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MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL

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Front Lines and Deadlines

PERSPECTIVES ON WAR REPORTING

Harold M. Evans, Tad Bartimus, Edith M. Lederer, Jacqueline E. Sharkey on the long view ❖ **George C. Wilson, James Kitfield, Jane Kirtley, Robert Sims, Peter S. Prichard, Patrick J. Sloyan, Derald Everhart** on the pen and the sword ❖ **Tom Gjelten, Judy Woodruff** on right and wrong **Timothy J. Kenny, Donatella Lorch, Gary Knight, Susan Moeller** on the price paid

THE FREEDOM FORUM

MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL

Front Lines and Deadlines

PERSPECTIVES ON WAR REPORTING

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for scholars, journalists and informed commentators to discuss topical themes
of enduring importance to the mass media and the public.

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COVER PHOTO: Israeli soldiers during riot on West Bank, Sept. 30, 2000
(SHARON ABBADY/BLACK STAR)

The Freedom Forum, based in Arlington, Va., is a nonpartisan, international foundation dedicated to free press, free speech and free spirit for all people. The foundation focuses on four main priorities: the Newseum, First Amendment issues, newsroom diversity and world press freedom.

The Freedom Forum funds two independent affiliates — the Newseum, the interactive museum of news in Arlington; and the First Amendment Center, with offices at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn., and in New York City and Arlington. Other operating offices are in Buenos Aires, Hong Kong, Johannesburg, London and Cocoa Beach, Fla.

The Freedom Forum was established in 1991 under the direction of Founder Allen H. Neuharth as successor to a foundation started in 1935 by newspaper publisher Frank E. Gannett. The Freedom Forum is not affiliated with Gannett Co., does not solicit or accept financial contributions, and does not accept unsolicited funding requests. Its work is supported by income from an endowment now worth about $1 billion in diversified assets.

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Front Lines and Deadlines
PERSPECTIVES ON WAR REPORTING

Marguerite Higgins gave up bathrooms for it. Floyd Gibbons lost an eye because of it.

Chris Morris drove through a hail of bullets for it.

Robert Capa, Dickey Chapelle and many others died for it.

It is war reporting, the most challenging assignment a journalist can ever have. Those correspondents understood that war has all the ingredients that make great stories—drama, intrigue, suffering, glory, defeat, life, death. From heroism in battle to the mundane daily routines of soldiering, readers hang on every word when their country is engaged in conflict.

The Newseum in Arlington, Va., is examining war reporting with its May-November 2001 exhibit, "War Stories." The exhibit takes visitors to the front lines through accounts of the lives of the men and women who have reported some of the epic events of history.

The "War Stories" exhibit inspired—and provided material for—this issue of *Media Studies Journal,* "Front Lines and Deadlines: Perspectives on War Reporting." The essays explore such topics as censorship, secrecy, media-military relations and the risks many journalists take in combat zones.

In "the long view," writers look at historical aspects of war reporting. Journalist and author Harold M. Evans, who was guest curator for the "War Stories" exhibit, outlines the accomplishments and personalities of famous and not-so-famous war correspondents. Columnist Tad Bartimus documents women's struggles to break into the ranks of combat reporters. Edith M. Lederer of The Associated Press reflects on how war reporting has changed from Vietnam to today. Journalism professor Jacqueline E. Sharkey reveals how military censorship has affected war reporting.

"The Pen and the Sword" covers the often contentious but mutually beneficial relationship between the news media and the military. Defense correspondent George C. Wilson has good news and bad news: The relationship has not gotten worse, but neither has it improved. Journalist Frank Aukofer notes that the reaction to his 1995 media-military report, "America's Team: The Odd Couple," came overwhelmingly from the military; the news media were largely indifferent. *National Journal*'s James Kitfield offers lessons drawn from media and military missteps during the war in Kosovo. Journalism professor and First Amendment expert Jane Kirtley urges journalists to fight the military's insistence on wartime secrecy, while former assistant sec-

retary of defense for public affairs Robert Sims argues that the media must respect the need for secrecy or face even greater coverage restrictions. Former *USA TODAY* editor Peter S. Prichard notes that fewer and fewer journalists have previous military service and speculates about how this may affect coverage. *Newsday* reporter Patrick J. Sloyan criticizes military leaders who "shredded" the First Amendment by restricting coverage of the Persian Gulf War. Editor Derald Everhart explains the unique challenges faced by *The Stars and Stripes* as it strives to cover the military for the military.

In "Right and Wrong," two essayists look at ethical issues for war correspondents. National Public Radio's Tom Gjelten helps reporters strike a balance between the need for journalistic objectivity and the urge to take moral action "in the face of evil." Gjelten also offers some rules for reporters covering today's more complicated confrontations. CNN's Judy C. Woodruff urges more and better coverage of international conflicts, even when U.S. interests are not readily apparent.

Writers in "The Price Paid" examine the professional and personal costs of reporting from the front lines. The Newseum's Timothy J. Kenny salutes journalists who have died covering war. *Newsweek*'s Donatella Lorch reveals her personal struggles after covering violence in Africa. Photographer Gary Knight explains the special dangers photojournalists face in capturing images of war. Author and professor Susan Moeller warns that the public can easily become inured to graphic images of wartime atrocities.

The concluding essay by Jerry W. Friedheim, whose career has included stops on either side, reviews some of the literature on the media-military relationship.

For the "War Stories" exhibit, Newseum staff interviewed dozens of battle-tested journalists. "In Their Own Words" features edited excerpts from interviews with Peter Arnett, Frank Bolden, Walter Cronkite, Ed Bradley and Janine di Giovanni.

This issue also features original reporting from some legends of journalism. Pieces from Ernie Pyle, James Creelman, David Halberstam and Relma Morin remind us what great war reportage is all about.

We would like to thank the Newseum staff for providing guidance, materials, resources and assistance with this issue.

— THE EDITORS

UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES, TUFTS UNIVERSITY

Edward R. Murrow, center, interviews U.S. Army Air Forces personnel during World War II.

THE LONG VIEW

Whoever the chronicler, we have an eternal and compelling curiosity about war—wars in which our own survival is at stake and wars long past.

— HAROLD M. EVANS

Harold M. Evans on the war correspondent

Tad Bartimus on women covering wars

Edith M. Lederer on how covering conflict has changed

Jacqueline E. Sharkey on military censorship

NATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL ARCHIVES, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

The Battle of Little Bighorn, 1876, as drawn by Red Horse

The Combat Correspondent

A look at war reporting, from Caesar's commentaries to cell phones

Harold M. Evans

History turned on the invasion's success, but the scene on the beach was desperate. The ships could not get close enough to put the soldiers ashore. Hands full and weighed down by the heavy burden of their weapons, the soldiers had to simultaneously jump from the ships, get a footing in chest-deep waves and fight the enemy who, standing unencumbered on dry and familiar ground, could so easily kill and maim the invaders.

The war correspondent reporting the scene in those terms observed: "These perils frightened our soldiers, who were quite unaccustomed to battles of this kind, with the result that they did not show the same alacrity and enthusiasm as they usually did on dry land."

The candor may strike an odd note. In the mythology of war, our men are never beset by elemental fear, still less paralyzed by it. The lexicon of defeat, if admitted, is of gallant retreats against overwhelming odds. But the war correspondent writing the story of the battle on that beach was uninhibited. He faced none of the frustrations and

dilemmas of the modern war correspondent because he took part in the battle himself, as the commanding general of the invasion of Britain in the year 55 B.C.

Julius Caesar is one of a very long line of soldiers who reported their own campaigns firsthand. Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* was informed by his experience in command of the Greek fleet at Thasos in 424 B.C. and his defeat by the Spartan general Brasidas. The professional, independent war correspondent—the unarmed civilian whose pen is supposed to be mightier than the sword—does not arrive on the scene until the Crimean War (1853-55) in the persons of William "Billy" Howard Russell of *The Times* of London, Edwin Lawrence Godkin of the *London Daily News* and G.L. Gruneisen of the *Morning Post* in London. So it is as well to acknowledge that, from time immemorial, "amateurs" have satisfied our perennial appetite for news of war—in oral history, in poem and song, in legend and myth, in drawing and painting and tapestry.

We know how English axmen cut down the Norman armored knights at the Battle of Hastings in 1066, and how King Harold died on Senlac Hill with an arrow in his eye, because it is all recorded on the Bayeux Tapestry. Mark Kellogg, a Western freelance newspaper reporter, set out to tell us what happened on the morning of June 26, 1876, on a hill at Little Bighorn in Montana. "By the time this reaches you we will have met and fought the red devils with what result remains to be seen," he wrote from Rosebud Creek the day before. "I go with [Lt. Col. George] Custer and will be at the death." And indeed he did die with the dashing officer who had disobeyed orders and allowed the reporter to ride along with the 7th Cavalry. Our idea of how every man with Custer perished comes from individual oral accounts retold by Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, father to son to grandson, vividly supplemented by 41 pictographs drawn by Red Horse, a Miniconjou Lakota chief at the battle.

Harold M. Evans is an editor and author of *The American Century* who served as guest curator for the "War Stories" exhibit at the Newseum in Arlington, Va.

Whoever the chronicler, we have an eternal and compelling curiosity about war—wars in which our own survival is at stake and wars long past. So much heroism; so much folly; so many brilliant moves; so many blunders; so many might-have-beens. In a current conflict we fret about loved ones, but in all war reports we share vicariously in the terrible excitement of combat. We exult in victories, but we want to know whether the cause is just, the means proportionate to the end, and the execution honorable. We relish front-line drama, but we expect to be advised if a decent patriotism is exploited. Do the Viet Cong represent a nationalist rebellion or international communist aggression? Do we really have vital national interests in sending 500,000 U.S. troops into battle to eject Iraq from Kuwait? The arguments go on long after the battlefield has been cleared of its dead.

For the modern war correspondent, the imponderables are more numerous and the canvas broader than it was for battle participants like Caesar. Those soldier-reporters were more exposed to risk than the professional correspondent, but in reporting they

had a simpler task. They had access, by definition. They were their own censors. They had no worry that their messages and histories would inadvertently cost lives because communication was so slow and restricted. They could take their time in reporting, they had no competition, and their eyewitness accounts were idiosyncratic.

IN MY VIEW, THE BIRTH and maturation of the unarmed professional war correspondent had four midwives: Democracy. Timeliness. Scale. Speed.

Democracy, nurtured by nearly universal suffrage and popular education, meant governments increasingly had to justify the blood, tears, toil and sweat of going to war. The advent of total war widened those risks beyond the combatants to every man, woman and child in the nation. Newspapers naturally played on the notion that only independent reporting would satisfy the popular appetite. That war stories sold more newspapers than anything else only demonstrates that high-mindedness and commercial gain are not always in conflict. Governments, for their part, became willing to give reporters battlefield access because they presumed the journalists would wave the flag.

Timeliness, the second midwife, first was recognized by *The Times* of London. The newspaper abandoned the traditional practice of relying on letters from junior officers at the battlefront when its readers clamored to know what was happening day by day in the Crimean peninsula where England, with France and the Ottoman Turks, was fighting the Russians. Lt. Charles Naysmith of the East India Company's Bombay Artillery covered the fighting for *The Times*, but he was thought to have no sense of urgency; perhaps his first priority was staying alive. The frustrated *Times* manager rebuked the foreign editor: "I wish you would impress upon Naysmith with all your eloquence the absolute necessity of writing as often as he can and sending letters without delay." The letters took more than a week to arrive anyway, coming by horse and steamer. The appointment of a stocky Irishman, William Howard Russell, was the trailblazing result, and the term "war correspondent" was apt because *Times* editor John Delane had Russell write him letters.

From time immemorial, "amateurs" have satisfied our perennial appetite for news of war.

Scale became the third midwife as bigger, longer and more far-flung wars required more trained observers and better coordination of their efforts.

Speed cut communication time, in turn increasing competition among publishers and editors for reporters who were cunning in the means of transmission and the evasion of bureaucracy. Curiously, in the 21st century, communication is so transformed that we are at the dawn of a new era where the war correspondent yields ground to the ordinary citizen. Today, people may speak directly to others by e-mail and the Internet, reporting their own experiences—unfiltered by journalist, editor or censor.

During the 1999 Kosovo war, a Web site organized by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting attracted contributions from ordinary citizens. Later, when NATO occupied Kosovo, the same nonpartisan Web site

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Ernie Pyle, center, with enlisted men, Anzio, Italy, 1944

was open to Serbs, reporting attacks on them by returning Kosovars. Such Web-site and e-mail reports might enrich war coverage, but their openness also means they can be easily manipulated. I don't believe they will ever supplant the professional correspondent and the authority of a recognized news organization in the way the reporter supplanted the literate soldier.

PROFESSIONAL COVERAGE REALLY exploded with the U.S. Civil War. As in all things, America went for mass production. Southern newspapers still relied heavily on telegrams and letters from serving officers, but at least 500 reporters covered the war for the North—after a fashion. Phillip Knightley, author of a history of war reporting, *The First Casualty*, pinned these adjectives on the reporters' chests: ignorant, dishonest, unethical, inaccurate, partisan and inflammatory.

The nonprofessionals' record was better. In the Napoleonic Wars, soldiers and sailors penned brilliant firsthand accounts of the battles of Trafalgar and Waterloo. Caesar had as good an eye for a story as any tabloid reporter. And thus the scene at Omaha Beach on D-Day is eerily reminiscent of his account of the Roman landing in 55 B.C. At Normandy 2,000 years later, men carrying 66 pounds of equipment had to jump into water that not only was deep but laced with booby traps and mines; many drowned. Those who made it to the beach—mostly to the wrong sectors, for which they had not

been trained—curled up in the sand behind the seawall, pinned down by intense machine-gun, rifle, mortar and artillery fire from the sheer cliffs above. Gen. Omar Bradley's beachhead, like Caesar's, would have been lost but for inspired leadership. "Get the hell off this damn beach and go kill some Germans," screamed Col. Charles Canham at an officer taking refuge in a pillbox. "Get your ass out of there and show some leadership."

We owe such scenes to postwar writers who attempted to reconstruct Omaha Beach. At the time, the reality of the landing, its full horror, its blunders and the awesome nature of its heroism, did not come through. There were 558 accredited print and radio correspondents for the five Normandy beaches, but the arena was vast and chaotic. The reporters were restricted by censorship as well as by German soldiers doing their damnedest to nail anything that moved. Censors went on the beaches with the reporters, checking that none of them wrote or radioed dispatches that would help the enemy or dismay people at home.

The correspondents filed 700,000 words on the first day. Radio transmitted into living rooms the sound of gunfire and men's cheers and ships' whistles and planes' engines. The reports were all very exciting, but they did not encourage readers and listeners to imagine men in a funk. Nor did they report that infantry landed with weapons inferior to the Germans' in every category except artillery, or that the U.S. Navy launched assault craft so far out that most of the amphibious tanks and guns were swamped and sank in heavy seas, or that among the 2,500 Americans dead at the end of the first day were 40 percent of the combat engineers. The much-loved Ernie Pyle, who footslogged with the grunts in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France and the Pacific, was laconic: "Our men were pinned down for a while, but finally they stood up and went through, and so we took that beach and accomplished our landing."

Web-site and e-mail reports might enrich war coverage, but their openness also means they can be easily manipulated.

The cryptic reticence is explicable, but historian Max Hastings' 1984 reconstruction of D-Day well summed up the consequence of the landing's coverage at the time: "Few Europeans and Americans of the postwar generation have grasped just how intense were the early [Normandy] battles."

The folk memory is of an effort of fearless superiority. Steven Spielberg's epic film, "Saving Private Ryan," finally did something to redress this notion. His portrayal of the landings is impressionistic, but it is a masterpiece of cinematic art. It evokes the ordeal of the men on the beach, making their achievement all the more memorable. "Saving Private Ryan" is very like Stephen Crane's "The Red Badge of Courage." Spielberg was unconcerned with the larger picture or the logistics—with the essential pith of war reporting—just as Crane was unconcerned with "Stonewall" Jackson's tactics in the woods at Chancellorsville where his soldier-coward had his epiphany.

Works of such artistic imagination give us a sense of the emotions and chaos of the

battlefield. They answer the questions Walt Whitman posed so poetically:

> *What history, I say, can ever give – for who can know – the mad, determin'd tussle of the armies, in all their separate large and small squads – as this – each steep'd from crown to toe in desperate, mortal purports? Who know the conflict, hand-to-hand – the many conflicts in the dark, those shadowy-tangled, flashing moon beam'd woods – the writhing groups and squads – the cries, the din, the cracking guns and pistols – the distant cannon – the cheers and calls and threats and awful music of the oaths – the indescribable mix – the officers' orders, persuasions, encouragements – the devils fully roused in human hearts – the strong shout,* Charge, men charge – *the flash of naked sword, and rolling flame and smoke?*

Those who answer Whitman's cry today find themselves caught up in an environment where rocket-propelled grenades have replaced swords, and cell phones have replaced telexes. It's a new world for war correspondents, as we shall see in the pages ahead—one in which new rules and new technology often clash with past conventions and ideals.

This essay is adapted from "War Stories" by Harold M. Evans,

CULIVER PICTURES

Photographer Margaret Bourke-White, 1945

BULLETS AND BATHROOMS

Women had to contend with sexism in the military to win recognition as war correspondents.

TAD BARTIMUS

IT WAS ALWAYS THE BATHROOM thing.

Women, the men said, couldn't go to war because there was no proper place for them to relieve themselves discreetly. That was The Big Excuse.

Photographer Georgette "Dickey" Chapelle heard it in 1941 and replied, "I'm sure the 14th Infantry has solved much tougher problems than that."

Reporter Marguerite Higgins heard it in 1951 and shot back, "There is no shortage of bushes in Korea."

Correspondent Gloria Emerson heard it in Vietnam and wrote, "Women reporters who go into the field make professional Army officers nervous, for these men must immediately explain that no, repeat, no toilets exist for us."

Women covering wars don't worry about such things. Female journalists, like their male counterparts, worry about getting the

facts right, getting the story out, beating the competition and surviving to tell another tale. We are resourceful or we wouldn't be in this business. We don't march in ideological lockstep. We don't want extra attention. We expect to carry our own gear and to pull our own weight. Many of us do not believe women bring any special gifts to the job, although gender unquestionably offers different perspectives and can be both a help and a hindrance, depending on the circumstance.

The influx of women into journalism in the last half-century has helped to dispel some of the patronizing sexism and overprotection that prevented many qualified females from photographing and reporting on previous wars.

Women editors who've worked their way up from street reporting now routinely send women to cover everything. It's commonplace to see front-page bylines and nightly news stand-ups from women reporting from Kosovo, Chechnya, the Middle East and a dozen other hot spots around the globe.

When CNN's Christiane Amanpour became the first female superstar of televised combat during the Persian Gulf War, she kicked over the last barrier between women journalists and the front lines. There she was, with the whole world watching—smart, brave, competent, doing her job in a professional manner.

A HUNDRED YEARS AGO WAR REPORTing was almost exclusively a male profession. Men were the fighters, after all. The few literary exceptions included Greek poetess Sappho's version of the Trojan War in the sixth century B.C. and Margaret Fuller's first-person account of the French bombardment of Rome in 1849 for the *New York Tribune*. By 1900 the U.S. Census recorded only 2,193 women among 30,098 full-time journalists. An ambitious, idealistic girl who wanted a reporting adventure, especially on the front lines, had few role models.

Tad Bartimus writes the nationally syndicated column "Among Friends," distributed by United Feature Syndicate. She was a correspondent for The Associated Press in Vietnam from 1973-74 and also covered conflicts in Northern Ireland and Latin America.

Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, for the sheer force of her honest prose, became one. Severely injured near Reims in October 1918 when a companion picked up an unexploded grenade, Sergeant wrote:

A stunning report, a blinding flash, and I am precipitated down the bank, hearing, it seems, as I go the Lieutenant's shriek of horror: 'My arm, my arm has been carried away!' …

I become an impotent, aching creature, full of unpleasant holes, lost in a corner of devastated France infinitely remote from every one I care for. …

The surgeon is bending over my wounds now, shaking his head. …

I am getting ether in large quantities. Sensation of vibration—of waves beating, and through it voices very clear:

Who is she?

A journalist.

The Spanish Civil War was a crucible for some of the most eloquent women writers of a generation. Playwright Lillian Hellman made radio broadcasts urging U.S. support for the Republicans. Free-lancer Frances

Davis sent a "mail column" to small newspapers back home and eventually wrote her way into a full-time job with the London *Daily Mail* covering Gen. Francisco Franco's victory. But Martha Gellhorn's reporting of the Spanish Civil War for *Collier*'s magazine set the standard for narrative front-line journalism for years to come:

> *At first the shells went over: you could hear the thud as they left the Fascists' guns, a sort of groaning cough; then you heard them fluttering toward you. As they came closer the sound went faster and straighter and sharper and then, very fast, you heard the great booming noise when they hit. ... An old woman, with a shawl over her shoulders, holding a terrified thin little boy by the hand, runs out into the square. You know what she is thinking: she is thinking she must get the child home, you are always safer in your own place, with the things you know. … She is in the middle of the square when the next one comes. A small piece of twisted steel, hot and very sharp, sprays off from the shell; it takes the little boy in the throat. The old woman stands there, holding the hand of the dead child, looking at him stupidly, not saying anything. … At their left, at the side of the square, is a huge brilliant sign which says: Get out of Madrid."*

Gellhorn met Ernest Hemingway in Spain and they married in 1940. Their union lasted just five years; her front-line reporting continued for another 50 and is collected in the book, *The Face of War.* Hemingway married another war correspondent, Mary Welsh, who gave up her career in 1946 to please him.

Like Gellhorn and Welsh (hired by London newspaper magnate Lord Beaverbrook to report for his *Daily Express*), some renowned women correspondents were linked to famous men, and that reflected glory initially added to their cachet. But most women war correspondents earned their stellar careers by putting work ahead of romance, and many stayed single or were divorced. Syndicated columnist Dorothy Thompson was writer Sinclair Lewis' wife from 1928 until 1942. *Life* magazine photographer Margaret Bourke-White was married to writer Erskine Caldwell, but they parted during World War II.

Some renowned women correspondents were linked to famous men, and that reflected glory initially added to their cachet.

Shelley Smith married *Life* photographer Carl Mydans, and together they became the magazine's first roving correspondent team, first in Europe in 1939 and then in China the following year. They were interned by the Japanese in Manila, then Shanghai, until they were repatriated in 1943 and returned to Europe. Theirs was a rare marriage that endured.

THE CONFLICT DESCRIBED BY ONE historian as the "largest single event in human history" provided plenty of opportunity for ambitious women reporters and photographers to find great stories and make their careers.

Bourke-White was already well-known when World War II made her arguably the most famous female journalist in the world.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION

Marguerite Higgins covering the Korean War, 1950

She was a skilled industrial photographer for *Fortune* when publisher Henry Luce chose her photo of Montana's Fort Peck dam for *Life*'s first cover. She became not only a great news shooter but a very lucky one, too. She was in Moscow with five cameras, 22 lenses, 3,000 flashbulbs and four portable developing tanks when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Sleeping on her hotel balcony to photograph Red Square during air raids, she wrote:

"I would start up to see the square below dancing with fireflies as the shrapnel tinkled down on the pavement. But as soon as the sound grew soft, I would be back in slumber on the marble ledge, my cameras, set for time exposures, still recording any streaks of light that might flash through the sky."

She wore red shoes and a red hair-bow to a rare interview with Joseph Stalin, then worked all night in a U.S. Embassy bathroom to print her historic pictures. She charmed President Roosevelt's emissary, Harry Hopkins, into personally carrying the photos back to the United States the next morning.

All war correspondents need curiosity and a sense of fearlessness; it also helps to have friends in high places. When the ship carrying Bourke-White from England to North Africa was torpedoed, she took only her cameras in the lifeboat. After her rescue, Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, who'd led the first bombing raid on Tokyo and was then commander of the 12th Air Force, loaned her some of his clothes and personally

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Correspondents, from left, Virginia Irwin of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* Marjorie Avery of the *Detroit Free Press* and Judy Darden of the *New York Sun* write dispatches from Normandy, France, 1944.

authorized her to fly on a bombing mission—a rare privilege for male reporters and unheard-of for females.

Accompanying Bourke-White's seven-page *Life* spread was her glamorous "one picture is worth a thousand words" self-portrait. Shown wearing a sheepskin-lined, high-altitude flight suit, and standing before a B-17 in North Africa in 1943, she was described in the magazine as "the first woman ever to fly with a U.S. combat crew over enemy soil." Twenty years later that same picture, spotted in an old magazine in my grandmother's attic, made me exclaim, "I want to do that!"

WHEREVER WOMEN TURN UP IN wartime, gossip follows. Bourke-White fueled rumors that she received special privileges by openly having an affair with a tall, handsome Army Air Forces general who commanded a bomb group. She dismissed the sniping by saying, "You can do one of two things: Put your mind on your work, or worry about what people are saying about you. The two do not mix."

Elegant, bohemian Lee Miller—protégé of magazine publisher Condé Nast, pupil and lover of Man Ray, star of a Jean Cocteau film before she was 25—took a circuitous path to war-correspondent fame. A *Vogue* model in her teens, she became a successful portrait photographer in New York City, and Pablo Picasso had just painted her portrait in the south of France when Germany invaded Poland. Returning to London, British *Vogue* hired her to photograph the blitz. She subsequently collaborated with CBS newsman

Edward R. Murrow on the book *Grim Glory: Pictures of Britain Under Fire.*

In post-D-Day France, her acute "eye" established her reputation for photography that was both artistic and technically excellent. She covered U.S. service women at a Paris fashion show, surrendering German officers, the venerated writer Colette and the Alsace campaign. After photographing Hitler's apartment in Munich, she liked it so much that she moved in; one of the most famous pictures of Miller captures her taking a bath in the Führer's tub.

Miller, Bourke-White, Marguerite Higgins of the *New York Herald Tribune,* Helen Kirkpatrick of the *Chicago Daily News* and Sigrid Schultz of the *Chicago Tribune* all reported from Buchenwald the day Gen. George S. Patton made neighboring German civilians tour the Nazi death camp.

The ranks of women war correspondents had swelled after the Normandy invasion, and by the war's end American readers were familiar with the bylines of Ruth Cowan of The Associated Press, Lee Carson of International News Service, Iris Carpenter of *The Boston Globe*, Catherine Coyne of *The Boston Herald*, Marjorie Avery of the *Detroit Free Press* and a dozen others.

Higgins had felt cheated by coming late to the war in 1944, though she stayed on in Germany to cover the Nuremberg war trials, the Berlin blockade and the subsequent airlift. When fighting broke out in Korea, Higgins traveled there, but the U.S. commander expelled her because, he said, "This is just not the type of war where women ought to be running around the front lines."

The *Herald Tribune* editorialized that "newspaper women today are willing to assume the risk and in our opinion should not be discriminated against. We hope [Higgins] will be allowed to continue her work." Gen. Douglas MacArthur soon rescinded the banishment, and Higgins returned immediately from Tokyo.

"Of course GIs whistle and wolf-call as you jeep past a convoy on the road. But when the shelling and shooting starts, nobody pays any attention. I … can probably hit a ditch as fast as any man."

— Marguerite Higgins

"At the actual war front," Higgins wrote, "a woman has equal competitive opportunities. Essentially it comes down to being in the combat area at the crucial time and having the stamina to do the jeeping and hiking necessary to get where you can file your story.

"Of course GIs whistle and wolf-call as you jeep past a convoy on the road. But when the shelling and shooting starts, nobody pays any attention. I … can probably hit a ditch as fast as any man."

In 1951 Higgins won nearly 50 journalism prizes and awards, including the George Polk Memorial Award, the Overseas Press Club citation for "courage, integrity and enterprise," and the Pulitzer Prize, which she shared with fellow correspondents Keyes Beech, Homer Bigart and three others. She was the first woman to win the Pulitzer for chronicling combat. Other female newspaper reporters chose her Woman of the Year.

Higgins died 14 years later of a rare trop-

ical illness following her 10th reporting trip to Vietnam and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

TO REACH OUR OWN BRASS RINGS we all stand on the shoulders of the women who've come before us. So it was with the approximately 270 women from around the world who were accredited as war correspondents to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Some came for a few days, others stayed for years, flying into Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airport with one-way tickets on commercial airliners. It was easy to cover the war; all you needed were a couple of letters of reference on letterhead, a mug shot and a few forms. Action was everywhere, military transport plentiful.

Women journalists have proved—to soldiers, editors, each other and themselves—that they can go everywhere and do everything.

Among the early female arrivals were, again, Gellhorn and Higgins; Chapelle, who'd been with the Marines at Iwo Jima; Beverly Deepe, Elaine Shepard, Anne Merick, Ann Bryan Mariano, Susan Sheehan, Frances FitzGerald, Helen "Patches" Musgrove, Denby Fawcett, Elizabeth Pond, Georgie Ann Geyer, Philippa Schuyler, Jurate Kazickas and Frenchwomen Suzanne Labin, Michele Ray and Catherine Leroy.

Chapelle died on Nov. 4, 1965, when she encountered a booby trap while on patrol with the Marines. She was 47. Higgins died two months later, at the age of 45. On May 9, 1967, Schuyler was killed when the helicopter in which she was riding crashed into Danang Bay. She was 35.

Kazickas and Leroy were both wounded; Leroy, Ray and Kate Webb were captured by communist forces, imprisoned and released.

Gloria Emerson arrived for *The New York Times* in 1970 and left two years later, writing: "Nothing is simple here for the Americans or the South Vietnamese. The blame and the guilt, the guilt and the blame, and always the surprise that it turned out as miserably as this, covers us all." Her book about the war, *Winners and Losers,* was hailed for its "passion and furious honesty."

By the early 1970s nearly every news organization in Saigon had a woman on its staff. Edith M. Lederer of The Associated Press and Tracy Wood of United Press International were fierce competitors during the final American withdrawal and prisoner-of-war releases. Laura Palmer, who arrived as a free-lancer, landed radio reporting jobs with both ABC and NBC. Vietnam became the place where an unknown "stringer" who was in the right place at the right time could get on the cover of *Newsweek* or the front page of *The Washington Post*. A single photograph or datelined lead launched many a career.

Unlike World War II's Bourke-White and Miller, and Korea's Higgins, no female journalists became superstars in Vietnam. Rather, a few dozen highly competent women photographers and correspondents found steady work covering a new kind of war where the front lines could be the market where you bought your vegetables or the theater where you went to a Saturday night movie. It was a guerrilla war that offered combat, and stories, in urban streets as well as in distant paddies and highlands.

Women war correspondents were no longer anomalies in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and when the war ended their careers continued. That was the major difference between them and their World War II sisters, who couldn't "take a job away from a man" when they returned to work on a newspaper. Many women who covered Vietnam are still in journalism and, like Lederer, have gone on to datelines in other wars.

But get them together in a room—as happened last year at a seminar organized by Christine Martin, dean of the Perley Isaac Reed School of Journalism at West Virginia University—and many of these women will say their Vietnam experience was a highlight of their lives.

"When people ask me how Vietnam changed my life," Denby Fawcett wrote 30 years later, "I have difficulty answering because Vietnam is my life. If you pinch my skin, Vietnam is there. If I rub my eyes, Vietnam is underneath. … Vietnam is everything brave about me and everything that is still uncertain."

When Fawcett's daughter, Brett Jones, announced she was going to Kosovo, it was hard for her role-model mother to protest, so she cheered her child on.

Women journalists no longer have to plead or finagle their way into combat coverage just because of their gender. They have proved—to soldiers, editors, each other and themselves—that they can go everywhere and do everything.

And hardly anybody talks about bathrooms anymore.

COURTESY MALCOLM BROWNE

AP correspondent Malcolm Browne walks through the Vietnamese countryside, 1972.

From Telex to Satellite

The technology changes but not the mission.

Edith M. Lederer

I can still picture myself in Phnom Penh in May 1973, desperately trying to find the censor who had gone on a break and wasn't in any of his usual eating or drinking haunts.

The last U.S. combat troops had left Vietnam just over a month earlier, and the "hot war" had shifted to Cambodia. Phnom Penh was virtually surrounded and short of food. Waves of U.S. B-52 bombers attacked day and night across the Mekong River. Amid electricity shortages, a 10 p.m. curfew loomed. Finally, just as I was about to give up on filing my story that night, the censor showed up at the post office and telecommunications building where he had a small cubbyhole.

We argued about a few changes he wanted to make in my copy before approving it. The phone lines to Tokyo, Hong Kong and Saigon were bad that night, so I sat down at the telex and started punching telex tape—quite rapidly, I might add, because I'd had a lot of practice. I fed the tape through the telex machine, and off my story went to Tokyo and ultimately to New York.

Writing the story had been easy. Filing it had consumed more than four hours, not

unusual in wartime Cambodia.

The only way around the censor was to find a "pigeon"—someone reliable who was leaving the country and would carry a story or film to the outside world, where the AP would pick it up and transmit it. We tried this with features, analyses and stories that we knew would never get past the censor. The television networks did the same.

When a month earlier I had gone to Phnom Penh for the first time, I realized what freedom we'd had in Vietnam: There was no censorship, and in the AP Saigon Bureau we had our own slow-speed teletype and operators to key in our copy and transmit photos.

It was an era of typewriters and black-and-white film, of cumbersome radio and television equipment. But even 1960s and '70s technology was enough to make Vietnam the first war in which timely stories and pictures came nightly to U.S. television screens and daily to U.S. newspapers.

Edith M. Lederer joined The Associated Press in 1966 and has since covered many wars and conflicts. Currently she is the AP's chief United Nations correspondent.

MONTHS AFTER I LEFT VIETNAM, in the summer of 1973, I was sent to another "hot" war—this time in the Middle East. I arrived in Tel Aviv days after the Egyptians had crossed the Suez Canal on Yom Kippur, the Jews' holiest day of the year, and again confronted censors. The Israeli military censor had to approve all military-related stories and film from the country, a practice that continues today. The big difference was that the AP had a direct line to send copy from its offices to the censor; after clearance we could transmit it directly to New York.

In Israel, however, I confronted another kind of censorship for the first time.

Reporters and photographers in Vietnam had virtually free access to the war. If there was space on a U.S. military helicopter, you could get on and fly to any battle zone. You could also get in a jeep and drive anywhere, which could be very risky and led to many reporters' and photographers' deaths. Transportation was much more difficult in Cambodia, where the news media got air transport only if the government wanted an event covered. The sole limits upon driving, however, were those imposed by one's own sense of risk.

The Israeli government, by contrast, required all members of the media to have a military escort. Generally, escorts were reservists called up to active duty. Some were very easygoing about where you could go. Others were not.

One day I was with several colleagues watching a tank battle in the Sinai Desert. Charles Mohr of *The New York Times*, whom I later learned was a World War II military buff, recognized that the Israelis were using tactics employed at El Alamein, Egypt, in World War II. When Mohr began talking about the tactics, our military escort accused him of breaching Israeli military intelligence—and I don't think that story got out immediately.

THE NEXT TANKS I SAW WERE IN Afghanistan, six months after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. This was Moscow's Vietnam, and the government in Kabul had stopped issuing visas to journalists. I got into the country masquerading as

a rug buyer (and actually bought about 100 kilim rugs for a friend's store in New York).

Because filing stories by telex or telephone was impossible, I used several "pigeons" to carry stories to New Delhi, India, where the AP picked them up. I wrote a long series on the war—after I left Afghanistan.

Computers first appeared in U.S. newsrooms in the early 1970s but didn't really hit the battlefield until the 1980s. Even then, filing by computer often proved impossible. Reporters frequently used computers as little more than fancy typewriters. When I returned to Afghanistan in 1989 to cover the civil war in the wake of the Soviet pullout, I had to file by telex, and well into the 1990s telex remained the primary means of transmitting stories from Third World hotspots in Asia and Africa.

The advent of mobile phones in the late 1980s made filing easier, provided the user was someplace where the signal could be picked up. On assignment in Northern Ireland in 1988, I was at an Irish Republican Army funeral when a Protestant gunman ran through the cemetery firing a pistol and throwing grenades at the Catholic mourners. I dove for cover behind a tombstone but managed to dictate a story via mobile phone, my face almost in the dirt. The phones were quite new then, and other reporters offered me a lot of money to use it, but I refused. After all, competition is competition, and the phone certainly gave the AP a scoop.

By the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, electronic devices had become smaller and more common. Portable satellite dishes had arrived as well, making filing considerably easier.

Yet in a sharp departure from Vietnam policy, the U.S. military insisted on controlling media access to the soldiers who poured into Saudi Arabia after the invasion. Further, when the Persian Gulf War began in January 1991, the military allowed coverage only by small media pools.

The Pentagon had been roundly criticized for barring the press from accompanying U.S. forces during the 1983 Grenada invasion. The protest led to new ground rules, including a "security review" of all stories and photos before transmission, to guard against the release of sensitive information. The rules remained in effect during the Gulf War.

I was in the Air Force combat pool, at the largest U.S. air base in Saudi Arabia, when warplanes took off to bomb Iraq. Although the pool wasn't supposed to file until the next day, the deputy base commander led us to a secret telephone. I dictated the story to the AP bureau in Dhahran, where the main media operation was based. Happily, the military cleared it almost immediately.

Just before the ground war began in late February, U.S. military commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf ordered a news blackout, preventing a great deal of pool coverage. But the Air Force pool ignored the blackout, and the Marine Corps—once it became clear that the U.S.-led coalition forces would quickly liberate Kuwait and rout the Iraqis—allowed its pool to file reports.

Meanwhile, the reporters, photographers and TV crews not in the pools made a mad dash—often with heavy satellite equipment in tow—to get into Kuwait City, and they were the first on the scene to report the coalition's victory.

By the time the lengthy Bosnian war began in 1992, the news media relied mainly on satellites to file stories, pho-

DENNIS BRACK/BLACK STAR

Persian Gulf War pool reporters question a Kuwaiti, foreground, who escaped Iraqi occupation.

tos and TV footage, though the equipment was still heavy and difficult to transport.

Filing was faster when NATO started its 78-day bombing campaign in 1999 to end the Yugoslav crackdown on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Portable satellite telephones and digital cameras ruled the day. Lightweight, portable video cameras that can be powered by a car battery are now available.

All these advances have made it theoretically possible to file copy to a home base at any time from almost anywhere—a jungle, a desert, a ship or a foxhole—even at the height of a battle. But while the new technology can deliver the news almost instantly, the basics of news gathering in times of conflict have changed very little.

Journalists will always encounter obstacles, such as difficulties getting entry visas from reluctant governments or finding reliable translators and guides to good intelligence (so you don't find yourself in the middle of an ambush or being robbed, or worse, at a roadblock). Even the most tech-savvy reporters and photographers still must go into the field and take the necessary risks to see events firsthand and to report them accurately and fairly.

CORBIS

Washington Post pressman checks the first edition after the U.S. Supreme Court decision allowing publication of the Pentagon Papers.

War, Censorship and the First Amendment

The military has replaced outright control of war reporting with "news management" techniques.

Jacqueline E. Sharkey

From censorship through deception, the American government's wide-ranging efforts to control information about military operations date back to the Revolutionary War.

When he led the Continental Army, George Washington sometimes exaggerated British losses to sustain Colonists' morale, according to William M. Hammond of the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln's administration allowed journalists to accompany the troops but suppressed newspapers for security violations.

During World Wars I and II, U.S. military officials censored journalists' reports from the field while the government established "information" offices at home to pro-

duce stories and pictures that would foster support for the conflicts.

In Vietnam, journalists had battlefield access while following Pentagon ground rules. The military used its Saigon briefings—known as the "Five O'Clock Follies"—to put a positive spin on information.

The Vietnam conflict also led to government efforts to exercise prior restraint. When *The New York Times* began publishing classified information about the conflict in 1971, the Nixon administration went to court to prevent further publication of what became known as the Pentagon Papers. But the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 6-3 decision in *New York Times Co. v. United States,* declared that First Amendment values overrode national security arguments. Justice Hugo Black's opinion said:

> *In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. ... And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the Government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.*

Jacqueline E. Sharkey, a University of Arizona journalism professor, is the author of *Under Fire—U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf.*

Some journalists called this a decisive victory in the battle against censorship, but it turned out to be just another factor the Defense Department and its civilian leaders considered while devising a strategy for future combat coverage.

In the 1980s and '90s they developed a new model for controlling information. First used during the 1983 invasion of Grenada, then during the conflicts in Panama and the Persian Gulf, the model combined "pre-censorship"—preventing reporters from reaching the field—with other news-management techniques that allowed the government to control content and spin.

Chief among these techniques were televised briefings that enabled the White House and Pentagon to circumvent the press and present their version of events directly to the American people. Dick Cheney, who was defense secretary during two of these conflicts, said in a 1995 taped interview that he and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin Powell developed the briefings because the "information function was extraordinarily important. I did not have a lot of confidence that I could leave that to the press."

Understanding the news-management model that emerged at the end of the 20th century is important for several reasons.

First, the government still uses some of its techniques to influence military coverage.

Second, pre-censorship is another form of prior restraint, once used by the British to control the Colonial press. Prior restraint ended in the Colonies in 1721 and re-emerged in full force 250 years later in the Pentagon Papers case. The U.S. government engages in pre-

publication censorship whenever it limits battlefield access, and it is impossible to justify when operational security or troop safety is not at stake.

Finally, renewed discussions about military news management are crucial at a time when the United States is increasingly involved in multinational operations with organizations like NATO, whose other members have restrictive press laws and no First Amendment tradition.

The military's impetus for developing a new model for controlling combat coverage grew out of the Vietnam War. Some military officers believed negative press coverage contributed to the U.S. defeat. This perception persisted even after military historians and academics showed that the American people turned against the war not because of the news media but because of rising U.S. casualties and the lack of political leadership.

Yet the useful news-management model that U.S. officials found in 1982 came out of a far different conflict: Britain's war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). The British military controlled the press by limiting the number of journalists who accompanied the troops, regulating their trips to the battlefield and reviewing their news reports before transmitting them. The result was overwhelmingly positive coverage and a political victory for Margaret Thatcher's government.

That the U.S. military focused on a British press-management strategy is ironic and chilling. Britain's restrictions on the Colonial press—which included punishments for printing truthful criticism of the government—were one reason the First Amendment was created. Britain today still has press regulations that are anathema to the idea that a government "shall make no law" abridging freedom of the press.

IN ADDITION TO LIMITING BATTLEFIELD access, the Pentagon's news-management model included these techniques:

Sanitizing visual images of war

During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. military briefers repeatedly showed images of laser-guided bombs unerringly hitting their targets. The Pentagon said during the first week that Air Force missions had an 80 percent success rate but did not tell journalists until after the war that only 8.8 percent of the 84,200 tons of bombs dropped had precision-guidance mechanisms. Former Pentagon analyst Pierre Sprey later told a House committee that for every bomb that hit a target, "there were maybe 70 or 75 misses that nobody was showing," for a success rate of less than 1.5 percent. This revealed "just how shameless the censoring of the results for the guided weapons was during the war," Sprey testified.

Concealing information that would embarrass the U.S. government

The Pentagon did not want to disclose that planning for the invasion of Grenada was so hurried that some troops were given tourist maps. In Panama, the Pentagon was reluctant to correct its statement that U.S. troops found 50 kilos of cocaine in a building used by Gen. Manuel Noriega, even after lab tests showed the substance was farina, cornmeal and lard.

Misleading the news media about military mistakes

During the Grenada invasion the Pentagon did not reveal that U.S. planes mistakenly had bombed a mental hospital until journalists discovered the incident by interviewing medical personnel on the island. After the Gulf War, the Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Merrill McPeak, said U.S. forces "made some mistakes about what we bombed." He declined to elaborate, saying his recommendation to disclose errors "got turned around, quite frankly."

Misleading the news media about military successes

During the Grenada invasion Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger announced that the operation to rescue hundreds of U.S. medical students had been "extremely skillfully done." After the invasion, then-Maj. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, a deputy commander of the Grenada operation, said Pentagon intelligence had been so poor that when U.S. troops arrived they did not even know the medical school had two campuses.

During the Gulf War the Pentagon referred repeatedly to the success of the Tomahawk missile. In its final report to Congress more than a year after the war, the Defense Department said the missile had a "98 percent launch success rate." This meant only that the missile had left its launcher and achieved level flight. The report declined to estimate how many targets the Tomahawk hit, saying this figure was "much more difficult to determine."

Using Pentagon briefings to undermine the role of the press

The Pentagon's Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, a briefer during the Panama and Gulf operations, called televised briefings "the most significant part of the whole operation" because "the American people were getting their information from the government, not from the press."

Cheney stated he didn't want to distort information, but Col. David H. Hackworth—a highly decorated soldier who served in Korea and Vietnam and covered the Gulf War for *Newsweek*—said the briefings were a "very carefully orchestrated snow job" and "a duplicate of the 'Five O'Clock Follies.'"

Defense Department personnel who presented misleading information at the briefings may have violated the Pentagon's Principles of Information. The principles, reissued by Cheney following criticism of the Panama press restrictions, stated that the Defense Department will provide "a free flow of general and military information ... without censorship or propaganda" and that "information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment."

Shortly after the Gulf War ended, a poll indicated that four out of five Americans thought military restrictions on news reports were a good idea.

Some in Congress were so concerned about whether lawmakers and the public were getting the facts from the Gulf War that in February 1991 the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on the Pentagon's media policies. Military public affairs officers who had served in Vietnam testified that the military had gone beyond what was needed to protect operational security and troop safety. But Defense Secretary Cheney declined to make major changes in the press rules. One reason: The American people strongly supported them.

Shortly after the Gulf War ended, a poll by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press indicated that four out of five Americans thought military restrictions on news reports were a good idea.

The press bears part of the responsibility. Although the media protested the Grenada,

Panama and Persian Gulf restrictions, they still used the information and visuals the Pentagon provided. When the military announced the pool and security-review system for the Gulf conflict, news organizations initially protested, but some soon began fighting among themselves for pool slots.

Some news media engaged in self-censorship, declining to appropriately cover dissenting voices or to fully show the human cost of war. When one photograph of a charred Iraqi corpse on the "Highway to Hell" arrived at The Associated Press, editors decided it was "a little too graphic" to transmit.

Initial coverage of the Gulf conflict was so enthusiastic that Pentagon officials feared a loss of public support if a ground war resulted in heavy casualties. The White House and Defense Department started what then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams called "euphoria control." Gen. Powell warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that "ground combat is nasty business. It is not nice and sanitized and clean as a video game, such as nice gun-camera footage"—neglecting to mention that Pentagon briefings repeatedly showed this footage.

In negotiations after the war, the news media obtained some concessions about rules for future coverage, but efforts to control information and images continued from Somalia to the Balkans.

One irony is that the news-management policies, developed in response to the Vietnam War, were the opposite of what some top military officers had recommended after the U.S. defeat.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Fred C. Weyand wrote that the military should never again go along with civilian leaders' attempts to make war look as if it were a policy alternative with little cost. Military officers "must counsel our political leaders and alert the American public that there is no such thing as a 'splendid little war.' … War is death and destruction. The American way of war is particularly violent, deadly and dreadful. … We should have made the realities of war obvious to the American people," Weyand wrote.

Over the past 20 years much of the press has failed to show Americans that reality.

"Too often the press has gone along with censorship" and "hasn't always been a very good guardian of the First Amendment," noted Jeffery A. Smith, author of *War and Press Freedom—The Problem of Prerogative Power.*

Journalists and media analysts have warned that pre-censorship endangers democracy in several ways. Legendary CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite told a Senate committee investigating media restrictions during the Gulf War that pre-censorship was "totally unsatisfactory" because "history begins to be distorted with every second that passes after it occurs. With every retelling of the story by witnesses, the story changes."

Cronkite said he "would rather have the post-censorship" because journalists at least could be on the scene to obtain information the public would need to make long-term decisions about policy and policy makers, even if that information couldn't be released immediately.

As constitutional scholar Smith said in an interview last year, the First Amendment was created because the founders believed "government officials were not the people to trust with the control of information," and the press should make "the ultimate choice" about what people learn of military operations. A press denied access to the battlefield cannot make that choice.

DENNIS BRACK/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/TIMEPIX

A CNN camera crew interviews a U.S. soldier after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 1990.

THE PEN AND THE SWORD

The prospect of an army of government spinners talking electronically and directly to hundreds of news outlets ... scares the hell out of me. We need walking, talking, thinking and challenging reporters to keep track of a place that has the power to blow up the planet. — GEORGE C. WILSON

George C. Wilson on media-military relations

James Kitfield on lessons from Kosovo

Jane Kirtley on the public's right to know

Robert Sims on military secrecy

Peter S. Prichard on journalists' military service

Patrick J. Sloyan on the failure of press pools

Derald Everhart on the role of the military press

DAVID GREEDY/LIAISON

U.S. Brig. Gen. Kenneth Quinland talks with reporters in Debelde, Kosovo, 2001.

MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS: NO WORSE, NO BETTER

But one scenario for the future is alarming.

GEORGE C. WILSON

THERE IS GOOD AND BAD NEWS about what has happened to media-military relations since a journalist and a military officer took look at them in a 1995 study, "America's Team: The Odd Couple. A Report on the Relationship Between the Military and the Media." The long-term outlook, however, is downright scary for those fearing radical change in the ways the press gathers news and the government dispenses it.

First the good news:

- Since that odd couple, Frank Aukofer of the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* and Vice Adm. William P. Lawrence, wrote their book, the relationship has not worsened.
- The press corps covering national defense is the best in Washington, D.C., in terms of understanding its subject matter and poking into dark corners. One of the Pentagon's own, Bryan Whitman, deputy

director for defense information, said, "I would give the Pentagon press corps an A-minus and our own information officers something less."

- Major newspapers and television networks still spend millions of dollars covering the military-industrial complex with experienced, expensive reporters, even in peacetime.
- A number of military leaders are realizing that they are in a war for people's minds, not territory, and therefore need to explain themselves through the news media to win.

Now, the bad news:

- Since Aukofer and Lawrence wrote their book, the media-military relationship has not improved, either.
- The proliferation of competing outlets for military news—think Internet—has broadened the "go with what you've got" attitude and spurred sensationalism, which in turn has cost the press credibility with an already suspicious military establishment.
- While the quality of defense reporters remains high, the quality of the military's information officers has declined.
- Government control and spin, à la the Persian Gulf War, is still very much with us.

George C. Wilson, a former chief defense correspondent for *The Washington Post,* is now a writer for *National Journal*, a newsweekly on politics and government.

These conclusions grew out of interviews with a wide spectrum of journalists and information officers as well as my own observations as a chronicler of the military for 40 years, both in Washington and in hot spots from Vietnam to Bosnia.

"About the same," replied Robert Burns when asked to compare today's media-military relationship with that of 1995. Burns covers defense for The Associated Press in Washington and thus potentially has the most readers. "I really don't share what might be the conventional wisdom that relations are bad or that there is a serious problem," he said. "I think for the most part my relations with all the services in the Pentagon are pretty good."

Burns' views fit with Aukofer and Lawrence's conclusion that the media and military "have learned that cooperation serves the interest of each as well as serving the American people." Thomas Ricks of *The Washington Post* said the relationship in the field is particularly good.

However, the defense press is no more monolithic than the Pentagon. Burns and Ricks represent the dominant viewpoint, but dissenters exist, too. David Wood of Newhouse News Service, who spends much of his time with troops, said media-military relationships in the field "have gone into the toilet in the last six months," but he could not explain why.

As a wire-service reporter, Burns reports the top of the news, leaving him little time to go vertical. Reporters for specialized publications such as *Aviation Week & Space Technology* magazine, insider newsletters and Army Times Publishing Co.'s family of privately owned military newspapers do go vertical and often run into layers of resistance as they try to get to the core of a story. David Fulghum of *Aviation Week*, for example, said the typical Air Force information officer today neither knows nor cares about the guts of what his or her own service does. Further, he said, that officer feels no sense of mission to help reporters tell the Air Force

story in depth. Fulghum said the situation developed as the best and brightest left the Air Force public affairs community.

Frank Wolfe of *Defense Daily*, who delves into military procurement and research, said civilian and military officials in those areas seem to feel no obligation to explain what they do and why to specialty reporters including himself. "It's really tough," he said.

Tobias Naegele, executive editor of Army Times Publishing Co., said he was astounded that Army public affairs leaders today see no need to build a bridge to the *Army Times*, which focuses on their service and goes into the homes and offices of Army personnel. Every reporter interviewed for this piece, both print and electronic, gave the Army's information shop the poorest ratings among the armed forces.

Those interviewed also agreed universally that the Defense Department—civilian and military alike—is a top-down organization in which the minions take their cues from, and often surpass, the king. If a defense secretary, general or admiral stiff-arms the press, his subordinates are apt to do the same thing—and then some.

I ALSO BELIEVE THE DISTINCT culture that has developed in each of the armed services shapes the media-military relationship. If I had to liken each service to a dog breed, the Army would be the family Airedale—a great companion in the woods, but he messes on the living room carpet and can't understand why he keeps getting spanked. The Navy would be the sleek Weimaraner (it's hard for an officer to look bad in Navy blues)—intelligent and well behaved but insistent on being properly approached. The Air Force would be the French poodle with a rhinestone collar that avoids the cold and wet and doesn't fancy pulling a sled but can do lots of tricks if he feels like it. The Marine Corps would be the husky that is proud of pulling a heavy sled through a blizzard and will go all out to help—but only if he trusts you.

The distinct culture that has developed in each of the armed services shapes the media-military relationship.

Similarly, each news gathering organization—each reporter, for that matter—has a different culture shaping the kind of defense news it seeks. Bill Gertz of *The Washington Times*, for instance, regularly scoops the rest of us by working the intelligence community. Kenneth Bacon, who just finished a six-year tour as the Pentagon's top spokesman, gives Gertz's stories high marks and contends that if they appeared in either *The Washington Post* or *The New York Times* they would trigger government investigations.

PRACTITIONERS AND EVENTS CAN change the cultures of the military and the media. When I first started covering the Pentagon, at the beginning of the Vietnam War, print reporters were running around the Pentagon, often coatless. They dominated official briefings with sharp questions. TV correspondents were the occasional visitors in suits who knew little about soldiers and weapons. TV reporting on the military came of age during the Vietnam War and has been getting better, by and large, ever since.

One practitioner who exemplifies this



HESOON YIM/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Former Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon

switch in roles and the changed culture between print and electronic media is Jamie McIntyre, CNN's longest-serving military affairs correspondent. He reminds me of the print reporters of the Vietnam era as he races around the Pentagon in rumpled khakis and with fire in his eyes. And like the print reporters of yore, he has no trouble selling his editors on defense stories, even those with no bang-bang. McIntyre represents the CNN factor at the Pentagon—a factor that the whole military establishment has learned to reckon with, like it or not. Influential people around the world see and hear McIntyre, which makes him and his CNN colleagues major players in the media-military relationship.

"Army public affairs seems to be nonexistent these days," McIntyre said. "Part of that is that they have a chief of staff [Gen. Eric K. Shinseki] who, to say it generously, is media-shy. Some would say he doesn't really like the media, and that sort of trickles down to subordinates, including those designated to deal with the media." When the Army grounded its fleet of Apache helicopters, it "went through a concerted effort to bury that story. No heads-up. Nobody called at home," said McIntyre. The Army instead waited until 9:30 p.m. on the Friday of a holiday weekend to slip an announcement under news-cubicle doors at the Pentagon. And of course no one was in those cubicles. "Their strategy was that if we release it now and don't tell anybody about it," McIntyre said, "come Tuesday (Monday

was a holiday) we can then say, 'Well yes. They've been grounded, but some of them have been fixed and returned to duty.' The objective was to ameliorate the effect of this negative story.

"I find out about it after the weekend, go down to Army public affairs and read them the riot act: 'This is unacceptable; how can you do this? This is a cover-up. How can you look yourself in the mirror when you go home and say you did a good job when you deliberately buried the story?' They had some story about how it wasn't approved. Two weeks later they ground the Apaches again and do the same thing. They release it at 7 o'clock at night instead of 9:30. It's disingenuous.

"And when we ask about it, they try to tell us the Apaches aren't grounded. 'They're just under a safety review.' Are they flying? 'No they're not flying, but they're not grounded.' When you have to drag the truth out of somebody, you don't feel like you're being dealt with straight."

The government has a harder time justifying to the public modern-day wars where democratic principles—not tangibles like oil or territory—are at stake.

ABC'S JACK MCWETHY HAS COVERED the Pentagon off and on since 1979. "The air war over Kosovo," he said, "was a long, sustained period where we were looking for answers, and the Pentagon provided the answers on an almost-daily basis. We found out later that it was distorting the facts. Does that mean [military officials] were guilty of lying or only putting the best face forward? I don't know. I'm sure they felt they were putting a lot of information out, good information in their view, but it was the combination of Brussels (NATO headquarters) and Washington trying to brief simultaneously that partially skewed it. Brussels was much worse in trying to spin it than even Washington was, in my opinion. …

"[Army European commander Gen.] Wes Clark was bucking everybody: 'You want to know about this air war? Talk to me.' That was the attitude [he] had in Brussels. He wouldn't let any of his commanders talk to me, even when I went there. ... I couldn't talk to anybody. I did talk to several of them, but it had to be off the record and at their peril. Is that better or is that worse than the Persian Gulf War?

"Relations between the media and the Pentagon … over the last five years … have not declined or deteriorated, but I think they continue to be sometimes constructive and sometimes constrained and often antagonistic," McWethy said.

Dana Priest of *The Washington Post,* who wrote a prize-winning series about theater commanders titled "The Proconsuls," was among the reporters who told me that a growing number of military leaders "have absorbed the lesson of the last 20 years that you cannot ignore the public and, in fact, can make your case to the public through the press." She added that defense secretaries frequently "forget that lesson, partly because of their close ties to the White House and its political agenda and determination to control the agenda." Priest said the press was both "spun and complicit in the spinning"

during the Kosovo campaign "by not asking enough questions about the methodology."

Former Pentagon spokesman Bacon, when asked about the points made by McWethy, Priest and others, said he and other briefers cautioned time after time that their Kosovo bombing reports were preliminary. When a Pentagon briefer warned that bombers might have hit a decoy, not a tank, no reporter passed that on to the public, he added. The press, Bacon said, paid inordinate attention to bombs that missed targets and "reveled in cheap shots that completely distorted the coverage" of what he regarded as a very successful air campaign. Bacon agreed that the government has a harder time justifying to the public modern-day wars where democratic principles—not tangibles like oil or territory—are at stake. "Is it right to risk American lives to defend Kosovars? Public officials have to do a better job of answering such questions," he said.

LOOKING OVER THE HORIZON, Bacon and others in the government's military information network see a revolution in the way the news media gather defense information and the government dispenses it. Bacon said the current corps of Pentagon reporters might well be the last of its kind because the Internet is galloping in to take its place. His sense is that young people get most of their information off computer screens, not TV screens or printed pages.

The Pentagon's Whitman said questions coming into the Defense Department electronically from all over the world—including from newspapers of all sizes—and the Pentagon's electronic responses "are eliminating the middleman," the reporter walking the halls of the Pentagon. The speed of that Internet questioning and answering—generated both by the technology and the intensified competitiveness in which reporters insist they "need information before we're ready to announce it"—"heightens the tension and increases the friction" between the media and defense establishments, Whitman said.

Consider the long-term consequences of this elimination of the middleman, the reporter. "Let's face it, the media are a filter as well as an avenue. The Internet allows us to reach more customers" without going through that filter, Whitman said. What looms ahead, then, is the prospect that the government will take a more direct route to the public, via the Internet, to win the war for people's minds. As a result, government information—or propaganda—will have less of what is generally healthy filtering by the press.

Will the paperless society be followed by a reporterless society in which no reporters slip covertly into Pentagon offices to interview officials who know what's really going on? I don't know about most people, but the prospect of an army of government spinners talking electronically and directly to hundreds of news outlets and one-man commentators—some responsible and some not—scares the hell out of me. We need walking, talking, thinking and challenging reporters to keep track of a place that has the power to blow up the planet.

IT TAKES TWO TO MAKE A TEAM

FRANK AUKOFER

WHEN THE FREEDOM FORUM PUBlished "America's Team: The Odd Couple" in 1995, the reaction was immediate and disjointed. The military embraced it; the media ignored it.

In the years that followed, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn., shipped more than 15,000 copies of the study of the military-media relationship, which I co-authored with retired Vice Adm. William P. Lawrence. The overwhelming majority of those copies went to the military.

Frank Aukofer is the retired Washington bureau chief of the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.*

Within weeks of the publication, the invitations to speak and discuss the report started rolling in from military organizations. Over the course of more than five years, I delivered speeches, moderated panel discussions, participated as a panel member and led seminars on the subject.

The venues were all military: the Army and Navy war colleges, the Air University and War College, Marine Corps University, the Coast Guard Academy and the U.S. Military Academy, as well as countless public affairs conferences sponsored by the Army National Guard and other military organizations, both on and off military installations and at the Pentagon.

Unfortunately, Lawrence suffered a stroke only a month after the publication of "America's Team." This meant I had to go it alone instead of being the junior partner in the Lawrence-Aukofer Road Show. It also meant I had to struggle to develop credibility with the audiences, which would have been automatic with the presence of the admiral, a hero who spent six years as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam and was the senior officer at the "Hanoi Hilton," where Sen. John McCain also was imprisoned.

Not surprisingly, I found a great deal of skepticism among my audiences, which typically consisted of military officers ranking from captain to colonel (in the Navy, from lieutenant to captain) along with a smattering of academy students. Surprisingly, however, I found an eagerness to learn about the workings of the news media and a willingness to be persuaded that newspeople could be patriots, too, and that not every reporter was out to win a Pulitzer Prize or a Peabody Award at the expense of the military.

My overwhelming impression was that the military, at the very top levels, had seriously embraced the message that the nation's men and women in uniform needed to make their case to the American people, and that the best way to do it was through the traditional news media—despite the risks inherent in the scrutiny of a free press. There was recognition that the military had a powerful, positive story to tell to a public largely ignorant of its culture, and that it should accept whatever warts might be unearthed along the way. Because of the military's chain of command, that message was filtering slowly down through the officer corps and, in some cases, to the rank and file.

Meanwhile, virtually no response came from news organizations, despite our warn-

ings in "America's Team" that unless editors and news directors planned for the future with their military counterparts, the media-military relationship once again could be dashed against the shoals of mistrust in the next big conflict.

There was some contact, but it was mainly from the larger news organizations—the television networks, wire services and major newspapers—and they primarily were looking out for their own interests. The report sparked little or no reaction, as far as I could determine, from professional organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Associated Press Managing Editors or the Radio-Television News Directors Association.

A likely major reason is the unstructured nature of news organizations. They are independent, highly competitive and not inclined to cooperate with one another—not even on something as important as making certain the next war or military engagement is covered properly.

Now almost six years old, "America's Team" is dated. But many of its points are still valid, and it still is in use. Lawrence (having resumed an active schedule) has advised the U.S. Naval Academy on a new media course for midshipmen in which the book is the major text.

As George C. Wilson, one of the premier military reporters of our age, notes in the preceding article, the military-media relationship has stabilized, but problems remain. In my mind, a major reason for that is simply turnover. Reporters change beats, editors and news directors move on, and military officers savvy about the media are transferred, promoted and retired. Hence the flaws in the military-media relationship are not susceptible to an overall solution. Because of the constant substitution of new faces, as well as the inherent differences between the missions of the "odd couple," sustained effort is needed to maintain a working relationship that will benefit the American people by providing for their security as well as their enlightenment.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS/U.S. AIR FORCE/SENIOR AIRMAN JAMES N. FASO III

F-15C Eagle jets prepare to receive fuel from KC-135R Stratotanker during Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia, 1999.

Lessons from Kosovo

Bad things happen when the media and the military butt heads yet again.

James Kitfield

Despite round-the-clock media coverage, America went to war wearing blindfolds in 1999. Each day that spring, many hundreds of U.S. service members risked their lives in combat against Serbian forces, yet the American people were largely in the dark about the attacks launched, the targets chosen and the damage inflicted. Most of the pilots' names remain unknown to this day. Commanders were officially gagged, and reporters were, for a time, barred from air bases participating in Operation Allied Force over Kosovo.

Meanwhile, NATO and the Pentagon managed, massaged and manipulated the information released to the press, with an eye toward filling air time with the alliance's message of the day instead of filling in the blanks for the voracious news media and an uninformed public. Some information that leaked through the early blackout and into the 24-hour media torrent, however, was genuinely harmful—inadvertently threatening the war effort and the lives of the Americans waging it.

As another bruising chapter in a tumultuous media-military relationship, Operation Allied Force suggests that in an age of instant communications, the problem may not be too little information but too much—globally broadcast too quickly to permit verification and reflection, and concentrated and exploited too cleverly by government and military officials with an agenda.

Pentagon officials deny ever purposely misleading the media, but they admit to clamping down on the information flow to an extraordinary degree during the early weeks of Allied Force. Changes in the nature of modern warfare and the news business, they say, are altering the rules of engagement between the military and the press.

For instance, wars increasingly fought by alliances—such as Allied Force and Desert Storm—have a much greater political component, making officials warier of straying off message and inadvertently causing a public backlash in a sensitive alliance country. Over-the-horizon warfare and fire-and-forget weapons concentrate information in the hands of military officials and make it much harder for the media to provide "ground truth," especially when U.S. ground troops are not involved or kept off-limits to the media.

The burgeoning number of 24-hour cable and Internet outlets also has had a dramatic impact. Not only has this proliferation increased the likelihood that leaked information could compromise operational security, but the increased media competition detracts from careful fact checking.

James Kitfield is the national security and foreign affairs correspondent for *National Journal*. He has written on defense, national security and foreign policy issues for more than a decade.

"We're living in an age of 24-hour news networks, all competing for scoops, and that's led to much less respect in the media for protecting operational security," said then-Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon after the war in Kosovo ended. For instance, during the early days of Allied Force, when the Serbs had shot down the first U.S. F-117 stealth fighter, Bacon said that one 24-hour news channel was broadcasting fighter takeoffs, potentially giving Serb air defense gunners critical warning. "I also don't think the press understood the absolute necessity we felt in terms of holding the alliance together. So this was a new kind of war, and it offered new challenges, and I'm not sure either the press or the Pentagon is yet up to that challenge," he said.

If Kosovo represented a new kind of war, however, many experts recognized an old and familiar pattern in the dysfunctional media-military relationship. Once again a national emergency threw the two professions together, only to find that mutual distrust and misunderstanding exacerbated the inherent tensions in their relationship. At one point in the conflict, for instance, much of the national press corps—including *The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal,* The Associated Press, CNN and NBC News—wrote a collective letter to the secretary of defense, complaining bitterly about the wartime veil of secrecy.

A close look at the historical currents, cultural dynamics and technological trends driving the media-military relationship sug-

gests that the level of distrust and the cultural gap between these camps are substantial. If the fissure widens to the extent that the two sides once again stare at each other not only with misunderstanding but also with open disdain and disbelief—as certainly happened during the Vietnam era and its aftermath—both professions will have failed the American people.

"I believe the relationship between the media and the U.S. military in the interim between Vietnam and Desert Storm became so bad that it was a threat to the well-being of our republic," said Lt. Gen. Bernard "Mick" Trainor. He became one of the few veterans to cross the media-military chasm when he began a second career as a journalist and columnist for *The New York Times* after leaving the Marine Corps. "I also think the military's manipulation of the media during Kosovo, and the tightening of its grip on essential information with this attitude of 'We'll tell you what you need to know,' was in many ways a payback for what the military still believes the media did to it in Vietnam."

In an age of instant communications, the problem may not be too little information but too much—globally broadcast too quickly and exploited too cleverly.

PARTLY DUE TO THE LINGERING, mutual distrust arising from the Vietnam War—coupled with the end of the draft—the cultural gap in professional attitudes between the media and the military has steadily widened. Over the past quarter century both professions attracted Americans of vastly different natures and perspectives while nurturing and sharpening those natural proclivities. Media careers entice people who are comfortable questioning authority precisely because they see their roles as speaking truth to power. The military attracts and indoctrinates those who naturally respect authority because the battlefield brooks neither dissent nor questioning of orders.

Because journalists see themselves as both protecting society's underdogs and serving as watchdogs of the most powerful, they tend to be liberal on social issues. Given the tremendous risks to life and even national survival inherent in its work, the military is conservative by nature and tends to attract those embracing conservative social views.

Surveys and opinion polls suggest that since the 1970s journalism has become even more liberal as a profession, while the military has become more conservative. In a 1996 Freedom Forum poll of 139 Washington bureau chiefs and correspondents, for instance, 89 percent said they voted for Bill Clinton in 1992, compared with only 7 percent who backed George Bush. According to the survey, 50 percent of journalists identified themselves as Democrats, while only 4 percent said they were Republicans.

Also since the end of the draft, the U.S. military's political orientation has by most accounts shifted in the opposite direction. After several decades of self-selection, the all-volunteer force has become increasingly conservative. In a 1999 paper, "A Widening Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society," Ole Holsti, professor of interna-

PETER TURNLEY/BLACK STAR

Members of the news media swarm a car of ethnic Albanian Kosovar refugees crossing the border into Macedonia, 1999.

tional affairs and political science at Duke University, found that between 1976 and 1999 the proportion of self-identified Republican military officers grew steadily—from fewer than one in three to six of seven. Only one officer in 20 was self-identified as "liberal" or "somewhat liberal."

As the media-military clash over coverage of Kosovo revealed, changes in the nature and technology of both the journalistic and military professions seem likely to widen the cultural divide in the future. By many measures journalism is becoming more chaotic and the military more controlling.

Media watchers long have worried that an explosion of media outlets on cable TV and the Internet, along with the cutthroat competition of 24-hour news cycles, have conspired to trample fundamental journalistic standards of objectivity and meticulous sourcing. Pentagon public affairs officers—the first line of contact between the media and the military—often complain that instant analysis and a growing tilt toward negative and sensational news are combining to make the media less reliable partners in informing the public during times of war.

"With the explosion of 24-hour news outlets, there's greater pressure to report in real time, before facts can be evaluated and confirmed. Then those often factually incorrect stories are instantly dissected, analyzed and commented upon on the air," said one senior military public affairs officer.

Even reporters and producers caught up in a 24-hour news merry-go-round blame

the accelerated pace for problems affecting the media-military relationship. The rush to get stories out first and with a new twist, they say, erodes their ability to separate rumor from fact and to supply the necessary nuance and background to put stories in context. The Pentagon is also becoming more adept at manipulating the media pack and throwing it off the scent of critical stories.

"The incredible competitive pressure of 24-hour news cycles is making reporters into speed bumps on the information highway," said Mark Brender, a Navy veteran and former long-time ABC Pentagon producer. "And because we're always rushing off to the next story, the Pentagon has learned it can manipulate the media easier. They spin us with the cockpit video because they know that video has power and will lead the broadcast, and if they can just make it past the 6:30 p.m. news shows, they are home free. Reporters don't have time to go back and poke around for the real story. Increasingly, the Pentagon is blowing stories right by the media."

One story that many reporters believe the Pentagon "blew by them" concerned how badly unprepared NATO was in the early weeks of Allied Force. The implied message of the countless NATO and Pentagon briefings at the time implied that a massive, Desert Storm-type bombardment would either shock Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic into submission or destroy the Yugoslavian military. The military withheld critical information that could help the press and public gauge the campaign's level of effort, such as the numbers of aircraft sorties and bomb-damage assessments. Consequently, early headlines and reports bought into the military's depiction of an ever-intensifying blitz: "NATO Opens Broad Barrage Against Serbs" (March 25, 1999, *The New York Times*); "Bombing Spreads" (March 29, *The Washington Post*); "NATO Planes Step Up Attack on Serb Troops in Campaign's 5th Day" (March 29, *Times*); "NATO Builds Firepower for 24-Hour Attacks" (March 30, *Post*).

NATO spokesman Jamie Shea described how NATO deliberately saturated the airwaves with successive briefings timed to keep the 24-hour media pack running in circles.

In truth, the initial bombing campaign was anything but massive, and the media badly misrepresented its size and scope in that first month. Now we know that the early Allied Force campaign was a modest effort based on the political calculation that Milosevic would back down as soon as he realized NATO was serious. His failure to do so caught the alliance and the Pentagon badly off guard, forcing them to rush three times the number of aircraft into the theater to mount a serious air campaign. Partly to hold together a shaky alliance, NATO officials tried to obscure this fact.

NATO spokesman Jamie Shea's remarkably candid speech after the war dispelled any doubt that government officials had used the dynamics of the never-ending news cycle to manipulate the media. Shea described how NATO deliberately saturated the airwaves with successive briefings from Brussels, Lon-

don and Washington, timed to keep the 24-hour media pack running in circles.

"One thing we did well during the Kosovo crisis was to occupy the media space," Shea said. "We created a situation in which nobody in the world who was a regular TV watcher could escape the NATO message. It was essential to keep the media permanently occupied and supplied with fresh information to report on. That way, they [were] less inclined to go in search of critical stories."

Such a calculated manipulation of the media threatens to increase an already worrisome credibility gap. Some reporters are concerned that the media and the military are heading for another disastrous estrangement as a result of butting heads during Kosovo. "When the Pentagon decided to clamp down on information during Kosovo, it had a terrible effect on our ability to cover the war, but eventually that will backfire on the military," said Rick Newman, defense correspondent for *U.S. News & World Report.* "The more they continue to adopt this 'control the information at all costs' mentality, the more unwilling reporters will be to give them the benefit of the doubt. The Pentagon is setting a trap for itself."

In fact, that trap might have sprung on May 22, 1999, when after many weeks of tensions over information control during the Kosovo war, Pentagon briefers announced "the most active night of strikes so far." NATO air strikes, they said, not only had hit between 40 and 50 targets in Kosovo but also had virtually shut down Yugoslavia's electrical grid.

"Looking back, that may have been the turning point in the war," said then-Pentagon spokesman Bacon. "It showed our increased ability to hit Serb forces on the ground in Kosovo, and it brought the war home to the population of Serbia as a whole."

The next day, however, when Bacon picked up *The New York Times* to see how the paper had played this turning point in the war, he was aghast. Given the military's early, misleading proclamations of an ever-intensifying war, all the media heard on May 22 was another cry of wolf. The pivotal day of bombing had merited a mere sentence in a picture caption on the *Times*' front page.



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Censored notebook page of United Press correspondent Robert C. Miller, 1942

Enough Is Enough

Journalists should draw a line in the sand to limit the military's attempts at absolute secrecy.

Jane Kirtley

Shortly after the end of the American Civil War, journalist F. Colburn Adams wrote, "The future historian of the late war will have [a] very difficult task to perform ... sifting the truth from falsehood as it appears in official records."

Similar to the oft-repeated axiom that truth is the first casualty of war, Adams' observation succinctly summarizes the nub of the conflict between the military and the news media. The military's mission is to fight, and to win, whatever conflict may present itself—preferably on the battlefield but certainly in public opinion and the history books. The journalist, on the other hand, is a skeptic if not a cynic and aims to seek, find and report the truth—a mission both parties often view as incompatible with successful warfare, which depends on

secrecy and deception as much as superior strategy, tactics, weaponry and manpower.

Accordingly, the military and the media seem destined to be forever at odds. Many, though by no means all, of the generation of officers who served in the Vietnam War, as well as those succeeding them, have never really forgiven the press for the "living room war" that brought home images of combat's death and destruction. Thoughtful observers such as Col. Harry G. Summers, who testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee near the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, acknowledged that "blaming the media for the loss of the Vietnam War was wrong. The media, and television in particular, [were] good at showing the cost of the war. But [the] cost of anything has meaning only in relation to value . . . . It was not the news media, which reported the price, that lost the war. It was the government which . . . deliberately failed to establish its value."

Jane Kirtley is the Silha Professor of Media Ethics and Law at the University of Minnesota School of Journalism and Mass Communication. Previously she was executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press in Arlington, Va., for 14 years.

The enduring perception, however, that the media "lost" the war in Vietnam persists in some military circles. In the wake of the bitterness following that Southeast Asian conflict, it is perhaps not surprising that the Pentagon and the White House reconfigured the equation—retreating from a policy of open coverage tempered only by voluntary adherence to security guidelines, and instead adopting strict control of both battlefield access and press dispatches from the front.

For many media observers, the nadir of media-military relations in modern history occurred during the Reagan administration when Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger decided that the press would not be allowed to witness the invasion of the island of Grenada. Plans for the invasion had been kept secret, but once journalists learned that U.S. forces had landed, they immediately tried to cover the story. U.S. ships and aircraft turned back at least two boats and a plane chartered by the news media, and several reporters already in-country were held incommunicado. Some days later about 100 journalists were taken to Grenada in military planes but reported that they were closely supervised, kept far from the action and thwarted in their attempts to transmit their own footage to the U.S. public.

Although reporters eventually gained access to the island, the news media continued to grumble. Larry Flynt, publisher of *Hustler* magazine, even sued Weinberger and others in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., seeking an order prohibiting the access restrictions and a declaration that the government's actions had violated the First Amendment. He didn't get either one.

In what was to become the template for a series of frustrating court decisions, District Judge Oliver Gasch dismissed the complaint, finding that the decision to impose a press ban was properly within the military commander's discretion and, moreover, that the Grenada situation was unlikely to repeat itself. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—

including then-Judge Kenneth Starr—affirmed the dismissal on grounds of mootness.

This pattern repeated itself in subsequent conflicts. A Defense Department panel, chaired by Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle and including two retired journalists, proposed a press pool, to be deployed at the outset of covert military operations. The theory behind the compromise was that the press pool would give media representatives real-time access to military operations without compromising security. But journalists complained that the military kept the pool reporters isolated, away from the conflict, during operations in Iran and Panama. Then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was lambasted, not only by the press but even in a 1990 Pentagon report, for his "excessive concern for secrecy."

Regardless of the medium, those in the press pool all complained that their access to military operations had been severely impaired and that the press was subjected to unprecedented censorship.

THEN CAME THE PERsian Gulf crisis. When U.S. troops went to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield, the press pool did not go along. It was several days before journalists, carrying Saudi Arabian visas the State Department arranged for them, were deployed to Dhahran. The new "ground rules" and regulations eventually included the notorious "security review" process—which the military insisted was needed to protect operations but which the media saw as pernicious censorship designed to thwart independent reporting. Print reporters were particularly frustrated as their stories were delayed for hours, sometimes days; broadcast journalists seemed to face fewer obstacles in preparing and airing their live transmissions. Regardless of the medium, those in the press pool all complained that their access to military operations had been severely impaired and that—far from being "business as usual"—the press was subjected to unprecedented censorship.

And so, in the best American tradition, the journalists sued. Nine organizations and four individual journalists filed a federal suit in New York, seeking an injunction against enforcement of restrictions on movement. The suit also called for the speedy dispatch of news reports for anything other than legitimate security reasons. A second suit, filed shortly thereafter, sought similar relief and also challenged the exclusion of specific news outlets from the pool. Yet another federal judge disappointed the press. U.S. District Judge Leonard Sand of New York, like his D.C. counterparts, found that both the "uniqueness" and the need for speedy resolution of the gulf conflict made it impossible to render an opinion on the constitutionality of the military restrictions in that particular theater.

Uneasy negotiations between the press and the Pentagon, lasting more than eight months, followed. They culminated in a new set of nine principles for combat coverage, which the Pentagon adopted in May 1992. The principles espoused "open and independent reporting" of military operations as the norm, with pools to be used

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President Reagan receives update on Grenada invasion from his staff, 1983.

only for short periods and for limited purposes. The military reaffirmed the concept that public affairs officers would be liaisons, not censors, and pledged to transport the pools and to facilitate the transmission of journalists' stories.

The final sticking point, however, concerned the phantom "10th principle": security review. The Washington bureau chiefs of major media organizations who had represented the press viewpoint insisted that journalists would abide by clear "ground rules" similar to the simple guidelines during the Vietnam War but would resist prior review by government officials. The military contended, in words recalling the famous dicta in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1931 *Near v. Minnesota* decision, that "it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop safety or the success of the mission."

AND THERE, FOR THE MOST PART, the official record ends. Subsequent military operations elsewhere simply failed to present the same opportunity for government restrictions.

As the Persian Gulf conflict demonstrated, the nature of warfare was changing, and news-transmission technology was changing, too. The possibility of real-time dispatch of written, audio and video reports from the front became a reality, adding verisimilitude to the military's hyperbolic insistence that news coverage could literally aid and abet the

enemy. Yet at the same time, the advent of Internet communications rendered the threat of censorship via prior review less feasible. This has left the military with the choice of either letting in the press and resigning itself to open and robust coverage, perhaps by "rogue" journalists far less willing to abide by Defense Department principles, or trying to block media access—the very scenario that veteran journalist Walter Cronkite had deplored in congressional testimony near the end of the Gulf War.

The drawback to a government-imposed news blackout, from a military perspective, would presumably be that while the American people might tolerate or even embrace such a policy for a short time, no military operation could continue without public support in the long run. In a democracy like the United States, the public expects to get news, and they expect to get it from sources other than the government.

In a democracy like the United States, the public expects to get news, and they expect to get it from sources other than the government.

During the Gulf War, of course, the public did get news—or at least what it thought was news—on a regular basis, 24 hours a day, complete with spectacular video footage. My own experience, admittedly anecdotal, was that in the days following the Gulf War, when I spoke to audiences made up of the general public, none had any inkling that the press's movement and dispatches had been restricted.

In other words, the media themselves did not adequately inform the public that the rules of the game were not what they might have expected. Most news consumers blew right past those "agate-type" disclaimers in the newspapers that the military had reviewed the stories.

IF A NEW ADMINISTRATION TRIES TO impose Draconian restrictions, the media can and should adopt a strategy to oppose them. The press must protest, of course, but it must simultaneously convince the public that, above all, it will do everything possible not to imperil U.S. lives or the integrity of military operations while also pledging to tenaciously and courageously chase the story—offering the independent perspective that the Founding Fathers deemed essential when they drafted the First Amendment.

The media also should forget about lawsuits. Their track record in the courts has been abysmal on this issue, not only in the cases of Grenada and the Gulf War but also in subsequent related actions, such as the unsuccessful attempt to report on the return of soldiers' bodies to Dover Air Force Base. The Supreme Court remains lukewarm at best, and hostile at worst, when it considers press access to locations not generally open to the public, such as prisons. Although the court observed in *Branzburg v. Hayes* (1972) that news gathering enjoys some First Amendment protection, I see little prospect that the current justices will expand those rights in the foreseeable future.

Which brings me to my final recommendation, a modest proposal that I anticipate will please no one: If the military subjects the media to unacceptable restrictions on coverage of military operations, the only ethical

solution is to refuse to cover them at all. I can hear the howls of protest as journalists from all quarters insist that it is not only their right but their duty to cover the news. They must do what they can to get the story—even under less-than-optimal conditions, they'll say—on the theory that incomplete information is better than none.

In principle, I agree; but experience has shown that the military, given the opportunity, will do everything possible to use the media as instruments of propaganda, to shape public opinion and to garner support. This is perfectly understandable, but it is inimical to a free press and a free people. It is up to the press to resist, and it must.

So, by all means, agree to abide by reasonable "ground rules" if you can do so without compromising your journalistic integrity. But be wary of accepting facilities or support from the military. Recognize the risks inherent in relying on the Pentagon's good offices as your means of covering conflicts. And make it abundantly clear to your readers and viewers when you are denied the opportunity to cover a story in the way that you see fit and that they would expect.

As a last resort, be prepared to say, "Enough," when the military draws yet another line in the sand.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

USS Shaw explodes at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941.

War Without Witnesses

Journalists must respect the military's need for secrecy—or face even greater restrictions on coverage.

ROBERT SIMS

Military secrecy has been with us always, and it isn't going away. Nor should it.

For literally thousands of years, secrecy has been an effective military tool for maintaining technological advantage and maximizing the element of surprise. The Hittites, after inventing iron and using it to forge superior weapons, defeated the Babylonian Empire and dominated the lands of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine from 1600 to 1200 B.C. By successfully keeping the smelting process secret, they controlled the region for 400 years. Centuries later, the United States gained a huge advantage in global affairs after World War II by keeping the atomic bomb secret—for a while.

Since the earliest days of the modern news media, military leaders have worried about popular morale and used secrecy to

try to gain or maintain public support. During the Revolutionary War, George Washington complained that dispatches from New York newspapers undermined his battlefield efforts. During World War II, news of the Pearl Harbor attack was heavily censored; neither the number of casualties nor the number of ships sunk was released to the press. Not until more than a year later, in January 1943, did the public see the indelible newsreel images we have of the attack, captured by Fox Movietone cameraman Al Brick. The need to keep the Japanese from knowing detailed results of the attack justified the secrecy, but the primary benefit for the military was to maintain the morale of the U.S. public and armed forces.

The most powerful argument for military control of the media concerns reporting that might endanger troops' lives. The public traditionally supports military control of the news. The national consensus behind the U.S. war effort made secrecy easier during World War II.

Today we still need to protect the lives of service men and women from careless or inadvertently damaging reporting. In an era of instant global communications—aided by laptop computers, the World Wide Web, satellite phones and commercial photographic satellites—this task becomes more difficult. Those capabilities plus the fierce competition to be first in the 24-hour news cycle—led by cable-TV channels that must provide fresh, interesting, nonstop information—create a witch's brew for believers in military security. They have crystallized the issue for military leaders: To accomplish their mission, they must learn how to control the media.

Robert Sims is a former White House deputy press secretary for foreign affairs and former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs during the Reagan Administration. He is the author of *The Pentagon Reporters.*

In most cases, U.S. military leaders simply call on journalists to act responsibly. At the outset of Operation Desert Storm, Gen. Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Pentagon press corps that he "would ask for some restraint on your part as you find out information." He continued, "If you would always measure it against the need for operational security to protect our troops, that should be uppermost, I think, in all our minds."

Powell could well expect journalists to take his counsel because, if for no other reason, a substantial majority of Americans believed media coverage would make it harder for the Alliance to win the war. A poll in January 1991, at the time of Operation Desert Storm, found that 79 percent of the public approved of military censorship. In the battle for public support, the news media are no match for the military and its concerns about American lives.

Public opinion notwithstanding, observers have generally exaggerated the press's influence on specific military operations. Before the Bay of Pigs debacle, *The New York Times* withheld and toned down Tad Szulc's report that anti-Castro partisans had been training in Florida and Guatemala and planned to invade Cuba in mid-April 1961. Afterward, President John F. Kennedy reportedly told *Times* Managing Editor Turner Catledge, "If you had printed more about the opera-

tion, you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."

The colossal mistake, of course, was launching the raid with too small a force and without air support, which the U.S. Navy had planned to provide but the administration canceled at the last minute. Whether the *Times* had printed its story or not, the operation "had been cranked up too far" and would have proceeded anyway, thought *Times*' Washington bureau chief James Reston. Publishing the report, however, would have given Kennedy a perfect scapegoat for the administration's mistakes. The media make good scapegoats. Politicians and the military have learned to use them skillfully in that way.

The media make good scapegoats. Politicians and the military have learned to use them skillfully in that way.

IRONICALLY, IN VIETNAM, where truth became the first casualty, reporters and the military had a surprisingly good relationship in the field. Discarding the censorship that had been part of the fabric of the Korean War, the government blamed the news media for the lack of national consensus. Arguably, news reports—especially in the form of graphic photos and television—did undermine public support for the war. Perhaps a more convincing argument is that a flawed strategy lost the public's support, and the media became the scapegoat.

Fast-forward to the invasion of Grenada in 1983, during Ronald Reagan's presidency. In that instance the Pentagon controlled press policy, and the commander of the forces attacking Grenada kept reporters—scrambling to reach the scene of combat—isolated aboard ships. Military and civilian public affairs officials, including the White House Press Office, were excluded almost entirely from the planning for handling the press during the attack. Faced with major complaints from reporters and media officials, a White House press official implored Chief of Staff James A. Baker to intercede. Although President Reagan had given complete control of the operation—including information policy—to the Pentagon, Baker finally convinced the president to relent and get reporters to the island. Nevertheless, with no independent reporting for the first two days of combat, the invasion's purpose and success largely escaped public attention.

Despite the White House's arrangement of military briefings and interviews with officials from neighboring Caribbean countries who applauded the U.S. intervention, news organizations were in an uproar, and their coverage reflected that. They lost sight of the fact that after alarming developments on the island, the administration had developed a joint Navy, Army, Air Force and Marine Corps operation in complete secrecy. These forces successfully gained control of the island, rescued U.S. medical students in the process, restored order, and eventually returned control of Grenada to local citizens. The press, excluded from the party, declared it a disaster.

Mishandling of the press in Grenada ushered in a period of self-examination, illustrated by a report from retired Army Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, a former information

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President John F. Kennedy tells newspaper editors that Cuba must not be abandoned, 1961.

chief with Vietnam experience. His commission recommended that the military secretly take a media pool of reporters and cameramen to an isolated location in the event of a forthcoming combat situation that U.S. media could not generally cover. The Pentagon established such a pool system with the cooperation of media organizations.

The media pool became something of an excuse for commanders in the field. They thought it was a panacea, taking the responsibility for reporters off their shoulders. In its first serious deployment, the pool went to Panama in the 1989 invasion. The deployment was generally rated a failure. Reporters got there late and found the story being covered by others already on the scene. The media pool exists to this day but has been largely dormant in recent years, simply because no clandestine combat operations have occurred in locations without reporters. Certainly that was the case in the Persian Gulf War, when some 2,500 accredited correspondents became a major headache for the military.

In the wake of Grenada, then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger committed to "Principles of Information" that his successors have endorsed. According to one of the principles, "Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces."

Despite information principles and the

CORBIS

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf with troops

realization that something had gone wrong with media handling in Grenada and Panama, relations improved little during the Persian Gulf War. The U.S. military tried to control information and battlefield access. As detailed by print press pool coordinator John J. Fialka in *Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War,* neither the press nor the military covered itself in glory. In the inevitable post-mortem, a group of media representatives and Pentagon officials could not even agree on the use of censorship or, euphemistically, "security review." Fialka predicted a future of "war with no witnesses," based on the Grenada model.

That's not too remote a possibility, given the sentiments of military leaders like Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War. "The most difficult decisions are the ones that involve human life," he said. Journalists must recognize the importance to the military, and to the country, of protecting the lives of service men and women. Reporters and news organizations must develop responsible ways to do that, in tandem with the military. If they cannot confront this issue and develop procedures that work for them and for the military, they can expect the military to do it for them. They can expect a war without witnesses. If it comes to that, the military will likely have solid support from the public whose sons and daughters are at risk.

THAT SAID, MORE AND MORE MEMbers of the military acknowledge the

need to engage with the press, and not necessarily because of the First Amendment or because they like reporters. They might like them, but most present-day reporters have not served in the armed forces and are woefully unprepared for military assignments. In contrast, the National War College and service colleges teach military officers that dealing with reporters and providing information is part of their jobs, and the officers have learned how to do it. They know that news can affect both their personal success and the mission's success. They have concluded that they need to understand how to work with the media to reach the public through them. But they will never be willing to put their troops at risk for the sake of information flow.

As an institution, the Defense Department decided to make nonsensitive information available as rapidly as possible through the Internet. Reporters and the public find an amazing amount of information readily available through DefenseLink (www.defenselink.mil). By subscribing free to its listserv, anyone can receive by e-mail every Defense Department press release, contract and speech. Some 25,000 individuals already subscribe to the service.

All this represents progress for those of us who believe that the Defense Department is doing the people's business and that the people have a right to know what's going on there.

Still pertinent, though, is the military's unwavering core belief that it must protect information vital to national security. This applies to secret technologies, information that would destroy public and troop morale, or reporting of troop deployments that could endanger U.S. forces. This issue is not comparable to issues such as cameras in the courtroom, access to city council meetings or computerized records. It is a fundamental issue of life and death, victory or defeat.

The military should fight to protect security information. It can win the fight more easily with sensitivity to the public's right to know. The trick is for our uniformed guardians to develop a reciprocal relationship with the news media instead of an adversarial one—one in which both sides recognize each other's needs and roles and resolve to do the right thing for the country.



THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

CBS News correspondent Morley Safer during patrol in Vietnam

Basic Training

Fewer journalists serve in the armed forces, leading to diminished understanding between the media and the military.

Peter S. Prichard

Washington's annual Gridiron Club dinner is probably the pre-eminent gathering of journalists and the nation's political power structure. On a Saturday evening in March, reporters, editors, publishers and TV anchors rub shoulders—literally—with the president, Cabinet members and U.S. Supreme Court justices. The principal purpose is to have fun and laugh at the skits the Gridiron Club journalists perform, skewering Democrats and Republicans.

At the beginning of each Gridiron dinner, there is a clear but subtle acknowledgement of Americans' long commitment to public service. The Marine Band plays John Phillip Sousa's famous march—"The Stars and Stripes Forever"—and then plays, in rapid-fire order, the anthems of the five military services: the Coast Guard, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.

It is a Gridiron tradition for the people in the audience—most of whom are or have been journalists—to stand when the tune of

their service branch is played. In the mid-1980s, when I began attending the dinner, about two-thirds of the audience stood during the military medley, acknowledging with pride their own service to the nation. (I served with the U.S. Army for 19 months; nearly 14 of those were spent in South Vietnam in 1968-69.) So I stand when "The Army Goes Rolling Along" is played.

In 2001, in this audience of nearly 600, fewer than one-third stood for the military music. In fact, for some branches—the Air Force, for example—fewer than five people rose.

Anecdotally, this suggests that among today's working journalists, very few have served in the military.

Peter S. Prichard is president of The Freedom Forum. From 1988-95, he was editor of *USA TODAY*. Prichard served in Army intelligence in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969 and received the Bronze Star.

FORMAL STUDIES HAVE NOTED A need for journalists to have a better understanding of the military. In a 1995 report by The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, "America's Team: The Odd Couple, A Report on the Relationship Between the Military and the Media," journalists and service members were asked this question:

"Do you (agree/or not) that few members of the news media are knowledgeable about national defense matters, such as military personnel, equipment capabilities and the specifics of foreign military threats?"

Seventy percent of the military respondents agreed with that statement. Perhaps more telling, 74 percent of the press respondents agreed that journalists lacked such knowledge of the military.

Stephen Rynkiewicz of the *Chicago Tribune* summed up the view of many in the press: "Few reporters question such dubious notions as 'surgical strikes.' Few reporters have military backgrounds and few editors [as well]. Considering both the military's expense to taxpayers and interest from its current and former personnel, the inattention to this subject is surprising."

Air Force Gen. John P. Jumper spoke for most of the military when he said, "In Desert Storm so many reporters were not at all familiar with military matters and had no idea of the importance of security when dealing with operational matters. There was no sense that any sensitive information would be handled with any care. ... Responsible news agencies should send reporters experienced with military matters."

DOES IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE that very few journalists have served in the armed forces? The draft ended in 1973, so it is natural that fewer and fewer Americans have served in the military.

To understand whether lack of service adversely affects news coverage, simply examine some of the apparent differences in attitudes between veterans and nonveterans.

In more than 30 years in journalism and journalism-related jobs, I have noticed a few common characteristics among some journalists who lack military experience:

- They sometimes distrust military personnel automatically. They often see service men and women as puppets, incapable of independent thought.
- They have no conception of, and little appreciation for, the skill, dedication and intensity many men and women in the military bring to their jobs.

- They lack appreciation for the high quality of military training, for its degree of difficulty and the fact that much of it is dangerous.
- They lack respect for the hardships that military people and their families endure to serve and defend the country.
- They tend to underrate many of the military's formidable accomplishments: not just keeping the peace but being a true equal-opportunity employer, successfully putting young people in positions of great responsibility, running huge organizations and executing difficult missions.

A current example: Consider the technical and logistical skills it takes to maintain the no-fly zones in Iraq. Every day, air crews fly across hostile territory, face enemy fire, often flying at night and in all weather conditions, to help ensure that Iraq does not regain military power and threaten its neighbors. Or think about the diplomatic and military tightrope that peacekeepers in Bosnia must walk every day. Many of the pilots, the ground crews and the infantry personnel are volunteers. Many are members of National Guard units on regular rotations.

Are the complex realities and formidable technical challenges of these missions reflected in daily news coverage? Occasionally but not often. The no-fly zone in Iraq, in particular, gets scant news coverage.

The military shares some of the blame for this. Many senior officers have no use for the press. They would agree with Civil War Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, who said of reporters: "They publish without stint positive information of movements past & prospective, organizations, names of commanders, and accurate information which reaches the enemy with as much regularity as it does our People. ... So that no matter how rapidly we move, the enemy has advance notice. ... Never had an enemy a better corps of spies than our army carries along, paid, transported, and fed by the United States."

Are the complex realities and formidable technical challenges of military missions reflected in daily news coverage? Occasionally but not often.

Pete Williams, NBC's Supreme Court correspondent who was once the chief Pentagon spokesman, thinks this attitude persists, more than a century later, among some senior officers. "In the mind of the average field-grade commander," Williams said, "nothing good can come out of an encounter with a reporter. They (the press) just can't help you."

Williams also has noticed bias by journalists concerning the military. "There is a cultural prejudice toward the military," he said. "Some say about young people in the military, 'Yeah, they couldn't do anything else, so they joined the military.' That is so unfair, so wrong. The officers I worked with in the Pentagon were some of the best-educated, most world-wise people I've ever met."

None of these observations is meant to suggest that our military is perfect. Far from it. It is important to note as well that many journalists with no military experience have been among the best of our war correspondents: Peter Arnett, David Halberstam, Edith Lederer and Morley Safer, to name just a few. It is also true that journalists who

DENNIS BRACK/BLACK STAR

Time correspondent Jay Peterzell talks to U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, 1990.

have served may have a regrettable tendency to be cheerleaders for the military.

But clearly the lack of military knowledge among many journalists today does affect the completeness and the degree of sophistication of the news coverage.

Other observers have made similar points. Writing in 1991 in *Presstime*, the magazine of the Newspaper Association of America, Jack Dorsey, a military affairs writer for *The Virginian-Pilot* in Norfolk, cited this example: "A somewhat seasoned reporter, trying to capture the scene in a Virginia Beach restaurant ... for a feature story, wrote that 'a Navy colonel' had done such and such. For a military town like Virginia Beach, populated with thousands of members from all service branches, it was almost enough to cause the silver eagle of the officer's collar to take flight in disgust when the error was published. Navy and Coast Guard officers of such rank are captains. Army, Marine and Air Force officers are colonels.

"It is that kind of mistake, albeit small, about which the Pentagon experts rightly complain. Call a battleship an aircraft carrier or an Air Force F-15 Eagle (fighter) a bomber, and the credibility gap widens even more."

DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, the officers in charge complained from time to time that the journalists covering that conflict lacked even the most elementary knowledge of the weapons systems, ranks, and other systems and conventions of the military. For some journalists, it was like covering a football game without under-

standing what a first down was.

"On active duty I had the feeling that was the case," said Gen. Walter Boomer, a retired Marine four-star general who commanded troops in the Persian Gulf region. He noted that media ignorance makes it important for military leaders to help journalists understand defense issues.

"I tried to convince our young military people to take the time to learn who the journalists are who are covering them. They've sort of written off the media. [The press] is a fact of life. It's an important part of the fabric of our country. … [Military leaders] have to figure out how to deal with it . . . to try to reach out and educate and expose journalists to what the military is all about."

At *USA TODAY*, where I was then the top editor, we hired a retired Marine major to help us keep the military terminology straight during the Gulf War. At least we realized what we didn't know, and our readers gave us high marks for accuracy.

The reality is that among journalists, knowledge of the military and respect for its abilities have declined markedly since the demise of the draft. One of the unintended benefits of universal military service, at least from the military's perspective, was that large numbers of the population gained an appreciation for what it took to serve.

Today that knowledge is largely gone. The public is often ignorant of the military's skills and accomplishments, and so are journalists. As a result, the news media are not covering a very big story with the knowledge and sophistication it deserves. Our current defense budget is about $300 billion, the third-largest federal expenditure. The United States operates 600 military bases and other facilities around the world. More than 1.4 million Americans serve on active duty. The nation is home to more than 25 million military veterans.

All of the stakeholders—the armed forces, the journalists and the public—deserve better. The work of Americans in uniform is a huge and complex story, and it ought to be told well, by people who thoroughly understand what they are covering.

Battle Impressions

JAMES CREELMAN

There were two vivid, impressive moments during the battle of El Caney. One was when I stood beside General Chaffee and saw a button cut from his breast by a Mauser bullet. A moment before, he had been raging up and down the line, the only man in his whole brigade who was not lying flat on the grass. His hat was on the back of his head, and his lean, thirteenth-century face was glorified with the passion and fury of the fight—the toughest, profanest, divinest soldier I ever saw in battle, his eyes shining, and the muscles standing out on his neck and forehead like knotted cords. Then as I stood beside him in the shadow for a moment, a Mauser bullet clipped the shining ornament from his breast, and he looked into my face with a half-startled, half-amused air.

The next tremendous moment of the fight was when I went alone to the edge of the trench in front of the stone fort, and saw the Spaniards who remained alive crouching there and waiting for death. The thing that fascinated me was a drop of blood which hung on the end of a dead man's nose. His lips were drawn back from his teeth and he seemed to be laughing, and there on the end of his pinched nose was a great bright drop of blood.

In every battle that I go through, I somehow get a melody in my head and hum it to the end of the action. I suppose it is the result of nervous excitement. A man's nerves play him some very curious tricks. All through the battle and massacre of Port Arthur in the Japanese war, I hummed the air from Mendelssohn's "Springtime," and during the shell fire I found myself actually shrieking it. When I started in the charge on Fort Caney, I began to hum "Rock of Ages," and I couldn't get rid of the tune even when I was lying among the dying of Chaffee's brigade in the hospital camp. I remember that when General Chaffee leaned over me after I had been shot and asked me how I was, I couldn't answer him until I had finished, in my mind, one phrase of "Rock of Ages."

James Creelman made news as well as reported it as a correspondent for the *New York Herald,* the *New York World*, *Illustrated American* and *Cosmopolitan*. In 1898 Creelman went to Cuba to cover the Spanish-American War for William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal*. He helped lead an American charge against Spanish forces at El Caney.

From Cosmopolitan, *September 1898*

BOB PEARSON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, left, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell at a Pentagon briefing during the 1989 invasion of Panama

The Real War

The news media's complicity in government censorship dismays a reporter who covered the Persian Gulf War.

Patrick J. Sloyan

Politicians and the news media—government and the men and women who daily portray their actions to voters—are in continual battle. We are adversaries. The rub comes when reporters portray an event differently from the carefully contrived official view. Lyndon Johnson was one of the most fearless presidents when it came to confronting the press, but as the Vietnam War drained his popularity at home, he became more reluctant to hold press conferences. One of his aides recalled urging Johnson to go on national television to once again stress the success of

the military venture, but Johnson balked. "I can come out every once in a while," Johnson said of challenging media coverage, "but those sons of bitches come out every day."

The perpetual war between press and government has produced an ocean of bad blood, with extremes on both sides. The late Frank Kent of *The Sun* in Baltimore, a Washington newspaper veteran, represented one wing: There is only one way to look at politicians, Kent said, and that is down. At the other extreme is Vice President Dick Cheney.

Cheney was secretary of defense during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. He effectively shredded the First Amendment by imposing censorship on U.S. journalists covering the confrontation with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Abandoned were self-imposed ground rules that the press used during the Vietnam War to prevent security breaches that might endanger U.S. troops.

In the 10 years of the Indochina conflict, out of several thousand U.S. correspondents, none had accreditation revoked for violating these rules, which the U.S. military also approved. But during Desert Storm, reporters had to have military escorts wherever they went, escorts who routinely would interrupt interviews if a soldier strayed from the official line. Dispatches, still photographs and video footage were subject to military censorship. Reporters operating outside the so-called pool system for wire services, newspapers and networks were subject to military arrest. After some bloodless protests, corporate leaders of media organizations accepted Cheney's edicts.

Not everyone knuckled under. More than 70 reporters were detained, threatened at gunpoint or literally chased from the front lines by U.S. Army military police and public affairs officers. Some were roughed up. Photographer J. Scott Applewhite of The Associated Press was punched, handcuffed and had his film seized when he photographed U.S. soldiers killed by an Iraqi Scud missile. About 150 reporters who were directed by their employers to participate in Cheney's pool system found they were blocked from witnessing combat. Their reports were delayed or, in most cases, "lost" after Cheney ordered a news blackout during the ground war. As a result, the pool media failed to produce a single photograph, strip of videotape or eyewitness account of 300,000 U.S. Army troops in combat with an estimated 400,000 Iraqi soldiers.

Later, Cheney would say that the generals (among them Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now secretary of state) requested the restrictions. But politics was the real reason for Persian Gulf War censorship. Political leaders enjoy an astounding windfall of voter support for using military power to crush a foreign enemy, real or imagined. This is not just a U.S. phenomenon. Margaret Thatcher was on the verge of being ousted as Great Britain's prime minister and Conservative Party leader when Argentina made the mistake of seizing the Falkland Islands in 1982. The British invasion of those specks in the south Atlantic revitalized her career. She

Patrick J. Sloyan, senior correspondent for *Newsday*'s Washington bureau, has covered national and international news since 1960. He won the 1992 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting and shared the 1997 Pulitzer for spot news.

became the longest-serving prime minister in British history. President George Bush's public approval rating after Desert Storm was the highest any president had achieved in the history of opinion polling. We saw it again in last year's election of Vladimir Putin as Russian president. His lone attribute appeared to be the aggression against Chechnya and its Islamic residents.

THE KEY TO SUCCESS for Thatcher in the Falklands, Bush in the Persian Gulf and Putin in Chechnya was the same: Blindfold the media.

Not a word of British losses at sea—236 sailors and soldiers perished—became public until after the fleet arrived in the Falklands. By then, the casualties were almost secondary to Thatcher's announcement that the islands had been retaken. Restrictions on the Russian and international press last year meant the bloodshed in the Caucasus went unwitnessed by the public. For the world watching the Iraqi desert, the Persian Gulf War was a series of smart bombs destroying bridges and apparently empty buildings.

Eliminated from these accounts were the horrors of war, the battlefield mistakes, the dead and wounded and the human suffering and grief. That is the other side of political use of military power. Newspaper and television accounts of the Vietnam conflict's reality turned many U.S. voters against their government years before it dawned on the politicians in Washington.

President Bush was all too familiar with the ugliness of war. He once recounted a day aboard an aircraft carrier where he served as a bomber pilot during World War II. When an unwary sailor wandered into the path of a landing plane, the propeller sliced him in two. Bush said he could still hear a chief petty officer calling for a broom to sweep the guts from the flight deck. "I have seen the hideous face of war," Bush said.

Despite the daily intensity of the coverage and millions spent on reporters and photographers, Desert Storm ended without any reliable account of battles, losses, triumphs or disasters.

By leading the media establishment into pool coverage of the Persian Gulf War, Bush and Cheney hid that face from the public. Despite the daily intensity of the coverage and millions spent on reporters and photographers, Desert Storm ended without any reliable account of battles, losses, triumphs or disasters.

I COVERED THAT CONflict from October 1990 through its end in March 1991. After a brief vacation, I spent the rest of the year finding out what the press restrictions had hidden, starting with the opening moments of the land invasion when the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) broke through the defensive trench line of 8,000 Iraqi troops. Division commanders had studied the World War I-style trenches from aerial photographs and, with some help from Washington think tanks, devised a low-risk assault. Instead of using soldiers with bayonets to clear the trenches, they mounted plows on their main battle tanks, the M1 Abrams. After rehearsals before the assault, the commanders desig-

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

President Lyndon Johnson defends Vietnam War policy, 1967.

nated two tanks for each trench line. With an Abrams on either side, the desert sand was easily plowed into the trenches. Following the tanks but actually straddling the trenches were Bradley fighting vehicles, lighter armored machines equipped with a cannon and machine guns. Finally, bringing up the rear were combat earthmovers, which smoothed out the filled-in trenches so that an observer would see only the faceless desert of southern Iraq.

After an artillery bombardment pinned the Iraqis in their trenches, two of the 1st Division brigades—8,400 Americans in 3,000 vehicles—began filling in 70 miles of trenches. More than 2,000 Iraqis surrendered, but thousands were killed by gunfire or buried alive under tons of sand. Col. Anthony Moreno, commander of the 2nd Brigade, which led the assault on the heaviest defenses, said in a taped interview, "For all I know, we could have killed thousands. I came through right after the lead company. What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with peoples' arms and things sticking out of them. As the Iraqi soldiers saw what we were doing and how effective and fast we were doing it, they began jumping out of their holes and surrendering." The commander of the 1st Brigade, Col. Lon Maggart, told me his troops buried 650 Iraqi soldiers.

Pool reporters with the 1st Division were ordered to stay back until the end of the assault the next morning. Included in that pool was a distinguished combat correspondent, Leon Daniel of United Press International. Daniel told me later that he was surprised by the dearth of dead bodies. In Vietnam, he said, a relatively small firefight would produce a stack of corpses. But combat earthmovers had removed any trace of what had happened in the previous 24 hours. Daniel asked one commander where the bodies were. The officer, a public affairs major, replied, "What bodies?"

Not until after my dispatches appeared did the Army formally acknowledge what had happened.

MY REPORTS APPEARED in *Newsday* in June, three months after the speeches, the parades and the medals. They were news to the chairmen of both the House and Senate Armed Services committees, the panels charged with overseeing the Pentagon and the military. Even more shocked were some of my colleagues who were scrambling to match these accounts. What really sickened some of them was Cheney's confirmation that my dispatches were accurate. My tape-recorded interviews certainly helped prod the Defense Department's confirmation.

The burial-brigade dispatch was one of 13 that I filed after Desert Storm. It was a particularly nasty development for Cheney, who had just finished a formal report to Congress. His report implied that only 457 Iraqi soldiers had been killed during the war—the number of bodies that allied troops found and buried. Cheney's estimate coincided with Bush's contention that the Persian Gulf War was, as televised government briefings portrayed, largely a bloodless affair. In fact, Cheney's spokesman told reporters that U.S. troops never really engaged in close combat with Iraqi forces. As I probed deeper in interviews with commanders and soldiers involved in the fighting, my estimate was closer to 35,000 Iraqis dead on the battlefield from both the air and ground war.

But where were the battles? One senior Army officer urged me to talk to commanders of the 1st Division, the same outfit that buried thousands of Iraqi troops. The Army measures battles by its own losses. The senior officer noted that one of the 1st Division units had been engaged in a ferocious night battle that left six soldiers dead and more than 30 wounded. Five main battle tanks were destroyed, along with five Bradley fighting vehicles. After interviews with almost 100 participants, I learned that battle was a tragic fiasco. The six men killed, the tanks and fighting vehicles destroyed, and the 30 wounded all were victims of what the Army calls "friendly fire." In every instance, the Army lied to families about the cause of death. Not until after my dispatches appeared did the Army formally acknowledge what had happened.

For all the hype about allied military prowess in the desert, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf could not destroy the bulk of Iraq's best troops and tanks. The administration could not parlay a military triumph into an election victory. You might remember challenger Bill Clinton's bumper sticker: "Saddam Hussein Still Has His Job. Do You Still Have Your Job?"

The Bush presidency did provide a constitutional landmark, however. Desert Storm marked the occasion when the world's most powerful media barons gave up their constitutional right to report on U.S. troops in battle by bowing to government censorship. None of the wire service, newspaper or broadcasting executives was happy with Bush's controls, but none challenged their legality, either. Their inaction had many causes, but my opinion is that the government somehow led them to believe the pool system would work to their advantage.

Take *The Washington Post,* for example. Under the pool system, every censored dispatch by *Post* reporters was supposed to be shared instantly with every other journalist covering the war. Instead, one of the *Post*'s pool reporters kept very interesting information about U.S. Marine Corps operations hidden until after the war. It was finally revealed in a book serialized by the *Post*. I should note here that the *Post* and my competition in New York City, *The New York Times,* criticized my reporting after I won the Pulitzer Prize for my Desert Storm coverage.

On the day I received that honor, I criticized the very establishment that sponsors the Pulitzer Prizes for groveling before government censors. It underscored the media leaders' abandonment of the First Amendment and the battle against government secrecy.

Another reason that news organizations caved was disengagement at the top levels of media corporations. Too many men and women who control the flow of information in this republic have forgotten their adversarial relationship with government. The wave of mergers in recent years has led major corporations to assume control of newspapers and television networks. These mergers often must pass muster with the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, the Federal Communications Commission, Congress and other powers in Washington—all of which would prefer less adversarial media.

Gannett, Knight Ridder, the Tribune Co. (which owns *Newsday*), Newhouse and other chains have grown rich by centralizing many aspects of the business. They are the fattest of cats. And in city after town, those corporations have installed editors who have little time for the First Amendment because too much of their day goes toward marketing and budgeting.

Editors who go along with this corporate style are rewarded beyond their wildest dreams. A recent Inland Press Association survey found that editors of newspapers in the 250,000-to-500,000 circulation range earn an average of $250,000 a year. Bonuses and stock options accounted for, on average, another $56,470 a year. But that income hinges on their willingness to trim expenses—reducing the size of the news hole, making do with fewer reporters, cutting budgets for lawsuits to assert First Amendment rights.

In the editor's office, this issue is far more gray and complex, not the black-and-white image I am presenting. But to me, it is a disturbing trend. I can think of only a handful to share my foxhole in the real war that goes on every day between the press and government.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

The Stars and Stripes reports the near-end of World War II.

Reporting on the Warriors

The Stars and Stripes *strives for good journalism in a "company-owned" arena.*

Derald Everhart

At the 50th-anniversary celebration of the European edition of *The Stars and Stripes* in April 1992, "60 Minutes" commentator Andy Rooney asked the gathering of several hundred people, "What are you still doing here?

"I think that the best thing for the United States of America would be if *The Stars and Stripes* closed down because we should move out of [Europe], and I know most of you won't take that too kindly," said Rooney, who had reported for the military newspaper when he was a GI in World War II.

The famous curmudgeon's comments

made many on the newspaper's staff—worried that the military is always seeking a reason to shut down the newspaper—cringe. Indeed, the paper's long history of battles on journalistic grounds continues today as potential censorship and other military controls remain issues.

Rooney's remarks reflected his belief that, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification, Europe no longer needs U.S. troops. Without troops, he reasoned, there would be no need for *The Stars and Stripes*.

But 56 years after the end of World War II, 100,000 U.S. Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel still serve in Europe. These days, those troops are likely to bring their spouses, children and pets with them. Add Defense Department civilians and their family members, and Europe contains an American military community of more than 300,000 people, spread out primarily in seven countries.

Although those numbers are down 60 percent from the height of the Cold War, when U.S. troops served as a tripwire for Soviet Bloc aggression, today's European force is more likely to be deployed from bases in Germany, Italy and England to hot spots in the Balkans, the Middle East or Africa. Bringing the news to this far-flung community remains the job of *The Stars and Stripes*—in many places the only English-language newspaper available.

The Defense Department gave *The Stars and Stripes* the mission of serving as the "hometown newspaper" for service members overseas. "Its editorial policies and practices shall be in accordance with the highest journalistic standards governing U.S. daily commercial newspapers," reads DoD Directive 5122.11.

However, the journalistic issues that faced the newspaper in Rooney's day and earlier—censorship and news management by the military—remain a battle for its reporters and editors, albeit a subtler one.

As part of their jobs, staffers at both the European and Pacific editions of *Stripes,* as they informally call the newspaper, continue to follow troops as they did in World War I and World War II.

Stripes reporters were there when units of the 1st Armored Division crossed the Sava River into Bosnia at the end of 1995. During the 1999 bombing campaign against Yugoslavian forces in Kosovo, "Stripers" were on Air Force flight lines and U.S. Navy cruisers and aircraft carriers and with Army contingents in Albania and Macedonia. They followed the first U.S. ground troops into Kosovo after the bombing. Later that year, they went into East Timor with an international peacekeeping mission. They are just as likely to report from Korea, Okinawa, Turkey or NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

Just as the military and its mission have changed since the end of World War II, so too have the paper's staff and readers. During World War II the reporters and editors came mostly from the enlisted ranks. Back then it was a newspaper for soldiers and by soldiers, heavy on war news. Today most of the staff in the 14 European bureaus—

Derald Everhart was European desk editor with *The Stars and Stripes* in Griesheim, Germany, from 1997-99. Currently he is deputy editor of the Gazette Newspapers in Prince George's County, Md.

including Bosnia and Kosovo—and 10 Pacific bureaus are civilians, including all the senior editors. Of the editorial staff of 27 in Europe, only four reporters and one photographer are from the armed services. And while a colonel used to carry the title of publisher and editor, civilians hold those positions today in Washington, where the centralized copy-editing and pagination staffs of both the Pacific and European editions are based.

The paper's readers are just as likely to be civilians—spouses and family members living on military bases, and other Defense Department employees—as they are members of the military. For that reason, the reporting flows both ways in its circulation areas. During the Kosovo bombing, *Stripes* reporters wrote about the long working hours, minimal comforts and muddy field conditions facing the troops and airmen deployed in Albania, Italy and Macedonia to set up staging camps. At the same time, other reporters wrote about anxious family members at the European home bases who were coping with the uncertainty of that potentially prolonged and dangerous deployment.

The Stars and Stripes carries a mix of wire news from back home in the United States and local, staff-written stories on issues affecting those stationed overseas. Recently the European edition published a three-part series on the quality of water being delivered to base housing, where many of the buildings and plumbing are more than 40 years old.

While war reporting might be perceived as a glamorous occupation filled with adventure and tinged with danger, reporting on the warriors, as *Stripes* reporters do daily, is more like covering the residents and workers of a large company town. What puts *Stripes* in a different, sometimes difficult, situation is that it is owned and subsidized by the "company" its reporters cover.

While war reporting might be perceived as a glamorous occupation filled with adventure and tinged with danger, reporting on the warriors, as *Stripes* reporters do daily, is more like covering the residents and workers of a large company town.

For that reason the Defense Department has codified some standard journalistic protections. "The DoD policy for *The Stars and Stripes* is that there shall be a free flow of news and information to its readership without news management or censorship," says DoD Directive 5122.11. "The calculated withholding of unfavorable news is prohibited."

The First Amendment protection afforded *The Stars and Stripes*—its civilian editors decide independently what stories reporters will write, which ones to run and how to play them—sets the newspaper apart from its electronic cousins at the extremely popular Armed Forces Radio and Television Service or the ubiquitous base newspapers that serve the same community.

Both AFRTS and the base publications are products of the armed services' public affairs machine, which promotes "command information," or the commanders'

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Soldier stationed in South Korea catches up on the news, 1950.

point of view. That means that the staff-produced material aired or published is what someone in the chain of command wants the troops to know.

Still, the Defense Department does impose limitations on *The Stars and Stripes*. For starters, the staff cannot publish stories that knowingly disclose classified information, adversely affect national security or endanger the lives of military personnel. Although the newspaper cannot publish its own stories that violate those rules, it can publish stories containing such information if they come from another publication or news agency. But the department's directives do allow the publisher to hold or kill a story if he believes it would violate those rules.

Such an event happened just last year, and the fallout caused a stir among the staff and the journalism community when the *Stripes* editor resigned in protest.

In that August 2000 incident a *Stripes* reporter in Europe wrote about the planned deployment of Patriot missiles from Army bases in Germany to Israel. The information came from the communities where the soldiers were based, from Army sources in Germany and from diplomats in the Middle East.

Pentagon higher-ups caught wind of the story and contacted Clifford Bernath, civilian director of *Stripes*' parent agency, the American Forces Information Service, to say they had national security concerns about the story. Bernath, in turn, called Publisher Tom Kelsch, also a civilian, who listened to the arguments.

Without reading the story or identifying the Pentagon officials who made the request, Kelsch decided to kill the story. His position was that the deployment was classified and the story posed a security threat to soldiers.

The staff was incensed that the Pentagon was trying to censor the paper, and the editors protested vociferously. Kelsch, who had listened to the Pentagon's case under a cloak of confidentiality, said he was not allowed to divulge the reasons behind his decision, even to his senior editors.

A similar story on the missile deployment appeared in *The Washington Post* the next day. Even then, Kelsch refused to run the story, though he allowed the editors to run the *Post* story in the following day's edition.

Kelsch's top newsman, Executive Editor David Offer, who'd been in the job about four months, resigned in protest the day after the *Post* story ran in *Stripes*.

In a newspaper column on the incident two days later, *Stripes* ombudsman David Mazzarella said Kelsch should have tried harder to ascertain what parts of the story were classified, given the "apparently open way" the planned deployment was being treated in Europe. The Pentagon's involvement and Kelsch's decision left a "sense of disquiet and suspicion," Mazzarella's column concluded.

Because of the newspaper's status within its "community," some overzealous public affairs officers and commanders believe that the newspaper's primary mission should be to promote morale among the troops.

THOUGH SUCH HIGH-profile censorship attempts are few, the military has subtler ways of controlling the news—as any reporter from a civilian newspaper in regular contact with a local military base can attest.

Public affairs officials insist on being the sole point of contact for base matters and information, and reporters can usually enter bases only with an escort. Although *Stripes* staffers carry military identification cards admitting them to all overseas bases, the rule is that reporters do not go on a base to work a story without first notifying the base's public affairs office. The unspoken threat is that the command could revoke the reporter's ID card if this procedure is not followed, thus limiting access to the military community and the stories that are the newspaper's daily fare.

The military also frequently uses the Pri-

vacy Act to deny reporters access to information that would be public record in the civilian world—for example, arrest logs, charging documents and disposition of criminal charges. Just getting the report on the cause of an unattended death can take several letters and many months of waiting.

Because of the newspaper's status within its "community," some overzealous public affairs officers and commanders believe that the newspaper's primary mission should be to promote morale among the troops. So they are slow to respond to information requests, "forget" or "misplace" requests, or simply refuse to release information they consider too controversial or negative. Fighting that mind set is a constant in the workaday world of *Stripes* reporters and editors—and the subject of many complaints to Mazzarella, a former *USA TODAY* editor.

Stripes reporters face a few other journalistic limitations arising from the newspaper's military status.

The first is the inability to use the Freedom of Information Act to force disclosure of information. Because one federal government entity cannot "FOIA" another, *Stripes* reporters work to get around that by using Defense Department directives that afford *Stripes* equal access to information available to U.S. civilian newspapers. The newspaper has developed its own freedom-of-information request letter, in which it reasons out its argument: If the information sought is releasable under FOIA, then the spirit and intent of the law should make the information releasable without a FOIA request. That letter tends to work on enlightened public affairs folks who understand the concept.

The second limitation is that *Stripes* reporters cannot protect a source from an authorized military investigation. Although that has rarely been an issue, such an investigation theoretically could arise from the publication of a story.

A third limitation, perhaps the least problematical for reporters in their day-to-day work, is a restriction on staff-generated editorials or political endorsements. To compensate, the newspaper runs a wide selection of opinion columnists and political cartoonists from a variety of syndicates. The ombudsman also has the authority to run his column—in which he responds to readers' or staff complaints—on the opinion page, unedited and uncut.

Despite its lack of a traditional editorial voice, *Stripes* does offer readers an unfiltered voice through its letters-to-the-editor page. Recent readership surveys indicate that the letters page is the second most popular—after sports. The page gives *Stripes* a loud voice in its overseas community and helps further define its independence from the military.

Over the past few years the sometimes rough-and-tumble letter threads have dealt with racism in the military, former President Bill Clinton's impeachment, and the high tempo and number of deployments away from home bases and families. The most popular, continuing themes in the letters: AFRTS, the commissary and exchange services, and—you guessed it—*The Stars and Stripes*.

HATRED TO STAY

RELMA MORIN

LONG AFTER THE LAST SHOT IS FIRED, the weeds of hatred will be flourishing in Korea, nourished by blood and bitter memories.

This is the heritage of the short weeks during which most of South Korea was learning Communism.

Only weeks ago in the region around Seoul and Inchon, people were being killed, dispossessed of land and homes, left to starve, or driven away from all they held dear—because they were not Communists and refused to act like Communists. …

Today, in that same region, the same things are still happening—because some Koreans are Communists and propose to remain so.

Hidden in the hills a mile off the road to Seoul, there is a village of twenty-four mud-stone huts with thatched roofs. … Even before the North Korean military invasion last June, nine of the men in the village were Communists. The headman didn't know why. He simply said they belonged to a Red organization, and frequently went to meetings in Inchon at night.

As a result, the headman said, some of the other villages banded together and beat the Communists.

"There was always trouble and fighting," said the headman, "and we talked of driving the Reds away."

Then the North Korean army swept southward over this little village. The nine Communists suddenly appeared in uniforms.

They killed some of their neighbors and caused others to be put in jail at Inchon. The headman himself fled to safety in the south. One of the villagers went with him.

"He did not want to go," said the headman. "He was to be married. The girl stayed here. She is 18 and a grown woman, but she did not know what to do."

Back in the village the nine Communists began putting theory into practice. First they confiscated all land. Then they summoned landless tenant farmers from nearby villages and told them the land would be given to them if they became Communists. …

Then, ten days ago, the Americans attacked Inchon. Before the Communists left they herded thirty-three men into a large cell in the Inchon jail and locked the doors. Then the thirty-three were shot to death.

As soon as possible the headman came back to his village. Soon the man who had fled with him came back too. …

The American officer asked: "What would you do if the nine Communists came back?"

The headman and the others listening burst into hearty laughter.

"Kill them, naturally," the headman said.

Relma Morin won two Pulitzer Prizes for war coverage in the 1950s, the first of which was for this article on the enmity between communist and noncommunist members of a newly liberated Korean village.

Excerpt from Associated Press dispatch, Sept. 25, 1950. Reprinted with permission of The Associated Press.

CHRIS RAINIER/CORBIS

Child running from sniper fire, Maglaj, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994

RIGHT AND WRONG

Journalists are storytellers, not social scientists or historians or criminal investigators or humanitarian aid workers. We offer the power and eloquence of our writing and observation. — TOM GJELTEN

Tom Gjelten on journalists' moral responsibility and the new rules of war reporting

Judy C. Woodruff on why U.S. media should cover foreign wars

GILLES PERESS/MAGNUM PHOTOS

Photographer James Nachtwey carries orphaned baby, Zaire, 1994.

Finding the Right 'Moral Attitude'

Journalists can best serve victims of crisis by balancing humanity and professionalism.

Tom Gjelten

The 20th century ended with an eruption of small but savage wars around the world: Colombia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chechnya, Afghanistan and beyond. In every conflict, the victims were predominantly civilians. Those who escaped outright death or injury in the fighting often were left homeless and hungry. Journalists who covered the fighting witnessed war crimes, human rights violations and untold suffering, much of it preventable. Once again, war reporters had to consider their own moral responsibility in the face of evil.

We journalists have always had difficulty deciding whether professional ethics require that we care about the people we cover or remain indifferent to their plight. Critics of our performance in war and crisis situations argue that we should consider our reporting's impact. Carole Zimmerman, speaking for the Bread for the World aid agency, has even suggested that journalists "re-imagine" their profession and consider becoming

explicitly humanitarian in their approach to international reporting. People working on programs to prevent violence recommend that we think more about how our reporting may affect the development of a conflict. Human rights monitors insist that we aggressively uncover atrocities and injustice.

Journalists instinctively resist arguments that we be more "socially responsible," having seen how authoritarian governments around the world have used that demand to muzzle an irksome free press. Moreover, we have faith that good journalism intrinsically serves the public interest. But we need to think more carefully about the responsibilities we have—individually and professionally—when we find ourselves in places where war crimes are occurring and where our actions as journalists and as people could change the course of events.

Tom Gjelten is the national security correspondent for National Public Radio. He is the author of *Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege* and a contributing author of *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know*.

MOST JOURNALISTS WANT THEIR reporting to make a difference. War correspondents would have little reason to risk their lives for a story if they did not believe they served a larger purpose in getting the news to their readers, listeners or viewers. War reporting in the Balkans, Africa, Chechnya and elsewhere has been for many of us a passion-stirring personal experience. We were among the first to learn that great atrocities had been committed and the first to witness the terrible suffering in their wake. Having seen such things, we had to choose the appropriate reaction.

Lindsey Hilsum, a reporter for Independent Television News in the United Kingdom, covered the mass killing of Tutsis in Rwanda and decided to testify before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. "It was not my responsibility as a journalist," she later explained. "My role as a journalist could even have been compromised by my testifying. But I also have responsibilities as a human being." A journalist who witnesses a crime is not absolved of the responsibility to report the crime to the proper legal authorities.

Roy Gutman, who won a Pulitzer Prize for exposing Serb-run concentration camps in Bosnia, hoped his stories would save lives. "You've got to do everything in your power to stop these things," he said, "and exposing it is one of the best ways to do it." Gutman is careful, however, to limit the journalist's role: "Our job is to supply the facts so other people can make the judgments. The worst thing is to step across the line and recommend what should be done."

SOME NEWS MEDIA ANALYSTS ARGUE that journalists should maintain moral detachment. Former newsman Marvin Kalb (now directing the Washington office of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University) complained in a recent book that some journalists in Bosnia wrote their stories "for the specific purpose of affecting national policy," a practice he criticized as a departure from the standard of objectivity. "To the degree that this change in professional attitude is simply a limited response to the anguish of covering a truly dreadful human tragedy such as the events in Bosnia," he wrote, "this may be understandable though still

regrettable. But if reporters are now to adopt a moral attitude toward their stories, then the public is almost certain to be shortchanged."

Still, as a veteran journalist, Kalb should have known that adopting a "moral attitude" in journalism was hardly unprecedented. Crusading reporters who uncover corruption in local government or child abuse in day-care centers are seen as performing a public service. One of the Pulitzer Prizes is even reserved for this kind of journalism. Many reporters who covered the civil rights movement in the 1960s adopted a "moral attitude" in their stories without being criticized for surrendering their objectivity.

Bob Greene, a longtime investigative reporter for *Newsday*, told an interviewer that his generation of journalists went into the business "because it was an opportunity to effect change for good. You never did it for money because you knew it was the poorest paying job in the world. … [But] you can try to work for what is presumed to be good, if nothing else, by bringing accurate information to people."

In fact, journalists who make no moral judgments in their reporting and who treat all stories equally are routinely criticized for being cynical or mercenary. Such charges helped prompt the "public journalism" movement, whose advocates contend that the press should work openly "to help communities solve problems and to aid in the country's search for a workable public life." News organizations practicing "public journalism" (generally community newspapers) have polled citizens about their main concerns and reported extensively about possible solutions to identified problems.

Journalists who make no moral judgments in their reporting and who treat all stories equally are routinely criticized for being cynical or mercenary.

Thus far, journalists have confined the practice to domestic affairs, but some critics of international reportage have suggested extending public journalism to the global arena. Peter Shiras, a veteran of such agencies as Catholic Relief Services, has argued that the "public journalism" approach "could be usefully applied to conflict situations abroad wherein reporting would focus not only on the conflict but also on an array of both indigenous and international strategies for dealing with the conflict."

That approach probably takes a noble idea a step too far, however. Reporters can demonstrate moral and social responsibility without becoming proactively involved in their own stories. If journalists are to be deployed abroad as social workers or conflict-resolution specialists, it probably will be through groups or projects with exclusively humanitarian aims (such as the Search for Common Ground, a nongovernmental organization) rather than as staff members of traditional news organizations.

ANOTHER RECOMMENDATION CONcerning coverage of hot spots overseas is that we revise our notion of newsworthiness. The news media often are criticized for focusing excessively on emergencies instead of paying close attention to potential conflicts or crisis areas before they erupt. Yet such criticism is at times naïve. John Hammock and Joel Charny—both associated with Oxfam America, an antipoverty advo-



HORST FAAS AND MICHEL LAURENT/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Soldiers conduct bayonet executions in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1971.

cacy group—suggested in a recent article that "journalists given overseas assignments—even when parachuting into a disaster—should be fluent in the language favored locally." To meet that requirement, a news organization would have to employ as many foreign-language speakers as the United Nations does.

Hammock and Charny go on to recommend that journalists "present the daily lives of people in developing countries and their organized efforts to solve their own problems—before, during and after crises." Would Hammock and Charny promise to read such articles or listen to such programs? The media organization best known for this approach in covering the developing world, United Nations Radio, is hardly known for its wide audience.

Useful media criticism must consider the realities of the business: We must win and hold the attention of readers, listeners and viewers; we operate under tight budgetary constraints, and our resources are limited. Covering emergencies will always be a higher priority than covering people's daily lives. After all, we are not development officers, agricultural extension agents, public health workers or family planning advisers.

"Good news is too often considered not newsworthy," complained Zimmerman of Bread for the World, who asked journalists to

"re-imagine" the purposes of their profession. "Murder in a small town and its big-time equivalent, war within or between nations, makes better news than a nutrition program that improves a million lives."

Editors do not consider war to be "better" than life-saving nutrition programs. Their major responsibility is to see that the world is explained, not that it is improved. In most editors' judgment, an overseas story deserves coverage if, among other things, it is:

- Important: Broad values, interests or resources are at stake.
- Dynamic: The story has some suspense, with events changing and the outcome uncertain.
- Illustrative: The story has explanatory power, suggesting trends or patterns.
- Interesting: The story will hold the attention of readers, listeners or viewers.

If critics want the news media to cover stories that fail to meet at least some of these criteria, their advice is not helpful. They are on solid ground, however, when they fault the press for being inaccurate; distorting reality; insufficiently examining the root causes of conflicts; resorting to simplistic analyses or clichés; stereotyping, or failing to ask tough questions. When diplomats, historians, social scientists or others explain how the news media get a story wrong, they do help.

JOURNALISTS DO NOT NEED TO "re-imagine" their international work to help prevent or resolve conflicts around the world. They simply need to do their jobs better—by the traditional standards of their profession.

Geneva Overholser, a former *Washington Post* ombudsman, once quoted a *Post* reader who said she did not understand foreign news stories and consequently did not read them. "If Americans better understood economic and political circumstances abroad," Overholser asked, "wouldn't there be hope for steadier policies and more effective interventions?" Overholser suggested that news organizations run regular "primers" on major foreign news stories, answering basic "who, what, where, when and why" questions to give readers some context for understanding breaking developments.

Because war correspondents often witness the first stages of a conflict, their reports can serve as warnings. A major challenge to diplomats, aid organizations and peace mediators is the relatively weak domestic constituency for their efforts. Foreign news coverage can change that, as U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recognized. "Peacekeeping operations," Annan said, "depend for their support on widespread public awareness of the conflicts, and we are committed to doing everything we can to facilitate the work of the media."

Of course, journalists are storytellers, not social scientists or historians or criminal investigators or humanitarian aid workers. We offer the power and eloquence of our writing and observation.

When people are in anguish, it is our unique professional responsibility to convey what they feel and not just the facts of their predicament. We must aim to preserve the human dignity of those whose experiences we relate. When suffering is gruesome, we must take care that our reporting steers clear of pornography. Stories that pander to emotion—offering no insight or analysis—might titillate but do not explain and may even distort what has happened. In the end, to balance emotion with dispassionate observation is one of the great challenges of professional war journalism.

This essay is adapted from "Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View" (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).

War from a Helicopter

David Halberstam

The first time one sees a member of the Vietcong there is a sharp sense of disappointment. He is not, it turns out, very different; he is simply another Vietnamese. Generally when you see him he is either kneeling and firing at you, or he has just been captured, or, more often than not, he is dead. The bodies of enemy dead are always lined up, feet all in an orderly row. The guerrilla wears little, perhaps a simple peasant pajama suit, perhaps only shorts. He is slim and wiry, and his face could be that of your interpreter or of the taxi driver who drove you to My Tho. Only the haircut is different, very thin along the sides and very long on top and in front. It is a bad haircut and, like the frailness of the uniform and the thin wallet with only a few pictures of some peasant woman, it makes the enemy human. But one's sympathy does not last long; this is the same face which has been seen by the outnumbered defenders of some small outpost before it was overrun.

There were not many operations in which Vietcong were caught; there were few prisoners in this war. One of the rare exceptions to this that I ever observed took place in April 1963, when I accompanied the new armed-helicopter units in the upper Camau peninsula. …

David Halberstam covered the Vietnam War for *The New York Times*. In 1964 he received the Pulitzer Prize, along with Malcolm Browne of The Associated Press, for his work there.

At about 8:30 a.m. we saw some movement in the village below, followed by a few light crackles around us. It was ground fire; the bait had been taken. We came in low once over the village and saw some men scurrying to positions. … We were making our advance on the tree line under fire when we saw one man in a black suit desperately running across the open field. It was the dry season and the fields were of sun-caked mud. Suddenly a helicopter descended almost on top of the man, and he stopped and held up his hands. The Vietnamese commander ran over to him. There was no weapon on this Vietcong; neither was there any of the bowing or scraping that local guerrillas who posed as farmers sometimes employed.

This enemy was angry and defiant, and at first a little scared as well—until he saw me and spit at me. The commander slapped his face very hard and said something in Vietnamese. Later I was told that the captain had said to the prisoner, "The Americans are very kind. They do not kill, and they are always telling us not to kill you, but I am not so kind and I will kill you. You will see."

Excerpt from "The Face of the Enemy in Vietnam," Harper's Magazine*, February 1965.*

CHRIS RAINIER/CORBIS

Bosnian Muslim sniper aims at a target in Sarajevo during the Yugoslavian civil war.

Beware of Thugs, Warlords and P.R. Agents

Rules for reporting postmodern wars

Tom Gjelten

As a foreign correspondent in the 1980s, I covered war and revolution in Central America. In the 1990s I reported the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. The Central American and Yugoslav wars were just a few years apart, yet they belonged to different historical eras: before and after the end of the Cold War.

In Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, the opposing sides were clearly distinguished by political ideology, with contrasting views on the distribution of wealth and the role of private capital. The wars were local but fit neatly into the wider context of East-West struggle. The Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries generally supported one

side and the United States the other.

In Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, however, the warring parties could not be placed so easily along a left-right spectrum. These conflicts were not primarily about land ownership or workers' rights, and they were far less connected to broader global rivalries. War in the former Yugoslavia was mostly provoked by local demagogues who, in a time of rising social and economic discontent, saw benefits to be gained by turning people against their neighbors.

For now, the Yugoslav pattern echoes in conflicts around the world, from West Africa to East Timor. State disintegration is increasingly common. Old ethnic rivalries are rekindled, even where linguistic and cultural differences are slight. Much of the fighting is among civilians, and it is especially brutal. Conflicts increasingly involve nonstate actors, and the parties are less inclined to abide by customary international humanitarian law and the established rules of war. The fighting creates enormous problems for neighboring states, yet the outside world is not sure whether, when or how to intervene.

In its primitiveness, warfare at times seems to revert to the style of past centuries. Marauding groups chase down their hapless victims and club them to death, hack their limbs off or gouge their eyes out. Yet these also are Information Age conflicts—battles where words and images are mighty weapons. Some of the most vicious militia groups are most eager to work with news media outlets, both local and international.

In fact, the outcome of many small, postmodern wars may depend as much on how they are perceived as on how they are fought. To mobilize his people, a leader must portray a conflict as a fight for collective survival, and this might mean getting the people to identify with an exclusive group, defined perhaps by religion or ethnicity. Hatemongering demagogues in Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, used local radio stations to foment interethnic conflict. The international media's representation of these wars also is important because it can influence the response of other states and international organizations.

Under such changing circumstances, journalists must reconsider the conventions of traditional war reporting and adopt guidelines appropriate for covering armed conflict in the 21st century.

THE FIRST RULE IS TO BE CAREFUL. For as long as journalists have followed troops into combat, war reporting has been a high-risk profession. The downscaling and deregulation of war in recent years have made it even more dangerous. More journalists died in the first year of fighting in the former Yugoslavia than were killed during the first five years of heavy U.S. involvement in South Vietnam.

Those of us who were in Central America learned early that it is far safer to go into battle in the company of one side or the other than to strike out on your own. The troops you move with will provide some protection. Normally you can rely on a command-and-control structure with clear rules and expectations. And there is far less danger of stumbling across a front line by accident.

In Bosnia, Somalia, Chechnya and Sierra Leone, such arrangements have been the exception. War in these places involved not just organized armies but also paramilitary groups, armed civilians and even criminal organizations. Covering messy conflicts is far

riskier than conventional war reporting. The "soldiers" manning a roadblock may turn out to be drunken thugs, attracted mainly by the opportunity to extort money, jewelry or equipment from passing journalists. They may answer to no superior officer or only to colleagues in crime. Anarchy reigns where state authority has disappeared, and working as a journalist under such circumstances can be a deadly business.

The best course is to be especially cautious, understand that no "arrangement" guarantees your security, learn to recognize land mines and bring body armor. In Central America we wore T-shirts and rode in "soft" cars. In Bosnia we were outfitted with flak jackets and helmets and traveled in armored cars. The BBC now requires all staff journalists headed for a war zone to first complete a "Hostile Environments Training Course," where they learn how to handle themselves during a firefight, what to do if taken hostage and how to dress a bullet wound.

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AT THE SAME TIME, JOURNALISTS need to be sure they make sense of the story they're covering. Good war reporting in this time of localized unrest is in some ways even more important than during the days of worldwide crisis and East-West confrontation. Many of the small wars currently being waged are almost incomprehensible to outsiders. One recent global tally found 30 armed conflicts under way simultaneously, each claiming about a thousand lives per year. Some get noticed; many do not. The reports of front-line journalists determine in part how the world responds.

In the early months of war in Chechnya and Bosnia, for example, few foreign governments had representatives on the ground to report to their capitals on the unfolding conflicts. Many foreign journalists, however, had access to a portable satellite telephone or telex and were prepared, sometimes foolishly, to head straight for the most troubled areas. Their accounts often were the only information available to the outside world.

Since policy makers cannot explain such conflicts within a Cold War framework, they must analyze them on a case-by-case basis, and the pattern of press coverage can sway their judgment. For example, the 1992 reports of starving children in Somalia shamed the Bush administration into sending U.S. forces to Mogadishu to help distribute food aid there. But pictures of a dead U.S. Army Ranger being dragged through a Mogadishu street prompted the Clinton administration to bring the troops home.

Journalists covering wars like those in Somalia, Chechnya, Kosovo and Sierra Leone therefore might find themselves in a position of unaccustomed influence but also greater responsibility. We have a newly important obligation to provide clear, cogent explanations of the conflicts we cover. It is not enough to dismiss current wars as tribal uprisings or explosions of interethnic animosity. Journalists need to explore the roots of conflict and the histori-

ANTOINE GYORIL/CORBIS/SYGMA

Serbian volunteers train during civil war in Croatia, 1991.

cal background. An explanation of the fighting in Angola and Sierra Leone, for example, needs to cover the diamond trade. Likewise, Colombia's civil war cannot be reported without referring to illegal drug trafficking.

Too often, when challenged to report complex conflicts in faraway places, journalists resort to clichés. In Rwanda, reporters unfamiliar with the events preceding the 1994 mass killings were inclined to suggest, as BBC journalist Fergal Keane later observed, "that the genocide was the result of some innate interethnic loathing that had erupted into irrational violence. … Much of the coverage of Rwanda in the early days," he lamented, "neglected the part that power and money had played in the calculations of those who launched the genocide."

When war raises clear moral issues, reporters need to identify them. It was not enough in Bosnia to interview refugees fleeing from a burning village and relate their sad stories. We needed to dig deeper, to find out which houses were burned and which were left standing, and to tell the larger story of "ethnic cleansing" often behind the refugee tales.

This requires a careful balance of direct observation and analysis. Critics of war coverage in Bosnia sometimes accused the news media of overdramatizing the conflict, exaggerating the number of Muslim casualties and too quickly portraying Serb actions as criminal. The opposite charge was made in Rwanda: A steering committee evaluating the international response to the crisis faulted the media for not realizing more

quickly how widespread the killing actually was. "The overall failure of the media to accurately and adequately report on a crime against humanity," the committee said, "significantly contributed to international disinterest in the genocide and hence to the inadequate response."

Good, responsible reporting from the front lines can provide early warnings to the international community, differentiating between those wars raising broader issues and those arising from purely local conflict. Journalists covering war need to be grounded in international humanitarian law, the rules of war and the Geneva conventions. At a time when participants in a conflict casually fling charges of "genocide" and "war crimes," reporters need to know what those terms actually mean. The Crimes of War Project, initiated by journalists at American University in Washington, D.C., is a major step in that direction.

At a time when participants in a conflict casually fling charges of "genocide" and "war crimes," reporters need to know what those terms actually mean.

AS WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPACT OF our war coverage, we also will find that interested parties want to influence our reporting. All those involved in a war have stakes in portrayals advancing their particular interests, and the fragmentation of armed conflict in the post-Cold War era dramatically raises those stakes. War correspondents must keep all these competing agendas in mind and guard against the related pressures.

In virtually every war today, the military confrontation brings with it what could be called "the battle for the story," and that struggle can be just as intense. In recent months the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had an Internet dimension, with supporters of both sides hacking into each other's Web sites, determined to disrupt the information flow. Last April's U.S.-Chinese confrontation over a U.S. surveillance plane prompted another "Web war," with Chinese propagandists anxious to portray the conflict to the world as a battle to defend Chinese sovereignty against U.S. hegemony. In Chechnya, human rights monitors have begun videotaping atrocity scenes to counter misinformation from the Russian government.

In Bosnia the battle for the story was just as intense and waged on all sides. Serb nationalists, enjoying a clear military advantage over the Bosnian government forces, hoped to discourage any thought of outside intervention. Serb leaders therefore described the conflict as an eruption of age-old hatreds beyond the comprehension of other countries, much less worthy of their interest. In Sarajevo the Muslim-dominated government had the opposite aim. Desperate for the United States and other Western powers to come to their rescue, Sarajevans wanted visiting journalists to portray the war as a struggle that threatened Western civilization as we know it. U.N. Protection Force commanders, under intense criticism for failing either to deliver aid effectively or to protect endangered civilians, defended their performance by downplaying the suffering in Bosnia, at one point even disputing whether Sarajevo could really be

considered under "siege."

Human rights advocates, for their part, saw Bosnia as a test case for the post-Cold War effort to establish the primacy of international humanitarian law and universal human rights standards, and they constantly urged journalists to highlight those issues. When so many groups present such different ideas of "the story," a responsible correspondent must keep his or her distance from all interested parties. We must ignore outside pressures as best we can and describe conflicts objectively and completely, without regard for whose interests our reporting serves.

NEVER HAS WAR REPORTING DEMANDED more skill, judgment and knowledge. Correspondents routinely are expected to "parachute" into highly dangerous situations where the rule of law is not recognized and where civilians—including journalists and aid workers—are considered legitimate military targets. We are asked to cover wars whose origins may be obscure and to explain complex conflicts to a largely indifferent audience. What we say about a war could influence whether the rest of the world chooses to intervene, whether justice is done or denied, and whether killing is stopped or allowed to continue. We are expected to tell "the truth" in situations with many versions and no obvious answers. When we raise questions of good and evil, our reports should clarify those moral issues, but we cannot become advocates.

Generally editors prefer to send their more experienced reporters into war zones, but the personal and physical demands in many ways make it a job more suitable for younger reporters. As a minimum, war correspondents should receive better training. Just as medical, legal, science and business reporting has grown more sophisticated and specialized in recent years, so should the reporting of war, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions. As journalists, we need to clarify our professional obligations, develop new ethical guidelines for these new situations, and commit ourselves as a profession to upholding those standards and even to being held accountable to them.

This essay is adapted from "Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View" (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).

LAURENT REBOURS/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

A father's hands press against the window of a bus carrying his tearful son and wife to safety from Sarajevo, 1992.

We Owe the World

Why the U.S. news media must cover foreign conflicts

Judy C. Woodruff

In the spring of 1999 *New York Times* reporter Chris Hedges stood up to say a few words of thanks after receiving the Francis Frost Wood Award for Courage in Journalism from Hofstra University for his coverage of the conflict in Kosovo. In his remarks, Hedges discussed the origins and the ramifications of the war in that Kentucky-size region in the former Yugoslavia. But what stuck in the minds of those in the New York City audience, and those who read his words later, was one particular point. The news media were "partly to blame," Hedges said. "We failed to cover the conflict until it burst into a crisis."

Preoccupied with the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky story at the time, the news media were not just late in unleashing reporters and cameras on one of the world's hot spots, Hedges said. More ominously, he added, the news media's failure—to first cover the Yugoslav conflict and then to explain it accu-

rately—can be linked with the fate of NATO. By their inattention and later misinterpretations, he charged, journalists must answer in part for NATO's lack of influence over events, a development that he said could lead to the weakening, crippling or crumbling of the alliance.

That is a heavy burden for a news corps more accustomed to focusing on O.J. Simpson than Slobodan Milosevic. And it's one easy to slough off by those weary of being blamed over the years for everything from the rise in teen violence in the United States to the coarsening of the political culture in Washington.

But now that instant communications rival governments in the ability to influence the outcome of events, we should appreciate more than ever what Hedges meant. We in the news media actually play a larger role in world affairs than we are comfortable acknowledging.

This greater responsibility comes, ironically, at a time of widespread retrenchment in the news business at home and abroad. Standards of financial profitability now are being applied to decisions that used to be based primarily on standards of journalism. With the bottom line playing an ever-increasing central role in decisions about news coverage, few news organizations are free to deploy reporters without considering the number of "eyeballs" that will read or see the resulting story. In television, the costs of getting a story on the air—the latest video and audio technology, satellite time, number of people involved and their salaries—make such decisions even more difficult. Managers now respond to research that tells them what audiences like and what they want to see.

In this "it's-a-business" environment, there are heated debates about whether sending a crew to cover insurgency in Mexico's state of Chiapas or an outbreak of fighting between India and Pakistan is worth it. Some have proposed increasing the pooling of TV resources to cover those kinds of stories and air them on the largest number of outlets. But competition among U.S. television networks is alive and kicking. The long-held belief that competition makes news coverage better—although not always true—has become so ingrained in the minds of network veterans that it is difficult to shake off.

Judy C. Woodruff, a veteran of more than 20 years in broadcast journalism, is CNN's prime anchor and senior correspondent. She anchors "Inside Politics," the nation's only daily program devoted exclusively to politics.

STILL, THERE ARE DISSENTERS. Longtime "60 Minutes" producer Don Hewitt has proposed that the traditional early evening newscast be radically revised: Pool the coverage of stories every network wants, and redeploy resources for analytical and enterprise reporting that would give each network a distinctive look.

But until Hewitt's vision or someone else's is adopted, news managers have to ask tough questions. For instance, how much does a development in a foreign country affect U.S. interests? And if the answer is "not much," is it such a momentous or unusual story that the networks would be at a competitive disadvantage not to cover it?

Those questions will not go away. The economics of news reporting is a fact of life for every media entity. Only public broad-

ANDRE KAISERT/GAFF FOTOARCHIVE

Bosnian refugees in building used to house cattle

casting, with its softer mandate for attracting viewers and listeners, is largely exempt. That's where important stories that might not make the commercial networks get told.

As news managers wrestle with how best to deploy their resources, they can study the results of marketing research to identify their audiences: How many people are watching? Male or female? How old are they? What are their incomes? What sort of news interests them the most? Local community news? Politics in Washington? International happenings? TV programmers constantly weigh the answers to these and dozens of other questions.

Over time, the answers have proved instructive. In 1974, when the Vietnam War was reaching its bloody and politically messy conclusion and regularly making news headlines, an initial survey of Americans found that only half were "very interested" in news about U.S. relations with other countries, and only 35 percent were "very interested" in news about other countries in general. That shows surprisingly little curiosity, one might think. Yet four years later—early in Jimmy Carter's presidency and at the height of the Cold War—the number of Americans interested in U.S. relations with other countries dropped to 44 percent and the sector interested in news of other countries declined to 26 percent.

The survey, conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations every four years since 1974, shows that the U.S. public's interest in international affairs waxes and wanes. Interest peaked at 53 percent in 1990—in the aftermath of tearing down the Berlin Wall, at the dawn of the Soviet Union's dissolution, and when the United States led a coalition of

nations against Iraq's Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait. By 1998, with the Cold War long over, popular interest had fallen to percentages nearly as low as those two decades earlier.

What is fascinating is that, over this same 24-year period, the percentage of Americans who believe the United States plays an increasingly important and powerful role as a world leader has climbed fairly steadily, from the high 20s to exactly 50 percent. Perhaps we've been lulled into thinking that, with no immediate threat to our existence, the United States occupies an exalted, almost invulnerable spot on the planet—a spot that allows us to focus our attention inward, to domestic matters as momentous as the future of Social Security or as frivolous as the box-office returns on the latest Hollywood blockbuster.

We have an obligation to help people in the "have" part of the world stay informed about the "have nots."

If so, it also is a spot deaf to the cries of more than 2 million children who died as a result of armed conflicts around the world in the last decade of the 20th century and of more than 6 million who were disabled or otherwise seriously injured. According to a report prepared by the United Nations and sponsored by the International Conference on War-Affected Children, the proportion of war victims who are civilians has leaped dramatically in recent decades, from 5 percent to more than 90 percent. As of the end of 2000, about 20 million children had been uprooted from their homes.

If that seems too harsh an indictment, some perspective may help explain why we should care: An estimated 6 billion people now inhabit the planet. Ninety-five percent live outside the United States. Ninety percent don't speak English.

So although the United States is the world's sole superpower, and can throw its weight around economically, militarily and culturally, it also represents a tiny minority. Most of what goes on in the world is well beyond its control. The United States can use its influence—and does—but it is increasingly obvious that it does not always get its way. That was recently made apparent when it lost its seat on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Beyond the U.N., European nations are more emboldened than ever to disagree with controversial U.S. proposals like President George W. Bush's plan for a national missile defense system.

Then why not sit back and let the world do its thing while we do ours? Here are three reasons: our children, our grandchildren and their children. Those who expected that the end of the Cold War and the meltdown of the Soviet Union would usher in an era of peace and prosperity were only half right. Yes, the United States enjoyed unprecedented economic prosperity during the 1990s. And yes, it has not been involved in a prolonged war since Vietnam, nearly 30 years ago.

But while the United States has prospered, two-fifths of the planet's population—nearly 2.5 billion people—subsist on less than one dollar a day or cannot meet even the most basic needs. Moreover, the number of civil wars worldwide has increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. By one estimate, more than 150,000 peo-

ple, most of them civilians, lost their lives because of wars in 1997 alone.

But the story is far more profound than one of lives lost. The Carter Center, the nonprofit institution founded by Jimmy Carter which formerly monitored conflicts around the world, listed 30 major conflicts and about 100 smaller ones under way in 1999. Since then, the number has climbed.

In addition to the deaths, the Carter Center and others calculate that in 1997 alone, 20 million people were forced to leave their homes, and untold numbers were wounded or suffered the indirect consequences of conflict. Countless children have seen their fathers and brothers killed or taken away, leaving them emotionally scarred and perhaps growing up wanting revenge. All this creates an atmosphere of fear and instability.

This legacy is being laid down not at the end of a world war but right now. Yet the typical reaction is to shut this information out or discount it: "It's too depressing; it doesn't really affect me; there is nothing I can do about it." Some of that is true. Most people are too busy to be consumed for long with the plight of the world's poorest and its victims.

We who are journalists or managers of newspaper and television empires have an obligation to help people in the "have" part of the world stay informed about the "have nots." We have an obligation to tell them about ethnic, racial and territorial disputes that could fester or have consequences for other parts of this planet, which, after all, is a place of limited resources.

If some people don't want to read or listen to these stories, that is their choice. But it's our obligation at least to make the information available to them.

In a more complex world, with old hatreds and new economic rivalries often overlaid, our job seems more urgent than ever. Now that the Cold War era is dead, what is replacing it? The answer lies not just in the nuances of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and China—as important as those are—but also in the human story, in man's inhumanity to man, particularly on the African and Asian continents.

Two years ago you could traverse Africa, from the Red Sea in the northeast to the southwestern Atlantic coast, and never set foot on peaceful territory, according to the Carter Center. Fifty thousand people died in the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Almost 2 million died during the long conflict in neighboring Sudan. And so on, through genocide in Rwanda and fighting in Angola and Sierra Leone. Do people in Africa matter less than those who die every day in the Middle East? Of course not. And as long as such conflicts continue, there can be no peace and prosperity for a large part of the world.

Those who live in the United States should understand this better than any other prosperous nation on earth, for it is a nation of immigrants. Almost one in 10 people in the United States today were born in another country, making it more diverse than anywhere else. Try as we might to be apart from it—or even above it—we *are* the world.

If that's not an excellent reason to cover the world, and cover it energetically, I don't know what is. After all, stories of conflict teach us who we are as human beings and what sort of world our children, and their children, will inherit. If we in the news business don't lead the way in telling those stories, who will?

JAMES P. BLAIR

The Freedom Forum Journalists Memorial, Arlington, Va.

THE PRICE PAID

How many journalists have heard, "No story is worth getting killed for"? The risk-takers see things differently. They believe that sometimes a story is worth putting one's life on the line. — TIMOTHY J. KENNY

Timothy J. Kenny on journalists who died covering the news

Donatella Lorch on the emotional aftermath of war reporting

Gary Knight on getting close enough

Susan Moeller on compassion fatigue



LASZLO BALOGH/REUTERS

Reuters correspondent Kurt Schork, who was killed in Sierra Leone in May 2000

In the Bleeding Fields

Journalists lose their lives covering war and conflict.

Timothy J. Kenny

"I'm told time and time again, mostly by editors, no story is worth dying for. I beg to differ—there are stories worth dying for. Some of my colleagues have made that choice and have died in brutal ways. And they should be honored for having made the choice to get that story."

— PAUL WATSON,
Los Angeles Times

Most journalists are not risk-takers.

That notion might come as a surprise, given that some of us in the business tend to glamorize what we do. Likewise, Hollywood has reinforced many a romantic stereotype. You know the movies: "All the President's Men," "Deadline USA," "The Front Page," "The Paper" and others of that genre.

Alas, most journalists' jobs—while cer-

tainly more interesting than putting fenders on trucks—are more likely to involve covering city councils, state legislatures or, heaven help us, the White House, than anything dangerous.

Most journalists have weighed "what if" against "yes, but" and found a refuge between the worlds of risk and comfort. They follow the rules. Today's newsroom generally is a low-key, computer-driven bastion of political correctness—a distant cousin to the chaotic clatter of yesterday's city rooms and their hard-drinking, cigar-smoking inhabitants. Most people in the business today risk little and lead lives of quiet, if interesting, middle-class comfort.

Timothy J. Kenny, a former newspaper reporter and editor, is director of research and news history at the Newseum in Arlington, Va.

Then there are the others—the ones who take the chances the rest of us can't or won't. These journalists investigate Mafia murders and South American drug wars. They cover West Bank demonstrations, Indonesian riots and Sierra Leone's civil war. They have felt the wrath of mobs, choked on clouds of tear gas and seen comrades lying dead in pools of blood.

Photographers of this breed are perhaps the boldest. They have to get close to get good pictures. So they get hurt—by shrapnel, by rocks, by rubber bullets. Too often they end up dead. How many journalists have heard more than once, "No story is worth getting killed for"? The risk-takers see things differently. They believe that sometimes a story is worth putting one's life on the line.

THE FREEDOM FORUM JOURNALISTS Memorial is a 37-foot-high glass and steel spiral in Freedom Park, adjacent to the Newseum in Arlington, Va. Twenty-six names were added to its glass panels on May 3, 2001, World Press Freedom Day. The memorial, the most comprehensive of its kind in the world, now bears the names of 1,395 men and women who died doing their jobs. More than half of the names (705) are those of men and women who died while covering conflict.

War reporters have a decidedly romantic if fatalistic streak, although some would deny that. A cynic, after all, is only a romantic disappointed by life. Scratch the cynicism of any hard-bitten war correspondent and you'll often find someone who got into journalism to improve the world, someone offended by the random unfairness of life, someone convinced deep down of humanity's basic decency. He or she still believes journalism can make a difference.

Georgette "Dickey" Chapelle, a latecomer to World War II, covered the Pacific Theater. Her shot of a blood-soaked Marine aboard a hospital ship attracted widespread attention when home-front blood drives used it repeatedly. Chapelle might have been one of those without an "off" switch, though it's not really clear. Those who worked with her often saw her push her luck to the limit to get a story or photo. At Okinawa she ignored an order to stay aboard ship and went ashore with the Marines, telling one commander she wished to go "as far forward as you'll let me."

She arrived in South Vietnam in 1961 at age 43, proud that she carried her own pack and ate C-rations in the field with the grunts. Four years later shrapnel from a

booby trap ripped through her throat while she accompanied a Marine patrol outside Chu Lai. One of the war's most dramatic photos shows Chapelle receiving the last rites. (See facing page.) She was the first female correspondent to die in Vietnam. A Marine honor guard took her body home to Milwaukee. Her last words reportedly were, "I guess it was bound to happen."

The risk-takers cover wars for various reasons: a compelling story, the adrenaline rush, and the fame and money a strong performance can bring. Sometimes, though, it's just plain craziness. Sean Flynn, the son of Hollywood icon Errol Flynn, died in Southeast Asia the way he had lived: hard and fast and without rules. He had been acting in a movie in Singapore before going to Vietnam, wanting to see some action, and quickly got accredited as a UPI photographer. He disappeared in 1970 with fellow "easy rider" Dana Stone in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge captured both men and held them for a year before clubbing them to death. Flynn was a very good photographer, with several *Time* covers to his credit. He was also an adrenaline junkie. "Sean Flynn spent most of his time playing out in real life the Hollywood derring-do of his swashbuckling father," said author William Prochnau. "[He] had death wish written all over him."

Other reporters died from covering wars of a different nature. Ireland's Veronica Guerin was a brave, headstrong woman who covered organized crime in Dublin for the *Sunday Independent*. She had no quit in her. One night, thugs came to her house and shot her in the thigh because of her high-profile investigations of Irish drug wars. Even then, she refused to stop reporting the story. Most of us would have. She couldn't.

Guerin covered Ireland's underworld, she said, because "crime is an evil subculture existing within our culture. And to me, exposing it is what journalism is about. I suppose that's why I do it. It is a story that has to be told."

The Freedom Forum Journalists Memorial now bears the names of 1,395 men and women who died doing their jobs. More than half died while covering conflict.

In 1996 a motorcycle pulled alongside her car when she stopped at a traffic light outside Dublin. The motorcycle passenger shot Guerin three times in the heart and once in the neck. She was 36 and left behind a husband and a 7-year-old son. Her murderers were caught and convicted. Later, Ireland enacted tough new organized-crime laws.

Don Bolles also paid the ultimate price for his persistent crime coverage. After 15 years of exposing political scandals and organized crime in Arizona, Bolles decided he'd had enough. "I thought, 'This isn't worth it to me or my family,' " he said. In November 1975, "I told my editors, 'No more. I'm no longer in investigative reporting.' "

Seven months later *The Arizona Republic* reporter died, the victim of a car-bomb explosion in a Phoenix parking lot that blew off both his legs. As he lay mortally injured, Bolles whispered to rescuers, "Mafia." He died 11 days later. Within a week 39 reporters from across the nation formed the Arizona Project



THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Dickey Chapelle receives last rites, Vietnam, 1965.

to continue Bolles' work. Within a year the project exposed a web of corruption, narcotics deals and land fraud that resulted in 18 indictments.

Most of the men and women named on the Journalists Memorial were foot soldiers pursuing truth, just trying to get the story right. They were professionals who knew what they were doing. Most didn't take unnecessary chances, but sometimes just covering the news can be dangerous.

The story was the lure for former fighter pilot and CBS correspondent George Polk, murdered in 1948 in Salonika, Greece, while covering the civil war between communists and monarchists. Polk's unblinking reporting had earned him death threats.

In his final broadcast, he said: "Here in Greece, this capital city has a slight case of the jitters. So far today—and it's only early afternoon in Athens—44 alleged communists have been executed. … The Greek government's anticommunist measures

include martial law, curfew at night and heavy guards at strategic places. This is George Polk reporting from Athens." His battered body, wrists and ankles bound, washed up on the shores of Salonika Bay. He had been shot in the back of the head at point-blank range.

One of journalism's most prestigious awards is named for Polk, whom journalist I.F. Stone called the Cold War's first casualty. In 1965 veteran field producer Ted Yates won the George Polk Award for his Vietnam coverage. Like Polk, NBC newsman Yates was fearless and brilliant. He had a sly sense of humor and could laugh at the absurdities of his often-dangerous world. Two years after winning the Polk award, Yates was shot and killed in Jordan while covering the Six-Day War.

The risk-takers cover wars for various reasons: a compelling story, the adrenaline rush, and the fame and money a strong performance can bring.

FOR EVERY ESTABLISHMENT lackey trapped on a beat, taking press releases and not making waves, a reporter or a photographer is putting his or her neck on the line for a story that won't let them alone. It's too good. It's too big. It's too important to stop doing. So they don't.

Sierra Leone was the worst killing field for journalists in 1999. Ten lost their lives covering the civil war there. In May 2000 Reuters correspondent Kurt Schork met the same fate, gunned down along with APTN cameraman Miguel Gil Moreno de Mora. Schork had left a flourishing career as a corporate lawyer to write about war and the suffering of ordinary people around the world. He was 53 years old.

"War reporting," Schork said, "is a job, is a craft—not a holy crusade. The thing is to work and not get hurt. When that is no longer possible, it is time to get out." Described by colleagues as the best war correspondent of his generation, Schork had covered fighting in Bosnia, Kurdistan, Chechnya, East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. But all that experience was not enough to keep him alive.

Finally, there was Egon Scotland. He was covering the war in Croatia in July 1991 for the German newspaper *Suddeutsche Zeitung* when an inexperienced colleague failed to return from the field. Scotland went looking for him, driving a clearly marked press car. Serb militiamen, who often targeted the press, opened fire on the vehicle and shot Scotland in the stomach with an exploding dumdum bullet. He died at the scene, at age 43. Among the effects taken from his body was a copy of a poem by Slavko Bronzic, a resident of Osijek in the Slavonia region of Croatia:

To the Reporter
Take as many notes and shots as you can,
My friend,
But do not report to the world that only
A number was killed
In the golden fields of Slavonia.
As no number has any given name or
Any taken future
Do report to the world that

It was Johann and William
And Victor and Fransecso
That was killed
In the heart of Slavonia
And that Gabriel and György
And your name, too
Will be killed tomorrow.
Take as many notes and shots as you can,
My friend,
But do not report to the world that only
A number was killed
In the bleeding fields of Slavonia.

'THIS ONE IS CAPTAIN WASKOW'

ERNIE PYLE

AT THE FRONT LINES IN ITALY, (BY wireless Jan. 10, 1944)—In this war I have known a lot of officers who were loved and respected by the soldiers under them. But never have I crossed the trail of any man as beloved as Capt. Henry T. Waskow, of Belton, Tex.

Captain Waskow was a company commander in the 36th Division. He had been in this company since long before he left the States. He was very young, only in his middle 20s, but he carried in him a sincerity and gentleness that made people want to be guided by him.

"After my own father, he comes next," a sergeant told me.

"He always looked after us," a soldier said. "He'd go to bat for us every time."

"I've never known him to do anything unkind," another one said.

I was at the foot of the mule trail the night they brought Captain Waskow down. The moon was nearly full, and you could see far up the trail, and even part way across the valley. Soldiers made shadows as they walked.

Dead men had been coming down the mountain all evening, lashed onto the backs of mules. They came lying belly down across the wooden packsaddle, their heads hanging down on the left side of the mule, their stiffened legs sticking awkwardly from the other side, bobbing up and down as the mule walked.

We left him there beside the road, that first one, and we all went back into the cowshed and sat on watercans or lay on the straw, waiting for the next batch of mules.

Somebody said the dead soldier had been dead for four days, and then nobody said anything more about him. We talked for an hour or more; the dead man lay all alone, outside in the shadow of the wall.

Then a soldier came into the cowshed and said there were some more bodies outside. We went out into the road. Four mules stood there in the moonlight, in the road where the trail came down off the mountain. The soldiers who led them stood there waiting.

"This one is Captain Waskow," one of them said quickly.

Two men unlashed his body from the mule and lifted it off and laid it in the shadow beside the stone wall. Other men took the other bodies off. Finally, there were five lying end to end in a long row. You don't cover up dead men in the combat zones. They just lie there in the shadows until somebody else comes after them.

The uncertain mules moved off to their

Ernie Pyle accompanied World War II Allied forces in the invasions of North Africa, Italy and Normandy, and reported from the front lines with personal stories of soldiers and their lives. His reports, collected in *Here Is Your War* (1943) and *Brave Men* (1944), earned him a Pulitzer Prize. Pyle was killed by Japanese gunfire on the Pacific island of Ie Shima in 1945.

olive groves. The men in the road seemed reluctant to leave. They stood around, and gradually I could sense them moving, one by one, close to Captain Waskow's body. Not so much to look, I think, as to say something in finality to him and to themselves. I stood close by and I could hear.

One soldier came and looked down, and he said out loud:

"God damn it!"

That's all he said, and then he walked away.

Another one came, and he said, "God damn it to hell anyway!" He looked down for a few last moments and then turned and left.

Another man came. I think he was an officer. It was hard to tell officers from men in the dim light, for everybody was grimy and dirty. The man looked down into the dead captain's face and then spoke directly to him, as though he were alive:

"I'm sorry, old man."

Then a soldier came and stood beside the officer and bent over, and he too spoke to his dead captain, not in a whisper but awfully tenderly, and he said:

"I sure am sorry, sir."

Then the first man squatted down, and he reached down and took the captain's hand, and he sat there for a full five minutes holding the dead hand in his own and looking intently into the dead face. And he never uttered a sound all the time he sat there.

Finally he put the hand down. He reached up and gently straightened the points of the captain's shirt collar, and then he sort of rearranged the tattered edges of his uniform around the wound, and then he got up and walked away down the road in the moonlight, all alone.

The rest of us went back into the cowshed, leaving the five dead men lying in a line in the shadow of the low stone wall. We lay down on the straw in the cowshed, and pretty soon we were all asleep.

SCOTT PETERSON/LIAISON

Photographers document massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda, 1994.

Surviving the Five Ds

A writer struggles with the emotional aftermath of covering brutality in Africa.

Donatella Lorch

A new york winter can be cold and grim. But to me, in early 1996, after three years of covering conflict in Africa, it was like a prison. It didn't help that the city was battered by one of the worst snowstorms on record. For those first few months back in the United States, I struggled with an emptiness that I nursed alone at night in my darkened living room, watching the lights of New Jersey across the Hudson River, wine in hand, deeply lonely, anxious and unhappy. I lived with insomnia and jumbled nightmares that even today occasionally intrude. I felt deeply alienated. My sister complained about my temper and constant impatience.

Back then I chalked it up to missing my Africa friends and disliking my new assignment. But over the years I have talked to many colleagues who shared the same experiences and realized that my emptiness that winter was very real, just as powerful as withdrawal from any drug.

We all dealt with it at different levels and

in differing degrees. Some friends claim they are immune. Many say they can't give up that thrill of being in war zones and find that life back home is just too pedestrian and boring. I was guilty of that for a few years. At the other extreme, I have watched many drink heavily and at least one slip into alcoholism, while others suffered from bouts of depression. In my decade and a half in journalism, I know of two who committed suicide.

In Africa my colleagues and I joked that we covered the five Ds: the Dead, the Dying, the Diseased, the Depressing and the Dangerous. In three years there, I reported on six civil wars, genocide and massive refugee migrations. I walked over thousands of corpses. I was shot at, carjacked, arrested and contracted cerebral malaria. It was a roller coaster of intense emotions, an adrenaline high that included raw fear and anger and horror and pure, extreme fun. I loved it. I hated it.

The Africa reporters were a close-knit elite, a weirdly snobby clique; we differentiated between those who had covered the genocide in Rwanda and those who hadn't, between those who lived in Africa and those who didn't. We joked about dead bodies over sushi at a Japanese restaurant in Nairobi (much to the shock of neighboring tables). Yet we took Africa very personally. Many of us were deeply angered by the West's inaction over Rwanda. One British reporter even resigned in protest. A common litany and ingrained frustration was that our editors just didn't understand what our lives were like and what we did to get a story.

I AM NOT QUITE SURE WHY I CHOSE to be a reporter and a foreign correspondent. My first television memories are of the Tet offensive in Vietnam—I was hooked. I must have been about 14 when I decided I wanted to write about war. It took another 13 years and many detours before I made it to Afghanistan and began traveling with the Mujaheddin guerrillas. At first, adventure and curiosity drew me there, but I remained in the field for other reasons. I felt privileged to witness and write about history as it unfolded, to become part of people's lives and to make it real for others thousands of miles away. Sometimes I even felt I made a difference. Gradually the strands of the story weave in and around your own life and affect the way you view everything else.

I have no favorite defining moment, no great incident of utter fear or sadness or happiness. Thankfully, colleagues have not been killed or wounded in front of me. The most dangerous stories are not necessarily the ones that have stayed with me. Certain events have remained as mental snapshots. And I remember smells.

Take Nyarubuye. The utter quiet. Small pink and white flowers grew along a red brick wall near the church, and the dust of the dirt road smoked up around my shoes. Once it must have been an idyllic little hamlet in eastern Rwanda, but when I

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COURTESY DONATELLA LORCH

Donatella Lorch with U.S. soldiers in Somalia

walked through it in May 1994 it was just bodies. The church and school complex lined by those beautiful flowers was piled with corpses—about 800 of them. Two colleagues and I spent a few hours walking over them and around them, peering into dark rooms so that we could count them, mentally separating the women and little children, leaning over desiccated, broken limbs and cracked skulls to guess how they had been killed. We didn't talk. The smell and the stillness were too overwhelming. I'd put Vicks VapoRub on my nose and a bandanna over my mouth and tried hard to gulp little breaths. The rain had left scattered puddles, and bodies had rotted in them. It was impossible to escape that sickly, gagging stench. This place, I knew, had witnessed true evil, an evil that I could see and smell. Yet it floated about, untouchable, and all I could do was take notes.

Less than an hour's drive from Nyarubuye was the paved road. There we stopped the car and did what I had done after visiting other massacres in Rwanda and Burundi: We pulled out whatever food we had and ate lunch. Months later, a British army psychiatrist reassured me that I was not being callous but rather subconsciously reaffirming that I was still very much alive. In *The Things They Carried*, author Tim O'Brien says there is no greater feeling of aliveness

than after a firefight. I think many of my Nairobi-based colleagues expressed this by creating a small baby boom.

The culture of war journalists differs significantly from that of those covering the military or law enforcement because our war lacks institutional structure. This void boosts the feeling that one is alone. Many of us created our own inner circle of on-the-road friends. After covering the genocide in Rwanda and the cholera epidemic in Zaire, Michael Skoler, a close friend and award-winning Nairobi bureau chief for National Public Radio, found it hard even to share experiences with his family. "There was no way to really share the experience, to put it into logical, analytic terms," he said. "So the feelings never got resolved, they just sort of sat."

Especially in Goma, as he watched thousands of people die around him, Skoler said he went back and forth between wanting to help and wanting to hide behind his work. After three weeks of constant work, when his editors told him a colleague would relieve him, he found he couldn't leave the story. Instead, without telling his wife or his editor, Skoler volunteered for two days in one of the refugee camps. He then returned to Nairobi and spent a couple of weeks lying in his living room, unwilling to talk or go out.

Africa is still very personal and very present in his life. Years after Goma, in the incongruous setting of an ethics class at business school, Skoler said the death and destruction resurfaced and hit him with waves of emotion. One image still haunts: Amid the filth of the cholera epidemic, a tiny 6-year-old girl clung to him; she was orphaned, and aid workers said she would die unless he took her out of the camp. That would have meant taking her to his home in Nairobi. "I had a chance to save someone's life and I walked away from it," he said. "That image comes back a lot. I'm pretty sure I made the wrong choice." Skoler said reporting the Rwanda story left him feeling guilty because he could go home while those he covered were caught in the midst of terror with nothing to protect them and nowhere to escape.

In a year and a half, six of my colleagues were killed (in Mogadishu), several were shot, and one was kidnapped. We drank heavily. Many smoked dope; at least one did hard drugs.

Editors back in the States were often clueless about what we had witnessed or how it might have affected us. At *The New York Times*, after my stint in Rwanda, I was debriefed by a psychiatrist with a long list of abbreviations after her title. My great memory of the session, before I zoned out, was that she asked me where Rwanda was. Yet I was luckier than many of my colleagues. *The New York Times* went to bat more than a few times for me, turning the world of U.N. peacekeeping upside down to get me out of Rwanda, getting me the best care for my malaria.

Fear is an isolating experience, one that is difficult to share. It is also an underestimated emotion. Most people experience fear in spurts, but what happens

GILLES PERESS/MAGNUM PHOTOS

Bodies left to rot in the sun, Rwanda, 1994

if you are constantly exposed to it day after day, night after night?

Roberto Suro, who covered the 70-day siege of Beirut for *Time* magazine, described it with awe. "It boosts your senses," he said of the heart-pounding adrenaline. "It makes you hyperperceptive. It turns up the volume. You see and hear things much more vividly." He believes the effects last for years. Even living in Rome, he felt constant apprehension—scanning the roads around him, looking for snipers, avoiding untraveled routes.

Living in Africa was very similar. I spent long weeks in Mogadishu, a city where you could travel only in a car with armed guards; where reporting often meant running the gantlet between warring subclans; where potholes were mined at night; where bullets pierced our hotel walls and snipers took pot shots at us on our roof. In a year and a half, six of my colleagues were killed there, several others were shot, and one was kidnapped by her driver and held for several weeks. We drank heavily. Many smoked dope; at least one did hard drugs.

The tension never fully dissipated back home in Nairobi, where armed burglaries and carjackings were commonplace. Even now I catch myself, for brief moments, looking for danger, wary of walking on unmarked trails because of land mines or just checking out people to see if anyone looks suspicious. And if smell can trigger memories, all I need is to catch a whiff of road kill before I remember the churches of Rwanda and the hills of Burundi.

On July 12, 1993, four journalists were stoned and shot to death by a

mob in Mogadishu. Accepting a last-minute flight offer, I had left the night before and headed home to Nairobi. The death of photographer Dan Eldon and the three others filled me with an overwhelming feeling of loss. Maybe it was because we had spent the evening before laughing and clowning on the hotel roof, or maybe it was because I was alive and they weren't. Maybe it was because I always thought death wasn't supposed to touch us. But it brought home my own mortality and underscored my fear of losing people close to me.

Nearly a year and a half ago, I decided to give up the road and the wars and the adrenaline. I moved to Washington and am learning how to live in suburbia. According to a Freedom Forum-sponsored study,[1] female war correspondents drink five times as much as their counterparts in the general journalistic population. I do drink more than before I went to Africa, but I like to think that it probably would compare to a European male counterpart's consumption.

I still miss the years on the road and the intense emotions I experienced. The stories I covered dug deep into my heart and soul. They filled me with awe when I witnessed the courage of some of the people I met. They filled me with anger over the corruption and greed of others. I became intimately acquainted with fear, desperation, cynicism and total vulnerability. They remain my companions today.

[1] *"Risking more than their lives: The effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on journalists," published by The Freedom Forum European Center, 2001. Available at www.freedomforum.org.*

SANTIAGO LYON/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Cameraman Miguel Gil Moreno de Mora, right, follows a Kosovar soldier during Albanian-Serb conflict, 1998. Moreno was later killed in Sierra Leone.

Up Close and Deadly

Photojournalists face special dangers in capturing images of conflict.

GARY KNIGHT

THE UNIQUE DANGERS FACED by photojournalists who cover war are best captured in the words of Robert Capa, the man who set the standard for modern war photography—and who was killed when he stepped on a land mine in Vietnam in 1954: "If your pictures aren't good enough, you aren't close enough."

Getting close is inherently hazardous, but most photojournalists believe they cannot communicate war from the hotel lobby or press conference and that good photographs rarely come from a telephoto lens. They have to be close enough to touch, close enough to breathe the same air, as immersed as the men and women whom they view

through the lens. They have to be prepared to take the same risks and face the same fears the combatants confront.

Photojournalists, and a small number of video camera operators, usually work alone or in pairs. This allows them to think and act swiftly, unencumbered by the need for a consensus of colleagues (as is often the case with television crews). It lets them be absorbed into a conflict rather than attached to it and gets them more involved with the participants and the casualties. It also puts them right there. That makes photographers more prone to physical harm, and in some cases mental harm, than others in the news media. I think that's a small price to pay for the privilege.

Gary Knight is an award-winning photojournalist who is a contract photographer for *Newsweek*.

PHOTOJOURNALISTS RARELY ENJOY the support infrastructure that other members of the media have. In most cases this is because the vast majority of photojournalists who cover world conflict are free-lance contributors rather than staff members. More often than not, free-lance photojournalists finance their own work, providing entirely for themselves. This excludes them from facilities normally available to employees, including such things as satellite communications, armored vehicles, bulletproof jackets, abundant financial resources, logistical support and research facilities. It also excludes them from another vital component: Should it all go terribly wrong, there may be no one out there to know they have a problem, no one to turn to for help.

During the war in Bosnia, my wife, Fiona, and I would often make our separate ways to the field. Fiona, a network TV producer, would leave the house in a silver limousine, with $10,000-$20,000 in her bag, armed with pages of research. She would fly in business class and be greeted upon landing by a local producer, who would have arranged her onward travel and would brief her fully on the current situation. Fiona would work for two to three weeks in the field, traveling in an armored car with her crew and correspondent, communicating by satellite telephone, with practically everything she needed at her disposal. When she returned home, in the same elegant manner as she left, she could even get counseling and medical care, if needed.

I, on the other hand, was totally on my own. During the war in Yugoslavia some magazines would give free-lancers only "guarantees," not assignments. That way they could not be held responsible if a photographer was killed or wounded.

Guarantees never covered expenses, however. So, shortly after Fiona left, I would head for the airport in the cheapest minicab available, raiding any ATM machine brave enough to accept my card. I would take a cheap flight and, on arrival, would hire a cheap, "soft-skinned" car and make my way to the story. If things got hot along the way, I would put the car seat in maximum recline and drive as fast as I could. If I needed to speak to the magazine client, I would first have to find a satellite telephone. In Sarajevo that meant driving down Sniper Alley—in full recline. Once I got in phone contact with the magazine, I could be kept on hold for 10 minutes (that costs $450). My overnight accommodation was usually

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Associated Press photographer Nick Ut is treated by South Vietnamese army medics after being wounded by mortar fire, 1972.

on someone else's floor. By the end of some of these trips, I would arrive home having spent more money than I had earned.

I have no complaints. The lack of support can be liberating; it gives photojournalists the freedom to ask the questions they want to ask and to look at what they feel is important. More often than not, they set their own agenda, and that is a source of strength.

The role of photojournalists in war coverage, however, becomes significantly more hazardous because of events way beyond their control. And control, in fact, is the key word. Since the end of the wars in Indochina, the media have been restricted in their movements and, in some cases, targeted by military forces as part of their strategy. Journalists now must go to increasingly extreme lengths to get to the story.

The U.S. war in Vietnam made both state and irregular forces recognize that the visual record of their behavior and conduct is significantly more compelling and damaging evidence than any other, one that their own propaganda departments are incapable of undermining. The only way to smother that message effectively is by placing more restrictions on the movement of journalists and photojournalists in the field.

The U.S. armed forces have made huge efforts to do exactly that in the theaters where they operate but fortunately with

limited success. It always amuses me to see the strategy mirrored—down to use of the same language—by the surrogate irregular forces that the United States supports.

Reprehensible as it was, the allied forces' attempted censorship of many journalists during the Persian Gulf War failed. Individuals operating outside, not within, the pool mechanism generated much of the best visual material from that conflict. British video cameraman Vaughan Smith became famous after he spent weeks disguised as a British army officer and enjoyed U.S. military support to reach places restricted to those less industrious. Even so, the time spent getting to the location of the story under such conditions, together with the dangers of finding a "back door," can be debilitating.

In some cases, notably in Israel and in the former Yugoslavia, military forces have deliberately targeted the media, particularly video camera people and photojournalists. Again, this censorship has not been successful, but it does raise the odds somewhat.

The days of newspeople as bystanders are over. They more often are seen as participants and treated as such. This just increases the danger for photographers, who are often closer to the belligerents than other journalists. Photojournalists can wear bulletproof jackets, drive armored cars, or rely on fate, amulets and charms. They can use myriad methods to feel more secure, but photographing a conflict at any level can exact a heavy price. Knowing that is a heavy burden.



BENNAN LINSLEY/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Children whose limbs were amputated by rebels in Sierra Leone, 1999

Compassion Fatigue

Graphic, complicated stories numb readers and viewers to atrocities.

Susan Moeller

The nadir of the last half of the 20th century might well have come in Rwanda. From the outset, news reports and photographs documented something extraordinary—even if journalists understood fairly late that they were witnessing genocide. As Ted Koppel said in his opening voice-over to a "Nightline" story in May 1994: "The horrific pictures, they come into your living room, leaving nothing but questions of how far humanity can sink, of how irreparable the damage is that's been done, of whether the world could and should help. Tonight, 'Rwanda: The New Killing Fields.'"

During those hundred days, Americans read reports from the scene and saw images of victims that were unprecedented in their graphic nature. They read on the front page of *The New York Times* what the head of the Ugandan cleanup operation had to say: "Children are skewered on sticks. I saw a woman cut open from the tailbone. They have removed breasts and male genital

organs." *Newsweek* ran a close-up of a dead woman, arms tied behind her and so bloated as to look like some obscene inflatable doll. CNN and the networks ran images of pasty bodies floating down rivers and collecting in miserable clots in eddies and at the base of waterfalls.

The public flinched and looked away. After *Newsweek* published a large photo by Magnum photographer Gilles Peress of a decomposing corpse, one reader wrote, "You wouldn't publish some obscenities, however common or benign the usage, or print photos of a healthy, naked human body—yet you think it's appropriate that I be shocked nearly to the point of vomiting by a full-spread, close-up photo of the hideous corpse of a Rwandan civil-war victim." (See photo, next page.) Jefferson White of Cedar Crest, N.M., went on to say, "I support your right to publish what you wish, and it may be necessary to display such an image. But you might have featured it less prominently and on a smaller scale."

White wasn't the only one to recoil from the news of the genocide. Since the April start of the crisis, the international aid consortium Oxfam had sought help for Rwanda. Oxfam America received only about 10 calls a day in response, and few donated money. But in mid-July with the genocide over but the refugee crisis in camps across the border at its height, Oxfam received more than 1,000 calls in 24 hours and raised $50,000, more in one day than in the preceding four months. Oxfam attributed the sudden interest to news coverage of the cholera epidemic that had killed 7,000 Rwandans who had fled to camps in Zaire. The link was so direct, said a *Boston Globe* story, that the "calls peak immediately after graphic reports of dying Rwandan refugees are broadcast."

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Americans responded more to cholera among the refugees than to the genocide of the Tutsi. They weren't naïve enough to think that $5 sent to Oxfam could rescue a child trapped by genocidal killers. It might, however, buy a refugee child a blanket.

When the news media turned to the refugee camps, Americans could look at Rwanda again. It was almost a relief when cholera broke out in the camps. They could care again. The disaster was both familiar and could be ameliorated. The problems—disease, sanitation, water and food—had time-tested solutions. But what could any one person do about a nation full of sadistic butchers? As *Time* magazine put it, "The horrifying slaughter is another explosion in a mainly ethnically based civil war that outsiders understand imperfectly if at all—and therefore do not know how to solve."

WHY DO SOME CRISES INDUCE compassion fatigue (and donor fatigue) in a way that less-dramatic disasters do not? The bare facts of an event (genocide or cholera, for example) trigger caring less often than does the story told about that

GILLES PERESS/MAGNUM PHOTOS

Some readers objected when *Newsweek* ran this photo of a victim of tribal violence in Rwanda, 1994.

event—and the moral argument that story makes, the moral box into which we place ourselves and others. Without a compelling moral argument—if we cannot decide, for example, which side is the "good guy"—we are liable not to care. We fall into compassion fatigue after seeing graphic images and hearing graphic tales that mean little to us beyond the fact that "people are being hurt."

Especially egregious events are particularly at risk for prompting compassion fatigue because they create a disconnect in the psyche. The sheer existence of an event so horrific as genocide, for example, and the helplessness of individuals in the face of it, conflicts with basic ideals and values cherished in U.S. society. Americans avoid confrontations with realities suggesting that humanity's dark and brutal impulses remain as vital as ever or that individuals often have no influence over their own environments.

Civic engagement—the opposite of compassion fatigue—occurs when members of the public find that their own interests are in synch with the community's needs and standards. One difficulty in moving Americans toward engagement is that they consider few political themes or few international conflicts compelling enough to galvanize a concerted response. Their incentive to care is diminished. Except for a few generic themes—"protecting children," for example—Americans feel minimal compunction about ignoring calls to action or even calls

simply to pay attention.

Sociologist C. Wright Mills identified what is now an article of faith for advertisers, politicians and sociologists alike: Americans respond generously when engaged by private concerns but remain indifferent to public calls for their attention. Private concerns tap into the needs, even desires, of an individual. Public calls arouse the suspicions of, and impose outside agendas on, the individual.

Turned around, this argument posits that public issues can be made immediate by capturing private interests. Pity, for example, can provoke a sporadic response, which explains individual donations after a natural disaster. But constantly playing the same note can cause Americans to close their ears. Compassion fatigue can set in when we believe the media are just crassly playing on our sympathies. Rarely does pity, for instance, provoke a response long-lived enough to jump-start Americans into caring about a country or region beyond an immediate disaster. One feels pity for only so long before feeling tempted to consider the person or situation merely pitiful.

Rarely does pity provoke a response long-lived enough to jump-start Americans into caring about a country or region beyond the immediate disaster.

THE MEDIA GO THROUGH VARIOUS contortions to attract the public's notice: They focus on the American angle, they don't linger too long on the same story, they sensationalize the story. Yet these contortions produce news that only reinforces compassion fatigue. You have to know a subject well before you can care about it, whether "it" is golf or a war in Sierra Leone. If you get skewed information, not enough information, or information that is too offensive, you are unlikely to care about the topic.

Some in the media, sometimes, understand the phenomenon and try to meet it head-on by marrying a nuanced text to images that might be graphic but are not just horror-porn. A well-done example was a May 2000 article in *The New York Times*' Week in Review section. Jane Perlez's article about the morality of the international community's dealings with Sierra Leone's rebel leader Foday Sankoh, titled "A Chance to Give Evil Its Rewards," included a large Associated Press photograph, selected by photo editor Sarah Weissman. (It's the one on the first page of this article.) The searingly beautiful portrait showed two children, one a girl perhaps in her early teens, the other a boy half her age. The girl, seated facing forward, looks out of the frame to her left. Her arms are raised in front of her, forming a shelf at the crook of her elbows which props up the extended left arm of the boy. He leans into her, but looks straight into the camera. It is a double portrait of two exquisite children.

It is also a portrait of horror. The girl has no hands; the viewer must look twice at the puckered stumps to recognize them for what they are. The boy, shirt off, with soft childish skin, also has been mutilated. His right arm is hacked off just below the shoulder; a slight knob of skinned-over bone protrudes. This is a morality tale with a vengeance—all the more powerful because

of the children's understated poses and expressions. Self-evidently, the children are victims. But the image is not pathetic. For one, the children are too self-possessed. Nor do the photograph and the accompanying *Times* article read as a media attempt to grab our attention with gratuitous sensationalism. These are not children *in extremis,* smeared with blood and dirt, the pitiable figures in a breaking-news tragedy. These are children inured to their fate, showing patiently to the camera what life has dealt them.

The children's mere existence argues for moral engagement and moral solutions. These children need more than a month of good meals and a better roof over their heads, all of which a local or international relief organization could provide. These children need a lifetime commitment of resources—and beyond that because the atrocities committed against them are so dastardly. In an era when humanitarian intervention beckons—the implication being that thugs who inflict terrible crimes on individuals and societies must be brought to justice—these two children, and others like them, are patient witnesses.

In many ways, the true horror of a Sierra Leone is not the injured children we are shown; it is the thousands more whom we do not see. And while the media cannot acquaint us with all of those suffering or at risk, at their best they can get the broader story out. We might be overwhelmed, but we might just as well become engaged because we will better understand cause and effect. Understanding is the prerequisite for caring.

Words alone can be soulless. Images alone tell an abbreviated story. Too often pictures provide illustrations but not explanations. Yet through words and pictures, used in concert and given generous space and time, an audience can come to understand a crisis. And that understanding can prompt the public to see beyond the damaged children and to realize that a box of Band-Aids doesn't deliver compassion.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Walter Cronkite films interview while covering the battle of Hue City, Vietnam, 1968.

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

I knew I had been hit, and I turned my arm and I could see the blood, and the first thought I had was, oh God, they're going to cut my arm off. — ED BRADLEY

Excerpts from interviews with

Peter Arnett, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author

Frank Bolden, *The Pittsburgh Courier,* one of the few accredited black correspondents in World War II

Walter Cronkite, former wire-service reporter and former anchor of "CBS Evening News"

Ed Bradley, correspondent for "60 Minutes"

Janine di Giovanni, correspondent for *The Times* of London

A Frightening Night

Peter Arnett

On getting to know U.S. troops:

In Vietnam, in the earlier period of the war, reporters developed close relationships with the men they were covering. If you were out on patrol with an American who was advising a Vietnamese paratrooper battalion and you got into action, he could well throw a rifle towards you and say, "Hey, ya gonna help us out here?" And you wouldn't stand on the Geneva Convention and say, "You know, I'm a civilian, I'm a reporter, I can't get involved." More than likely you would take the weapon and say, "I'm ready," and hope to hell that you'd never have to use it. Fortunately, at no time did I actually have to use a weapon. The closest it came was in 1965. I was at an American Special Forces camp in Song Be north of Saigon. There'd been an attack the previous night. Two-thirds of the Americans had been killed. There were only four left. They welcomed us there and they said, "Well, you can stay with us tonight on the condition that you help defend the camp, and we're expecting an attack." So through the night I was manning a machine gun at a mortar pit and was told, "If the VC come up that ravine, your job is to make sure they don't make it to the wire." It was the most uncomfortable, frightening night I ever spent in my life. But I was ready to shoot that machine gun, if only to defend myself. But fortunately, I didn't have to do it.

On criticism of his war coverage:

Much of the criticism that I've had in my career beginning in Vietnam and going right through to the Gulf War was the fact that I was from New Zealand. Being a foreigner, it was sort of perceived that I would not be able to represent American values; that my allegiance would be questionable; and that therefore, my credentials were not valid for covering wars Americans were involved in. In Vietnam, of course, there were New Zealand troops, Australian troops, many, many South Vietnamese troops, Koreans, Thais. My nationality at that point, as with Morley Safer's from Canada, was a basis for criticism. So in the Gulf War, the critics attempted to go back to that particular criticism. Why not criticize me on the basis of my reporting rather than on the basis of where I'd come from?

On Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf:

When I met him in 1966, he was the senior adviser to a Vietnamese airborne unit. He was very much in command at a remote firebase in the highlands that had been under siege for a while. I encountered him when I went in to do a story about this particular siege. And he was gruffly spoken. I remember when I arrived at that particular camp he said, "What the hell are you doing here? You know where you're at?" He was critical of the war strategy at that point, trying to hold on to keep his unit from being overrun and personally being very brave. I never did see him during the Gulf War. I know that my reporting from Baghdad did not please him. After the Gulf War, I was at a gathering in Washington, one of these big press gatherings. Schwarzkopf was there, and I said hello to him and we shook hands. And I said, "I know you were critical of me," and I said that was "disappointing because I was the only one in Baghdad who could pronounce your name." And he said, "Ah, but with an Iraqi accent."

Edited excerpt from an interview for "War Stories," an exhibit at the Newseum in Arlington, Va.

Bravery Over Discrimination

Frank Bolden

On military acceptance of black soldiers:

The legacy of both the Tuskegee Airmen and the 92nd Glory Infantry Division in World War II in my book are equal because they both proved that blacks in combat would not wither under fire. I was assigned for a short stay at Tuskegee to welcome the first black fliers. They did not permit the Negro fliers to be trained at the white air bases. We all know that Tuskegee was an agricultural school, it wasn't even an engineering school. But they sent them there. And I reported that day, I'll never forget it, the field was a cow and animal pasture. We had to wait two days for them to clean up the field so we could walk in it.

The Tuskegee Airmen's historic flight was when they first bombed Berlin. They flew the left protective wing of the bombers. The wing that was supposed to go on the mission came down with the measles, and the only unit left was the black fliers. There was quite a bit of objection from the white fliers because they didn't think that the black fliers would be up to that. It was the first time that the 15th Air Force never lost a bomber going or coming.

When the 92nd was disbanded at the end of the war, I was invited to that ceremony, and I was mighty proud when the secretary of war read to the public that this division in World War I and World War II had earned 12,096 American citations of valor and 48 countries had honored them. The 92nd made it possible for black people to go into any branch of the armed services on the ground. The infantry was open to us, and we got our black officers. These two units had an impact on America.

On a messman's bravery at Pearl Harbor:

In World War II, segregation and discrimination kept the Negro recruit from doing anything in the Navy except being a messman. Dorrie Miller, coming out of Texas, was a messman, and the day Pearl Harbor was attacked, he came up out of the galley and saw the devastation on deck. He'd never had any training on a machine gun. He grabbed one and brought down three Japanese planes. It made two lines in the newspapers.

The Pittsburgh Courier thought he should be recognized and honored. We sent our executive editor to the naval department. They said, "We do not know the name of the messman—there's so many of them." We spent $7,000 working to find out who Dorrie Miller was. We advocated that he get a Medal of Honor. Later on he was killed on another ship. The black press was needed in order to show the positive side of what we were doing in this war.

Edited excerpt from an interview for "War Stories," an exhibit at the Newseum in Arlington, Va.

Gliders, Bombs and the Blitz

Walter Cronkite

On covering World War II:

World War II remains probably the greatest memory any correspondent has. United Press managed to get me to the right place at the right time. I did the battle of the North Atlantic when it was at its hottest and we were losing it, losing a lot of ships out of every convoy. I made a couple of convoy trips which were quite interesting. I made the landing in North Africa. I made the first B-17 raid over Germany that they permitted correspondents on. I was overhead on D-Day and got into Normandy in D-plus-five. I dropped with the 101st Airborne into Holland, and covered the Battle of the Bulge, and then Nuremberg afterwards. The trial of the top Nazis—Goering, Hess, the rest of them. So, I had a pretty good war. Got bombed out a couple of times in London. That's an experience.

On bravery:

I guess a lot of it is how you want to appear to your fellow man. It's a peer pressure sort of thing. If you were alone, I think you would probably weep and cower and run. But you don't do that, that's not the way you handled yourself. I think the greater fear is the fear of what your fellows will think of you. When I was assigned to a glider instead of a parachute going into Holland, I came very close to fleeing back to London. I could have. I was a civilian war correspondent and nobody's making me go. I'd seen what had happened to the gliders in Normandy, and it was terrible. I really had no desire at all to go in by glider. But the mere thought of what they'd say about me at the 101st Airborne—what they'd say, my colleagues, when I came whimpering back to London—was enough to put me on that glider.

On conditions at the battlefront:

I think the infantry is the worst. I wouldn't mind going to war almost any way except with the infantry. Those poor devils, hastily digging a foxhole, for heaven's sakes. Cowering in it as the bombs and the shrapnel fly. That's terrible! The air war is frightening, of course, terribly frightening. It's not much fun having anti-aircraft shells bursting around you, the great orange glow and the black puffs from the smoke and the incoming fighter planes with the tracer bullets coming right next to the skin of your airplane and right next to you. Seeing your airplanes in your flight going down around you, getting hits on your own aircraft. On the North African landing, I was aboard a battleship for the first couple of days, and that's a fairly safe place to be. Being on a transport ship in a convoy, being a real sitting duck, virtually nothing you can do, totally dependent on the escorts you've got, is terrifying.

Edited excerpt from an interview for "War Stories," an exhibit at the Newseum in Arlington, Va.

Doing 'The Lord's Work'

Ed Bradley

On wartime journalism:

Every day that you go down the road and you come back alive, there's a sense of accomplishment, satisfaction, exhilaration—that you put your life on the line and you did OK. We're not doctors or saving lives, but sometimes you feel like you're doing the Lord's work because the public has a right to know. The best of what we do is giving the public what they have a right to know. You had that sense that you were out there every day, and you were doing something that was worthwhile. You weren't just sitting there covering some dreary hearing, which has to be done, but you had a sense that it meant something, that it was worthwhile, it was meaningful.

On success and failure in Vietnam:

I knew early on not only that there was no way the United States could win that war, but also that South Vietnam could not win the war. I spent some time with the Viet Cong, and I remember one night, talking to this guy northwest of Quang Tri, and he said, "You know, we fought the French before you. And we fought the Chinese. We fought you. We'll fight the South Vietnamese." And he said, "It may take five more years, 10 more years, 20 more years. But we will win in the end." And I knew that the United States didn't have 20 years of patience for what was going on in Vietnam. They couldn't last that long and they couldn't last propping up the South Vietnamese government that long. I knew there was no way we could win that war.

On fear:

There are times when there is fear, but this was a time when there was no fear, when I was wounded, because I didn't think I was in any danger. We were in the middle of a field, and the Khmer Rouge were in the tree line, mortaring the positions of the government soldiers. I had said to Norman Lloyd, who was the cameraman I was working with, that we've got everything we need here, except a conclusion. We've got the Cambodian Army shooting small arms fire, .50-caliber machine guns, those big god-awful recoilless rifles that are on armored personnel carriers that make a hell of a noise. We had air strikes. And I was sitting on the film bag, under a tree. Then I heard an explosion, and that explosion blew me in the air and I hit the ground. I had these separate and distinct thoughts from the time of the explosion to the time I hit the ground, which was a split second: I heard the explosion. I said, "What's that? Oh that's the recoilless rifle on this armored personnel carrier. Hey, there's no recoilless rifle on this armored personnel carrier. You'd better turn and see what that noise is." That's five separate and distinct thoughts in a split second. And then I knew I had been hit, and I turned my arm and I could see the blood, and the first thought I had was, oh God, they're going to cut my arm off. That was the first thought I had. Fortunately, they didn't. The shrapnel went through, so all they had to do was stitch me up.

Edited excerpt from an interview for "War Stories," an exhibit at the Newseum in Arlington, Va.

A Lucky Day

Janine di Giovanni

On covering war in Africa:

I never really anticipated the stress of it—the physical stress. When you've been in the midst of a conflict for about four weeks, the exhaustion you begin to feel. And you are running. I always thought it was a cliché that you run on adrenaline, but for instance, I flew on a chopper into Sierra Leone that was empty because it was going in to evacuate people. So I arrived and everyone was standing at the airport, pushing and shoving to get on the chopper to get out of the country. And I got off, and as the chopper lifted off and took people away, I thought, "My God, what have I done?"

On being kidnapped:

In Montenegro, at the beginning of the bombing, I crossed by accident into Kosovo territory with two French journalists. We were taken captive by these Serb paramilitaries who were drunk. They marched us into the woods and started beating up the cameraman. And I remember thinking, "This is it. You've had your seven lives." It was a really awful hour and a half spent with them in which they were obviously deciding what to do with us. They finally loaded us into a car. I guess maybe they were looking for a spot on the road to kill us. Maybe they were looking for a place to rape me. I don't know. But at one point, they just got tired of it and just kicked us out and told us to never come back there again. Afterwards, I saw a refugee who had passed me as the soldiers led us off into the woods at gunpoint. And he said to me, "Thank God. Thank God you're alive. You don't understand. They usually don't change their minds." So I don't know if it's that I was lucky or it wasn't my day.

On male vs. female reporters:

I really do think it makes a difference if you're a woman. And I'm not saying that you go in and you use your sexuality in any way because I just don't think that would ever work. But what I find is that a lot of times people will respond to you because you're a woman in a much more open way. I find that people talk to me, that I can get them to open up. They can tell me things in a way that maybe they don't with men. Maybe I remind them of their sister, their mother, their girlfriend or something. Maybe it does help that they'd rather take a smiling woman along with them on the road than take a bunch of grumpy guys. Who knows? At any rate, it gets me on the back of the truck, and that's what I'm trying to do.

Edited excerpt from an interview for "War Stories," an exhibit at the Newseum in Arlington, Va.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Macedonian special police and photographers run for cover from heavy artillery fire, March 22, 2001.

REVIEW ESSAY

Are the media and the military ready for the next war?

Jerry W. Friedheim on, among others:

Live From the Battlefield
Peter Arnett. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994

Big Story
Peter Braestrup. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977

Hotel Warriors
John J. Fialka. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992

The Bang Bang Club
Greg Marinovich and João Silva. New York: Basic Books, 2000

Chienne de Guerre
Anne Nivat. New York: PublicAffairs, 2001

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Russian soldiers in Chechnya, 2000

Adversaries or Antagonists?

The media-military conundrum

Jerry W. Friedheim

It's the biggest game in the world: preservation of a free society. The players: media and military. The contending principles: free expression and national security. The challenge: How do tomorrow's players learn from and embellish the lessons of the past?

They read. They think. They come to understand the game, to love it, to relish it. We Americans are the luckiest citizens with the best chance to defend the most freedom. Our Constitution enshrines both the common defense and a free press. We know that a strong, free country and a strong, free press are inseparable. You cannot have one without the other. No nation ever has; none will.

Of course, even wars that are not "American" carry major import for the United States in an interlinked political, economic and security-minded world. What we don't know *can* hurt us.

So what are the best books for young journalists and military officers to read and mull—and for older editors and security

officials to recall and review? And what should they seek there? Lessons from past conflicts that, though dated, hold insight for the *next war*—a major confrontation that the news media will report as differently from Vietnam, when copy sputtered along wire cables and film was flown thousands of miles, as they reported the Hainan Island incident this year, when video phones and private satellites flashed words and images.

Where better to start than *Live From the Battlefield*, in which Peter Arnett details his adventures from Vietnam to Baghdad for the AP and CNN. Arnett was the dean of war correspondents for the last half of the last century, and his book reminds us that only wily risk-takers and free spirits need apply. One day he filed his own AP story from Laos, then another version to cover his absent UPI colleague, then another on behalf of a missing Reuters pal. Peter didn't mind, and the world got the news.

Danger was his middle name. One day, with Laos communications down, he sloshed across the mile-wide Mekong River to Thailand with a vital scoop, his passport and $200 clamped between his teeth. Later, from Iraq, as his connection to CNN sputtered in and out, he stuck his microphone out the window to catch the sounds of exploding missiles. Battle-site communications always are lousy. Sometimes military services help; often they don't. Nonetheless, a few skilled and slightly sneaky correspondents always get the news through.

Jerry W. Friedheim, a former newspaperman and journalism teacher, is retired after serving as the founding executive director of the Newseum in Arlington, Va. He served as assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and was president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association.

In Vietnam, Arnett—in helmet and poncho—went where the soldiers and Marines went. He liked them, as Ernie Pyle had in World War II, and he followed the military's reporting guidelines to guard their safety. He appreciated the military leadership when it provided jeep and helicopter transportation. But he didn't hold his dispatches to hear the views of the top brass when, for instance, he found unannounced use of tear gas to clear enemy caves and bunkers. He filed what happened and let the AP worry about getting the Pentagon's policy explanation. The AP's president sometimes thought Peter a bit too much of a maverick; his colleagues voted him the Pulitzer Prize.

He watched the last Americans evacuate Saigon and stayed to meet the North Vietnamese. He sympathized with other correspondents who left Baghdad when that war started, but he stayed, persistently maneuvering his way through Iraqi censorship to tell the story as well as he could for as long as he could. Many correspondents' memoirs tell similar tales, and whatever the *next war* holds, both media and military need to understand that this is what a war correspondent is and does.

THE VIETNAM WAR IS LONG GONE but much studied by such scholars as military historian William M. Hammond and journalist Peter Braestrup. Hammond's *Reporting Vietnam* is subtitled *Media and Military at War,* and he elucidated that big picture as has no other writer by under-

standing the role of a free press and mining hundreds of government public-information directives, many of them from Washington decision makers. Braestrup's *Big Story* likewise is unique in exhaustively plumbing the Tet offensive of early 1968 to show what happened on the ground, how news people reported it, how editors back home changed and presented the stories, and how Washington leaders perceived the events.

Hammond asked: What happened to the media-military cooperation forged during World War II and even the Korean War? How did these adversaries become antagonists? He recalled that as Vietnam began, correspondents like Arnett and David Halberstam sometimes questioned policy and official obfuscation but placed great confidence in U.S. troops. A reciprocating military eschewed censorship in favor of voluntary reporting guidelines that were almost never broken.

Hammond found plenty of subsequent mistakes on both sides, but in the end he placed primary blame for the evolving distrust and discord less on in-country reporters and officials than on the policies and actions of U.S. political leaders at home. Thus, if we would prepare wisely for the *next war*, we must seek a broad perspective and be alert for what might happen at home as well as at the front.

Braestrup's monumental, in-depth case study of the portrayal of war lets us follow the smallest details from the field, through the reporting and editing, to the actions and reactions of public officials. He found no conspiracy, just an overwhelmed, overhasty news process that unintentionally and dramatically evoked crisis and distorted complex reality until Washington leaders saw a homefront disaster rather than an enemy defeat.

One need not read all of Braestrup's 728 pages to grasp the burgeoning melodramatics. Consider just his reconstruction of news coverage during the siege in the city of Hue. First, the AP reported that enemy troops "control most of the streets." Then the UPI Hue correspondent wrote that it might become "the bloodiest nine blocks" since Korea. UPI's Saigon bureau chimed in with "foot by bloodsoaked foot." And CBS intoned, "bloody inch by inch." From New York City, *Time* rewriters first said "block-by-block struggle," which gave way to a "brick-by-brick" fight.

So watch out. During the *next war* you, too, might overwhelm the news process. Still, we have learned lessons beyond Vietnam, and two unassuming paperbacks are chock full of them.

Another title by Braestrup, *Battle Lines,* was a Twentieth Century Fund report occasioned by the worst U.S. government failure in media-military history: the failure to plan for, or to take any newspeople on, the 1983 invasion of Grenada. This time Braestrup worked his succinct magic on every major war and every involved issue: censorship, access, communications, accreditation, transportation, pools, and the soldier-scribe cultural chasm.

He examined Ike taking newsmen along on D-Day. MacArthur landing them in Inchon. Gen. Abrams flying them into Cambodia. The British taking them to the distant Falklands. Then Reagan's National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberately barred Grenada coverage while lying to the White House press secretary and deceiving the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, causing a predictable press explosion and contrite government efforts to put press planning back into national-security deliberations.

COURTESY PETER ARNETT

Peter Arnett in Vietnam

HOTEL WARRIORS, BY JOHN FIALKA, dissected the Persian Gulf War experience that tested, bent and broke the post-Grenada press-pool planning as Army news fell into a self-dug, communicationless black hole. The more P.R.-astute Marines raked in headlines and credit with their former public-information chief as battle commander and their philosophy that the press, like the rain, is just something to cope with on the battlefield.

Gulf War coverage gave both press and military the first taste of the future's instant-communications technology as TV-network truck convoys dragged satellite-uplink dishes across the desert, safe and sound under total allied air superiority. It got the military thinking about how in the *next war* to throw an electronic umbrella over the entire battle area, forcing the media to use only military-provided channels.

Back at headquarters, Bob Woodward's *The Commanders* put the top layer on the cake as he reconstructed the high-command interaction of George Bush, Dick Cheney, Jim Baker, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft and Norman Schwarzkopf. Each of them certainly had studied all the lessons above. They tried to implement them. They convinced the Saudis that U.S. forces do not deploy without U.S. correspondents. They planned to get many reporters into the field when the land-war phase started. Correspondents went. Copy was prepared. Some actually was sent out. And much of it arrived at home newspapers and networks only after the war was over.

So the U.S. media-military future is not secure. A new generation of soldiers and scribes must contend over it again. Meanwhile, there are other wars, smaller wars,

regional and ethnic wars, bloody and disgusting wars—covered for the world and for U.S. residents almost entirely by non-U.S. journalists.

Violence, terror and despair in South Africa, Yugoslavia and Sudan spill from the shocking photos by Greg Marinovich and João Silva, which are the guts of *The Bang Bang Club*. If the *next war*s are like these in lawless bandit country, then Peter Arnett's risks will pale in comparison.

Marinovich was shot covering one firefight in which colleague Ken Oosterbrock died. Silva calls himself a "conflict" photographer, going where people get killed—the "dead zones." It is free-lance work, with no nurturing parent organization to order you home and no friendly military nearby to walk, ride, eat and sleep with. It is headlong combat journalism on your own. If you survive, it yields stories and images of the dead and the dying. Clearly these two are good at it, enthralled by it, committed to it. News results, but gathering it is very, very scary.

ANNE NIVAT'S *CHIENNE DE GUERRE* is among this year's most striking new books. She stowed away with the rebels, behind the lines of the unending, ugly war in Chechnya. The Russian side is wont to jail journalists. Some Chechens will kidnap you and sell you to other Chechens. Either side might just as likely kill you. But with cunning, deception and disguise, Nivat sought out the terror, witnessed the horror, endured the hunger, sat under the bombs, and reported the chilling stories of needless death and compassionless destruction, escaping with her life to become the Moscow correspondent for the French daily, *Liberation*.

"I lived through hell," she wrote, "… the kind of raw fear that wipes out other thought or feeling, that makes your mouth dry." She kept going by retreating into her professional self; struggling to keep her ballpoint pen from freezing; jotting her notes on legal-size paper concealed in her plastic boots; recharging her satellite phone from tractor batteries; dictating quickly to Paris; and hiding, listening, questioning, moving on, always moving on.

Could any other tough journalist have accomplished this reporting crusade? Probably not. Did it take a special person? Certainly yes: a mother-taught Russian speaker, totally engaged—even obsessed—by the region and its people, with a French doctorate in Russian affairs plus a fellowship at Harvard's Russian Research Center, driven by a youngster's desire to make her name with a big story, itching to flout Russian denial of accreditation, eager to conquer what her French colleagues call "Anglo-Saxon journalism." The name is made. Anne Nivat will be heard from again, even before the *next war*.

Finally, a lighter note. This business can still have some laughs. Many wars ago Evelyn Waugh skewered all of us ink-stained, electron-buzzed news junkies in *Scoop*, a classic 1938 satire about the most unlikely war correspondent of all time, the Brits' William Boot of *The Beast*. If you haven't read it at all, or haven't reread it for a while, I won't give it away—except for this one helpful hint from *The Beast*'s foreign editor as he hurries the dumbfounded Boot toddling off to war:

> *You'll be surprised to find how far the war correspondents keep from the fighting. Why, Hitchcock reported the whole Abyssinia campaign from Asmara and gave us some of the most colorful eyewitness stuff we ever printed!*

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IN THIS ISSUE

War reporters "find themselves caught up in an environment where rocket-propelled grenades have replaced swords, and cell phones have replaced telexes. It's a new world for war correspondents—one in which new rules and new technology often clash with past conventions and ideals." — HAROLD M. EVANS

RECENT ISSUES OF

MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL

The First Amendment, Fall 2000

The 45 words of the First Amendment—unchanged since ratification in 1791—give Americans the right to freely express ourselves through speech, faith, petition, assembly and the written word. While the public generally supports these freedoms, its commitment sometimes wavers because of concern about violence, racism, children's exposure to controversial content and other issues. The challenge is to apply the First Amendment's fundamental freedoms when original intent runs headlong into new technology and shifting societal interests.

Courage, Spring/Summer 2000

If history is usually written about the winners, stories of courage are usually written about the famous. Yet some of the bravest actions of journalists are unknown—obscured by the passage of time, hidden by veils of anonymity or buried by systematic repression. This issue aims to correct that imbalance by telling the tales of the not so familiar, those who worked on the margins of popularity, who blazed new but solitary paths or who left fleeting legacies. Their lives and their work are a reminder that tests of integrity usually occur far from the spotlight.

Campaign 2000, Winter 2000

The campaign of 2000 was preceded by other elections when spin, invective, scandal and deficient reporting sometimes seemed to overwhelm the best in American journalism and American democracy. In the belief that foresight is better than hindsight, our writers injected informed analysis and suggestions into presidential and congressional races at the start. By understanding where the currents of the time have taken journalism and politics, the news media will be better able to navigate a desirable course in the future.

After the Fall, Fall 1999

The changes that swept Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 passed with relatively little bloodshed, and if history had ended then there would be cause for easy optimism. But in the enduring battles with censors and would-be censors that bedevil emerging democracies, new questions appear. Not only is there much for journalists to cover, in some places the fate of journalism is still an open question. This issue explores not just the epic events of 1989 but the new stories that emerged in that region in the 1990s.