

Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building

Following the botched Somalia operation, the terms “military intervention” and “nation building” were mostly exorcised from the vernacular of policymakers. Yet, behind the scenes and subsequent to that intervention, the U.S. government has continued to engage in similar activity in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now East Timor. The onset of the millennium gives us the opportunity to reflect on what we have learned about these operations since the end of the Cold War. Is our response better today? Where are our soft spots, and how can they be redressed? Examination of developments in nation-building after U.S.-sponsored military intervention in the last decade reveals the factors that put the U.S. government on the path to military action in the first place, the changes in peace-support operations, the advances in nation-building efforts and the recommendations for improving future operations.

Democratization and Nation-Building Defined

The promotion or support of democracy by the U.S. government, also known as democratization, has shifted in focus since the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II. Then it stood for demilitarization (and denazification in Germany), establishment of democratic institutions, and reeducation of the entire country’s population. In Vietnam, and later in much of Central America during the Cold War, democratization came to

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mean challenging communist advances rather than actually implementing democratic reforms. Only since the end of the Cold War has the campaign once again attempted to fulfill its stated purpose, with the ultimate aim the enhancement of international peace and security. The promotion of democracy is based on the assumption that democracies rarely go to war with each other and that an increase in the number of democratic states would therefore imply, and indeed encourage, a more secure and peaceful world.

Nation building, which really means state building,¹ has over the years signified an effort to construct a government that may or may not be democratic, but preferably is stable. Today, nation building normally implies the attempt to create democratic and secure states. Thus democratization efforts are part of the larger and more comprehensive nation-building campaign, but democratization can also occur in places where the state is secure and does not need to be rebuilt, such as with electoral reform in Mexico.

The 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama provides an appropriate starting point for this study because it straddles the Cold War and post-Cold War interventions. It introduced—albeit unsuccessfully—the democracy rationale; that is, to counter the reversal of democratic elections as an excuse to intervene, without an apparent threat of communism. U.S. troops also used the post-World War II plans for the reconstruction of Germany and Japan as their guide for Panama. Somalia then served as a test case for a purely humanitarian crisis that did not affect the developed world. Its failure hindered any massive reaction in the next major humanitarian crisis in Africa, in Rwanda.

Events in Somalia did not stop the U.S. government from intervening in Haiti in 1994, because of the latter's proximity to the United States and problems associated with the increased flow of refugees into Florida. Haiti then became the first case when the aim of the military intervention and the nation-building attempt were the same: to establish a democratic state. It was also the first time the United Nations Security Council sanctioned intervention to restore a democratically elected government. The U.S. government considered Somalia when trying to eschew involvement in Bosnia, but was eventually pressured into acting there militarily beginning in 1995, again on humanitarian grounds, although maintaining the credibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. leadership in Europe factored in as well. The use of force in Kosovo in 1999 was facilitated by the spillover effect from Bosnia, which encouraged European Union countries to support military involvement because of the looming threat in their own backyard.²

What Provoked the Military Response?

Certain similarities in the pre-intervention phase in these cases merit men-

tion, if only to serve as possible early warning signals for future crises that might lead the U.S. government toward choosing the military option. Attention to these factors could allow the U.S. government to step back and go in an altogether different policy direction or proceed in a systematic and well-coordinated manner.

The period leading up to the intervention was marked by inconsistent policy, public waffling, and empty threats in these cases: by the U.S. government in Panama and Haiti, by the international community in Somalia, by Europe and then the United States in Bosnia, and by the two together in Kosovo. It is perhaps impossible for democratic states to refrain from such behavior because, as Bruce Russett explained, “In the absence of direct attack, institutionalized checks and balances make democracies’ decisions to go to war slow and very public.”³ Other common issues that drive democratic states to intervene, however, can be considered—particularly refugee flows, the media spotlight on humanitarian suffering, increased use of sanctions, and continued defiance by rulers.

A large increase in refugee movements, especially into a powerful neighboring country, is one indicator. In Panama and Somalia, this was not a factor, but it was to a significant degree in Haiti and Bosnia. Later, refugees from Albania fleeing into Italy and Greece, from Kosovo to neighboring countries, from East Timor throughout the region, from Liberia and Sierra Leone to Nigeria and other West African states, as well as refugee shifts within Central Africa, also played a significant role in the decisions to intervene in those countries. Most governments cannot easily prevent refugees from arriving, not only because it is difficult and expensive to police borders, but also for human rights reasons.

Media coverage of these crises, with the ensuing public outcry, also forced policymakers to react. Although it fueled the initial military response in Panama, the “CNN Effect” became a major factor after the Persian Gulf War when safe havens for the Kurds were established. By the time of the Somalia intervention, media coverage pushed the U.S. government, because images of starving children were viewed with discomfort by many Americans. It also was partly responsible for the abrupt termination of the UN operation, as those same Americans witnessed their boys being killed in a brutal fashion by the very people they had gone to help. In the case of Somalia, the U.S. government reacted too impulsively to media portrayals; instead it should have utilized them to debate the merits of

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continued action and how to rectify the mistakes already made, which arguably might have been more effective.

In Haiti, the opposite occurred. Significant coverage of events during the period leading up to the intervention spurred a healthy debate about a possible intervention and gave those organizations that would be involved ample time to plan. The refugee crisis, however, was exaggerated by the U.S. media, even though during the height of the crisis, Cuban refugees were also arriving in large numbers without any corresponding threat to the Cuban government. Notably, during the lead up to the intervention, articles on Haiti were soon listed in the domestic pages of the U.S. press.

In Bosnia, televised Serb atrocities promoted a serious international dialogue, which belatedly helped convince wavering U.S. and European publics of the need for NATO bombing. This coverage also contributed to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Full-scale reporting of Kosovo refugees encamped in neighbouring countries, along with some coverage of bands of marauding Serbs in early 1999, also eased the way for an even more significant bombing effort.

Sanctions are often applied as a first response to large refugee flows and media pressure. Yet sanctions usually fail to achieve their desired aim of reversing or ending the crisis, as was blatantly evident in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. In the cases of the former Yugoslavia and arguably South Africa, they have been effective. Sanctions, however, also can have the undesirable consequence of promoting nationalist solidarity amongst the targeted population in defiance against the major powers, rather than causing the public to rise against their leader as the policy intends. Even in the rare event that the public does react, leaders normally take the necessary precautions to remain in power. Moreover, the punitive effects of sanctions are almost always avoided by those with money and power, sometimes by import substitution, but mostly by smuggling.

The policy of applying sanctions is thus inherently myopic and frequently leads to the collapse of the domestic economy. For example, the Haitian embargo, which endured for several years without accomplishing its stated purpose of removing the Cedras regime, adversely affected long-term recovery and increased the need for foreign assistance because essential medical and food supplies were drastically reduced, while most jobs in the basic industries were lost. This caused more refugees to attempt the journey to the United States and greater economic instability. More recently, attempts have been made to target sanctions at specific individuals, but overall they have only served to make the post-conflict renewal period more difficult.

Refugee flows, media coverage, and sanctions in these cases forced the international community, with the support of the UN Security Council, to

threaten action against the errant rulers. As these threats mounted, it exposed them to charges that warnings were being ignored and not ameliorating the deteriorating situations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Noriega, several Somali warlords, Cedras and company, the Bosnian Serb leadership, and Milosevic continued to defy international pressure because such policy pre-intervention was confused, did not follow a hard-line, and wavered sufficiently to encourage these wayward rulers into thinking they could continue their activity unabated, particularly when they endangered the lives of foreign soldiers.

This noncompliance eventually compelled the U.S. government to choose force in order to demonstrate that the sole remaining superpower would not be pushed around by nasty, tin-pot, small-time, thug dictators and warlords. The Security Council also needed to demonstrate that its resolutions were intended to be observed, not ignored. Thus it approved—sometimes belatedly—the military option in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In all these situations, the common assumption has been that if these particular “rulers” were removed, democracy would neatly fall in place. This simplistic analysis overlooks the obvious fact that the entire system of these states needs to be rebuilt because it is completely rotten and that rogue rulers survive and prosper precisely because there is no democratic foundation. The removal of one nasty element only guarantees that another one will quickly fill his place. For example, in Somalia, after Siad Barre was removed, warlords such as General Aideed filled the power vacuum. When Aideed was killed in August 1996, he was replaced by one of his sons, Hussein Aideed, who assumed control of his father’s faction.

The inability to cope with each of these four factors—refugees, the media, sanctions, and defiance by errant rulers—produced the “Do Something” effect and entrapped the U.S. government into choosing the most extreme option of force. In justifying the decision to intervene in Haiti, Madeleine Albright, then-U.S. ambassador to the UN, explained,

Together, we, the international community, have tried condemnation, persuasion, isolation, and negotiation. At Governors Island, we helped broker an agreement that the military’s leader signed but refused to implement. We have imposed sanctions, suspended them, and strengthened them. We have provided every opportunity for the de facto leaders in Haiti to meet their obligations. But patience is an exhaustible commodity ... The status quo in Haiti is neither tenable nor acceptable.⁴

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The U.S. government added the public rationale of “defending democracy” and “maintaining our reliability” to the list of when the United States can use force—only after the fact—in these cases, in order to safeguard the international norm of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states.⁵

These four factors have not been as prominent in other civil crises and consequently can partially account for the absence of a threat to intervene in Algeria, Burundi, or Sudan, for example, where the conflicts may be as horrific, if not worse. Additionally, the decision to intervene is also based on the relative power and size of the country concerned and likelihood of a successful outcome. For example, it is extremely unlikely that the U.S. government would ever threaten China with intervention. Or witness the moral dilemma that European states and the U.S. government find themselves in with respect to the Russian bombardment of Chechnya, without apparent regard to civilians, in late 1999.

Once the decision to intervene had been made, further entrapment ensued as it became clear that a hasty withdrawal would only ensure that the situation on the ground reverted to that which caused the intervention in the first place. The peace-support operation and the nation-building component thus entered into play.

Changes in Peace-Support Operations

One of the most important shifts in operations concerns the role of the U.S. military in political reconstruction. A conspicuous change has been the gradual reduction of U.S. military control over nation-building activities, with Germany and Japan representing the peak. Indeed, both of these operations were directed entirely by the military, with civilian agencies playing a subordinate role.

Panama was the last operation in which the military overtly directed political reconstruction, although there, at least, the U.S. military had extensive experience and relations with Panamanians. Somalia was the last in which the military made important behind-the-scenes decisions, such as preparation of the nation-building resolutions for the Security Council. By Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the military’s role was primarily confined to maintaining security, although it has participated in political reconstruction discussions at the senior level, while U.S. civil affairs, special forces, and psychological operations troops supported political activity.

Whether they like it or not, the U.S. and European militaries will have a role to play in future peace-support operations. European militaries do not view these operations as suspiciously as their U.S. counterpart because of

their historical experience in “gray” military operations during the colonial period and, for the British military today, in Northern Ireland as well. The only other alternative would be an increase in the use of private security firms, called mercenaries by some, raising questions of accountability.

Improvements in civil-military relations have been another striking development since Panama, when there was no initial cooperation due to the need to maintain secrecy about the timing—and indeed occurrence—of the invasion. In Somalia, there was a conspicuous lack of cooperation on all sides and turf wars: between UN headquarters in New York and UN operations in Mogadishu, between civilian and military operators in Mogadishu, and even between U.S. and foreign militaries. Additionally, while preparing for the intervention, similar to Panama, there was no joint planning between the military and the heads of relief organizations, even though the military was originally deployed to provide protection for these organizations. In such a climate, it was hardly surprising that it became extremely difficult to carry out the mandate.

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In sharp contrast, the Haiti operation experienced the fewest difficulties in implementation, where military, humanitarian, and development agencies were melded in a tight partnership due to the insistence of Lakhdar Brahimi, special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG). The development agenda was integral from the beginning, civilian and military actors trained together before deployment, and a civilian directed the entire operation. This does not guarantee that Haiti will develop a stable democracy, but at least a well-coordinated initial phase has provided the best possible environment for democratic reforms to take root.

In Bosnia, coordination improved after Carl Bildt’s period as high representative during the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), during which he was not given any authority over the military, and therefore had no means to enforce the Dayton Accords. Meanwhile, the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), in Croatia, which integrated the two, achieved more success in executing its mandate. The former transitional administrator for UNTAES, Jacques Paul Klein, was later appointed deputy to Carlos Westendorp, the subsequent high representative for Bosnia, and then in August 1999 became the SRSG in Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating a more assertive shift in policy.

For Bernard Kouchner, SRSG of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a compromise appears to have been reached, as dem-

onstrated in Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999, in which the SRSG is mandated to “control the implementation of the international civil presence, and ... to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner.” Yet when it works, coordination depends too much on the personalities involved rather than on a prior agreement on standard operating procedures. The United States is attempting to incorporate many of these changes into doctrine to ensure greater consistency, the most recent being Presidential Decision Directive 56 in May 1997, which is more thorough but still needs to be adapted to an international agenda.⁶

The policy of applying sanctions is inherently myopic.

The protection of aid workers, humanitarian relief supplies, and foreign troops has also become a significant factor interfering with the realization of the mandates in all the operations except Panama. Even there, ironically, one of the justifications for the invasion was the “threat to American lives,” yet only one U.S. citizen had been killed prior to the invasion, while 23 U.S. troops were killed during

Operation Just Cause in Panama. By Somalia, U.S. soldiers were no longer allowed to die, at least not on a humanitarian mission (military casualties were more acceptable during the Persian Gulf War). The fear of body bags thus far is mainly a U.S. preoccupation, although in Bosnia, anxiety about Serb reprisals on British, Dutch, and French peacekeepers put a stop to NATO bombing sorties for some time. Later during IFOR and NATO’s subsequent operation, Stabilization Force (SFOR), this fear has impeded the active apprehension of indicted war criminals, particularly Karadzic and Mladic, by NATO troops.⁷

If the U.S. government continues to allow its decisions to be dominated by what Thomas Weiss refers to as “a zero-casualty foreign policy,”⁸ then Americans will be unable to provide the necessary leadership in these missions, and relations with their allies will also suffer. It is indeed absurd that a U.S. life abroad is valued more highly than at home. Considering that 30 Americans were killed in Somalia, 19 in Grenada, and 23 in Panama, perhaps being a soldier is a safer occupation than a police officer, foreign correspondent, aid worker, or even a taxi driver in most major U.S. cities. This is not to argue that the lives of U.S. soldiers are dispensable, rather that their security will be enhanced by clearer and more robust rules of engagement. If strong signals are consistently sent out to errant leaders that mistreatment of foreign personnel will be met with serious reprisals, aid workers and soldiers will operate in a more secure environment.

Another important lesson learned from Haiti was that the goals set by the international community must be limited and realistic. Again, this is in contrast to Somalia and earlier in the UN operations in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), when the Security Council Resolutions were overly ambitious and too numerous to be implemented and therefore destined to fail. A final and very important lesson that needs to be fully realized is a public, lengthy commitment to the operation, which is critical for allowing confidence-building measures sufficient time to be adopted. U.S. policymakers frequently refer to the Vietnam-induced fear of “mission creep,” which occurred during planning for all these operations. Perhaps calls for early withdrawal merely represent a diversion for the U.S. Congress, since these operations have been regularly extended. Indicating a recent shift in policy, Dave Scanlon, SFOR Spokesperson, reported that “SFOR is now working toward an ‘end state,’ not an ‘end date.’ Deadlines no longer apply to the mission here ... What is left is to ensure a stable and secure environment so that ... a lasting peace [can be] established.”⁹

Advances in Nation Building?

If we use the Allied occupation after World War II as a starting point, it appears at first sight that little has been learned—today’s democratic Germany and Japan can contrast sharply with these cases and attest to the success and importance of externally sponsored nation-building efforts. As Roy Licklider explained, “The resulting governments are impressive testimony that it is possible for outsiders to establish relatively benign governments which locals will support for at least half a century.”¹⁰ Yet it is also important to note that Allied success in implementing democratic reforms was enhanced by respect for education and high literacy rates, advanced levels of industrialization, and, of course, unconditional surrender.

The United States, Britain, and France as well had a significant stake in preventing the reemergence of Germany and Japan as powerful and aggressive nations. Stable and democratic states were hence viewed as vital to international security. Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and now Kosovo have not been considered as critical by the U.S. government, though the latter two affect European security and thus figure more prominently in European policy.

Success in Germany and Japan, moreover, was achieved by policies that focused on sweeping economic, political, and educational reforms that affected the entire population for several decades. Again, external interest and support for the same in these post-Cold War cases have not been nearly as significant, although it could also be argued that the first of these inter-

ventions only took place in 1989, and democratic reforms need a solid and lengthy commitment before they take root. More targeted international aid could obviously make a difference. But interest here is slight, particularly in Congress, where representatives want to spend less money and exert less energy abroad, especially after the initial hype of the military operation subsides and international civil servants are getting on with the mundane tasks required to rebuild the state.

Interestingly, studies have demonstrated that the U.S. public in general supports spending on foreign affairs. In 1995, for example, the average American believed that the U.S. government was spending at least five times more than the amount actually allocated. When told what the real figures were, the majority endorsed maintaining or increasing that amount, not reducing it.¹¹ Yet influential representatives in the U.S. Congress continue to push for reductions in foreign-assistance funding. And they have been successful in their campaign: in 1999, less than one-half of 1 percent of the total U.S. budget went to foreign economic and humanitarian assistance.¹²

This amount is not remotely comparable to that which enabled Germany and Japan to become stable democracies, to the benefit of the Germans and the Japanese, not to mention for the United States and its allies in terms of security, trade, and political relations. For example, in 1948, the first year of the Marshall Plan (1948-1952), aid distributed to 16 European states amounted to 13 percent of the entire U.S. budget. This total did not even include all costs incurred during the German occupation and any of the occupation costs in Japan.¹³ The equivalent for fiscal year 1997 would be \$208 billion, in sharp contrast to the actual appropriation of \$18.25 billion.¹⁴ Although many Americans might claim foreign assistance is no longer the priority it was after World War II, it is also true that the threat posed by recent conflicts to international peace and security is more serious than may be apparent and could be mitigated if U.S. government gave them greater attention.

The Trilateral Approach: An Old Look at a New Problem

A strategy for rebuilding and democratizing states after intervention must incorporate three fundamental elements. It needs to reestablish security, empower civil society and strengthen democratic institutions, and coordinate international efforts. Each cannot be fully implemented without the others. For example, strengthened democratic institutions will not endure unless the state maintains the legal monopoly on force.

Elements of this approach were indeed applied in these cases, yet they were only applied in varying degrees and not holistically. The trilateral strat-

egy is nothing new; it resembles that adopted successfully by the Allies in Germany and Japan. Can it be applied to a more modern and hence different type of crisis?

REESTABLISHING SECURITY

Prior to implementing democratic reforms, the government needs to recover as much control over security as possible. In many developing states, they are unable to do this. Instead, governments are forced to share protection with a number of nonstate actors, who may be called warlords, the Mafia, rebels, guerrillas, terrorists, or paramilitaries. The restoration and maintenance of governmental control over security is contingent upon military, police, and judicial reforms.

Some states choose to abolish the armed forces entirely and maintain only the police, as in Costa Rica, Haiti, or Panama. An alternative could be to retrain the military to work on domestic concerns such as border patrols to limit terrorism and trafficking in drugs, arms, and/or nuclear materials, or to provide coastal and environmental protection, disaster management, and rebuilding of infrastructure (e.g., an engineer corps). Military reforms should also include a reduction in defense expenditure.

Police reform is also vital and has been a major component of these cases. In most situations, an entirely new force is necessary, one that could ensure public safety and gain the confidence of the local population. The goal is to achieve a comprehensive change in mindset of the local police and of the public, as previously the police in many of these countries had only served to terrify civilians through extortion and torture, instead of providing protection.

Thus far, newly trained forces have inevitably included some members of the old force, due to the lack of experienced personnel and the belief that it would take longer to train an entire corps of new officers than to re-train some of the old. Such a policy has not been without controversy, although the method applied in Haiti appears to have garnered more domestic support, that is, phasing out the old force in increments while simultaneously recruiting and training new troops. The model used in Bosnia also displays the advances in promoting accountability by international police trainers, while in Kosovo, UNMIK has initiated a similarly transparent multiethnic program.¹⁵

Judicial reforms are also necessary and linked to other security sector re-

Until security is reestablished, state reconstruction cannot be successfully realized.

forms. Many excellent training organizations already exist, such as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, while watchdog organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, help to ensure that these bodies maintain high standards. Without accountable criminal investigative procedures, trained judges and lawyers, and prisons that adhere to fundamental human rights standards, police reform would be pointless.

The composition of the postconflict state must largely be decided by its inhabitants.

The planned international criminal court could also send the appropriate message to adhere to international law, as well as provide the forum to punish those guilty of mistreatment of international personnel. This court would relieve countries emerging from civil war with scarce resources and overwhelming demands to bring perpetrators to justice. If a warlord suspects that he may be called to task for massive human rights abuses, irrespective of the existence of a central authority, he may be less likely to com-

mit such crimes. For example, a number of Somali warlords paid attention to the Pinochet affair after he was arrested in London in October 1998.¹⁶ At the least, the court would prevent the international community from negotiating with particular warlords if they are indicted, allowing members of civil society to resume positions of authority.

Demilitarization is also a priority, albeit extremely difficult to achieve, particularly in heavily armed societies, such as Somalia (or the United States). This would include disarmament, demobilization, and demining as integral components with the aim of reintegrating militia and soldiers into civil society, as indeed occurred in a thorough manner in Germany and Japan. In the latter two, there was also a purge of the nasty elements in both societies who had contributed to the war, which helped to rebuild trust.

There is no political will in the United States to become so extensively involved in demilitarization due to the fear of casualties, yet until control over security is reestablished, state reconstruction cannot be successfully realized. A permanent security-sector reform unit could be established at UN headquarters, perhaps in conjunction with the UN security coordinator, to coordinate all police, military, and judicial reform activities.

EMPOWERING CIVIL SOCIETY AND STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Linked to the question of security is the need to consider the influence of nonstate actors, especially warlords. Often responsible for civil war and, at

extremes, the collapse of government, warlords maintain their power by controlling strategic resources and valuable real estate, such as diamond mines and ports. The intervening power's choice of authority in any negotiations, therefore, can have serious repercussions, as in the UN operation in Somalia when Aideed was empowered at home and abroad by being branded "Enemy Number One" by the U.S. government. At the time, and indeed today, there are a number of warlords operating throughout southern Somalia, with no one warlord controlling the entire territory.

More attention paid to the warlords occurs at the expense of traditional leaders from civil society. Ignoring the faction leaders entirely is arguably ineffective because they control the situation on the ground and will need to relinquish their hold if peace is to be realized. This eventually occurred in Haiti when the junta agreed to leave the country, admittedly while U.S. troops were on their way. In Bosnia, Karadzic, and Mladic's exclusion from Dayton and subsequent ban from political participation because of their indictment by the Tribunal has allowed other leaders to emerge and participate, although the two still wield enormous influence because they have not been fully ostracized nor arrested.

The international community still negotiated with Milosevic, however, at Dayton. This issue resurfaced in the crisis in Kosovo that erupted in summer 1998 and again in early 1999, when Milosevic was finally made an international pariah during the NATO bombing campaign. Had he been excluded from Dayton and called to task for his responsibility in the wars in Yugoslavia, perhaps the subsequent humanitarian crisis that led to the bombing campaign might not have reached such a dire state.

Leaders from civil society should be included in all negotiations. They maintain respect in their communities and, if sufficiently empowered, could be capable of convincing those with weapons to disarm and negotiate. The inclusion of women should also be emphasized as their role is often enhanced during civil conflicts because traditional, male-dominated structures break down.

The final and perhaps most important reason to focus on leaders from civil society is that democracy is not a priority for warlords, who are mainly concerned with sustaining and aggrandizing their holdings. When warlords discuss the composition of a future state, the debate tends to focus on who will fill which post in the next government—particularly the positions of president, prime minister and minister of finance—not what type of government should be established. Further, the normal assumption is that the new state will be unitary because this type of state is easier to dominate. In direct contrast, members of civil society have a vested interest in promoting democratic reforms that include power-sharing mechanisms and decentralization

of power, which help to ensure that one person cannot usurp power.

It is also possible that the international community's rigid adherence to the Montevideo Convention of 1933 exacerbates conflict. To gain recognition under international law, a state needs to have (1) a defined territory, (2) a population, (3) an effective government, and (4) the capacity to enter into international relations. Fulfillment of these conditions is necessary for recognition, yet their erosion or disappearance later in time do not mandate that it should thereafter be withdrawn or suspended.

The international community cannot replace local endorsement of democratization.

The application of such a principle would decertify a large number of states, mostly in Africa, in some parts of the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia, where borders are largely insignificant and porous, disputes rampant, and governments systemically corrupt and unable to control much territory outside the capital. In fact, only the fourth stipulation is still met by some collapsing states. While having a population

merely signifies that the territory is not *terra nullius*, in many of these states, several borders are straddled by populations which often hold more allegiance to their ethnic group than to the state.

Warlords technically need only grab the capital city and claim a government, which in turn allows them to receive foreign aid and all the other goodies that come with state recognition. If the international community could instead institute a mechanism for suspending recognition until such time as the state demonstrated a commitment to establish a representative government that respected fundamental human rights, perhaps this would reduce the warlords' scramble for control.

The international community, led by the United States and Europe, can help to buttress the power base of members of civil society by fortifying or establishing democratic and transparent administrative institutions. This can be achieved by utilizing the expertise of the many U.S. and European nongovernmental organizations that work to strengthen the rule of law, enhance respect for human rights, support international electoral observers, improve financial management and accountability, promote decentralization, expand civilian control of the military, and improve electoral processes, legislatures, political parties, the media, the economy, and education at all levels of society. Additionally, the development and implementation of democratic constitutional arrangements with power-sharing mechanisms should also be a priority.

When the next crisis erupts that eventually turns into a nation-building operation, it may be time to consider new approaches to governance, which might even include support for a government that stretches beyond the external frontiers of that state. Indeed, if we are to consider temporarily decertifying certain rogue states, so too should we contemplate relaxing the rigid adherence to the Westphalian state-based system.¹⁷ One approach may be greater decentralization, at least for African crises, since traditional culture and levels of command and authority operated at the local level long before colonial powers interfered in the continent. Power could be devolved to villages and communities, even including those that cut across international borders. This example could also apply to potential crises in other parts of the world, such as in the former Soviet Union.

Consociational principles could also be used to realign loyalties within a larger regional grouping. Consociational arrangements provide options for power sharing between different groups, with jobs and public moneys distributed according to group sizes. They are based on the concept of separate but equal and are feasible options for deeply divided societies during the period when trust needs to be rebuilt. Each group administers its own community needs, such as education, and minorities are given the right to veto legislation. Consociational principles can be used in any type of political system, from a unitary state to a loose confederation.

As in any political arrangement, safeguards must be instituted to protect minorities, but they will also need external support to ensure their implementation, which again means prolonging the international presence. If such programs are not sustained, the only other way to prevent a recurrence of war is to carve the state into smaller, more ethnically pure pieces. This option sanctifies ethnic cleansing but is unfortunately the one most likely to be chosen because the time commitment is shorter. Consociational arrangements, in contrast, do not force populations to move, because they are allowed to associate with others, no matter where they live.

Finally, the composition of the post-conflict state must largely be decided by its inhabitants to ensure an invested ownership in the peace process and encourage its successful implementation. The best will in the world on behalf of the international community cannot replace local endorsement of democratization. Support for capacity building and inclusion of local actors in the decision-making process, as has been occurring in the Kosovo Transitional Council during UNMIK, is an imperative.

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Just as coordination is important during a peace support operation, so too is it vital during reconstruction. Owing to the insecurity inherent in crisis en-

vironments and the preponderance of external actors engaged in mediation and assistance efforts, international coordination has been increasingly considered a crucial element in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. This is especially the case when dealing with a collapsed state because there are no official counterparts on the ground with legitimate negotiating status. Although all would agree that coordination is necessary, the effort to develop common objectives and principles on an international level needs to be enhanced. The five international communities that require coordination are nongovernmental organizations, donors/governments, multilateral organizations, militaries, and, significantly, the private sector.

The role of the private sector has largely been overlooked, even though foreign corporations also play an indirect and sometimes direct role in complex emergencies. Multinational corporations can exacerbate conflicts, but they also can help in their resolution. Many mining and oil companies, for example, have a large stake in unstable regions and often wield enormous influence with whatever remnant of a government exists and, even in some cases, with rebel groups. They also offer the employment that is so essential during rehabilitation.

Coordination of international efforts in reconstruction is particularly vital for the following reasons:

- to facilitate the adoption of common policies and responses;
- to prevent overlap of programs;
- to maximize the effective use of available resources; and
- to promote a secure operational environment for aid activities (e.g., a united front against hostage-taking, harassment, or extortion).

Although the UN already gives certain agencies the task of the lead coordinating role and others have been created in situations of state collapse,¹⁸ a more concerted effort should be made to institutionalize and expand the terms of reference of these bodies for all conflicts as soon as they erupt.

The three components discussed in this section—security, democratization, and coordination—already exist at some level in most peace-supporting and nation-building operations, yet they have not been regulated to the degree necessary to ensure wider adherence. Only when the three components form part of an overall strategic package can we hope to achieve greater synergy in future missions. Anthony Lake concluded, “Neither we nor the international community has either the responsibility or the means to do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to rebuild nations.”¹⁹ Although this point is valid, he also admits the failure to comprehend the overall dilemma by his remark “whatever it takes.” This inability to conceptualize what it takes to rebuild states is associated with the recent increase in seemingly intractable conflicts but also signifies the lack of interest in addressing

these crises in a comprehensive manner. Today's strong democracies in Germany and Japan reflect the value of such a commitment. More attention paid to resolving prevailing crises can thus ensure that future operations achieve similar success.

Notes

1. The term "nation" is often confused with "state," particularly in the United States. Although the term "nation building" incorrectly depicts what the U.S. government is attempting to do, as it rarely strives to create a nation inhabited by peoples of the same collective identity, this term has become synonymous with state building. For example, when the U.S. government and the UN attempted to rebuild Somalia, they did not try to reunite all Somalis living in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia with Somalis in the former Somali Republic, which would have indeed created a Somali nation; rather, they focused on rebuilding the former Somali Republic.
2. The case of East Timor differs from these cases because it has long been considered by the decolonization committee in the UN as a territory that can decide its future (unlike Kosovo, for example), and the violence that led to military intervention was based on the reaction to the UN-sanctioned referendum. It will not be discussed to any extent in this article, even though it is becoming a nation-building operation, because it was only beginning at the time of the preparation of this article.
3. Letter to the editor, *Economist*, April 29, 1995.
4. UN Document S/PV.3413 (New York: United Nations, July 31, 1994): 12.
5. See John M. Shalikashvili, "National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era," 1997, which lists guidelines he set out when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shalikashvili's strategy built on that of his predecessor; see Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (Winter 1992-93): 32-45. See also Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 16-17, citing former Secretary of State Warren Christopher's guidelines, from testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in April 1993. Finally, see Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for national security affairs, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World," remarks at George Washington University, March 6, 1996. Shalikashvili, Christopher, and Lake have also correspondingly represented the different foreign-policy communities within the U.S. government: defense, state, and intelligence. The three sets of guidelines are purposely rather vague, which gives the U.S. government latitude in deciding whether to become engaged.
6. The Clinton administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, *Presidential Decision Directive* 56, May 1997.
7. The British military conducted a poll in 1997 to see how many deaths of British soldiers the public would tolerate and found the numbers quite high, about 15 per month. Respondents remarked that soldiers joined on a voluntary basis and should therefore be well aware of the risks they might encounter. Indeed, the British, French, and Dutch all lost more soldiers than the Americans did in the four cases discussed here, while the Pakistanis suffered grave losses in Somalia without withdrawing.

8. Thomas G. Weiss, "Collective Spinelessness: UN Actions in the Former Yugoslavia," in Richard H. Ullman, ed., *The World and Yugoslavia's Wars* (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), p. 91.
9. From correspondence with Lt. Cmdr. Dave Scanlon, SFOR spokesperson, April 1999.
10. Roy Licklider, "State Building After Invasion: Somalia and Panama," presented at the International Studies Association annual convention, San Diego, Calif., April 1996.
11. See "Americans and Foreign Aid," Program on International Policy Attitudes, a joint program of the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes and the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, January 23, 1995; or Steven Kull, I. M. Destler, and Clay Ramsay, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public* (College Park, Md.: Center for International and Security Studies, 1997).
12. The Challenge of Foreign Assistance (September 1999), www.info.usaid.gov, 6.
13. Curt Tarnoff, "The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Relevance to the Present," *Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress*, January 6, 1997.
14. Author's calculation. Budget information provided by U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.
15. See "Bosnia and Hercegovina: Beyond Restraint," *Human Rights Watch Report*; and *Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, S/1999/987 (September 16, 1999): para. 30.
16. Author discussions in Kenya and Somalia, 1999.
17. Jeffrey Herbst, "Alternatives to the Current Nation-States in Africa," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/1997).
18. The Afghanistan Programming Board, the Monitoring and Steering Group in Liberia, and the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, which were all established on an ad hoc basis, are the best examples of such international coordinating mechanisms in situations of state collapse.
19. Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World."