

## **The American Forces Network in the Cold War: Military Broadcasting in Postwar Germany**

**The author wishes to thank a West German colleague, Denise Ferchow, for her help in this research.**

*With the end of World War II, many U.S. troops in Germany remained to meet the new requirements of occupation. Staying with them was their own war-born radio network, the American Forces Network, Europe (AFN). Operating several powerful transmitters, AFN beamed news, information, popular music, and variety over a Western Europe otherwise bombarded by Cold War radio propaganda. This essay examines AFN's postwar programming, the military's influence over the network, and the shadow audience of Europeans who tuned in during this period.*

\*\*\* \*\*

When authors choose to write about the external broadcasting voices of the United States, they invariably dwell upon the traditional services such as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL), and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS). The political impact of these agencies in Europe has been frequently discussed. The role played by U.S. military broadcasting, however, has been underemphasized.

For more than 40 years, the U. S. Army has been operating a network of powerful broadcasting stations in the heart of Western Europe. The American Forces Network, Europe (AFN) was established during World War II, expanded during the Allied occupation, and continues to operate today, airing music, news, and information 24 hours a day. The network's seven studio stations produce radio and television programming that is broadcast over 31 AM and 21 FM radio transmitters and 107 television transmitters, ostensibly aimed at serving the 500,000 American troops, civilian employees, and their families stationed primarily in West Germany, but with smaller contingents in Berlin, Belgium, and the Netherlands.<sup>1</sup>

Although many of AFN's transmitters are of minuscule power and cover only small areas where American military personnel are concentrated, there are notable exceptions. The network's 150 kw Frankfurt radio transmitter broadcasts on 872 kHz with three times the power of any AM station in the U. S. AFN operates seven other AM transmitters of 10 kw or more, providing a medium-wave radio signal that covers much of West Germany during the day, and can be received over a large part of Western Europe at night ("Fact Sheet," 1984).<sup>2</sup>

The network's programming is much like that found on U.S. commercial stations with one exception: AFN airs no commercial advertisements. Mail shipments and a satellite link connect AFN with its U.S.-based parent organization, the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), which provides the network with the latest in American music, news and other live and prerecorded programs.<sup>3</sup>

Although network officials argue that AFN is aimed primarily at U.S. troops, the radio network has also attracted a large "shadow" audience of Europeans throughout the years, especially among the West Germans. Attracted by the upbeat style, popular music, and straight-forward news, these shadow listeners have received large doses of American culture and ideology throughout the last 40 years, including the critical period just after World War II.

Yet little has been written of this period in the network's history. Partly this has been attributable to the remoteness of the network from U.S. broadcasting historians, but even more restricting has been that, until recently, official documents of the era dealing with AFN were buried in classified government archives. Now, however, the routine declassification of Army and State Department files of the period has made available many previously closed records about the post-war operation of AFN.

Several writers have investigated other aspects of the network. Bayless (1968), Browne (1971), and Craig (1986) published contemporary descriptive analyses of the network's operation. Barnouw (1968), Briggs (1970), Delay (1951), and Kirby & Harris (1948) have all written of the network's war years. None of these authors, though, has dealt with the operation of AFN during the most influential period of the network's history-the years immediately following World War II.

This article describes the facilities and programming of AFN during this period, discuss the influence the military exerted over news and information programming, describe the nature and extent of the shadow audience, and speculates on the unpremeditated influence the network's programming had on post-war Germany.

### **AFN at the War's End**

AFN was one of several military broadcasting facilities established by the U.S. during World War II to serve U.S. troops throughout the world. The network began operation in London in 1943 with a string of low-powered transmitters scattered throughout the British Isles, and after D-day, mobile radio stations were dispatched to accompany the advancing forces. As each territory was occupied, semi-permanent AFN stations were established in France, Belgium, and eventually in Germany. With the war's end, however, came the departure of U.S.

troops from Britain and France, and by late 1945, the transmitters in those countries began to be dismantled.

In July, 1945, with all European hostilities ended, the four Allied powers withdrew to the zones of occupation. U.S. forces occupied the southern portion of Germany, and Berlin, deep in the Russian zone, was divided into four sectors and was to remain under four-power control. Authority over the German civilians in the American zone became the responsibility of the Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS). OMGUS, a U.S. Army command, ruled for 4 years until 1949, when control was transferred to the State Department in the form of a civilian Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) (Zink, 1957).

One of the first goals of the U.S. military government was to restore a closely controlled German-language press and radio system that could communicate directives and other information to German civilians in the occupied zone. The restoration of order, the management of scarce resources, and the beginnings of a program of "de-nazification" all relied on a quick reconstruction of the German media system. Captured German civilian radio stations were repaired and returned to operation under the close supervision of U.S. Army Psychological Warfare personnel. By the end of 1945, Radio Munich, Radio Stuttgart, and Radio Frankfurt were all in full operation (Ziemke, 1975, p. 377).

Meanwhile, AFN had established its own network of seven studio-stations (in Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Bayreuth, Bremen, Bremerhaven, and Berlin) to serve the occupation troops. Although there was occasional technical cooperation between AFN personnel and troops operating the German-language transmitters, the two groups had distinctly different functions and were decidedly separate administrative units.

Five of AFN's transmitters were small, but three were high-powered units captured from the Germans. Two were 100 kw medium wave transmitters located in Stuttgart and in Munich; an additional 50 kw short-wave also operated in Munich. These provided ample coverage of the occupied zone.<sup>4</sup> Depending on atmospheric conditions and interference, reception after sunset was possible throughout and beyond Western Europe.<sup>5</sup>

### **Postwar Programming**

The programming style that had proven successful with wartime GIs changed little during the post-war period. As it had during the war, the American Forces Radio Service (AFRS), based in Los Angeles, continued to supply AFN and other U.S. troop radio stations with both the raw materials for locally produced programs (chiefly musical selections) and with air-ready prerecorded programs on disc. These were generally transcriptions of programs then being

broadcast by the commercial U.S. radio networks, but with an AFRS announcer in lieu of the original advertisements.

Additionally, AFRS produced some of its own information programs for distribution to AFN and other military radio outlets. A large number of programs were also produced by AFN in Germany, generally using materials sent from AFRS. Most often, these were programs of prerecorded music, augmented by a soldier-announcer in the now-familiar disc jockey format. Patterning itself after U.S. commercial broadcasting, AFN evolved a broadcast day that combined some "network time," during which all transmitters broadcast the same program, and some "local option time," during which each studio produced and broadcast programming tailor-made for its own "local" audience.

By August, 1955 (the first year for which detailed data is available), AFN was airing nearly 133 hours per week of programming, or about 19 hours per day: 36% was ready-made programs from AFRS, 43% was network-produced programming, and 22% was produced by the local AFN stations (*Analytic Survey of Broadcast Schedule*, 1955). Popular music was a network staple, but other program types were represented as well. About 53% of airtime was devoted to music, and whereas most of it was classified as popular, over 23 hours per week was devoted to classical and semi-classical music. Another 19% of the program time consisted of news and information, with the remainder of the day made up of drama, variety, sports, and religious programs (*Analytic Survey of Broadcast Schedule*, 1955).

Some of the shows produced in Germany enjoyed special popularity with both GIs and European listeners. *Hillbilly Gasthaus*, a program of what was at that time described as mountain music, drew thousands of letters from German listeners who praised it as a prime example of American folk music, foreshadowing the rise in popularity of American country music in Europe nearly 2 decades later. Other upbeat disc jockey shows with creative titles such as *Luncheon in Munchen* and *Bouncing in Bavaria* also had loyal followings (Burchard, 1950).

Music programs originally heard on American commercial radio and received on disc from AFRS were also popular. Big band shows such as *Fred Waring*, *Woody Herman's Orchestra*, and *Harry James* were complemented by other music styles, such as *Sigmund Romberg*, *Overseas Opera*, and the *New York Philharmonic*.

Another 31 hours per week (16%) of program time were dedicated to variety and dramatic programs. Popular comedies such as *Abbott and Costello*, *Jack Benny*, *Ozzie and Harriet*, and *Charlie McCarthy* were included, as were drama anthologies such as *AFN Playhouse*, *Tales from the Tower*, and *American*

*Radio Theater* (AFN press packet, 1955; *Stars and Stripes*, 1945-1955; U.S. Army, 1947).<sup>6</sup>

AFN sought to provide not only popular entertainment for its audience, but news and information as well. A large staff, many of whom were experienced U.S. civilian journalists, compiled frequent newscasts, both from the American wire services and from AFN's own correspondents. Reporters were dispatched to cover major European events, such as the United Nations Paris Conference of 1948, and transmission lines were leased to allow live daily reports from the scene (McCormick, 1948b).

The network's news professionalism during these years earned it a high reputation among both Americans and Germans. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* called it "one of the best and most well-respected news organizations in all of Europe" ("Wie Objektiv," 1968). *New York Times* columnist Jack Gould (1966) wrote of AFN's reputation among its shadow listeners, calling the network "a voice that Europe trusts" (p. 11). Gould pointed out that the Europeans, skeptical of Cold War propaganda broadcasts, turned to AFN for news because they felt that it would attempt neither "to kid [nor] to lecture the GIs who could instantly detect any hokum inconsistent with what they heard from home" (p. 11).

Gould (1966) was correct in assessing the popularity of the network's news with the shadow audience. The portrayal of AFN as completely objective and uncensored, however, was too generous. Although not under the same pressures as the propaganda services, the political turmoil in postwar Germany gave the network's news operation a high profile. AFN was an arm of the U.S. government, and as such, it was subject to military control and political influence.

This control was promulgated in the "Editorial Policy for the News Service of the American Forces Network," a document submitted to, and approved by, the Chief of Staff of the European Command (EUCOM) in 1948 (McCormick, 1948a). The policy states that "the Department of the Army acts in a manner analogous to that of the board of directors of any responsible news agency in a democratic country," and that the mission of the network is "to provide as complete, accurate and unbiased coverage of general and local news as facilities and equipment permit." However, "interpretive programs" on world events were to be presented only by commentators "whose views support American government policy or are critical in a constructive, non-communist manner." News stories "adversely critical" of the Army or Military Government were permissible, "provided the facts are irrefutable." The network was not to become "a sounding board for German political leaders, particularly those desirous of using its facilities to express criticism of Allied policy in Germany." Also cautioned against was the use of editorials published by newspapers in the Russian zone or other reports "inspired by alien propagandists" who were critical of U.S. policy. The network was not to become overly critical of the Russians

either. Caution was even to be used "in cases where prominent Americans, such as Congressmen or executives, issued statements that border on vituperation against the Soviet Union." If doubts arose about the propriety of a story, the news staff was to seek the approval of EUCOM's Chief of the Public Information Division (McCormick, 1948a).

Pressures on news reporting did not come solely from the military. The Department of State, aware of AFN's large shadow audience, sought what they termed "closer coordination" between the political positions espoused by the State Department through the VOA and those represented on AFN. The Department of the Army agreed to coordination as long as AFN was not under any formal obligation to be guided by State Department policy (Egan, 1950; U.S. Department of State, 1950).

Inevitably, conflicts arose between the military commanders and the network's civilian newsmen. In one 1951 incident that received public attention, an AFN newscaster resigned in protest, accusing the network of suppressing news stories, including coverage of speeches by U.S. political figures that showed domestic disagreement on American foreign policy issues (Raymond, 1951). Nevertheless, public disclosure of such incidents was infrequent, and it does appear that AFN's reputation for objective news remained high among troops and shadow audience listeners.

Sports programming was felt to have an important role in keeping young soldiers in touch with home. Sports news was either included in the regular newscast or presented at a specially reserved time. Big sporting events such as boxing title fights, the baseball World Series and New Year's Day football bowl games were carried live (atmospherics permitting) via AFN's rebroadcast of an AFRS short-wave transmission from the U.S. ("AFN to Air," 1946).

Another 14 hours per week (11%) of AFN's program schedule included what the Army called "I & E" (Information and Education). As with other AFN programming, some of these shows were transcriptions of commercial network programs obtained by AFRS while others were prepared in Germany by AFN staffers themselves. Information programming supplied by AFRS included current events discussions (efforts were made to get such programs to overseas stations within 2 weeks of the original airdate), science documentaries, and historical dramatizations (Wheatley, 1946). AFN-produced programs provided information specific to the European Theater. Such titles as *This is Germany*, *Know Your Army*, *Woman's World*, and *Bookstall* suggest the diversity (AFN Press Packet, 1955).

Information programs were designed to improve the knowledge and morale of soldiers and their families, and content was closely monitored by the Army command. One early program entitled *Life Can Be Rough in the E. T.* (GI

slang for the "European Theater") attempted to use a satiric soap opera style, complete with realistic GI dialogue, to address the enlisted soldiers' occupation-era problems and frustrations, but when the Commanding General of the Third Army objected to some of the portrayals, the civilian in charge of the program was fired and the program was ended (Keyes, 1946). Although censorship incidents were rarely this blatant, military commanders were clearly able to exercise their influence over programming.

A unique aspect of the I & E programming was the use of brief commercial-like announcements scattered throughout programs. Even though many of AFN's shows had been originally produced by the U.S. commercial networks complete with sponsors' messages, all ads were excised by AFRS before the programs were broadcast over troop radio. This practice had begun during the war, when commercials were omitted under the assumption that soldiers in combat zones would think them trite and in poor taste. Later, the need to maintain the network's charity status with program suppliers kept commercials out.

To fill in the sometimes awkward gaps, wartime troop stations began adding their own spots of a noncommercial nature. Promoting everything from prevention of venereal disease to reenlistment, AFN and other troop networks turned the advertising style of U.S. commercial radio into an information tool. Often produced with imagination and humor, the troop information spots proved popular, and by the time of the occupation, they were scattered throughout virtually every program (Kirby & Harris, 1948). Commanders found them an ideal way to dispense information that might not otherwise be attended to and, by using local option time, messages could be tailored to specific geographic areas.

AFN was clearly successful with its primary audience, the U.S. troops. In a 1946 survey of 2,425 enlisted men and 116 officers, 72% said that they listened to the radio each day, and the average listening time was 3 hours. Although other stations (such as the BBC) could be received, most respondents listened only to AFN. Half or more of the enlistees said they listened to AFN's popular music, news, comedy and variety, sports, and western music shows. Less than a third, however, reported listening to the forums and discussions and classical music programs. Nearly 60% said they paid at least some attention to the informational spot announcements and about the same proportion said the spots should be continued. The favorite program was *Spotlight Bands*, presumably a popular music show, followed closely by news (U.S. Army, 1947).

## **Military Radio and the Cold War**

With the end of the war had come U.S. hopes for a new era of peace, prosperity, and global cooperation. By 1947, however, it had become clear that U.S. and Soviet aims in Europe would be difficult to reconcile. A policy of containment emerged "to hold Russia within its present sphere of control, and to fill the 'vacuums' in Europe and Asia left by the war" (Campbell, 1948, p. 3).

One aspect of the evolving Cold War was the heightened level of radio propaganda of both East and West to be heard in Germany. A stepped-up U.S. information campaign was seen as essential "to explain our purposes and to combat the effects of Soviet propaganda throughout the world" (Campbell, 1948, p. 10). This mission received a major boost with the signing of the Smith-Mundt Act in January, 1947, authorizing substantial increases in the U.S. propaganda campaign with VOA to be the principal instrument in the worldwide effort (Campbell, 1949, p. 23.). In this effort, the Germans were to be a major target. A Congressional report pointed out that:

a general feeling of hopelessness exists among the German people, especially concerning their political future. At the present time there is need for prompt denial and correction of the stream of misstatements in the press and radio emanating from Soviet-controlled media both inside and outside of Germany. (U. S. Congress, 1948)

Radio was especially important in the German effort because, although newsprint was scarce, radio receivers were plentiful (McClure and Textor, 1948). In late 1947, then, when OMGUS launched a major anticommunist campaign, it included the addition of more radio facilities to reach the German population (Raymond, 1947). All German-language stations in the American zone were required to carry a VOA broadcast each evening, a practice that continued well into the 1950's (Pilgert, 1953). The VOA tone was "hard-hitting, almost consistently anti-communist," although "this tended to lose certain segments of the audience" (Pirsein, 1979, p. 234).

## **AFN's Shadow Audience**

Although it is difficult to document precisely what effect the Cold War increase in radio propaganda had on German listeners, with its entertainment orientation and straight-news style, AFN soon found it had developed a large shadow audience among the Germans, measured in part by the tremendous volume of fan mail received. By 1954, for example, the network was receiving more than 58,000 pieces of mail a year from West German fans alone (AFN Press Packet, 1955).



This popularity developed despite the fact that the network's programs were always in English. Not all West Germans tuned to AFN, but the language barrier was not as great as it might first appear. Browne (1971) addressed the issue pointing out that one need not speak English to be attracted to AFN's mostly music programming. Additionally, English was widely taught in European schools, and AFN's mail suggested many of the foreign listeners tuned to the network for language practice. Many Germans relied on AFN as an excellent source of straight-forward news, free from the heavy-handed propaganda of both East and West. As one former AFN employee of the era explained it:

Europeans tend to listen to [AFN] with the attitude, "I know that the Voice of America is propaganda trying to sell the United States to me, but AFN is not trying to sell me anything. It is here to entertain the U.S. forces with what they are used to at home. It represents the real United States." (Sheppard, 1956, pp. 44-46)

Despite such perceptions, AFN served as subtle propaganda for the American way of life. The network that was built and operated mainly to entertain and inform American troops became, as Gould (1956) pointed out, "one of the more successful examples of American influence" in Europe:

One of the morals perhaps is that good propaganda may consist of doing the things we enjoy most and hence can do best rather than trying to do less well those things we think others should like . . . . In the ceaseless babble on the international airwaves, it is reassuring to hear one calm voice that speaks naturally no matter who is listening. A layman cannot help but wonder if in the long run this isn't perhaps also the best propaganda. (p. 19)

Large quantities of mail flooded the network each month, and records of the country of origin illustrate the dual nature of the audience. For the year 1954, for example, the network reported receiving nearly 140,000 cards and letters of which only about 38% were from U.S. citizens. Fully 42% were from Germans and another 15% came from the British Isles. Smaller percentages came from other countries, including some from the Eastern bloc. Almost all these listeners were tuning in to the network's medium wave transmitters, because the short-wave operation was short lived and FM was still quite limited. AFN's popularity was such that the network's daily program schedule was printed in some 80 European periodicals (AFN Press Packet, 1955).

Because AFN made no systematic attempt to measure its shadow audience, however, estimates about the numbers of European listeners are little more than guesses. Several approximations were published in the years after the occupation, but these vary widely: from 10 million (U.S. Congress, 1962) to 30 million ("GEMA [German ASCAP] Puts Bite," 1958) to 50 million ("Soldier

Network," 1963) to "well over 50 million" (Anderson, 1960). One explanation for such a wide range is in the ill-defined term "listener." None of these sources explained how long or how often one would have to tune in to be a listener. Another difficulty is that some estimates were for the West German audience alone, whereas others were for all of Europe.

A more recent and reliable approximation of listenership is found in a 1964 U.S. Information Agency (USIA) survey report. The survey, based on interviews with a random sample of about 1,200 West Germans, showed that 2% listened to AFN at least once per week, and another 3% reported listening, but less often than once per week. Generalizing to the West German population of 58 million in that year yields about one million West Germans who listened at least once per week. The survey also discovered about equal numbers of West Germans listening to the Voice of America and the BBC (U.S. Information Agency, 1964, pp. 1-6).

The rise of television and an increase in the number of other radio stations on the air eroded AFN's shadow audience over the years. The one million regular listeners per week in 1964 undoubtedly represented a decline from the early postwar period. Even the most conservative estimate, though, shows that AFN's German shadow audience has always been much larger than its primary audience of American troops and their families.

AFN's marked avoidance of programming to its shadow audience was a matter of carefully considered policy. Military regulations had even been established prohibiting the network and other AFRS outlets around the world from programming for any but U.S. troops; foreign language broadcasting was specifically forbidden. There were (and remain today) two major reasons for this. First, control of AFN remained in the hands of the Army troop commanders who saw the service strictly as a morale and information tool for the benefit of the military. They jealously guarded the network from any attempts by other government agencies, such as the State Department, to use AFN for overt propaganda. Such attempts, they feared, would only result in the alienation of the soldier audience, with a consequential loss of the network's power as an information tool (U.S. Congress, 1962, p. 23).

Second, AFN was supplied programs and music discs by the U.S.-based Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS), which received them through contracts with stateside program suppliers. The U.S. entertainment guilds and unions had agreed to waive their customary fees and residuals on program materials, resulting in almost cost-free access to virtually every record and radio program produced in the U.S. This policy had been established during the war on the understanding that the programs were intended for troops only. Any indication that AFN was programming for a different audience would endanger this arrangement (U.S. Congress, 1962, p. 20).

On the other hand, the U.S. music industry benefited greatly from the arrangement, for AFN became instrumental in introducing and promoting American pop music in postwar Europe. Just how much impact the network had can be gauged by several articles appearing in the trade press during the postwar era. Heralding a 1946 "world disc boom," *Daily Variety* said AFN outlets were "largely responsible" for an international increase in demands for U.S. records ("World Disc Boom," 1946).

The British music publication *The Melody Maker and Rhythm* carried a 1950 feature on AFN's Mark White, host of a late night jazz and pop request show from Munich that was a trendsetter throughout Western Europe. Commenting to its readers that White's voice was "as familiar as the Greenwich Time Signal," the article detailed the program's popularity including White's receipt of 1,500 letters a week from around Europe (Henney, 1950, p. 3.).

A 1956 article in *Variety* commented that, "It's no exaggeration to say that the AFN stations are mostly to blame for the Germans' strong predilection for American music"; it argued this popularity was "based on the truly excellent variety of music these stations are able to offer" ("East Germans Flip," 1956, p. 18). It further speculated that the heavy listenership of East Germans to AFN Berlin was responsible for an increase in Anglo-American popular music on the East Germans' own stations.

Claiming "50 mil[lion] Europeans can't be wrong," Anderson (1960) detailed the network's 17-year history. Anderson pointed out that, "It is AFN's tremendous European audience that is credited with creating the trans-Atlantic market for American music. There is scant doubt on this score" (p. 1). In fact, the network's influence had grown to the point that a major German trade publication was printing a list of current hits compiled by AFN disc jockeys.

## Conclusion

The AFN of post-war Germany was very successful with U.S. troops. As the heyday of network radio was coming to a close in the U. S., its life was extended in Germany where, for most troops, GI television would be decades away. And, as with radio at home, AFN became an important part of the lives of the U.S. forces and their families.

For the shadow audience of Germans, AFN provided a welcome alternative to the pervasive postwar radio propaganda. By late 1952, propaganda expert Ralph White (1953) was writing about "The New Resistance to International Propaganda." Pointing out that "the world is more and more tired of 'propaganda,'" White suggested that "the way into the heart of the skeptical neutralist lies not through artifice but through candor" (p. 540).

White's (1953) point helps explain AFN's popularity with the German audience during the Cold War era. The network hardly fit the mold of a traditional international broadcasting service. It scrupulously avoided programming to European audiences, it broadcast only in English, and it devoted the largest portion of its program time to popular entertainment. When it did air newscasts and discussion programs, the programs were compiled from commercial U.S. sources and, despite a control over news and information that most U.S. civilian journalists would find objectionable, AFN discussed the political and social problems of the U.S. in a relatively open way, especially when compared with the other available radio services. Yet it was just these characteristics that provided what Sheppard (1956) called "unconscious propaganda" (p. 46); that is, AFN, without intent, displayed to its shadow audience what many found to be a positive and appealing image of the U.S.

Although the network did not deliberately aim its programming at the German audience, neither were U.S. authorities unconscious of its power. In a secret 1948 message to the State Department, OMGUS commander General Lucius Clay argued that AFN was an important voice in counteracting Soviet propaganda, and that it "probably has the greatest number of listeners of any program or programs broadcasted on the continent of Europe" (U.S. Department of State, 1948, p. 1).

In the years following V-E day, Americana flooded Germany, and especially the U.S. Zone of Occupation. Movies, music, and magazines as well as personal contact with GIs left an American cultural legacy. The "real America" portrayed on American media, both in the U.S. and in Germany, was an upbeat land of plenty where capitalism and hard work paid off for everyone; these are the same American myths that are perpetuated worldwide today in U.S. television fare. By providing what Sandford (1976) has described as "the tantalising glimpses of an affluent and swaggeringly self-confident life style" (p. 94), AFN successfully promoted American culture, and in so doing promoted American ideology.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Other locally oriented U.S. military broadcasting facilities are located in Southern Europe and at other locations around the world. There is also a U.S.-based short-wave service (Craig, 1986).

<sup>2</sup> The network's television transmissions, however, are of very low power and signals are not generally receivable by European viewers. Even those who can receive the signals must cope with the fact that AFN television uses U.S. rather than European standards for lines and color, making proper reception impossible on a standard European television receiver (Craig, 1986, p. 37).

<sup>3</sup> For a fuller discussion of AFN's current organization, facilities, and programming, see Craig (1986).

<sup>4</sup> For the most complete description of AFN until the end of 1945, see Delay (1951). For a description of later facilities see U.S. Congress, (1962). Also of assistance are materials in the American Forces Network Press Packet (1955).

<sup>5</sup> The short-wave audience was worldwide, with reported reception as far away as Palestine, India, Australia, and the U.S. (see *Reception Report*, 1947). By 1951, however, the Munich short-wave transmitter had been turned over to VOA, but a second, low powered, short-wave transmitter was operated by AFN Frankfurt until sometime after 1955 (see AFN Press Packet, 1955). Military broadcasting facilities were established by other countries as well. The most influential of these was the British Forces Network (BFN), later to become the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS). Operating originally from Hamburg with a captured German transmitter, BFN could be heard "all over Europe" (Taylor, 1983, pp. 40-41). Later budget cuts and frequency allocation problems led to the 1956 conversion to an all-FM (VHF) operation with a much-reduced range (Taylor, 1983, p. 97, 100).

<sup>6</sup> These titles represent programs aired at various times during the 10-year period 1945-1955. They were not all aired concurrently.

## References

- AFN to air Louis-Conn bout. (1946, June 19). *Stars and Stripes* (Altdorf ed.), p. 1. [During and immediately after the war, the *Stars and Stripes* published editions in several European locations. Later, only a single European edition was published. The articles cited herein were published in either the Altdorf, Germany, edition or the European edition as noted.]
- American Forces Network Europe Press Packet. (1955). Mimeographed documents, many untitled. [The press packet was prepared by AFN in 1955 and evidently distributed as a press information packet. These documents were obtained by a West German colleague, Denise Ferchow, from the archives of the *Frankfurter Neue Presse*. Refer to author for access.]
- Analytic survey of broadcast schedule. AFN. Week 27 February- 5 March 1955.* (1955, August 1). In American Forces Network Europe Press Packet.
- Anderson, O. (1960, July). 50 mil Europeans can't be wrong. *Billboard*, pp. 1, 46.
- Barnouw, E. (1968). *The golden web: A history of broadcasting in the United States, volume II--1933 to 1953*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bayless, O. (1968). The American Forces Network-Europe. *Journal of Broadcasting*, 12, 161-167.
- Briggs, A. (1970). *The war of words: The history of broadcasting in the United Kingdom, vol. III*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Browne, D. R. (1971). The world in the Pentagon's shadow. *Educational Broadcasting Review*, 5, 31-48.
- Burchard, A. (1950, July 3). AFN ends 7th year as stations multiply. *Stars and Stripes* (European. ed.), p. 4.
- Campbell, J. (1948). *The United States in world affairs: 1947-1948*. New York: Harper.
- Campbell, J. (1949). *The United States in world affairs: 1948-1949*. New York: Harper.
- Craig, R.S. (1986). The American Forces Network, Europe: A case study in military broadcasting. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 30, 33-46.

- Delay, T.S., Jr. (1951) A historical study of the Armed Forces Radio Service to 1946 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1951). *Dissertation Abstracts International*, W1951, 239.
- East Germans flip over U.S. music in AFN-Berlin coup. (1956, May 2). *Variety*, pp. 1, 18.
- Egan, W. (1950, August 17). *Closer coordination between Voice of America programs and American Forces Network programs*. Message 515 from Chief, Information Services Division, Office of Public Affairs, High Commissioner for Germany, to Department of State. National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, Record Group 59, Box 2552, Decimal File 511.62A, 1950.
- Fact sheet-American Forces Network Europe. (1984). Unpublished publicity release supplied by Headquarters, AFN, Bertramstrasse 6, D-6000, Frankfurt (Main), Federal Republic of Germany. [Consult author for access.]
- GEMA (German ASCAP) puts bite on Armed Forces Network for royalties. (1958, September 10). *Variety*, p. 135.
- Gould, J. Two voices. (1956, February 5). *New York Times*, sec. 2, p. 11.
- Gould, J. A voice that Europe trusts. (1966, April 17). *New York Times*, sec. 2, p. 19.
- Henney, J. (1950, January 14). AFN has plans afoot to boost British jazz. . *Melody Maker and Rhythm*, p. 3.
- Keyes, G. (1946, May 29). *AFN radio program Life Can be Rough in the E.T.* . Memorandum from Commanding General, Third Army, to Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater (with endorsements). National Archives, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 332: European Theater of Operations, Adjutant General, Decimal File 000.77, Vol. I, 1946.
- Kirby, E.M. & Harris, J.W. (1948). *Star-spangled radio*. Chicago: Ziff-Davis.
- McClure, R. A. and Textor, G.E. (June, 1948). Rebuilding Germany's information media. *The Army Information Digest*, 3, 10-15.
- McCormick, O. (1948a, May 21). *Editorial policy for the news service of the American Forces Network*. Memorandum from Chief, Troop Information & Education Division, to Chief of Staff, European Command. National

- Archives, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 338 European Command (EUCOM) Chief of Staff Decimal File 000.77 Vol. I, 1948.
- McCormick, O. (1948b, September 7). *Direct news broadcast of the United Nations Paris Conference*. Memorandum from Chief, Troop Information & Education Division, to Chief of Staff, European Command. National Archives, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 338: European Command (EUCOM), Chief of Staff, Decimal File 000.77, Vol. I, 1948.
- Pilgert, H. (1953). *Press, radio and film in West Germany: 1945-1953*. Bad Godesberg-Mehlem, West Germany: Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.
- Pirsein, R.W. (1979). *The Voice of America: A history of the international broadcasting activities of the United States Government: 1940-1962*. New York: Arno
- Raymond, J. (1947, December 28). Soviet zone held to bar free talk. *New York Times*, p. 7.
- Raymond, J. (1951, January 30). Europe radio gag laid to U.S. Army. *New York Times*, p. 9.
- Reception report on AFN short-wave, December, 1947*. (1947). National Archives, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 338: European Command, Chief of Staff. Decimal File 000.77 Vol. I, 1947.
- Sandford, J. (1976). *The mass media of the German-speaking countries*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Sheppard, W. (1956, October 13). AFN at work. *Saturday Review*, pp. 44-46.
- Soldier network (AFN) marks 20th anni; now has 50,000,000 listeners. (1963, July 24). *Variety*, pp. 2, 61.
- Stars and Stripes*. (1945-1955). European editions. [U.S. Army newspaper published daily and weekly AFN program schedules].
- Taylor, D. (1983). *A microphone and a frequency: forty years of forces broadcasting*. London: Heinemann.
- U.S. Army, Headquarters, United States Forces European Theater, Information and Education Service, Research Section. (1947, January). *What the American soldier says about American Forces Network in Germany* (Attitude Research Report No. E-4-86). National Archives, Modern Military



- Branch, Record Group 338: European Command (EUCOM), Secretary to the General Staff, Decimal File 000.77/1, Vol. I, 1947.
- U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (1948). *The United States Information Service in Europe* (80th Congress, Senate Report No. 855). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Special Government Information Subcommittee (1962). *Overseas Military Information Programs* (87th Congress, House Report No. 1549). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- U.S. Department of State (signed Murphy). (1948, August 4). Incoming Telegram 1925 (from Berlin) to Secretary of State. National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, Record Group 59, Box 2667, Decimal File 576.Copenhagen/8-448.
- U.S. Department of State (signed Acheson). (1950, August 11). Airgram A-433 to High Commissioner for Germany. National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, Record Group 59, Box 2552, Decimal File 511.62A, 1950.
- U.S. Information Agency. (1964). *Listening to foreign broadcasts in six countries of western Europe* (Research Report No. R-224-64). Washington, DC: Author.
- Wheatley, J. P. (1946, June). Radio Platters -- Troop Information Tools, *Army Information Digest*, 1 (2), pp. 24-28.
- White, R.K. (1953). The new resistance to international propaganda. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 16 (4), pp. 539-551. Reprinted in *International propaganda/ communications: selections from the Public Opinion Quarterly*. (1972). New York: Arno.
- Wie objektiv darf der Soldatensender AFN berichten? [How objectively is AFN allowed to report?] (1968, January 10). *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Local ed.). [Consult author for access]
- World disc boom. (1946, January 11). *Daily Variety*, p.1.
- Ziemke, E. (1975). *The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany: 1944-1946* (Army Historical Series). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Zink, H. (1957). *The United States in Germany: 1944-1955*. New York: Van Nostrand.