Open Regionalism: Cultural Diplomacy and Popular Culture in Europe and Asia*

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With specific reference to Germany's position in Europe and Japan's in Asia this paper argues that internationalization and globalization are jointly creating an open regionalism in contemporary world politics. Globalization and internationalization shape policy and outcomes not directly but indirectly through regional institutions and practices that their cumulative impact keeps open. Today's open regionalism contrasts strikingly with the bloc regionalism of the 1930s.

The world-wide web offers a powerful illustration of the way globalization creates novel conditions of openness. It is perhaps the clearest example of the radical changes that globalization is bringing about. The Cold War was about division; the world-wide web is about connection. During the Cold War there was a hotline linking the White House with the Kremlin. Leaders were trying to stay in charge. On the world-wide web we are all connected, and nobody is in charge. The web creates both new social and economic benefits as well as new risks and vulnerabilities. Technology itself is neutral. It empowers individuals for good and ill. It is individuals – peace activists mobilizing against land mines and terrorists attacking the symbols of U.S. power – rather than governments whom the web empowers.

Viewed through different analytical lenses, the internet helps make the same point a second time. It is a good example of how internationalization processes are shaped by the actions of national governments. A classified RAND report proposed in 1962 a packet-switching network to protect the U.S. military from a nuclear attack. The idea was never implemented. But a few years later researchers working for the Department of Defense (DoD) backed a similar approach to address problems they had encountered in dealing with computing and communication problems of the U.S. military. Thus the internet developed rapidly in the interest of enhancing national security. As is true of the microelectronic and telecommunication revolution, the internet is a deliberate creation of the American national security state (Lipson and Gayton 1998, pp. 2-3). Furthermore, there are governments, most notably in Beijing (but also in Bavaria), that are trying to make the internet into an intranet, trying to exercise a measure of national control over the content of information that flows across national borders. In the case of China (but not Bavaria) the U.S. government is funding an American-based computer network equipped with privacy servers designed to prevent the Chinese government from censoring the contents of internet users in China (Lee 2001). China is not an isolated example. On issues of child pornography, for example, in December 2001 national police forces in nineteen industrial states coordinated a crack-down on pedophiles (Hoge 2001). As the evolution of server technology is increasingly focusing on geolocation, it is naive to dismiss such efforts at exercising some measure of state power as a Don Quixote fighting with windmills or an Orwellian effort at thought control. Even if they fail, states will continue to attempt to monitor the evolving information revolution they helped bring about. With the coming of the internet "distance is dying; but geography, it seems, is still alive and kicking" (2001).

Two case studies support this paper's argument. Cultural diplomacy is chosen here as an easy case for internationalization theory. States typically regard themselves as the privileged carrier of national culture. Popular culture, on the other hand, is an easy case for globalization theory. Its spontaneous and unregulated spread spans national

borders and defies most attempts at suppression. Globalization theorists often insist on the variable responses to and appropriation of global factors by local actors. Globalization thus becomes "glocalization," a term common in areas as disparate as studies of popular culture and analyses of the automobile industry. Internationalization theory readily concedes that national effects can at times intersect powerfully with regional effects in creating "deep" rather than "shallow" forms of regionalism. In short, this paper argues that open regionalism points to the existence of the cumulative and combinatorial effects of globalization and internationalization in different regional settings. The interparadigmatic battle that proponents of internationalization and globalization theory have waged misses the point. The effects that these theories usefully and correctly point to do not act directly on human behavior, but through the regional institutions and practices in which actors are embedded.

The cumulative impact of globalization and internationalization in Europe and Asia is profound. This chapter develops its argument in several steps. Sections 1 and 2 highlight, respectively, the significance of regionalism and regionalization and of globalization and internationalization. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the different ways that globalization, internationalization and regionalization combine to create a world of open regions. They do so by investigating cultural affairs, an issue that illustrates with particular clarity the confluence of international and global factors. Section 3 analyzes cultural diplomacy, like national security, a central prerogative of the state. Internationalization theory expects persistent national differences, illustrated here by the different approaches that the Japanese and German state have taken in this policy domain. Section 4 looks at popular culture, like finance, a preferred domain for processes that are escaping state control. Globalization theory expects convergence across nations and regions.

Taken together, both sections make two claims. First, different combinations of global and international effects create open regionalism in both Europe and Asia. Second, the international and global processes that create openness are not sufficiently powerful to wash away enduring regional differences that set Asia apart from Europe. Section 5 identifies these differences. In Asia the politically defining institution is the market, typically operating along ethnic or national lines. Identity capitalism is thus the characteristic practice of Asian regionalism. Europe's defining institution is law with its primarily regulatory effects on policies and behavior. Formal political institutions are the most typical regional practice of European regionalism. The paper's final section 6 contrasts briefly today's open regionalism in cultural affairs with the historical experience of closed regionalism of the 1930s.

1. Regionalism and Regionalization

Throughout the 20th century regionalism has offered a complement or alternative to the more ambitious universal visions that at various times have been offered as antidotes to nationalist excesses (Yalem 1965). Within fifteen years of the League's universal blue-print. Nazi Germany and the Japanese military had developed their preferred "bloc regionalism." At the end of World War II regionalism and globalism offered again two contrasting blueprints for world politics (Daase et al. 1993). U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull stood for universalism, British Prime Minister Winston

Churchill championed regionalism. This split is reflected in the United Nations Charter. Article 24 charges the Security Council to preserve world peace and international security. Article 52 emphasizes the importance of regional organizations (Yalem 1965).

On questions of security regionalism trumped universalism during the Cold War. Most states relied on Article 51 and the right of collective self-defense. Regional alliances such as the Rio Pact (1947), NATO (1949), SEATO (1954), and the Warsaw Pact (1955), undercut the system of collective security that Cordell Hull had championed. The world was divided into "East" and "West," two rival blocs led by the two superpowers. In the "South" Third World states looked to regional organizations like the OAS, OAU, and the Arab League to defend their recently won sovereignty (Acharya 1999a); (Acharya 1999b); (Acharya 1999c).

On economic issues the political alliances and strategies that evolved during the Cold War blurred the neat distinction between universalism and regionalism. As a matter of general principle the United States pushed for a lowering of tariff barriers and the establishment of freely convertible currencies. The policy aimed at world-wide economic integration. The Cold War restricted integration to the richest parts of the capitalist world. Initially, economic reconstruction in Europe and the adoption of policies of import substitution in the Third World slowed down economic integration. Subsequently the formation of customs unions and free trade areas in Europe, Latin America and East Africa pointed to a growing interest in regional integration schemes. Subregional organizations like ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Economic Community of West Asian States (ECOWAS) also flourished. The convergence of international liberalization regionalism pushed international interdependence in the 1970s to levels reached first at the beginning of the 20th century.

Since the 1980s economic deregulation and rapid advances in communications technologies have integrated markets further. The 'Washington consensus' about a proper economic policy has spread from the U.S. Treasury and the IMF throughout the world. Most governments have adopted market-friendly policies, institutional transparency, and a lower profile for government. Export-led-growth and foreign-investment-led economic strategies are now favored to achieve rapid national development (Lawrence 1994). At the same time these strategies activate national and transnational opposition movements.

States are "racing to regionalize" in this new context (Thomas and Tétrault 1999). In a world of increasingly porous borders, contemporary politics features large numbers of regional organizations dealing with both economic and security affairs. Paul Taylor (Taylor 1993), for example, concludes that "the 1980s was a period of remarkable growth in regional organization." And the 1990s saw an explosion of regional initiatives, including the adoption of NAFTA, the creation of the EEA which liberalized trade between the EU and EFTA, the Miami Declaration of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTA), and APEC's Declaration of Bogor (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995). The 33 regional trade agreements signed between 1990 and 1994 constitutes the largest number for any five-years period since the end of World War II (Mansfield and Milner 1999); (Frankel 1997). In the latter half of the 1990s, the enlargements of NATO, the EU, and ASEAN illustrate the continued strong effects of regionalism in different parts of the world. Enlargement goes hand in hand with interregional engagement. Since 1996, European and Asian leaders have met periodically in the ASEM talks. Corresponding links between

the EU and Mercosur are under active consideration. On matters of security, regional institutions must also be understood on their own, distinctive terms. "Efforts to cope with violent conflicts," conclude David Lake and Patrick Morgan, "will primarily involve arrangements and actions devised and implemented at the regional level . . . Regions are a substantially more important venue of conflict and cooperation than in the past" (1997).

Governments find regionalism attractive for a number of reasons. First, neighborhood effects encourage intensive trade and investment relations. Secondly, economic regionalism may not require the strict reciprocity that the WTO insists on. Thirdly, at the regional level, efficiency and competitiveness are often strengthened through international forms of deregulation. While this may weaken directly the attraction of universal approaches to liberalization, it may strengthen them indirectly. In addition, the effects of regional economies of scale and savings in transportation costs can create dynamic effects that also accelerate economic growth. The convergence of such developments is reflected in the politics of the WTO. In the words of Sweden's former minister for foreign trade and European Union affairs, Mats Hellstrom, "one can foresee a future where the vast majority of world trade is governed by regional rules and preferences" (Richardson 1996). The selection of the first director general of the new World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, became an exercise in regional politics. With Japanese support South Korean trade minister Kim Chul Su ran unsuccessfully as the "Asian" candidate against a "European" and a "North American" one. In slightly altered form the selection of the successor to the WTO's first director-general, Renato Ruggiero, offered a repeat with Mike Moore, former Prime Minister of New Zealand, and Supachai Panitchpakdj, Thailand's deputy premier, deadlocked for many months.

Since the early 1980s changes in U.S. policy have strengthened regionalism both directly and indirectly. Seeking to shore up its international position U.S. policy, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, developed regional initiatives to complement its traditionally universal stance (Helleiner 1994). This change in policy encouraged the formation of regions open to the world economy as the United States became a member of several economic regions (Fishlow and Haggard 1992). Leveling the playing field in the name of "fair trade," the U.S. government sought to protect both vulnerable and strategic industries, such as textiles and microelectronics, and aimed at opening up European and Asian markets through concerted political pressure and the creation of NAFTA. Shedding its traditional hostility to regionalism, the United States government thus embraced regionalism as a useful complement to its universal, neo-liberal strategy. "For U.S. policymakers," write James Mittelman and Richard Falk (2000), "regionalism has nonetheless emerged as a critical, yet still tentative, and even inconsistent feature of a neoliberal multilateral order – an adhesive often used to join the political and economic dimensions of global restructuring." By the early 1990s the main driving force for regionalism was in the opinion of Jagdish Bhagwati (1992) the U.S. government's policy to accept and promote regional initiatives under GATT's Article 24.

U.S. policy has also strengthened regionalism indirectly. Throughout the 1990s the primary focus of American politics was domestic not foreign. Freed from the pressures of the Cold War, many states finally had an opportunity to strengthen their regional position as U.S. policy turned inward (Hettne and Inotai 1994). Facing novel conditions, many governments supported regional initiatives as a politically useful

hedging strategy (Bobrow and Kudrle 1999); (Whalley and Perroni 1999). Since the late 1980s in particular, policies supporting regional trading arrangements have proliferated (Milner 1994). For Björn Hettne, regionalism and multipolarity thus are two sides of the same coin (Hettne and Inotai 1994); (Hettne 1999); (Hettne and Söderbaum 1999). For several reasons regionalism "has become an extremely important feature" (Gilpin 2001) of world politics.

While we can rightfully insist that we live in a world of regions, it is far from clear how that term should be understood (Mansfield and Milner 1997); (Lake and Morgan 1997); (Morgan 1997); (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995). Common language use suggests the relevance of geographical proximity. It shapes the intensity of social and economic exchanges, the salience of security relations, and the pressure for the coordination of government policies. Regions, however, are not only geographically given but also politically made (Lewis and Wigen 1997); (Hummel 2000). They are in the words of Kanishka Jayasuriya (1994), "a set of cognitive practices shaped by language and political discourse, which through the creation of concepts, metaphors, analogies, determine how the region is defined." Even though agreement on the boundaries of "Europe" and "Asia" is typically lacking, a variety of political actors are invoking regional identities. "Europe" and "Asia" are reference points that are distinct from "Berlin," "Paris," "Tokyo," and "Beijing." Referring to an extensive body of scholarship that views regions as symbolic constructs, Patrick Morgan (1997) asserts bluntly that "there is no way to identify regions, through geography, that enhances analysis in international politics." Christopher Daase (1993) comes to a similar conclusion referring specifically to elaborate definitions advanced by Thompson (1973), Cantori and Spiegel (1970), and Russett (1967).

This is going too far. Regions have both material and symbolic aspects that are both reflected in and reshaped by daily practice. In statistical studies economists have demonstrated the importance of geographical distance for the intensity of international trade flows (Frankel 1997); (Isard 1956). Geography, these studies show, is not destiny. Political borders have powerful effects on economic behavior. In North America, for example, individuals are ten to twenty times more likely to trade within than across the U.S.-Canadian border. Furthermore, culture can overcome distance in the relations among different national economies. "The effect of sharing a common language, even for far-removed countries, is very similar in magnitude to the effect of sharing a common border" (Frankel 1997). It is therefore plausible to think of regions, in both material and symbolic terms, as creating variable patterns of political interdependence. Karl W. Deutsch (1981) thus defines a region succinctly as a group of countries that, compared to other groups, is markedly interdependent over a wide range of different issues.

Regionalism, as a political project and regionalization as a process of change are both shaped by the demise of bloc politics separating East from West, and the consolidation of market capitalism in both North and South. A world of regions is not a territorially bounded system of geo-economic blocs that simply projects national mercantilism onto a supranational plain (Luttwak 1990); (Luttwak 1993). Nor is it a system that unbundles territorial sovereignty in an era of postnational politics (Ruggie 1993). Regionalism is instead supported from "above" and from "below." It is supported from above by being embedded in organizations with universal membership such as the

WTO and the United Nations Charter. It is supported from below by many small states which are looking to regional institutions as protective buffers against strong external pressures. In sum, regionalism and regionalization reflect pervasive political forces that shape contemporary world politics (Gilpin 2000).

2. Globalization, Internationalization and Open Regionalism

Globalization and internationalization create a regionalism that is open not closed. These concepts update earlier insights. Yesterday's "international interdependence" is today's "globalization" and "internationalization" (Jones, King, and Klein 1993). Some of the writings of the late 1960s could have been published today. Charles Kindleberger (1969), for example, argued that "the international corporation has no country to which it owes more loyalty than any other, nor any country where it feels completely at home . . . The nation-state is just about through as an economic unit . . .The world is too small. It is too easy to get about." George Ball's (1968) description of a world of footloose cosmopolitan corporations anticipated today's discussion by three decades. And Roy Harrod's (1969) characterization of the Eurodollar market in the late 1960s as existing without "headquarters or buildings of its own . . . a network of telephones and telex machines around the world" – with due allowance for some technological innovations – describes global financial markets at the beginning of a new millennium.

Then as now, analytical concepts are deeply contested both analytically and normatively. In the 1970s, careful analyses of increasing levels of international interdependence, both understood as growing sensitivities and vulnerabilities of societies and states, pointed to their wide-ranging, powerful effects on world politics (Alker, Bloomfield, and Choucri 1974); (Solomon and Gault 1977); (Interdependence n.d.). Liberals saw an era in which traditional centers of authority would be challenged by new, non-state actors. Marxists pointed to the inherent instabilities that growing international interdependence was creating for capitalism both at home and abroad. And realists and students of domestic politics argued that even a sharp increase in levels of interdependence would not be strong enough to transform world politics. Today's disagreements are equally strong. They focus, for example, on the benefits of increasing efficiency and the costs of increasing inequality that come in the wake of globalization. Similarly the spread of a global popular culture has energized in many quarters political counter movements that insist on the political primacy and moral superiority of nation-states or religious communities. Disagreement centers also on the outmoded organization of the international state system with its inadequate response to growing challenges such as global warming and genocide. States are criticized for being too small for many of the big problems and too big for many of the small ones. In domestic politics what is increasingly needed is not heavy-handed state intervention but the light-footed tap dance of public-private partnerships.

Persistent political disagreements over interdependence, globalization and internationalization does not mean that we have learned nothing new in the last three decades (Keohane and Nye 2001). In the late 1960s and early 1970s the discussion of changing levels of international interdependence was framed narrowly. It focused on the international relations among rich states, disregarded the socialist camp, and was not

closely linked to the discussion of dependency between rich and poor states. With the exception of Marxist scholars, most analysts subscribed to a rationalist epistemology and individualist ontology. Current debates are broader. They focus on processes that connect all parts of the world, and they are open to interpretations based on a variety of epistemological and ontological stances. This broadening in political and analytical perspective has been of little help in resolving persistent debates about the meaning in the movement of different statistical indicators. As was true of the 1890s and 1960s, declining costs in the 1990s have made possible further, sharp increases in the volume of transportation and communication. Scholars disagree on what to make of the statistical data. Placed in different analytical frameworks, indicators of changing levels of international interdependence can support the claims made by the proponents of both globalization and internationalization.

Although the concepts of globalization and internationalization are often used interchangeably in public discourse, the Group of Lisbon (1995) is correct in insisting that "they refer to different processes and phenomena. More important, they imply different actors, playing the game by different rules, and they have significantly different impacts on strategies, policies, and societies." Globalization theorists typically think in sociological categories that underline the emergence of novel types of relations in the global system. Theorists of internationalization, on the other hand, typically think in economic categories that focus on the attributes of actors such as corporations or states.

Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson see a vast difference "between a strictly global and a highly internationalized economy" (Hirst and Thompson 1996) [Also see: (Mittelman 2000); (Prakash and Hart 2000); (Prakash and Hart 1999); (Beck 1998); (Weiss 1999).] Globalization has a powerful effect on world politics. Internationalization acknowledges basic continuities in the evolution of the international economy. "Internationality is embedded in territorial space; globality transcends that geography" (Scholte 2000). In a global economy, transnational corporations undercut national public policies. In an international economy, government policies continue to adapt the national economy to the operations of multinational corporations. This difference is important. Proponents of internationalization theory see world populated by a small, well-established, cast of characters that plays an old game by established rules: states bargaining within and about international regimes; national champions and multinational corporations competing in national and international markets; and perhaps a few non-state actors seeking to shape the exercise of national power. Globalization theory insists instead on the centrality of a large cast of new characters, many of whom are enacting new roles and adhering to new rules: global governance without and around government; transnational corporations spanning the globe; and a multitude of non-state actors and social movements bound together by novel patterns of transnational alliance. Many disagreements about contemporary world politics are rooted in such contrasting expectations about the effects of globalization and internationalization on world politics.

Globalization and internationalization are not facts on the ground. They are also analytical categories that help us view the world. These categories unavoidably reflect the different habits of sociological and economic styles of reasoning. Sociology focuses on relationships and processes, economics on actors and attributes. The intertwining of reality and concept opens the door to strongly held beliefs. François Perroux (1950) noted

a long time ago that around internationalization as "a kernel of reality there develops a double process of interpretation and of dramatization." More recently, Michael Veseth (1998) illustrates the same point in the notion of the "selling of globalization." Kathleen McNamara (1997) has extended this line of reasoning by noting that globalization and internationalization are reinforced by the spread of neo-liberal norms. Such norms interact with specific domestic structures. In the 1990s, for example, a wave of election victories by center-left parties proved that in Europe, neo-liberal policies are compatible with partisan ideologies that differ significantly from the center-right coalitions that had initially supported the neo-liberal program in the 1980s and that were being reelected in growing numbers at the beginning of the 21st century.

Globalization transforms both the basic character of actors and the incentives they face. While the end of bipolarity and the Cold War loosened some of the shackles imposed on the diversity of national political arrangements and policy choices, globalization is imposing new ones. Globalization tends to reduce political diversity the world over. And it can create an almost infinite variety of local patterns of appropriation of and opposition to globalization processes. Internationalization acknowledges the force of market pressures but insists that the institutional arrangements of national economies and the nation-state are sufficiently adaptable to accommodate to international pressures without losing political control. Economic and social exchanges create an increasingly dense web of interactions among governments, corporations, parties, lobbies, and social movements, without altering their basic identities. Internationalization by itself is indeterminate and leaves different states sufficient leeway as to how, where, and when to adapt to changing external circumstances.

Differences in analytical perspectives generate different expectations. Globalization theory argues that contemporary changes are transformative and will produce increasing similarities and converging outcomes of global best practice. Internationalization theory expects that contemporary changes are additive and will produce differences in the depth of integration and diverging outcomes in different states. Globalization theory focuses on global social processes that reconstitute spatial and social arrangements within and between states and societies. Internationalization theory analyzes the economic conditions that constrain states and societies. Globalization theory examines the density of flows, the integration of dispersed activities, and the changes in social inequality within and between states and societies. Internationalization theory focuses attention on variations in economic openness, the spread of activities across borders, and changes in national autonomy. Globalization theory talks of governance without government and the changing character of states, highlighting the emergence of new transnational and non-state actors. Internationalization theory speaks of the changing balance between deregulation and reregulation and the changing capacities of states, and underlines the continued importance of multinational corporations and states.

The insights of both analytical perspectives, this paper argues, are useful though partial. Globalization theory points to social changes in world politics that are transforming the capacities of territorial states and other actors. Internationalization theory sees instead an incremental process of increasing national openness that does not touch the core competencies of territorially-based states. It is implausible to assume that either global or international effects shape world politics to the exclusion of the other.

There is no theoretical or practical reason why global and international processes, virtual and trading states (Rosecrance 1986); (Rosecrance 1996), could not exist simultaneously. Regionalism, this paper argues, reflects both processes. As devoted an advocate of globalization and author of a best-seller on the topic, Thomas Friedman (1999), perhaps unwittingly, does not draw a sharp distinction when he argues that "a new international system has now clearly replaced the Cold War: globalization."

3. Cultural Diplomacy in Japan and Germany

In their cultural diplomacies all states reflect, as in security, the logic of an international, not a global, world. They regard it as their special prerogative to represent the cultural achievements of the political community in the international society of states. The specific comparison of Japan and Germany supports this inference. It reflects also a great difference in the content and strength of the national and international elements in Japan's and Germany's state identities. Despite that very noticeable difference, Japan's and Germany's cultural diplomacy both champion cultural exchange that build increasing links between countries and thus support open regionalism.

Japan. Only a decade ago economics and technology appeared to have paved the road leading Japan inevitably back to "normal" great power status. Because it threatened to limit Japan's international appeal cultural insularity was the only foreseeable bump in the road ahead. To Joseph Nye, for example, Japan looked like a "one-dimensional economic power," with little political relevance for other polities (1990). In a similar vein Ulf Hannerz (1989) argued that Japan put "culture on exhibit, in the framework of organized international contacts, as a way of displaying irreducible distinctiveness rather than in order to make it spread." This opinion was held beyond the U.S. and Europe. China's leading film director, Xie Jin, as well as many other Chinese commentators, argued that in contrast to Chinese and Western cultures, Japan lacks the religious and philosophical tradition, necessary in his opinion for sustaining a leading role in international affairs (Deng 1997a). Such views are also held widely in Japan. Akio Igarashi (1997), for example, writes that "Japanization lacks a particular 'idea'." In this view Japan is condemned to be culturally passive or inert. As implausible as it is analytically, this view is also wrong empirically.

Throughout most of the postwar years, on questions of cultural diplomacy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and, since the early 1970s, the Japan Foundation have been the two central actors. The Ministry and the government more than the Foundation have a nationalist vision of Japan's place in a changing world. That vision requires "explaining" to others the unique features of the Japanese polity that foreigners simply cannot grasp. In the 1960s that need to explain may have been driven by a sense of inferiority about Japan's "backwardness", in the 1980s by a sense of superiority because of Japan's extraordinary economic catch-up, and in the 1990s by a sense of equality as Japan was facing problems troubling also many other industrial states. This political stance of explaining the exceptionalism of Japan has limited appeal abroad. This is in sharp contrast to the enormous success that Japan's producers of mass culture have enjoyed in selling their products abroad as I show below. "Image alliances" link the products of different cultural media and find expression in an innovative production

process well suited to competition in regional and global markets. Japan's popular culture, artistically creative and economically dynamic, is developing a broad appeal especially in Asian-Pacific markets. Japan's comparative advantage lies, in particular "with selling the know-how of indigenising the West (America) . . . Japanese cultural presence tends to be 'culturally odourless' and its cultural products are destined to be localised in overseas markets," especially in Southeast Asia (Iwabuchi 1998). In these markets Japanese products have had no trouble being "understood" (S. Shiraishi 1997).

Japan's foreign cultural diplomacy is embedded in its general cultural policy (Shikaumi 1970); (Havens 1987); (Watanabe 1999); (Zemans 1999). In Japan, as in Europe, "in general, the institutions responsible for cultural exception, projection, and co-operation have remained dependent on national diplomacies [sic] whereas the responsibility for managing issues related to cultural projection and diversity belongs to the national departments of culture" (Bélanger 2000). By 1945 Japan's military had tainted the concept of "culture" so deeply that prior to 1990 the government eschewed the concept altogether. There have, however, been two turning points in Japan's approach to domestic and foreign cultural policies. In both international influences became increasingly important thus strengthening the foundations of open regionalism. One occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the other in the early and mid-1990s. Both times policy change resulted from the central government's self-conscious attempt to reshape its international image. Cultural diplomacy became an instrument in the government's pursuit of making Japan a more international state celebrating culture as well as a truly first-rate international power (Havens 1987). To this end the government decided first in favor of a more active support of culture and subsequently for making the arts a more visible presence in Japan's international cultural affairs. Both policy innovations enhanced the international component in Japan's cultural diplomacy and thus strengthened the slow process of opening up Japan to outside influence.

After the late 1960s elected officials became increasingly aware that culture was a popular issue in local and regional elections. The creation of the Agency for Cultural Affairs in 1968 was influenced greatly by international discussions in UNESCO and by the model that the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts offered to Japan in the mid-1960s (Zemans 1999). Under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, the Agency "manages a state-defined notion of 'culture' and Japaneseness" (McVeigh 1998). It does so in a fashion that is more centralized than is true for most other countries (Havens 1987). Its institutional affiliation is with the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, with very conservative views on culture, understood primarily as high culture and the arts and emphasizing Japan's uniqueness. With "high culture" in the view of the Ministry and the Cultural Agency intimately connected to the idea of fidelity to a tradition of deep study, repetition, and performance without thought, classical culture, not popular art with its transient and market drive trends, best reflects Japan's uniqueness (Interview No.5, Tokyo, January 7, 1999 and No.3, March 15, 2001). The Agency for Cultural Affairs reflects these values and focuses its attention overwhelmingly on high culture. From its perspective the purpose of international cultural exchange is to strengthen Japan's domestic culture (Interview No.2, Tokyo, March 14, 2001).

The Cultural Agency occupies a central place, especially in domestic cultural policy making (Interview No.2, Tokyo, March 14, 2001). Virtually all of the Agency's resources are allocated to preservation, with less than 5 percent supporting the creative

aspects of the arts in sharp contrast to prefectural and municipal governments which spend little on preservation and much on the promotion of culture and art (Zemans 1999); (Watanabe 1999); (Havens 1987); (Interview No.3, Tokyo, March 15, 2001). In an international context in which Japan was seeking to define itself since the late 1980s as one of the leading world powers for the 21st century, Japan's increasing commitment to culture and the arts has been evident at all levels of government. But it was only in the 1990s that the Cultural Agency uses the term "cultural policy" freely in its official reports. After five years of deliberation the Agency issued a report in 1990 that articulated a set of general policies and suggested a number of detailed measures, paying particular attention to regional development and international cooperation. In 1996 the government issued a second major report, Arts Plan 21, which, in the interest of creating a "New Cultural Nation," sought to enhance further the importance of Japanese culture and the arts. Finally, based on the report of an advisory committee, the government adopted in 1998 a "Masterplan for Promoting Culture" (Watanabe 1999); (Agency for Cultural Affairs 2000). A number of specific policy initiatives have sought to translate these plans into action in the 1990s, among others by increasing the level of funding for culture and the arts, creating a quasi-governmental Japan Arts Council, strengthening amateur performances and access to cultural events, soliciting the active cooperation of the private sector, changing Japanese tax laws so that donation for the arts are tax-deductible, and encouraging further regional and local initiatives. In the late 1990s the annual budget of the Cultural Agency amounted to about $11 billion, subsidized somewhat by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001).

Inexorably the CA has been drawn into international cultural activities. In 2001 it opened a small Office for International Cultural Exchange that coordinates the international activities of each of the major divisions of the CA. In addition the office invites annually 30-40 outstanding artists and experts to visit Japan, runs exchange programs with members of the PRC cultural bureaucracy, and briefs the Commissioner and Vice-Commissioner of the CA before their meetings with foreign visitors. While some divisions of the CA, such as the Fine Arts and Arts and Cultural divisions, have regular international contacts, for example through organizing exhibits abroad or administering grants competitions for foreign artists, all major initiatives of the CA are typically cleared with the Japan Foundation or MOFA.

Prefectural and local government have assumed an increasingly important position in Japan's cultural policy and diplomacy. Territorial decentralization of power away from Tokyo has opened space for the construction of international links by prefectures such as Hokkaido, Kanagawa, Okinawa, and Niigata, among others, to create developmental policies involving adjacent regions in China, Russia, and Southeast Asia. In 1975 Kangawa prefecture was the first one to open an international exchange office. Two decades later all 47 prefectural governments have set up such international exchange departments. Prefectural governments have also established in each capital, and in eight metropolitan areas, semi-governmental international exchange associations which they fund and staff. In 1988 the Ministry of Home Affairs established the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (Jichitai Kokusaika Kyokai) (Tanami 1994). In growing numbers city and town halls have imitated these prefectural policies.

Several government offices are involved in the conduct of cultural diplomacy. The Prime Minister's Office, for example, is in charge of youth exchanges; about 500

high-school or college students travel to Southeast Asian countries every year. The Ministry of Education has a division dealing with UNESCO and some academic exchange programs, especially in the performing arts (Interview No.3, Tokyo, March 15, 2001). The range of activities under the control of MOFA has varied over time. Generally speaking the ministry has seen its mission in increasing knowledge about Japan abroad (Interview No.4, Tokyo, March 15, 2001). It has thus been especially interested in the more policy relevant aspects of cultural diplomacy such as the organization of study tours for younger leaders (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001). The ministry also funds various national and international organizations. Equally important, it has been intimately involved in the activities of the Japan Foundation which is involved in Japanese language teaching and Japan-centered cultural programs overseas.

In creating the Japan Foundation in 1972 the Japanese government sought to modernize and internationalize a policy machinery increasingly geared "to export official culture" (Havens 1987); (Interview No.8, Tokyo, January 7, 2000). That fact alone put the Japan Foundation in a somewhat competitive relation with the domestic lead organization, the Cultural Agency (Shikaumi 1970). Administratively, the Japan Foundation operates under the supervision of the Cultural Affairs Division of MOFA (Interview No.3, Tokyo, October 6, 1997). MOFA appoints its top officials. The head of the Foundation's Administrative Department is typically on loan from MOFA. And the ministry has veto-power over some of the key appointments inside the Foundation (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001). There are weekly meetings between the top leadership of the Foundation and MOFA. Information sharing, policy coordination, and political interference are all part of the normal political routine. The Japan Foundation organizes a large number of programs dealing with people-to-people exchanges, language instruction and Japanese studies, the arts and performing arts, print media, and film, audio-visuals and TV.

Contacts with business are close. The head of the Japan Foundation attends monthly meetings with the leadership of Keidanren, the peak association of business (Interviews No.3, Tokyo, October 6, 1997, and No.6, Tokyo, March 19, 2001). Business looks to cultural diplomacy as a way of neutralizing foreign criticisms of Japanese business practices. Both business and government agree on the fundamental objective of creating abroad a supportive climate for Japanese firms. Yet the Japan Foundation was exclusively funded by the government (Y5 billion) with only a token (Y6 million) contribution by Keidanren. By 1995 the original endowment Yen had increased twenty-fold to Y100 billion. In addition to its income from endowment the Japan Foundation receives annual allocations, especially funds from the government's ODA budget. Economic motivations thus are built into the organizational blue-print of the Japan Foundation. As part of the government's administrative reform program the Foundation was confronting in 2001 a range of difficult options stretching from privatization to becoming an independent agency, to outright abolition, creating along the way much friction in the bureaucracy (Interview No.4, March 15, 2001). And it is asking itself whether the Foundation should address general way-of-life issues and public values, that is, issues that would require a new rationale for the Foundation and might affect the financial support it receives from Japan's ODA budget. The existence of such discussions underlines that in international comparison the Japan Foundation's level of activity is relatively small. Its $80 million budget for external cultural affairs amounts to only about

a third of the outlay of the German Goethe Association and the DAAD or the British Council. Institutionally, however, the Japan Foundation has served as a model for others such as the Korea Foundation and Taiwan's Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation.

In setting up the Foundation the government's aim was to combat both the misunderstandings of Japanese foreign policy and Japanese business practices overseas and to counteract an underlying fear of isolation that remains a constant theme in Japan's cultural diplomacy (Interview No.6, Tokyo, January 7, 1999). Initially, the Foundation's main mission was to make available abroad information about Japan so as to enhance other peoples understanding of Japan's uniqueness. Equally significant it initiated also a variety of cultural exchange programs (Zemans 1999); (Interview No.4, Tokyo, March 15, 2001). Organized as a non-profit organization, the Foundation worked closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and "played an often essential role in the implementation of foreign policy, with a program strategically designed to complement government objectives" (Zemans 1999). [Also see: (Havens 1987)] "There was a degree of aggressiveness in the Japanese approach to cultural exchanges during this period . . . even those who advocated mutual understanding through cultural exchanges thought little of the necessity for the Japanese to try to understand other peoples' cultures" (Hirano 1988). According to Article 1 of the law governing its operations, the Japan Foundation was prohibited from "introducing foreign cultures to the Japanese public" (Hirano 1997). Even though they establish important preconditions for a successful cultural diplomacy abroad, to this day MOFA and the Foundation stay deliberately clear of controversial issues, such as the role of Japan's minorities and historical issues, such as the atrocities that Japanese soldiers committed during the Pacific War.

Operated largely under the auspices of the Japan Foundation language teaching abroad is one, if not the most, important part of Japan's cultural diplomacy. In terms of budgetary outlays in Southeast Asia, for example, the Japan Foundation spends about half of its total funds on language instruction (Relations 1997). Since Japanese is not one of the world's leading languages this imposes inherent limits on Japan's cultural diplomacy. Disregarding the comparison with English as the world's lingua franka Spanish and French are world languages with, respectively, growing and declining appeal. Chinese and Hindi are special cases, the former with obvious relevance in both East and Southeast Asia. In terms of sheer numbers Spanish, Arabic, Bengali, Portugese and Bahasa Indonesian rank ahead of Japanese, which ranks in turn ahead of Russian, German and French (Finkenstaedt and Schröder 1992). More relevant than the absolute number of speakers of a language is the number of non-native speakers trying to learn a language. The Japanese figure increased sharply from 730,000 in 1988 to 2.1 million in 1998, three-quarters of whom are residing in Asia-Pacific (Japan Foundation Japanese-Language Institute 2000); (Relations 1997); (Drifte 1996); (Schodt 1994). But that number is small, compared, for example, to German which is learned by 15-20 million foreigners, mostly in Europe (1994a). As a regional language with limited appeal Japanese is a weak reed on which to build a cultural diplomacy that aims to export Japanese culture.

In sharp contrast to the U.S. government's commitment to spread the American way of life or the French government's efforts to help the cause of French civilization, before the late 1970s culture served as little more than an instrument useful for smoothing ruffled economic feathers abroad to contain the growing resentment that Japan's export offensive in world markets was creating (Drifte 1996). A broad definition of the concept

of cultural cooperation to include economic development thus became a defining characteristic of Japan's cultural diplomacy. When the Japan Foundation was formed in 1972, then Foreign Minister Fukuda insisted that "culture" not be part of its name. The Foundation's work was to get at all the roots that posed obstacles to economic development, be they cultural, educational or technological. This broad definition of culture permitted a dramatic change in the funding of the Japan Foundation. Starting in 1982 the government cut its direct contribution covering the operating costs of the Foundation. Instead the Foundation was funded largely through Japan's development aid budget which increased sharply in the 1980s. By 1987 30 percent of the operating costs of the Japan Foundation was in the form of ODA subsidies spent on programs that assisted economic development (Kawamura, Okabe, and Makita 2000). This shaped the work of the Foundation in significant ways. The statistics on student exchange are telling. The number of engineering students from ASEAN member states traveling to Japan on different scholarship programs increased sharply. In 1993 more than 5,000 students from ASEAN were studying in Japan, compared to only 47 Japanese students who enrolled in universities in ASEAN states (Relations 1998); (Wong 1991); (Machado 1987). Of the total number of Japanese studying abroad in 1995 only 2 percent were in ASEAN countries. With the economic sources and motivations of Japan's cultural diplomacy so strong throughout the 1980s, it is not surprising that on cultural matters relations between Japan and Southeast Asia remained hierarchical rather than egalitarian.

A content analysis of the speeches of Japan's Prime Ministers before the Diet document a gradual evolution of policy with the importance of cultural themes increasing in the 1980s and 1990s (Hirano 1988); (Wong 1991). In the 1950s and 1960s culture was strictly subservient to the economic goals of Japan's foreign policy, a lubricant that could ease the frictions accompanying Japan's export offensive on world markets. Violent demonstrations protesting Prime Minister Tanaka's visit of Southeast Asia in 1974 and ASEAN's opposition to the export of synthetic rubber to Japan during the same year reinforced the government's emphasis on diminishing foreign misunderstandings of Japan and misinterpretations of Japanese business practices. Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to Southeast Asia in 1977 and his proposal for a "heart to heart interchange" led to the creation, in 1979, of the multilateral ASEAN Cultural Fund (Relations 1997). Even though it is not a member of ASEAN, Japan contributed 5 trillion Yen to make the Fund an important vehicle for furthering cultural cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asia. Fukuda's initiative stressed the importance of culture as an instrument for enhancing peace through balanced and non-hierarchical exchanges. Prime Minister Ohira (1978-80) articulated an even broader vision for Japan's cultural diplomacy. Besides explaining Japan to others, Ohira insisted that Japan would have to learn from others. In the long-term international economic cooperation could succeed only in a system of give-and-take. Since then Japan's cultural initiatives have placed new emphasis on achieving cooperative and balanced relationships with other countries.

With the increase in Japan's international status and its growing financial contributions to international organizations MOFA has sought to play a more active role on the international stage. Still barred from a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, in the 1990s Japan has practiced a form of status politics on the international stage of cultural diplomacy. UNESCO is a good example. Japan's relations with UNESCO have had a very special meaning since the 1950s. It was the first international organization that

the "new" Japan joined after 1945, symbolizing to the Japanese, who continue to support UNESCO very strongly at the grass-roots to this day, the United States, and other advanced industrial states the fundamental change that Japan had experienced in its effort to become a democratic and peace-loving country (Interview Nos. 4 and 6, Tokyo, March 15 and 19, 2001).

Almost two-thirds of MOFA's funding in support of cultural diplomacy is funneled through the Japan Foundation to UNESCO which receives about a quarter of its total budget from Japan. Among allegations that many of the votes had been bought or rigged, Koichiro Matsuura, Japan's ambassador in Paris, was elected in October 1999 director-general of UNESCO (Fitchett 2000). According to one senior member of the UNESCO staff, "Japan launched a full-scale diplomatic offensive. It reminded everyone, for example, that it is the largest foreign aid donor to sub-Saharan Africa – and that now it would like some return on its money" (Henley 1999). Matsuura became the first Asian head of UNESCO. His bid was supported by many Asian states and poorer countries. From MOFA's perspective UNESCO is an important aspect of a multilateral cultural diplomacy that is supported by Japan as the U.N.'s and UNESCO's largest aid donor.

In the 1990s Japan's cultural diplomacy has also evolved along regional lines. The final report of a commission convened with the express purpose of generating practical steps for regional cultural cooperation recommends, for example, a course of action quite at odds with Japan's traditional approach to cultural diplomacy. "Japan should place itself squarely in Asia and on equal footing with other Asian countries" (Relations 1998).With the enormous push of Japanese corporations into Asian markets after the 1985 currency realignment, the economic links between Japan and Asia have grown sharply as has the flow of people. Between 1972 and 1996, the number of visitors from ASEAN countries increased 24-fold from 1.2 to 28.4 million, more than twice the increase in the number of other international visitors (Relations 1997).

Institutional and political innovations are quite evident. Responding to a wide-spread perception of the growing importance of Asian regionalism, a 1989 Japan Foundation initiative led to the creation of an ASEAN Culture Center, the first publicly funded organization charged with introducing the cultures of other peoples to Japan (Hirano 1997); (Interview Nos. 4 and 6, Tokyo, January 6 and 7, 1999). It was renamed in 1995 as the Japan Foundation Asia Center (Relations 1997). The Center funds programs promoting intellectual exchanges in Asia that support the cultural advancement in Asian countries as well as programs to encourage a better understanding of Asia in Japan. Among the Center's many activities is the sponsoring of joint productions of theater, musical events and film by multinational teams of Asian artists. (Interview No.8, Tokyo, January 7, 2000). Put briefly, the Foundation's furthering of cultural exchanges with ASEAN countries has become an important political symbol of Japan's participation in Asia. The terms of cultural engagement in the 1990s have become more egalitarian than the ones that guided Japanese policy in the 1930s, 1950s and 1970s. Through the work of the Asia Center Japan's government, for the first time in the 20th century, is beginning to sees itself as an integral part of Asia-Pacific. Investing in more balanced cultural relations and partnerships is an important step that signifies Japan's regional engagement and that may help lay the foundations for strengthening artistic processes of regional identity formation in a rapidly changing world (Kawamura, Okabe, and Makita 2000).

A broader regional focus in the work of the Foundation became even more apparent with subsequent initiatives. In terms of both the source and the level of funding the creation of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) in 1991 represented a very large financial commitment for the Japan Foundation. The CGP's establishment increased the proportion of the Foundation's total funds flowing to North American activities from 10 to 30 percent between 1989 and 1992, before dropping back to 19 percent by 1995 (Relations 1997). With U.S.-Japan trade friction at dangerously high levels since the mid-1980s, the Center "was established with the primary objective of promoting U.S. Japanese collaboration toward the goal of fulfilling shared global responsibilities and promoting exchange and dialogue throughout all fields in Japan and the United States" (Zemans 1999). In line with the redefined mission of the Japan Foundation (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001), the Center funds intellectual and grass-roots exchange programs as well as a fellowship program. It is less interested in high culture and more in collaboration and joint problem solving (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001). This shift in focus required a change in the 1972 legislation that gave the Japan Foundation its mandate and was a source of considerable conflict as the bureaucracy resisted what it considered a dilution of the objectives and instruments of Japan's cultural diplomacy (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001). The CGP is thus moving part of the way from the idea of exporting Japanese culture to a strengthening of global problem-solving capacities. What in English is called the "Center for Global Partnership," is in Japanese the "Japan-U.S. Center." In the thinking of Japanese government officials internationalization not globalization is the context for the government's cultural diplomacy (Wada 1998); (Interview Nos. 4 and 6, Tokyo, January 6 and 7, 1999).

The CGP was a deliberate attempt of trying to reduce the direct political influence that MOFA habitually exerts on the work of the Foundation and on individual projects. Going beyond the U.S. advisory committee that had not been successful in shielding the Japan Foundation, the creation of an independent endowment sought to reduce unwanted political interference. Interference did, however, occur from financial markets, in the form of a sharply declining value of the CGP's endowment and endowment pay-out. Between 1991 and 1998 endowment income declined by 40 per cent, spendable income on programs by more than half (Interview Nos. 4 and 5, Tokyo, January 6 and 7, 1999). The involvement of the U.S.- based Social Science Research Council in the fellowship selection process was a second shield against political interference. While the creation of the Japan Foundation in 1972 had been an attempt to establish better contacts between Japan and Japanese specialists in the U.S., the creation of the CGP and its Abe fellowship program was an attempt to broaden the links between Japan and the world (Interview Nos. 6 and 8, Tokyo, January 7, 1999 and January 7, 2000); (Telephone Interview No. 2, Ithaca, NY, April 30, 1998).

Haltingly in the 1980s and more rapidly in the 1990s gaining a better understanding of and respect for foreign cultures became part of the government's official cultural diplomacy. The internationalization policy of Japan in the 1980s had both national and international elements. It underlined Japan's uniqueness while, at the same time, it was also beginning to open the country to cultural developments from abroad. Kenichiro Hirano (Hirano 1988) concludes that after many decades of being subordinated

to economic considerations by the 1990s the cultural elements in Japan's foreign policy have acquired a more independent standing.

The link between Japan's cultural diplomacy and its economy thus gradually weakened. For example, one of the three pillars of Prime Minister Takeshita's 1988 "Global Initiative" was the expansion of cultural exchanges to encompass all forms of "cultural cooperation." At a time of intense and increasing economic friction with the U.S. this initiative served the main political purposes that had marked Japan's cultural diplomacy throughout the postwar period. But it was also predicated explicitly on the view that "international cultural exchange serves to form an open global community in which cultural diversity is understood and accepted with tolerance, thereby contributing to international cooperation and world peace" (Drifte 1996). [Also see: (Kawamura, Okabe, and Makita 2000)] The Takeshita speech led to the creation of the first Prime Ministerial Commission on International Cultural Exchange (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001). Its main thrust was to both work for more cultural cooperation abroad and to develop programs that would expose Japan to cultural products and practices of other societies. The report recommended that the Japan Foundation be strengthened further. Between 1989-92, after a decade of virtually no growth, the Foundation's staff doubled and its budget tripled.

Since then virtually every Prime Minister has started a major cultural program such as Prime Minister Hosokawa's "Exchange That Will Build the Future of the Asia-Pacific Region," (1994), Prime Minister Murayama's "Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative" (1995), and Prime Minister Hashimoto's "Multinational Cultural Mission" (1997). Many of these initiatives, to be sure, remain little more than exercises in diplomatic rhetoric. Significant signals of underlying shifts in norms and values, they are not translated programmatically. Marking the end of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, Murayama's initiative was conceived as part of Japan's new comprehensive cultural policy toward Asia. Budgeted at over 100 billion Yen the project was intended to support historical research and various exchange programs. It took six years to overcome MOFA's determined resistance, motivated by bureaucratic fears of renewed controversies over Japan's war guilt, before the Center began to work on a much reduced scale in 2002. Documents located throughout Southeast Asia and Chine will be excluded from its data base and work (Interview Nos. 4 and 6, Tokyo, March 15 and 19, 2001). Hosokawa's exchange programs were stymied by bureaucratic infighting (Interview No.4, Tokyo, January 6, 1999). In his 1997 speech Hashimoto made no reference to the 1995 Murayma "Initiative." Had he done so, writes Tatsuya Tanami, "I doubt the locals would have had any idea what he was talking about" (1997). As it turned out, Hashimoto's "Mission" did not get funded (Interview No.8, Tokyo, January 7, 2000). The gap between rhetorical commitment and half-hearted implementation captures Japanese cultural diplomacy accurately – in transition.

Another program also illustrates how cultural diplomacy has moved away from serving Japan's narrowly construed economic interests. Widely pointed to as an example of a successful initiative in cultural diplomacy is the Japan Exchange Teachers (JET) program (Interview No.5, Tokyo, January 7, 1999); (McConnell 2000). It now covers most English-speaking and European countries but also a significant number of Asian states. JET allows young university graduates from foreign countries to spend up to three years in Japan, learning Japanese language and ways of life while working as teaching

assistants to foreign language teachers in Japanese schools or colleges or as assistants in prefectural or city international affairs offices. By 1999 the program recruited annually about 6,000 participants, placed in about one-third of all Japanese public secondary schools, and had 20,000 alumni (McConnel 2000, p. 3), many of them likely recruits for Japanese companies or heading for careers that would keep them in contact with Japan throughout their professional lives (Drifte 1996). The ostensible target of this program is the small number of foreigners coming and living in Japan. The real target, one might well argue, is the insularity of Japanese society that is undermined by putting young foreigners into Japanese schools and offices and thus helping to open Japan to the world. Different ministries supported the policy for different reasons. The Education Ministry, for example, for the former, MOFA for the latter. Whatever the bureaucratic motivation, the programs is, in the words of David McConnell (2000), a government-sponsored program of "mass internationalization."

After 1993 the Japan Foundation has also set up special programs for the Japan-Europe Exchange. It assists in intellectual as well as grass-roots exchanges and supports processes of democratization in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. In the same year the Japanese-German Dialogue Forum was created. The Japan-France Dialogue Group followed in 1995. Both were designed as ongoing dialogues with the groups engaging each other annually. The administration of these groups was put in the hands of private organizations. The biannual Asia-Europe (ASEM) meetings also stimulated further intellectual exchange especially in the preparatory and follow-up phases. At the initiative of the Japanese government, at the first ASEM meeting, the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation was launched with a membership of more than twenty Asian and European think tanks which are attempting to transform themselves into a "think net" (Wada 1998); (Interview No.4, Tokyo, January 6, 1999).

In the conduct of Japan's cultural diplomacy the Japan Foundation and the Cultural Agency offer two distinctive windows on the world. The difference between them is reflected in two of their affiliated institutions. As part of its extensive involvement in Japan's cultural and intellectual life in 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation founded, and initially supported, the International House, together with the Japan Committee for Intellectual Interchange (Maekawa 1997). Subsequently, MOFA took over sponsorship of the I-House. Located in Tokyo's cosmopolitan and bustling Roppongi district, both as a residential facility and as an intellectual center the "I-House" looks outward (Wada 1998). The exquisite International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibuken), located in the serene green hills surrounding Kyoto, exudes an altogether different atmosphere. Created with the active support of Prime Minister Nakasone and operating under the Ministry of Education, it opened its doors in 1987. The Center's work focuses on Japan's traditional cultures and values as well as the role of Japanese culture in the world. It collaborates with European rather than U.S. scholars. Both places are engaged in foreign cultural relations. Thematically engaged in issues not dissimilar to those of the I-House, the Research Center conveys an inward orientation. Like these buildings Japan's cultural diplomacy has two faces: outward and inward. Despite this important difference both faces increasingly seek to engage the world, if on different terms.

Since the early 1970s on questions of cultural diplomacy the number of actors has broadened both within the government and throughout civil society. Besides the central

government many local and prefectural organizations have become involved in this policy arena, and the number of non-governmental organizations active in cultural affairs has also grown sharply. These developments are not the unrelated rise of civil society forces in a democracy that is evolving away from its Japanese moorings toward some Western model. Instead, the rising importance of local, prefectural and non-governmental actors is often the result of the policies adopted by the central government. The result is that various governmental and non-governmental organizations now cooperate in cultural activities or work side by side, often involving local governments in the development of a variety of grass-roots ties. The content of Japan's cultural diplomacy has broadened to encompass not only cultural exchange and language teaching but also cooperative projects, for example in the preservation of historical sites (Relations 1997). Finally, virtually all participating institutions show in the 1990s "an overwhelming tendency toward programs oriented towards inviting persons from overseas rather than sending Japanese abroad" (Relations 1997).

A growing number of citizen groups are getting involved in program development and implementation of cultural diplomacy in return for which they receive government funding and supervision. Quite often leading officials of these organizations are former government officials. It is difficult to gauge accurately the importance of NGO's for the simple reason that their numbers are very large. One of the most knowledgeable observers of the scene, Tatsuya Tanami (1994), estimates their number in excess of 5,000; since then the number has increased sharply (Interview Nos. 1 and 6, March 13 and 19, 2001).These groups focus primarily on learning about foreign cultures and secondarily on organizing exchange and active cooperation programs. They are beginning to use the worldwide web to coordinate activities across national borders.

Philanthropic foundations have also come to play an important part in Japan's cultural diplomacy (Yamamoto and Komatsu 1995). After an initial period of setting up science-based foundations starting in the early 1960s, and private research institutes and social welfare and environmental organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, broader philanthropic foundations, independent of their sponsoring corporation, were created in large numbers in the 1970s and 1980s. Mitsubishi (1969), Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation (1973), Toyota (1974), Hoso Bunka Foundation (1974), Yamada Science Promotion Foundation (1977), Suntory (1979), and Nippon Life Insurance (1979) are prominent examples. Half of the 394 foundations listed in the Foundation Directory of 1992 were established after 1980 (Tanami 1994). The assets of internationally-oriented foundations set up in the 1980s were about one-third of domestically- oriented foundations (Relations 1997). Among the major foundations Nippon and Toyota are probably most important for Japan's international cultural activities, the former cooperating mostly with the U.N., the latter with Asian partners (Interview No.4, Tokyo, January 6, 1999 and No.6, Tokyo, March 19, 2001).

While this growth in corporate philanthropy is impressive, it must be viewed in context. In the late 1980s the combined total assets of all of Japan's grant-making foundations was less than one-third of those of the Ford Foundation (Yamamoto and Amenomori 1989). Total corporate giving to private nonprofit groups in the mid-1980s amounted to less than $150 million with only a small proportion going to the arts (Havens 1987). Japanese corporations appear to value "high" culture in part because of the status it confers and the investment opportunity it provides. In the spring of 1990, for

example, Ryoei Saito, a 74-year-old paper processing magnate bought in three days both Van Gogh's "Portrait of Dr. Gachet" (for $82.5 million) and Renoir's "Au Moulin de la Galette" (for $78.1 million), both sales far in excess of the previous $54 million all-time record for a single painting. By the late 1990s both paintings, and most of the other impressionists and Picassos, had left Japan, as cash-strapped Japanese corporations were using "bad debt art" to offer banks collateral (Strom 1999).

In the 1970s and 1980s Keidanren acted as a catalyst for corporate giving by coordinating business fund-raising to acculturate Japanese corporations to the concept of corporate citizenship and to strengthen Japan's "private" cultural diplomacy. Before 1997 corporate giving in Japan was not tax-deductible, a sharp contrast to the U.S. where up to 10 percent of pretax profits can be donated tax-free. Japanese corporate giving thus lags far behind the U.S., both in the relative number of corporations making donations (30 percent in the U.S., 9 percent in Japan) and in corporate donations as share of pretax profits (1.55 per cent in the US, 0.33 per cent in Japan) (Fujiwara 1992). The "Keidanren method" of organizing corporate philanthropy is centralized. Keidanren evaluates requests for contributions. When approved, half of the total amount is allocated in equal parts to each of Japan's five largest corporate groups; the remainder is allocated among different industry groups which, in turn, collect fixed shares from individual companies (Fujiwara 1992); (Yamamoto and Komatsu 1995). External economic frictions spurred the number of newer foundations dedicated to international exchange and cooperation. Of 59 such foundations 10 were founded in the 1960s, 33 in the 1970s, 115 in the 1980s, and 28 in 1990-92 (Menju and Aoki 1995). Somewhat different figures are reported by Yamamoto and Amenomori (Yamamoto and Amenomori 1989); Tanami (Tanami 1994); and the University of Tokyo Study Group (Relations 1997).

Foreign-based Japanese foundations were established in increasing numbers in the 1970s and 1980s. They moved into Southeast Asia early. Examples include the Toyota Astra Foundation (1974), the Asahi Glass Foundation of Thailand (1974), and the Yayasan Asahi Glass Indonesia (1973), the NEC Foundation (in the mid-1970s), and the C&C Education Foundation (1988) (Yamamoto and Amenomori 1989); by the mid-1990s 35 Japanese foundations operated in Southeast Asia (Relations 1997). By the late 1990s some of these foundations were developing innovative programs such as supporting public intellectuals who would be rotated among different countries with Tokyo not as the only hub but part of a web of urban centers where these intellectuals would convene to write about and discuss Asian affairs (Interview No.9, Tokyo, January 7, 2000); (Menju and Aoki 1995, pp. 154-7). And they moved into Europe late, as illustrated by the Daiwa Trust for U.K.-Japan Relations (1988) and the Stichting Canon Foundation in Europe (1987). The so-called 'Cones Europe' report on Europe 1992 urged Japanese corporations to become good corporate citizens to win the hearts and minds of Europeans. The report advised Japanese corporations to join trade associations, business organizations, and voluntary associations, hire Europeans to act as lobbyists, set up a European-wide intelligence gathering network, and sponsor civic activities. In short it advised Japanese corporations to do all the things that they were already doing in the U.S. (Drifte 1996).

The U.S. was in fact the most important foreign site where Japan's philanthropic foundations got engaged on a large scale in the early 1980s. Examples include the Matsushita Foundation (1984), the Hitachi Foundation (1985), Toyota USA (1985), Ise

Cultural Foundation (1986), Optech USA D.D. Fund (1988), Subaru of America Foundation (1984), and the Nakamichi Foundation (1982). Only the Sony Foundation (1972) made an early start. Various organizational affiliations of the Japan Society coordinate their activities with MOFA policies. U.S.-based Japanese foundations made charitable contributions in the U.S. totaling $30 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1991 (Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 1995). The rate of donation of these foundations approximates or exceeds the U.S. average of pretax profits, and it lies four or five times above the average of corporate giving in Japan (Fujiwara 1992). Such generosity was made possible by the government which came to regard corporate philanthropy in the U.S. as an essential component of its cultural diplomacy. A change in the Japanese tax code in June 1990 made overseas, but not domestic, contributions tax-deductible. "Generally speaking, Japanese companies are much more sensitive to social responsibilities in the United States than they are in Japan" (Fujiwara 1992).

The absence of socially responsible groups, fostered by the government's tax policy, became painfully obvious in the aftermath of the great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995 showed to the Japanese people a shocking degree of disorganization and incompetence at all levels of government in dealing with this monumental disaster. Thousands of volunteers streamed to Kobe and started organizing spontaneous relief efforts. The earthquake put a spotlight on Japan's non-governmental organizations and non-profit organizations that had always existed in the shadow of the Japanese state (Kawashima and Borden 1999). In the face of a natural disaster and a prolonged economic crisis calls grew louder demanding new legislation dealing with non-profit organizations (Yamaoka 1999); (Kawashima and Borden 1999). The civil code of 1898 provided religious, social welfare, school and other special purpose organizations with a legal basis as public service organizations, not as a matter of right but as a matter of judgment by the central government under whose authority they were placed. This put Japanese NPOs at a serious disadvantage in many practical aspects of their work including being granted tax-exempt status. In international perspective Japan's NPO sector thus lags far behind others, measured in terms of employment, operating expenditure, and individual contributions (Sato and Inouchi 1999); (Salamon and Anheier 1994). Passed on March 25, 1998, new legislation made the granting of NPO status a matter of administrative formality not political judgment (Pekkanen 2000). The paperwork is no longer be processed by the relevant ministry of the central government but by the prefectural government. It is estimated that about 10 percent of all Japanese NPOs will now legally incorporate. The law did not address the issue of tax-exempt status for NPOs which remains unfinished legislative business. In sum, despite considerable growth in the number and level of activities of Japanese NPOs and NGOs, "the government sectors, both central and regional, are still powerful and influential and overwhelm private sectors" (Tanami 1994). In Japan the balance of power between state and society is changing, but slowly (Interview No.6, Tokyo, March 19, 2001). And so is the deeply ingrained policy of presenting Japan to the world as a unique polity that expects, rightfully, a sympathetic understanding.

Since the Meiji Restoration Japan has embarked on a "cultural mission" to secure its position as a sovereign state in an international order dominated by the West, while also assuming the leading position in East Asia. Since 1945 the government has not used cultural diplomacy explicitly as a vehicle for projecting an inherently superior set of

Japanese values, as was true before 1945. Instead cultural diplomacy has served the purpose of creating a more stable economic environment for Japanese business abroad and for explaining the specificity of Japanese culture and values abroad. Gradually, however, some of the core assumptions that have supported Japan's cultural diplomacy for decades have changed since the 1970s. International and regional elements of cultural diplomacy are becoming more important. New actors are bringing fresh approaches and new insights to bear on Japan's cultural diplomacy. And policy is now acknowledging that culture is not the handmaiden of business and, more tentatively, that Japan must learn as well as instruct. Economic hard times make that acknowledgement easier. But they also undermine the financial basis of policy as Japan is entering a new era of budgetary pressures that is constraining a cultural diplomacy already relatively small by international standards.

Germany. As recently as the 1950s some Germans still made a sharp distinction between culture and civilization, between the inward high values of art, science and morality on the one hand and the behavioral manifestations of reasonably courteous and social patterns of behavior on the other. Civilization, it was thought, was more transportable than culture (Herf 1984). After the Holocaust the German government has reacted to the horrors of Nazi Germany not by shunning the concept of culture, as did the Japanese government, but by making it a centerpiece of Germany's postwar strategy of reestablishing itself in the community of states. German culture thus has reacquired its second European and international meaning, translated perhaps best as cosmopolitan humanism (Bildung).

Josef Goebbels is reportedly to have said "When I hear the term culture, I reach for my revolver." German politicians reach instead for their wallets. Culture is big business in Germany. The first comprehensive analysis of the economic importance of Germany's culture sector concluded that in the late 1980s it employed 680,000 persons and created annually a value-added of DM40 billion, with the core of the culture industries accounting for about half of this total. This makes the culture business substantially larger than the aero-space or office equipment industries. The total cultural sector is comparable to energy in terms of value added, to agriculture and clothing and textiles in terms of employment, and to machinery in terms of investment (Innern 1990); (Heinrichs 1997); (Peisert 1978). By comparison corporate philanthropy is still relatively young in Germany with one-third of the foundations set up since 1990 (see: http://www.stern.de/servelet/stern/). In the year 2000 there were 9,500 foundations with assets exceeding DM 50 billion, and annual outlays of about DM 830 million. This sum is a mere 5 percent of the 16 billion that the public sector pumps annually into all forms of culture (König 1999).The German government's generous system of public subsidies of cultural affairs provides the context for the importance of cultural diplomacy with which German governments sought to rehabilitate itself internationally after 1945, especially in Europe.

The Europeanization of various aspects of German politics, society, and economy has had the effect of eviscerating much of the old distinction between culture and civilization. And the end of the Cold War and German unification, as well as the "return" of central and eastern Europe, has increased Germany's cultural importance in Europe. Since 1949 Germany's cultural diplomacy was motivated by the attempt to project an image of "normality," in contrast, for example, to French attempts to project the image

of "national greatness" (Znined-Brand 1997). Germans have traditionally subscribed to a sharp distinction between a cultural (Kulturnation) and a political (Staatsnation) nation. Germany's division after 1949 was a political act and German culture remained both the foundation for future unification and a contested battle ground for two German states aiming at becoming the "true" representative of German culture during the Cold War (Hoffmann 1996). Support for the security and foreign policy strategies of the state was part of West Germany's cultural diplomacy during the height of the Cold War as was the struggle over the representation of "Germany" by two quarreling German states. Conspicuously absent was the explicit use of cultural propaganda in the interest of the state that marked German policy before 1945. During the 1950s, cultural diplomacy was viewed as an indirect support of German exports; "learning German and buying German" were considered close cousins.

Post-war Germany's cultural diplomacy has undergone significant change from emphasizing self-representation and language teaching, to dialogue, exchange and cooperation, and back to a renewed emphasis on language teaching (Markovits and Reich 1997); (Witte 1985); (Werz 1992); (Znined-Brand 1997); (Poidevin 1985). In the first two post-war decades Germany's cultural diplomacy was motivated by replacing the memory of Auschwitz with that of Goethe and Schiller: in the 1950s by resuming external cultural contacts and language teaching and in the 1960s by strengthening Germany's cultural presence throughout the Third World. In this effort Germany relied on the classical means of cultural diplomacy, founding German schools abroad and fostering academic exchanges.

By the early 1960s German policy was beginning to shift to a broader focus and to feature a more cosmopolitan content. Major reform, however, had to wait until the early 1970s. Under the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt, the SPD/FDP coalition government adopted in 1970 new guidelines for its cultural diplomacy (Peisert 1978); (Sartorius 1996); (Witte 1981; Witte 1988); (Znined-Brand 1997). The guidelines broadened the concept of cultural diplomacy to include popular culture and to insist on the introduction of elements of foreign cultures into Germany as an important part of Germany's cultural diplomacy. The machinery for cultural diplomacy in the Foreign Ministry was adapted to these new policy objectives. Cultural diplomacy became an integral part of Germany's "active peace policy." This reform process continued with a Parliamentary report in 1975. In its 1977 response the government added an explicit European dimension to its cultural diplomacy, insisting that policy "must aid the political integration of Europe in its cultural dimension" (Znined-Brand 1997). The reform decade ended in 1980 with a major conference, attended by representatives of 42 states that gave Germany's cultural diplomacy an explicitly international mission.

Although these changes aimed at the legitimation of Germany as a cultural state in a changing world in the 1970s, the SPD-led government was insisting also on a "well-balanced pattern of self-representation abroad." At a time of great turmoil in domestic politics – wide-spread demonstrations, terrorist attacks, and the political screening of applicants for civil service jobs – the government was unwilling to relinquish its right to influence how Germany represented itself abroad. In the late 1970s some cultural programs became subjects of political controversy, with authors such as Günther Grass and Heinrich Böll charging the government with undue interference in artistic freedom. Such controversies continued, on and off, in the 1980s under a conservative government

led by Helmut Kohl. While the government tended to favor the teaching of German language abroad rather than cultural diplomacy understood in the more encompassing sense that it had acquired in the 1970s, the policy was to support both (Sartorius 1996). Yet the government lacked the funds to implement fully such an ambitious policy. As a result of a general budgetary retrenchment the share of Germany's Foreign Ministry in the federal government's budget for cultural diplomacy was cut from one-half in the 1970s to one-third in the 1990s.

The end of the Cold War and the renewed interest in central and eastern Europe in Germany recalibrated once more the balance between language and culture. High demand for German as a language of business and trade and pent-up demand for traditional German culture reinforced the incipient reorientation of German cultural diplomacy that had started in the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1992 Germany more than doubled its outlays for language teaching (from DM 18,2 million to 40,2 million), but it increased by only 40 percent expenditures for cultural programs (from DM 15,5 to 25,5 million). And while the government's support of language programs expanded between 1991 and 1995, the funding of cultural of programs declined sharply (Link 1981); (Neumann 1992); (1994a); (Wehrmann 1992); (Znined-Brand 1997); (Herrmann 1994); (Wood 1999a). German policy, however, continued to favor its multilateral cast by insisting, whenever possible, of working with numerous partner organizations. And policies supporting German culture and language were understood not as substitutes for but as complements to the attraction of English and the appeal of American popular culture (Wood 1999b); (Lepenies 1995); (Lepenies 1999b); (Lepenies 1999c); (Supp 1991).

The relation between language and culture can be understood as either a necessary or a facilitating condition for gaining access to a culture. In the first case language is a constitutive element of culture and the carrier of values, as in the French understanding. In the second it is a means of communication which, though not separable from its content, is primarily a carrier of information, as in the German understanding (Arnold 1980); (Znined-Brand 1997). The collapse of the Habsburg Empire at the end of World War I led to the erosion of German. The policies of Nazi Germany and Soviet occupation after 1945 raised high barriers against German language and culture throughout central and eastern Europe (Peisert 1978). In the 1940s Germany murdered millions of East European Jews who were often carriers of German culture and language. At the end of World War II more than 10 million ethnic Germans either left as refugees or were expelled from central and eastern Europe thus restricting further the international importance of German after 1950. Since then, until the end of the Cold War international language statistics show that the influence of German has continued to shrink. In the 1990s about 20 million non-Germans speak or are learning German, about 12 million of whom are living in central and eastern Europe. The inability of the German government to elevate the status of German in international organizations, including in the EU, and the declining interest in German language everywhere, except in central and eastern Europe, are reflecting trends that are unlikely to be reversed by the intensification of German language instruction abroad.

Since 1989 the different strands of Germany's cultural diplomacy have come together as united Germany is seeking to articulate anew the role it seeks to play in Europe and in the world at large (1996); (Markovits and Reich 1997); (Schmidt et al. 1996); (Znined-Brand 1997). Unsurprisingly German unification highlights some of the

cultural gaps that continue to divide East from West in united Germany. In the understanding of many on the Right and on the Left of the West German political spectrum who are united by a latent anti-Americanism, East Germany was the true inheritor of a German culture not tainted by Western commercialism and various forms of cultural degradations. In contrast to the anti-Americanism common among many of their West German colleagues, East German artists and intellectuals, by and large, supported unification (Lepenies 1999b). Yet the coming of a market economy cut East German culture loose from its supportive political moorings. Worried about the collapse of the East German culture industry the federal government granted a one-time subsidy of DM900 million, enough to create the foundation for survival of East German culture but not enough to defend its accomplishments in a period of social transformation and economic scarcity (Ackermann 1991). Government policy continues to emphasize language teaching abroad, especially in central and eastern Europe. And the Foreign Office has borrowed liberally from East German programs and practice, but not personnel, where this helped strengthen Germany's cultural reach, especially in Eastern Europe (Interview Nos. 2 and 4, Berlin, May 23 and 25, 2001). The complexities and ambivalences that Germans experience daily about their identity after unification thus are mirrored also in Germany's cultural diplomacy.

On questions of culture and cultural diplomacy it is an undue simplification to speak of Germany in the singular voice. In Germany's federal system cultural affairs are the prerogative of individual states rather than the federal government. And at the federal level cultural policy is made by a variety of ministries, among others Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, Education and Science, Women and Family Affairs, and Economic Cooperation and Development (Beyme 1998). Regional and local governments and large numbers of independent organizations implement policy within the guidelines of various public bodies. In 1998 a newly created office of State Minister for Cultural Affairs, or what in the U.S. would be called "culture Czar," is a high-visibility appointment at the federal level, however, without any substantial power base (Wood 1999a). The office is located in Bonn rather than Berlin. As a successor to the defunct cultural department of the Ministry of Interior it is staffed largely by civil servants who have worked previously on police, sport or civil defense issues. Although culture is an issue that is politically highly charged, the federal government has little direct say on such matters and invests not many of its administrative resources.

Although decentralization is also the hallmark of cultural diplomacy, the federal government plays an important role (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen 1980); (Roche 1998). Confronted with wide-spread international skepticism about Germany's fledgling democratic institutions, in 1952 the Foreign Affairs Ministry established a division of cultural affairs and made culture, besides economics and politics, the "third pillar" of Germany's foreign policy intended to improve the international climate by fostering cooperation and exchange (Brandt 1967). The government invested significantly in the third pillar. Over the years the financial outlays for cultural diplomacy have increased sharply. In 1992 the Foreign Office spent about DM 1.2 billion per year, roughly a third of the estimated total of 3.5 billion DM that Germany allocates for cultural diplomacy and also of the Foreign Ministry's budget (Kinkel 1996); (Werz 1992); (Interview No.2, Berlin, May 23, 2001). Despite its financial clout the federal government has a difficult

time, however, to coordinate all of the variegated aspects of Germany's cultural diplomacy, implemented by about a dozen ministries.

The German government has relied on a system of independent contractors that are operating under the indirect supervision of the Foreign Ministry. Its cultural division with 10 sections and 100 employees has under its direct supervision only the German schools that the government is operating abroad. For all other issues there exists a dual chain of command abroad (Mitchell 1986); (Werz 1992). German embassies have cultural attaches who cooperate closely with other parapublic institutions that are conducting much of Germany's cultural diplomacy abroad. These include institutions such as the Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service, the German Research Council, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Inter Nationes, the Institute for Foreign Relations, and the Deutsche Welle, a German radio, TV and on-line program (Gehrs and von Hammerstein 1999). These parapublic institutions are an important reason why the Foreign Ministry can insist with some justification that its cultural diplomacy is not a handmaiden of either government or partisan policy.

There is in fact no more than a fleeting boundary separating the government's cultural diplomacy and what in Germany is called "societal foreign policy," the foreign policies of various societal organizations with frequently significant cultural content. It is difficult to get an overall count of the number of organizations active in this policy domain. Apart from about a dozen federal ministries, 15 states, scores of regions, hundreds of cities and communities there are perhaps as many as 200 public, parapublic and private organizations involved in Germany's cultural diplomacy (Haigh 1974); (Arnold 1980); (Weidenfeld 1996); (Wood 1999a); (Link 1981); (Witte 1981). Case studies of Germany's cultural diplomacy in Latin America and the Soviet Union document both the broad array of institutions involved and the variability in different world regions and across different policy domains (Scherfenberg 1984); (Lippert 1996). In the developing world, for example, policy is focused primarily on technology, vocational training and the provision of information. Because it provides a large share of the budget of its partnership organizations, in the case of the Carl-Duisburg Society which seeks to strengthen vocational training overseas as much as 90 percent, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation runs a much more centralized operation than does the Foreign Ministry. It is also more sensitive to issues of technological change, including new media. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has barely begun to recognize the importance of new media for cultural diplomacy (Interview No.2, Berlin, May 23, 2001).

The Goethe Institute is arguably the most important of these parapublic institutions and one that has been emulated by Spain and Portugal when these two countries set up their machinery for cultural diplomacy in the early 1990s (Roche 1993). Founded in 1951, the Goethe Institute's headquarter is in Munich, and since its merger in 2001 with Inter Nationes, previously the government's main public relations organization and counterweight to the Goethe Institute, Bonn not Berlin (Interview No.3, Berlin, May 23, 2001). Since it lacked the requisite administrative resources, and since it was interested in lowering anti-German sentiments abroad by making cultural diplomacy more autonomous from government influence, the Foreign Ministry made the Goethe Institute in 1960 the administrator of the programs of 35 cultural institutes that it had run itself in the 1950s (Berlin Interview 2-01, May 23, 2001). In doing so the Ministry preserved the right to decide on funding, veto the appointments of directors, and be

consulted on major programmatic decisions (Znined-Brand 1997). A contract signed in 1963, and renegotiated in subsequent decades, specified that language instruction and cultural programs were to be administered as one unit (Amt 1989); (Werz 1992). The main purpose of the programmatic activities of the Goethe Institute, articulated once again in 1995, is to mediate between equal cultures with different traditions (Hoffmann 1996). Yet German unification and the "return" of the central and eastern European countries to Europe prompted the Goethe Institute in 1997 to give itself new guidelines. The Goethe Institute focused its activities once more on its core competencies, language, culture, and art, and it made a partial shift back to emphasize elite culture.

A 21 per cent budget cut imposed in the mid-1990s was an important reason. In the early1990s the Goethe Institute had about 3,000 employees and ran 161 institutes in 73 different countries sponsoring annually about 14,000 events. During the 1990s 38 institutes were closed, and 20 new ones were opened (Interview No.2, Berlin May 23, 2001). Part of the federal government's general budgetary consolidation, prompted in 1999 a further 5 percent cut (Interview No.2, Berlin May 23, 2001). By the end of the 1990s the Goethe Institute operated only 128 institutes abroad (Schneider and Schiller 2000); (Werz 1992); (Wood 1999a); (Weidenfeld 1996); (Drifte 1996); (Markovits and Reich 1997); (Innern 1990). Reflecting the original, European and classical orientation of the German understanding of culture, the biggest offices continue to operate in Paris, Rome and Athens.

The main task of the Goethe Institute is to provide for language instruction and to further cultural cooperation. It supports language instruction, lectures, exhibits, and the provision of information and books (Hoffmann 1996); (Mitchell 1986). Since the 1970s government policy has put increasing emphasis on cultural dialogue as a plausible way for bridging deep political conflicts leading to diplomatic rupture. The government viewed the dialogue model also as an effective instrument for enriching Germany's domestic culture, and thus of enhancing Germany's capacity to learn from others. By the mid-1990s the Goethe Institute 9 of the 25 language training centers were located in Germany.

Like the Foreign Ministry, the Goethe Institute favors a multilateral approach to cultural diplomacy and a dialogue format that sees merit not only in "exporting" German language and culture but also in "importing" culture from abroad. Various exchange programs are funded by the Foreign Ministry, and about one fifth of the budget of the Goethe Institute is spent on importing foreign culture through organizing events inside Germany, including running language courses for foreign workers. In a speech he delivered as the first state secretary for cultural affairs of the SPD/FDP coalition in 1969 Ralf Dahrendorf called for "a shift of emphasis from a foreign policy of state to a foreign policy of societies" (Werz 1992). If the options were once thought to be either "self-representation" or "dialogue," since the 1970s "dialogue as self-representation" has increasingly come to be taken for granted (Herrmann 1994); (Werz 1992). Dahrendorf gave an important initial impetus. The institutionalization of the dialogue model of cultural diplomacy, however, was the result of practical work in the field which gradually shaped the views of politicians and informed the articulation of policy principles (Interview No.2, Berlin, May 23, 2001). The State Minister for Culture, Berlin's uniquely important House of Culture which since 2001 operates under the auspices of the federal government, and the Institute for Foreign Studies are some of the major institutions that

are seeking to import culture. So do many of Germany's local communities (Interview No.3, Berlin, May 23, 2001). One important vehicle is cooperation with foreign artists, curators and institutions in the organization and sponsoring of exhibits. Inside Europe and between Europe and Asia networks of cooperative relations are growing across different cultural sectors. In the words of the incoming general secretary of the Goethe Institute, Joachim-Felix Leonhard, "foreign cultural relations begin at home" (Sittner and Steinfeld 2001). Presenting a "good image abroad" thus is no longer the main impetus that drives Germany's cultural diplomacy (Interview Nos. 2 and 4, Berlin, May 23 and 25, 2001). Cultural diplomacy is no longer a "third" pillar but an integral part of a foreign policy that stresses how Germany institutionalizes basic human rights and values.

The Goethe Institute and the government's cultural diplomacy has not escaped all political controversies about the proper balance between political autonomy and government intervention, program content, and funding priorities. When, for example, Franz Josef Strauss, conservative leader of the CSU, attacked the Goethe Institute in the mid-1980s for being too left-liberal in its policies, the conflict centered on two contrasting visions of cultural policy. While both emphasize the teaching of German language abroad, one focuses largely on the "export" of German cultural products and practices and the presentation of a positive and unified image of Germany, while the other one emphasizes as well the "import" of cultural products and practices from abroad and the depiction of German society as characterized by democratic debate and public controversy (Sartorius 1996); (Bundestag 1986). In this controversy both sides have emphasized the political imperative of cultural diplomacy and neither has regarded Germany's cultural diplomacy as serving directly the economic interests of German business. The late 1990s also witnessed an unmistakable tension between an evolving German version of multiculturalism and countercurrents in German politics that declare, especially in conservative circles, that German is the country's guiding culture (Leitkultur) (Cohen 2000). Such occasional political quarrels have never questioned that Germany's cultural diplomacy should be implemented by a partnership between the public and the private sector which enjoys a very considerable degree of political autonomy while operating within the broad guidelines the federal government sets.

Although there is scant evidence, the Goethe institute hopes that its work will soon be complemented by a more systematic cultural diplomacy of the European Union (EU). Fiscal constraints are growing in all European countries. Over strong German opposition, Great Britain, for example, has closed four of its five cultural offices in Germany, and France 12 of its 24 institutes (Kloth 2001). There are some signs that, in the interest of saving money, Britain, France and Germany are beginning to cooperate in their cultural diplomacy on a case-by-case basis (Kloth 2001). More generally, very gradually cooperation in national cultural diplomacy is occurring not through but around Europe. Spurred by cost cutting imperatives that operate in all European capitals, cooperation between governments is increasing on issues of culture either through cooperative project plans, and also in a few cases through investment in jointly operated or owned buildings. In September 2000, for example, for the first time officials from the main European states and Finland were meeting to discuss how to further cooperative ventures (Interview Nos. 2 and 3, Berlin, May 23, 2001). In a major speech Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer reiterated the central role of Germany's cultural diplomacy as

"an integral element of a foreign policy that aims at the prevention of conflict and the securing of peace" (Amt 2000).

Summary. Internationalization theory expects continued national difference rather than global convergence occurring within a context of continued openness to developments in world politics. Japan's cultural diplomacy remains firmly rooted in the world of nation states. Its subservience to economic ends into the 1980s shows that policy remained deeply rooted in a national perspective. Equally important is a remarkable consistency, well into the 1980s, in the purpose of cultural diplomacy: to instruct others of Japan's uniqueness. This is not to deny unmistakable signs of change in policy and in the identity that it reflects, that have occurred since: specifically the rise of new actors, reflected in the growing role of prefectures and communities, non-governmental organizations, and corporate philanthropy on the one hand and a broadening of policy focus from the UN and UNESCO, to the U.S. and Southeast Asia. On balance Japan's cultural diplomacy illustrates the primacy of national and a gradual rise of the importance of regional effects within the context of openness to developments in world politics.

Germany's cultural diplomacy is, like Japan's, firmly rooted in the world of internationalization not globalization. From the beginning of the Federal Republic cultural diplomacy was an important tool of international rehabilitation. The power of the German state was heavily circumscribed, and the habit of proceeding not alone but with several partners became deeply ingrained. In a comparative perspective that places Germany and Europe next to Japan and Asia, they point to a less national and a more international context for the policy and politics of culture.

4. Cultural Processes in Asia and Europe

The stylized self-representations and interpretations that governments seek to project and import through cultural diplomacy are only one part of the cultural processes that are shaping world politics. Popular culture is another. And as globalization theory insists, it is an important force creating homogeneity all over the world. Open regions in this view are attributable to the growing force of cultural globalization.

Distinctive of cultural processes in Asia is the dynamic spread of the attractive products of Japan's profitable mass culture industries in Asian-Pacific markets. In contrast to the politically insular approach of the government, Japan's dynamic capitalism has built a highly competitive and successful popular culture industry, ranging from Japanese cartoons (manga) to Japanese forms of hospitality (karaoke songs), slot machines (pachinko), and movies (anime). Widely regarded in Asia as a successful model in the commodification of culture, Japan acts as a filter for U.S. products and practices in Asia. This market-oriented approach lacks deliberate political efforts to create stronger cultural bonds in Asia; it creates common conditions indirectly, through the export of the products of the leisure industry. By comparison, European cultural processes lack vitality both in Germany and in Europe. In sharp contrast to its financially expensive and politically motivated cultural diplomacy, Germany lacks an artistically dynamic and commercially viable popular culture industry that extends into regional and global markets and that can compete successfully with American products. It is, however, part of a European polity that seeks to shape, largely unsuccessfully, a distinctively European

programming that seeks to stem the tide of American products swamping European markets.

The Regional Spread of Japanese Popular Culture. Since the early 1990s in particular the products of Japan's mass culture industries have spread at an astonishing rate throughout Asia-Pacific (Craig 2000). There can be little doubt that Japanese firms have been more adept at exporting mass culture than the state has been at exporting elite culture. This is not to argue that markets operate in a vacuum. They are closely intertwined with politics. In the early 1990s, for example, the government was quite self-conscious in announcing that Japan was on its way of becoming a "life-style superpower" that would find new and creative ways of using leisure time. Since culture in Japan is defined as a leisure activity and not an aspect of social welfare, it ranks far below sports and travel. The fact that the MITI office producing such plans was working overtime was a warning of how difficult it would be to decree top-down social change in favor of enhanced leisure consumption.

The model of a leisure society that the Japanese were emulating was drawn from Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, from the U.S. (Leheny 1998). Since leisure is a form of domestic consumption, enhancing it promised to narrow Japan's mounting export surplus (Ono and Schlesinger 1992). More importantly, long-term change, especially among the young of a burgeoning "middle-mass" society, was altering life-styles in Japan's metropolitan areas and, with a short time-lag, in major urban centers throughout Asia-Pacific. The urban middle mass is attracted neither by the traditional folk art of members of the lower classes nor the Western high culture preferred by members of the upper classes. This new middle mass operates in a space that is culturally open and relatively undefined. The demands of its new life-style are not met within existing cultural frameworks and with existing products (Honda 1994); (Iwabuchi 1994).

Japanese producers were ready to meet that demand. Developed in highly competitive domestic markets, Japanese print and electronic products, for example, reflect both imagination and quality and also scale economies and tie-ins across different media that create large numbers of spin-off products, clout in distribution and marketing channels, and large profits (Korhonen 1994). "Ultimately,"writes Frederik Schodt (1996), the popularity of Japan's popular culture "is emblematic of something much larger–perhaps a postwar 'mind-melt' among the peoples of industrialized nations, who all inhabit a similar (but steadily shrinking) physical world of cars, computers, buildings, and other manmade objects and systems." The new Asianism that is appearing in contemporary Japan is, in the words of Koichi Iwabuchi (1994) the product of "constructing cultural similarity with the rest of Asia through popular culture and urban consumption . . . . Japanese cultural industry is still less concerned with the direct export of Japanese cultural products than with how to rid cultural products of 'Japanese smell' and to make them acceptable in Asia." In short, by translating Western leisure products and a life-style of urban consumerism Japan's culture industries are creating a new sense of sameness with other parts of Asia and beyond.

Japanese mass culture is helping to create a similarity in urban life-style and facilitates processes of acculturation among the young that far surpasses the reach of Japan's official cultural diplomacy. The spread of mass culture is facilitated enormously by the communications revolution that young customers in Asia-Pacific have embraced so readily, from Star TV to fax machines, personal computers, cellular phones and

personal pagers. The result is a projection of Japanese images and values that differ sharply from the more limited personal freedom, the more pervasive ethic of self-sacrifice, the more authoritarian relationships, and the suppression of many signs of individuality that characterized Japan only half a century ago. Japanese culture products give clear expression to the values and aspirations of the contemporary Japanese middle class – the freedom to pursue romantic inclinations and sexual impulses, the tensions between the individual and the organizations in which they live and work, and the urge to be one with nature. The image of Japan is cosmopolitan and complex. It is of growing relevance to the every-day experiences especially of the young in Asia-Pacific.

Since the mid-1990s Japan's mass culture products and life-style have become cutting edge in most countries in East and Southeast Asia, offering a complement to or substitute for Hollywood. Rapid economic growth and the creation of a new middle class in the large urban centers in Asia-Pacific have created a market very receptive to Japan's burgeoning popular culture (Honda 1994); (Biers 1994); (Hirano 1996); (Tesoro 1996); (Koh 1999); (McGray 2002). Trends in Japanese comic books, music, serialized TV dramas, movies, fashion, and karaoke are having a profound impact on the middle-class life-style of especially the young living in Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai, Taipei, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and even Seoul.

Take popular music, for example. The influence of Japanese pop songs is clearly evident in the songs of Hong Kong stars like Jacky Cheung. Although she remains virtually unknown in Japan, Chiba Mika, a Japanese pop star groomed for East Asia markets, was one of the great successes in Taiwan, Southeast Asia and China. Her career, "planned" for foreign markets, shows one facet of the broad appeal of Japanese culture products. Indeed Sony Music Entertainment is using the same strategy to introduce a Colombian rock star, Shakira, to the U.S. market after she had sold more than eight million records in Latin America (Orwall 2001). The Japanese music industry, seeking to export "concepts" has in fact made the production of Asian stars, what Sony calls "Asia Major" a centerpiece of its regionalization strategy (Iwabuchi 1994); (Iwabuchi 1998). Music auditions held throughout Southeast Asia are part of a concerted corporate effort of opening up the regional music market (Iwabuchi 1994). But this is only part of the story. "Japan's popular culture has been spreading thanks largely to the initiative of local promoters and the warm response of consumers" (Honda 1994). Using Hong Kong as a node to reach all of Asia, Hong Kong rock stars borrow from Japanese hits and produce them for the large Asia-wide market. New cross-over styles such as Mandopop have thus emerged, spurred by large markets in Asia-Pacific, a large Asian immigrant community in the U.S., and the rise of the Internet (Tam 2000). The creation of an incipient Asian-Pacific culture is the result of such dynamic market processes.

Japanese comics or manga illustrate cross-over of another type, the close relation between importing and exporting cultural products. Japan's culture industries are acting as a transmission belt for many cultural trends originating in the United States. By incorporating various subtle changes in Japan's imports of U.S. products, Japanese artists create a mass culture more accessible and meaningful to consumers in Japan, East Asia and Southeast Asia. But subtle adaptations can create entirely new art. Osamu Tezuka, was greatly influenced by Walt Disney and U.S. cartoons. Yet he helped revolutionize manga by decompressing story lines and introducing cinematic techniques into the

images he drew. The result was a visualized narrative reprinted in over 300 books summarizing his life's work (S. Shiraihi 1997, 237).

Tezuka's genius and flair for visual narration helped set in motion artistic and economic developments that created a large and dynamic industry in Japan, which is increasingly looking to export markets in Asia-Pacific. Japanese filtering of US cultural products has the advantage of neutralizing country-specific features, be they American or Japanese, and thus creating a stronger region-wide appeal. One leading Japanese publisher has begun to train systematically East Asian cartoonists in Tokyo who then work abroad, most likely in the business of pirating Japanese products, and spreading manga through various domestic markets. With intellectual property rights now more rigorously enforced throughout Asia-Pacific, the growing appeal of manga creates a large export market for Japanese corporations, promising high profits and enormous growth potential. It now seems a safe bet that we are dealing here with a genuine cultural innovation not a cultural fad.

The dramatic collapse of the Hong Kong film industry, however, is a salutary reminder of how quickly the tide of mass culture can turn. Once a goldmine for action movies, admired and viewed widely throughout Asia-Pacific, industry sales shrunk by more than 50 per cent between 1992 and 1997, due to declining quality, the move of Chinese triads into the industry, and piracy video compact disks that cost less than half of the price of a movie ticket (Strauss 1998). For the time being though, unlike Hong Kong action movies, Japanese manga have growing region-wide appeal (Natsume 2000).

Manga are less like comic books and more like visual novels. They illustrate well a dynamic market-based process of regionalization (S. Shiraishi 1997). As a Japanese art form visual storytelling has roots that go back a thousand years (Lent 1989). Comics are not for kids, although boys and young men are the key market; as three-quarters of all manga cater to them (Schodt 1996). In addition manga target a broad array of very different socio-economic and age groups of Japanese of different sexual orientations. Over the last generation manga thus has become a major feature of Japanese culture. Between 1980 and 1998 the number of manga books or magazines published annually increased from 1 to 2.2 billion, or 35 percent of Japan's total print market in terms of numbers of copies sold and 20 percent in terms of gross revenues (Interview No.2, March 14, 2001). This amounts to 15 manga a year for every man, woman, and child in Japan. Manga typically run 400 pages and are issued weekly. On a page-by-page basis they are six times cheaper than U.S. comics. On average 20 new manga volumes are published every day, more than 500 per month (Kondo 1995); (Natsume 2000); (Schodt 1996); (Shiraishi 1997). In highly competitive markets, manga artists and publishers provide high quality products that meet their readers' needs and interests which are ascertained frequently through reader surveys. Series that do not meet with reader approval typically disappear within ten weeks (S. Shiraishi 1997).

A 320-page manga can be read in 20 minutes, less than 4 seconds per page (Schodt 1996).The market is large and diversified so as to permit an enormous breadth and depth in the themes that are covered. Sex and violence are prominent in the vast majority of manga; in 1992 a quarter of all comics were estimated to contain sexual content and a significant proportion was dedicated specifically to that subject (Sabin 1995); (Ito 1995); (Shiokawa 1999). But sex does not define the whole genre. Generally speaking the subject matters treated "range from porno to physics . . . Imagine a best-

selling American comic about fly-fishing or managing an international hotel" (Burress 1997). Former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa had his opinion columns published not in a newspaper or magazine but in a widely circulated manga magazine (Burress 1997). Japan's right-wing historical revisionism movement gets a mass audience through Yoshinori Kobayashi's manga books, such as "On War" and "Taiwan Discourse" (French 2001); (Dickie 2001). Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic Buddhist sect that organized the anonymous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, was publishing its own manga as a way of proselytizing. Many of the organization's more outrageous ideas seem to have been lifted from manga (Schodt 1996). New city ordinances such as Kyoto's latest comprehensive Development Law and changes in the national Tax Law are publicized in manga form (Nitschke 1994). Together with film and novels, manga have become a full-fledged medium of expression that is now beginning to face a saturated domestic market and perhaps also some artistic stagnation (Botting 1998).

Each successful manga goes through its own product cycle. One of the great hits of the 1990s, the Sailor Moon series, is a good example (Kondo 1995). [Also see: (Shiraishi 1997)] After three months of successful sales in manga form, it is made into a TV animation. At the same time novelty goods and props that appear in the manga are put on sale. After half a year the serialized installments are put out in book form, generating much higher profits than magazines. A couple of months later "film" comics, selected frames from the TV animation, are put on sale and within a year the TV animation itself is sold on videotape. Finally during both summer and winter school vacations an animation version is released for screening in movie theaters. Musical renditions are staged. A video game based on the original manga appears. And a collection of the original artwork is published in an expensive book-form. As Sailormoon and other successful manga go into runs that can last years and decades, they are creating successive generations of off-springs of characters and props that go through similar merchandising cycles. During the first two years of Sailormoon's astonishingly successful run more than 5,000 novelty products and 20 video games had been put on the market (Kondo 1995); (Grigsby 1998). In 1996 Dragon Ball Z, one of the most popular characters of Japanese anime, earned $2.95 billion world wide in merchandise alone (Mullen 1997). The domestic character-merchandising industry was valued at $15 billion in 1995. Saya Shiraishi's analysis suggests that the "image alliance" between manga and anime is the foundation for multimedia product cycles that are distinctive of Japan's mass culture industry and that are very profitable in Asian-Pacific markets (Shiraishi 1997).

Japanese manga have rapidly spread regionally. The enormous growth in Hong Kong's comic book industry, for example, was based on pirated editions of Japanese manga. Hong Kong comics are associated with the name of Tony Wong, the founder of Jademan. But by the early 1990s the sales of local publishers of comics had grown so much that they began to acquire licenses for the legitimate translation and marketing of manga. By 1993 Japanese manga controlled 50 per cent of the Hong Kong market. Pirated Japanese manga were also an important factor in the development of Taiwanese comics. The Tong Li Publishing Company run by Fang Wennan, "the self-appointed 'king of pirated manga,'" released over a thousand titles during a fifteen-years period (Schodt 1996). Most of the smuggled comics were intended for rental shops which have declined in importance only in the 1990s as Japanese TV-animation are broadcast every day, all day, not only on two cartoon channels but also by the other networks. Japanese

publishers are trying to reproduce the Japanese production system in Taiwan (S. Shiraishi 1997). Taiwan and Honk Kong are gateways to China's enormous market that has shown great receptivity to Japanese manga. The Chinese word for comic, manhua, introduced in 1925, is borrowed from the Japanese characters meaning 'manga' (Farquhar 1995). The first foreign TV animation aired in China in the 1980s was Japanese. Japanese comics sell very briskly. And character merchandise is easily available all over the country, including in state stores (S. Shiraishi 1997).

In the 1990s licensed manga in translation have become more important in Asia-Pacific. In 1992, for the first time, Shonen Magazine was published in its entirety in Taiwan which came to embrace Japanese popular culture in the 1990s, and by 1995 in South Korea, Thailand and Hong Kong (Kondo 1995); (Iwabuchi 1998). Developments in Indonesia are remarkably similar; foreign editions appear typically with a time lag of about two weeks (S. Shiraishi 1997). In Taiwan the lag is only three days (Schodt 1996). The Bangkok editorial office employs local cartoonists to adapt the Japanese edition to Thailand's visual cultures. As Thai and local talent improve throughout East and Southeast Asia, foreign cartoons will probably be published in growing numbers in the Japanese market.

Japanese cultural products do not have universal appeal however. In Thailand talk of Japanese cultural imperialism is spreading (Interview No.9, January 7, 2000). The Philippines have resisted the appeal of Japanese manga. In fact, because of their violence, the government, with a U.S.-style system of censorship, imposes occasional bans on the import of manga and anime (S. Shiraishi 1997). After 1945 Filipino komiks were modeled after U.S. comic books. There are virtually no imports of either licensed or unlicensed manga; pirated material comes from the U.S. (Rifas 1995). By the 1970s komiks were the most widely-read medium in the country and provided half of all Filipino movies with their story lines. Developments in South Korea suggest, however, that the Philippines are a rare exception to the mass appeal of manga. For decades the South Korean government imposed a total ban on the import of Japanese cultural products. Japanese manga have, in the words of a member of a Korean Ethics Committee, long been censored for "deep kissing, nudity, profanity, and portrayals of stabbings, shootings, blood and amputations" (Schodt 1996). Yet South Korea is deeply affected by Japanese manga and anime (Chung 1997). Despite an import ban imposed until very recently, Japanese manga control 70 per cent of the Korean market (1994b). Korean animation TV stations rely largely upon Japanese imports and, until 1997, habitually violated the 30 per cent limit that the government had imposed on use of foreign animation products. Since 1995 a change in government policy aims at increasing the production of domestic anime, with only modest success (Yu 1999). In addition S. Korean producers subcontract for U.S. and Japanese animation companies on a large scale. With a warming of the bilateral relations between S. Korea and Japan in the late 1990s, a joint committee on mass culture has begun to work on relaxing trade barriers (Interview No.4, Tokyo, January 6, 1999).

Japanese TV cartoons (anime) build often on the characters and story lines of manga (Napier 2000); (McCarthy 1999). This is the true foundation for what is at times called 'Japanimation,' with special appeal for children and teenagers. A half-hour cartoon requires 40 people working full time for 45 days. The cost of imported, licensed products amounts to less than 10 percent of the total cost of domestic production cost. In the case

of the most popular childrens' TV show, Pokémon, a licensed episode costs about 20 percent of the half million dollar of an American-made cartoon (Rutenberg 2001). Taiwan's and Korea's animation industries rest largely on the outsourcing of the productions of Japanese and also U.S. firms (S. Shiraishi 1997); (Lent 1998).

Even though both the Cultural Agency and MITI have recognized the growing economic importance of popular culture (Kawamura, Okabe, and Makita 2000), the government's cultural diplomacy and foundation activities, have had little to do with the regionalization of Japan's popular culture. In the eyes of the Ministry of Education and the Cultural Agency, Japanese pop culture is often viewed as little more than an U.S. import with deeply corrosive influences that undercut the traditional practices that define Japan's culture. But times are beginning to change. Like their wood block print ancestors, manga were once regarded by Japanese officials as low culture "not appropriate to show the outside world. Now the Japanese government and corporations are on the verge of almost treating manga like tea ceremony – 'this is something we should show the foreigners'" (Burress 1997). With manga gradually incorporated into the official Japanese school curriculum and stuffing the shelves of school libraries there is much debate about whether and how this facet of Japanese culture should be "officially" represented abroad (S. Shiraishi 1997); (Relations 1998). "The Overseas Public Relations Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now sends copies of Mangajin to its embassies and consulates in 180 nations around the world; at a recent international conference it also handed out copies of a translated 'business manga' anthology to 500 foreign reporters" (Schodt 1996).

In her illuminating analysis Saya Shiraishi (1997) concludes that "Japanese popular culture is becoming Asian popular culture." After decades of phenomenal growth in domestic markets both manga and anime products are increasingly looking to export markets, primarily in Asia-Pacific but also globally, for future growth and profits (Schodt 1996). Pokémon showed Japanese firms that enormous profits could be reaped by taking the industry into regional and world markets. This regional spread is greatly aided by the talents of entrepreneurs operating in overseas networks. And it draws strength from the young who use the internet for pirating manga and anime products in Asia and for organizing anime and manga fan clubs in the U.S.

The process is not unidirectional. It is a deliberate policy of Japanese publishers to support, for example, Taiwan's young artists, by reserving 40 per cent of the pages of some of their flagship journals in Taiwan, for their work. And foreign manga artists are gradually entering Japanese markets. Japanese publishing firms are importing Vietnamese artists, training them and sending them back, giving them plenty of slack in the work they do in Japanese subsidiaries in Vietnam. Similarly in music, Japanese companies are signing up Japanese singers, give them language training and send them abroad to sing in foreign languages (Interview No.6, January 7, 1999 and No.9, January 7, 2000). The export of Japanese popular culture thus creates its own countercurrents that are conducive to hybridization. For artistic creativity remains the center of the mass culture industry. As long as that creativity prevails Japan's multinational image alliances will help its popular culture penetrate Asian-Pacific markets, pulled in by the apparently insatiable demand of a new urban middle-class and able to replicate in different national contexts (S. Shiraishi 1997). Based on his examination of the role of Japan's popular culture industries Koichi Iwabuchi (1999) concludes that "Japan's newly articulated

connections with other parts of Asia through pop cultural flows show no signs of weakening."

Japanese family TV dramas, not Western soaps, Japanese horror movies, not Western versions with strange, blond and blue-eyed characters, the familiar cuteness of Pokémon characters, not Mickey Mouse, and Japanese pop songs easily adapted to karaoke, not choreographed American bands – all of these are cultural products that sell in Asia-Pacific because they are more familiar and resonate more fully with existing cultural repertoires (Tadokoro 2000/01); (Interview Nos. 3 and 4, Tokyo, March 15, 2001). This regional popular culture is spreading beyond Asia-Pacific. In the largest European market, Japanese manga is revitalizing Germany's stagnant comic book industry in the late 1990s (Rosenbach 2001). Japanese children series like Pokémon and Dragon Ball have become big hits on German TV in the late 1990s (Hammerstein 2001). And the most popular movie ever made in Japan, "Spirited Away" was a co-winner of the 2002 Golden Bear Award at the Berlin film festival (Pilling 2002) highlighting what Dave Kehr ((Kehr 2002) has called Japanese Cinema's "Second Gold Age." The 1990s has been the decade of Japan's "Gross National Cool" (McGray 2002). It has belied the notion of Japan lacking in "soft" power as Joseph Nye (1990) argued in a widely cited book at the beginning of the decade. Some of that soft power derives from Japan's century-old quest of translating and absorbing foreign influences; some derives from the clever perfection of marketing strategies; some from the creativity of brilliant artists. The sum total of Japan's popular culture illustrates that the appeals of Japan's cultural products rest on more than mastering the medium of mass merchandising. A life-style superpower need not be a military or economic superpower.

German Popular Culture and Americanization. As Germany and Europe are both awash in a sea of popular culture, most of it of American origin, the politics of popular culture in Europe focuses on imports not exports. Americanization has come to refer, in Germany and elsewhere, to the appropriation of the products of American mass culture by different social strata, groups and generations and the processes by which these groups create their own subcultures that, taken together, constitute a national culture (Jarausch and Siegrist 1997). Historical research into the Americanization of the young, everyday life, gender roles, generational change, literature, popular music, film and television give us insights into complex processes of cultural and social change. In Germany and in Europe it has connotations that are both positive (democracy, capitalism, affluence, modernity, tolerance, enlightenment) and negative (non-European, culturally inferior, superficial, materialist, profit-hungry). Since World War II the indisputable leadership of the U.S. has made the "American Way of Life" both salient and accessible for Germans and Europeans.

Concepts such as "self-Americanization" (Maase 1997), "self-colonization" (Wagnleitner 1994), and "cultural creolization" (Kroes 1996) all underline the active role that Germans play in the process of selection and appropriation of the products of American mass culture. With Elvis Presley joining the U.S. Army in Germany in October 1958 – crew-cut, military demeanor, and all – German newspapers featured the headline "Elvis Presley is becoming German" (Maase 1997). For the 341 million paper novellas (*Groschenhefte)* that Germans bought in 1971, the preferred story line was, in the words of one of the publishers, "the German Western," written by German authors, many of whom had never been in the U.S. (Haufler 1997).Which American cultural

imports succeed and which fail, what the terms of success and failure are, and how individuals and groups interpret the availability of new modes of expressing themselves in their own cultural milieu, all of this is a complex mixtures of technocratic and egalitarian elements in which Americanization and anti-Americanism always remain close cousins (Gemünden 1998).

European avant-garde and contemporary American popular culture are deeply intermingled both in mutual admiration and criticism (Gemünden 1998); (Huyssen 1975). Anti-American protests during the Vietnam War relied on "teach-ins" and other American forms of civil disobedience. And the songs of Bob Dylan and Joan Baez, and the revival of American Blues and Soul music, imported in the form of Rock-n-Roll, helped shape Liverpool's Beatlemania which then conquered American markets. In the late 1960s a generation of middle-class German youths, reared on Hemingway, Pollock, New Orleans Jazz and the Gettysburg Address, began to equate the U.S. with Nazi Germany thus creating an American idiom for confronting Germany's past and their own parents. "Self-Americanization" captures the repertoire of symbols and practices open to numerous recombinations by individuals and groups that operate not in homogeneous national societies but in complex networks of self-enacted cultural affinities.

Hollywood is the prime example of American domination of Europe's popular culture. This domination is not only a matter of the spread of English as the world's preferred language as the British film industry illustrates. Although it is part of the high-growth, creative services sector, Great Britain's film and television trade balance has turned from a surplus of more than 100 million pound sterling in 1987 to a deficit of almost 200 million a decade later (Adams 1999). In the case of Germany cinema both reflected and shaped evolving national identities after 1945 (Fehrenbach 1995). Throughout the post-war era the allure of Hollywood has been extremely strong. The export of U.S. movies to Germany started slowly in the 1950s but gained strength with the generational changes of the 1960s. By the mid-1970s almost half of the total number of movies shown on Germany's public TV stations was American. Commercial TV has led to a further sharp increase in the number of American movies shown on German TV (Schneider 1997). German movie makers, particularly in the 1970s, used American themes and techniques to arrive at their own distinctive style (Gemünden 1998).

Germany and Europe have been swept up by a global tide. In 1987, 79 percent of the global film and TV exports originated in the U.S. (Wagnleitner 1994). Despite some national subsidies, compared to Hollywood the European industry is less well funded and produced, and lacks the thematic inventiveness, technical wizardry and firm control over global distribution networks that give Hollywood its edge in world markets. In four sample years in the 1990s, David Laitin [(1999); also see: (Bertlein 1989)] found that US films accounted in all years and in all national markets for more than 50 percent of the most popular movies. In 1998 the market share of U.S. movies was lowest in Italy and France (around 50 percent), highest in Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands (between 80 and 85 percent) and ranged in the middle (between 65 and 75 percent) for all other European countries (European Commission 2000). A 1996 study of the Commission found that 16 percent of the cinema tickets sold in the EU was for national films in their home markets; 6 percent for movies from other European countries; and 78 percent for movies from overseas, mostly from the U.S. Of the 40 commercially most successful movies only ten were from Europe; 19 of the top 20 commercial successes were from the

U.S. (Theiler 1999a). In Germany 9.5 percent of movie shows in theaters were German productions in 1998, down from 17.5 percent in 1997. While domestic movies can claim occasionally as much as 40 percent of the domestic market, as in France or Italy, all European films are weak outside of their home markets. Attempts to use the German tax code to make Berlin-Babelsberg, in the 1930s and 1940s Hollywood's most avid rival and imitator, once again an important center of the global movie industry have failed (Pauly 2001).

There exist undoubtedly some pockets of cultural resilience. William E. Schmidt [(1993); also see: (Laitin 1999)] has noted that in the 1990s, perhaps for the first time in decades, there is some evidence that American hegemony over pop culture is being challenged by the emergence of a European sense of music, fashion and style. MTV Europe, for example, is modeled after the American television channel; yet it offers music and fashion that would be hardly recognizable if young Americans were to watch (Gemünden 1998). In the 1990s European art films and German genre films show cultural fusion at a level that is deeper than the mere disappearance of a distinctive German style of *Autorenfilm* in which the director writes the script, produces the movie, acts, and promotes. Light-hearted and entertaining this German genre is more American than the Americanized version of the new German cinema of the 1970s (Gemünden 1998). Central to cultural processes of Europeanization, American popular culture, not indigenous European content, remains the single most pervasive cultural influence in contemporary Europe.

There is one exception to this generalization. In the world of popular music Europe is very much part of a global market dominated by English-language songs. Yet each European country has its own version of national pop music that sells well in domestic and other European market. In contrast to the movie industry, the EU has three major companies (Britain's Thorn EMI, Netherland's PolyGram and Germany's BMG) that together account for 40 percent of world market sales. European pop music is shaped by global trends, including developments in the US, but it cannot be said to lack its own regional and national dynamism. In the 1940s and 1950s the national origin of rock-n-roll was distinctively American; its adaptation into Germany's evolving working class culture of "Halbstarke," for example, offers a clear illustration of how the process of self-Americanization works (Maase 1993); (Poiger 1997); (Poiger 2000). By the 1980s, however, German rock music produced its own distinctive "New German Wave" (Dirke 1989).

This blurring of national boundaries has accelerated as a regional Euro Pop style began to develop on its own, combining Eurovision song contests with the disco-dance sound of the clubs in Ibiza, one of Europe's favored vacation spots (Laitin 1999). Swedish disco groups such as ABBA and the German/Italian "Europbeat" with its high-tech sound quality convinced British recording studios in particular that the time was ripe for producing not only for the American but also for the European market. Originating from Detroit, and after slow growth in the 1980s the popularity of Germany's techno music movement exploded in the early 1990s with its timely political message of "love", "peace", and "unity." By the end of the 1990s the techno sound of Berlin's annual musical spectacle, the Love Parade, drew 1.3 million ravers to Germany's capital, bringing the city additional income of about 100 million dollars and mountains of rubbish in the city's Tiergarten. In 2002 the Love Parade went international with similar events

planned also in Vienna and Leeds (Seidel 1997). Techno music has evolved different national styles, for example "jungle" in England and "trance" in Germany. And leading techno artists such as England's Aphex Twin and Japan's Ken Ishii are at least as well known and important as are Americans (Molenda n.d.).

In most other popular music styles which, unlike techno, rely on lyrics the border between Europe and America is porous and blurred. "European rap lyrics are neither fully 'imitating' their U.S. model(s) nor are they fully 'emancipated' from these" (Androutsopoulos and Scholz 1999). In the European market, it is rare for non-English songs to hit the top charts outside of their domestic markets. In February 1999, for example, the top-ten or top-twenty listings in nine European countries listed 170 titles; of the twenty-two titles appearing on the lists of more than one country, only one was not in English. Besides European-owned recording companies, the pervasive influence of English language is thus an important conduit for a regional pop music culture that is linked to the American market. This regional market does not act as a strait-jacket. A German recording artist *Sash!* had five top-five hits in 1997-98 with titles in three languages, none of them German (Laitin 1999). Besides EU productions selling well in Europe, national songs sell relatively well in national markets, in sharp contrast to the movie industry. Except for France where the proportion is about one-half, about one-fifth of the top hits are domestic, slightly larger than the figure for European imports (which tend to vary around 15 per cent) but well below the figure for US imports which tend to vary around 40 per cent. The national origin of between a quarter and a third of the top-hits is unknown, illustrating a point of fundamental importance, the extent to which "origin" is not a very meaningful category for many listeners of popular music (Laitin 1999).

In contrast to Japan, German popular culture has not succeeded in producing and marketing products with broad appeal in European markets and beyond. Yet German media giants have grown into some of the largest corporations in world markets, some with spectacular successes, such as Bertelsmann, some with a resounding bankruptcy, such as Kirch. What unites these corporations is an aggressive investment in rapidly growing media markets coupled with a total lack of interest in and ability to provide an authentic message.

With annual revenues of about 15 billion dollars in the year 2,000, Bertelsmann was the third largest entertainment company in the world in 2000, well behind Time-Warner and Walt Disney. Having nurtured relations with the cash-strapped AOL in the mid-1990s (and eventually turning two small investments of about $50 and $270 million into returns estimated at about 2.5 billion and 7-8 billion dollars) Bertelsmann rejected a merger proposal from AOL and thus lost out to Time-Warner which also beat Bertelsmann in its attempted acquisition of EMI, the one remaining independent music label. And after investing close to 100 million dollars in Napster it is far from clear that Bertelsmann will succeed in changing a free exchange of music once serving some 80 million users into a viable commercial service (Foege 2002). With 300 subsidiaries in 54 countries and about 75,000 employees, Bertelsmann revenues continue to increase. The company is strong in magazines, books and music. And in 2001, for the price of 9 billion dollars, it increased its stake in Europe's largest television broadcaster, the RTL Group, from 37 to 67 percent. That deal was structured so that within the next four years

Bertelsmann would open itself up to public investors for the first time in its storied history.

From its headquarters in a small North German town, Bertelsmann has established itself firmly in the U.S. market (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994). The company is clearly on the move. A decade ago, in the early 1990s, Bertelsmann's then CEO Woessner insisted in an interview "we are an international company. But not global" (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994). His successor Thomas Middelhoff sees matters very differently. After buying Random House in 1998, adding to its ownership of Bantam, Doubleday and Dell, Bertelsmann, became the largest book seller in the American market and world-wide. It also holds a 50 percent stake in barnesandnoble.com. In contrast to Viacom's investment in Paramount and the News Corporations's investment in Fox-TV, Bertelsmann has avoided investing in a major Hollywood studio and prefers its stake in the European CLT-Ufa network. The company's CEO, Thomas Middelhoff, wonders what the impact of Hollywood movies will be a decade hence. He favors European broadcasters investing in productions for European audiences instead (Gapper and Stüdemann 1999). It is the internet and e-trade, however, that resonates most directly with the origins of Bertelsmann as a subscription-based book club, built up since 1945 by Reinhard Mohn, a member of the Bertelsmann family which had started the firm in 1835. In 2001 Bertelsmann is more global in its operations than any of the other large entertainment corporations. It generates two-thirds of its revenues outside of Germany; for AOL Time Warner the corresponding figure is only one-fifth. In sum, in many though not all of its main product divisions Bertelsmann is on its way of becoming a global corporation.

Not all German media companies have operated as successfully as Bertelsmann. Leo Kirch, for example, controlled Germany's biggest commercial television networks and owned the rights to the world's largest library of programming and sports events, including the World Cup soccer tournament and Formula One racing. In 1996 Kirch acquired virtually all movie rights from each of the major Hollywood studios for the next ten years. He invested about 6 billion dollars in exchange for pay and pay-per-view rights to Hollywood's total production of movies and TV shows. Tied personally and financially to the conservative political establishment in Bavaria and Germany, in the spring of 2002 Kirch's high level of debt left him no choice but to file for bankruptcy in the spring of 2002.

Whether successful or failures, Germany's large electronic and media corporations are interested in the medium, not in developing a message. What is true for old-fashioned print-media at the subnational scale holds also for Germany's high-tech electronic media operating on a world scale. After 1991, for example, a Bavarian newspaper chain bought up much of the Czech Republic's regional press. Czech politicians and intellectuals were deeply worried about possible German interference in Czech affairs. But the *Bayern-Kurier* was good at producing profitable regional papers, not exporting conservative German political views (Jerábek and Zich 1997). Bertelsmann "is not known for openly promoting a political creed in its media. The main goal seems to be business growth, and not to operate as a leader of opinion" (Kleinsteuber and Peters 1991, p. 195). The man who made Bertelsmann one of the world's media giants in the second half of the twentieth century, Reinhard Mohn, is not particularly interested in publishing, printing, music or the internet. "He could just as happily sell anything that

wasn't disreputable. His passion is to create a successful corporate structure" (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994).

EU Cultural Policies. The pervasiveness of processes of cultural globalization, specifically Americanization, has prompted political responses at the European level that are noteworthy for both, having been made and having failed to strengthen a distinctive collective European culture (Blanke 1994); (Ress 1991); (Niedobitek 1997); (Häberle 1983); (Krings 1989); (Shore 1996); (Pantel 1999). A popular political joke, and a French nightmare, defines a European as a person who watches American soap operas on a Japanese television.

The area of audio-visual products offers a good illustration (Hubel 1990); (Theiler 1999a); (Theiler 1999c); (Theiler 2001); (Collins 1993a); (Collins 1993b); (Collins 1994); (Collins 1995); (Schlesinger 1994); (Schlesinger 2001). The EU has moved vigorously to facilitate the cross-border flow of audio-visual material in part to balance against cheap imports of US movies for TV. To buy the rights for showing one hour of US TV movies costs only 10-15 percent of producing a film in Europe. In a report released in the mid-1980s the Commission estimated that in the future European TV would annually broadcast 125,000 hours of new movies and entertainment shows, with European production covering only 5,000 hours (Bertlein 1989). The 1989 Television without Frontiers Directive, slightly amended in 1997, eliminated most legal barriers to the transmission and reception of television signals between EU member states and imposed a controversial and non-binding quota regime on imports, thus seeking to reduce the exposure of European mass audiences to the products of the U.S. entertainment industry. Film and TV involved significant economic interests that touch directly on the single market initiative and the EU's commercial policy, pitted in this sector rhetorically against the "outside" world, and especially the U.S. The political salience of this dimension of European cultural policy thus was large.

How to address the inherent attractions of US fictional programs has became a major focus of the Commission's attention. From a globally dominant position the US entertainment industries are controlling very high market shares in Europe for a number of complex reasons, among them established market position, a historical preference of the European working class historically for cultural products less elitist when produced by U.S. than European producers, and the internal size and heterogeneity of the U.S. market which both permits economies of scale and offers space for cultural experimentation typically lacking in European productions. The Commission's clarion call for Europe's cultural defense was tactically astute. It created a political alliance of Parliament and Commission with, rather than against, some of the most important member states, especially France and its cultural minister Jack Lang. Protection against "foreign cultural predators" was acceptable to national governments; the construction of a collective European cultural identity was not. A European culture that did not exist, as manifested in two decades of failed cultural and television policies, was easily mobilized as a plausible construct in "defending" against the "outside" world (Theiler 1999a).

The first concrete manifestation of this European policy was the MEDIA programme. After years of tortuous negotiations this program started in 1986. It sought to enhance circulation of national audiovisual programs among member states, assisted by the Community with loans for low-budget films for European-wide distribution, joint audiovisual production among producers in small geographic or linguistic markets, and a

scheme to refine translation and dubbing techniques appropriately called BABEL (Broadcasting Across the Barriers of European Languages). The funding of these initiatives amounted to no more than 0.13 ECU per EU citizen in the early 1990s (Theiler 1999a). The program hoped to increase the 20 percent figure of European films shown outside of the country of origin (Bertlein 1989). With the exception of modest funds supporting coproduction, all EU policies aimed at increasing circulation of cultural products across national borders. Europeanization had ceased to mean denationalization of content, that is, the creation of new symbols of collective identity. What mattered was market availability for audiovisual producers rather than transformation in product content (Theiler 1999a).

The Treaty of Maastricht gave the EU for the first time a weak mandate in the area of cultural policy. Yet despite new directives that the EU Commission adopted for satellite transmission in August 1995 and for cable in September 1996 developments in the 1990s did not mark a new era in audio-visual policy. Even though the number and range of activities and financial outlays of the EU increased in the area of special events, literature promotion, the preservation of European heritage, the promotion of exchanges in new cultural networks, and in the production and distribution of "high culture" movies, many legal restrictions and qualifications remain, including the veto power that all member states retain in this politically sensitive area.

Outside of the EU the bi-national Franco-German *Arte* channel started broadcasting in May 1992 "high culture" programs with French and German soundtracks or subtitles. Although well- funded, Patrick Démerin (2002) points to the many shortcomings of this unique experiment that are reflected in a market share of only 3 percent in France and 0.7 percent in Germany. Since 1993 a consortium of mostly European public broadcasters, and Egypt, is transmitting news and current events programs. In avoiding the failed experiment of *Europa TV* it uses national, not "denationalized" news casts with a multilingual soundtrack; it disperses national news throughout Europe rather than producing non-national audiovisual content. The Commission often subsidizes Euronews by running informational programs that combine advice for citizens with self-promotion. Despite the EU's efforts in the mid-1990s 94 per cent of European television consumption was accounted for by viewers watching domestic channels with primarily domestic rather than European program scheduling (Theiler 1999a). With such a fragmented European market, EU policy continued to seek to strengthen the transnational circulation of cultural goods, services and workers, including films and television programs

In short, all attempts of creating a pan-European television station with non-national, European programming have failed. Viewers did not like European programs. And national governments were unwilling to secure Community-wide distribution of its signals and adequate financial support (Theiler 1999a). Only when the Commission learned how to frame the issue in economic terms were national governments interested in ceding some ground. In the 1990s the EU thus has sought to Europeanize audiovisual production rather than consumption. The European Parliament and the Commission have subsidized multinational co-productions in the hope of moving to a partial denationalization of content over time. Due to a lack of support by many member states this policy has also failed. Instead Community policy was reduced to boosting domestic output and to subsidize circulation of audio-visual material throughout the Community.

In this sense the EU's audio-visual policy resembled cultural policy more generally: it facilitated the "horizontal" flow of products and information without having an effect on the "vertical" dimension of content that could create a different collective identity. Put differently, because European states guard their cultural sovereignty jealously against initiatives from Brussels, but not Hollywood, in cultural terms Europe is "plurinational" rather than "non-national."

With the end of the Cold War, the salience of cultural conflicts in world politics has increased sharply. Differing attitudes toward globalization, genetically modified food, immigrants, religious belief systems and minority rights are now often outranking in importance issues of troop deployments, missile gaps and defense budgets (Stille 2000/01). Distinctive of Japan's foreign cultural relations is a dynamic spread of the attractive products of its profitable mass culture industries in Asian-Pacific markets. Germany's mass culture industries are conspicuous by their absence, both in Germany and in Europe. Yet in their own way, German media conglomerates, such as Bertelsmann, have enjoyed great success in world markets. The cultural power of Japan and Germany is thus reflected in product and media markets. Neither Japan and Asia nor Germany and Europe are any longer defined by a distinctive cultural message. For states and regions that, only half a century ago, chose to oppose an expansive Western liberalism with an exclusive cultural nationalism, the triumph of the medium over the message signals an astounding change. For Germany it has ended the false opposition between German "culture" and Western "civilization," and for Japan and Asia it has prepared the ground for "odorless cosmopolitanism."

5. Identity Capitalism in Asian Markets and Law and Politics in the European Polity

Markets and law are the two key institutions around which Asian and European regionalism is organized. In Asia regionalism is shaped by the powerful impact of "identity capitalism" in markets that are typically organized along national lines in the case of Japanese networks and along ethnic ones in the case of the overseas Chinese. In Europe law and judicial institutions are embedded in a variety of political institutions that are linking the European polity at different levels.

Japanese and Chinese Networks in Asian Markets. Asian regionalism is institutionalized in markets in which national, Japanese and ethnic, overseas Chinese identities matter greatly. In the view of Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura the benefits of cultural affinities and old familial and business ties in overcoming problems of trust and reliability offer only fleeting advantage to a Chinese mode of organizing that is inherently inferior to Japanese production alliances. In their view Chinese entrepreneurs adhere to a "strategy of turning quick profits, rather than investing for the long run" (Hatch and Yamamura 1996). Chinese networks cultivate rent-seeking, Japanese ones dynamic technological efficiency. The architecture of the Japan-centered Asian regionalism is hierarchical. Japan controls the flow of aid and technologies and provides producers in other countries with capital and intermediate inputs. South Korea and Taiwan, though closing the development gap quickly, specialize in somewhat less sophisticated goods and remain dependent on Japanese imports of key technologies and intermediate products. Thus, they have taken their place between Japan and the NIE's in Southeast

Asia, which currently provide raw materials and markets and are upgrading industrial platforms for assembly and increasingly indigenous production (Hui 1995).

The contrast between Japanese and Chinese business networks is evident in the case of Thailand. Using careful field research, Mitchell Sedgwick (Sedgwick 1994), for one, concluded that "Japanese multinationals in Thailand have reproduced an atomization of labor and strong centralization of decision-making authority – the 'Fordism' – that they managed to avoid in post-war Japan . . . Beyond internal plant dynamics, however, the strict centralization is also reflected in the position of subsidiaries vis-à-vis headquarters. Subsidiaries in Thailand are part of a tightly controlled and rigorously hierarchical organizational structure extending down from Japan." Thailand's Chinese-dominated business community has taken different forms over time, but in the last three decades the younger Chinese entrepreneurs have responded to the internationalization of the Thai economy by running their businesses along traditional Chinese lines and maintaining close contacts with the Chinese business communities in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and China. Rapid corporate growth resulted from the horizontal and open networks of the Overseas Chinese, rather than vertical and closed ones, which are typical of Japan (Hamilton and Walters 1995).

Both the Japanese and Chinese variants of Asian regionalism are essentially defined in market terms (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997a), but the historical sources and characters of those markets differ greatly. Japanese capitalism flowered between 1870 and 1930 in an era of state-building, Chinese capitalism, developing at the same time, bears the marks of state-collapse (Hamilton 1996). The population of overseas Japanese has been dwarfed by the Chinese diaspora since the mid-19th century, and Chinese business networks are more extensive and have deeper historical roots than their Japanese counterparts. Japanese officials have built up Japanese networks in full awareness of the severe limitations that Japanese firms face in confronting Chinese merchants in Asia (Hamashita 1988); (Hamashita 1997); (Curtin 1984); (Skinner 1979). Different historical origins thus have shaped the characters of China's and Japan's economic extensions into Asia. In the words of Joel Kotkin, "in contrast to the exceedingly close ties between the Japanese *salarimen* abroad and their home islands, the Chinese global network posses no fixed national point of origin, no central 'brain'" (1993).

This general pattern is evident in specific industrial sectors, such as electronics (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997a). Japanese networks of firms rely substantially on known Japanese suppliers with comparable technical capacities. Overseas Chinese firms work through networks that draw on the increasingly high technical specialization of small and medium-sized firms scattered throughout Asia. Japanese networks are closed, Japan-centered, and long-term. Chinese networks are open, flexible and disposable (Borrus 1994).

Thus, Asian regionalism is built on organizational characteristics that differ greatly along dimensions that set vertical Japanese firm networks apart from horizontal Chinese ones (Hamilton, Orrú, and Biggart 1987); (Hamilton and Feenstra 1997). In vertical organizations groups are controlled by shareholding ownership, while horizontal networks favor family ownership and partnerships. Within a group, vertical networks control through cross-shareholding and mutual domination; horizontal ones through multiple positions held by core personnel. Vertical systems organize between group

networks with cross-shareholding; horizontal ones favor loans and joint ventures by individuals and firms. In the former, subcontract relations are structured or semiformal; in the latter, they are informal and highly flexible. And growth patterns are differentiated by bank-financing in vertical systems and informal financing and reinvestment in horizontal ones (Orrú, Hamilton, and Suzuki 1997).

Japanese and Chinese patterns of organization are in some ways also complementary. The new crop of Chinese tycoons in Southeast Asia at times cooperates with Japanese business, for example, in the Siam Motor Group in Thailand, the Astra Company and Rodamas Group in Indonesia, the Yuchenco Group in the Philippines, and the Kuok Brothers in Malaysia (Hui 1995). In 1974 of 138 joint ventures between Japanese and Indonesian firms, 70 percent of the Indonesian partners were local Chinese (Hui 1995); (Brick 1992). Japanese firms find it very difficult to work without Chinese middle men.

In sum, while Asian regionalism is defined in market terms, Asian markets do not consist of a series of unconnected and atomized individual transactions. At the regional level market transactions typically follow along ethnic Chinese or national Japanese lines. Both types of business network avoid formal institutionalization (Gambe 1997); (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997a); (Deng 1997). Japanese *keiretsu* structures and Chinese family firms bring about economic integration without political links. In the 1990s regionalism and regionalization in Asia is open to developments in the global economy, its economic form is network-like, and its political shape is multicephalic.

Law and Politics in a European Polity. Compared to Asia European regionalism is institutionally very differently defined. This is mostly due to the EU. The values of liberal democracy define the membership rules of the EU. The rule of law, private property in a market economy, the rights of democratic participation, and respect for minority rights and social pluralism all derive from liberal human rights which are central to the EU. They are embedded in a system of multilateral arrangements of states committed to a peaceful resolution of all conflicts. Since 1957 these values have been cast in legal language and are specified in various treaties that European governments have signed and ratified. They have been restated succinctly by the European Council in its 1993 Copenhagen meeting (Schimmelfennig 2001).

With the passing of time regional integration in Europe changed from a system of bargaining between governments to a polity in which, among others, governments also bargain (Moravcsik 1998); (Milward 2000); (Weiler 1991); (Weiler 1994); (Weiler 1995); (Weiler 1981). Governance in Europe occurs at multiple levels that link subnational, national and European institutions (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996); (Héritier et al. 1996); (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996); (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998); (Héritier 1999); (Hooghe and Marks 2001); (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001). Groups, parties and government bureaucracies are drawn through the policy process into a polity that is acquiring legitimacy while remaining contested (Banchoff and Smith 1999). The formal institutions – the Council of the EU, formerly the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice – are hybrids that share powers with national governments and with each other (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991); (Sbragia 1992); (Anderson 1995); (Wallace and Wallace 2000); (Colchester and Buchan 1992). While the emergence of a wide range of institutions at the

European level is noteworthy, in comparison to Asia, the truly distinctive feature of European integration is a far-reaching process of legal integration.

The evolution of European law is marked by the constitutionalization of the EC Treaties by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national courts. This process combined institution-building with legal interpretation. The term constitutionalization describes the process by which a set of EC treaties evolved "from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign states, into a vertically-integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and obligation on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within EC territory" (Stone Sweet 1998a). Constitutionalization results both from the ECJ's judicial activism and an incessant judicial dialogue between the ECJ and national courts.

The process of constitutionalization has occurred in two waves (Stone Sweet 1998a). In the period 1962-79 the ECJ succeeded in securing both the principles of the supremacy of European over national law and its direct effect on all legal subjects in the EC. In the second wave (1983-90) the process of legal integration gave national judges enhanced means for guaranteeing the effective application of EC law. In 1983 the ECJ established the principle of indirect effect. It compels national judges to interpret existing national law to be in conformity with EC law. The ECJ extended the principle of indirect effect further in a 1992 ruling. In situations when directives that have not been transposed or have been transposed incorrectly national judges must interpret national law to be in conformity with European law. "The doctrine empowers national judges to rewrite national legislation – an exercise called 'principled construction' – in order to render EC law applicable in the absence of implementing measures" (Stone Sweet 1998a). And in 1990, a high point in Europe's legal integration, the ECJ established the doctrine of government liability. Under this doctrine a national court can hold a Member State liable for the damage it may have caused by not having properly implemented or applied an EU directive. The ECJ has pushed the legal integration process much further than the member states contemplated on their own, and also much further than the process of either Europe's economic or political integration (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998b); (Mattli and Slaughter 1998).

Legal and political integration result from institutionally linked decision streams of a variety of actors including litigants, lawyers and judges. The process by which national courts have accepted the supremacy and the direct effect of European law is highly variable and path-dependent. Rather than looking at legal developments at different levels, a former judge on the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the 1980s, Thijmen Koopmans (1991) argues that it is "more rewarding, intellectually, and also more interesting, to look at it as one global process: that of the progressive construction of one many-sided legal edifice."

The competition among national courts and between courts and other political actors promotes Europe's legal integration. Between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s in particular the ECJ has attempted to strengthen the decentralized system of enforcing European law. This has created the conditions in which lower and higher national courts compete in the use they make of European law. "It is the difference in lower and higher court interests which provides a motor for legal integration to proceed" (Alter 1998a). Lower courts tend to use European law to get the legal outcomes they want. Higher courts tend to restrain instead the expansion of European into national legal orders. In the

competition between lower and higher courts, Karen Alter [(1998a); (1996)] and Alec Stone Sweet [(2000); (1998a)] show, lower courts have moved higher courts to a position where the latter must accept the supremacy and direct effects of European law. Legal integration, however, is not a one-way street as the judicial process in different states can also lead to a retardation of legal integration. In two famous decisions in 1974 (Solange I) and 1993 (Maastricht) the German Constitutional Court has put serious constitutional constraints on the process of European legal integration (Alter 1998b); (Mattli and Slaughter 1998).

Legal integration occurs also through dialogue. "The construction of a constitutional, 'rule of law' Community," writes Alec Stone Sweet (1998a), "has been a participatory process, a set of constitutional dialogues between supra-national and national judges." That dialogue has two parts, the creation of new doctrine, such as the primacy and direct effects of EU law, and the acceptance of this new jurisprudence by national courts and national politicians. The ECJ has created this jurisprudence typically in cases that national courts brought before it. And even though all national judiciaries insist on a national constitutional basis for the supremacy of European law, the fact of the matter is that national courts now apply the decisions of the ECJ even when national politicians and administrators object (Alter 1998a); (Witte 1998); (Stone Sweet 1998a). The constitutionalization of the EC treaties and the process of legal integration thus rests crucially on how national courts interpret, apply, and challenge European law and how national reception of European law influences subsequent decisions of the ECJ. At the intersection of law and politics, Europe's legal integration is a process in which judges and other political actors navigate within the institutional order of a European polity.

The constitutionalization of the EC Treaty and the political competition among courts suggest the image of politics under law rather than law contingent on politics (Armstrong 1998). An early student of European law, Stuart Scheingold concluded in 1971 that "a rather flexible process of litigation is taking shape within a consensual framework of modified national choice" (p. 14) This was a prescient summary of the evolution of the Europeanization of law. Instead of focusing attention on the advantages or disadvantages of intergovernmentalism or supranationalism the Europeanization of law underlines instead the dynamics of legal integration in a multi-tiered European polity that combines traditional, hierarchical and centralized elements of state power with non-traditional, non-hierarchical and plural systems of governance.

The European polity suffers from decisional inefficiencies and, to some extent from a lack of legitimacy. They are rooted in a growing gap between "negative" and "positive" integration, between far-reaching, legally mandated eliminations of economic and social borders on the one hand and, at best, cautious and uneven advances in regulating merging European markets (Scharpf 1999). But the constitutionalization of the European treaty system, not the recurrent debate about a European constitution, has given the European polity its most distinctive trait. In an important paper Joseph Weiler (2001, p. 244) calls this the principle of constitutional tolerance. Not unlike the consociational systems that once characterized some of the small European democracies, distinct European states are committed to coming together in an ever closer union, connected through a growing number of ties that invite more than that they oblige, to submit national power to the decisions of a political community in which other states, not a

democratic public, exercise authority. "European federalism is constructed with a top-to-bottom hierarchy of norms, but with a bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority and real power" (Weiler 2001, p. 240).

6. A Very Distant World: Bloc Regionalism in the 1930s

The openness of contemporary regionalism is due to the joint impact of global and international factors. Europe's and Asia's financial crises of the 1990s illustrate how globalization in financial markets triggers internationalization processes. Developments in global market and the actions of states jointly strengthen open regionalism.

Japan's and Germany's cultural diplomacy and Europe's and Asia's popular culture markets point to the same conclusion. They confirm that in empirical domains favored by internationalization theory (cultural diplomacy) and globalization theory (popular culture) the pressures for openness are very strong. The two case studies, furthermore, confirm also that Asia's and Europe's open regionalism have different institutional structures revealed by dynamic market developments in Asia and European efforts to shape popular culture politically. Distinctive of Japan's and Asia's foreign cultural relations is the dynamic spread of its profitable mass culture industries in Asian-Pacific markets. By comparison Germany's mass culture industries are weak both in Germany and in Europe. Seeking to reduce Europe's dependence on U.S. imports, the EU has attempted, half-heartedly and largely without success, to intervene in global culture markets. Put briefly, the combined effects of globalization and internationalization and the dynamics of contemporary regionalism create a world of regions that are similar in their openness and dissimilar in their institutional structures and practices. These findings point to a regionally specific form of politics and policy that differs from the expectations of two widely-held views: internationalization and national differences and globalization and global convergence.

A brief glance back at the cultural policies and processes of the 1930s underlines the distance that separates the open regionalism of contemporary world politics from the bloc regionalism of the 1930s. Japan and Germany offer ready examples illustrating this difference. Then the content of Japan's identity was couched in the language of national will to be imposed on others abroad rather than of national consciousness to be experienced by the self at home. Cultural diplomacy offered an avenue of projecting politically inherently superior Japanese values. In the early 20th century Japanese Liberals were inspired by the vision of Japan as the one modern nation-state that could integrate the contrasting cultures of Occident and Orient (Shibasaki 1999b, pp. 32-63, 212-30); (T. Shiraishi 1993). In this view Japan was a unique intermediary, both equal in its relation with Western states and superior in its relation with other Asian states. Japanese nationalists subscribed to a similar though more extreme view. They were convinced that Japan was inherently superior to all other states. It was Japan's task to change from a society primarily importing culture from the West to one primarily exporting culture to Asia. Despite their many differences, what united both conceptions was the idea of Japan's uniqueness. Expressing different admixtures of liberal and nationalist elements, during the interwar period Japan's foreign cultural relations was informed by this underlying set of ideas (Shibasaki 1999a, pp. 39-40); (Shibasaki 1999b, pp. 32-62, 212-30); (Takahasi 1998). Liberals were promoting Japan's special cultural mission through

small intellectual exchange programs championed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused instead on cultural projects in China that tended to express the view that Japan was to lead, China to follow.

In the 1930s Japan was on a "cultural mission" to secure its rightful position in an international order dominated by the West. The annexation of Manchuria was justified as an Asian alternative to the proven inadequacies of Western liberalism. The Japanese military hoped to prove that the East's harmonious Asianism was superior to the West's fractious liberalism. As a laboratory for Japan's plans for its wider Asian empire, Manchuria was to consolidate Japan's leading position in East Asia (Iriye 1994, pp. 75-83); (Iriye 1997, pp. 119-25). The Society for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, KBS) expressed this dual impulse in Japanese policy. It was created in 1934 in order to help improve the fraying of relations, especially with the U.S., and deal on the basis of equality with other sovereign states (Tanami 1994, p. 1). The KBS became also an important vehicle for conducting Japan's cultural diplomacy in China (Shibasaki 1999b, pp. 91-188); (Takahasi 1998). Before 1937 the KBS expressed the view, shared by both liberals and nationalists, that Japan's internationalism was to be strengthened and that Japan was superior to its Asian neighbors. By 1940 the KBS converted a cultural diplomacy that insisted on Japan's uniqueness into an instrument of propaganda that glorified Japan's war of aggression in China and Southeast Asia (Hirano 1988, pp. 147-8); (Watanabe 1999); (Interview No.1, Tokyo, March 13, 2001). Japan's "new internationalism" differed from the one espoused by the Western status-quo countries. It sought to unite several countries sharing, in the words of legal scholar Tamura Tokuji, "a new Asian culture" (Iriye 1994, p. 83). Between the late 1930s and the end of the Pacific War the Japanese media characterized the war in terms of cultural survival (Iriye 1997, pp. 132-4). It was waged not only on behalf of Japan but of a billion Asians. In the language of one 1943 radio broadcast "Our culture is that which teaches our way of happiness to every member of the Greater East Asia Sphere . . . Our mission in this war is to teach the Imperial way. This war will expel the occidental concept of culture" (McMurry and Lee 1947, p. 90). Abroad, Japan's task was greatest in the Philippines which had been influenced by American movies and dance music for so many years that it was not easy "to banish America" and return the Philippine people to its "original oriental ways" (McMurry and Lee 1947, pp. 107-8). In domestic politics the Japanese government discouraged actively any attention to Western culture and art, and, in the interest of strengthening the authentic essence of Japan's unique culture, it blocked the work of indigenous, Westernized forms of art such as opera, orchestras and dance. After the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese government banned the showing of American and British movies, Jazz, and baseball (Shillony 1981, pp. 144-5).

Until the early 1970s the Japanese government relied on the KBS to deal with all aspects of its cultural diplomacy. Thoroughly delegitimated on account of its complicity with Japan's militarist expansion, the KBS apologized after 1945 for the excesses of the late 1930s and 1940s (Shibasaki 1999a); (Shibasaki 1999b, pp. 189-211). It stood, however, firmly by the principles of cultural nationalism that it had pursued vigorously before 1937. After Japan's disastrous defeat in the Pacific War the KBS sought to ensure Japan's cultural survival. For the KBS cultural diplomacy was an international means deployed in the pursuit of a national objective. Specifically, the KBS remained committed to the export of Japanese culture, and to promoting international cultural

exchanges that would spread Japanese and East Asian culture, thus making its own distinct contribution to world culture. Elements of continuity in policy across 1945 thus are more striking than elements of discontinuity. Japan's nationalism as an object of cultural policy and diplomacy was adapted, not replaced.

Since the early 1970s, however, Japan's contemporary cultural diplomacy has changed greatly. While Japanese nationalist sentiments remain strong and exist today in clearly recognizable form, national closure to cultural influences from abroad is no longer public policy and neither is national propaganda. For Japan as for most other industrial states the export and import of cultural values and practices occurs in a world in which national cultures are integral parts of transnational cultural networks (Bélanger 1999). Japan's contemporary cultural relations with other states and societies thus differ greatly from those in the past, especially since the early 1970s. The dynamic spread of Japan's mass culture industries outside of Japan is reinforcing this important shift. Despite its inaccessible language, a combination of exceptional artistic creativity and corporate savvy have made, in the words of Anne Allison (2002, p. 4), the "cuteness of capital and the commodification of intimacy" the hallmarks of Japan's cool cultural power.

In the case of Germany the break of 1945 has been much sharper than in Japan. The history of Germany's cultural diplomacy dates back to the late 19th century and is grounded in a political tradition that, in the absence of political unity before 1871, prized culture as a constitutive aspect of German identity. Initially Germany's cultural diplomacy focused on supporting German schools operating abroad (McMurry and Lee 1947, pp. 39-47); (Düwell 1976); (Düwell 1981). In the late years of the Second Empire, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg embraced the potential political importance and usefulness of an active cultural diplomacy in a memorandum which he drafted for use inside the government bureaucracy while, at the same time, speaking in public against advisability of the government expanding its reach into this policy arena (Kloosterhuis 1981, pp. 10-3). This ambivalent reaction was characteristic of the Empire's general political strategy that vacillated between the contradictory pulls of military and commercial expansion. After the diplomatic fiascos of the two Morocco crises of 1905/06 and 1911 the liberal imperialist group that had organized itself around Friedrich Naumann's vision pushed for strengthening Germany's international position through an energetic cultural offensive rather than a risky military grasp for world power. To this end about 50 "foreign associations" were founded between 1912 and 1914. A central task of these associations was to collect from private sponsors funds in order to strengthen Germany's cultural expansion abroad (Kloosterhuis 1981, p. 16). Imperialism and cultural diplomacy thus entered a symbiotic relationship.

After World War I, the German government made foreign cultural diplomacy an institutionalized part of the Foreign Office and an integral part of the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic. Left without traditional military instruments of statecraft, the political consensus at the time favored the development of new cultural ones (Düwell 1976); (Düwell 1981). Building on the institutional innovations of the Weimar Republic, after 1933 Nazi Germany dramatically changed the instruments of cultural diplomacy for the purpose of political propaganda, in particular by intensifying contacts with ethnic Germans living abroad (McMurry and Lee 1947, pp. 63-77). German associations and cultural clubs often became strong supporters of Germany's expansionist goals. For Josef Goebbels, a great admirer of Hollywood, the war against the United States was also a

cultural one, in contrast to Britain and France which as European powers were able to generate authentic, if flawed, cultural products. The aesthetic appeal of fascism, most famously in the Nuremberg rallies of the Nazi party and the films of Leni Riefenstahl, extended well beyond the borders of Nazi Germany. Staffed by French and francophone volunteers, the SS division "Charlemagne" was among the last troops defending Hitler's Chancellery in the final days of the war, fired up by anti-Communist feelings against Asiatic bolshevism, for sure, but also by the deeply-engrained anti-Americanism of the French Right (Lepenies 1999a, p. 8).

Japan's and Germany's cultural diplomacy and cultural politics in the 1930s and 1940s was symptomatic of Asia's and Europe's bloc regionalism more generally (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997b, pp. 373-8). The political economy and ideology of the Co-Prosperity Sphere were the culmination of Japan's historical experiences with building a regional empire after the mid-1890s. The occupation and annexation of Taiwan, Korea and Manchuko encouraged the Japanese government to create new combinations of industry, labor and raw materials, and to invest in infrastructure, communications, transportation and hydro-electric power. This geographically contiguous empire laid the foundation to Japan's second wave of industrialization in the 1930s. The addition of the Southeast Asian periphery to a semi-periphery consisting of Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuko would generate badly-needed raw materials, such as oil, rubber and rice to support an autarchic regional empire that could wage total war. That was the plan.

From the start, Japan's attempt to make this imperial vision a reality was ill-fated. When the Japanese militarists seized power in the 1930s Hideki Tojo relied on improvisation. Japan's annexation of Manchuko was defeated by China's strong nationalist opposition. The "Co-Prosperity sphere" and the ideology of "Asia for Asians" were constructs created to address the mess Japan confronted in China and in Southeast Asia. Although Japan pacified Manchuko, its puppet regime in Nanking never enjoyed any legitimacy. And Japanese terror did not succeed in breaking Chinese resistance. In Southeast Asia Japanese rule was less brutal than in China. It granted nominal independence to Burma and the Philippines; and the promise of full independence for Indonesia was cut short only by Japanese surrender in 1945. Yet whatever legitimacy Japan may have enjoyed initially was lost by rampant corruption, the forceful conscription of labor into the war effort and of women into sexual slavery, and the forced delivery of rice and other raw materials. Japan's vision and unsuccessful implementation of an autarchic "bloc" regionalism in the 1930s has nothing in common with the open regionalism that characterizes contemporary Asia.

The same conclusion holds even more true for Germany's search for "living space" in the 1930s, reinforced by a Nazi doctrine of racial purity that was to create a New Order in Europe. Hitler's megalomaniac vision sought to transform all political boundaries in Europe. Nazi Germany was a movement regime to accomplish radical aims and thus to supplant a liberal imperialism deemed both inferior and inauthentic. Germany's racial purification was to serve the purpose of dominating all of Europe, at the cost of incarceration, slave labor, and eventual mass murder of all opponents, social deviants, ethnic minorities and Jews. This revolutionary objective was matched by a strategy of unlimited aggression. Hitler hoped for British and American acquiescence in a recalibration of the European balance of power, while he waged war on France and the

Soviet Union over primacy in Europe. That hope was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose and the power of the Anglo-American world imperium.

The coherence of Hitler's ideological vision required adjustment to geographical context. In Eastern Europe the New Order was to be a destructive colonization process: wars of ethnic cleansing; vast population resettlements; outright annexation; the creation of apartheid regimes; a rule of terror through the close cooperation of different police forces, the Nazi party, and the courts; and the Holocaust. In Western Europe the New Order rested on a less murderous rule. Building on Eric Ludendorff's conception, the Nazis embraced the notion that Germany was placed at the center of an autarchic European bloc, extremely protectionist in its external orientation and strictly hierarchical in its internal organization. The importance of Germany's cartellized industries, its uncompetitive agricultural sector, and its exclusionary cultural practices all worked in the 1930s in the direction of creating a distinct trading and currency bloc in the interest of the most efficient extraction of the maximum production capacities for its war effort. In the 1940s the Nazis adjusted this bloc under wartime conditions to a credit and balance of payments structure that linked Germany to Northern and Western Europe.

Open regionalism is pervasive in world politics. Viewed against the background of this history, today's talk of "bloc" regionalism is misplaced. Instead David Henderson (1994, p. 184) is correct in observing that "the world economy today is not divided into a number of geographically distinct but otherwise similar 'blocs'." Helen Milner (1994, p. 109) concurs when she concludes that "in many cases the data do not support the idea of growing blocs." Contemporary regionalism has nothing in common with the regionalism of the 1930s. Then the conservative German theorist of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, had predicted that the French and British empires would be amalgamated into a world of three regional blocs dominated by the U.S. in North and South America, by Germany in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and by Japan in Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific islands. With a hierarchical division of international labor within each of these three blocs, there would be less need for inter-bloc trade and investment (O'Loughlin and Anselin 1996, p. 134). The snap shots of the 1930s underline the difference between now and then. Japan and Germany fell hostage to the allure of constructing regional empires that they would rule directly. Authoritarianism, racism and militarism all foreclosed in the 1930s the option, opened up after 1945, of exploring the efficacy of indirect rule by trading states serving liberal ends. Total defeat in war was the precondition for Japan's and Germany's belated conversion to the Anglo-American way of international rule and open regionalism.

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