

Styrelsen för 
PSYKOLOGISKT FÖRSVAR

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Marjan Malešič
MEDDELANDE 157

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SPFs FÖRORD

Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar (SPF) har ägnat ett betydande forskningsintresse åt psykologisk krigföring och propaganda samt åt mediernas och nyhetsrapporteringens roll vid konflikter. Att nyhetsmedierna har betydelse som instrument för opinionspåverkan är oomtvistat. Försök att styra och forma och ibland även manipulera opinioner, både nationella och internationella, blir närmast något självklart för den stats- och krigsledning som har makt och kontroll över medierna. Skilda befolkningsgrupper i ett samhälle med olika intressen av etnisk, kulturell, religiös, politisk eller annan karaktär kan också ha intresse av att på olika sätt påverka människors tankar och sinnen.

I studien *The Role of Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict* (SPF rapport nr 164) behandlades mediernas roll i konflikten mellan Kroatien och Serbien från augusti 1991 till januari 1992. Studien genomfördes av ett forskarteam vid universitetet i Ljubljana, Slovenien, under ledning av dr Marjan Malešič. Det är främst det defensiva elementet i skeendet – det psykologiska försvaret – som är föremål för analys i den studien. I projektet *Propaganda in War* (SPF rapport nr 174), genomfört av samma forskarteam, är det i stället den offensiva psykologiska krigföringen under kriget i Bosnien-Hercegovina som behandlas. I studien analyseras medieinnehållet i kroatiska och serbiska nyhetsmedier under perioden januari till april 1993.

Föreliggande studie gäller inte tillstånd av krig utan avser förhållanden under pågående fredsarbete i Bosnien. Studien har initierats mot bakgrund av svenska internationella fredsfrämjande åtaganden där SPF har funnit det angeläget att bidra till och bredda kunskaperna om miljöer – inte minst informationsmässiga – i vilka svenska militära och civila enheter kan komma att verka. SPF kan på så sätt utifrån sitt funktionsansvar bidra till det internationella fredsarbetet genom att öka kunskapen och kompetensen rörande internationella förhållanden och bidra till en demokratisk utveckling i samhällsstörda länder eller regioner.

Studien tillhandahåller kunskaper rörande dels mediekonsumtionen, synen på medierna och medieinnehållet i en krigshärjad region, Doboj i norra Bosnien, med skilda etniska befolkningsgrupper, dels befolkningens inställning till de fredsbevarande FN-insatserna där. Resultaten i studien torde kunna användas i den pågående demokratiseringsprocessen av lokala nyhetsmedier till stöd för det fredsbevarande arbete som bedrivs i Bosnien-Hercegovina.

Även denna studie har på ett förtjänstfullt sätt letts av dr Marjan Malešič. Jag vill tacka honom och hans kollegor i Ljubljana och Sarajevo. När det gäl-

ler initiativ till och uppläggning av studien har major Anders Johansson, huvudlärare i medie- och kommunikationsvetenskap vid Försvarshögskolan och tidigare pressofficer vid NORDPOL-Brigaden i Doboj och docent Roland Nordlund, tidigare vid SPF, gjort aktningsvärda insatser. Ett tack också till min kollega vid SPF, dr Martin Bennulf. Den språkliga granskningen av texten har Judith Rinker svarat för.

Göran Stütz
Forskningschef, SPF

PREFACE

The National Board of Psychological Defence (SPF) in Sweden has taken a considerable research interest in psychological warfare and propaganda as well as in the role of the media and news reporting during conflicts. The notion that the news media constitute an important instrument for shaping public opinion is undisputed. Attempting to control, form and sometimes even manipulate opinions, both national and international, becomes almost a matter of course for a government and military command wielding power and control over the media. Different sections of the population within a society – with different ethnic, cultural, religious, political and other interests – can also have various reasons for wishing to influence people's feelings and opinions.

The study, *The Role of Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict* (SPF report no. 164), deals with the role of the media in the conflict between Croatia and Serbia during the period August 1991 to January 1992. The study was conducted by Dr. Marjan Malešič and his research team at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. The primary focus of this analysis is on the defensive element of the course of events, i.e., on psychological defence. Another study, *Propaganda in War* (SPF report no. 174), conducted by the same research team dealt instead with the offensive psychological warfare carried on during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This study analysed media content found in the Croatian and Serbian news media during the period January to April 1993.

The present study is not concerned with the state of war but instead with the circumstances during the then ongoing peace work in Bosnia. The study was initiated in light of the international Swedish peace-promoting commitments there. SPF has found it important to contribute to and spread knowledge on environments – not least informational – in which Swedish military and civilian units could be stationed to work. In this way, SPF can, based on its functional responsibility, contribute to international peace work by increasing knowledge and competence concerning international circumstances as well as facilitate democratic development in socially disturbed countries and regions.

The study provides knowledge concerning media consumption, views on media and the content of media in a war-torn region (Doboj in northern Bosnia) containing various ethnic groups, on the one hand, and concerning the population's attitudes towards UN peace-keeping efforts there, on the other. The results of this study might be useful in the ongoing process of democratisation of local news media, thus supporting the peace-keeping work being conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This study, as well, has been commendably led by Dr. Marjan Malešič. I

wish to thank him and his colleagues in Ljubljana and Sarajevo. Considerable efforts in initiating and setting up the study have also been made by Major Anders Johansson, main lecturer in media and communication sciences at the Swedish National Defence College and previously information officer for the NORDPOL Brigade in Doboj, as well as by Associate Professor Roland Nordlund, previously at SPF. I also wish to thank my colleague at SPF, Dr. Martin Bennulf. Judith Rinker is responsible for proof-reading the text.

Göran Stütz
Director of research, SPF

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The research project *Peace Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public in Former Yugoslavia* is third in the series produced for the Swedish government's National Board of Psychological Defence by the Defence Research Centre of the University of Ljubljana's Institute of Social Sciences. The first project, *The Role of Mass Media, in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict* focused on the activities of the mass media in Croatia and Serbia during the early phases of the war in Croatia (1991-2). The second project, *Propaganda in War*, also focused on Serbian and Croatian mass media, but the analysis dealt with the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of 1993; the main area of interest was propaganda disseminated via the media as one of the dimensions of psychological warfare. The data and information obtained from these projects made it possible to make an additional analysis of the attitude expressed in mass media toward international community actors involved in "crisis management" on the territory of the former Yugoslavia at this time. In addition, the present author participated in the research project *The Analysis of Propaganda on RTS, HTV and BHT*. This dealt with the attitude in Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Croatian and Serbian television toward the Dayton Peace Agreement signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris, which brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The author was able to highlight the results on the attitude of mass media toward the endeavour of the international community to bring sustainable peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As the title suggests, the subject of the research project *Peace Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public in Former Yugoslavia* was the relationship between international community actors involved in the peace process, key national and local mass media, and the public in the former Yugoslavia, with a clear emphasis on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The peaceful political solution to the problems of nationalism, division and hostility among nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina was only possible through the collaboration of external and internal factors. National and local mass media, as an internal factor, play an important societal role in this peace process and in framing domestic attitudes toward the relevant international community projects and actors. The main assumption of the research project could be interpreted as the expectation that, with its influence on popular opinion, the mass media could play a crucial role in creating the conditions for sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, equally, the uncooperative behaviour of mass media could be a serious impediment to the peace process.

Hence, in our research project, we briefly explore the role of international actors in the peace process on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and introduce the attitude of mass media toward the peace operations and their

protagonists. Then we depict the media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally, we present the attitude of the public toward the mass media on the one hand, and toward the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other.

We used several approaches to explore the topic. First, we applied a descriptive method to depict the role of the international community in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia: how international community actors (mis)understood the conflicts there, what political and military actions were taken by the international community, what were the impediments to the effectiveness of the mission (especially in the early stages of the conflicts), and the attitude of major international community actors toward the crisis in general and the peace efforts in particular. We also made an additional analysis of information and data related to the role of mass media in the former Yugoslavia toward the international community, obtained by the aforementioned research projects. The analysis displayed the attitude of Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian electronic and print media toward international community actors involved in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, especially toward UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR.

We then analysed the post-Dayton media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina by using statistical data, content analyses of messages conveyed to the public and descriptions of various electronic and print media. Finally, we conducted a public opinion survey to obtain the attitude of Bosnians toward the mass media. We explored the sources of information deemed most valuable by the respondents, popular interest in different topics, the credibility of mass media, and the favoured electronic and print media. The survey also produced data on public attitudes toward the ongoing peacekeeping operation. We were most interested in the amount and quality of information on peacekeeping and public perceptions of SFOR's role, mission and achievements.

The study of mass media activities in former Yugoslavia related to the peace support operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to be of great importance, due to the fact that the effort of the international community to resolve the conflict and to make possible a normal life in the country depends to a great extent on the mass media support and, consequently, public acceptance and approval of the peace support effort. The effectiveness of the peace mission in question can not be achieved beyond the expectations and desires of local population; therefore, it is very important that the international community political and military actors find the way to the population, explain their objectives and seek public support. It is obvious that the way to the population is through the mass media of three nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One of the general problems of peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to be the unpleasant surroundings created by local mass media, and consequently, the fact that the international community actors and domestic actors do not communicate in an adequate way; rather, they speak two »different languages«. Perhaps the study can give an answer as to how to avoid such a situation. Previous studies of mass media activities in former Yugoslavia showed that the public was a subject of persistent propaganda, which is why one of the important answers to be found by this study is how to provide the objective information to all ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and prepare them to accept and support the objectives of peace support operations. In this respect, the results of the study could be of a great benefit to the international community and local actors involved in peace effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sweden has a long and impressive peacekeeping tradition, while Slovenia as a young independent state has just entered the endeavours of the international community to bring peace to different turbulent regions and countries. Both countries have forces in the troublesome territory of former Yugoslavia and they should know what kind of environment they send their forces into. This environment is comprised of numerous factors, one being the local mass media. It is important to know how mass media operate on the ground, their attitudes toward the peace support operation, how they influence the public and, consequently, the attitude of the public toward peacekeepers. Soldiers, policemen and civilians go to the post-conflict areas to provide various assistance to the population and to help build a sustainable peace. Their motives are positive and they expect local population to support them, which is not always the case and could produce serious frustration with negative security implications, especially when military and civilian personnel are not prepared for such a situation. Studies like the present one, we hope, can enable this preparedness to be more thorough and effective.

As the author of the report, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my colleagues Ljubica Jelušič, Maja Garb, Vinko Vegič and Igor Kotnik from the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, who have provided substantial support to the research project. I would also like to thank the Mareco Index Bosnia research fellows who conducted the public opinion survey in the Dobož area, to Nerzuk Čurak, University of Sarajevo, and Anders Johansson, the Swedish National Defence College, who were very useful contacts in providing information and data from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Göran Stütz, Director of Research, and Associate Professor Roland Nordlund, who supported the research project and revised the report on behalf of the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE CONFLICTS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

(Mis)understanding the Conflicts

»The post-Cold War euphoria is well and truly over. The 'world community' now faces a fragile and disorderly political landscape with its confidence in ready solutions badly shaken. Nowhere is this more apparent than at the United Nations (UN), where the promise of a new era of 'humane intervention' and 'second-generation multinational operations'¹ has given way to uncertainty, second guessing, and soul searching. Caught between the old order of stable strategic blocs and state sovereignty, and an emergent era of 'global governance', resting on an economic and socio-cultural base which is at once apparently globalizing and fragmenting, policy-makers at state, inter-state, and non-state levels face unprecedented opportunities and challenges. Among the most compelling of these is the set of challenges surrounding the expanded 'peace menu' – including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. More specifically, how is this expanded range of instruments and opportunities to be deployed in a way that avoids becoming a part of the problem and which effectively promotes prevention of and/or lasting resolutions to violent conflicts« (Black & Rolston 1995:3). All these UN

¹ The era of traditional peacekeeping lasted from 1948–89, during which thirteen operations were deployed, while in the next phase from 1989–94 some eighteen operations were deployed (Chopra 1998:4). It should be noted that several operations have been launched since 1994 in the world, too.

related dilemmas **have** profoundly affected and/or expressed themselves during the political and military intervention of the international community in former Yugoslavia from 1992 on.

The international community has significantly influenced the course of events in former Yugoslavia in the last decade, sometimes through action and sometimes through inaction. Holbrooke (1998:21) referred to former Yugoslavia as "the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s", and as representing "a failure of historic dimensions". Why was this the case? According to Holbrooke (*ibid.*), there are five major factors to be taken into account:

1. **The misreading of Balkan history.** Many of the books and articles on Yugoslavia gave the impression that the wars in the beginning of the nineties were inevitable. The most influential of these was Rebecca West's *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (first published in 1941) in which she openly expressed pro-Serb views and held Muslims as racially inferior. The text was very influential among Western readers. More recently, a book by Robert Kaplan (1993), *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, should be mentioned. Kaplan suggested that nothing could be done by outsiders in a region so steeped in ancient hatred. According to Holbrooke, the book had a profound impact on President Clinton and other members of the US administration. This book sometimes served as an excuse

for the reluctance or inability of the major international actors to deal with the problems in the Balkan region.

2. **The end of the Cold War.** Yugoslavia was important to the West during the Cold War because of its anti-Soviet orientation and great strategic importance. But the country fell apart almost unnoticed by the West, when the Cold War was over and Soviet communism was close to its final demise.
3. **The behaviour of Yugoslav leaders themselves.** Nationalism, rather than democratic ideals, was the most important weapon in the struggle against communism.
4. **The inadequate American response to the crisis.** The American Administration was fatigued by dealing simultaneously with the Gulf War and the death throes of the Soviet Union, and the reluctance to intervene in Yugoslavia was exacerbated by the impending presidential election.
5. **The mistaken belief of the Europeans that they could handle their first post-Cold War challenge on their own.** Yugoslavia appeared to be the worst test for the European common security policy, and Europe was not able to act as a unified power.

When discussing the causes of failure of the British policy toward Yugoslavia, James Gow (1996:89) also observed that the "UK assessment of the war in Yugoslavia initially saw it through historical glasses". This assessment had two dimensions. First, the Eastern Question was raised in 1870 when the Turks butchered the Bulgarians and the British opposition leader William Gladstone urged Disraeli's government to help the Bulgarians. The latter resisted, and students of British foreign policy were subsequently taught that his "hands off" policy was and still is correct. Second, the Yugoslav conflict itself was un-

derstood "less in terms of the modern dynamics of disintegration and more in terms of historic animosity". The conflict might be understood as ethnic and historic while the main cause of the war, Serbian nationalism, was neglected and the inter-communal aspect of the war, neighbours fighting each other, was emphasised.

David Owen (1995:12) argued that "had NATO intervened from the air in the autumn of 1991 against the Yugoslav People's Army, it could have moderated the worst excesses of the war". He also raised the question of whether the Europeans in NATO could have acted militarily in 1991 without the US. According to him, the answer is "No"! The Germans were excluded from military participation due to constitutional restrictions and their role in the Balkans in World War II (the same situation applied to Italy). Turkey and Greece were mutually excluded. France and Britain were reluctant to engage their ground forces in a conflict that they judged to be a civil war of tremendous complexity.

According to Day (1995:81-4), there were two general theses at the beginning of the nineties that tried to explain the fighting in former Yugoslavia: first, that the conflict or war represented yet another round of inevitable and immutable ethnic hatred; second, in a macro perspective, that the conflict represented a clash of civilisations that were exclusive and were fighting each other. Day (ibid.) offered an additional explanation of the situation. Writing about the causes of the conflict, he starts with economic factors (lasting economic deterioration), and continues with political ones (no proper political succession after the death of President Tito), and repressive ones (grossly overstuffed police and military forces). Consequently, he is convinced, the international community could practice preventive diplomacy in two areas:

economic (economic assistance based on “the village bank model” rather than at mega projects), and political (stressing the democratic accountability of police forces and the military). For Day, even the hitherto preventive mission in Macedonia could fail if it is not soon supported by the political vision and an economic plan to ensure a robust and sustainable regional economy.

We can see from the selected statements that there was a great deal of misunderstanding of the Yugoslav situation and unproductive searching of causes of the conflicts and, consequently, delayed action of the international community when the conflicts broke out. Misunderstanding of the conflicts, often heralded by a historical perspective, together with national interests, prevented states and international institutions from acting timely and effectively in the former federal state. Also, if the reasons for the conflicts in former Yugoslavia were first economic and political and then military ones, the international community – after halting the armed clashes – should provide a balanced set of opportunities for the target country to recover in economic and political terms.

Political and Military Actions of the International Community

The first concrete attempt to intervene in the conflict in former Yugoslavia occurred in the summer of 1991, during the “mini-war” in Slovenia. After ten days of hostility between Slovenian Territorial Defence forces and the Yugoslav People’s Army, the “troika” of the European Union helped to forge the Brioni Accord of 7 July. Under the Accord, Slovenia was to cease its push for independence for three months and the Yugoslav People’s Army was to withdraw peacefully from Slovenian territory by October (Malešič

1999:263). However, EU diplomacy was unsuccessful in ending the war in Croatia that followed the Slovenian episode in early August. The EU was not alone. The first Resolution of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the war in Croatia was adopted at the end of September. The Resolution supported EU attempts to achieve a cease-fire, allowed UN observers into Croatia, and introduced an arms embargo on the territory of former Yugoslavia. This cease-fire agreement between hostile states at the beginning of 1992 was followed by the Security Council’s decision to establish UNPROFOR.² The force was fully deployed in Croatia in May 1992, and a few months later UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where war had erupted on 5 April 1992.

The deployment of UNPROFOR in Croatia was authorised by UNSC Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992, after the conditions on the ground had stabilised sufficiently to give the confidence that a peacekeeping mission could succeed. Resolution 757, which introduced the imposition of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) because of its involvement in the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was also passed. A blockade of the Adriatic Sea and Danube River was established by Operation Sharp Guard to prevent commercial goods from entering the FRY. UNSC Resolution 761, adopted on 29 June 1992, provided for a multinational deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Resolution 770, passed in August, authorised the use of all necessary measures to facilitate, in co-ordination with the UN, the delivery of relief by humanitarian organisations and agencies, while

² UNPROFOR (1992-5) has been the largest UN peace operation to date, comprising almost 40,000 troops and the second most expensive, with an expenditure of \$1billion (Black & Rolston 1995:42).

Resolution 776, passed in September, carried the concept further by adding a major extension of UNPROFOR's mandate. The latter was enabled to provide protective support for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) convoys throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 9 October, the UNSC adopted yet another Resolution, this time closing Bosnia-Herzegovinian air space to all traffic except UN flights.

However, the situation on the ground deteriorated and only the NATO air campaign against Bosnian Serbs in summer 1995 created the basis for the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995. It comprised the main General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina document and 11 annexes. The main document contains 11 articles that refer to 11 annexes and express the willingness of the parties to the agreement to accept the decisions and agreements written in the annexes. The Peace Agreement recognises Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified and integral state, officially called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and consisting of two equal entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska. The former controlled 51% of the state territory and the latter 49%. The content of the Peace Agreement could be divided into military and civil parts. The military aspects of the Agreement are defined in Annexes 1-A, Agreement on the Military Aspects of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 1-B, Agreement on Regional Stabilisation, while nine annexes deal with civil aspects. There are two commissions to control the realisation of the Peace Agreement: the Joint Military Commission to control the realisation of the military aspects of the Agreement, and the Joint Civilian Commission to control the civil aspects. Implementation Force (IFOR), later renamed Stabilisation Force (SFOR), was authorised to

exercise the military aspects of the Agreement, while the civil part was to be carried out by various organisations, agencies and institutions coordinated by the UN High Representative. The realisation of the civil aspects was related to the realisation of military aspects, hence the two Commissions cooperated and coordinated their activities.

The UN played an important legal role, authorising the use of force to implement the peace agreement. The belligerent parties accepted the peace plan and agreed to the deployment of a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) that was to include NATO forces. If the cease-fire was broken, UNSC Resolution 1031 authorised IFOR to use force.

Effectiveness of the Missions

Michael Pugh (1997:7,9) introduced the terms "mission cringe" and "mission creep" while addressing the problem of efficiency concerning peacekeeping in the new British doctrine, described in two Army Field Manuals, *Wider Peacekeeping* and *Peace Support Operations*. Mission cringe refers to a group of perceived inadequacies that give rise to allegations of doing nothing, avoiding the issue and appeasing bullies. It suggests that there are discrepancies between desirable ends and the means adopted (or not) to achieve them. The problem primarily lies at the level of UN mandates, political will and strategic planning. Mission creep occurs when there is an incremental increase in the tasks assigned to UN forces to the point that they far exceed those for which the forces had planned and equipped (from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, for example).

As in other missions in which peace enforcement units were used, the outcome in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992-4, has been less than

satisfactory precisely because of confusion over the mandates of the forces on the ground. In addition, there was a poorly coordinated military/political interface that prompted the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to question the wisdom of UN involvement in military enforcement activities in general.

MacInnis (1995:73) highlighted some general situations faced by UNPROFOR and which eroded the concept of impartiality that was so crucial to the success of the mission:

1. The incomparability of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. There appears to be a slowly growing realisation of the differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking or enforcement operations, but there are still some scholars who equate these differences to equipment rather than to intention. Peacekeepers' primary tool, and their greatest source of protection, remains *credibility*, and this is based on a combination of professional competence and a perception of impartiality. When peacekeepers lose this, they are no longer credible and become a legitimate target of the belligerent factions. UNPROFOR had a limited mandate during its mission in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and limited equipment and training, therefore it had a limited self-defence and protective capability. Neither did it possess the capability or the mandate to enforce a particular solution on any or all of the parties in the conflict. It was frequently shown that such a position was not universally understood, with some NATO officials believing UNPROFOR could also perform some peace enforcement, and even that the force could then revert to peacekeeping. Hence, the key difference between peacekeepers and enforcers is their relationship

with the parties in the conflict. The missions are separate and distinct, therefore the peacekeepers should avoid any attempt to be involved in peace enforcing activity.

- 2. The increasingly difficult relationship between the military and humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping.** The humanitarian goals of different organisations are based on the provision of support according to need, not on the political or military intentions of the potential recipients. This is acceptable to the military as well, but the warring parties on the ground might not understand it in the same way, and the impartiality could be questioned. And if a peacekeeping force is involved in humanitarian activity, is it obliged to act according to international humanitarian and human rights law if civilians are endangered? And what if such a mission transforms itself into military intervention?
- 3. The relative benefits of conflict prevention and containment versus intervention.** Macedonia, where a relatively small number of peacekeepers successfully prevented a conflagration (a preventive UN force was deployed in May 1992), proved a positive example of conflict prevention through the deployment of a peacekeeping force prior to the outbreak of violence. This valuable lesson with respect to both conflict prevention and containment has not been fully taken on board by the international community.

Haltiner (2000:19) warns that in addition to differing national interests, political problems and ill-defined mandates, inefficient peace operations can also be explained by the inadequate structuring, organisation, training and equipping of the forces deployed. Haltiner cites several reasons for the low success rate

of what are called new missions, including peacekeeping. Worth mentioning is, for instance, the ambiguous political mandates and the notoriously unclear command structures of UN missions. Furthermore, conflicts vary in nature and intensity and have their own histories. Frequently, it seems, peace forces are used half-heartedly and for symbolic reasons because the political will to find lasting political solutions is lacking. Further reasons for near or actual failure come easily to mind. Some of the most important reasons for potential failure may well lie in the unsuitability of traditional military organisational structures for any tasks that are not of a combative nature. A new military model apt for the new policing tasks has yet to be developed.

The problem of peacekeeping in general is the fact that almost all contemporary conflicts around the world are *intrastate* (SIPRI Yearbook 1998:8), based upon nationalist or tribal tendencies, religious competition or ethnic assertion. The international community has problems dealing with such conflicts, since UN missions were envisaged for *interstate* conflicts. The present contradiction between the right of states to exist and the national aspirations of component groups will continue, and consequently there will be a dilemma whether the borders of states should be respected or the right of self-determination of nations should be given a priority. Therefore, it is possible to predict that the UN will continue to search for some middle ground on which it can “do something”. Consequently, peacekeepers will mostly operate outside traditional military operations: as human rights monitors, trained in international humanitarian law and war crimes, especially the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 – shortly, they should be participants in every attempt to limit, control or end an ongoing conflict.

The Position and Experience of Different Countries

It is very important to understand the attitude of different countries toward the Yugoslav crisis in the nineties, because they significantly influenced the role of the international community in the approach, pace and instruments used to resolve the crisis. National interests often limit the activity of the international community and consequently its efficiency. The attitudes of the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), France and Russia, as major actors in the international community and especially in this crisis, will hence be examined. In addition, two less influential countries, Canada and Sweden, played an extremely important role from the start in the UN’s peace operations. These two countries will be briefly explored in terms of the relationship between peacekeepers and the local population, media reporting and public opinion about the mission, and the perceived efficiency of the mission. The findings will later be compared to the results of opinion polls conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself.

United States of America

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992-5 spanned the mandates of two American Presidents: George Bush and Bill Clinton. The American debate centred on how to resolve the crisis, while the UN attempted to mitigate the harshness of the war by distributing humanitarian aid to Bosnia’s civilian population.

The US was one of the major powers that was reluctant to commit forces to the purpose of enforcing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, “those who now criticise the UN’s performance in Bosnia-Herzegovina rarely do so for the mission it was actually chartered and resourced to perform: peace-

keeping and the distribution of humanitarian aid" (American National Interest and the United Nations 1996:21-3). One could say that public expectations of the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina grew, but the organisation was not given the mandate embraced in Chapter VII of its Charter that would have enabled it to use force to stop the fighting and to protect safe havens effectively.³ Therefore, "the member states that failed to agree on a more robust policy cannot deflect all blame onto the United Nations. The United Nations was limited in its resources and its mandate" (ibid.). According to the authors, one strategic success was achieved, namely the Bosnian conflict was prevented from spreading and directly involving other states. This was primarily achieved by UNSC and Contact Group diplomacy that excluded outside military forces.

The Bosnian crisis has been one of the greatest challenges for US-European relations in the post-Cold War era. "When Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, it was initially seen on both sides of the Atlantic as an opportunity for Eu-

rope to rise to a new level of leadership by taking the lead in dealing with this problem" (Seeking a New Balance 1998:39). A consequence of this was that when the peacekeeping force for Bosnia-Herzegovina was established, France, the UK and other European nations contributed with the majority of troops, while the US declined to participate.

The insufficiently armed UN mission, lacking the cooperation of the local warring factions, proved ineffective until the US decided to become directly involved in the crisis. The US pushed for the NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions, which gradually led to the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995 that ended the war. As mentioned earlier, IFOR was introduced soon afterward and the American troops initially represented one-third of the multinational contingent.

Opinion polls carried out in the US revealed that the public was supportive of American troops participating in the peacekeeping operation. However, this support was much higher during 1997-98 than at the beginning of 1996. The major factor behind this increase in support was a growing perception that the mission was successful in providing peace, and this was backed by a positive portrayal of the mission in the mass media, the fact that some of the indicted war criminals were sent to The Hague, and the fact that Bosnian Serbs elected a new government that was more moderate and which accepted the Dayton Accords. Regardless of this growing perception of success, the data showed there was still much room for improvement. Nevertheless, the data on the success of the peace operation and the US' role in it was influenced by the misperception that the war was still going on and that a significant number of American troops had been killed by hostile fire (Seeking a New Balance 1998:43).

³ Chapter VII is essentially coercive and designed to deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression perpetrated by sovereign states. Through Chapter VII, the UNSC is empowered to investigate alleged violations and then determine measures to be taken against the states and parties concerned. These measures can include provisional ones without prejudice to the rights, claims, or positions of the parties concerned (Article 40), political and economic pressure (Article 41) and the use of force (Article 42). Coalition operations against Iraq in 1991 were authorised by the UNSC under Chapter VII, which authorises whatever actions "as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security" (Article 42). Such an operation could be categorised as *peace enforcement*, and is generally a large-scale operation beyond the ability of the UN command and therefore delegated to a lead nation or an alliance of willing states, as envisaged by Chapter VIII (Peace Support Operations 1997: A-2).

United Kingdom

As pointed out by James Gow (1996:89–90), the British policy toward former Yugoslavia was very much influenced by a historical perspective. But there were also associations to the situation closer to home. The inter-ethnic dimension of the conflict in Yugoslavia was often compared to that in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, the British Ministry of Defence was having to cut defence expenditure and this ran counter to the financial requirements of potential British (military) activities in former Yugoslavia.

According to Gow (1996:91), the British contribution to the international effort in former Yugoslavia covered three areas: support for international diplomatic efforts, troops for the UN force and the imposition of sanctions through UNSC resolutions.

The UK contributed troops because of a self-perceived responsibility as one of the major military powers in Europe, and because the country had hosted the London Conference on former Yugoslavia in 1992. The UK wanted to take the lead in the mission after this conference and also wanted to please domestic public opinion, which had been significantly struck by the revelations of Serb-run concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main purpose of deploying troops was to provide protection for UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations in their delivery of assistance to endangered communities. There was pressure on the government to provide a sizeable contribution, resulting in 2,400 troops eventually being dispatched.

Despite the fact that there was no provision under international law for the involvement of Croatian and Serbian military and paramilitary forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the general debate about the use of force was heavily influenced by the assessment of the crisis as an ethnic conflict with strong historical con-

notations. The UK was reluctant to consent to UN- or NATO-led air strikes because of the presence of British forces on the ground. This attitude did not change until spring 1995. The UK also favoured the retention of the UN arms embargo on the territory of former Yugoslavia, claiming that more arms would enhance the reciprocal bloodshed, that Russia would not agree to the partial lifting of the embargo, and that more arms would not necessarily help the Bosnian army to achieve victory. The interpretation in London was that the request for external military intervention would not be superseded by a lifting of the embargo.

France

France has taken a singular stance regarding the Yugoslav crises. Its policy was very active but not without ambiguity and ambivalence. The country's primary objectives throughout the crisis were based upon historical and legal perspectives and can be summarised as follows (Lepick 1996:77): to put an end to the violence and to find an equitable solution for all the ethnic groups based on the rule of international law, to assert French concerns in the peace process and to prevent the conflict from spreading across the Balkans by establishing a "*cordon sanitaire*".

France was very much in favour of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the EU. As a result, the Yugoslav crises were seen as a crucial test and as an opportunity to demonstrate Europe's collective capacity to deal with the crises without American assistance. In the first phase of the conflict, France wanted to preserve the unity of federal Yugoslavia and avoid blaming Serbia for the outbreak of the war in 1991. This can be understood in light of a longstanding Franco-Serbian friendship. German support for Slovenian and Croatian independence was

judged as a serious foreign policy mistake and a betrayal of the EU's CFSP. The failure of the EU to prevent an intensification of the conflict necessitated a new diplomatic course that relied more upon the UN. France supported all the Resolutions adopted by the UNSC on former Yugoslavia, including Resolution 743 of February 1992, which created a peacekeeping force for Croatia with a substantial French contribution.

An initial serious shift in French policy occurred during the June 1992 Lisbon Conference, where French President Francois Mitterrand cited Serbia as the aggressor. Henceforth, French policy gradually accepted the idea of using a limited military force to change the situation on the ground. When the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan that France had firmly supported, French policy supported America's tough stance. In addition, France started to see the role of NATO as important to the resolution of the conflict, admitting that the Western European Union (WEU) was not viable for such a mission. Finally, when the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which envisaged that Bosnia-Herzegovina be divided into three political entities, linked by a confederate system, failed in January 1994, the French government called for greater US involvement and a more determined use of force. Serbian aggression had not stopped, and therefore France supported a resolute ultimatum on the aggressor.

Overall, French policy toward the crisis can be understood through four major concerns (Lepick 1996:84): (1) even if France did not want to get any further involved militarily in the conflict, Paris intended to hold a tough line and wanted UN and NATO decisions to be strictly respected, (2) France wanted war criminals, regardless of nationality, to be judged by the International War Crime Tribunal, (3) France clearly supported a negoti-

ated peace in Bosnia and believed the process could be a success, and (4) French diplomacy promoted reconciliation between Croatia and Serbia.

Russia

Russian policy toward the Yugoslav crises in the first half of the nineties was predominantly influenced by domestic problems facing the political elites while they tried to transform the country and manage its adjustment to the post-Cold War international environment. According to Edemskii (1996:29), five sets of problems should be examined here: (1) Russia's perception of the post-Cold War international order and the role of Russia in it, (2) Russian attitudes toward ex-Soviet republics, (3) the domestic debate between "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles", (4) the clash of "reformers" and "conservatives", and (5) perceptions of the political situation in former Yugoslavia.

According to Edemskii (1996: 29, 30), Russian policy toward Yugoslavia during 1991-5 could be divided into four phases. In the first phase (1991), the then - USSR, together with the US, condemned violence in Yugoslavia, requested that the Helsinki Accords be respected and rejected the break-up of the country. The Yugoslav situation had been seen as a possible pattern for the future of the USSR, and therefore the logical policy was to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia. These features of Russian policy were more obvious under President Gorbachev and were less explicit under President Yeltsin.

The non-explicit approach to the Yugoslav crisis continued in the second phase, 1992, especially in the first half of the year. Russia feared physical isolation from Europe by the creation of a "cordon sanitaire" from Croatia to Poland. This was the main reason for Russia's recognition of Slovenian and Croatian

independence in 1992, to establish a friendly relationship with both states. Russian policy supported the West's pressure on Serbia and voted for the imposition of sanctions against rump-Yugoslavia in the UN despite strong domestic opposition to such policy. Russian foreign policy was largely influenced by the severe domestic economic situation and by the expectations of receiving substantial economic and financial assistance from the West. From summer 1992 onward, the wars in former Yugoslavia became a major means for Russia to be involved in creating "the new international order". Russia's position in the UNSC and its constructive policy allowed it to be a major player at the joint EU-UN London conference on Yugoslavia. According to Edemskii (1996:37), the key principles of Russian policy after this conference could be summarised as follows: "equal responsibility of all sides; active support for the London conference mechanisms providing that final decisions be discussed in the Security Council where Russia had her voice; no new resolutions against Belgrade on the grounds that the previous ones should be implemented first. Russia also insisted on more secure procedures for sanctions and the punishment of sanction breakers".

The beginning of the third phase (1993) was characterised by Russia's diplomatic offensive across the Balkan region. Russia actively supported the Vance-Owen plan as the basis for its collaboration with the West, and pressured the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs to accept it. Part of this offensive was a plan, which Edemskii (1996:40) summarised as: "insistence on a political solution and opposition to any proposals involving the use of military force, resistance to lifting the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia, and attempts to impose sanctions on Croatia due to her

role in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russian diplomacy in this phase helped the West to accept the 'de facto' partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan".

The fourth phase (1994-5) was characterised by the following features (Edemskii, 1996:43): (1) explicit resistance to any military solution that did not have the prior authorisation of the UNSC, that is, only with Russia's permission, (2) a more independent role for Russia in managing the conflict, partly as a response to the fear of increasing isolation from the West, partly because of the changing political climate after the December (1993, parliamentary, M. M.) elections, and partly in affirmation of Russia's status as a great power with her own interests which should be protected, even without consultation with others, (3) attempts to find a Russian "carrot" for Serbia, and a readiness to develop relations if Belgrade should meet the requirements of the international community, and (4) being actively involved in a new mechanism of conflict-regulation – the "contact group" – meaning a new phase of cooperation with the West on an equal basis.

At the end of this phase Russia accepted the then actual option of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs.

Canada

Canada has a long tradition of peacekeeping, having participated in all 13 operations that constituted the first generation of peace operations. Even in the second generation, Canada remains prominent and stands at the top of the list of participants. "In terms of the number of troops actually contributed to UN operations, Canada is in third place after France and United Kingdom" (Winslow 1999:1). In the case of former Yugoslavia, Canada was one of the first countries to com-

mit troops to UNPROFOR, with its contribution peaking at 2,600.

As the emphasis of SFOR becomes more one of hearts and minds, its soldiers and officers say that the local community sees the mission and the Canadians as friends and partners. "We are not an occupying force. We have a lot of eyes and ears on the ground" (Winslow 1999:10) said one officer. They do not buy food and fuel locally in order to avoid creating a false and dependent economy. However, some locals do work for the Canadian contingent, and the troops provide humanitarian aid and other forms of support to the indigenous population. "Canadian forces personnel, when contacting the local population, encounter many forms of cultural tensions. In particular, they face ethical dilemmas of how to treat impoverished locals, how to remain neutral in a conflict-ridden society, and how to deal with pervasive corruption" (Winslow 1999:11). Canadians operate a radio show and distribute pamphlets about their mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the last few years. They want to infuse the local population with Canadian Western values and give them the information.

Relations with the national media are more or less limited to Canadian and local outlets. Winslow (1999:14) is right to note that the Somali experience caused a tremendous mistrust and antipathy of the military toward the media, and this has thus been an important feature in Bosnia. Modern technology allows for an instant transmission of information, and therefore the military is in a position to compete with the media and can provide accurate information to the military chain of command and political decision-makers quicker than the media informs the public. Officers and soldiers complain that the media only cover 5–10% of their activity, and that it is too often interested in problems, scandals

and sensational news, while positive actions are often ignored.

The Canadians have a Public Information Officer who has promoted SFOR activity since 1996 in the local population and a Public Affairs Officer, who has promoted the Battle Group to Canada.

Sweden

According to Johansson (1999:2), over 80,000 Swedes have served in UN peacekeeping operations in the period 1948–98. The problems of peacekeeping are well represented in domestic political debates. In 1993, the Government and Parliament approved the deployment of a major combat unit to Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were at least three important motives: first, the tradition of peacekeeping requested a tangible and visible Swedish presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina; second, the wars in former Yugoslavia seemed more related to Swedish national security than had, for instance, Somalia, especially because the aggressive nationalism could affect other European countries given the sensitive situation in post-Cold War Europe; and third, the focus of Swedish foreign policy has shifted from the Third World to Europe in the last decade.

In 1997–9, over 70% of Swedish citizens supported the UN's role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the use of force to restore peace and security. The same figure was achieved regarding the deployment of Swedish troops in the Balkans (Stütz 1999).

"At the beginning of March 1992 Swedish participation in UNPROFOR consisted of military observers, civilian police and a headquarters company. As UNPROFOR's task and mandate grew, the first Nordic battalion (NORDBAT 1) was deployed to Macedonia in January 1993. The Nordic, and with it the Swedish commitment was subsequently increased to include a mechanised infantry bat-

talion (NORDBAT 2) placed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during October 1993. This Nordic battalion was deployed in the Tuzla area in the northern part of Bosnia. From December 1995, Sweden has also contributed personnel within the framework of NATO cooperation, since UNPROFOR had become a NATO-led operation. To participate in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and later in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) was something new from a Swedish point of view. As mentioned above, Sweden had rather extensive experience and knowledge about working in UN missions, but considerably less experience regarding NATO, since Sweden is not a member. The culture, traditions, terminology and to some extent, collaborators were all quite new for the Swedes" (Johansson 1999:6).

It is interesting to examine how Swedish combat units engaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 and 1995 and to estimate their effectiveness. This reveals significant differences between the battalions. The first battalion was much more convinced than the other that they fulfilled their task. The majority of battalion members thought that »they succeeded in alleviating the suffering of the civilian population, that they had protected the civilian population against attacks/assaults and that they had acted to calm down the conflicting parties« (Johansson 1999:10). The follow-up battalions were less convinced about their tasks being accomplished as envisaged. However, the NATO peacekeeping period in Bosnia-Herzegovina was characterised by the view that the unit had succeeded in accomplishing different tasks, and that their efforts were appreciated (ibid.).

The Swedish media provided substantial coverage of events in former Yugoslavia in general and of the role of Swedish peacekeepers in particular. From the outset, »the tone was quite positive but as time passed more

criticisms were raised, first toward the impatient management of the UNPROFOR operation and later also toward Swedish achievements in former Yugoslavia« (Johansson 1999:19). Problems of leadership for national units, alcohol abuse and the exploitation of prostitutes among soldiers and officers were mainly reported by the tabloid press (ibid.).

Since Sweden is non-aligned, some questions could have been raised by the media when NATO took over the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, analysis revealed that the mass media did not substantially cover the issue of non-alliance while reporting and commenting on NATO-led peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This contributed to the consensus regarding the new meaning of Swedish non-alliance in the 1990s.

According to Johansson (1999:21), the personnel of different Swedish battalions during the UNPROFOR mandate in 1992-5 had a relatively negative attitude toward the various groups of civilians they encountered while carrying out their duties, but they also perceived that the attitudes of different groups of civilians toward peacekeepers were even more negative. However, when NATO took over the operation, the attitudes of Swedish soldiers toward the local population became more positive.

To conclude this chapter, we believe that the way the international community understood and dealt with the crisis in former Yugoslavia affected the effectiveness of the peace support operations. It is also important to understand the position of crucial international community actors in a peace support process, because their national interests, expectations and motives frequently set the limits on the international community peace effort. As far as the peace support operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, it is important for the success of the study, to be able to compare the in-

terests, expectations and motives of the international community and those of the local communities expressed in public opinion poll. By doing so, we can »gauge« the extent

to which the interests, expectations and motives of both sides differ, which might be interpreted as an indirect indicator of the success of the peace support operation.

MASS MEDIA'S IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICTS

The Role of Mass Media in the Conflicts

There were many analyses devoted to the media's role in the Yugoslav crises beginning in 1991. The present author has been involved in three research projects on the subject. Before briefly presenting the results of those projects, this chapter introduces three statements from individual international community representatives, who, at different stages during the conflicts, experienced the significance of the mass media for the warring factions involved and international community actors that wanted to bring the conflicts to their end.

For instance, Graham Day (1995:81), a Civil Affairs Officer with UNPROFOR, expressed the view: "in few other situations do fact and fantasy mix so freely as in the former Yugoslavia. Historical and social facts have been selectively edited, and then plucked from their context and used to manufacture propaganda fantasies by all warring factions. As if that were not bad enough, this mythical contemporary folklore is then often gleefully retransmitted and amplified by a Western media machine hungry only for sensational pictures and thirty second sound bites, while being impatient with critical analysis and reasoned understanding".

Lord David Owen, Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY), also dwelled upon the issue of media impact. In the very first paragraph of his book *Balkan Odyssey*, Owen (1995:1) emphasised that »nothing is simple in the Balkans. History pervades every-

thing and the complexities confound even the most careful study. Never before in over thirty years of public life have I had to operate in such a climate of dishonour, propaganda and dissembling. Many of the people with whom I have had to deal with in the former Yugoslavia were literally strangers to the truth«.

Richard Holbrooke, US President Clinton's special envoy and chief negotiator to former Yugoslavia, stressed the media's importance in his book *To End a War* (1998:24). He borrowed some lines from Warren Zimmerman, former US Ambassador to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: »Those who argue that 'ancient Balkan hostilities' account for the violence that overtook and destroyed Yugoslavia forget the power of television in the hands of officially provoked racism. While history, particularly the carnage of World War II, provided plenty of tinder for ethnic hatred in Yugoslavia, it took the institutional nationalism of Milošević and Tudjman to supply the torch.... Yugoslavia may have a violent history, but it isn't unique. What we witnessed was violence-provoking nationalism from the top down, inculcated primarily through the medium of television.... Many people in the Balkans may be weak or even bigoted, but in Yugoslavia it is their leaders who have been criminal. The virus of television spread ethnic hatred like an epidemic throughout Yugoslavia...An entire generation of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were aroused by television images to hate their neighbours«. Holbrooke also quoted (ibid.) Noel Malcolm's book *Bosnia: A Short History*: »Having watched Radio Television Belgrade in the period 1991-2,

I can understand why simple Bosnian Serbs came to believe that they were under threat, from Ustasha hordes, fundamentalist jihads, or whatever...It was as if all television in the USA had been taken over by the Ku Klux Klan«.

These quotes illustrates the media circumstances that peacekeepers and other international representatives in former Yugoslavia had to work in. It is especially important in today's perspective, since it is obvious that the peace process can not be accomplished successfully without the cooperative stance of the media operating in the turbulent area.

The role of mass media in the conflicts and war propaganda were the major topics in two research projects dealing, respectively, with media activities in mass communication during the war in Croatia in years 1991-2, and with the formulation and dissemination of propaganda messages specifically related to the state of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 (Malešić 1993 and 1997). The present author also participated in a project called *The Analysis of Propaganda on RTS, HTV and BHT*, which examined the attitude of Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Croatian and Serbian national televisions toward the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Šiniković 1996). The main results of these studies shall be summarised below.

Mass Media During the War in Croatia

As noted elsewhere, the Yugoslav crisis, which culminated at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, had war as its epilogue. One of the conflicts on the territory of the former federal state was the war in Croatia, which predominantly was an armed conflict between the Croatian and Serbian states. Above all, the conflict during 1991-2

contained elements of classic aggression, civil war and ethnic conflict.

Running parallel to the political changes and military conflicts in Yugoslavia were the activities of mass media. Different political concepts of the reform of Yugoslav society, mainly in conformity with the concepts of the national political elites, were projected through the media. The mass media in different Yugoslav republics completely accomplished the role of political propaganda and warmongering given them by the politicians. The thesis emerged at that time that mass media activity was the main cause of the wars in Yugoslavia. The thesis might be confirmed if mass media were independent and free, but we have to conclude that the media were mainly an instrument of governing political elites of the respective Yugoslav republics. Of course, such a conclusion does not apply equally. The six republics differed greatly in the composition of their media (pro-, anti-government and independent) and their degree of impartiality. Concerning the Serbian government-controlled media, we can assert that they created a "critical mass" of war in the political-ideological field.⁴

⁴ Trotsky (1989:70,71), who worked in Belgrade as a war correspondent for *Kievskaya Mysl* before the outbreak of the first Balkan War in 1912, wrote: "At the outbreak of war, Belgrade – whose population at that time was no more than 80,000 – had 14 daily newspapers. This number is even more surprising if one considers the fact that 80% of Serbia's almost 3 million population is illiterate. Due to the developed political life, journalism plays a very important role. In both Serbia and Bulgaria the press was one of the key factors in the creation of the psychological preconditions for war. The people's enthusiasm for the war transformed itself into a high state of morale in the army, which proved to be just as important as sound military planning in the victory of the Balkan allies... The single, unified political slogan of Belgrade's independent politically oriented press became 'Agitation for war – never mind against whom, whether it be Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey, or even the entire European community'".

In the period prior to the eruption of war, the media created *an exclusive interpretation pattern*, which completely polarised different values, standpoints, ideas and their protagonists. The space for communication became very narrow and had disappeared by the end of that period. *Popular opinion* of the adversary was based upon *extreme events and processes* – the media only published material from abroad that strengthened the domestic public opinion constructs. At the end of this process, there was *a media blockade*, which was more psychological than institutional. That is to say, despite the presence of foreign media, the public did not want to read about, watch or listen to things that could spoil the image of the different problems. But this image was a consequence of exclusive mass media activity in special circumstances. *“Mass psychosis”* was obvious; the public did not want other information. For example, Serbs in Croatia could choose between Croatian and Serbian media, but took the Serbian option that reported from Belgrade what was happening in Croatia. Also, a *“drug malfunction”* of the media was obvious – after long-term propaganda, members of the public became addicts – they demanded a daily dose of threats, hatred, hostility and even fear.

The Bosnian War Experience

Propaganda during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 is of particular interest. In addition to the three ethnic groups (Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Muslims) directly participating in the war, the states of Croatia and Serbia were also involved. They, however, would not admit to their involvement and attempted to conceal it using propaganda messages.

In order to study propaganda qualitatively, it was defined as a “planned, deliberate and systematic effort directed at formulating perceptions, manipulating facts and organising behaviour so as to provoke a response from the people that is in line with the intentions of the propagandist” (Malešić 1997:179). We also created a theoretical model of propaganda, which helped us to study the propaganda reality in Serbia and Croatia. The basic dimensions of the model were: (1) propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, propaganda and religion, propaganda and reinterpretation of history), (2) routine lies, (3) collective and selective memory loss, (4) classic (hard) propaganda, (5) anti-propaganda, (6) use of language, (7) source criticism, (8) iconography, (9) compatibility of visual and textual information, (10) (de)construction of the national memory, (11) who “the other” is, (12) context of propaganda, (13) public and (14) propagandist and the structure of propaganda organisation (ibid.). The model was then confronted with the propaganda reality in Serbia and Croatia, respectively.

If we look at the chronology of the conflict we can see that the war began with Serbian aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 and gradually developed into an ethnic and a civil war in which everybody fought everybody else – *bellum omnia contra omnes* – and in which allies and enemies changed roles in a relatively short time span not only at the level of the three ethnic communities, but also at local levels. Such frequent shifts in coalitions and anti-coalitions demanded a well-oiled, multi-directional propaganda machinery. Finally, the three sides in the Bosnian war were characterised by their vast differences: civilisational (with one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina having ex-

perienced Austro-Hungarian rule, and another part having lived under Ottoman rule), religious (Catholicism among the Croats, Orthodox Christianity among the Serbs, and Islam among the Bosnian Muslims), and cultural (language, script, customs). Such fundamental differences provided an extremely sound basis for the dissemination of propaganda messages. This was *the context of propaganda*.

We observed that Serbian television and print media frequently connected propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, followed by propaganda and religion and propaganda and reinterpretation of history), conspiracy theory, accusing and discrediting the opponents, anti-propaganda, disseminating routine lies, classic (hard) propaganda and collective (selective) memory loss. Croatian television and print media displayed classic (hard) propaganda, accusing and discrediting the opponents, appeals for cooperation, ideology and propaganda (history, nationalism and religion) and to a lesser degree conspiracy theory.

The main conclusion is that Serbian propaganda partly fits into the theoretical propaganda model, and partly expands it. This is also the case for Croatian propaganda. The difference between the two states lies in the fact that almost all of the propaganda elements were more frequent in Serbian than in Croatian mass media. However, it should be stressed that Serbian media devoted much more time and space to (ongoing) events and processes in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war, while the Croatian media focused more on the semi-war situation in Croatia itself.

Our assumption that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was covered predominantly by using a stereotyped visual text that faithfully

accompanies certain kinds of information proved to be well-founded. The fundamental aim of the propagandist is to simplify the image of the war, making it easily comprehensible to the average viewer. On the basis of such visual stereotyping of war, it is possible to anticipate the picture that will "accompany" the text. As a result, despite the massive amount of other information presented to the public (at least as far as Serbian television is concerned), in terms of television, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an "invisible" one, hence, the accompanying text of the news was frequently more important than image.

Far from being spectacular, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be defined as a ritual conflict. Therefore, it cannot be presented comprehensively but only fragmentally. Croatian Radio-Television (HRT) and Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) both employed various techniques in this regard. If we look at reports from Sarajevo, we notice that RTS mostly showed pictures of the city from a considerable distance (for example, from the vantage point of an artillery position), which made it impossible to see the extent of the devastation. Conversely, HRT presented images from within the city (from the vantage point of the target area), in which totally destroyed housing was in view and where people could be seen running for their lives from snipers' bullets.

The analysis of Croatian and Serbian television news programmes and their role in the *formulation of national and collective memory* was limited by the fact that both broadcasting organisations utilised the "closed" world of symbolism, decipherable only by those who shared a common national "background knowledge". As a state-controlled institution under the direct influence of political parties, television had an exclusive monopoly on public communication and on defining the dominant linguistic

styles⁵. In other words, the basic role of television in defining a new collective memory lay in the process of defining the nation, a nation that was recognisable to everybody.

One of the conclusions refers to how “*the Other side*” is defined. Here, propaganda utilises the very simple matrix of “us” and “them”. The Other side is depicted as being utterly unacceptable, as something which “...threatens the survival of our community by its very existence”. This is where the mechanism for the (re)construction of both the national and collective memory, and concomitantly for forgetting, is at its strongest.

Another important element studied concerns defining *the source of information* and, therefore, albeit indirectly, *the propagandist* (who brings the news, who forms the largest audience, and in what way does national television recognise or dismiss the credibility of the source?). Public appearances are only allowed for those who are eloquent and communicatively competent. In other words, propa-

⁵ Complete control of the mass media in a country permits the possibility for swift changes in the direction that propaganda takes. History provides many such examples, such as the attitude of the German public toward the USSR. Within a very short period of time, Third Reich propagandists in the 1940s succeeded in transforming the “*friendship*” which figured so prominently during the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Accord into raw animosity when Germany launched its massive attack against Soviet Russia. We saw a similar situation in relations between countries of the now non-existent Yugoslavia and the USSR at the time when the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) resolution was adopted to expel Yugoslavia from the organisation in 1948. The almost reverential attitude of the Yugoslav people (particularly its loyal communists) toward the USSR and Stalin was transformed almost overnight into a negative and reflectionist one. While the majority of people readily embraced the new stand, for many, the dramatic, literally overnight turnabout brought deep psychological trauma, as well as Draconian prison sentences for those who did not immediately comply with the new Order.

gandists must be capable of carefully controlling the parameters of communication in order to control the dominant interpretations of events – interpretations from which each individual will extract his own meaning. The aim of the propagandist is to reduce to the absolute minimum the number of different possible interpretations of political events by reducing the number of available sources of information. The analysis shows that all the main Serbian and Croatian propagandists from Bosnia-Herzegovina were allowed to enter Serbian and Croatian mass media, respectively. Both RTS and HRT were more likely to use sources that expressed sympathy toward their own countries, usually through live presentations or interviews, whereas hostile sources were rarely used, and if used, only indirectly.

It should be said that it is very difficult to uncover *the structure of propaganda organisation* solely on the basis of a content analysis of media information. Thus, questions concerning the type of propaganda organisation, its structure, whether it is strictly centralised and hierarchic, remain more or less unanswered. All the same, we may state that in Serbian media, and to a lesser degree in Croatian media, all the major propagandists (that is the political and military Serb and Croat leaders from Bosnia-Herzegovina) found their place and opportunity. In terms of Croatian propaganda, we can say that the media was open and at the disposal of the Bosnian Croats, while in Serbia, “domestic” propagandists were more distinct.

Concerning *the iconography*, we could establish theoretically that the most important factor is the visual background of a certain message. Against such a background, the sender of the message is connected to the values the icons personify. But iconography is also a matter of provoking certain emotions from the public. In this sense, we found that reli-

gious symbols, para-state symbols, historical and cultural monuments were used most often. We also discovered that military symbols were used to accompany certain messages. The Serbs frequently used their old coat-of-arms, which includes, among other things, four C's (C is an S in Cyrillic letters), which are interpreted as "*Samo Sloga Srbina Spašava*" ("only unity saves the Serbs").

As regards *the use of language* for propaganda purposes by the Serbian and Croatian media our conclusion can be summarised as follows: The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was preceded by a campaign of forceful and highly emotional propaganda. These activities aroused emotions and apportioned blame to the other side while justifying the activities of one's own side. And when the war finally came to an end, similar kinds of propaganda were most likely to be used by the losing side to justify defeat, and by the winner to glorify victory (assuming, of course, that there was a victor). Although the language of post-war propaganda will probably change in form, information value and emotional charge – at least as perceived by outside observers – for the main actors in this war (increasingly Muslims and Croats, on the one hand, and the Serbs, on the other), it will most likely continue to be unchanged and carry the same emotional message for a very long time to come – a message of distrust, uncertainty, and hatred.

The analyses of the *Croatian public and Serbian public* emphasised the importance of the term "political culture" for the targets of propaganda.⁶ Mass media has an ambivalent role

⁶ Political culture could be defined as a network of orientations towards the political system. Those orientations consists of the cognitive, the affective and the value dimension. Political culture is the result of the comprehensive developments of the society, and is influenced by different socialisation factors with mass media being one of them.

in this process. On the one hand, the extent to which it can influence the public is limited by the existent political culture, while on the other hand, the media are one of the socialisation factors that greatly affect political culture. The relatively low educational level of the public in Serbia and partly in Croatia is a characteristic that is arguably one of the preconditions for the success of simplistic propaganda. Another precondition is surely the public's inclination toward "authoritarianism", which is as much a consequence of patriarchal traditions as it is a legacy of the former communist system. Here, authoritarianism is characterised by authoritarian submissiveness, aggression, inflexible opinions, conservatism, dogmatism, excessive resistance to change, and an inclination toward superstition and myths.

The Media's Attitude Toward the International Community's Efforts to Stop the Conflicts

Data from the two research projects presented above allowed an additional analysis of the attitudes expressed by Serbian and Croatian media toward the political actions, peace-keeping and humanitarian activity of the international community – individual states and organisations like the OSCE, the EU, and the UN – during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively (Malešić 1999).

The quantitative results of the research referring to the war in Croatia in 1991-2 showed that *Serbian press* devoted quite a lot of space to topics like Europe, the EU, the UN, peace forces and the like. The state-controlled press placed the war in Croatia in a wider European geographic and political context. Its stress on finding a resolution of the conflict acceptable to all sides encouraged Serb forces in Croatia to conquer ("to liberate") as much

territory as possible before the arrival of UN troops. And these forces found much comfort in the fact that the UN was sending peacekeepers rather than peacemakers.

The opposition press tried to convince their readers that Europe saw the conflict in Croatia in a different light than did official Serbia and the great majority of the Serb public. One significant feature was the treatment of war from a civilisational point of view; another was the reduced scepticism about Europe and Catholicism among Serbs as a psychological preparation for the intervention of the international community in the Serbian-Croatian conflict. The opposition press supported the idea that the European community could make a contribution to the settlement of the conflict, while the state-controlled press condemned the European interference and the leading role of Germany in it, as a danger to create a 'Fourth Reich'.

The Croatian press paid a great deal of attention to the internationalisation of the conflict – many expectations were raised in such a context. It relied upon the help of the international community, but failed to arrive in the expected form, despite the fact that Croatia was the victim of aggression in 1991. Therefore, there is no surprise about the level of optimism concerning the pressures applied by the international community against the Serbs or about the arrival of "peacemaking" forces. An additional analysis of the Croatian daily *Vjesnik* revealed such an initial optimism regarding the arrival of UNPROFOR in Croatia. *Vjesnik's* attitude toward UNPROFOR can be divided into three distinct phases: First, there was acceptance (January–February 1992), then a phase of misunderstanding (March–April), and finally there was disillusionment (May–August). These showed the obvious trend of UNPROFOR's acceptance and popularity decline in the Croatian media

and consequently in popular opinion. As far as the public attitude is concerned, UNPROFOR was a victim of unrealistically high expectations spread by the politicians and negotiators of the peace plan.

As revealed in our research referring to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of 1993, the propaganda reality of *Serbian television* matched and even surpassed the theoretical model of propaganda by offering two additional elements: conspiracy theory and accusing and discrediting the opponents. Both elements had a significant impact on the attitude of Serbian television toward the activities of the international community during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the majority of cases, the international community's efforts were characterised by Serbian TV in conspiratorial, accusatory and discreditory terms: all the UN's resolutions and actions are anti-Serb, the world's media is exercising a psychological genocide against Serbs, the co-chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia are biased and unjust – everything they do is to the detriment of the Serbian people, the centres of world power favour Western interests and run a genocidal policy against the Serbian people, and so on.

Croatian television hardly corresponded to our theoretical model but concurrently expanded it in two ways: accusing and discrediting the opponents (mainly Muslims) and appeals for cooperation (with Muslims). As far as the international community and UNPROFOR were concerned, Croatian TV was not as aggressive as its Serbian counterpart. It directed a few accusations toward the Russian UNPROFOR troops and, at least indirectly, demonstrated the impotence of the UN in (Eastern) Bosnia. It additionally stressed the lack of determination and the apathy of powerful international personalities, and warned that talks between UNPROFOR commanders

and Bosnian Serb commanders yielded no positive change on the ground.

If we turn to the press we can say that *Serbian print media* regarded the role of the international community primarily in conspiracy theory terms. The actions of international actors were all described as being to the detriment of the Serbian people. The relevant international organisations, institutions and individual states were the subject of accusation and discrediting. Greece and Russia were perceived as Orthodox allies and traditional friends of Serbia.

Croatia's print media's attitude toward the international community was less rectilinear than in the Serbian case. This ranged from indirect accusations in the context of hard propaganda, by describing the fatal humanitarian conditions in "safe havens", to support for the peace plan and different activities estimated to stop Serb aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some Islamic states and the negative consequences of their presence on the ground were usual targets of the Croatian press.

The Attitude of Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Croatian and Serbian Television Toward the Dayton Agreement

A peace conference, under the auspices of the Contact Group and with the US as a key mediator, took place in November 1995 in Dayton, USA, and culminated on 14 December the same year with the signing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina in Paris. The Agreement was signed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, and was to create a basis for sustainable peace and stability in the region.

It is difficult to estimate the ultimate impact of the Dayton Agreement in the peace

process. It was a step forward compared to previous attempts to bring peace, due to the successful termination of armed conflict and the suffering of the civilian population. The Agreement was not perfect and was dictated by the major powers. None of the parties involved in the conflict was satisfied; nevertheless, it represented a sound basis for peaceful conflict resolution. The main deficiency seemed to be a lack of clear political vision for the country. The destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina depends on many factors, among them the role of the international community in the conflict resolution process and on the country's economic and political stabilisation. Then there is the role of the media within the country in support of peace and the co-existence of different nationalities.

The third major research project⁷ to be summarised here examined the attitude of Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian *national TV stations* toward the Dayton Peace Agreement. Ten television "News of the Day" programmes from each selected national television were analysed during 11–20 March, 1996. These programmes reflected everyday political, economic, cultural and sporting life and therefore were the best indicators of the attitudes expressed by the television editorial boards toward various state and social affairs. There were other political broadcasts that could have been analysed as well, but the "News of the Day" programmes provided the best basis for a comparison between the three aforementioned television networks. Altogether, 30 "News of the Day" programmes were examined with the total length of 16 hours and 14 minutes.

⁷ See more in Bensad Šiniković, 1996: *Analiza propagande na RTS, HTV in BHT* (The analyses of propaganda on RTS, HTV and BHT). Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences.

Table 1: The structure of "News of the Day" Programmes, 11–20 march 1996

| Topics | News of the Day Programmes | | |
|--|----------------------------|------------|--------|
| | Croatian TV | Serbian TV | B-H TV |
| | % | % | % |
| Dayton Agreement | 15 | 17 | 59 |
| Other political topics | 34 | 24 | 6 |
| International news | 12 | 7 | 6 |
| Economic news | 11 | 24 | 14 |
| Culture | 5 | 5 | 7 |
| Other topics | 24 | 24 | 9 |
| Total amount of time (minutes) devoted to Dayton Agreement | 54 | 61 | 154 |

The material formed the basis for an analysis of the basic characteristics of television propaganda activity; linguistic, visual and ideological features of television reporting, and differences in the structure of content of "News of the Day" programmes related to the exercising of the Dayton Agreement. The main focus was the attitude – positive, neutral and negative – of the three national television stations toward the fulfilment of Dayton Agreement provisions on the ground. The logic behind this was the strong influence television has on popular attitudes toward the problem. The success of peace promoters decisively relies on mass media, especially television.

The time frame for the analysis was carefully chosen in concordance with the events and activities that were crucial to the realisation of the peace process. These included: (1) the expiration of the deadline (D+90), in which the jurisdiction transfer of areas from one entity to another was to be accomplished (e.g. the transfer of Sarajevo's suburban areas to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), (2) the Geneva meeting of the Contact Group, (3) the beginning of proceedings at The Hague Tribunal against war criminals from former

Yugoslavia, and (4) the Ankara International Conference on arming the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Army.

The very first step of our research was to analyse the thematic structure of the different "News of the Day" programmes. The contributions were classified as follows: the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, political topics that were not directly related to Dayton, international news, economic news, culture and other news (science, sport, weather forecasts, etc.).

The analyses showed that 59% of contributions on Bosnian-Herzegovinian television referred to the Dayton Agreement. Next came economic topics with 14% (culture 7%, other political themes 6%, international news 6% and other topics such as science, health, weather forecasts 9%). Obviously, Dayton was seen by the editorial board as the vital topic for the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.

Serbian television devoted much less time to the Dayton Agreement – 17%. Economic and internal political (both 24%) topics dominated. The emphasis on economic issues was a consequence of the lifting of international sanctions at that time, and discussion about

the renewal of the economic life in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Both networks devoted relatively little time to international news. This demonstrates the media's preoccupation with domestic affairs and the lack of information transparency in both countries.

Of all the stations analysed, Croatian television devoted the least time to the Dayton Agreement – 15%. Internal political issues dominated, 34%, these were followed by international news, 12%, economic news, 11%, culture, 5% and other news, 24%.

The quantitative analyses of the news programmes also showed that the amount of prime-time devoted by "News of the Day" programmes to the Dayton Agreement over the whole period reached 154 minutes and 15 seconds for Bosnian-Herzegovinian Television, 61 minutes and 30 seconds for Serbian Television and 54 minutes and 15 seconds for Croatian Television. The total time analysed was 16 hours and 14 minutes.

The qualitative analyses of news referring to Dayton indicated that all television stations mostly stressed those sections of the news that *reaffirmed official views and attitudes* in the respective countries. Those events and activities that did not coincide with the official line were either mentioned briefly or excluded. The Serbian television News of the Day programme paid attention to the talks between Federal and international representatives regarding the implementation of the peace process. This coverage served to prove that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serbs were determined to respect and fulfil the peace agreement. Serb television also reported on the problems between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs (Muslims) in the formation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intention here was to create the impression that those to be blamed for the delay in the implementation of the peace agree-

ment were to be found "on the other side". It was also "proof" that an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a viable option where the two interested ethnic groups faced many problems in forming the federation.

A similar approach was taken by Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian TV. This was obviously a consequence of subordinating the truth to the propaganda objectives. Such an approach was also evident in cases that were not directly connected to Dayton, where economic, cultural and foreign policy topics were misused to achieve propaganda effects. For example, the economic cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was misused by the Croatian television to interpret it as a proof that Croatia was consolidating the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serb television used economic topics to stress the economic progress and reconstruction allowed by the partial lifting of UN sanctions. And Slobodan Milošević's regime, which "always invested a lot of energy in achieving lasting peace", had enabled such a progress. Bosnian-Herzegovinian television misused cultural news to report on Serbian ethnic cleansing in the history of multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian television reported criticism by Croatia's cultural elite toward Peter Handke's book *A justice for Serbia* for his pro-Serbian attitude.

International events were also manipulated for propaganda effects. Serb television reported extensively on the international conference on terrorism held in Egypt in March 1996. The journalists only emphasised the danger of Islamic terrorism related to the crises in the world where there is Islamic fundamentalism. In this context, television reported the killing of an IFOR soldier in the Tuzla area, and warned about the danger of the spread of Islamic terrorism, without any proof of who had committed the crime.

On the whole, *selectivity in approach and manipulation* was an important feature of television reporting. This also holds for *the selection of sources* – not once in the period analysed did the respective stations use the “other side” as a source. In addition, only the representatives of “our side” were asked to give an interview and to comment on the situation on the ground. Only Bosnian-Herzegovinian television was plural in this respect, allowing Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats to comment on the difficulties faced by the newly formed federation. This was the consequence of its endeavour to achieve equality and impartiality of reporting as far as both ethnic groups were concerned. Nevertheless, such an approach created many problems regarding the consistency of editorial policy and the message sent to the public. Bosnian-Herzegovinian television was also plural in representing the peace process relating to the views of different political parties. Croatian and Serbian television, meanwhile, prioritised the respective ruling parties. Serb television covered the standpoints of the ruling Socialist party and its allies on ten occasions in this period, while the opposition parties were not mentioned at all. The same holds for representatives of the Orthodox Church who still supported the Bosnian Serbs. All three stations paid a great deal of attention to the statements of representatives of the international community, but only those who reaffirmed the official image of the peace process.

The content analyses and review of the sources of information showed that television displayed “*an exclusive interpretation pattern*” that was not open to the ideas, standpoints and views of the opposite side. The usual “us and them” propaganda construct was employed. To this end, “we” are innocent and “they” are to be blamed for all the problems, “we” want peace, “they” obstruct it, and

“we” support the peace process, “they” create stumbling blocks. Also, the differences between the report and commentary were not respected, hence, the journalists mixed it up and “ennobled” their reports with their own exclusive views. Hence, the reports did not inform the public, but provided the journalists’ subjective interpretation. All the important events (the Geneva meeting at this time) were accompanied by 10-minute speeches of the most prominent state politicians in the News of the Day programmes – in this case, Dr. Franjo Tudjman (Croatia), Slobodan Milošević (Serbia) and Alija Izetbegović (Bosnia-Herzegovina).

The visual interpretation of concrete events was most prominent on the Croatian network, while the Serbian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian stations were more static in that respect, often providing only “postcards” of the cities reported from and still pictures of the personalities referred to. In those cases, the television propaganda reduced itself to the level of radio.

Various *symbols* were not used as frequently in post-Dayton television propaganda as had been the case during the war (Malešić 1997:185). The national, para-state, religious and military symbols were replaced by official state symbols, especially of Bosnia-Herzegovina (a new national flag) and Croatia (a national herald), while Serbian television did not display symbols at all. *The language of propaganda* also changed – Manichean, hyperbolic, highly emotional and redundant style language was replaced by the language of accusation of the other side. This served to prevent the peace agreement from functioning. The language is more rational, with the value-charged and extremely negative characterisations of the other side being abandoned. This was the logical consequence of the peace agreement having been signed and there be-

ing no longer any need to mobilise the public for war. The post-Dayton propaganda language conforms to official political language and follows the political objectives of the respective states. For example, Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian television referred to the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as “a former Yugoslavia”, while Serbian television referred to it as “a preceding Yugoslavia”. The difference stems from the controversial standpoint as far as the continuity of the former state is concerned – according to the Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian political elites, former Yugoslavia fell apart, while for the Serbian and Montenegrin political elites, some republics of SFRY seceded from the then state.

In conclusion, the representatives of the international community in former Yugoslavia witnessed a very hostile climate produced by the mass media activities in the region. They all saw mass media as an instigator of the conflicts and an impediment to an effective peace process when the armed clashes ceased. The presented analyses confirmed that observation by disclosing a propaganda role of mass media ordered to them by the po-

litical elite, and by stressing the fact that the public was an object of long-term »brain-washing« and ideological, and nationalistic pressure, which prevented the population from judging the situation objectively. The existent political culture and an inclination toward authoritarianism helped the media to convey propaganda messages to the public.

The media analyses also showed that the international community actors that entered the conflicts to stop them and to make peace were under tremendous pressure from the local media. The peace plans were not presented to the public in a realistic way, creating too-great expectations from the public and frustrations when the implementation of the peace plans initiated. Obviously, the peace support forces were victim of the unrealistically high expectations of the public, and we will aim at checking the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina through public opinion polls. It is also obvious that positive changes in media attitudes toward peace support operation could influence the public and stimulate a positive behaviour toward the peacekeepers, which is crucial to the success of peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

THE POST-DAYTON MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In socialist Yugoslavia, the media were not free and independent, meaning they were (in)directly controlled by the one, and only, (communist) political party and by the state institutions. The authoritarian regime did not allow freedom of speech in general. The notorious Article 133 of the Federal Criminal Act introduced the *verbal delict*, meaning that the freedom of speech was not respected by the authorities.

There were, however, some exceptions, especially in times of political thaw. These came in cycles, relating to the more and less oppressive attitudes of the »party« and »state« against mass media at different times. Some professional journals (*Perspektive*, *Praxis*, *Nova revija* and others) with a smaller audience occasionally tackled »taboo« topics and widened the space of communication, but sooner or later they would be repressed. At the beginning of the 1980s, some political weeklies (among others *Mladina*, *Danas*, *NIN*) were also quite critical of the political establishment. Although there was a great deal of criticism in the media, they criticised bureaucracy, technocracy, hyperinstitutionalisation and the inefficiency of state institutions. But they remained on the periphery, while the core elements of the socialist system, especially the communist party and Yugoslav Peo-

ple's Army, remained almost untouched, until the second half of the 1980s when those topics were opened.

The mass media were decentralised in Yugoslavia, especially after the 1974 Federal Constitution. This was necessary because of the great national, linguistic and cultural differences and barriers among the Yugoslav nations and nationalities. There was no significant federal media that would influence public opinion in general, and therefore it was primarily print and electronic media in the republics that influenced the formation of popular attitudes toward various social issues. In fact, this decentralisation was territorial-political. There was still an ideological centralisation, stemming from the aforementioned control of the communist party and its heavy promotion of the socialist ideology. However, the media situation was not the same throughout the country and the threshold of media freedom differed significantly among republics.

In the late 1980s, the ideological centralisation of the communist party vanished and was replaced by other ideologies, the most prominent being *nationalism*. Since that time the media was decentralised in both a territorial-political and ideological sense, heading to a severe struggle of different types of nationalism.

Mass Media in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Nineties

The conditions in which the mass media had to operate have been very changeable and dynamic in the last decade in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1990, when the socialist system in former Yugoslavia and the rest of East Europe was approaching its end, many new print and electronic media were established. In addition, a young generation of relatively independent journalists appeared, and the process of media ownership transformation began, meaning that the state-owned media were privatised. In autumn 1990, the first free and independent multi-party election was held in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the election campaign mirrored the situation across the whole former Yugoslavia – strict national homogenisation. Three main nationalist political parties won the election in their own Bosniac, Serbian and Croat surroundings of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they continued to consolidate their positions in the mass media. Hence, the control of the mass media was transferred from the communist party to the ruling nationalist political parties in their respective areas.

The media war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started ten months before the first grenades fell on Sarajevo, namely in July 1991 when Serb police from Banja Luka occupied a radio and TV transmitter of *RTV Sarajevo* on Kozara mountain and configured it to receive *RTV Belgrade*. The justification was “anti-Serbian behaviour coming from Sarajevo”.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which started in April 1992, stopped the technological development of mass media and destroyed a great deal of the related infrastructure. The majority of newspapers and electronic media became a propaganda tool of the civil and military authorities and other centres of power that emerged in the partitioned

country.⁸ Foreign mass media, especially Croatian and Serbian television, competed in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the benefit of their own states and to the detriment of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian people (Malešić 1997).

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, mass media under the control of the ruling Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) became the centre of severe nationalistic indoctrination and even racism prior to and during the war. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, alternative and relatively independent mass media appeared in the northern parts of today's Republic of Srpska (the areas of Banja Luka, Bijelina and Doboj). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the area controlled by the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), only media that supported HDZ policy existed. Media on the territory controlled by the Sarajevo government were a bit more free and independent, especially in the bigger cities where critical journalism in fact did exist. However, the state radio and television of Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the direct supervision and influence of the state authorities and the

⁸ The content analyses of the printed media accomplished by Stojak and Resić (1994) in 1992-3 showed that the topics covered by the newspapers and journals referred mainly to the actual everyday events related to the war in the country, the transformation of lifestyle in war circumstances, but also addressed the dilemmas of common life after the war. All topics were very much politicised. It is very interesting that the topics related to culture, art and sport were well represented in the analysed media; we could interpret this as an endeavour of media to establish a kind of counterweight to a war tragedy and to develop a sense of “normality of life”. The quantity and length of articles devoted to the economy, humanitarian assistance and refugees were rather small. In the ideological sense, the ideologies of nationalism and religion were predominant, while the main ideas that appeared in the media were the ideas of victory, hatred and “all against us”. The messages conveyed to the public were either positive (“us”) or negative (“them”), while the neutral ones were rare.

Table 2: The number of print and electronic media in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991, 1996 and 1998

1991: 377 newspapers, 54 radio stations, 1 national (with three channels) and 4 other TV stations, 1 news agency

1996: 145 newspapers, 92 radio stations, 29 TV stations, 6 news agencies

| | | |
|--|---|-------------------------------|
| <i>Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina:</i> | → | <i>Under Croat control:</i> |
| 120 newspapers | | 10 newspapers |
| 56 radio stations | | 15 radio stations |
| 22 TV stations | | 5 TV stations |
| 5 news agencies | | 1 news agency |
| ↓ | | |
| <i>Under Bosniac control:</i> | | <i>Under Serbian control:</i> |
| 110 newspapers | | 25 newspapers |
| 41 radio stations | | 36 radio stations |
| 17 TV stations | | 7 TV stations |
| 4 news agencies | | 1 news agency |

1998: 138 newspapers, 170 radio stations, 59 TV stations, 11 news agencies

Bosniac-Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA). At the local level, with no exception, the mass media were *part of the propaganda machinery of local civilian and military authorities, regardless of the ownership of the media.*

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a great impact on mass media; editors and journalists and three media systems were established as a consequence of the national, political and territorial divisions of the country. These three systems do not correspond with each other, and have become accustomed to being the propaganda tool of their own side, producing three different “realities” of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Journalists have had many difficulties in adjusting to a normal function of media – to inform, to examine, to educate and to amuse, and as far as post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, to become a factor of creating trust between nations and of tolerant spirit proliferation.

The understanding of these figures can be

increased by the comparison of figures on population structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina in years 1991 and 1997. The figures are presented in Table 3.

The general impression from these figures is that the electronic media gained ascendancy in the development of Bosnia’s media in the 1990s, while the print media lost a great deal of ground. Despite the war and the destruction of transmitters, the number of radio and TV stations increased significantly between 1991-6; meanwhile, the number of print media dropped by more than a half and the number of news agencies increased from 1 to 6. A comparison of 1996 and 1998 reveals that the number of newspapers decreased slightly and then relatively stabilised, while the numbers of radio and TV stations and news agencies doubled. The figures also show that the majority of print media, electronic media and news agencies are controlled by Bosniacs.

Table 3: The national structure of population in 1991 and 1997

| | Bosniacs | Croats | Serbs | Others | Total |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| 1991 | 1,902,956 | 760,852 | 1,366,104 | 347,121 | 4,377,033 |
| 1997 (residents) | 1,340,975 | 450,817 | 1,052,009 | 57,412 | 2,899,262 |
| 1997 (displaced persons) | 448,718 | 119,499 | 440,173 | 780 | 1,009,170 |

Given the demographics, there is a proportionally high number of print and electronic mass media. It is also clear that the number of those categorised as “others” (mainly those who proclaimed themselves as being Yugoslavs) decreased significantly after the war, and this could undoubtedly be significantly attributed to the exclusively nationalist patterns of reporting and mobilising audiences.

The majority of TV stations are state-owned, some are private, and the rest either have mixed ownership or have yet to resolve the problem of ownership. There are many technical and financial problems that especially limit the activity of local media, which sometimes cease to operate.

The expansion of all kinds of mass media in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been allowed by very liberal legal requests and helped by international assistance. Alternative and independent media are supported by organisations like USAID, the Soros Foundation, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission. State-controlled media in the Federation were given help by European and Islamic states. Meanwhile, local radio and TV stations were supported by other European local authorities and organisations, no doubt animated by Bosnian refugee associations. After signing the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Republic of Srpska also started to receive international help to create and develop its mass media.

The 1996 election campaign transformed the media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

particularly in the Republic of Srpska where the totalitarian media situation was endangered by the founding of a few alternative and critical newspapers, magazines and electronic media (*Alternativa, Novi Prelom, Panorama, Nezavisne novine, Best radio Šipovo* and *NTV Banja Luka*). In addition, some private radio and television stations were established, but avoided coverage of political topics and did not carry informative programmes. The process of media pluralisation was enabled by international pressure, assistance and initiatives, combined with the individual courage of editors and journalists.

Media pluralisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was made easier because there had been an independent and free media prior to the war, while further outlets had emerged during the fighting (*Oslobođenje, Dani, Slobodna Bosna, Studio 99* and *Zetel*). These made a significant contribution to the democratic atmosphere of the post-war period in the country.

The elections in 1996 were an adequate test of the autonomous nature of mass media in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁹ Television seemed to

⁹ Annex 3 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Agreement on Election, specifically requests that the parties involved provide the necessary conditions for free and fair elections, and especially a politically neutral atmosphere. They are requested to respect the right of secret voting without intimidation and *they must assure the freedom of speech and press, and allow political associations and provide for the free movement of people.*

be the most influential medium during the campaign – not only stations located in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also those who covered the country in Serbia and Croatia.¹⁰ The impartiality of all television stations was badly hidden and the international community had to press media to be more objective. The situation was worst in the Republic of Srpska, where television displayed a strong nationalism and intolerance toward other nations. However, the impact of the media in general was limited due to the fear and distrust among voters.¹¹ This is an interesting phenomenon, indicating that people's voting decisions are not based on political party manifestos but rather on more basic things like national and religious affiliations.

It was clear from the mass media content analyses that there was a great deal of partiality and manipulation during the election campaign (Media Plan 1997). Among these, the most obvious was the negative selection of information, changes in the meaning of news, the limited scope of information sources and the taking into account of exclusively official sources. Equally, there was no distinction made between the report and the commentary. Commentaries were made prior to the reporting of the news, judgements were made without proper argument, there was "dirty language", and preference was given to one political opinion to the detriment of others.

The situation has not improved much in

the following years: the electronic media in the Republic of Srpska and the part of the Federation controlled by the Croatian *HDZ* still openly supports the ruling parties and ferments tension and mistrust. The State-owned electronic media of the Federation have a more balanced programme. However, they only partially support the government dominated by the Muslim *SDA*. Even *RTV Bosnia-Herzegovina* lost a great deal of its previously recognised impartiality and gave itself a Bosniac orientation, thereby shedding its multinational character.

These problems were exacerbated by legal chaos, which inevitably impedes democratisation, economic stability and the development of mass media.

The professionalism of the media, editors and journalists seems to have been the major factor behind the media's democratisation and development, but is very much limited by the existent political culture and communication culture.¹² The autonomy and quality of mass media is more the exception than the rule, and more a result of the individual characteristics of editors and journalists than a thoughtful and planned development of a media landscape. The education of editors and journalists is therefore of crucial importance to the improvement of the media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Let us now introduce the general situation regarding the position of different types of mass media in Bosnia-Herzegovina in recent years.

¹⁰ The 1998 USIA poll of Bosnian Croats indicated that the vast majority (85%) relied on television for information on the then impending election; much fewer used the radio (4%), magazines (3%) or campaign sources (2%). As television was the dominant medium, the Croatian state-run *HTV* was the dominant network for election related news (91%).

¹¹ The USIA poll also indicated that the media had little (44%) or no (27%) influence on voting. Only 27% acknowledged at least some media influence.

¹² The analyses showed that the "language of hatred" mass media used in the pre-war and war periods lost its strength and became more normal in recent years. This was envisaged by our previous research report on propaganda in war (Malešić 1997), but we warned that the normal expressions could still have very negative associations for the people involved in the war, especially for soldiers and victims.

Television

Apart from the three major television stations, *TV Bosnia-Herzegovina*, *TV Široki Brijeg* and *TV Pale*, there are many local stations that emerged when the process of democratisation and political pluralism took hold at the beginning of the 1990s. These local stations have a brief history, having been established either prior to or during the war. War conditions, the social changes they caused and the lack of an adequate legal framework brought a host of difficulties to the process of profiling the broadcasting system. The legal resolution of network frequencies' delivery and of copyrights to the produced programme were two of the pivotal issues to be solved. Social and international incentives could help the process to be less spontaneous and disorganised, especially by creating market conditions that could stimulate media competition and independence.

Why do individuals and/or institutions establish television stations? The motives are numerous, ranging from the desire to overcome the communication blockade, to patriotism, to national and religious affirmation, to promotion of political interests and to commercial expectation. New television stations have obvious problems in finding their role in the media landscape and identifying the role of free journalism. In addition, many young journalists who work in broadcasting see it as a way of personal promotion and status rather than a way to promote professional ethics. In such a situation, the ownership of the station defines the character of its programmes. Programme quality also depends on the stations' relatively scarce technical, personnel and material resources.

The negative trend depicted above is often supported by the international aid organisations, which, instead of supporting the existing television stations, prefer to establish new

ones, and by doing so further complicate the media landscape and reduce the credibility and professional image of the media in general.

Hence, television in general lacks a firm legal framework, educated personnel and advanced technical equipment.

Radio

The story of radio is not entirely different from that of television, save for the fact that, in the 1980s, almost every municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina had its own radio station. Therefore the ownership structure is different from that of television, but one should not neglect the fact that the ownership transformation as far as radio is concerned has yet to be concluded. The lack of a legal basis limits radio and works against the widening of communication space. The main problems are undefined registration procedures, the issuing of frequency licences and the organisational scheme of radio stations. As seen in Table 2, there are many radio stations, but their physical development is not matched by an adequate structure and programme quality. Personnel is also a limiting factor for radio development, and this is the main reason (together with the low standard of technical equipment) why radio stations frequently rebroadcast other foreign and domestic programmes rather than creating their own.

Print Media

The main characteristics of the print media in Bosnia-Herzegovina are diversity and huge fluctuation. There are around ten relatively stable dailies, weeklies and monthlies (*Oslobođenje*, *Večernje novine*, *Bošnjčki avaz*, *Bosna East*, *Zmaj od Bosne*, *Front slobode*, *Naša riječ*, *Hrvatska riječ*, *Tuzla-list*, *Dani*, *Ljiljan*, *Republika* and *Mostarsko jutro*); their appearance is constant, the content profile is recognisable, they

have an adequate cadre basis and network of collaborators, and they are technically reasonably equipped. All of them have predominantly an informative-political character.

Beside informative-political print media, there are others that could be categorised as cultural-educational, religious and print media for children. Even during the war from 1992-5, newspapers that mainly covered sport, amusements and music appeared quite frequently. True professionalism is still far away, however: the dynamics of appearance do not conform with actuality, the target audience is not defined and editorial policy is not stable. Technical equipment, especially computer support, is also in very bad condition.

News Agencies

The most important news agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina in recent years were *BiH PRESS* (covering the whole Federation), *ONASA* (independent within the Oslobođenje group), *MINA* (for the Muslim community), *SRNA* (the Republic of Srpska) and *HNA* (for the Croatian region of Bosnia-Herzegovina). The main sources of information for the news agencies are state and para-state bodies, domestic and foreign mass media, and civilian and military (SFOR) international representatives.

Autonomy of Mass Media?

The Media Plan in Sarajevo established the extent to which mass media in Bosnia-Herzegovina were instrumentalised by the state, political parties and other institutional and non-institutional centres of power (Media Plan, 1997). During the war in 1992-5 and after, the centres of power and their impact upon mass media output were hidden. Formally, the state does not influence the media and

its content, since there is no formal censorship, and the legal framework – to the extent that it exists – is very liberal; likewise, political parties also do not exert an influence. Much greater influence is provided by non-institutional factors and the individuals who act as their representatives. Mass media are very much dependent on the will of donors, owners of enterprises and foundations; however, names of these parties are kept secret. Circulation is not an adequate indicator of the quality and importance of print media – some, for different reasons, print fewer copies than they can sell. Other newspapers print more copies because of the financial support they receive and the copies are free, but the true influence on the audience is rather small. During the war two “media fronts” were formed, one being civilian and multicultural, the other being nationalist; this does not apply exclusively to print media.

As Chandler (2000:112) put it “the media climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains far from perfect, especially in the Republic of Srpska and Western Herzegovina. It is widely accepted that here is a close relationship between control of the media and political activities, also indeed with the will to comply with the Peace Agreement”.

International Community Media Regime

Apart from the domestic mass media, international media operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the peace support operation, and this seems to be an important segment of the country's media landscape. It produces radio programmes, television broadcasts, newspapers and journals, brochures, occasional information sheets and Internet messages. And it is worth mentioning that SFOR created a special Combined Joint Information

Campaign Task Force that releases video-clips on the military part of peace operations devoted to the general public.

There is also an Independent Media Commission, established by the EU, that works as a media ombudsman in the country. In 1999, it became the primary focus of media reform and regulation and a key factor touching upon all the major objectives of the international community. The Commission's mandate was to "create...a permanent system for regulation and control of the broadcasting sector with a fair, open and professional regulatory system for broadcast media throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. This regulatory system is important to the development of a media market and the larger market economy."¹³ It was to work in three key areas: (1) the establishment of a free and open broadcasting environment, (2) the protection of journalistic freedom, and (3) to encourage the effective use of the Radio Frequency Spectrum. The major tasks of the Commission were to ensure adoption of the Press Code, to issue provisional and permanent broadcast licences, to realign broadcast frequencies, to establish the Press Council, and to make proposals on Election Law, Media and Broadcast Law and copyright and related laws. It also has a coercive mandate in the sense that it was authorised to close down the medium in the event of its non-compliance to the rules introduced by the international community.

The powers of OSCE in the sphere of mass media have also been greatly extended in recent years. The OSCE-headed Provisional Election Commission rules provided for authorities at all levels to adhere to certain standards, which include (Chandler 2000:117, 128) fair reporting, avoiding inflammatory lan-

guage and providing accurate and balanced information. In addition, OSCE has an unprecedented control over media output, including the power to punish those who do not comply with its requests, a possibility to request the release of election-related material produced by OSCE and a possibility to demand from Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities that licences and frequencies for electronic and print media be granted expeditiously, on the basis of objective non-political criteria.

Mass Media Market

It is typical of Bosnia-Herzegovina today that mass media develop and the numbers of media available change regardless of the level of general and specific (media) market development. At the end of 1995, when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, there was no media market in the country, but there were over 100 radio stations, 37 TV stations and 154 newspapers which is, as far as the latter is concerned, more than today. How was it possible that mass media prospered with such intensity during the war, when many communications were cut and people's standard of living was so low? Here are some possible explanations: (1) the duty of mass media owned by the state or controlled by political parties or local civilian and military authorities was war propaganda, while more independent media spread ideas of civil society, therefore, *media had primarily the political function in the society*, while the economic aspect (profit) was totally neglected, (2) the legal chaos provided very liberal conditions for media creation, the only hindrance being the political concordance with the prevailing force in the area: *the media landscape was changing according to the changes on the front*, (3) the technical standards adopted were extremely low: it was important only that "*we were read, heard and seen*", (4) *media op-*

¹³ Peace Implementation Council – Madrid 1998 Annex III.3.

eration was cheap: employees were not paid, copyrights were not respected, material costs were not covered: it was a war, and (5) a great deal of media was able to survive *due to extensive international help* from different geographical and ideological directions.

When the market started to work after the Dayton Agreement, at least partially, the first victim of the new circumstances in the country was the print media – the politicians were no longer interested in giving support and the purchasing power of people did not allow them the frequent purchase of newspapers and journals. On the other hand, the number of radio and TV stations in that period increased, meaning that the electronic media still operated according to low programme and technical standards and still exploited some of the advantages of wartime.

The cantonisation of the country causes many problems in the creation of a common mass media market. There are three media systems currently operating without adequate communication between them. The Republic of Srpska is connected to the rest of the world via the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina via Croatia, while the rest of the Federation finds itself in a communication sandwich. The newspapers do not circulate; therefore, it is not possible to buy various newspapers in different parts of the country. Even the commercials of the “other side” are not allowed to be released by the media, regardless of the positive financial impact such an act would cause. There are no written rules banning the cooperation, but it seems that people accepted the logic of division as a consequence of the war – *each entity has its own territory, armed forces, police, political parties and mass media*. The most prominent generators of this situation are TV stations that operate within the entities – they are not cooperative and they address audiences that

are divided along the national(istic) lines.

In practical terms, there is no adequate mass media market in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. The preconditions for that seem to be the full privatisation of mass media, the education of mass media managers and thorough research of the market. In this context, mass media professionals should be enabled to define their target audiences, to identify the competition, to make cost-benefit analyses, to identify the potential consumers of commercials and those who will order them, and to invest money and energy in the education of employees.

To conclude, Bosnian-Herzegovinian mass media suffered tremendously during the war in 1992–95 and the media landscape today consists of organisations with the pre-war tradition, war experience and the habits formed in a post-war period. The data showed that the media landscape is very unstable, changeable, and, especially for print media, highly fluid.

New sources of information appear to become more and more important, enabling the mass media to cope with media blockade typical of the last decade. The media market has not yet been developed and the relationship between ownership and editorial policy is undemocratic.

The present legal framework is insufficient to allow for the comprehensive development of commercial and public media systems. The war cut the supply of new technology and the media lags behind the typical technological progress of the rest of the South-East European region. The quantity and quality of personnel involved in media production is not high enough to provide a sustainable development of media systems and professional, autonomous and democratic media activity among the Bosnian-Herzegovinian community.

In the last couple of years, the international

community's media regime has played an important role in establishing "order" and creating better conditions for the operation of mass media. This activity seems to be of the greatest benefit for the electronic mass media that has suffered the most from the legal and broadcasting (frequencies) chaos.

The analysis of the media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina reveals that there are three media systems operating along the national »borders«, autonomous each from the other, and with no adequate communication between them. They are to a great extent controlled by the national political parties in their respective entities. All in all, one can find a mixture of old and new styles and habits in media reporting; the dynamics of the media systems are very high, therefore the media landscape has not yet been fully established.

In the next chapter we will explore the attitude of the public in one region of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward the mass media on the one hand, and toward the peace operation and SFOR on the other. We will primarily try to determine whether the public endorses the above depicted media policy. We will also check whether the public trusts the media. One of the crucial tasks is to determine if the public receives objective information about the peace support operations and what its attitude is toward Nordic Polish Brigade and SFOR activities in the region and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in general. No doubt, the role of mass media is crucial in forming this attitude; consequently, media activity is one of the pivotal tools in striving to achieve success in peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

PUBLIC OPINION ON MASS MEDIA AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

As announced at the end of previous chapter, the opinion poll was conducted on mass media habits, and on the attitude of the people toward peacekeeping forces in one region of Bosnia-Herzegovina – Dobož. This region was under the responsibility of the Nordic-Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade, within the overall SFOR effort to bring sustainable peace to the country. The purpose of the poll was to identify the most influential media in the region and the consumer habits of the population as far as mass media are concerned, to reveal the potential points of collision between the population and peacekeepers, to find ways to improve SFOR's image and to disclose misinformation and propaganda presented through local media. The results obtained should help SFOR's and NORDPOL's command structures, especially those responsible for public relations, to operate consistent and effective public relations regarding the peacekeeping mission, SFOR's role in Bosnia-Herzegovina and NORDPOL's role in Dobož.

According to Major Anders Johansson, an active member of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NORDPOL Brigade put much focus upon the importance of keeping the public informed on its activities and established a fruitful cooperation with the local community. Much of this communication took place through the work with the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) efforts, social patrols and through contacts with local media. The open-minded contact enhanced

NORDPOL's chances of a successful peace implementation and stabilisation of the post-conflict environment. By maintaining this dialogue with the public, NORDPOL expected to make itself less vulnerable to propaganda from hard-liner elements and held an open possibility to counter deliberate misinformation and anti-peace activities such as orchestrated riots and other type of violence directed toward SFOR-personnel or the former warring factions. A secondary aim was to establish a good example how western world democratic institutions respect a need for a dialogue with its own populations.

To further describe NORDPOL press and information activities up to 1999: NORDPOL had succeeded in establishing an extensive network of more than 40 local journalists who kept a regular professional exchange with on a weekly basis. At its peak this included weekly press conferences held jointly with OSCE and UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), as well as close cooperation with 16 radio stations amounting to 13 hours of live broadcast. Also, monthly special press arrangements such as press field trips were arranged on SFOR activities. Great effort was put on explaining NORDPOL activities and its role in the peace process. The road to travel in order to achieve this has been long and filled with ordeals, obstacles and a great deal of hard work. To get to the point where journalists from all entities would come to the same press conference would not have been

possible without some good will from the local journalists and the exemplary dedication of the NORDPOL press and information officers. In 1995 these same journalists were filled with suspicion and hatred against each other and refused to meet even on a professional basis. Therefore, NORDPOL had to hold two identical but separate press conferences since they otherwise would have been boycotted, just because journalists from the Republic of Srpska and the Federation refused to meet.

A series of journalist seminars where all entities were represented started during the fall of 1998, directed at developing the local journalists' skills, morals and ethics. This programme developed through a dialogue with NORDPOL Brigade press and information section, the local journalists, journalists from Sweden and Norway and in later seminars also with the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence. The programme ran successfully up to May 1999 and helped to develop the professional relationship between NORDPOL and the local journalists. The latter accepted the programme since they could get new insights on the role of journalism, editorial matters and media in general in democratic societies. The programme has, together with other NORDPOL press activities, significantly helped to create an atmosphere of collegial respect, unity and collegiality between some of the local journalists, despite cultural differences and former hostilities between these entities and individuals.

A problem at the time was the fact that there were few reliable, if any at all, polls made of the public opinion in the brigade's area of responsibility. The brigade did not have any way of judging how successful it was in its communication with the local populace. Press and information activities had reached close to their maximum performance when it came to external information and

press activities. Any future downsizing in personnel would mean that cooperation with local media in general and live broadcast on local radio stations in particular had to be harshly prioritised and a sound analysis had to prove that the remaining selection of media supported NORDPOL aspirations to communicate as effectively as possible with the local populace. Also, a study could help to develop and direct special information efforts for target audiences that were not reached through the existing media operations conducted by the NORDPOL Brigade.

This valuable experience was one of the reasons to conduct a public opinion poll on mass media and SFOR (NORDPOL). The poll was carried out in April 1999 by Mareco Index Bosnia, Sarajevo (a registered public opinion and market research agency), while the questionnaire was prepared by the Defence Studies Department of the University of Ljubljana, and elaborated somewhat and approved by the National Board of Psychological Defence, Stockholm, and a representative of the NORDPOL Brigade. The questionnaire consisted of 15 identifying questions, 23 functional questions and 13 demographic questions. The interviews were face to face in the respondents' homes and the interviewers were given uniform methodological instructions prior to the survey.

The substance of the questions can be summarized in different but inter-related groups: (1) sources of information in war and peacetime, (2) interest of the public in various mass media topics, (3) estimation of the media situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (4) most preferable electronic and print media (radio station, TV station, newspaper and journal) and the reasons for that, (5) level of trust in various mass media, (6) information about SFOR and NORDPOL Brigade activities and the sources of information on that, and (7) attitudes of the

public toward SFOR and NORDPOL Brigade activities.

According to official Bosnian government sources, the region of Dobož, which was the area of responsibility of the NORDPOL Brigade, had a total of 613,872 inhabitants, with 339,162 living in the Muslim-Croat Federation and 274,710 in Republika Srpska. This was the basis for the sampling. The sample itself was comprised of 600 respondents over 18 years of age, and living in the region of Dobož, 300 from Republika Srpska (Derventa 70, Dobož 140 and Teslić 90) and 300 from the Federation (Gradaćac 70, Graćanica 80, Lukavac 90, Dobož East 60).

The sample is thus representative of the region. Urban and rural areas were also taken into account, and all main nationalities living in the region were included. The sample was drawn using a multi-stage, stratified random sampling method. Stage one was the random selection of sampling points proportional to the distribution of population. Stage two was the random selection of starting points within each sampling point. Stage three was the selection of households using the »random route« technique. Stage four was the selection of individual respondents (one per household) using a random selection key (next birthday).

The poll was carried out by 18 interviewers (ten Bosniacs, one Bosnian Croat and seven Bosnian Serbs). The fieldwork was controlled by three supervisors (one Bosniac and two Bosnian Serbs) who checked 10% of all interviews by telephone or personal visit. The interviewers established 819 contacts due to the fact that 219 randomly selected respondents refused to participate in the poll. The reasons for the refusal were different, ranging from not interested in the interview (131 refusals), respondent never at home (29 refusals), political reasons (43 refusals), to reasons of privacy

(16 refusals). Thus 281 Serbs, 280 Bosniacs, 33 Croats, 5 Yugoslaves, and 1 other were interviewed. The main results of the poll are presented below; the tables are, however, presented as an appendix.

Media Habits

Sources of Information

The overall results show (see Table A1 in appendix) that the most important sources of information during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina were national radio broadcasts (82%), national television (78%), local radio broadcasts (65%) and interpersonal communication – relatives, friends and neighbours (56%). Radio once again proved to be the most important source of information in times of crisis. This was confirmed during the 10-day mini-war in Slovenia of June–July 1991, where radio proved to be the most influential institutional source of information (Malešić 1994:285), and the Iraqi rocket attacks on Israel during the Gulf War in 1990–91 (Gal 1992:159). Apart from being the main source of information, the messages released through radio played an important role in mitigating uncertainty as a main cause of fear. Therefore, radio played an educational and therapeutic role by providing quick and reliable information. In both Slovenia and Israel, radio was able to maintain its peace-time characteristics and rules of functioning during war-time. These characteristics were the speed of reporting, credibility, authenticity and direct transmission. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the above described role of the radio holds only for the initial period of the war, while after a few months, radio lost its editorial openness and started to present propaganda, following television and print media (Thompson 1994:237).

The high figure for television as a source of

information during the war is somewhat surprising, given the typical circumstances of war – especially if we consider the endeavours of all warring factions to destroy the enemy’s radio and TV transmitters – and the rather complicated process of TV broadcasting in times of resource scarcity. Compared to the electronic mass media, the role of national and local newspapers and magazines seemed to be less important as a source of information. Obviously, people read newspapers less in times of war. Interestingly enough, military sources played an important role in providing information to soldiers and civilians, and we should also note the relatively high impact of the international media (press, radio, TV and internet) and international organisations (Red Cross, OSCE, EU, UN and NATO).

However, the table comparisons reveal differences between the Bosniac, Serb and Croat populations. During the war, Bosniacs relied on national and local radio and TV broadcasts. Serbs, meanwhile, did not turn to the international media and organisations, nor did they use local TV; rather, they relied on national (the Republic of Srpska) TV and radio, on relatives, friends and neighbours, as well as local radio. Sources of information were more evenly distributed among Croats, with an emphasis on national (Herzeg Bosna) radio and TV, and on local radio. More than a third of Croats in the sample also turned to the international media.

A clear majority of the respondents (72%) maintained mainly the same media consumer habits after the war, but 27% changed their main sources of information, by giving more emphasis to national TV and radio, local TV and radio, and newspapers and magazines (Tables A2 and A3). As can be seen from the tables, the most significant change took place among the Bosniacs, while the vast majority of Serbs retained their media habits into

peacetime. It should be noted that the media in some Bosniac areas were “nationalised” by Serbs and Croats after the war, so, many Bosniacs were “forced” to change their media habits. For Bosniacs and Croats, national and local television became more significant sources of information after than during the war. The Bosniacs have come to make greater use of international media. Croats, meanwhile, rely more today on relatives, friends and neighbours than before, and have largely abandoned the military as source of information (Table A4).

Almost all (95%) of respondents say that they own a radio receiver and/or a TV set, while the rest have access to both media, either through friends, cafes or through other means (Table A5).

The Interests of the Public and Credibility of Mass Media

We can see from Table A6 that the public in the region of Dobojski is mostly interested in international affairs (77% were very interested and rather interested) and domestic politics (80%), while other topics like art and culture, sports, military issues, crime and local politics, do not attract as much attention (reaching about 60%). When comparing the three nationalities we find that Bosniacs are most interested in domestic politics, international affairs and sport. Serbs are more interested in local politics, crime and military issues, whereas the Croats prefer art and culture.

Various domestic and international political, military and humanitarian actors, who deal with the peaceful consolidation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have very diversified attitudes toward mass media activity. We asked the respondents about the present media situation and the behaviour of the mass media in Bosnia by offering different statements on the development role of media, the level of media

control and the credibility of the media (Table A7).

As far as the development role of media is concerned, the majority of the public (69%) mainly agree that free and independent news media is a precondition for the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while 11% disagree. The control of the media is an interesting topic, as well. A (relative) majority of respondents (43% and 53%, respectively) mainly agree that journalists are controlled by media owners, and that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian news media is controlled by political leaders, but on the other hand, they approve of such a position by claiming that the »news media should be controlled in order to establish a peaceful development of Bosnia-Herzegovina« (49% mainly agree, while 21% mainly disagree).

In addition, there is obviously no adequate trust in the mass media. The statement that one can always trust Bosnian-Herzegovinian media was accepted by one-fifth of the respondents (19%), while the majority mainly disagree (54%). 23% mainly agree that news media mostly publish objective information. Half of the respondents mainly agree that Bosnian-Herzegovinian news media are partial and in favour of certain interests, while only 22% mainly disagree, and a majority (55%) think that news media serve as propaganda tools for their political leaders.

The most controversial issue seems to be whether or not news media reports unpleasant facts: 34% mainly agree, while 38% mainly disagree, that news media does not report unpleasant facts. As can be seen, the figure »don't know« answers was very high for all statements, ranging from one-fifth to one-third of respondents.

Of the three nationalities, Bosniacs agree most with the statements that free and independent news media is a precondition for the

development of Bosnia, that news media does not report unpleasant facts, that news media mostly produce objective information, and that Bosnian news media can always be trusted. Serbs agree most that news media serve as propaganda tools for political leaders, that Bosnian news media are controlled by political leaders, is partial and favours certain interests, and that the journalists are controlled by the media owners. Croats agree most that the news media should be controlled in order to facilitate the country's peaceful development.

In general terms, we could say that all three nationalities in the region of Dobož agree that free and independent mass media is crucial for the country's development; Bosniacs seem to put most trust in the media, Serbs are convinced that it is controlled by political elites, and Croats legitimise this control, believing that by so doing, a peaceful future is more feasible.


Most Preferable Electronic and Print Media

A set of questions was used to establish which mass media is most read, watched and listened to, and which mass media is most influential in the Dobož region, or at least within different entities and nationalities.

A vast majority of people in the region (87%) usually listen to the *radio news programmes* (Table A8). The most often listened to radio station among those who usually listen to a news programme is Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina (34%), followed by Serbian Radio (27%), and then by a set of local radio stations such as Radio Jungle (14%), Radio Dobož (10%), Radio Gračanica (9%) and Radio Dobož East (6%). All other radio stations seem to be less important as far as the news programmes are concerned.

However, there are significant differences

Figure 1: Radio and TV-habits during a day.



between the nationalities. About two-thirds of Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina’s audience are Bosniacs, with over one-fifth being Croatian, whereas Radio Doboj East and Radio Gračanica have an exclusively Bosniac audience. Serbian Radio and Radio Jungle are predominantly listened to by Serbs, with some Croats, while Radio Doboj has mainly a Serb audience. Hence, as far as local radio is concerned, Serbs and Croats have more in common than do Croats and Bosniacs, and, to some extent, the same to national radio. It is important to note that Croatian radio is not the preference of Bosnian Croats.

People usually listen to various radio stations for different reasons. In our case, among the major reasons for the selection of radio

stations were not religious or cultural reasons, but trust in the media (50%), the way certain radio stations deal with matters that concern the audience (42%), and the objective, impartial and truthful news they bring to the listeners (39%, Table A9). Further it can be seen that Serbs do not choose a radio station for offering the “best” (impartial, objective and honest) news; rather, they place most emphasis (at least more than the other two nationalities) on cultural and religious factors. Bosniacs and Croats, meanwhile, select radio stations because they frequently deal with matters that concern them and are seen to offer the “best” (impartial, objective and honest) news.

Two-fifths (40%) of the audience listen to

the radio all day, while others listen to it more or less throughout the day (Table A10). If we sum up those who listen to the radio all day and other groups, we find that the radio »prime time« is in the morning (until 10:00) and in the afternoon (between 2:00 and 6:00), although we could say that audiences are high throughout the day (Figure 1).

As seen from Table A11, almost all respondents (91%) watch *television news programmes*. Among the most popular stations are Bosnian and Herzegovinian Television (44%), Serbian Television (33%), Republic of Srpska Television (13%) and Croatian Television (9%). Among the most popular local television stations in the Doboj region are OBN (6%), Lukavac Television (5%) and Television K3 (4%).

Bosnian TV news broadcasts are primarily watched by Bosniacs and Croats, while Serbs prefer Serbian TV and Republic of Srpska TV. The two nationalities have more in common regarding television than radio, although Croats also watch Serbian and Republic of Srpska television. Bosnian national television is largely the reserve of Bosniacs.

All respondents who usually watch television news programmes watch at least one TV news programme per day. The major reasons behind selecting which television news programme to watch are not religious or cultural, but trust in the selected television network (55%), and the manner in which matters concerning the audience are dealt with (52%). Other reasons are that the programmes other than the news programmes are better (43%), and that the news is better in terms of objectivity, impartiality and truth (Table A12). The last three points apply more to Bosniacs and Croats, while Serbs choose the station they trust the most.

The majority of respondents (87%) watch television in the evening, from 6:00 until 10:00

p.m. (Table A13, Figure 1). Hence, if one wants to reach the television public with a certain message, the best time of doing it is in the evening.

Newspapers and magazines are read by 40% of the residents of Doboj region (Table A14), a rather small portion compared to the figures on radio and television. There is a group of newspapers with more than 10% of the readership, and in this group, the most popular newspapers and magazines are *Dnevni avaz-Daily avaz* (23%), *Glas srpski-Serbian Voice* (15%), *Večernje novosti-Evening News* (15%), *Večerne novine-Evening Newspaper* (12%), *Telegraf-Telegraf* (10%) and *Slobodna Bosna-Free Bosnia* (10%). Also significant is a group with 5–10% of readers, consisting of *Blic-Blitz* (7%), *Politika-Politics* (6%), and *Nezavisne novine-Independent Newspaper* (5%). Dailies are overwhelmingly read more than weeklies. Table A14 reiterates the differences between the nationalities: *Dnevni avaz* seems to be entirely Bosniac, *Glas srpski*, *Nezavisne novine* and *Blic* are entirely Serb, *Slobodna Bosna* is Bosniac and Croat, *Telegraf* and *Politika* are Serb and Croat, while *Večerne novine* seems to be the most acceptable to all three nationalities.

Again, the reasons for the preference of newspapers and magazines are not religious or cultural, but rather the print media dealing with matters concerning readers (61%), it being objective, impartial and truthful (41%), and trust in the respective newspapers and magazines (32%, Table A15). Once again, Serbs give greater weight to cultural and religious reasons, whereas the others stress the importance of the topics dealt with and impartiality. Price is not an important factor of newspaper selection among those who read them, and we do not know anything about the view on price among those who do not read newspapers and magazines at all.

Among other things the respondents were

asked about their trust in various mass media in light of conflicting or different information they provide about serious events happening in their community (Table A16). Taking into account very sceptical opinions about independence, impartiality and freedom of mass media in their country, most people put most trust in television (63%), then radio (13%), and finally newspapers (4%). Hence, all nationalities put most trust in television, but not to the same extent. More than three-quarters of Bosniacs, and over half of Croats trust TV, while over a half of Serbs do not. One-fifth of respondents (20%) do not know whom to trust, if at all; this especially applies to Serbs.

The results suggest an obvious contradiction: on the one hand, the intensity of reading/listening/watching mass media in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the public is rather high, while on the other hand, the level of trust in the same mass media is rather low, with the relative exception of television.

Peace Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public

Sources of Information on SFOR and NORDPOL Brigade

SFOR and NORDPOL have been in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Dobož region for several years now. The respondents were asked to estimate their knowledge about the work of SFOR and NORDPOL on a scale from 1 (not informed) to 5 (very well informed – Table A17). Almost one-third say that they are not informed, one-fifth is rather uninformed, but 5% say they are well informed. This implies that the public in the Dobož region is not very well informed about the endeavours of the international community to bring lasting peace to the country. There is at least an ostensible contradiction in that people often watch, listen to and read news but do not have much

knowledge about SFOR and NORDPOL. Does this mean that these are not topics covered by mass media or that it is news but people are not interested? But once again nationality comes to the fore, due to the varying amount of available information. Over half of the Serb population (55%) claim that they are not informed on NORDPOL and SFOR missions and activities, while the other two nationalities (according to themselves) seem to be rather well informed.

Surprisingly, the question on sources of information about SFOR and NORDPOL shows that 50% of people in the Dobož region are not interested and do not want this sort of information (Table A18). Others, among those who want information, claim that the most valuable sources of information on SFOR and NORDPOL are local broadcasts (51%), and national radio broadcasts (47%), national television broadcasts (35%) and local newspapers and magazines (30%). For approximately 15% of the public, one of the sources of information regarding SFOR and NORDPOL are international media (press, radio, TV or/and internet) and international organisations (Red Cross, OSCE, EU, UN and/or NATO).

Two-thirds of Bosniacs do not want further information; the corresponding figure in the other two nationalities is 26% and 27%, respectively. For Bosniacs, the most valuable sources of information on NORDPOL and SFOR are local radio broadcasts (80%), national TV (68%) and national radio (65%). Serbs primarily seem to use sources other than those listed in the table, and the Croats obtain information on NORDPOL and SFOR from national and local radio broadcasts and brochures.

Mandate and Missions of International Peacekeeping Forces

There were many occasions during the peace support operations when international actors,

including SFOR and NORDPOL, were exposed due to the alleged misuse of their mandate and specific competencies. In recent years, all sorts of information, including rumours and hearsay, were spread about the international forces' activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, as well as information about the activities of the Nordic-Polish Brigade (NORDPOL) in the Doboï region. We selected a few of these rumours and asked the respondents if they had heard about them, and if they had we followed up by asking them if they believed the rumour in question (Table A19).

The first information to be offered was: »In 1995, radioactive bombs and bullets were used during NATO air strikes on Republic of Serbia Army positions, causing an environmental problem«. One-quarter of the respondents had not heard of this or did not remember. One-third had heard the information but did not believe it, and one-third believed it entirely.

The second statement was on the alleged harassment activity of NORDPOL in Doboï: »NORDPOL Brigade harasses the local populace and conducts illegal house searches for weapons«. Thirty per cent of the people had not heard of this or did not remember, 33% had heard but did not believe it, while the rest of the population either partly (14%) or entirely (23%) believed it.

The third item was: »The members of the NORDPOL Brigade deliberately scare children during the house searching by pointing their weapons at them and their parents«. Thirty-six per cent had not heard about this or did not remember, 39% had heard but did not believe it, while one-quarter either believed it partly or entirely. The last contestable information was: »The reflectors that SFOR uses and hand out to facilitate road traffic at night are radioactive«. Almost 45% of respon-

dents had not heard about this or did not remember, approximately 40% had heard but did not believe it, while others either believed it partly (10%) or entirely (7%).

Crosstabulation reveals that Bosniacs seldom believed these "rumours", while some Croats did believe and Serbs were much more prone to believe. The results reveal that the public in the region of Doboï, and perhaps in Bosnia-Herzegovina in general, is very much susceptible to rumours and hearsay, meaning that all available instruments and procedures (quick information about the intentions, explanation of procedures and techniques used, use of reliable and trustful channels to release the information, and so on) to keep rumours from spreading should be used more frequently and systematically.

SFOR's tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina are undoubtedly very complex and important, and the respondents were asked to assess selected tasks performed by SFOR in terms of their importance (Table A20). Accordingly, the most important of SFOR's tasks among those in the list are assisting and training Entity Armed Forces in mine-clearing operations, monitoring the zones of separation and monitoring EAF mine lifting/clearing operations. All these tasks were assessed to be important by approximately two-thirds of the sample. Other tasks – confiscating weapons, maintaining a safe and secure environment, providing humanitarian assistance, apprehending indicted war criminals, monitoring the Entity's army training and movement activities, providing medical assistance and conducting weapon storage site inspections – were assessed as important by approximately half the population.

It is interesting to note that about one-fifth of the respondents could not assess the importance or unimportance of these ten SFOR tasks, even in cases which seem to be of a

great direct benefit to inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as mine-clearing activity and maintaining a safe and secure environment.

However, nationality again played a crucial role in perceiving the importance of different tasks. For Bosniacs, all the tasks are important (from 74–96%). Croats do not quite match this enthusiasm (from 42–72%), and only (9–47%) of Serbs accept their importance. Almost all Bosniacs (96%) think that an important task for the international forces is to apprehend indicted war criminals, whereas among the Serbs, only 9% think so. For Croats, an important task (according to 72%) is to assist and train entity armed forces in mine-clearing. Of the three ethnic groups, Serbs most frequently used the “do not know” option.

Table A21 shows that people in the region of Doboj mainly agree that it is safe to live in the NORDPOL Brigade’s area of responsibility, that NORDPOL Brigade established good cooperation with the local population and local authorities and tries to establish equal relations with all communities, that the peace is in danger if SFOR withdraws from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the withdrawal of the NORDPOL Brigade would be a threat to security in the area. At the same time, the respondents mainly disagree that the number of SFOR personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be increased (14% strongly agree, 19% agree somewhat, 14% disagree, 26% strongly disagree, 27% don’t know), which is actually the confirmation of the international community’s present policy as far as the number of troops on the ground is concerned.

As far as the security of the region and country in general is concerned, people estimate security will diminish after the withdrawal of NORDPOL (29% strongly agree, 27% agree somewhat, 10% disagree, 14% strongly disagree, 20% don’t know), and that

the withdrawal of SFOR from Bosnia-Herzegovina would lead to a renewal of the conflict (32% strongly agree, 28% agree somewhat, 8% disagree, 15% strongly disagree, 18% don’t know). It is interesting that on average more than 20% could not provide an assessment of the situation they live in, answering »don’t know«.

The answers also demonstrate that the majority of Bosniacs strongly agree with all but one statement on the subject, while on average, the same applies for over a third of Croats. Less than 10% of Serbs strongly agree with the statements. However, all three nationalities relatively agree that the number of SFOR personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina should *not* be increased. Again, the “do not know” option is most used by Serbs.

To conclude we have found that the media habits of the public in the region of Doboj is focused on electronic media, i.e. television, and radio. The majority of the public maintained the same media habits as during the war. Especially among the Serbian public, while the Bosnian public somewhat changed their media habits after the war. In general the public is most interested in international affairs and domestic politics. All ethnic groups agree that a free and independent mass media is a prerequisite for peaceful development in the country. However, people do tend to choose media according to their national affiliation. It is important to stress that the Serbian public in the region functions in what can be viewed as a peculiar way. They follow only Serbian mass media, they claim that the mass media is controlled by a political elite, and they do not trust television although they watch it regularly. Therefore the Serbian public do not know who to trust, and in fact it is an important task for the international community actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish intensive communi-

cation with the Serbian public on a regular basis.

Regarding attitudes toward SFOR, and the NORDPOL Brigade we must stress that the public in general do not have sufficient information concerning peacekeeping operations and its objectives. This is particularly true among Serbs. That is, most likely, the reason

why Serbs are more susceptible for rumours than Croats and Bosniacs, and why they do not endorse peace support missions as important tasks. It is of crucial importance, for the success of the peacekeeping mission, to reach the Serbian public with information regarding the missions and the intention of peace supporting operation.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND CONFLICTS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A SUMMARY

The international community has significantly influenced the course of events in former Yugoslavia, sometimes via both action and inaction. Some authors (Holbrooke 1998) describe this international effort as the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s, and claim that the case itself represents a failure of historic dimensions. The reasons behind such a failure were the misreading of Balkan history that suggests that the war was inevitable, the end of the Cold War which greatly diminished the strategic importance of Yugoslavia (having been positioned between two military-political blocs), the nationalist behaviour of Yugoslav leaders, the US' inadequate response to the crisis (experiencing fatigue after dealing simultaneously with the Gulf War and the death throes of the Soviet Union), and the mistaken belief of some EU member countries that they could handle their first post-Cold War challenge on their own.

The mediating role of the international community started in summer 1991 in Slovenia, continued in Croatia, and then the UNSC Resolution 761, adopted on 29 June 1992, allowed the deployment of international forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Several UNSC resolutions were then adopted, to stop the conflict and to ease the situation of civilians; however, the situation on the ground deteriorated and only the NATO air campaign against Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1995 created the basis for the Dayton Peace Agreement that was signed at the end of that year. The UN played

an important legal role, authorising the use of force to implement the cease-fire and peace agreement. The parties in the conflict accepted Dayton Agreement and agreed to the deployment of a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), including NATO forces and troops from other countries. If the parties strayed from the cease-fire, UNSC Resolution 1031 authorised IFOR to use force. IFOR was later renamed SFOR (Stabilisation Force) and the peace operation continues today (December 2000).

As in other missions involving peace enforcement units, the outcome in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been less than satisfactory because of confusion over the mandates of the forces on the ground, along with the problem of a poorly coordinated military/political interface, which prompted the UN Secretary-General to question the wisdom of UN involvement in military enforcement activities. Three sets of problems seem to be crucial to a successful outcome in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Black & Rolston 1995:73): (1) the lack of symmetry between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, (2) the increasingly difficult relationship between the military and humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping and (3) the relative benefits of conflict prevention and commitment versus intervention. Some theorists (Haltiner 2000) warn that apart from exclusive national interests, political problems and ill-defined mandates, the reasons for the inefficiency of peace operations can be found in the inade-

quate structures, organisation, training and equipping of armed forces involved in peace support operations.

The problem of peacekeeping in general also lies in the fact that almost all contemporary conflicts around the world are *intrastate*, based upon nationalist or tribal tendencies, religious competition or ethnic assertion (SIPRI Yearbook 1998). The international community has problems dealing with such conflicts, since UN missions were envisaged to be used in *interstate* conflicts.

It is very important to understand the attitudes of different countries toward the Yugoslav crisis, because these significantly influenced the role the international community played in resolving the crisis; whether this was the approach, the speed or the instruments used. National interests often limited the activity of the international community and consequently its efficiency.

Mass Media and Conflicts

In addition to these external factors, mass media was also a crucial internal factor in helping to alleviate the severe circumstances international envoys and peacekeepers had to operate in. The statements of the most exposed international representatives revealed the unfair and even hostile attitude of 'local' mass media toward the international effort (Holbrooke 1998, Day 1995 and Owen 1996). This observation is still valid today, since it is obvious that the peace process in former Yugoslavia can not be accomplished successfully without the cooperation of the local mass media in this turbulent area.

Previous research showed that mass media in former Yugoslavia adopted an exclusive interpretation pattern that completely polarised different values, standpoints, ideas and their protagonists in the pre-war period. The scope

for communication became very narrow, and ultimately there was none. Popular perceptions of the adversary were based upon extreme events and processes – the media only published foreign material that strengthened domestic opinion. At the end of this process, a media blockade occurred, but this was more psychological than institutional (Malešić 1993:125, 126). That is to say, despite the presence of foreign mass media in the respective republics, the public did not want to read about, watch or listen to things that could spoil its image of the different problems. But this image was a consequence of exclusive mass media activity in special circumstances. "Mass psychosis" was obvious; the public did not want other information! After such long-term propaganda, members of the public became addicts, "demanding" a daily dose of threats, hatred, hostility and even fear. International actors entered this media landscape and climate and participated in the hostile media attitude toward "the other".

A model for propaganda analysis was developed during the Bosnian war. The model allowed us to make an additional analysis of mass media attitudes toward the international effort to bring sustainable peace to the region. A brief study of the results demonstrated that the propaganda reality of Serbian television matched and even surpassed the theoretical model by offering two additional elements: conspiracy theory and accusing and discrediting the opponents. Both elements had a significant impact upon the attitude of Serbian television toward the activities of the international community during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-5. In the majority of cases explored, the treatment of international activity on Serbian TV appeared to either be in the context of conspiracy theory or of accusations and discrediting; all UN Resolutions and actions were anti-Serbian, the world's media

were exercising psychological genocide against Serbs, the co-chairmen of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia were biased and unjust (everything they did was to the detriment of the Serbian people, the centres of world power acted in favour of Western interests and ran a genocidal policy against the Serbian people, the connection of internal and external enemies was obvious, and so on; Malešič 1999:285).

Serbian print media likewise primarily interpreted the role of the international community in the context of conspiracy theory. All activities undertaken by international actors were described as being to the detriment of the Serbian people. International organisations, institutions and individual states were accused and discredited. The exceptions were Greece and Russia, who were mainly seen as Orthodox allies and traditional Serbian friends (ibid.).

The propaganda reality on Croatian television during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina hardly corresponded to our theoretical model but concurrently expanded it by two elements: accusing and discrediting adversaries (mainly Muslims) and appeals for cooperation (with Muslims). As far as the international community and UNPROFOR were concerned, Croatian TV propaganda was not as aggressive as Serbian TV. There were some accusations of Russian UNPROFOR troops, the impotence of the UN in (Eastern) Bosnia was at least indirectly demonstrated, stress was placed on the lack of determination and excessive apathy among powerful international personalities, and it warned that talks between UNPROFOR commanders and Bosnian Serbs commanders yielded no positive change on the ground (ibid.).

Croatia's print media was less rectilinear than in the Serbian case, ranging from descriptions of the fatal humanitarian condi-

tions in the "safe havens", to support for the peace plan and activities intended to stop Serb aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some individual Islamic states and the negative consequences of their presence on the ground were the usual targets of the Croatian press (ibid.).

Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Croatian and Serbian Televisions on Dayton Agreement

The content analyses of news referring to the Dayton Peace Agreement accomplished in 1996 indicated that Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Serbian and Croatian televisions mostly stressed those sections of the news that reaffirmed official attitudes in the respective countries. Those events and activities that did not coincide with the official image of the peace process were mentioned briefly or were not published at all. Serb television's News of the Day programme paid attention to the talks between the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and international negotiators regarding the implementation of the peace process. This served as proof that the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs were determined to respect and fulfil the peace agreement. Serbian television also reported the problems between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs (Muslims) in the formation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The intention was to create the impression that those to be blamed for the delay in the peace agreement implementation process should be found "on the other side". It was also "a proof" that an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a real option when even the two interested ethnic groups faced several problems in forming the federation (Šiniković 1996).

A similar approach was used by Croatian and Bosnian televisions. Obviously, this was a

consequence of subordinating the “truth” to propaganda objectives. International events were also misrepresented for propaganda purposes. Serbian television gave significant coverage to the international conference on terrorism held in Egypt, only emphasising the danger of Islamic terrorism related to crises in those parts of the world where there is Islamic fundamentalism, and a strong reference was made to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Muslims living there in that context.

Therefore, selectivity in approach and manipulation were important features of television reporting and commenting on the Dayton Agreement. This also holds for the selection of sources – not once in the analysed period in March 1996 did the respective stations use the “other side” as a source of information. In addition, only the representatives of “our side” were asked for an interview and to comment on the situation on the ground. Only Bosnian television was pluralist in this respect, allowing Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats to comment on the difficulties faced by the newly formed federation. This was the consequence of its endeavour to achieve equality and impartiality of reporting as far as both ethnic groups were concerned. Nevertheless, such an approach created many problems regarding editorial consistency and the message sent to the public. Bosnian television was also pluralist in representing the peace process via the views of the different political parties, while Croatian and Serbian television, respectively, prioritised the ruling parties. All three stations paid strong attention to the statements of the representatives of the international community, but only to those who reaffirmed the official image of the peace process.

The content analyses and review of the sources of information also showed that television created an exclusive interpretation pat-

tern that was not open to the ideas and standpoints of the opposite side. The usual “us and them” scheme was created. Therefore “we” are innocent and “they” are to be blamed for all the problems, “we” want peace, “they” obstruct it, “we” support the peace process, “they” create the stumbling blocks. Differences between presenting a report and a commentary were also not respected, hence, reporters “ennobled” their reports with their own exclusive views. As a result, the report does not inform the public but rather provides it with the journalist’s own subjective interpretation of the event.

The propaganda changed once the fighting had ended in 1995. The manic, hyperbolic, highly emotional language was replaced by accusatory language of the other side, which acts to prevent the peace agreement from functioning. The language is more rational and the value-charged and extremely negative characterisations of the other side have been abandoned. This was the logical consequence of the fact that the peace agreement has been signed and, obviously, there was no longer any need to mobilise the public for war objectives. On the other hand, even more positive characterisations might produce negative associations to the people harshly affected by the war.

Media Landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina

We also analysed the recent media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conditions the mass media operate in have been very changeable and dynamic over the last decade. Three main nationalist parties won the 1990 election in their own Bosniac, Serb and Croat areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and continued to consolidate their positions in the mass media, therefore control of mass media was

transferred from the communist party to the ruling nationalist parties.

Mass media under the control of the ruling Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) became centres of severe nationalistic indoctrination and even racism prior to and during the war. After Dayton, the first alternative and relatively independent mass media appeared in northern parts of the Republic of Srpska (Banja Luka, Bijelina and Doboje). However, in Herzeg Bosna (the area controlled by the Croatian Democratic Community-HDZ in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Federation) the only media continues to be that which supports HDZ policy. Elsewhere, media in the territories controlled by the Sarajevo government were a bit more free and independent, especially in the bigger cities where critical journalism was not a novelty. However, the state radio and television of Bosnia-Herzegovina were under the direct supervision and influence of the state authorities and the Bosniac-Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Without exception at the local level, mass media were parts of the propaganda machinery of local civilian and military authorities, regardless of who owned the media (Media Plan 1997).

The impact of the war was to forge three media systems based on the national, political and territorial divisions of the country. These three systems do not communicate with each other, but are instead accustomed to being a propaganda tool for their own side, producing three different "realities" of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Journalists have had difficulties adjusting to a normally functioning media – to inform, educate, amuse, and as far as post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, to become a factor in creating and proliferating trust and tolerance between nations.

The general impression from the research is that the electronic media became dominant in the development of Bosnian-Herzegovinian

media system(s) during the 1990s, while print media lost a great deal of its pre-war importance. Despite the war and the destruction of transmitters, the number of radio and TV stations increased several-fold from 1991 to 1996, while the number of print media dropped by more than half. The number of news agencies increased from one to six. Meanwhile, between 1996 and 1998, the number of newspapers decreased slightly and then relatively stabilised, while the number of radio and TV stations and news agencies doubled. The figures also showed that the majority of print media, electronic media and news agencies are controlled by the Bosniac side. The figures on the population reveal that there is a relatively large number of printed and electronic mass media for a relatively small number of people. It is also obvious that the group of others (mainly those who proclaimed themselves to be Yugoslavs) decreased significantly after the war, and the media activity, with its exclusive nationalist patterns of reporting and mobilising audiences, no doubt contributed to that significantly.

Bosnian-Herzegovinian mass media suffered tremendously during the war and the media landscape consisted of some organisations governed by pre-war traditions, some by the war experience and some established in the post-war period. The data (see Table 2) showed that the media landscape is very unstable and changeable, and that fluctuation, especially of print media, is extremely high. New sources of information appear to be gaining in importance, enabling mass media to cope with blockades similar to that of the last decade. The media market has not yet been developed and the relationship between ownership and editorial policy is undemocratic. The present legal framework is insufficient to allow the comprehensive development of commercial and public media sys-

tems. The war cut the supply of new technology and the media now lag behind the technological progress typical for the rest of the region. The quantity and quality of personnel involved in media production is not high enough to provide a sustainable development of media systems and professional, autonomous and democratic media activity among the Bosnian community. In the last couple of years, the international community media regime played an important role in establishing “order” and creating better conditions for the operation of mass media. This activity seems to be of greatest benefit to the electronic mass media, which suffered most from the weak legal basis and frequency chaos.

Media Habits of the Public

The opinion poll carried out in April 1999 in the Doboј region, the area of responsibility of the Nordic-Polish Brigade (NORDPOL), showed that the most valuable sources of information during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992–95 in order to get a picture of what was going on were national radio broadcasts, national television, local radio broadcasts and interpersonal communication – relatives, friends and neighbours. Radio again proved to be the most important source of information in wartime (Malešič 1994 and Gal 1992). However, the high figure for television as a source of information during the war is surprising, bearing in mind the typical circumstances of war, especially if we take into account the endeavour of all warring factions to destroy the enemy’s radio and TV transmitters, and the rather complicated process of TV broadcasting in such an environment. Nevertheless, the figure is supported by the fact that the number of TV stations increased significantly during the war, as mentioned above.

More than 70% of the respondents maintained the same media habits after the war, while a minority changed the main sources of information, by placing more emphasis on national TV and radio, and on local TV and radio. The most significant change occurred among the Bosniac population, while a vast majority of Serbs maintained their wartime media habits in peacetime, as well.

We could see from the results that the public is mostly interested in topics like international affairs and domestic politics, while other topics like art and culture, sports, military issues, crime and local politics, attract a balanced interest. Data show that among the three nationalities, Bosniacs are most interested in domestic politics, international affairs and sport, Serbs in local politics, crime and military issues, and Croats in art and culture.

Of the three nationalities, Bosniacs agree most with the statements that free and independent mass media is a precondition for the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that mass media does not report unpleasant facts, that mass media mostly publishes objective information and that one can always trust Bosnian-Herzegovinian mass media. Serbs agree most that mass media performs a propaganda role for political leaders, that Bosnian mass media is controlled by political leaders, is partial and in favour of certain interests and that the journalists are controlled by media owners. Croats agree most that the mass media should be controlled in order to establish a peaceful development of the country.

In general, we could say that all nationalities agree that free and independent mass media is crucial to the development of the country but they view the media quite differently. Of the three, Bosniacs put most trust in the media, Serbs are convinced that mass media is controlled by the political elite, and Croats legitimise control of the media, believing that

by so doing a peaceful development of the country is more feasible.

Opinion poll results also show that almost all people in the region of Dobož usually listen to radio news and watch television news. Newspapers and magazines are only read by two-fifths of respondents. Major reasons for the selection of the media are not religious or cultural, but trust in the media, dealing with the matters that concern the audience, and the objective, impartial and honest news they bring to the audience. Despite such an observation, it is possible to conclude that people select media primarily according to their national affiliation. Hence, there are mass media that are only consumed by Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, respectively.

All nationalities put the most trust in TV, but not all in the same station and not to the same extent. More than three-quarters of Bosniacs and more than half of Croats trust TV, while slightly over half of the Serbs do not. Almost one-fifth of the sample do not know whom to trust, if at all. This is true especially for Serbs, but not as much for Bosniacs, while Croats are close to the average.

Attitudes of the Public Toward SFOR and NORDPOL

SFOR and NORDPOL, as a part of the peace-keeping mission, have been in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the region of Dobož, respectively, for several years now. Obviously the public is not very well informed about the endeavour of the international community to bring lasting peace to the country. There is at least an ostensible contradiction in that fact in the sense that people often watch television news, listen to radio news and some of them read the news, but they do not seem to have much knowledge about the work of SFOR and NORDPOL. Does this mean that these

are not topics covered by the mass media, or that it is relevant news but people are not interested in that kind of news? But here again the national affiliation becomes very important, due to the different amount of information available to Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats in the region. More than half of the Serbian respondents claimed that they were not informed on NORDPOL and SFOR missions and activities, while Bosniacs and Croats seemed to be rather well informed.

The results in general also show that part of the public in Bosnia-Herzegovina is very susceptible to rumours and hearsay. Serbs especially were much more prone to believe different stories on SFOR and NORDPOL, while Bosniacs did not believe the 'rumours' and some Croats believed some of them. This means that all available instruments and procedures (rapid information about intentions, explanations of procedures and techniques employed, use of reliable and trustworthy channels to release the information, and so on) to avoid the spread of rumours should be used more frequently and systematically by international actors.

The tasks of SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina are certainly very complex and important, and according to the people in the Dobož region the most important SFOR tasks are assisting and training Entity Armed Forces in mine-clearing operations, monitoring the zones of separation and monitoring EAF mine-lifting/clearing operations. All these tasks were assessed to be important by approximately two-thirds. Other tasks – confiscating weapons, maintaining a safe and secure environment, providing humanitarian assistance, apprehending indicted war criminals, monitoring the Entity's armies training and movement activities, providing medical assistance and conducting weapon storage site inspections – were assessed as important

by approximately half the respondents. Interestingly, about one-fifth of the respondents could not assess the importance or unimportance of the aforementioned SFOR tasks, even in cases that seem to be of a great direct benefit for the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as mine-clearing and maintaining a safe and secure environment.

However, the “national factor” again played a crucial role in perceiving the importance of different tasks. Bosniacs view all listed tasks as important, Croats accept them fairly well, while Serbs accept them least. For Bosniacs, the most important task of international military forces is to apprehend indicted war criminals, while for Serbs this is the least important task! For Croats, the most important task of international forces is to assist and train entity armed forces in mine-clearing operations. The answer “do not know” is very typical for Serbs, confirming the aforementioned data that they were not well informed on the topic.

As we could see in one of the previous chapters, the attitude of the public in some states that sent troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina is different from that described above. The American public is supportive of their troops participating in the peace support operation and perceived it as a successful mission. The British public was also supportive to more decisive intervention in the conflict resolution after revelations of the war atrocities. The Swedish public also supports the UN effort to provide peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and supports the use of force if needed. In addition, Canadian peacekeepers think they are seen by the local public as friends and not as an occupying force, while Swedish soldiers believe they accomplished their tasks well and the local public appreciated it.

People in the region in general mainly agree that it is safe to live in NORDPOL’s area

of responsibility, that NORDPOL has established good cooperation with the local population and local authorities and tries to establish equal relations with all ethnic communities. Respondents mainly disagree that the number of SFOR personnel in Bosnia should be increased, and this actually confirms the international community’s present policy. As far as the security of the region and country in general is concerned, people estimate security will diminish after the withdrawal of NORDPOL and SFOR, leading to renewed fighting. It is interesting to note that, on average, more than one-fifth could not provide an assessment of the situation they live in, answering ‘don’t know’. The majority of Bosniacs strongly agree with all but one statement on the subject, while more than one-third of Croats, on average, strongly agree with all but one statement. Only 10% (or less) of Serbs strongly agree with these statements. However, all three nationalities relatively agree that the number of SFOR personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be increased. The answer “do not know” was again very typical for Serbs in all cases. Since the Serbian population in several respects differ from the other investigated groups further investigations of attitudes of Serbs to the issues in question might be called for.

According to Anders Johansson (personal message), a participant in the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, modern peacekeepers seem to put much interest in maintaining a healthy and fruitful dialogue with the local population and its representatives. A common saying among peacekeepers is that you cannot win peace without first winning the hearts and minds of the people on the ground. This seems to fit well with Bosnian-Herzegovinian experience, however the results of our analysis reveal that public opinion is hard to win in Bosnia-Herzegovina, due

to the ethnocentric perspective mass media hold toward the surroundings they operate in, and toward the international community's engagement in the region. In order to be successful, peacekeepers need to develop a profound knowledge of the attitude of people around them, as well as conduct a careful analysis of the local media situation they operate in. Would it not seem important that analyses such as this be conducted on a regular basis to support the efforts of the multinational forces that operate in peace support operations? The answer ought to be "Yes".

Mass media in Bosnia-Herzegovina hold great responsibility for the development and duration of the conflict in 1992-5 and seem to have a long way to go before they are viewed as a valuable impartial tool for the democratic development of the country; this has just started. Media's significance cannot be ignored by the organisations that operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Independent Media Commission is also making sure that this is not the case. Within its power is to regulate and direct Bosnian-Herzegovinian media practice and journalism toward the kind of standard and quality that can be expected in a democratic society. What is not in the Independent Media Commission's mandate is to interfere with the work of non-governmental organisations and other institutions that aid individual mass me-

dia and thus contribute to further complicating the over-established mass media situation, where single media organisations have rarely found a solid commercial basis on which they can operate. It seems that further studies on the mass media situation and public opinion of media and peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be of great value to SFOR and the Independent Media Commission and various aid organisations that operate in the country.

The analysis of the media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed three separate mass media systems that operate in the country, with little in common and producing three distinct "realities" on the situation in general and on the peace support operation in particular. The public opinion poll in the region of Doboï confirmed this assertion by revealing the fact that there exist three separate audiences addressed by the above mentioned media systems, as well. Bosniac and Croat audiences have little in common, while the Serbian audience functions in a very peculiar way and lacks the information on peace support operations. Consequently, one of the crucial issues to be addressed by the international community actors running the peace support operations is how to provide impartial, truthful and thorough information to the Serbian audience in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

FREDSBEVARANDE INSATSER, MASSMEDIER OCH ALLMÄNHETEN I TIDIGARE JUGOSLAVIEN: EN SAMMANFATTNING¹

Det internationella samfundet och konflikterna i det tidigare Jugoslavien

Det internationella samfundet har haft stor betydelse för hur händelserna kom att utvecklas i det tidigare Jugoslavien, ibland genom både aktivitet och passivitet. Vissa författare (t ex Holbrooke 1998) beskriver de internationella ansträngningarna som västerlandets största kollektiva misslyckande i säkerhetsfrågor sedan 1930-talet, och menar att kriserna under 1990-talet är ett misslyckande av historiska mått. Orsakerna bakom misslyckandet är flera. Bland annat en felaktig tolkning av Balkans historia, vilket ledde till bedömningen att kriget var oundvikligt, slutet på det kalla kriget, som avsevärt minskade den strategiska betydelse som Jugoslavien hade (som tidigare legat mellan de båda militärpolitiska blocken). Till detta kan läggas de jugoslaviska ledarnas nationalistiska agerande och USAs otillräckliga reaktion på krisen (en utmattningseffekt efter de samtidiga bekymren med Gulf-kriget och Sovjetunionens sönderfall). Tilläggas kan också den felaktiga uppfattningen hos vissa av EU-länderna att de skulle kunna klara sin första säkerhetspolitiska utmaning efter det kalla kriget på egen hand.

Det internationella samfundet inledde rollen som medlare under sommaren 1991 i Slovenien och därefter i Kroatien. Sedan kom sä-

kerhetsrådets resolution 761, som antogs den 29 juni 1992 och som medgav insats av internationella styrkor i Bosnien-Hercegovina. Efterhand antogs ytterligare FN-resolutioner med syftet att stoppa konflikten och minska trycket på de civila befolkningarna. Situationen på marken förvärrades dock och det var först genom NATOs flygangrepp på de bosniska serberna under sommaren 1995 som en grund lades för Dayton-avtalet, som undertecknades i december samma år. FN hade en viktig rättslig roll, genom att organisationen sanktionerade användning av våld för att genomföra avtalet om eld upphör och fred. Parterna i konflikten godtog Dayton-avtalet och medgav insats av en multinationell fredsstyrka (IFOR, Implementation Force), där det ingick NATO-styrkor och styrkor från andra länder. Om parterna inte följde avtalet hade IFOR enligt säkerhetsrådets resolution 1031 rätt att använda våld. IFOR döptes senare om till SFOR (Stabilisation Force) och denna styrka är fortfarande på plats (december 2000).

I likhet med vissa andra fredsbevarande insatser har situationen i det tidigare Jugoslavien, särskilt i Bosnien-Hercegovina, utvecklats mindre tillfredsställande. Orsaken till detta

¹ *This summary in Swedish is a translation of the preceding chapter "The International Community and Conflicts in Former Yugoslavia: A Summary".*

kan vara förvirringen i fråga om fredsstyrkornas mandat på marken, tillsammans med problemet med en dålig samordning av militära och politiska krafter, vilket fick FN:s generalsekreterare att ifrågasätta klokheten i att FN deltog med militära insatsstyrkor. Tre slags svårigheter tycks vara avgörande för situationen i Bosnien-Hercegovina (Black & Rolston 1995:73); (1) bristen på symmetri mellan fredsbevarande och fredsframtvängande insatser, (2) de allt större svårigheterna att förena militära och humanitära aspekter i fredsbevarande insatser och (3) de relativa fördelarna med att bedriva konfliktförebyggande arbete jämfört med att intervensera. Vissa teoretiker (t ex Haltiner 2000) anser att förutom i nationella särintressen, politiska problem och dåligt definierade mandat, ligger orsakerna till den dåliga effektiviteten i fredsbevarande insatser i brister i struktur, organisation, utbildning och utrustning av de militära styrkor som medverkar i insatsen.

Problemet med fredsbevarande insatser i allmänhet ligger också i att nästan alla moderna konflikter runt om i världen är *inomstatliga*, baserade på nationalistiska eller stamrelaterade konflikter, religiös konkurrens eller etniska hävdelsebehov (SIPRI:s årsbok 1998). Det internationella samfundet har problem med att hantera denna typ av konflikter, eftersom FN:s möjligheter till insatser tillkom med syftet att hantera *mellanstatliga* konflikter.

Det är mycket viktigt att förstå olika länders attityder till Jugoslavienkrisen. Dessa attityder hade stor betydelse för den roll det internationella samfundet spelade i hanteringen av krisen; oavsett om man tittar på den grundläggande ansatsen, tempot eller de redskap som kom till användning. Nationella intressen begränsade ofta det internationella samfundets aktiviteter och därmed dess effektivitet.

Massmedier och konflikter

Utöver de ovan nämnda externa faktorer utgjorde massmedierna en avgörande intern faktor i fredsarbetet i Bosnien-Hercegovina. Dessa skulle kunna bidragit till att förbättra de besvärliga förhållanden som internationella sändebud och fredsbevarare måste arbeta under. Uttalanden från de mest utsatta internationella representanterna pekar emellertid på den orättvisa och ibland fientliga inställning som "lokala" massmedier uppvisade emot den internationella insatsen (Holbrooke 1998, Day 1995, Owen 1996). Det är uppenbart att verksamheten i det tidigare Jugoslavien inte kan nå framgång utan att lokala massmedier medverkar i fredsprocessen.

Studier har visat att massmedierna i det tidigare Jugoslavien tillämpade ett synsätt som fullständigt polariserade olika åsikter, värderingar, idéer och deras företrädare under tiden före kriget. Utrymmet för kommunikation blev mycket litet, och till slut försvann det helt. Folkliga uppfattningar om fienden baserades på extrema händelser och processer – massmedierna publicerade bara sådant material som stärkte den inhemska opinionen. I slutet av denna process stod en medieblockad, men denna hade mer psykologisk än institutionell karaktär (Malešić 1993:125, 126). Allmänheten ville alltså inte, trots att utländska massmedier fanns att tillgå i de olika republikerna, läsa, titta på eller lyssna till budskap som kunde störa dess uppfattning i olika frågor. Detta var en följd av massmedialt utestängande verksamhet under extrema förhållanden. "Masspsykos" var uppenbarligen för handen – allmänheten ville inte ha någon annan information! Efter den långvariga propagandan blev man tillvänjd eller beroende och "krävde" en daglig dos av hot, hat, fientlighet och rentav fruktan. Internationella aktörer steg in på denna mediala scen och medverka-

de i mediernas fientliga attityd mot "motståndaren".

Under Bosnien-kriget utvecklades i en studie en modell för analys av propaganda (Malešić 1997:31). Modellen gjorde det möjligt att studera de attityder som förekom i massmedierna mot det internationella försöket att åstadkomma en uthållig fred i regionen. Analysresultaten visar sammanfattningsvis, att propagandainslagen hos den serbiska televisionen motsvarade den teoretiska modellen, och överträffade den till och med genom att tillfoga två element: konspirationsteori respektive anklagelser mot och misskreditering av motståndarna. Både dessa element hade en påtaglig betydelse för hur den serbiska televisionen behandlade det internationella samfundets insatser under kriget i Bosnien-Hercegovina 1992–95. I de flesta av de fall som undersöktes föll den serbiska televisionens inslag om internationella aktiviteter antingen under rubriken konspirationsteori eller under rubriken anklagelser och misskreditering: alla FN-resolitioner och FN-insatser var anti-serbiska, världens massmedier var hatiska mot serber, de biträdande ordförandena för den internationella konferensen om det tidigare Jugoslavien var fördomsfulla och orättvisa (alla deras åtgärder var emot det serbiska folket, världens maktcentra agerade för att gynna västerländska intressen och bedrev en folk-mordspolicy emot det serbiska folket, kopplingen mellan interna och externa fiender stod i öppen dag, osv; Malešić 1999:285).

Serbiska tryckta medier tolkade också det internationella samfundets roll som en del av en konspiration. Alla aktiviteter som genomfördes av internationella aktörer beskrevs som om det var till nackdel för det serbiska folket. Internationella organisationer, institutioner och enskilda stater anklagades och misskrediterades. Undantagen var Grekland och Ryssland, som framställdes som ortodoxa

allierade och traditionellt serbvänliga (ibid).

Propagandabudskapen i den kroatiska televisionen under kriget i Bosnien-Hercegovina kunde inte lika bra som den serbiska analyseras i den teoretiska modellen, men utvidgade den dock med två element: anklagelser mot och misskreditering av motståndare (främst muslimer) och upprop om samarbete (med muslimer). När det gäller det internationella samfundet och UNPROFOR var propagandan i den kroatiska televisionen inte lika aggressiv som den i Serbien. Vissa anklagelser riktades mot ryska FN-trupper, FNs kraftlöshet i (östra) Bosnien visades åtminstone indirekt, betoningen lades på bristande handlingskraft och stor apati hos de starka internationella aktörerna. Man varnade också för att samtalen mellan UNPROFORs chefer och de bosniska serbernas ledare inte skulle få några positiva effekter på rådande förhållanden (ibid).

Kroatiens tryckta medier var inte lika enkelspåriga som de serbiska. Där fanns beskrivningar av de humanitära misslyckandena i de "säkra zonerna", stöd för fredsplanen och för åtgärder riktade mot den serbiska aggressionen i Bosnien-Hercegovina. Vissa islamiska stater och den negativa effekten av deras närvaro på marken var de vanligaste målen för den kroatiska pressen (ibid).

Televisionen i Bosnien-Hercegovina, Kroatien och Serbien i relation till Dayton-avtalet

En analys av innehållet i de nyheter som berörde det fredsavtal som undertecknades i Dayton 1995 visar att televisionen i Bosnien-Hercegovina, Kroatien respektive Serbien främst betonade de delar av nyheterna som bekräftade de officiella ställningstagandena i de tre länderna. De händelser och åtgärder som inte överensstämde med den officiella bilden av fredsprocessen refererades bara

kortfattat eller inte alls. Det dagliga nyhetsprogrammet i den serbiska televisionen behandlade samtalen mellan representanter för den federala jugoslaviska republiken och internationella förhandlare om hur fredsprocessen skulle förverkligas. Detta togs som ett bevis för att republiken Jugoslavien och de bosniska serberna var fast beslutna att fullfölja fredsavtalet. Den serbiska televisionen rapporterade också om problemen mellan bosniska kroater och bosniaker (bosniska muslimer) under bildandet av federationen Bosnien-Hercegovina. Syftet var att ge intrycket att de som var ansvariga för fördröjningen av fredsavtalet fanns på "den andra sidan". Det var också "beviset" för att ett sammanslaget Bosnien-Hercegovina inte var ett realistiskt alternativ, när till och med de båda etniska grupper som ville bilda federationen hade problem med detta (Šiniković 1996).

En liknande inställning dominerade kroatisk och bosnisk television. Det var uppenbart att "sanningen" skulle underordnas propagandamålen. Internationella händelser vantolkades också i propagandasyfte. Serbisk television gav betydande tackning åt den internationella konferensen om terrorism som hölls i Egypten. Betoningen lades enbart på farorna med islamsk terrorism i relation till kriser i de delar av världen där islamsk fundamentalism förekommer, och man gjorde en stark hänvisning i sammanhanget till Bosnien-Hercegovina och muslimerna där.

Selektivitet och manipulation var sålunda viktiga inslag i nyhetsutbudet i respektive televisions tackning och kommentarer kring Dayton-avtalet. Detsamma gäller för valet av källor – inte någon gång under den period i mars 1996 som analyserats använde sig respektive station av "den andra sidan" som källa till information. Dessutom var det enbart representanter för "den egna sidan" som intervjuades och som fick kommentera situa-

tionen. Bara den bosniska televisionen var tillåtande i denna mening, och släppte fram både bosniaker och bosniska kroater för att kommentera de svårigheter som den nybildade federationen mötte; så långt nådde man i försöken till jämlikhet och opartiskhet i nyhetsrapporteringen. Samtidigt skapade detta stora problem med den redaktionella linjen och det budskap som gavs till allmänheten. Bosnisk television var också pluralistisk däri att den visade fredsprocessen med hjälp av olika politiska partiers åsikter, medan kroatisk och serbisk television prioriterade de styrande partiernas. Samtliga tre stationer lade stor vikt vid de uttalanden som gjordes av representanterna för det internationella samfundet, men endast från dem som bekräftade den officiella bilden av fredsprocessen.

Innehållsanalysen och granskningen av källorna i nyhetsutbudet visade att televisionen skapade ett slutet tolkningsmönster som inte släppte fram idéer och åsikter från motståndarsidan. Man skapade det vanliga upplägget med "vi och dom". "Vi" var oskyldiga, och "dom" låg bakom alla problem, "vi" söker fred, "dom" blockerar den, "vi" stödjer fredsprocessen, "dom" bygger hinder för den. Skillnaden mellan reportage och kommentarer upprätthölls inte alltid; reportagen "förstärkte" sina reportage med egna åsikter. Resultatet blir att reportaget inte informerar allmänheten utan förser istället den med reportagens subjektiva tolkning av vad som hänt.

Propagandan ändrade karaktär när striderna väl upphört 1995. Det maniska, överdrivna, starkt känsloladdade språket ersätts med anklagelser mot den andra sidan, som försöker förhindra att fredsavtalet börjar tillämpas. Språket är nu mer rationellt och de värdeladdade och extremt negativa omdömena om den andra sidan överges. Detta var å ena sidan den logiska följden av det faktum att fredsavtalet undertecknats, och att det natur-

ligtvis inte fanns ett behov av att mobilisera befolkningen för kriget. Å andra sidan skulle mer positiva omdömen om de andra ha skapat negativa associationer hos ett folk som var hårt drabbat av kriget.

Medielandskapet i Bosnien-Hercegovina

Vi har också analyserat det medielandskap som funnits de senaste åren i Bosnien-Hercegovina. De villkor som massmedierna där arbetat under har varit mycket varierande och dynamiska under det senaste decenniet. Tre huvudpartier med nationalistisk prägel vann valen 1990 i sina respektive bosniakiska, serbiska och kroatiska områden i Bosnien-Hercegovina, och de fortsatte att förstärka sina positioner i massmedierna. Kontrollen över massmedierna överfördes därmed från kommunistpartiet till de styrande nationalistiska partierna.

Massmedier som kontrollerades av det styrande Serbiska Demokratiska Partiet (SDS) blev kanaler för en starkt nationalistisk indoktrinering, och till och med för rasism, före och under kriget. Efter kriget dök de första och mer eller mindre fristående massmediala rösterna upp i de norra delarna av Republika Srpska (Banja Luka, Bijelina och Doboij). I Herzeg Bosna däremot (det område som behärskades av det kroatiska demokratiska samfundet (HDZ) inom Federationen Bosnien-Hercegovina) var även i fortsättningen alla medier inriktade på att stödja HDZs politik. På andra håll, i de områden som styrdes från regeringen i Sarajevo, var medierna något friare och mer oberoende, särskilt i de större städerna, där kritisk journalistik inte var något nytt. Statsradion och statstelevisionen i Bosnien-Hercegovina övervakades och påverkades direkt av myndigheterna och det bosnisk-muslimska partiet för demokratisk aktion

(SDA). På lokal nivå var massmedierna utan undantag delar av den propagandapparat som styrdes av lokala civila och militära myndigheter, oavsett vem som formellt ägde mediet (Media Plan 1997).

Effekten av kriget var att tre mediasystem skapades, som byggde på de nationella, politiska och territoriella uppdelningarna av landet. Dessa tre system kommunicerar inte med varandra, de är vana vid att fungera som propagandaverktyg för den egna sidan, och de skapar därför tre olika "verkligheter" i Bosnien-Hercegovina. Journalisterna har haft svårigheter att anpassa sig till medier som fungerar på normalt sätt – med att informera, utbildna och roa sin publik – för att efter Dayton bidrar till att skapa och sprida förtroende och tolerans mellan folken.

Det allmänna intrycket är att etermedierna blev de dominerande i Bosnien-Hercegovina under 1990-talet, medan de tryckta medierna förlorade en stor del av den betydelse de haft före kriget. Trots kriget och skadorna på sändarna ökade antalet radio- och TV-stationer flerfaldigt mellan 1991 och 1996, medan antalet tidningar, magasin etc. under denna tid minskade till mindre än hälften. Antalet nyhetsbyråer ökade från 1 till 6. Samtidigt minskade under tiden 1996 till 1998 antalet tidningar något, och stabiliserades sedan i viss mån, medan antalet radio- och TV-stationer och nyhetsbyråer fördubblades. Merparten av de tryckta medierna, etermedierna och nyhetsbyråerna stod under bosniakernas kontroll. Befolkningssiffrorna visar att det finns relativt många tryckta och elektroniska medier till en relativt liten befolkning. Det är också uppenbart att antalet "övriga" (i första hand de som såg sig som jugoslaver) minskade avsevärt efter kriget, och till detta bidrog utan tvivel medierna starkt, med sin ensidiga nationalistiska rapportering och mobiliserande syften.

Massmedierna i Bosnien-Hercegovina drabbades mycket hårt av kriget och medielandskapet bestod av några få organisationer som styrdes av synsätt från tiden före kriget, några som styrdes av krigserfarenheterna och några som skapats efter kriget. Data (se tabell A 2 i tabellbilagan) visar att medielandskapet är mycket instabilt och fluktuerande, och att svängningarna, särskilt i fråga om tryckta medier, sker mycket snabbt. Nya informationskanaler tycks växa i betydelse, så att medierna kan hantera blockader av det slag som förekommit under det senaste decenniet. Mediemarknaden har ännu inte mognat och sambandet mellan ägandet och det redaktionella innehållet är odemokratiskt. Den gällande lagstiftningens regelverk är inte tillräckligt för en bred utveckling av kommersiella och publika medier. Under kriget ströps inflödet av ny teknik, och medierna ligger nu under den tekniska nivå som gäller i resten av regionen. Kvantiteten av och kvaliteten hos de personer som arbetar inom medieproduktion är inte tillräckligt hög för att medierna skall utvecklas stabilt mot demokrati, professionalism och självständighet i det bosniska samhället. Under de senaste åren har det internationella samfundets massmediala styrning haft stor betydelse för att skapa ordning och reda och bättre villkor för massmedierna. Detta tycks framför allt gynna de elektroniska medierna, som drabbats hårdast av den svaga juridiska grunden och det kaos som rått i fråga om frekvenstilldelning.

Allmänhetens medievanor

Inom ramen för föreliggande projekt gjordes en undersökning bland befolkningen i Doboj-regionen belägen i norra Bosnien-Hercegovina. De viktigaste nyhetsmedierna i området identifierades. Dessutom erhöles en bild av medievanorna i regionen och en uppfattning

om befolkningens inställning till bl a SFORs verksamhet i Bosnien-Hercegovina i stort och till NORDPOLs fredsarbete i Doboj. De vunnna kunskaperna kan bidra positivt till SFORs och NORDPOLs relationer till medierna och till befolkningen i området. Intervjuerna genomfördes i april 1999 av *Mareco Index Bosnia* (Sarajevo) och omfattar 600 män och kvinnor i åldern 18 år och äldre och boende i Doboj-området. Personerna har delats in i tre nationalitetsgrupper; bosniaker (bosniska muslimer), kroater och serber.

Studien visar att de viktigaste informationskällorna under kriget 1992–95 i Bosnien-Hercegovina, när man ville orientera sig om vad som hände, var nationella medier. Det var fråga om den nationella radion, den nationella televisionen och den lokala radion. Viktigt i sammanhanget var också mellanpersonlig kommunikation – kontakter med släktingar, vänner och grannar. Radion visade sig åter vara den viktigaste informationskällan under krigstid (Malešić 1994; Gal 1992). Den höga siffran för den nationella televisionen (78 %) som källa till information under kriget är dock överraskande. Detta med tanke på de typiska omständigheterna under krig, särskilt med tanke på att alla krigförande parter eftersträvar att slå ut fiendens radio- och TV-sändare, och den därmed relativt besvärliga processen att göra TV-sändningar i denna miljö. Siffran får inte desto mindre stöd av det faktum att antalet TV-stationer ökade starkt under krigets gång, så som nämndes ovan.

Över 70% av de intervjuade behöll sina medievanor efter kriget, medan en minoritet bytte sin huvudsakliga informationskälla, så att de blev mer beroende av nationell och lokal TV och radio. De viktigaste förändringarna skedde i den bosniakiska gruppen, medan majoriteten av den serbiska gruppen behöll sina medievanor från kriget.

Studien visar också att allmänheten främst

intresserar sig för sådana ämnen som internationella frågor och inhemsk politik, medan andra ämnen, som konst och kultur, sport, militärfrågor, brott och lokalpolitik, får ett jämnt fördelat intresse. Data visar att av de tre nationaliteterna är bosniakerna främst intresserade av inhemsk politik, internationella frågor och sport, serberna av lokalpolitik, brott och militära frågor, och kroaterna av konst och kultur.

Av de tre nationaliteterna instämmer bosniakerna oftast i påståendet att fria och självständiga massmedier är en förutsättning för utvecklingen i Bosnien-Hercegovina. Det samma gäller för påståendena om att massmedierna håller tillbaka rapporteringen av obehagliga fakta, att de för det mesta ger objektiv information, att man alltid kan lita på massmedierna i Bosnien-Hercegovina. Serberna instämmer mest i att massmedierna tar på sig en propagandaroll för de politiska ledarna, att bosniska massmedier styrs av politiska ledare, är partiska och gynnar vissa intressen, att journalisterna styrs av ägarna till medierna. Kroaterna instämmer mest i att massmedierna bör kontrolleras för att landet skall få en fredlig utveckling.

Allmänt kan sägas att om än alla nationaliteter är överens om att fria och självständiga massmedier är en avgörande faktor i landets utveckling, har de ändå ganska skiljaktiga uppfattningar om massmedierna. Av de tre nationaliteterna är det bosniakerna som har störst förtroende för medierna. Serberna är säkra på att massmedierna styrs av en politisk elit. Medan kroaterna är för att medierna skall styras, därför att de tror att detta underlättar en fredlig utveckling i landet.

Mediestudien visar också att nästan alla i Dobojsregionen brukar lyssna på nyheterna på radio och titta på nyheterna på TV. Tidningar och tidskrifter läses av två femtedelar av de intervjuade. De viktigaste skälen till va-

let av medier är inte av religiös eller kulturell karaktär utan uppges vara förtroende, att medierna tar upp sådana frågor som mottagaren är intresserad av, att nyheterna presenteras objektivt, opartiskt och ärligt. Trots detta väljer man medier efter nationalitet i första hand. Det finns sålunda medier som endast konsumeras av bosniaker, serber respektive kroater.

Alla nationaliteter har mest förtroende för TV, men inte för samma station eller i samma utsträckning. Om man skulle möta olika uppgifter om en och samma händelse i olika medier skulle över tre fjärdedelar av bosniakerna och hälften eller strax däröver bland kroaterna och serberna sätta störst tilltro till uppgifterna i TV. En femtedel av samtliga intervjuade (bland serberna 31 %) vet inte vilket medium de skulle lita på i en sådan situation.

Befolkningens attityder till SFOR och NORDPOL

Den nordisk-polska brigaden (NORDPOL Brigade) är en del av den fredsbevarande styrkan SFOR som har varit verksam i Bosnien-Hercegovina och i Dobojsregionen sedan 1995. Det är dock uppenbart att befolkningen där inte har så väl reda på hur det internationella samfundet arbetar för att skapa en bestående fred i landet. Det finns åtminstone en märkbar motsägelse i det faktum att folk ofta tittar på TV-nyheterna, lyssnar på radionyheter, och att några av dem läser tidningar, men att de inte tycks ha särskilt goda kunskaper om vad SFOR och NORDPOL utgör. Betyder detta att dessa ämnen inte behandlas av medierna, eller att det finns inslag i nyheterna om dem men att folk inte intresserar sig för dessa inslag? Här blir åter den nationella identiteten viktig, beroende på att olika mycket information är tillgänglig för bosniaker, serber respektive kroater i regionen. Över hälften av serberna i undersökningen hävdar

att de inte känner till vad SFOR och NORDPOL sysslar med, medan bosniaker och kroater tycks relativt väl informerade om detta (se tabell A 17).

Resultaten allmänt visar också att befolkningen i denna del av Bosnien-Hercegovina är mycket lyhörd för rykten och att serberna är särskilt benägna att sätta tilltro till olika "historier" om SFOR och NORDPOL. Detta innebär att alla tillgängliga informationskanaler och metoder (snabba förklaringar om motiv, procedurer och tekniska lösningar, användning av pålitliga kanaler, osv) måste utnyttjas oftare och mer systematiskt av de internationella aktörerna för att förebygga rykesspridning.

SFORs uppgifter i Bosnien-Hercegovina är komplicerade och viktiga, och befolkningen i Dobojsregionen lyfter fram SFORs uppgifter att hjälpa och utbilda den bosniska militären EAF (Entity Armed Forces) i minröjning, att övervaka gränzonerna och att övervaka EAFs arbete med minröjning. Alla dessa uppgifter bedömdes som "viktiga" av omkring två tredjedelar. Andra uppgifter – att konfiskera vapen, upprätthålla säkerheten, ge humanitär hjälp, gripa krigsförbrytare, övervaka EAFs utbildning och förflyttningar, ge medicinsk hjälp och inspektera vapenförråd – bedömdes av omkring hälften av de tillfrågade som viktiga. Intressant att notera är att omkring en femtedel av de tillfrågade inte kan uttala sig om huruvida dessa uppgifter för SFOR är viktiga eller oviktiga, inte ens när det gäller uppgifter som förefaller vara till stor direkt nytta för befolkningen i Bosnien-Hercegovina, exempelvis minröjning och upprätthållande av säkerheten.

Även här spelar dock "nationalitetsfaktorn" en viktig roll för hur olika uppgifter uppfattas. Bosniakerna ser alla de uppräknade uppgifterna som "viktiga" (se tabell A 20 i bilagan) medan kroater och framförallt serber

är mer ljumma i sin inställning. Nästan alla bosniaker anser att en viktig uppgift för internationella militärstyrkor är att gripa krigsförbrytare – en uppfattning som inte alls delas av serberna. Bland kroaterna är de internationella styrkornas viktigaste uppgift att hjälpa och utbilda beväpnade militärenheter i minröjningsoperationer. Svaret "vet inte" är vanligast bland serber, vilket indikerar att dessa inte är så informerade i ämnet.

Som tidigare framgått skiljer sig attityder bland allmänheten i några av de länder som sânt trupper till Bosnien-Hercegovina. Den amerikanska allmänheten stöder att deras trupper deltar i fredsbevarande insatser där och uppfattar uppdraget som lyckat. Den brittiska allmänheten accepterar också en mer beslutsam intervention för att lösa konflikten efter det att krigsförbrytelseerna blivit kända. Den svenska allmänheten stöder också FNs ansträngningar att skapa fred i Bosnien-Hercegovina och stöder användandet av våld om så krävs. De kanadensiska fredsbevararna bedömer att den lokala befolkningen uppfattar dem som vänner och inte som en ockuperande militär styrka, medan de svenska soldaterna anser att de lyckats väl med sina uppgifter och att den lokala befolkningen uppskattar detta.

Folk i Dobojsregionen är i stort överens om att det är säkert att vistas inom det område som NORDPOL ansvarar för, att NORDPOL har etablerat ett bra samarbete med den lokala befolkningen och de lokala myndigheterna. Man anser också att NORDPOL försöker etablera likvärdiga relationer till alla etniska grupper.

De tillfrågade (40 %, se tabell A 21 i bilagan) anser att antalet SFOR-soldater i Bosnien-Hercegovina inte bör ökas, vilket i praktiken stämmer med den policy som för närvarande gäller i det internationella samfundet. När det gäller säkerheten i regionen bedömer folk att

den kommer att minska när NORDPOL försvinner (56 % anser detta) och att strider kommer att bryta ut igen om SFOR dras tillbaka (60 % håller helt eller delvis med om detta).

Det är intressant att konstatera att i genomsnitt över en femtedel av de tillfrågade (och främst serber) svarar "vet inte" i dessa ställningstaganden.

Enligt uppgift från en person som själv deltagit i fredsarbetet i Bosnien-Hercegovina, lägger moderna fredsbevarare stor vikt vid att upprätthålla en öppen och fruktbar dialog med den lokala befolkningen och dess företrädare. En vanlig formulering är att man inte kan vinna freden förrän man vunnit befolkningens hjärtan och sinnen. Detta tycks stämma väl med erfarenheterna från Bosnien-Hercegovina. Resultaten i studien visar bl a att det kan vara svårt att få med sig den allmänna opinionen, på grund av det etnocentriska perspektiv som massmedierna har på det samhälle där de verkar och på det internationella samfundets insats i regionen. För att fredsbevararna skall lyckas måste de skaffa sig en gedigen insikt om inställningen hos den befolkning där de verkar. De måste också göra en noggrann analys av det lokala medielandskap som de befinner sig i. Man kan därför ställa frågan om det inte vore lämpligt att studier liknande denna genomförs med jämna mellanrum för att stödja de multinationella fredsbevarande styrkorna i deras arbete? Svaret borde vara "jovisst".

Massmedierna i Bosnien-Hercegovina har ett stort ansvar för hur konflikten 1992–95 växte fram och fortlöpte. De tycks ännu ha en lång väg kvar innan de betraktas som självständiga redskap för regionens demokratiska utveckling, en process som just har påbörjats. De fredsorgan som är verksamma i Bosnien-Hercegovina får inte förbise mediernas betydelse. Kommissionen för självständiga medier arbetar också för att så inte skall bli fallet.

Kommissionen har möjlighet att styra praxis och journalistik inom medierna i Bosnien-Hercegovina i riktning mot den standard och den kvalitet som kan förväntas i ett demokratiskt samhälle. Vad som dock inte ingår i kommissionens mandat är att blanda sig i det arbete som utförs av ideella organisationer och andra organ som hjälper enskilda medier och som därmed ytterligare bidrar till förvirringen i en mediesituation med en påtaglig överetablering. Enstaka medieorganisationer har sällan fått den stabila kommersiella bas som krävs. Det förefaller som om fortsatta undersökningar av massmediernas situation och allmänhetens attityder till medierna och till den fredsbevarande insatsen i Bosnien-Hercegovina skulle kunna vara av stort värde för SFOR och Kommissionen för självständiga medier, och för de olika hjälporganisationer som verkar i landet.

Analysen av medielandskapet i Bosnien-Hercegovina har visat att det finns tre olika massmediesystem. De har inte mycket gemensamt och de skapar tre olika "verkligheter" i fråga om läget i allmänhet och om det fredsbevarande arbetet i synnerhet. Opinionsundersökningen i Doboj-regionen bekräftar detta genom att visa att det också finns tre skilda mottagargrupper för de nämnda mediesystemens produkter. Bosniaker och kroater har i några frågor en samsyn, medan den serbiska gruppen fungerar på ett mycket speciellt och i förhållande till de bägge andra grupperna på ett avvikande sätt och uppvisar bristande kunskaper om det fredsbevarande arbetet. En av de viktigaste uppgifterna för de aktörer inom det internationella samfundet som ansvarar för den fredsbevarande insatsen är därför att se till, att speciellt den serbiska gruppen i Bosnien-Hercegovina får tillgång till opartisk, korrekt och fullständig information om samhällsutvecklingen i regionen.

ABBREVIATIONS

AOR – Area of Responsibility
BHT – Bosnian-Herzegovinian Television
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU
CIMIC – Civil Military Cooperation
CNN – Cable News Network
EEC – European Economic Community
EU – European Union
FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HDZ – Croatian Democratic Community
HRT – Croatian Radio and Television
HTV – Croatian Television
ICFY – International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
IFOR – Implementation Force
IPTF – International Police Task Force
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NORDPOL – Nordic Polish Brigade
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
R(TV) – Radio (Television)
RTS – Radio Television Serbia
SDA – (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action
SDS – Serbian Democratic Party
SFOR – Stabilisation Force
SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
US – United States
USAID – United States Aid
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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APPENDIX: TABLES

Table A1. Media habits during the war

Q= So – if we start with your media habits **during the war** – which were your most important source or sources of information when you **tried to get a picture** of what was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time?

| | Nationality | | | All |
|---|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| national radio broadcast | 75 | 91 | 61 | 82 |
| national TV | 81 | 76 | 58 | 78 |
| local radio broadcast | 60 | 71 | 55 | 65 |
| local TV | 5 | 52 | 24 | 28 |
| relatives, friends, neighbours (personal communication) | 68 | 45 | 42 | 56 |
| military sources | 20 | 32 | 15 | 26 |
| international media (press, radio, TV, Internet) | 4 | 25 | 36 | 16 |
| international organisations (Red Cross, OSCE, EU, UN, NATO) | 8 | 18 | 13 | 13 |
| representatives of political parties/unions | 21 | 17 | 9 | 19 |
| national newspaper(s) and magazine(s) | 26 | 13 | 12 | 20 |
| local newspaper(s) and magazine(s) | 12 | 12 | 18 | 12 |

Per cent. Several answers were possible.

Table A2. Media habits today

Q = And when you want to inform yourself about the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina **today** – have you **changed** your main sources of information or are they still mainly **the same** as during the war?

| | Nationality | | | All |
|------------------------------------|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| no change | 63 | 82 | 79 | 72 |
| change | 38 | 18 | 21 | 27 |
| local newspaper(s) and magazine(s) | 12 | 12 | 18 | 12 |

Per cent.

Table A3. Changes in media habits

Q = In what way? If we start with *national radio broadcasts*, do you listen to radio news ...

| | more often | seldom | no change |
|---|------------|--------|-----------|
| national radio broadcasts | 72 | 16 | 12 |
| local radio broadcasts | 72 | 17 | 12 |
| national TV | 87 | 5 | 8 |
| local TV | 63 | 10 | 27 |
| national newspaper(s) and magazine(s) | 50 | 12 | 38 |
| local newspaper(s) and magazine(s) | 27 | 18 | 54 |
| relatives, friends, neighbours (personal communication) | 29 | 21 | 49 |
| representatives of political parties/unions | 20 | 24 | 56 |
| military sources | 14 | 31 | 56 |
| international media (press, radio, TV, Internet) | 29 | 14 | 57 |
| international organisations (Red Cross, OSCE, EU, UN, NATO) | 20 | 17 | 63 |
| other sources | 2 | 16 | 82 |

Per cent among those who changed media habits.

Table A4. Changes among nationalities who say they currently use a source “more often” than before

| | Nationality | | | All |
|---|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| national radio broadcast | 67 | 82 | 71 | 72 |
| local radio broadcast | 73 | 67 | 86 | 72 |
| national TV | 91 | 78 | 100 | 87 |
| local TV | 89 | 12 | 71 | 63 |
| national newspaper(s) and magazines | 51 | 49 | 29 | 50 |
| local newspaper(s) and magazines | 31 | 22 | 14 | 27 |
| relatives, friends, neighbours | 30 | 26 | 43 | 29 |
| representatives of political parties/unions | 19 | 22 | 14 | 20 |
| military sources | 15 | 14 | 0 | 14 |
| international media | 34 | 20 | 14 | 29 |
| international organisations | 19 | 22 | 14 | 20 |

Per cent among those who use respective source of information ‘more often’.

Table A5. Owning of or access to radio and TV

Q = Do you **own** a radio receiver?

| | |
|-----|-----|
| yes | 95% |
| no | 5% |

Q = Do you have **access to** a radio receiver through other means such as friends, cafés etc?

(distribution inside population which stated that they do not own a radio receiver)

| | |
|----------------------------|-----|
| access through friends | 61% |
| access through cafés | 7% |
| access through other means | 32% |

Q = Do you **own** a TV set?

| | |
|-----|-----|
| yes | 95% |
| no | 5% |

Q = Do you have **access to** a TV set through other means such as friends, cafés etc?

(distribution inside population which stated that they do not own a TV set)

| | |
|----------------------------|-----|
| access through friends | 64% |
| access through cafés | 9% |
| access through other means | 27% |

Table A6. Topics of interest

Q = People may have different interests affecting their media habits. How **interested** are you in the following **topics**? What about *international affairs* – are you very interested in that topic, rather interested, rather uninterested or not interested at all?

| topics | very interested | rather interested | rather uninterested | not interested at all | don't know |
|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| international affairs | 40 | 37 | 12 | 9 | 2 |
| domestic (B-H-) politics | 44 | 36 | 10 | 8 | 2 |
| art and culture | 24 | 36 | 23 | 12 | 6 |
| sports | 34 | 25 | 18 | 19 | 5 |
| military issues | 25 | 35 | 20 | 16 | 4 |
| crime | 28 | 35 | 20 | 12 | 4 |
| local politics | 31 | 31 | 20 | 15 | 3 |
| other | 1 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 83 |

| "very interested" | Nationality | | |
|-----------------------|-------------|------|-------|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| international affairs | 45 | 36 | 33 |
| domestic politics | 47 | 42 | 24 |
| art and culture | 28 | 17 | 39 |
| sport | 36 | 32 | 27 |
| military issues | 22 | 28 | 15 |
| crime | 28 | 30 | 12 |
| local politics | 31 | 33 | 12 |

Per cent.

Table A7. Opinion about the present mass media situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Q = The people here in Bosnia-Herzegovina may have different opinions about the **present media situation and media behaviour** in the country. What is your opinion on those matters? If you consider the **present** situation here in your community: do you **mainly agree** or **mainly disagree** with the following statements?

| | mainly agree | mainly disagree | don't know |
|---|--------------|-----------------|------------|
| free and independent newsmedia is a precondition for the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina | 69 | 11 | 21 |
| newsmedia does not report about unpleasant facts | 34 | 38 | 29 |
| journalists are controlled by media owners | 43 | 24 | 33 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina newsmedia is controlled by political leaders | 53 | 22 | 25 |
| you can always trust Bosnia-Herzegovina newsmedia | 19 | 54 | 27 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina newsmedia is partial and in favour of certain interests | 50 | 22 | 28 |
| newsmedia mostly publish objective information | 23 | 46 | 31 |
| newsmedia perform as propaganda tools for our political leaders | 55 | 19 | 26 |
| newsmedia should be controlled in order to establish a peaceful development of Bosnia-Herzegovina | 49 | 21 | 30 |

| "mainly agree" | Nationality | | |
|---|-------------|------|-------|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| free and independent news media... | 81 | 57 | 67 |
| news media does not report... | 39 | 30 | 27 |
| journalists are controlled... | 39 | 48 | 39 |
| news media is controlled... | 35 | 72 | 46 |
| you can always trust... | 34 | 6 | 6 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina news media is partial... | 32 | 68 | 52 |
| news media mostly publish... | 38 | 9 | 18 |
| news media perform as propaganda... | 36 | 74 | 55 |
| news media should be controlled... | 55 | 40 | 67 |

Per cent.

Table A8. Listening to radio newsQ = Do you usually **listen to radio news** programmes?

yes 87%
no 13%

Q = How **often** do you usually listen to **the news** on the Radio ...

| radio-stations | most often | every day | every second day | more seldom | never |
|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|------------------|-------------|-------|
| Hrvatski radio | 1 | 2 | 3 | 21 | 73 |
| Radio Bosna and Herzegovina | 34 | 9 | 6 | 19 | 32 |
| Radio Doboj | 10 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 66 |
| Radio Ozren | 1 | 3 | 4 | 9 | 83 |
| Radio Džungla | 14 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 65 |
| Radio Doboj East | 6 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 88 |
| Radio Gračanica | 9 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 74 |
| Radio Jelah | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 88 |
| Radio Gradačac | 3 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 85 |
| Radio Lukavac | 3 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 83 |
| Radio ZOS | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 96 |
| Radio Tešanj | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 91 |
| Radio Maglaj | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 95 |
| Radio Usora | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 94 |
| Radio Zavidovići | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 96 |
| Radio Zepče | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 94 |
| Radio Sr. Brod | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 96 |
| Radio Šamac | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 94 |
| Radio Modriča | 0 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 88 |
| Srpski radio | 27 | 13 | 3 | 5 | 53 |
| other radio | 27 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 62 |

| "most often" by 5% or more | Nationality | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|------|-------|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| Radio Bosna and Hercegovina | 67 | 3 | 23 |
| Radio Doboj | 3 | 18 | 4 |
| Radio Džungla | 1 | 26 | 19 |
| Radio Doboj East | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Radio Gračanica | 19 | 0 | 0 |
| Serbian Radio | 0 | 52 | 31 |

Per cent among those who listen to radio news programmes. Several answers were possible.

Table A9. Reasons given for preference of radio stationsQ = Generally speaking – why do you **prefer** this/these radio station(s)?

| | Nationality | | | All |
|--|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| religious/cultural reasons | 13 | 27 | 12 | 20 |
| “best” (objective, impartial, truth) news | 56 | 23 | 39 | 39 |
| I put most trust in this/these station(s) | 52 | 50 | 31 | 50 |
| often dealing with matters that concerns me | 61 | 22 | 46 | 42 |
| the only one(s) available | 6 | 14 | 12 | 10 |
| best programmes (<i>other than</i> news programmes) | 46 | 16 | 15 | 30 |
| best music | 47 | 25 | 31 | 36 |
| most entertaining station | 36 | 19 | 12 | 27 |
| other reason(s) | | | | 2 |

Per cent among those who listen to radio news programmes. Several answers were possible.

Table A10. Radio habits during the dayQ = **When** do you usually listen to the radio broadcasts?

| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| all day | 40 |
| in the morning (–10 am) | 16 |
| during the day (10 am–2 pm) | 12 |
| in the afternoon (2 pm–6 pm) | 15 |
| in the evening (6 pm–10 pm) | 14 |
| at night (10 pm–) | 3 |

Per cent among those who listen to radio news programmes. See figure 1.

Table A11. TV habits

Q = If we turn over to television – Do you usually watch **news programmes** on TV?

yes 91%
no 9%

Q= How **often** do you usually to watch **the news** on ...

| TV stations | most often | every day | every second day | more seldom | never |
|----------------------|------------|-----------|------------------|-------------|-------|
| AMNA, Tešanj | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 98 |
| TV Lukavac | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 85 |
| TV Zavidovići | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 99 |
| TV Maglaj | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 99 |
| TV Zepče | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 98 |
| OBN | 6 | 6 | 8 | 17 | 63 |
| K3, Doboj (Prnjavor) | 4 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 82 |
| HRT | 9 | 24 | 8 | 17 | 42 |
| BIH TV | 44 | 23 | 5 | 11 | 17 |
| Serbian TV | 33 | 14 | 2 | 7 | 45 |
| RSTV | 12 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 76 |
| other TV | 33 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 50 |

| "most often" by 5% or more | Nationality | | |
|----------------------------|-------------|------|-------|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| TV Lukavac | 7 | 0 | 22 |
| OBN | 10 | 0 | 4 |
| K3, Doboj (Prnjavor) | 0 | 9 | 4 |
| HRT | 10 | 6 | 7 |
| BIH TV | 76 | 7 | 37 |
| Serbian TV | 2 | 70 | 11 |
| RSTV | 0 | 26 | 11 |

Percent among those who usually watch TV news programmes. Several answers were possible. See figure 1.

Table A12. Reasons given for preference of TV stationsQ = On the whole – why do you **prefer** this/these TV-station(s)?

| | Nationality | | | All |
|---|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| religious/cultural reasons | 16 | 16 | 19 | 16 |
| “best” (objective, impartial, truth) news | 60 | 19 | 48 | 42 |
| I put most trust in this/these station(s) | 54 | 59 | 22 | 55 |
| often dealing with matters that concerns me | 70 | 31 | 44 | 52 |
| the only one(s) available | 11 | 24 | 15 | 17 |
| best programmes (<i>other than</i> news programme) | 60 | 23 | 44 | 43 |
| best music | 26 | 6 | 15 | 16 |
| most entertaining station | 24 | 7 | 7 | 15 |
| other reason(s) | | | | 2 |

Per cent among those who usually watch TV news programmes. Several answers were possible.

Table A13. TV-habits during the dayQ = **When** do you usually watch TV?

| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| all day | 7 |
| in the morning (–10 am) | 0 |
| during the day (10 am–2 pm) | 2 |
| in the afternoon (2 pm–6 pm) | 5 |
| in the evening (6 pm–10 pm) | 80 |
| at night (10 pm–) | 6 |

Per cent among those who usually watch TV news programmes.

Table A14. Printed news media habits

Q = How about **newspapers and magazines**? Do you **read** newspapers or magazines?

yes 40%

no 60%

Q = How **often** do you usually read ...

| newspaper/magazine | most often | every day | every second day | more seldom | never |
|--------------------|------------|-----------|------------------|-------------|-------|
| Dnevni avaz | 23 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 63 |
| Oslobodjenje | 4 | 2 | 2 | 18 | 74 |
| Većernje novine | 12 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 72 |
| Dobojske novine | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 99 |
| Tešnjak | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Većernji list | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 99 |
| Slobodna BiH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 97 |
| Dani | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 93 |
| Ljiljan | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 95 |
| Slobodna Bosna | 10 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 79 |
| Hrvatska riječ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 99 |
| Globus | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 98 |
| Nacional | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Feral Tribune | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Glas srpski | 15 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 77 |
| Nezavisne novine | 5 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 80 |
| Većernje novosti | 15 | 6 | 4 | 11 | 64 |
| Blic | 7 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 75 |
| Politika | 6 | 0 | 2 | 16 | 76 |
| Politika express | 2 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 85 |
| Svitanja | 3 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 89 |
| Nova Alternativa | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 93 |
| Reporter | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 91 |
| Prst | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 92 |
| Banjalučke novine | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 92 |
| Extra magazin | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 91 |
| Panorama | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 94 |
| NIN | 2 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 89 |
| Vreme | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 97 |
| Argument | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 95 |
| Telegraf | 10 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 80 |
| other newspaper | 9 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 87 |

Table A14. Printed news media habits (continued)

| "most often" by 5% or more | Nationality | | |
|----------------------------|-------------|------|-------|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| Dnevni avaz | 56 | 0 | 0 |
| Večernje novine | 22 | 4 | 8 |
| Slobodna Bosna | 20 | 2 | 15 |
| Glas srpski | 0 | 28 | 0 |
| Nezavisne novine | 0 | 9 | 0 |
| Večernje novosti | 0 | 28 | 8 |
| Blic | 1 | 12 | 0 |
| Politika | 0 | 9 | 8 |
| Telegraf | 1 | 15 | 23 |

Per cent among those who read newspapers/magazines. Several answers were possible.

Table A15. Reasons given for preference of newspapers and magazines

Q = Why do you **prefer** this/these paper(s)?

| | Nationality | | | All |
|---|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| religious/cultural reasons | 2 | 13 | 0 | 8 |
| "best" (objective, impartial, truth) news | 57 | 29 | 39 | 41 |
| I put most trust in that/these paper(s) | 32 | 33 | 8 | 32 |
| often dealing with matters that concerns me | 73 | 51 | 69 | 61 |
| cheapest | 4 | 3 | 8 | 3 |
| the only one(s) available | 11 | 3 | 8 | 7 |
| always read that/those paper(s) | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| best articles (content in general) | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| other reason(s) | | | | 3 |

Per cent among those who read newspapers/magazines. Several answers were possible.

Table A16. Trust in news media

Q = Say that something serious happened here in **your community** and you get **conflicting or different** information about the same event from your newspaper, radio and TV. Which of those do you **put most trust in**?

| | Nationality | | | All |
|--------------|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| newspaper(s) | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
| radio | 10 | 15 | 22 | 13 |
| TV | 78 | 50 | 58 | 63 |
| do not know | 9 | 31 | 18 | 20 |

Per cent.

Table A17. Knowledge about the work of SFOR and NORDPOL

Q = SFOR and NORDPOL have been around for some time now here in your community. How much do you know **about the work** of SFOR and NORDPOL? Please rate on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means "I am not informed" and 5 means "I am very well informed".

| | Nationality | | | All |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| not informed | 9 | 55 | 24 | 32 |
| somewhat not informed | 22 | 20 | 18 | 21 |
| not informed neither not informed | 38 | 21 | 24 | 29 |
| somewhat informed | 22 | 3 | 27 | 14 |
| very well informed | 9 | 1 | 6 | 5 |

Per cent.

Table A18. Sources of information about SFOR and NORDPOL

Q = People in your community get information about SFOR and NORDPOL from different sources. If you want to **inform yourself on the work of SFOR and NORDPOL** which are the most important sources of information?

| | Nationality | | | All |
|---|-------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | |
| not interested, want no information | 75 | 26 | 27 | 50 |
| national radio broadcast | 65 | 31 | 36 | 47 |
| local radio broadcast | 80 | 26 | 33 | 51 |
| national TV | 68 | 4 | 15 | 35 |
| local TV | 24 | 12 | 9 | 18 |
| national newspaper(s) and magazine(s) | 16 | 4 | 9 | 10 |
| local newspaper(s) and magazine(s) | 28 | 35 | 15 | 30 |
| relatives, friends, neighbours (personal communication) | 9 | 13 | 3 | 11 |
| representatives of political parties/unions | 15 | 11 | 3 | 12 |
| military sources | 26 | 3 | 21 | 15 |
| international media (press, radio, TV, Internet) | 25 | 7 | 18 | 16 |
| international organisations (Red Cross, OSCE, EU, UN, NATO) | 19 | 8 | 21 | 14 |
| brochures | 24 | 4 | 30 | 15 |
| posters | 10 | 1 | 3 | 6 |
| visit camp(s) | 9 | 1 | 0 | 5 |
| other sources | 6 | 51 | 24 | 28 |

Per cent among those who want information. Several answers were possible.

Table A19. Heard of and believe in rumours about the international forces' activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Q = In recent years all sorts of information – including rumours, hearsay – were circulated around about the international forces' activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, and besides that information about the Nordic-Polish Brigade activity here in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Have you **heard** the information and did you **believe it**?

| | Heard it and I believed it entirely | Heard it and I believed it partly | Heard it and I didn't believe it | I have not heard it | Don't recall |
|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Statement 1: <i>In 1995, radioactive bombs and bullets were used during NATO air strikes on "Republika Srpska Army" positions</i> | 33 | 11 | 33 | 19 | 4 |
| Statement 2: <i>.... and this has caused an environmental problem</i> | 33 | 11 | 32 | 20 | 4 |
| Statement 3: <i>NordPol Brigade harass local populace and conduct illegal house searches for weapons</i> | 23 | 14 | 33 | 26 | 4 |
| Statement 4: <i>The members of NordPol Brigade deliberately scare children during the house searching by pointing the weapons at them and their parents</i> | 12 | 13 | 39 | 33 | 3 |
| Statement 5: <i>The reflectors that SFOR uses and hand out to facilitate the road traffic during the night are radioactive</i> | 7 | 10 | 39 | 40 | 4 |

| believed entirely | Nationality | | |
|-------------------|-------------|------|-------|
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| Statement 1 | 3 | 63 | 24 |
| Statement 2 | 4 | 63 | 24 |
| Statement 3 | 2 | 46 | 9 |
| Statement 4 | 1 | 24 | 3 |
| Statement 5 | 2 | 12 | 0 |

Per cent among those who heard and believed information entirely.

Table A20. Opinions about the importance of different tasks of SFOR

Q = The units of SFOR have broad responsibilities and a numerous tasks here in Bosnia-Herzegovina **today**. Look at the list and tell us, which of them, *if any*, you personally consider **important and which you consider as less important?**

| | important | less important | don't know |
|---|-----------|----------------|------------|
| Monitoring EAF (Entity Armed Forces) mine-lifting/clearing operations | 66 | 14 | 20 |
| Assist and train Entity armed forces in mine-clearing operations | 69 | 13 | 18 |
| Confiscating weapons | 57 | 22 | 21 |
| Monitoring the ZOS (zone of separation) | 69 | 14 | 17 |
| Conduct weapon storage site inspections | 48 | 31 | 21 |
| Apprehend indicted war criminals | 54 | 25 | 21 |
| Providing humanitarian assistance | 55 | 27 | 18 |
| Monitoring of the entities' armies training and movement activities | 51 | 27 | 22 |
| Providing medical assistance | 50 | 30 | 20 |
| Maintaining a safe and secure environment | 56 | 22 | 22 |

| task | important | | | don't know | | |
|--|-------------|------|-------|-------------|------|-------|
| | Nationality | | | Nationality | | |
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| Monitoring EAF (Entity Armed Forces)mine lifting/clearing operations | 95 | 39 | 61 | 1 | 40 | 15 |
| Assist and train Entity Armed Forces in mine clearing operations | 91 | 47 | 72 | 1 | 36 | 15 |
| Confiscating weapons | 91 | 21 | 67 | 3 | 40 | 18 |
| Monitoring the ZOS (zone of separation) | 92 | 46 | 70 | 2 | 32 | 18 |
| Conduct weapon storage site inspections | 85 | 12 | 42 | 1 | 41 | 18 |
| Apprehend indicted war criminals | 96 | 9 | 70 | 1 | 42 | 15 |
| Providing humanitarian assistance | 80 | 31 | 49 | 1 | 35 | 15 |
| Monitoring of the entities' armies training and movement activities | 83 | 20 | 52 | 4 | 42 | 15 |
| Providing medical assistance | 74 | 25 | 49 | 3 | 38 | 15 |
| Maintaining a safe and secure environment | 86 | 25 | 64 | 4 | 40 | 15 |

Per cent. Those who claim task 'important' or 'don't know' by nationality.

Table A21. Opinion about peace support of SFOR and NordPol Brigade

Q = Look at the following statements and tell us, how strongly you agree or disagree with each of them

| | strongly agree | somewhat agree | somewhat disagree | strongly disagree | don't know |
|--|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------|
| It is safe to live in the NordPol Brigade area of responsibility | 36 | 27 | 7 | 13 | 17 |
| NordPol Brigade established a good co-operation with local population | 33 | 25 | 7 | 12 | 23 |
| The security in this area will diminish after the withdrawal of NordPol Brigade | 29 | 27 | 10 | 14 | 20 |
| NordPol Brigade tries to establish equal relations with all ethnic communities | 31 | 20 | 9 | 16 | 24 |
| NordPol Brigade established a good co-operation with local authorities | 31 | 23 | 6 | 14 | 26 |
| The number of SFOR personnel in B-H should be enlarged | 14 | 19 | 14 | 26 | 27 |
| The withdrawal of SFOR would lead to a renewal of a conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina | 32 | 28 | 8 | 14 | 18 |

| statement | strongly agree | | | don't know | | |
|--|----------------|------|-------|-------------|------|-------|
| | Nationality | | | Nationality | | |
| | Bosniac | Serb | Croat | Bosniac | Serb | Croat |
| It is safe to live in the Nord Pol Brigade area of responsibility | 63 | 10 | 36 | 4 | 31 | 9 |
| Nord Pol Brigade has established good cooperation with local population | 61 | 6 | 33 | 5 | 41 | 21 |
| The security in this area will diminish after the withdrawal of NordPol Brigade | 51 | 8 | 30 | 6 | 39 | 15 |
| Nord Pol Brigade tries to establish equal relations with all ethnic communities | 58 | 3 | 39 | 7 | 42 | 18 |
| Nord Pol Brigade established a good cooperation with local authorities | 59 | 3 | 36 | 9 | 46 | 15 |
| The number of SFOR personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be enlarged | 28 | 1 | 6 | 12 | 41 | 24 |
| The withdrawal of SFOR would lead to a renewal of a conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina | 55 | 8 | 49 | 4 | 31 | 24 |

Per cent. Those who 'strongly agree' with statements or 'don't know'.

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PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

The key subject of the research presented here is the relationship between different actors in the peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The images of these actors in different local mass media are analysed. The assumption for the research was that mass media do influence popular opinions on the situation. Mass media can in fact play a substantial role in creating a climate for sustainable peace. Therefore the attitudes of people with different ethnical background from the region of Doboj are analysed. The research shows that three different mass media systems operate in the country thus creating three different “realities” on the situation in general and on the peace support operation in particular. These mass media systems are to a great extent controlled by national political parties.

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