the coordination of information with diplomatic activities has proven difficult, which greatly hinders and precludes full integration of public diplomacy into the foreign policy process including taking public opinion into account as policy is made. Therefore, Malone argues that the growth of interest and activity, changes in thinking and institutional behavior and problems accompanying development produce a need for a reassessment of the present system. He concludes that the Stanton Panel's ideas make even better sense today than in the 1970's, which dictates that advocacy and policy articulation be placed in the State Department, the establishment of a separate agency for cultural communication , and making the VOA a separate government agency (Malone 100-1). Malone believes that the State Department is the most important figure in the foreign policymaking process. Therefore, assigning the job of political advocacy to the State Department that plays a central foreign policy role in the US government is inherently logical and increasingly desirable. In the end, the best solution is an international cultural agency existing separately but in partnership with the State Department, arguing that the "credibility of the VOA would be impaired if it were under direct State Department control" (Malone 141).

Allen C. Hansen**,** who served as a long-time USIA informational and cultural affairs officer, criticizes Malone's idea of establishing an independent cultural agency. While Malone describes the report in his 1988 review of the Stanton Commission

recommendations as “a major comprehensive study of US international informational, educational and cultural activities by an independent, privately funded group,” Hansen argues that the Stanton Commission report was “seriously flawed in the view of many professional foreign service officers” (Hansen xiv). When 148 USIA officers signed a statement that rejected the Stanton panel proposals and endorsed instead the consolidation of public diplomacy within a restructured, independent agency, this exemplifies how some professionals received the panel’s recommendations. Still, others agreed with the panel and wanted to see the USIA reincorporated into the State Department. For instance, Peter Galbraith, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said “the information part of policy is so important that perhaps it ought not be in a separate agency, but ought to be part of the State Department” (Hansen xiv).

Hansen essentially argues that although it may seem inconsistent that an organization whose primary purpose is political advocacy in support of US foreign policy to conduct nonpolitical educational and cultural exchange programs, the indirect benefits of exposing key foreign leaders and potential leaders to US education and culture can be politically significant in the long term even though a particular grant or program was not specifically designed for political purposes. Hansen contends that two elements have added to the confusion. First, the operation of VOA—how can it support foreign policy and be a reliable source of news? Second, US government educational and cultural exchange programs— should they be devoid of politics or serve foreign policy objectives?

Manheim suggests that public diplomacy is vital to our development of a comprehensive understanding of the making of US foreign policy. He argues that foreign

affairs policymaking offers a target of special opportunity to those who would influence the policy agenda. Manheim demonstrates the ability of external factors to influence US foreign policymaking that is "open to purposeful and informed manipulation using basic social scientific knowledge" and reviews the limits on this influence as well (Manheim 10). The impact that image-management efforts have on US media portrayals of the client country is evaluated. Manheim maintains that image management of the Gulf Conflict was the real "smart weapon", as broad coordination within and across governments to help mobilize support for the war is the most fascinating of known efforts at strategic public diplomacy. Manheim contends that Hill and Knowlton's association with Citizens for a Free Kuwait's effort to educate both its clients and the American people succeeded. Manheim asserts that at the political level, the public relations effort was not part of the process of policy formulation, but was a key element in policy *implementation*. In other words, the purpose of the public relations campaign was not to convince the president of a desired policy, but to maximize his freedom of action in dealing with Congress and the public in carrying it off. At the conceptual level, the campaign served as a catalyst (*intervening* variable)—"facilitating the bidirectional associations among the media, the public, and the policymakers as they framed policy toward the Gulf conflict" (Manheim 59-60).

Rawnsley (1996) emphasizes the importance of propagandists understanding and appreciating the value of public opinion to their ultimate success. He highlights that Americans only finally acknowledged the need of involving the VOA in the foreign policy process in the aftermath of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion, when the director of the USIA was made a full member of the National Security Council (Rawnsley 168).

Such an event reveals how the development of mass media revolutionized the diplomatic process. It provided statesmen with an extra channel to quickly and efficiently communicate with their opposite numbers across world. With the premise that people-power is a formidable force, entire populations could now be addressed, thus consolidating the position of public opinion in foreign policy. The media can also be used to "present a favorable image of a nation's own policies, decisions, actions and positions to the wider world" (Rawnsley 172). Despite these advantages, Rawnsley contends that there are problems with using media in the diplomatic process. For example, if each side presents its case and negotiating position in public, then there is the danger of losing the flexibility that is necessary to successful conduct of diplomacy. In other words, if populations become aware that a government deviates from their stated position, they may lose face and credibility in public opinion at home and abroad. As a result, there exists a danger that molding popular perceptions in today's age of image managers and sound-bites will take precedent over long-term diplomatic considerations (Rawnsley 173).

Rawnsley claims that broadcasting has made an invaluable contribution to the diplomatic process by facilitating a state's relations with both its protagonists and allies—existing and potential. Monitoring radio broadcasts is itself a technique of diplomacy since diplomats must obtain information to identify and examine trends, intentions, responses, and motivations of a particular state; monitoring radio transmissions allows a state to gain a better understanding of how its policies and intentions have been received in target countries. This can be proven by the fact that BBC English-language broadcasts (unlike their broadcasts in Russian), targeted at the Soviet Union were never jammed,

which suggests that Russian statesman with a comprehensive knowledge of English relied on radio as source of diplomatic news, intelligence, and information, and could gather the latest western diplomatic communications. In this way, the BBC continued to play a pivotal role in the foreign policy process (Rawnsley 167).

Rawnsley warns, however, that it is imperative not to ascribe to broadcasting more influence than it warrants (Rawnsley 167). After all, "Propaganda cannot make bad policy palatable" (Thomas Sorenson in Rawnsley 165) (referring to the failure of US propaganda and radio diplomacy in Vietnam). Events examined were first and foremost diplomatic events, motivated by political circumstances and shaped by politicians who make decisions independent of the media; these decisions were then reflected by policies which governed the broadcasts. For example, in the Suez and Hungarian crises, radio's involvement in finding a suitable resolution was minimal, but both were able to build on the politically-generated resolutions to the crises. Therefore, Rawnsley's central argument is that political communications is always "an auxiliary instrument of policy" (Rawnsley 5). Still, he urges international broadcasters to work together with their government or foreign services (Rawnsley 170). For instance, American propaganda and public diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a resounding success, is undoubtedly the most dramatic example of international radio being used as tool of diplomacy: together US and Soviet broadcasts, initially supplemented and finally supplanted the slow and cumbersome traditional diplomatic channels to resolve the crisis. Rawnsley argues that the VOA and USIA must be fully integrated into the foreign policy process and stresses the necessity of a closer working relationship between US propaganda and foreign policy elites (Rawnsley 172).

According to Campbell and Flournoy (2001), when the USIA was folded into the State Department in 1999, proponents argue that consolidation would put public diplomacy closer to policymaking. However, in practice, integration was difficult with public diplomacy officers feeling like second class citizens and subject to burdensome bureaucratic rules and procedures. The State Department's culture devalues diplomacy because they believe that making and executing policy are more substantive endeavors. Foreign policy professionals always focus on more pressing policy priorities. This is revealed in that most senior US government officials rarely grant interviews to foreign media and the process of receiving clearance to use policy talking points in public is so troublesome "that the points are moot by the time approval is granted" (Campbell 144). In addition, it does not help that public diplomacy efforts are seen as a waste of time to political appointees because foreigners do not vote. Furthermore, understaffed and under-funded embassy public affairs teams and the lack of senior Foreign Service officers fluent in difficult languages like Arabic contribute to the scarcity of effective US spokespersons. Campbell and Flournoy urge the prioritization of public diplomacy in the foreign policy process. They suggest both strengthening public opinion research since it is vital to shape and explain policy, and developing rapid response capability in order to correct misinformation on policies.

Ross's (2003) first pillar of public diplomacy is *policy advocacy*, argues that diplomacy must be incorporated into the ground floor of policy—not just in response to events. Ross urges policymakers to "take to heart the maxim that a policy that cannot be explained clearly and understandably to many different audiences is not sustainable" (Ross 23). As a result, "foreign policy and public diplomacy are inextricable and

integrated throughout the process of policy formulation and implementation" in the Bush administration's communications strategy. The second pillar is *context*, providing reasons and rationale for US policies in order to build genuine understanding and active support for them (Ross 23). Ross argues advocacy will fail if stereotypes discount policy messages. Thus, public diplomacy must be at the center of diplomatic work by the State Department.

Efficacy

Countless scholars and practitioners have attempted to uncover the secrets to executing successful public diplomacy programs, particularly with respect to international broadcasting. Such considerations include communication strategies, audience targeting, public opinion research, long versus short-range programs, entertainment versus news programs, and the nature of messages. Murrow sums up the problem of measuring the success of public diplomacy when he states: "no cash register rings when this happens" (Dizard 5). The influence of public diplomacy activities on foreign perceptions of the US is immeasurable because their objectives depend on the "most elusive of human acts—changing someone else's mind" (Dizard 5). According to Fortner (1994), international radio broadcasting is a "focused, purposive activity whose impacts cannot be readily ascertained and whose audience cannot be totally and precisely known" (Fortner 24). Likewise, Rawnsley (1996) discovered that his analysis was limited because although individual policies can be identified and it can be determined that the propaganda was disseminated, the receptivity of messages is not easily quantified. Therefore, the narrative must be contextualized by reminding ourselves of

limits of radio propaganda reception—that "the propagandist is working blind" (Rawnsley 181).

Brown (2002) asks, what results can be expected of public diplomacy? Since it is a human activity, efficacy cannot be neatly quantified. Still, statistics and raw data substantiate what public diplomacy has accomplished. For example, content analysis of articles in foreign media reveal pro versus anti-US sentiments. The number of foreign grantees becoming influential members of their government and the number of favorable responses from visitors to an art exhibit represents other indicators. One way of uncovering evidence of success is to perform quantitative studies on public diplomacy. In the past, the amount of quantitative literature has been small; this percentage should be increased in order to discover what works and what doesn't (Brown 9).

Brown maintains that public diplomacy's achievements also lie in two broader areas: keeping the lines of communication between the US and other countries open and depicting America in all its complexity. Continuous international dialogue assures linkages between the US and other nations, even when government-to-government relations are struggling:

> Public diplomacy thus not only helps traditional diplomacy succeed by creating opportunities for person-to-person contacts that can lead to better official ties, but it also makes up for the failures of traditional diplomacy by allowing human interaction to continue when formal negotiations are suspended or terminated (9)

Histories of international broadcasting often seek to answer—usually inconclusively—whether international broadcasting accomplished or assisted in assigned goals; however, such expansive accounts of efficacy are usually told via memoirs and rarely by the disaffected (Price 2002). This refers to those former practitioners of

international broadcasting proceeding to write books that make claims of the omnipotence of their practice. Obviously, such stories are biased to in favor of the value of the author's craft. Still, Price argues that international broadcasting has the ability to purposefully alter the mix of voices in target societies, affect the composition of their markets for loyalties, destabilize regimes, help mold opinions among their publics, and assert "soft power" for the purposes of achieving the national ends of the transmitting state.

Abshire (1976) agrees with Price that since international radio can serve to "undermine an adversary relationship set up by one side with a closed system", we must "show the world in its complexity and reveal people to each other and people to themselves" (Abshire 87). Abshire contends that the US must allocate greater resources to a policy that aims to build a broadcast bridge to the minds of Soviets and Eastern Europeans by openly and purposefully bringing ideas and information to these closed societies. He also stresses that the US must consider prospective audiences to forge a new broadcast diplomacy to the Soviet Union focusing on three categories of people: *the politically curious*, *the managerial and professional classes*, and *the younger generation*. Furthermore, he suggests that the US must reeducate old-fashioned diplomats who do not fully appreciate the need for a dynamic public diplomacy effort (Abshire 80-1).

Adelman concurs with Abshire and Price that the primary effect of public diplomacy is the steady stream of dissemination impossible in a closed society (Adelman 921). Fortner also claims that international broadcasting serves as a potential corrective for monopolies of knowledge constructed and maintained by government or privately held media. This crucial effect is reflected in BBC audience research, which indicates

that listening to foreign radio stations is inversely related to the degree of political restraint used by governments to control local media. Although the lack of generalizable knowledge about the size and response of audiences makes it difficult to assess the impact of international broadcasting, broadcasters do know the general characteristics of audiences in various parts of the world and can estimate audience sizes for many countries. It is doubtful nonetheless that broadcasters will ever be able to complete research on every country of the world within a tight enough time frame (even a decade) to allow them to construct a worldwide portrait of the international broadcasting audience (Fortner 19).

Abshire (1976) articulates that we live in a 'dangerously divided, nuclear-armed world"; thus, people must share a "basic measure of common facts and ideas if they are to make common cause (Abshire 87). While Abshire's ideas are written in respect to the Cold War, these notions can not only be applied to weapons of mass destruction, but to the War on Terrorism as well. The fact that the greatest foreign policy designs have failed because they did not gain over time public understanding based on knowledge and were not tested in public discussion proves that successful and enduring foreign policy designs must be institutionalized through broad public knowledge and understanding.

Fisher (1987) states that the essence of our international dialogue has changed in substance, as it has gone from being focused on political-ideological matters to economic or economic-ideological matters. He explains that interdependence is a large part of the reason. Like Abshire, Fisher asserts that since we live in an era of increasing interdependence, a high priority should be placed on *accurate* understanding. Recent studies of foreign policy decision-making indicate that national choices are too often a

function of an “unacceptable degree of misperception on all sides, including leaders, publics—usually both”. Given that decision-makers and constituents often reinforce each other’s inaccurate interpretation of events, “people are the prisoners of images” (10).

Likewise, Nye (2004) emphasizes that a successful strategy must go both ways, focusing on broadcasting US messages and two-way communication that engages all sectors of society. “Wielding soft power is far less unilateral than employing hard power—a fact that the US has yet to recognize. To communicate effectively, Americans must first learn to listen” (Nye 20). Americans must become increasingly aware of cultural differences and sensitive to perceptions abroad. The first step is to change attitudes at home via foreign reporting, foreign language training, and the Fulbright exchange.

Akin to Fisher, Hansen (1989) emphasizes the importance of social science research for knowledge about audiences, foreign public opinion, attitudes, and receptivity of messages. Hansen contends that the greater investigation into these areas of research, the greater success USIA programs will have. Hansen declares that understanding a specific culture is essential to successful communication with their people; hence, geography that creates lines of demarcation between cultures is vital. Hansen argues that the USIA must be organized in a manner that provides ready access to such knowledge and enables decisions to be based on that knowledge. “Unless messages are tuned to local interests, audiences are apt to evade, distort, or simply forget many of them, especially those emanating from outside their own culture” (Hansen 19). Hansen emphasizes that we must understand and interpret local cultures in order to tailor incoming messages to local needs and interests. Ultimately, no matter how

technologically efficient our communications become, success depends on knowledge of the local culture. "This essential requirement of knowing your audience if your message is to be received makes geographic area directors the key Washington-based USIA officials in assuring that public diplomacy programs are effective" (Hansen 19). Finn (2003) similarly believes that a prerequisite for US diplomats posted overseas should be first rate local cultural and historical knowledge and linguistic expertise. She argues that the success of execution of public and cultural diplomacy depends on the level of skill and long-term commitment of practitioners (Finn 19).

Wang and Chang (2004) maintain that since media coverage of public diplomacy events has the power to determine its success, one of the challenges practitioners and scholars continually confront is to uncover the dynamic interactions between public diplomacy and media communications. Comparable to Hansen, Wang and Chang stress that the role of the local press in public diplomacy communication cannot be ignored by public relations practitioners for a variety of reasons. International affairs, particularly from the developing world, are increasingly important. In addition, local media command larger audiences because it is the most accessible media for the public. Finally, news reporting between national and local media has gradually become blurred. Therefore, to effectively plan and manage such public diplomacy events, it is essential to understand how the media covers such them. Studies of US national media's coverage of foreign affairs including head of state visits have shown that coverage is often inadequate in volume and negative in nature. Wang and Chang claim that the critical role of local media has been neglected in previous research (Wang 23). The nature and characteristics of diplomatic media events in US local press have not been established. This represents a

gap in literature because most Americans rely far more on local media than national media for news and information. Therefore, it is vital for practitioners and scholars to develop a better understanding of how public diplomatic events are reported in the local press and to what extent such events are effective in achieving a country's international public relations goals of improving its national image.

Wang and Chang offer suggestions to public relations practitioners, especially government information officers, on planning such public diplomacy events and improving local press coverage. At the strategic level, practitioners must "think local" in planning and executing public diplomacy events for many reasons. Valence depends on the public's perception and expectation. "One of the most effective ways to reach Main Street is through local media" (Wang 22). Although Jiang may have reached elites, he did not reach Middle America, which is critical to improving mainstream Americans' understanding and opinion of China. Additionally, public opinion should be addressed in public diplomatic communication whose basic goal and function is to build and maintain mutual understanding between nations and cultures. At the tactical level, practitioners must "act local" by providing advance backgrounders of head of state visits to local news editors to help them determine newsworthiness of events and provide compelling visuals. They should also highlight linkages between Americans' everyday life and developments of the country involved in order to offer personal relevance to the local audience (Wang 22-3).

According to Adelman (1981), an unusually high rate in change of administrations (six in the past 18 years) has been detrimental to long-range programs; research has been shortchanged for pressing program needs (Adelman 924). Adelman contends that public

diplomacy's role should be viewed as a long-term foreign policy asset, "one designed to present foreigners with a mosaic impression of America's mosaic society and to incline them favorably toward American values" (Adelman 927). Such long-term programs also help to "create a climate of opinion in which American policies can be successfully formulated, executed, and accepted" (Adelman 927).

Adelman states that ICA's main goal in the developing world is to convey US' commitment to individual liberty and cultural diversity, stressing our strong cultural ties to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In order to be effective in this mission, ICA's output must be steady, easily comprehensible, and present a few basic, consistent themes (Adelman 927). Adelman asserts that "in its grandest sense, public diplomacy is preventive diplomacy" because it can "help prevent the people and leaders of friendly countries from drifting away, and the peoples of adversary countries from losing all touch with freedom or with America" (Adelman 928). Adelman maintains that the short-term use of public diplomacy is more controversial. "Radio can be contributory but never causal in a particular situation; it can help propel events along their current path but cannot lead them into a new one" (Adelman 928). For example, public diplomacy can help destabilize a regime such as Iran.

Furthermore, Nye (2004) argues that the development of successful public diplomacy must include strategies for the short, medium, and long terms. In the short term, the US must become more agile in responding to and explaining current events and must learn to work more effectively with Arab media outlets like Al Jazeera. In the medium term, US policymakers must develop a few key strategic themes in order to better explain US policies and "brand" the US as a democratic nation. Finally, the most

important strategies are long-term and Nye describes many ways to execute an effective strategy for creating soft-power resources and the conditions for democracy. These include a strategy built around educational and cultural exchanges to develop a "richer, more open civil society in Middle Eastern countries" (Nye 19). Also, the most effective spokespeople are indigenous surrogates who understand American virtues and faults—not Americans themselves. Lastly, corporations (technology to modernize education systems), foundations (support institutions of American studies and programs to enhance the professionalism of journalists), universities (exchange programs to students/faculty), and other NGO's and governments (support teaching of English and finance student exchanges) can all help promote the development of an open civil society. Ultimately, Nye stresses that "…even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product: a communication strategy will not work if it cuts against the grain of policy. Public diplomacy will not be effective unless the style and substance of US policies are consistent with a broader democratic message" (Nye 19)

Many scholars have focused on the challenge of reaching target audiences. Adelman recommends that messages must be tailored to the high-caliber target population: "the Soviet intelligentsia, young managers, scientists, and cultural and political leaders"—not the average Western radio audience (Adelman 921). Likewise, Ross's fourth pillar of public diplomacy, *tailoring messages for specific audiences*, dictates that different audiences require unique images and words, yet the values that stand behind such efforts must be enduring. Ross stresses the necessity of conducting audience research to shape specific programs for audiences. Ross believes satellite TV and Internet are conducive for relaying accurate and fast policy messages to audiences.

Ross evaluates US public diplomacy as being successful in some aspects of information flexibility such as the use of List-serve email and websites, as well as digital video conferencing. However, "The US has not yet fully come to grips with ensuring its share of the voices on the Internet, notably in chat rooms and other types of online conversations" that lack official or countervailing voices in discussions of US foreign policy (Ross 25).

Ross's sixth pillar, *alliances and partnerships*, "recognizes that as the number and importance of non-state actors have grown in international affairs, the official voice of the United States has grown smaller (Ross 26). Hence, we need the strength of international alliances and private-sector partners such as global corporations and humanitarian organizations to reach audiences of non-state actors. Such third party authenticity and verification as opposed to official channels is needed. Similarly, Dizard (2004) asks: How do you shape public diplomacy operations so that they are effective in reaching an increasingly complex pattern of audiences abroad? He concludes that "branding", the Bush administration's theme for redefining America, would "at best produce minimal results and more probably a backlash from the intended audiences abroad" (Dizard 229). Rather, "the more effective approach is to reshape public diplomacy operations to information-age realities, recognizing that they have a special niche in the complex pattern of US international interests" (Dizard 229). Hence, Dizard maintains that the US must do a better job of integrating overseas information and cultural factors into strategic decisions affecting our role in the world. Additionally, we must continue our policy commitment to removing barriers to informational and cultural flows throughout the world. Dizard claims that the record suggests the USIA was most

effective when it promoted broad US purposes, including cultural operations. Dizard asserts this legacy of accomplishment argues strongly for a continued official presence in this sector (Dizard 230).

According to Manheim (1994), strategic communication campaigns within the US are more effective when directed at issues and actors in foreign affairs versus domestic politics. The effectiveness of strategic public diplomacy is minimized or eliminated when the communication strategy itself becomes widely known. With respect to head-of-state visits, Manheim argues that the decisions as to how to accomplish these public diplomacy objectives and the ability to implement them are neither uniform nor automatic. Rather, they require an understanding of the potential audience for the visiting leader's message, a command of the appropriate channels for reaching the target audience, the generation of the "right" message to accomplish public diplomacy or policy objectives, and a degree of communication skill.

Manheim asserts that two aspects of the media image of foreign countries are particularly important in framing perceptions and actions of US policymakers who might be successfully influenced: visibility— the amount of media coverage that a given country receives—and valence—the degree to which the content that's available reflects favorably or unfavorable on the country in question (Manheim 131). In his examination of news coverage of various countries in the *New York Times*, Manheim discovers that efforts at persuasive manipulation that are overt and easily recognized are rejected. Manheim analyzes the impact of public relations efforts on news portrayals of those countries engaged in strategic public diplomacy and arrives at four conclusions. First, consistencies in timing and direction of image changes are associated with public

relations acts. Second, public relations activities can have a significant impact on the images of foreign nations presented to the US public. Third, if image-enhancement efforts itself are placed on media and public agendas—when consultants or activities go public—institutional and psychological defenses may be raised, thereby reducing the likelihood of success. Lastly, even the most effective public relations efforts cannot overcome substantial historical forces (Manheim 147).

Manheim also focuses on the utility of global events as a component of a country's public diplomacy by examining one of the most common forms: the staging of sporting spectacles—hosting of 1988 Summer Olympics by Korea. He concludes that the Olympic Games and other magnetic events prove an effective generator of visibility and political awareness. However, such unusual attention mounts pressure on the government to sustain national pride, confront basic questions of political development, and diffuse its opposition via democratization and fundamental political reform. The international news media acted as a catalyst in domestic and international exchanges that led to political change in advance of the Olympics. In the end, hosting the Olympics is a highly dramatic, visible, quasi-historical, and intermediate-length event. Nevertheless, efforts by a government to improve their image in the media are only successful when low visibility strategies are pursued, but far less likely to result in favorable image shifts when dramatic historical events, political violence, or overt evidence of image-enhancement efforts intervene (Manheim 120-21).

Manheim studied the carefully planned and executed rhetorical strategy of Pakistani Prime Minister Benzanir Bhutto's visit to the US in 1989 and of the public relations programs put in place for South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's visit in the

same year. He found that while a more favorable image of Bhutto and Pakistan as partners in democracy was established in media, the image of Korea was not improved in the minimal visibility among the American media and public (Manheim 80-1). Manheim maintains that the key to Bhutto's visit was her ability to capitalize on the favorable symbolic environment (Manheim 91). At the theoretical level, American lobbyist and political consultant Mark Siegel framed public perceptions by associating Pakistan with an established and highly regarded value (democracy) that is already present in the public's mind by providing "cues"—"words or visual images that tie the client to the target value (Manheim 92). The raised visibility of Pakistan in foreign policy dialogue and the thematic consistency of a democratic partnership of Bhutto's public diplomacy effort contributed to her success.

Hachten (2002) emphasizes that the credibility of an international station's news and commentaries is crucial for its reputation among foreign listeners. For example, since the BBC World Service is a public corporation containing independence, it has the best reputation, thereby drawing so many listeners during times of crisis (Hachten 107). This corresponds to Ross's (2003) third pillar of public diplomacy: *credibility*. Ross argues that US international messages must be consistent and truthful because all public messages can and will reach multiple publics. As a result, a strengthened public diplomacy function in the State Department and the White House Office of Global Communication is crucial to "developing consistent, authoritative international information messages and programs" (Ross 24).

Lynch (2003) argues that changes in policy cannot speak for themselves, yet no amount of dialogue will alter Arab public opinion about the US and its intentions without

tangible changes in policy. He believes that the first step to improve the US's image since 9/11 is to determine how to address Arabs and Muslims effectively; therefore, Arab public opinion must be taken seriously. Lynch criticizes the US for engaging in patronizing attempts to get its message out including ineffective public diplomacy, ads, and radio (pop music). He argues that the US must change its strategy in fighting a war of ideas and needs to approach public diplomacy in a fundamentally new way. Lynch contends that the consensus of the new Arab public sphere consisting of elite and middle class matters more than the street and rulers. Lynch maintains that since the 1990's, satellite TV has offered an alternative vibrant and open political debate. Rather than ignoring forces of transnational media like Al Jazeera, the US should try to change terms of debate by working through them and opening genuine dialogue (Lynch 83). The US effort of promoting the Bush administration's policies through occasional media appearances by official speakers achieves little because there is a sense of "spin". Also, US efforts of promoting a positive image of the US through pop culture are no match for Arab media (broadcast and print). The US must speak *with* Arabs—not *at* them and engage—not manipulate. Lynch emphasizes the difference between strategic versus communicative action. He contends that if US public diplomacy falls into the strategic category, then it is ineffective because it is automatically dismissed as propaganda. As a result, the US must engage intellectuals, politicians, journalists, and all public figures influential in shaping Arab public opinion, thereby gaining respect—not power (Lynch 85).

Dizard asserts that evidence suggests the USIA's activities made a difference in influencing foreign opinion, particularly in political situations where public attitudes

played a definable role in affecting US national interests. He says it is still too early to measure the effect such changes as Radio Sawa and the 24-hour satellite Middle Eastern Television Network (METN) will have on US public diplomacy. Dizard argues the real need remains a consistent long-term effort to influence both public and private attitudes and actions in ways that effectively counter the forces that encourage the clash of civilizations (Dizard 226). Dizard claims that public diplomacy's role in US foreign policy has taken on new significance since 9/11 and "there is no box score to tell us who is winning or losing in this global ideological game" (Dizard xv).

Conclusion

In conclusion, since the commencement of literature on public diplomacy in the 1960's, scholarly research on the subject has clearly matured. Literature began by recognizing the importance, yet having little knowledge of the inner-workings of public diplomacy. Currently, public diplomacy is in the spotlight of foreign policy in the War on Terrorism. The current post-9/11 theme in policy reports and studies is that public diplomacy is inadequate to the task, unevenly implemented, and grossly underfunded. According to Ambassador Smith, the principle unanswered question is how to get Congress and the White House to provide significantly more funding for public diplomacy. Issues accompanying that need include changing our unpopular policies that promote and reinforce anti-Americanism, or at least learning how to explain them better and changing the tone and frequency of our dialogue. Another obstacle in the future of the field of public diplomacy is how to fuse the education of practitioners and scholars in creating more effective public diplomacy efforts.

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