



Military Operational Measures of Effectiveness for Peacekeeping Operations

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FOR THE PAST 18 YEARS, stability and support operations have been a US diplomatic focal point. These operations involve employing military forces to support peace operations in places such as Lebanon, Bosnia, Haiti, Macedonia and the Sinai. Most recently, the United States deployed Task Force (TF) *Falcon* to Kosovo to support NATO's Operation *Joint Guardian*. Events during *Joint Guardian* indicate that military peacekeeping operations (PKO) require identifying specific operational measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to determine when conditions are established for transferring control to legitimate civilian authorities or other political organizations.

Dual Pillars of Diplomacy

Ethnic conflict in the Balkans is viewed as a different form of warfare, and the US military will continue to be involved in such wars. It is therefore incumbent on those with responsibility in these matters to pay close attention to the nature of ethnic conflict and determine how to use the dual pillars of diplomacy and force most effectively to support peace and justice.¹ It is critical to articulate the desired end state for an ethnic conflict before establishing conditions for successfully transferring control from military to civilian agencies. The end state for an ethnic conflict is limited to suppressing or defeating the insurgents or the dominant power, de facto partition, autonomy or independence.² Both Bosnia and Kosovo required NATO forces to separate warring parties as a condition for political accommodation. NATO's goal in Kosovo allows Albanians, the regional minority, autonomy in areas where they form a majority.

US security interests in the Balkans include controlling violence in the region, preventing the collapse of Europe's security structure and defining NATO's role in the post-Cold War era.³ PKO support dip-

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lomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. They take place following a diplomatic agreement between the disputing parties, the sponsoring organization and potential force-contributing nations. A credible truce or cease-fire must be in effect, and the disputing parties must consent to the operation. The military's main functions are to inhibit hostile actions by the disputing parties and to bolster confidence in the peace process.⁴

PKO also support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve long-term political settlements and normal, peaceful relations.⁵ The difficulty with achieving this aim in Kosovo is the lack of a unified truce among Serbian regular forces, paramilitary forces, ministry of interior defense forces, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rebel forces and NATO. Signing two separate military annexes to the peace agreement between the two parties weakened credibility. A military technical agreement (MTA) signed on 10 June 1999 between the Serbs and NATO provided for a three-phased withdrawal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo. The Undertaking, which was signed on 20 June 1999 between the KLA and NATO, provided a phased procedure for demilitarizing the KLA.

Kosovo Force (KFOR) is the 37,000-man, NATO-led contingent deployed to the region to monitor both the MTA and the Undertaking. KFOR is divided into five sectors of responsibility—US,

British, French, Italian and German—and is commanded by an allied three-star general headquartered in Pristina.

The United States is responsible for the southeastern portion of the province with all forces operating under the command and control of TF *Falcon*. Its mission is to maintain law and order, secure lines of communication (LOC), provide humanitarian assistance support and facilitate transition of the provincial government and infrastructure back to legitimate civilian authorities in sector. TF *Falcon* is an ad hoc coalition under the command of a brigadier general. The coalition is made up of one US infantry battalion, one mechanized battalion and one armored battalion; a Greek mechanized battalion; a Polish airborne battalion; and a Russian airborne battalion. These units rotate every six months. The TF is well-manned and equipped to deal with local military forces in its assigned area of operations (AO).

Military Security Tasks

The first challenge for the operational commander during PKO is determining whether crimes committed are ethnic or domestic. Events in Kosovo indicate that ethnic crimes generally include murder, assault, kidnapping and arson while domestic crimes normally involve assault, rape and larceny. The types of crime in Kosovo have changed over time. Military forces monitored the treaties throughout demilitarization and separation of the disputing parties and discovered a direct correlation between the status of agreements and the types of crimes that were committed. As the time lines and milestones for the agreements were met and domestic crime became more prevalent, the ethnic situation stabilized.

The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used to maintain law and order in the US sector accord with joint doctrine. To perform their mission, peacekeepers must have freedom of movement; open access to all areas in their operational areas; and the freedom to patrol freely, observe, monitor, verify and report their findings.⁶ TF *Falcon* foot and vehicle patrols monitor agreement compliance, deter violent acts and determine ethnic mix. These patrols put military presence in areas of concern. Special Forces teams also conduct area assessments and provide information on each sector's ethnic populations and leadership. Personal property search-and-seizure operations are conducted with probable cause to seize weapons, ammunition and other contraband. Efforts to identify, arrest, detain and process suspected war criminals are ongoing. Curfews are imposed in population centers where

violence and crime are most evident. A vehicular quick reaction force (QRF) is ready at all times to respond rapidly and forcibly to agreement violations, interference with freedom of movement and other threats to peaceful coexistence.

A primary supporting task of maintaining law and order is protecting and returning refugees, who

Although 335 aid agencies operate in Kosovo, military ties to NGOs in PKO are poorly structured. Previous peacekeeping operations illustrate that many NGOs view the military as out of touch with the values of the society they seek to protect, while military personnel tend to see NGOs as undisciplined and an obstacle to their duties.

number in the tens of thousands. Most Albanian refugees have returned to the province but have no place to live because of arson and vandalism. Camps established by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services, provide shelter for the homeless. These camps require security to prevent Serbian retaliation. Another concern is protecting Serbs who leave the province to return to Serbia. Many of them camp near municipal facilities while waiting for transportation out of Kosovo.

Another supporting task involves protecting key facilities such as hospitals, public utilities, factories and government buildings. Resuming normal operations in these facilities is critical to preserving many public and private documents and to restoring economic and political normalcy in the region. The documents serve as evidence in resolving claims such as land ownership.

Vehicular patrols, heliborne QRF and traffic control points (TCPs) secure LOCs. This is difficult because of the sector's size, approximately the size of Rhode Island. Still, vehicular patrols are useful in reducing obstacles and conducting show-of-force operations. The air QRF provides a UH-60 helicopter platform for responding to arson strikes and other serious incidents. Apache helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles are also excellent sources of information and intelligence. TCPs are effective in searching vehicles and monitoring refugee flow across the Macedonian border.

Humanitarian assistance support is provided in various ways. The most significant effort is the

Elements of TF *Falcon* patrolling near Vitina, Kosovo, during Operation Joint Guardian.

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medical support provided to minefield victims and other critically injured people. This was an important step toward winning the hearts and minds of the people because other facilities and air- or ground-evacuation capabilities were simply not available. The engineers provided tremendous assistance with demining operations. International law and the rules of engagement prohibit engineers from physically clearing minefields, but they can provide demolition and technical support to the UN teams.

Military escorts for NGO and PVO relief convoys are also required. Military transportation assets expedite movement of food, clothing and other supplies for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR focuses on returning Albanians to their homeland and has prioritized resources to repair roofs and patch windows and doors with plastic. Materials to repair homes, such as wood, glass and tile, are precious commodities and have to be secured by military forces. The only recourse for many families is to live with friends and relatives in lesser-damaged homes.

Information Operations

The operational commander's second challenge is to establish a positive relationship with the civilian population and influence adversaries not to use force.

In accordance with joint doctrine, information operations (IO) are used in Kosovo to degrade Albanian and Serbian abilities to respond to KFOR operations to restore peace.⁷ Commanders are responsible for themes and messages that synchronize IO throughout their AOs and guide TF elements as they interact with the local populace. Themes are broad statements supporting the mission and represent essential components of the end state or final objective the commander is attempting to attain, for example, that all military leaders will be held accountable for their actions. Messages directly support themes by specifying detailed actions that are associated with these themes. For example, a message supporting the theme used in Kosovo was that military leaders who violate provisions of the MTA or the Undertaking will be prosecuted under international law.⁸

The most important IO forum the TF *Falcon* commander used was the joint information committee (JIC). This committee conducted weekly meetings at a hotel in Urosevac to discuss treaty implementation and a plan of action—with milestones—for the continued evolution toward a peaceful, functional society. JIC members included US sector commanders, selected TF *Falcon* staff members, KLA zone commanders and Serb leadership representatives. The basic themes dissemi-



Local civilians asking for assistance at the Regional Information Center, Urosevac, Kosovo.

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nated to the JIC included that peace was a prerequisite for restoring normalcy in the region and that KLA and Serbian atrocities would not be tolerated. The JIC allowed the TF *Falcon* commander to issue policy and procedural guidance and to allow disputing parties an opportunity to voice concerns. This weekly gathering prompted several follow-on negotiations and meetings throughout the sector.

Another important IO program that was established throughout the AO was creating regional information centers (RICs). These RICs provide places and contacts for the local populace to interact with the military chain of command. Each RIC has an officer in charge and is manned by fire support personnel. Although each RIC is staffed slightly differently, each has linguistic, medical, military police (MP) and civil affairs (CA) support. RICs are points to document incidents, respond to complaints, and react to public safety needs. Also, RICs are sources of information for the local people and reinforce the message that KFOR responds to complaints regardless of ethnic background. Their presence also emphasizes that everyone is responsible for keeping the peace. RICs are excellent means to assess regional stability while building the people's trust and confidence.

Critical to IO in Kosovo are radio interviews with

local radio stations conducted by battalion TF commanders, executive officers and staff members. The psychological operations (PSYOP) staff representative arranges interviews that are conducted on Sunday afternoons. The PSYOP representative receives the questions from the interviewer two days before the event and relays themes that TF commanders want to cover during the interview. PSYOP staffs prepare responses to ensure coordination. A CA or PSYOP translator is always present to avoid confusion and to ensure that themes are transmitted accurately and convincingly. Official press releases that discuss events, policies or programs are also provided to local stations for broadcast. The radio stations receive payment for interviews or broadcasts after they air to ensure the plan was followed and that all broadcasts are devoid of emotion and politics. Radio broadcast procedures used in Kosovo are similar to those employed by TF *Eagle* in Bosnia.⁹

Also important to IO is providing information to the media. TF *Falcon* established a joint visitor's bureau (JVB) to deal efficiently with the press, media and other visitors such as congressional leaders. The suffering in Kosovo and the role of US forces are destined for worldwide attention. Sharing situational awareness with the media is basic and important because information affects international



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support for military activities.¹⁰ The public affairs staff effectively determines and disseminates media themes in the JVB that cover Serbian compliance with the MTA, mitigates reaction to mass gravesite and minefield reports, urges both military and public cooperation with KFOR and monitors KLA adherence to the Undertaking. Military commanders host reporters daily and give them open access to unit activities. Periodic press conferences also provide updates on military operations in the sector.

Civil Affairs Functions

The operational commander's third challenge is defining and restoring some sense of normalcy in the region as part of the mission's postconflict-resolution phase. CA personnel spearheaded this effort by providing advice and formulating procedures to create a basis for cultural accommodation and expediting compliance with the agreements.¹¹ CA personnel provide expertise in assessing the region and form a liaison with local civilian leaders, but the interaction with NGOs has become a more important factor in this process.

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many NGOs view the military as out of touch with the values of the society they seek to protect, while military personnel tend to see NGOs as undisciplined and an obstacle to their duties. These sentiments are no different in Kosovo. The number of NGOs continues to increase, and they are usually the first to enter a country and the last to leave. NGOs often have better local knowledge than military forces and are able to bypass local bureaucracies. NGOs also consist of organizations with varying degrees of competence and political motives. They are likely to resist military attempts to coordinate and control their activities and often differ on the best approach to problem solving.¹³ These factors indicate that modern PKO are complex, multifaceted missions that require close coordination between civilian and military elements to be successful.¹⁴

The TF *Falcon* commander established a civil-military operations center (CMOC) at TF headquarters, Camp Bondsteel, to synchronize information and coordinate interagency activities. The CMOC serves as a command and control center for the battalion CA teams to help establish an interim regional government, restore the industrial and agricultural economic base, and manage resources and assets.

Suspected arsonists are detained outside a company command post in Vitina, Kosovo. (Opposite page) Curious children surround a collection point for defused mines awaiting transportation for demolition in Urosevac.

US Army

A squad of MPs attached to a 1,000-person battalion TF is clearly not enough to enforce the law. [Crime prevention] should begin when there are sufficient MPs in the AO to perform this task. . . . [The] most difficult stage of maintaining domestic law and order involves using an interim international police force, then training and integrating a local police force. Neither force has materialized in Kosovo. European nations have committed to deploying a 5,000-person international police force to help patrol Kosovo but have provided only about 2,500.

The CMOC also worked to reopen, maintain and operate both the public service and public utility portions of the infrastructure. The principal elements of public service include the medical system, transportation network and schools. The most vital utilities include electric power, water and telecommunications.

Reconstructing the province began at the TF level. CA personnel chaired daily meetings with representatives from participating NGOs and international and regional security organizations at the RICs. These meetings established work priorities and allocated scarce resources among many competing demands and agencies. The predominant US government agency in Kosovo is the US Agency for International Development. It has the largest financial base in the region, while PVOs and NGOs lack funding for almost every endeavor in the province. The CA teams work to ensure unity of effort in applying limited resources to numerous needs.

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organizations working in Kosovo that were in conflict with one another before the bombing campaign now work effectively with US CA teams to establish an interim provisional government. One is the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, an element from the US Department of State. The second is an NGO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Both made significant contributions during the one-on-one negotiation process between KFOR commanders and the various provincial factions. Both organizations have extensive contacts in the region because of their previous presence and understand many political, ethnic and religious sensitivities. They work diligently with military commanders, CA teams and UN administrators to form a combined Albanian-Serbian interim government.

International organizations, such as the UN, have been effective in initiating economic redevelopment in Kosovo. Examples include making the German mark and the Yugoslav dinar official currencies, appointing judges and international jurists for a new legal system and imposing new customs duties to

help finance administrative functions. Bosnia is an excellent example of the link between socioeconomic conditions and PKO. Improving living standards was one means of easing tensions between the warring factions.¹⁵ To assess and manage the degree of economic recovery, CA personnel in Kosovo monitored the repair and reopening of small businesses and stores, the number of privately owned

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garden plots and commercially owned farms, the price of goods in the open market, fees for services and the amount of vehicle traffic in and around the cities.

KFOR is committed to getting factories opened and reestablishing the work force. One significant difficulty is the inability to pay workers. KFOR is also committed to restoring self-sufficiency by assisting farmers with normal harvests. CA assets are dedicated to repairing tractors and other equipment and to obtaining resources to prepare fields for planting. CA personnel are instrumental in getting the public transportation system operational by managing fuel, schedules and loads. KFOR also works with the International Medical Cooperation and Doctors Without Borders to restore the local hospitals to normal operating capacity. The hospitals are critically short of supplies and equipment, although medical personnel are reasonably available. The same situation applies to opening schools. Efforts are constantly made to acquire and repair suitable buildings so that teachers can resume classes. These indicators of economic normalcy are useful in prioritizing resources. Getting people off the streets and productively engaged is the first step.

Restoring electric, water, waste removal and telephone services were exacerbated by their substandard conditions before the NATO bombing campaign. Most utilities required extensive repair or replacement of items such as pipes, generators and microwave towers to facilitate restoration. CA personnel consolidated work requests, managed the labor and contractor work force, and procured supplies and equipment. One recent example involved

an inventory of the pipe factory in Urosevac to find the proper gauge pipe to repair the city's water line. Once the correct pipe was located, US military personnel transported the pipe to the damaged section and then worked with NGOs to repair the system.

Maintaining Law and Order

The first stage of maintaining law and order routinely involves deploying regular combat troops to neutralize ethnic violence. These troops enforce or monitor compliance with the military provisions of a peace treaty. This stage should begin immediately after hostilities cease and end when domestic crime replaces ethnic violence.

The second stage is preventing domestic crime. MPs should lead the force because they are tasked with law enforcement duties both during peacetime and war. MPs are better trained in traffic control, arrest, detention and investigation than combat soldiers. Augmenting TF commanders with additional MPs to perform these duties allows combat forces to concentrate on treaty implementation. However, the problem with this augmentation is that it pulls an already stretched MP force from home station duties or taps into overextended reserve forces. A squad of MPs attached to a 1,000-person battalion TF is clearly not enough to enforce the law. This stage should begin when there are sufficient MPs in the AO to perform this task and end when an international police force arrives.

The third and most difficult stage of maintaining domestic law and order involves using an interim international police force, then training and integrating a local police force. Neither force has materialized in Kosovo. European nations have committed to deploying a 5,000-person international police force to help patrol Kosovo but have provided only about 2,500.¹⁶ The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been more successful in establishing the Kosovo police force but has not fully integrated it into law enforcement activities or sustained its program. The first class graduated on 16 October 1999 and had 173 new officers from a variety of ethnic backgrounds.¹⁷ This stage should begin when an international police force takes responsibility from the MPs and end when a host nation police force is sufficiently trained to assume routine domestic law enforcement duties. A functioning host nation police force is a prerequisite for US troop withdrawal. UN administrators are responsible for this process but have not been successful in coordinating their efforts with the international community or KFOR commanders.



A CBS film crew covers a July 4th cookout in Vitina.

The embedded media program allows reporters to live and travel with commanders and units throughout the AO, and to see and feel the emotions and difficulties that TF Falcon faces each day. The embedded media program is a meaningful and effective way to decipher and exploit information under favorable conditions. Open access tells the real story, helps reinforce a positive attitude and has worked favorably in Kosovo.

The MOE for identifying the level and types of crime is closely linked to statistics. The crime rate in Kosovo has been significantly reduced since KFOR arrived. According to NATO's Secretary General, about five murders occur each week compared to 50 in June 1999.¹⁸ This statistic indicates that it is time to shift responsibility for law enforcement from KFOR to international and host region police forces.

Regional Harmony

The UN coordination problem with the police forces indicates a larger problem with synchronizing administrative functions provincewide. Fundamentally, it is a problem of authority and controlling and coordinating all organizations operating in a given region, including the UN, NATO, NGOs and PVOs. The MOE for this problem is forming a joint and combined staff under UNMIK's coordination and the UN's supervision. This process is clear to the UN and KFOR but requires more NGO and PVO cooperation. Each organization should be categorized by function; each functional area should have a lead organization. Organizations with the largest financial backing will tend to dominate their functions. The staff's standing operating procedures can be determined and developed over time, but its ability to di-

rect administrative efforts for the benefit of all parties will enhance and expedite transferring control back to legitimate civilian authorities. The international community should ban organizations that fail to comply with established procedures from the province or isolate them from support organizations.

Common Government Goals

The true MOE for transitioning from military commanders to civilian leaders is a general election. This requires a phased approach once military commanders take responsibility for their respective AOs upon occupying the province. During the first phase, commanders deal immediately with all factional leaders equitably and form a group of representatives from each municipality. Forcing both sides of a dispute to work together toward a common goal is critical to establishing an interim government. Determining and accepting common goals are challenging and dynamic while simultaneously attempting to restore political legitimacy. For example, military efforts to restore public services in Kosovo aligned factions within the disputed territory toward a common goal. This process eventually led to identification and cooperation of representative leaders, which in turn, allowed UNMIK to move toward the

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second phase of forming an interim government. These efforts assisted the interim governments in performing their duties.

The prerequisite MOE for conducting subsequent elections is voter registration, perhaps using the RICs to begin the process. The RICs became nerve centers for the municipalities and could have been used without cost to document public names and addresses. OSCE and KFOR leaders disagreed at the outset of the normalization process about when an election could be held. Military leaders urged OSCE to pursue elections within six months of NATO's occupation of the province; OSCE personnel believed that elections would not be an option for at least one year. Using the RICs would have expedited the election timeline.

A Successful Media Program

There are two schools of thought concerning military interaction with the media. One school proposes an uncooperative relationship with the press, denying access to many operations and forcing reporters to get information from secondhand sources. Information is disseminated in a "pull" rather than a "push" fashion. The other school of thought,

known as the embedded media program, welcomes media involvement in all operations to portray images and stories as they actually occur. This technique tends to lend credibility to operations and enhances the message's effectiveness with the public. The embedded media program allows reporters to live and travel with commanders and units throughout the AO, and to see and feel the emotions and difficulties that TF *Falcon* faces each day. The embedded media program is a meaningful and effective way to decipher and exploit information under favorable conditions. Open access tells the real story, helps reinforce a positive attitude and has worked favorably in Kosovo. The MOE for gauging a successful media policy is a functional, embedded media program.

Throughout the past 18 years, US military forces have expertly prepared to conduct PKO as an element of US diplomatic strategy. The greatest concern continues to be restoring some form of normalcy with limited resources and dealing with competing demands that are usually associated with functions outside of military jurisdiction. This reality affects everything from establishing an elected government to providing humanitarian assistance. Organizations such as NATO and the UN must be better prepared to provide sufficient political and economic support to adequately resolve a crisis; problems like Kosovo are not going away any time soon. Minorities will be increasingly unwilling to live with arbitrary borders when conditions seem intolerable.¹⁹ Operational commanders can significantly enhance their chances for success in future PKO by applying these proposed MOEs and implementing the associated recommendations. **MR**

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